



## U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center

Historical Services Division



# Learning the Lessons of Lethality: The Army's Cycle of Basic Combat Training, 1918-2019

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**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

“The primary job of the rifleman is not to gain fire superiority over the enemy, but to kill with accurate, aimed fire.”<sup>1</sup>

Army Chief of Staff GEN J. Lawton Collins  
circa 1953

This study analyzes the initial entry training programs for Army inductees for the last 100 years, to identify the patterns that have shaped that training. Technology has changed over the years, and training has adapted, but technological change has been a less important factor than the oscillation between wartime and peacetime methodologies. Changes in technology have not changed the core functions in which the Army trains its new Soldiers: lethality and survivability. The unvarying trend for the last century shows an increase in lethality and survivability skills after the nation enters combat, often learning harsh lessons. As soon as the conflict ends, however, the training emphasis reflexively moves back toward garrison-type activities. The length of initial entry or Basic Combat Training (BCT) has also waxed and waned over the years, ranging from as long as 17 weeks (1943) (not including OSUT) to as short as 8 weeks (1980). There were always external factors that affected the amount of training time available, such as budgets, force structure, institutional infrastructure, and end strength. This study focuses largely, however, on how the Army used the time allotted. The analysis focuses primarily on infantry skills, but also examines other training where necessary for clarity. (Non-infantry, especially sustainment MOSs, have traditionally received less marksmanship training.) The unifying concept is that all initial entry training categories have remained the same for Soldiers throughout the period, while time spent on each category has fluctuated. Soldiers received different training in specialties.

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted in Howard H. McFann, John A. Hammes, and John E. Taylor, HumRRO Technical Report 22, *TRAINFIRE I: A New Course in Basic Rifle Marksmanship* (Washington, D.C.: Human Resources Research Office, George Washington University, October 1955), 5.

This study examines the last century using four eras. It opens with an examination of World Wars and Mass Armies, during which the United States (U.S.) Army rapidly mobilized to meet requirements on a global scale. During World War I, the requirement to produce millions of Soldiers in a very short period of time, with little infrastructure to do so, produced a training process that was better termed mobilization than training. The doughboys who went to France in 1917 and 1918 were enthusiastic, but most had training little better than their grandfathers during the American Civil War. The urgency of deploying American Soldiers to Europe to bolster the Allied cause necessarily truncated the training process in the U.S., but required the Army to develop a second training program for units once they reached France. The U.S. Army relied heavily on its French and British allies for technical training, both in the States and overseas.

The harsh experience of developing that training process under emergency conditions drove the War Department to create better plans for mobilizing a large army. The U.S. entered World War II somewhat better prepared than in 1917. The Regular Army remained small, but the mobilization of National Guard units had swelled the ranks just before the war. The officers who would be the senior leaders of World War II had been junior officers in World War I, and they understood the scope of what was needed to create and train a large Army. The scale of that undertaking, however, dwarfed its predecessor. Raising an Army that would eventually total over 8,000,000 men included a variety of challenges such as finding the necessary training land; building bases to support large numbers of troops; retooling the industrial base to clothe, arm, feed, and equip those Soldiers; and developing new technologies to defeat sophisticated enemies in multiple theaters around the world. These challenges are beyond the scope of this study, but all of them affected training that the Army provided to its troops. The Army's short experience in World War I had allowed no time for adjustments to the training plan to account for combat experience. During World War II, however, senior commanders kept a weather eye on Soldier and unit performance, and by 1943 harsh experience had dictated changes to the training plan. The Army has always been a learning organization, but sometimes it has failed to adapt its training quickly enough to be effective in the current period of combat.

The second section of the study examines Limited Wars and Conscript Armies and also evaluates S.L.A. Marshall's influences on Army training after his World War II and Korean War studies. The war in Korea provides a cautionary tale for today's Army leaders. The years following World War II had been marked by a large, rapid demobilization; reduced and momentarily halted draft calls; drastically reduced budgets, with accompanying shrinking force structure; and a wide-ranging restructuring of the defense establishment that fundamentally affected the Army. The period also saw a European-focused national strategy that reduced Asia and the Pacific to secondary importance. When war came to Korea and the U.S. committed troops, the Army was ill-prepared in any way for such a large and rapid commitment. The troops had been inadequately trained. Faced once again with the urgency of deploying large numbers of troops quickly, there was no time to retool the training process.

The end of that war and rapid demobilization inaugurated a “boom and bust” cycle for training time: post-war training schedules emphasized administrative and garrison activities, until war then forced a refocus on lethality and combat training. Analysis of basic training manuals in the years preceding both the Korean and Vietnam Wars reveals movement away from combat-related training (marksmanship, tactical training, etc.), and more time allocated to non-tactical tasks such as drill and ceremonies, inspections, and guard duty. More than 40 percent of a new recruit’s training in 1964 centered on drill and ceremonies, inspections, and administrative requirements. Combat training hours (basic rifle marksmanship, chemical defense, individual tactical training) received reduced attention. When conventional American forces landed in Vietnam in 1965, some U.S. commanders, such as MG William DePuy, commander of the 1st Infantry Division, complained about the training level of new Soldiers. The “Big Red One” created a unit training program to acclimatize new troops to the operating environment and learn tactics relevant to combat operations.<sup>2</sup>

The third section, *Building a Professional Army*, examines the Army’s shift from a conscript-based force to an All-Volunteer Force (AVF) after the Vietnam War. Recognizing the need to provide a centralized, organizational focus on training, the Army created Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1973 to manage Army training and all units based in the Continental United States. TRADOC developers began developing new curricula for recruit training, experimenting with methods of increasing training efficiency to get qualified Soldiers to units faster. They also introduced new classes on race and drug abuse to address problems that had surfaced during the Vietnam War. In 1977, the Army officially adopted One Station Unit Training (OSUT), initially for Armor and Infantry Soldiers. OSUT combined the BCT with branch-specific Advanced Individual Training (AIT). The Military Police and Engineer schools later adopted the OSUT model.<sup>3</sup>

The final section studies the Long War. The events of 9/11 fundamentally changed how the Army operates and how it trains. The professional Army that developed over the two decades 1980s to 1990s has now been at war for nearly two decades more. While that long period of conflict has affected retention, resilience, equipment maintenance, unit training, and countless other aspects of the Army in negative ways, it has also affected basic combat training in mostly positive ways. The development of a fully professional army hinged on making it a “thinking” force: self-aware enough to identify its own shortcomings and training, and agile enough to do so in time make a difference in current combat operations.

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<sup>2</sup> Romie L. Brownlee and William J. Mullen III, *Changing An Army: An Oral History of General William E. DePuy, USA Retired* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Military History Institute, 1979), 140.

<sup>3</sup> Conrad C. Crane, Michael E. Lynch, and Shane P. Reilly, “Changing the Institutional Army: 1962-2018” (case study, Historical Services Division, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, 2018), 15.

After steady increases in lethality training beginning in 2000, that training again suffered a post-war dip in 2015. The increase in 2019 will bring the largest peacetime increase in lethality training since 1980. The previous example of post-war increases in lethality began in 1954, and the changes in training for the next 10 years were firmly grounded in the concept of increasing quality based on evidence collected during the Korean War. The changes proposed for 2019 also reflect changing quality. Adjusting training during peacetime allows the luxury of focusing on quality as well as quantity. The previous time increases in lethality training were driven largely by necessity and the need to move large numbers of troops through quickly, which forced the Army to focus more on the quantity of training rather than the quality. The changes beginning in 1954 were the Army's first attempt to address a quality training peacetime environment.

This study concludes with some trend analysis using the century as a whole, and provides some observations for the future. The last century had seen numerous changes in training techniques and philosophy. In 1918, the Army's mission was to mobilize as many "citizen Soldiers" as possible as quickly as possible, and many of them deployed with only rudimentary training. A century later, the system focuses on producing "Soldier citizens" who are highly trained in both lethal and cultural skills. The Army announced in 2018 a four-week pilot extension of Infantry OSUT, scheduled to begin in 2019. This marks the Army's most recent change to recruit training. The month-long extension will provide additional time for tactical training, which historical analysis has shown was critical to Soldier survivability and success on the battlefield. The nature of training and the weapons used has changed over the last century, but experience has shown that whenever the Army reduces its training on essential combat tasks such as Basic Rifle Marksmanship, it does so at a cost. Every move away from those tasks has later required greater emphasis on it. The current extension of OSUT indicates the Army's recognition of the need to continue that combat focused training.

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
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## Note on Methods

This study examines four eras from 1918 to the present. Training programs since that time have been modified to fit operational and technological requirements. Comparing contemporary training plans to previous versions reveals trends that are remarkably similar over time. One trend, an emphasis or a de-emphasis on lethality training, varies only in degree after each conflict. Each period examined includes an analysis of the factors affecting initial entry training in both narrative and the tabular form. Each table uses the same training tasks, using their modern or generic terminology. The glossary at App. 1 lists changes to some of that terminology over the years. The tables were limited to the most notable or important training tasks, with the rest summarized as other training.

The first table, 1918, provides the base case. The remainder of the tables compare the current training plan to the previous training plan. The sample chart below (Fig. 1) explains how each of the following charts is organized:

*Figure 1: Sample Basic Training Comparison Chart*




Within each basic training table, the training time is divided among four training categories: Garrison, Individual Soldier Skills, Lethality, and Collective. The data for the last 100 years indicates that the percentage of time dedicated to lethality skills has fluctuated between wartime and peacetime (see Fig. 2). Typically, during periods of peace, the time allotted for lethality training dropped, while garrison training increased. This often led to high initial casualties in the next conflict, after which the Army adjusted training time to provide more and better training. One might wonder precisely how much of an impact training had on combat casualties. It is difficult to make direct correlations between casualties and training at a macro level. The combat conditions vary too



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widely, and the effect of training time changes were difficult to immediately measure accurately. It is easier to correlate poor or ineffective training to high casualties than it is to correlate improved training to reduced casualties. Where possible, this study relies upon contemporary studies conducted during and after wars, and on commander's surveys and input.

*Figure 2: Basic Combat Training by Category Organized by Time Period*



The data sets in this analysis were chosen to illustrate the specific periods but are not the only sets available. With 1918 as the base case, each successive data set was chosen to illustrate specific changes that are either indicated by specific evidence or inferred by indirect evidence.

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## I. World Wars and Mass Armies

“Time was important, but proficiency was the most important factor in all training.”<sup>4</sup>  
Training Circular No. 5, *Infantry Training*  
August 1918

### **World War I**

World War I marked the Army’s first attempt at systematic individual Soldier training, but the requirement to organize divisions while building training bases impeded the units’ ability to train. When the U.S. declared war on Germany in April 1917, the U.S. Army consisted of 127,588 troops scattered in small garrisons across the country. In order to raise a mass Army to fight a war on a European scale, the Army created its first system of centralized individual basic combat training. There was, however, no centralized training headquarters or organization. The system based all training at the regimental level, with the division commander responsible for all combat training preparation. The training program for divisions preparing to go to France in 1918 was more mobilization than training. Drafted men went directly to regiments, which provided rudimentary training to familiarize Soldiers with military discipline and operations. The Army provided overall training guidance for the divisions, with training topics and prescribed hours for each.<sup>5</sup>

The initial mobilization plan called for a three-brigade division totaling some 25,000 troops, but the urgency of getting troops overseas quickly forced the Army to change the plan and activate only two brigades (two regiments each) per division. Regiments consisted of three battalions (three companies each) of 1,000 Soldiers each. With headquarters, supply, medical, ordnance, and weapons companies, the regiment totaled 3,832 Soldiers. In order to create new units quickly, existing regiments were split for new “cadre” regiments. All of this reorganization, including absorption of existing National Guard units as well as new recruits and inductees, occurred while the regiments were attempting to train their Soldiers.<sup>6</sup>

The 16-week basic training plan directed a total of 624 hours divided into four, four-week phases. The first three phases focused on individual Soldier skills and weapons training, while the final phase focused on collective combined arms and

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<sup>4</sup> War Department, Training Circular No. 5, *Infantry Training*, 1918, 9.

<sup>5</sup> Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945*, Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-212 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), 221.

<sup>6</sup> Historical Division, Department of the Army, *United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919: Organization of the American Expeditionary Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), 342-44, Tables 2, 4; Douglas V. Johnson II and Rolfe L. Hillman Jr., *Soissons, 1918* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1999), 19-23.

maneuver training. This established a pattern that has remained in place in slightly altered form to the present.

The lessons the Army learned from creating a large mass Army from scratch were reflected in the training plan finalized in August 1918 (see Table 1). This table (and others to follow) analyzes the basic Soldier skills taught in every basic training era, grouped into four categories: Garrison Training, Individual Soldier Training, Lethality Training, and Collective Training. With units already deploying, the War Department developed an infantry training program based on the skills it needed Soldiers to have before deployment. Garrison tasks consumed 32 percent of the time allotted for training, the largest portion of which was dedicated to drill and ceremonies at platoon, company, and battalion level. This did not indicate an overemphasis on spit and polish, but rather reflects the need to inculcate a culture of discipline and working together in a large mass of individual draftees with no background in either military or team activities. To amplify this, nearly 40 percent of the training was spent in combined training, maneuver, and open and trench warfare. The emphasis at the time was clearly more on collective training than individual training. Small pre-war budgets and lack of equipment also affected training, as target practice and musketry (Basic Rifle Marksmanship) received only 13 percent of the time allotted.<sup>7</sup>

The training program required a much more structured program than many of the divisions were able to execute. For instance, the 4th Division was activated on December 3, 1917, at Camp Greene, North Carolina, outside Charlotte. No part of the division was then at Camp Greene. MG George H. Cameron arrived from California a week later. The four infantry battalions came from camps in Gettysburg and Syracuse to form the division. While artillery and engineer units were generally at full strength with volunteers, the infantry units were greatly understrength, with no rifle company having more than 40 men. In January 1918, the War Department directed that all new volunteers be sent to the 4th Division until it was filled.<sup>8</sup>

Arriving at Camp Greene during the worst winter in memory, the 4th Division was confronted with rain, cold, snow, and impassable mud. The men were only able to train outside for 16 days total during December, January, and February. The division used the time for indoor lectures and training given by British and French officers, all of whom had extensive combat experience. These officers taught the American officers and NCOs, who then taught the Soldiers.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> War Department, Training Circular No. 5, *Infantry Training*, 1918, 19-22.

<sup>8</sup> Christian A. Bach and Henry Nobel Hall, *The 4th Division: Its Services and Achievements in The World War*, (n.p.: Headquarters, 4th Division, 1920), 17-21.

<sup>9</sup> Bach and Hall, 21-26. The 4th Engineer Regiment taught field fortifications to the men of the infantry. The muddy conditions made any kind of drill difficult.

Instilling the killer instinct also proved difficult. The division Chief of Staff, COL Christian A. Bach, summed up the problem:

Many of the men drafted had never struck a blow in anger in their lives. The bayonet instilled a fighting spirit and gave them individual aggressiveness, but it was never really popular. The rifle was the national arm of the American people, and they do not take kindly to the use of cutting or thrusting weapons. But, although the men of the 4th Division had few occasions to use their bayonets in hand-to-hand fighting, the training received was of real value and had a distinct psychological effect.<sup>10</sup>

Improving weather conditions in mid-March enabled the division to conduct intensive training for some five weeks, but the unit began moving by train to Camp Mills, New York, for embarkation on April 21, 1918. The rush to get to Europe, however, forced some units to deploy even before they had done any weapons training. The 39th Infantry Regiment, and one battalion of the 58th Infantry Regiment, for instance, were not able to conduct any target practice before deployment.<sup>11</sup>

The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) relied on additional combat training from the more experienced British and French armies before troops were committed to combat. The AEF General Headquarters (GHQ) established a collaborative training plan with British and French commands for newly arrived American divisions. The three-phase, 90-day process was designed to reinforce basic Soldier skills, acclimatize units to combat conditions, and prepare American divisions for replacing worn out Allied units at the front. The first phase included training on new weapons systems (37 mm gun, mortars, machine guns, etc.) and additional time for individual marksmanship.<sup>12</sup>

The 4th Division's 7th Brigade (consisting of the 39th and 47th Infantry Regiments) was attached to the 4th French Division on June 14, 1918, to complete training, including the long-delayed rifle marksmanship training for the 39th Infantry Regiment. Bach remembered, "These men had heard the thunder of the guns at the front but had never fired a rifle." The men also handled live grenades for the first time. The 4th Division moved into the line on July 14.<sup>13</sup>

After this additional specialized training, American units then went into the line with British and French units to acclimatize them to combat conditions. New regiments and companies, under veteran Anglo-French supervision, rotated in and out of active

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<sup>10</sup> Bach and Hall, 26-27.

<sup>11</sup> Bach and Hall, 27.

<sup>12</sup> The Society of the First Division, *History of the First Division during the World War, 1917-1919* (Philadelphia: The John C. Winston Company, 1922), 21-22.

<sup>13</sup> Bach and Hall, 58-59.

front line positions on ten-day tours during the second month. American troops defended against and conducted trench raids, familiarizing the men with combat conditions. By August 1918, the AEF was almost completely reliant on the Allies for this training. Many units did not have the opportunity to train for the full 90 days, because calls for immediate reinforcements from Allied commanders sent inexperienced and unprepared units into frontline positions against an experienced and determined enemy. The result was more than 300,000 casualties in 11 months of fighting.<sup>14</sup>

*Figure 3: Replacement Training Centers, World War I*

The Army began its initial foray into individual replacement training following the overseas deployment of its combat divisions in late spring 1918. Heavy combat losses required an individual replacement system to maintain the integrity of front line units. Depot staffs provided immunizations, medical examinations, job classification interviews, proficiency testing, and initial uniform issue to new recruits. The overworked and understaffed cadre had little time to conduct Soldier training other than rudimentary manual of arms drill and marching. The Army established fourteen Replacement Training Centers (RTCs) at camps vacated by deployed divisions in spring 1918. The hastily formed centers and training cadre required time to incorporate the systems and processes required for individual Soldier training. The centers were operating at full capacity by August 1918. The cadre created a 12-day training program for individual Soldier training and received augmentation from veteran officers and non-commissioned officers returning from France. New troops were assigned to a replacement battalion for additional training upon arrival in France. Replacement battalions emulated the French and British models and conducted training designed to reinforce basic Soldier skills and accustom green men to the operating environment.

Source: Leonard L. Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1954), 184-185, 227.

The Army's experience in World War I highlighted the need for a systematic training program that would give all Soldiers a basic level of combat training before deployment. Rushing Soldiers quickly to France gave hope to the Allies, but those Soldiers did not arrive fully trained. The additional training required when units arrived in France delayed entry in combat, but gave them the skills they needed.

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<sup>14</sup> The Society of the First Division, 21-22. Department of Defense, "Principal Wars in which the United States Participated - U.S. Military Personnel Serving and Casualties," Defense Casualty Analysis System, [https://dcas.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report\\_principal\\_wars.xhtml](https://dcas.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report_principal_wars.xhtml) (accessed November 13, 2018).

Table 1: Basic Combat Training Program, August 1918

Training Type	1918	
	16 weeks	
	Hours: 624	% Total
<b>Garrison Training</b>		
Administrative Processing/Orientation	30	7%
Drill and Ceremonies	120	19%
Proficiency Testing	12	2%
Inspections	0	0%
Intelligence Training	0	0%
Other Garrison Tasks	38	7%
<b>Garrison Total:</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>32%</b>
<b>Individual Soldier Skills</b>		
First Aid/Personal Hygiene/Sanitation	12	2%
Physical Training	36	6%
Marches and Bivouacs	12	2%
Basic Military Communications	0	0%
Defense against Chemical Attack	10	2%
Land Navigation and Map Reading	0	0%
Individual Tactical Training (Fieldcraft)	6	5%
<b>Individual Soldier Skills Total:</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>12%</b>
<b>Lethality</b>		
Bayonet Training	32	5%
Hand-to-Hand Combat (Combatives)	0	0%
Weapon Familiarization	4	1%
Hand Grenades	4	0%
Basic Rifle Marksmanship	78	13%
Other Lethality	0	1%
<b>Lethality Total:</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>19%</b>
<b>Collective Training</b>		
Rifle Squad, Platoon, and Company Tactics	38	2%
Combined Arms Training	156	25%
Night Operations	0	0%
Other (Collective Training):	36	4%
<b>Collective Training Total:</b>	<b>230</b>	<b>37%</b>
<b>Initial Soldier Training Totals</b>	<b>624</b>	<b>100%</b>

Adapted from: War Department, Training Circular No. 5, *Infantry Training*, 1918, 19-22. All percentages were rounded to the nearest whole number.



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## **Interwar**

After World War I training was decentralized. The 1921 training regulation specified, "Responsibility for training is a function of command, therefore it is the duty of each commander to furnish his subordinate commanders with a statement of the objects or standards to be attained and the time available for the purpose." Also, "Supervision, coordination, control of, and responsibility for the training of the Army is vested in the Chief of Staff, who exercises these functions through territorial commanders and the general service schools." During war, GHQ would apply lessons from the front to training. Regarding war time training, "Individuals and troops in full strength units will be turned over to G.H.Q., trained at least to the minimum standards. Thereafter, replacements to meet all demands that can be predicted, similarly trained, will be turned over upon requisition by G.H.Q." The fact that responsibility for training rested in the commander was reiterated later in the regulation and further spelled out: that "responsibility . . . extends to every individual and unit thereof," but the means of training was left up to subordinates, though results would be measured.<sup>15</sup>

In the 1928 regulation, training was still decentralized. After discussing decentralization, the regulation emphasized "progressive training," not just from basic to advanced, but "the training of a new unit is initiated by training the individual and thereafter training successively each subdivision of the unit from the smallest to the largest." Responsibility for training still rested with the Chief of Staff. Recruits were to be trained in Articles of War, regulations, orders, customs, physical fitness, hygiene, drill, guard duty, and more. During war, training would follow much the same guidelines, with some exceptions based on necessity. Training would not necessarily be as decentralized; "higher commanders" could propose adjustments to training topics and "central schools."<sup>16</sup>

The 1935 regulation still iterated the decentralized training, with a little more detail: Company commanders and higher conducted training to meet requirements. The higher commanders ensured compliance. As before, subordinate commanders had authority and responsibility within their commands. Progressive training was still stipulated as well and control still rested with the Chief of Staff. Recruits received the same training, and the same adjustments were to be made in wartime.<sup>17</sup>

The replacement system in place by World War II was designed to be an improvement over that of World War I. Replacement Training Centers were not reception centers, were separate from unit training, and existed in the services and arms. Soldiers would also be training in the appropriate branch specialties. "According

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<sup>15</sup> War Department, Training Regulation 10-5, *Doctrines, Principles, and Methods*, December 1921, 8-9, 11-12.

<sup>16</sup> War Department, TR 10-5, *Doctrines, Principles, and Methods*, August 1928, 5, 14.

<sup>17</sup> War Department, TR 10-5, *Doctrines, Principles, and Methods*, August 1935, 6, 11.

to the plan, replacements were to be trained in numbers proportionate to the requirements of mobilization and, later, to estimated rates of loss in battle.” Starting in March 1941, inductees trained at Replacement Training Centers. Graduates were sent to mobilized divisions and “other tactical units” and to new units. Tactical units then trained “teams up to the division level.” The War Department G-3 and LTG Lesley McNair (Chief of Staff, GHQ) both spoke favorably of the replacement training system in place. After Pearl Harbor, Chief of Staff GEN George C. Marshall did not want more replacement centers constructed, so divisions and most units received new individuals from reception centers. Therefore, it was back to uneven training, due to training being left up to units.<sup>18</sup>

## **World War II**

When the United States entered World War II, the nation again raised a large mass Army, but this time it had much more of the tradition and infrastructure in place. Chief of Staff GEN George C. Marshall and other Army senior leaders were determined to avoid the unpreparedness and hasty troop deployments that marked the First World War. Millions of draftees again arrived for military training, but this time the Army did not need to start cold. The War Department returned to a unit-based training plan, but this time made the division commander responsible to facilitate the training at regimental level and to certify its completion. The training plan developed in 1941 made many improvements over that of its predecessor, reflecting both advancing technology and the need for a structured plan. Early combat experience, however, revealed weaknesses in that plan as well. Forming divisions received priority for personnel manning, and division officers and NCOs formed the training cadres for new recruits. Select personnel from trained divisions then transferred to serve as cadre for recruits in the new formations.

## **World War II Mobilization**

During years before the war, the Army focused significant effort on developing mobilization plans. Not all of those plans worked, and many needed to be revised, but nevertheless the Army benefited from years of planning. The Regular U.S. Army in 1939 consisted of nine active divisions still in the World War I era “square” configuration (two maneuver brigades with two infantry regiments each), but all understrength (see Table 2). When Marshall became Army Chief of Staff on September 1, 1939, he immediately recommended to President Franklin D. Roosevelt that the Regular Army end strength be increased. The President balked, but agreed to moderately higher strengths of

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<sup>18</sup> Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1948), 170-72.

227,000 (17,000 additional troops) for the Regular Army and 235,000 (43,000 additional troops) for the National Guard.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization*, 554-55, 594-96. As the mobilization continued, political pressure began to build on the War Department to release Soldiers, especially the National Guard, from active duty. The war in Europe seemed to have hit a lull in fall and winter of 1940-41, and many legislators began to call for the Guard's release. Under pressure from isolationists, Roosevelt told Marshall to begin reducing the Army; only the attack on Pearl Harbor prevented the plans from being executed.

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Table 2: Pre-World War II Regular Army Divisional Strength

Division	Actual Strength	Peace Strength	War Strength	Peace Shortage	Units Short
1st Inf.	8,800	14,000	20,000	5,200	1 Inf. Bn., 8 FA Btrs., 12 Spec. Co.
2nd Inf.	10,000	14,000	20,000	4,000	6 FA Btrs, 13 Spec. Co.
3rd Inf.	8,500	14,000	20,000	5,500	1 Inf. Bn., 8 FA Btrs., 14 Spec. Co.
		14,000	20,000	9,600	4 Inf. Bn., 5 FA Btrs., 20 Spec. Co.
4th Inf.	4,400	14,000	20,000	10,200	6 Inf. Bn., 16 FA Btrs., 25 Spec. Co.
5th Inf.	3,800	14,000	20,000	10,600	6 Inf. Bn., 16 FA Btrs., 26 Spec. Co.
6th Inf.	3,400	14,000	20,000	10,500	7 Inf. Bn., 15 FA Btrs., 25 Spec. Co.
7th Inf.	3,500	14,000	20,000	9,800	8 Inf. Bn., 15 FA Btrs., 17 Spec. Co.
8th Inf.	4,200	14,000	20,000	11,500	7 Inf. Bn., 16 FA Btrs., 23 Spec. Co.
9th Inf.	2,500				
TOTAL	49,100	126,000	180,000	76,900	

Source: Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945*, Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-212 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), 550. The "Special Companies" consisted of the signal, tank, medical, ordnance, engineers, supply, and other support companies of the division base. Data as of February 2, 1939.

The war in Europe threatened to involve the United States by 1940, and the War Department began planning for possible mobilization. Given the training time required for reserve formations, President Roosevelt mobilized the eighteen National Guard divisions for one year beginning in September 1940, which arrived with personnel shortages. Congress also passed the Selective Service Act of 1940 in September, the first peacetime draft in the nation's history. By December 1941 the Army had mobilized

or activated thirty-six divisions in an effort to prepare for war, but filling and training those divisions and the ones to follow proved challenging.<sup>20</sup>

The World War II mobilization dwarfed its World War I predecessor. From October 1940 to December 1945, the Selective Service inducted 9.8 million men, of whom 8.1 million went to the Army. The draft calls were used to meter individuals into the Army at a steady rate, with the priority shifting between the Army Ground Forces (AGF), the Army Air Forces (AAF), and the Army Service Forces (ASF) according to requirements. In order to make the flow more predictable, President Roosevelt eliminated voluntary enlistment by Executive Order in December 1942 for men between 18 and 38. From that point on, all services got their personnel through induction. Army Service Forces operated all induction and reception stations. Inductees needed first to be medically screened and tested for aptitude, which eliminated a percentage of Soldiers. At the reception station, Soldiers were classified according to their scores on the Army General Classification Test (AGCT). Based on that classification and their physical abilities, they were then assigned to either a unit for training or a Replacement Training Center (RTC). Infantry Soldiers during the first part of the war went to divisions and completed all of their basic training with that division. As Soldiers dropped out for various reasons during training, the divisions continued to receive filler personnel from reception stations and RTCs. With divisions activating on a set schedule, large numbers of Soldiers could be identified and shipped together.<sup>21</sup>

After Pearl Harbor, the Army needed to field more divisions and other units than ever before and obtain millions of men to fill them. Feeding, clothing, housing, equipping, and training a mass army, while simultaneously establishing the infrastructure to support it, strained the War Department's capabilities. The War Department approached this enormous task as an engineering problem and developed a schedule that activated divisions at the rate of more than two per month, along with hundreds of support units. Under this schedule, the War Department activated thirty-

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
<sup>20</sup> Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, 434-35, 489-92. The War Department ordered those divisions to begin conversion to the new triangular configuration as well. All National Guard divisions had federalized by March 1941, but conversion of all the divisions consumed another year. The draft allowed the Army to fill losses as men classified critical to the war effort returned to their civilian jobs. Between June 1940 and June 1941, the National Guard lost over 91,000 enlisted Soldiers, released from active duty for either family dependency or defense-related jobs. See Michael D. Doubler, *I Am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636-2000*, Department of the Army Pamphlet 130-1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001), 197-98.

<sup>21</sup> Selective Service System, *Quotas, Calls, Inductions*, Special Monograph, no. 12, vol. 2, Appendices F-H (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), 29, Table 110; Bell I. Wiley, "The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions," in *United States Army in World War II. The Army Ground Forces: The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1991), 475. Command and General Staff College, *History of the Army Personnel Replacement System* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1948), 64.

eight new divisions in 1942 and seventeen more in 1943.<sup>22</sup>

To facilitate rapid Army expansion, the War Department designated each division as “parent” for one activating later. As new divisions mobilized, each parent division provided a “cadre” of 172 officers and 1,190 enlisted men (changed to 216 officers and 1,460 enlisted men in fall 1942) for a new division, no later than thirty days before the new activation (see Fig. 4). These losses came, on average, 6.5 months after the division activated, but some divisions experienced it much earlier. The 102nd Infantry Division, for example, activated in September 1942, but provided cadre to the 103rd Infantry Division in November 1942.<sup>23</sup>

Figure 4: Building an Infantry Division, 1942



Source: Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, *The Army Ground Forces: The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1948).

<sup>22</sup> Wiley, 434-35 (chart 1), 489-93; Shelby M. Stanton, *World War II Order of Battle, U.S. Army* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1984; reprint, Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2006), endpapers; Army Field Forces, memorandum from War Department to Each Officer Named, July 3, 1942, Subject: “Orders, July 3, 1942,” Record Group 337 (Headquarters, Army Field Forces), Box 107 (General Correspondence, 1942-1948), National Archives and Records Administration; John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1998), 171 (table 13), 192 (table 14).

<sup>23</sup> Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, 437-38; Stanton, endpapers.



When the units were finally full (a couple of weeks to a couple of months after activation), the divisions began individual training, followed by small unit training, large unit training, and finally combined arms training. The divisions faced many challenges to training. The 13-week (later 17-week) basic training schedule was a guideline, but it was often disrupted. In addition to cadre requirements, the divisions lost Soldiers to the AAF, to Officer Candidate School (OCS), and to the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP). The divisions also experienced difficulties when Soldiers failed to qualify at various stages in basic training and needed to repeat it. The division's 44-week training period, allowing for troop travel and other delays, was designed to be completed within one year. The division tested at each phase before moving to the next. The divisions lost personnel through the training process, and to fill levies for cadre for other divisions in addition to AAF, OCS, and ASTP. None of the newly activated divisions, however, completed training in under 18 months (see App. 2).<sup>24</sup>

The Army had learned some important lessons from World War I, which were reflected in the training plan that the Army used in 1941. The training plan dedicated the first 13 weeks of a 44-week division training plan with 572 training hours divided into three phases: basic (individual), technical (weapon operations), and tactical. The number of hours available for training was reduced from the 1918 training plan, but the new plan changed the training emphasis (see Table 3).

The program reduced by half the time allotted for garrison training from its World War I predecessor. For instance, time for drill and ceremonies dropped by two-thirds, from 120 hours to just 39, while the combination of administrative processing, orientation, and other garrison training decreased slightly. The new program dropped proficiency testing, but added inspections. The development of individual Soldier skills also saw reductions in some areas. Field sanitation and first aid training time was cut in half, but the individual tactical training used to build fieldcraft skills such as setting up tents, etc., saw a nearly eightfold increase. With the threat of gas attack seemingly less than during the First World War, the ten hours spent in chemical defense in 1918 were reduced to three by 1941. Physical training was slashed by 60 percent, averaging only one hour per week. Marches and bivouacs, however, increased by 40 percent. This reflected the need to provide Soldiers with toughening physical activities that would prepare them for the rigors of combat. Even as units were implementing this in training, however, units in combat were learning that this training would not be enough.<sup>25</sup>

The reductions in garrison training time allowed for a nearly 30 percent increase in training for Soldier lethality skills. Basic Rifle Marksmanship increased from 78 to 117 hours, 20 percent of the total training time available. Marksmanship training reflected

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<sup>24</sup> Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, 435, 442-48.

<sup>25</sup> The Geneva Protocol of June 17, 1925, banned the use of chemical weapons (but not stockpiling) by all the combatants of World War I. All combat nations signed the protocol but not all ratified it. Nevertheless, use of chemical weapons was extremely limited during World War II. The United States ratified the Geneva protocol in 1975.

warfare's evolving nature by requiring troops to fire at moving and aerial targets. Bayonet training was reduced by nearly one-third but grenade training quadrupled, reflecting the longer range of modern weapons. Small unit tactics training at company and below nearly tripled, and night operations were added. Combined arms training was slightly reduced, but this was probably due to the nature of the battalion and regimental training that followed basic training.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> War Department, Field Manual 21-5, *Basic Field Manual, Military Training*, 1941, 68-70.

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Table 3: Basic Combat Training Program Comparison, 1918 and 1941

Training Type	1918 16 weeks		1941 13 weeks		Hours/ % Trend
	Hours 624	% Total	Hours 572	% Total	
<b>Garrison Training</b>					
Administrative Processing/Orientation	30	7%	54.5	10%	▲/▲
Drill and Ceremonies	120	19%	39	7%	▼/▼
Proficiency Testing	12	2%	0	0%	▼/▼
Inspections	0	0%	13	2%	▲/▲
Intelligence Training	0	0%	0	0%	NC
Other Garrison Tasks	38	7%	3	1%	▼/▲
<b>Garrison Total:</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>32%</b>	<b>109.5</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>▼/▼</b>
<b>Individual Soldier Skills</b>					
First Aid/Personal Hygiene/Sanitation	12	2%	5.5	1%	▼/▼
Physical Training	36	6%	15	3%	▼/▼
Marches and Bivouacs	12	2%	17	3%	▲/▲
Basic Military Communications	0	0%	0	0%	NC
Defense against Chemical Attack	10	2%	3	1%	▼/▼
Land Navigation and Map Reading	0	0%	0	0%	NC
Individual Tactical Training (Fieldcraft)	6	5%	45	8%	▲/▲
<b>Individual Soldier Skills Total:</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>85.5</b>	<b>15%</b>	<b>▲/▲</b>
<b>Lethality</b>					
Bayonet Training	32	5%	20	3%	▼/▼
Hand-to-Hand Combat (Combatives)	0	0%	0	0%	NC
Weapon Familiarization	4	1%	0	0%	▲/NC
Hand Grenades	4	0%	16	3%	▲/▲
Basic Rifle Marksmanship	78	13%	117	20%	▲/▲
Other Lethality	0	1%	0	0%	▼/▼
<b>Lethality Total:</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>27%</b>	<b>▲/▲</b>
<b>Collective Training</b>					
Rifle Squad, Platoon, and Company Tactics	38	2%	102	18%	▲/▲
Combined Arms Training	156	25%	114	20%	▼/▼
Night Operations	0	0%	8	1%	▲/▲
Other (Collective Training):	36	4%	0	0%	▼/▼
<b>Collective Training Total:</b>	<b>230</b>	<b>37%</b>	<b>224</b>	<b>39%</b>	<b>▼/▼</b>
<b>Initial Soldier Training Totals</b>	<b>624</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>572</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>-8%/▼</b>

Adapted from: War Department, Training Circular No. 5, *Infantry Training*, 1918), 21-22; War Department, Field Manual 21-5, *Basic Field Manual, Military Training*, 1941, 68-70. All percentages were rounded to the nearest whole number.

The War Department modified tactical training in 1943 and incorporated classes on topics learned directly from combat experience. By 1943, however, the War

Department recognized the need to enhance individual training based on combat experience and on commanders' reports. This system prepared Soldiers better for frontline service than the World War I program had done for their predecessors. The new training program began in September 1943, seven months after the Army's defeat at Kasserine Pass, and introduced new tasks designed to enhance combat survivability. Basic training was lengthened to 17 weeks for the duration of the war, and the training performed within that time was greatly modified.

Under the 1943 training plan, garrison training increased slightly, but the components changed a great deal (see Table 4). Administrative processing and orientation time was reduced by more than two-thirds, while drill and ceremonies was reduced by one quarter. The plan recognized for the first time the need to qualify Soldiers rather than merely familiarize them, and introduced proficiency testing while increasing the number of inspections. The Army later credited this thorough and uniform proficiency testing for a decrease in the number of units reported "Not Ready."<sup>27</sup>

The time allotted for individual Soldier skills nearly doubled, with most of that time allotted for physical training and marches and bivouacs. Commanders realized that the reduction in physical training (PT) in 1941 had been a mistake, and increased it from one hour per week to four hours per week. Though not indicated separately on the table, PT also included hand-to-hand fighting and disarming tactics. The time spent on marching and bivouacs had increased in 1941, but the new 1943 plan doubled it again. These changes indicated a need to toughen Soldiers physically for the rigors ahead. The plan also included training on map reading and land navigation for all Soldiers; these had previously taught as technical training for select Soldiers.

The plan included a 40 percent increase in the amount of time Soldiers spent on Basic Rifle Marksmanship (from 117 hours to 164), consuming fully one quarter of the total training time. Bayonet training decreased slightly, but Soldiers also received familiarization on new weapons such as automatic rifles, machine guns, and carbines.

Other instructional topics included:

- Individual Tactical Training (36 hours)
- Anti-Tank and Anti-Personnel Mines (8)
- Motor Movement, Trucking, and De-Trucking (4)
- Identification of Friendly Aircraft (3)
- Identification of Friendly Armored Vehicles (2)

The training schedule reflected a shift in training philosophy, as collective training time was cut in half. Small unit training at company and below dropped by 35 percent (102 hours to 66), while collective training at battalion above was reduced by nearly 80 percent. This allowed trainers to focus the basic training time on individual skills and

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<sup>27</sup> Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, 540.

small unit tactics; Soldiers would receive ample opportunity for training with larger units and combined arms during the divisional training period after basic training. Training in night operations also doubled, reflecting the nature of combat conditions.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> War Department, Mobilization Training Program 7-1, *Individual Training Program, Individual Training for Infantry Regiment and Armored Infantry Regiment*, 1943, 23-24.

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Table 4: Basic Combat Training Program Comparison, 1941 and 1943

Training Type	1941 13 weeks		1943 17 weeks		Hours/ % Trend
	Hours: 572	% Total	Hours: 644	% Total	
<b>Garrison Training</b>					
Administrative Processing/Orientation	54.5	10%	33	5%	▼/▼
Drill and Ceremonies	39	7%	24	4%	▼/▼
Proficiency Testing	0	0%	44	7%	▲/▲
Inspections	13	2%	20	3%	▲/▲
Intelligence Training	0	0%	6	1%	▲/▲
Other (Garrison Tasks):	3	1%	0	0%	▼/▼
<b>Garrison Total:</b>	<b>109.5</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>▲/▲</b>
<b>Individual Soldier Skills</b>					
First Aid/Personal Hygiene/Sanitation	5.5	1%	17	3%	▲/▲
Physical Training	15	3%	40	6%	▲/▲
Marches and Bivouacs	17	3%	36	6%	▲/▲
Basic Military Communications	0	0%	0	0%	NC
Defense against Chemical Attack	3	1%	8	1%	▲/NC
Land Navigation and Map Reading	0	0%	8	1%	▲/▲
Individual Tactical Training (Fieldcraft)	45	8%	60	9%	▼/▼
<b>Individual Soldier Skills Total:</b>	<b>85.5</b>	<b>15%</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>26%</b>	<b>▲/▲</b>
<b>Lethality</b>					
Bayonet Training	20	3%	16	2%	▼/▼
Hand-to-Hand Combat (Combatives)	0	0%	0	0%	*
Weapon Familiarization	0	0%	46	7%	▲/▲
Hand Grenades	16	3%	8	1%	▼/▼
Basic Rifle Marksmanship	117	20%	164	25%	▲/▲
Other (Lethality):	0	0%	8	1%	▲/▲
<b>Lethality Total:</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>27%</b>	<b>242</b>	<b>38%</b>	<b>▲/▲</b>
<b>Collective Training</b>					
Rifle Squad, Platoon, and Company Tactics	102	18%	66	10%	▼/▼
Day and Night Patrolling, Scouting and Observing	8	1%	16	2%	▲/▲
Other (Collective Training):	114	20%	24	4%	▼/▼
<b>Collective Training Total:</b>	<b>224</b>	<b>39%</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>16%</b>	<b>▼/▼</b>
<b>Initial Soldier Training Totals</b>	<b>572</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>644</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>13%/▲</b>

Adapted from: War Department, Field Manual 21-5, *Basic Field Manual, Military Training*, 1941, 68-70; War Department, Mobilization Training Program 7-1, *Individual Training Program, Individual Training for Infantry Regiment and Armored Infantry Regiment*, 1943, 23-24. All percentages were rounded to the nearest whole number.



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## Replacement Training Centers

The Army Ground Forces (AGF), Army Air Forces (AAF), and Army Service Forces (ASF) each operated RTCs to conduct basic training for Soldiers assigned to those commands, but not assigned to units. Soldiers completed basic combat training using the current AGF training plan, and then completed advanced training for their air or service. The system was, in function, similar to today's OSUT and BCT/AIT. All Soldiers attended some form of basic training, including those selected for the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP). The RTCs are listed in App. 3.<sup>29</sup>

Planners anticipated heavy casualties, requiring a robust troop replacement system. AGF operated branch-specific Replacement Training Centers (RTC) to provide trained “fillers” for combat units. By 1941, the increased need for personnel in forming divisions justified the reduction of RTC training—with the exception of infantry, armor and signal MOS—for a brief period from thirteen to eight weeks. After the divisions began activating and taking some of the burden of the influx of inductees, the RTC training program adjusted to the AGF standard 13 weeks (later 17 weeks), for the remainder of the war. After the last division (65th Infantry) activated in 1943, RTCs focused on providing individual replacements to existing units.<sup>30</sup>

During the early part of the war, before 1943, the Replacement Training Centers were geared toward a specific specialty. Infantry, armor, tank destroyer, and all the service forces had replacement training centers. These did not replace basic training in divisions, they provided replacements after the divisions activated and deployed and also provided specialist training beyond basic training. They operated in conjunction with the service schools. For instance, the Infantry School at Fort Benning did not conduct basic training. It conducted specialist training and leadership training for NCOs and officers.

Some arms conducted their own basic training. For instance, the World War II infantry division had no organic armor. In addition to the armored divisions, which activated and trained together as did infantry divisions, the Army also used independent tank, tank destroyer, and artillery battalions. These also trained together as units. Each of the arms also operated RTCs such as Fort Knox, Kentucky (tanks), and Camp Hood, Texas (tank destroyers), to train individual replacements. Soldiers assigned to non-divisional artillery units trained at the Field Artillery School. In 1943 some Replacement

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<sup>29</sup> Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, 30-37; Emory R. Dunham, *The Army Ground Forces: Tank Destroyer History*, Study No. 29 (Washington, D.C.: Army Ground Forces, 1946), 95-108; The Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) selected enlistees with an AGCT (Army General Classification Test) score of 110 (later increased to 115) to attend college to study science, math, engineering, or a language. Candidates completed an eight-week basic training cycle at an RTC before reporting to college. The program began in 1942 and ended in February 1944 due to increased needs for replacements. Soldiers allotted to the AAF were classified for ground or air, and both received all basic training from the AAF schools.

<sup>30</sup> Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, 382.

Training Centers were converted to Branch Immaterial Replacement Training Centers (BIRTC), which conducted basic combat mission training replacements to be sent directly overseas. For service troops and other non-infantry Soldiers assigned to divisions, specialist training was completed at the end of basic training.<sup>31</sup>

The Army also expanded existing service schools to provide advanced training for both officers and enlisted personnel. All service school students completed either basic training in their assigned unit or graduated from an RTC prior to reporting for advanced training.<sup>32</sup>

### *SLAM Effect: S.L.A. Marshall's World War II Observations*

After World War II, noted journalist and historian COL S.L.A. Marshall published a book called *Men against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War*. Marshall had deployed into both the European and Pacific theaters during World War II as a combat historian, and published his controversial yet influential findings. Marshall explored unit performance through mass interviews with Soldiers that led him to several conclusions, the most controversial of which concerned the ratio of fire. He warned that only one quarter of Soldiers ever fired their weapons:

The 25 per cent estimate stands even for well-trained and campaign-seasoned troops. I mean that 75 percent will not fire or will not persistent in firing against the enemy and his works. These men may face the danger but they will not fight.<sup>33</sup>

Echoing what COL Christian A. Bach had discovered during World War I, Marshall also determined that Soldiers were not naturally predisposed to killing:

He is what his home, his religion, his schooling, and the moral code and ideals of the society of making. The Army cannot unmake him. In must reckon with the fact that he comes from a civilization in which aggression, connected with the taking of life, is prohibited and unacceptable. Teaching and ideals of that civilization are against killing, against taking advantage. . . . Fear of killing, rather than fear of being killed, was the most common cause of battle failure and individual, and the fear of failure ran a strong second.<sup>34</sup>

Marshall's findings outraged veterans who believed he was wrong, and infuriated historians who could find no hard evidence to support Marshall's claims other than his

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<sup>31</sup> Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, 377.

<sup>32</sup> Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, 249.

<sup>33</sup> S.L.A. Marshall, *Men against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War*, (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1947; reprint, Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1978), 50.

<sup>34</sup> S.L.A. Marshall, *Men against Fire*, 78.

own reports. Yet much of what Marshall had to say about leadership, training, and the effects of battle and fatigue were both intuitive and correct. The Army greeted his book enthusiastically, and began revising training programs to reflect some of his theoretical work on leadership findings. Those revisions reached the Army service schools in Command and General Staff College, while his thoughts about making training more realistic and combat-focused did not yet influence basic infantry training.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> F.D.G. Williams, *SLAM: The Influence of S.L.A. Marshall on the United States Army* (Fort Monroe, VA: Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1990), 51.

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## II. Limited Wars and Conscript Armies

### *Korean War*

The end of World War II brought a return to a peacetime training focus. The rapid postwar demobilization and reduced draft calls conflicted with the requirement for large numbers of occupation troops in Germany, Austria, Japan, and Korea. In an effort to get Soldiers to duty stations faster, the Army cut basic training to 8 weeks in 1948. The Army had created four "Training Divisions" to serve as training centers, but they only offered basic training. Advanced training became the unit commander's responsibility. In theory, this training philosophy prioritized the commander above all else, and rested on the assumption that no one can train troops as well as the commander. In practice, however, this training method simply shifted an undue burden to a commander who did not, in most cases, have the resources to conduct the necessary training. It also ignored the readiness component, because units with large numbers of inexperienced, undertrained Soldiers could not be combat ready. This training deficit became apparent during the Korean War, when undermanned, underequipped, and undertrained units were rushed to South Korea in response to the North Korean invasion. The 24th Infantry Division, for instance, reported only 54 percent of its pre-deployment strength as available after 17 days of continuous combat; losses included 2,400 men listed as missing.<sup>36</sup>

Responsibility for basic training lay with the new Office of the Chief, Army Field Forces (OCAFF), which replaced the Army Ground Forces in 1948. OCAFF managed the "general supervision, coordination, and inspection of all matters pertaining to the training of all individuals utilized in a field Army." The Army established six geographically-based, numbered Army HQs in CONUS responsible for almost all Army activities in these areas. The six continental U.S. Armies (CONUSAs) became MACOMs reporting directly to HQDA.<sup>37</sup>

After the wartime draft legislation expired in 1947, the Army's end strength dropped. The Selective Service Act of 1948 sent a new influx of inductees to the Army, however, and OCAFF quickly realized that the 8-week course was too short for effective learning, as the transition from civilian to military mindset consumed 2-3 weeks. This did not allow time for necessary repetition and retraining, and Soldiers usually needed retraining when they got to their units. OCAFF negotiated an increase to 13 weeks in

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<sup>36</sup> Thomas E. Hanson, *Combat Ready: The Eighth U.S. Army on the Eve of the Korean War* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2010), 30; Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1950), 59, 179-80. See also Leo Daugherty, "'Unpreparing for War,' U.S. Army Combat Training Doctrine, 1945-1949" (unpublished MS, 2015), 5 (pages unnumbered) and Wilson, 243-45.

<sup>37</sup> James T. Hewes Jr., *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), 214. See also Conrad C. Crane, Michael E. Lynch, Jessica J. Sheets, and Shane P. Reilly, "A Short History of Direct Reporting Units" (case study, Historical Services Division, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, 2018), 8.

late 1948, with one more week added in February 1949. OCAFF refocused initial training with an emphasis on “physical conditioning, discipline, pride, and the development of Soldierly qualities.” While this seemed laudable, a comparison of the training program published in 1949 to its World War II predecessor reveals a big shift away from Soldier lethality (see Table 5).<sup>38</sup>

The 1949 training schedule reflects the sharply decreased budgets in the years after World War II, as the time allowed for expensive combat training sharply decreased, while the relatively inexpensive garrison training increased. With no immediate threat of war, the post-World War II training plans reduced the amount of combat training but shifted toward a more holistic approach to training that made citizens as well as Soldiers. New recruits entering the Army following World War II spent more than half of the basic training cycle on garrison and administrative tasks.<sup>39</sup>

The training summarized on Table 5 as “Other Garrison Training” included:

- Achievements and Traditions of the Army (6 hours)
- Character Guidance (7)
- Military Customs and Courtesies (10)
- Military Justice (4)
- National Defense Establishment (2)
- Organization of the Army (2)
- Troop Information Program (16)

Previous training plans included some of those subjects, but not as extensively. Many of these would later be grouped in training as “Soldierization.”

The schedule allotted 55 hours for maintenance of clothing, equipment, and quarters; guard duty quadrupled to 16 hours; and administrative processing grew by 50 percent (33 hours to 50). Commander’s time, an innovation designed to give unit leaders maximum flexibility in training Soldiers, occupied 48 hours. Time for proficiency testing, however, was reduced by 90 percent. In all, garrison training occupied 53 percent of the available time (299 hours).

The increase in garrison tasks came at the expense of combat and field training. The new program halved marksmanship training; reduced machine gun and light weapons familiarization and defense against chemical weapons training by 75 percent; and eliminated bayonet training altogether. Necessary Soldier conditioning activities such as marching, bivouacs, and first aid training also saw dramatic reductions. Tactical training accounted for only three percent of their time while field training (bivouacs,

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<sup>38</sup> Daugherty, 9-10 (pages unnumbered); Department of the Army, Army Training Program 21-1, *Basic Military Training Program (14 weeks) for Newly Enlisted Men*, 1949, 1. OCAFF was a Field Operating Agency rather than a command.

<sup>39</sup> Department of the Army, Army Training Program 21-1, *Basic Military Training*, 1949, 4.

marches, land navigation, etc.) used only six percent. Only physical training and land navigation, comparatively inexpensive training activities, enjoyed moderate increases.<sup>40</sup>

In an effort to comply with OCAFF guidance and increase unit readiness, LTG Walton H. Walker, Commanding General of the U.S. Eighth Army in Japan instituted a training program in April 1949 designed to improve individual and collective training in the Eighth Army's four divisions. This program required that all units up to division level complete collective training by July 1950. The North Korean invasion in June 1950 curtailed Walker's attempt at unit training as the Eighth Army rushed units to the peninsula to stem the Communist invasion.<sup>41</sup>

The combination of garrison-focused basic training and shortened or curtailed advanced individual training programs sent fresh Soldiers into combat without the tactical and field training that their predecessors during World War II received. The war provided an expensive lesson in military unpreparedness. The Army's decision to focus on garrison tasks at the expense of combat preparation, and placing the requirement for advanced training on understrength and ill-equipped combat units, resulted in disaster for units rushed to the Korean peninsula following the Communist invasion in June 1950.

During the Korean War, the Army activated eight more training divisions, though several of these were reorganized into combat divisions later. OCAFF supervised the training divisions and ten smaller Replacement Training Centers. By 1953, OCAFF provided BCT for 606,447 non-prior service personnel. Of these, 518,000 received training in divisions or RTCs annually, with the remainder training in the General Reserve.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Department of the Army, Army Training Program 21-1, *Basic Military Training*, 1949, 2.

<sup>41</sup> Hanson, 18.

<sup>42</sup> Jean R. Moenk, *A History of Command and Control of Army Forces in CONUS, 1919-1972* (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, 1972), 32.



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Table 5: Basic Combat Training Program Comparison, 1943 and 1949

Training Type	1943 17 weeks		1949 14 weeks		Hours/ % Trend
	Hours: 644	% Total	Hours: 560	% Total	
<b>Garrison Training</b>					
Administrative Processing/Orientation	33	5%	50	9%	▲ / ▲
Drill and Ceremonies	24	4%	53	9%	▲ / ▲
Proficiency Testing	44	7%	4	1%	▼ / ▼
Inspections	20	3%	24	4%	▲ / ▲
Intelligence Training	6	1%	2	0%	▼ / ▼
Other Garrison Training	0	0%	166	30%	▲ / ▲
<b>Garrison Total:</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>299</b>	<b>53%</b>	<b>▲ / ▲</b>
<b>Individual Soldier Skills</b>					
First Aid/Personal Hygiene/Sanitation	17	3%	12	2%	▼ / ▼
Physical Training	40	6%	55	10%	▲ / ▲
Marches and Bivouacs	36	6%	34	6%	▼ / NC
Basic Military Communications	0	0%	0	0%	NC
Defense against Chemical Attack	8	1%	2	0%	▼ / ▼
Land Navigation and Map Reading	8	1%	16	3%	▲ / ▲
Individual Tactical Training (Fieldcraft)	60	9%	16	3%	▼ / ▼
<b>Individual Soldier Skills Total:</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>26%</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>24%</b>	<b>▼ / ▼</b>
<b>Lethality</b>					
Bayonet Training	16	2%	0	0%	▼ / ▼
Hand-to-Hand Combat (Combatives)	0	0%	0	0%	NC
Weapon Familiarization	46	7%	34	6%	▼ / ▼
Hand Grenades	8	1%	8	1%	NC
Basic Rifle Marksmanship	164	25%	80	14%	▼ / ▼
Other Lethality Training	8	1%	4	1%	▼ / ▼
<b>Lethality Total:</b>	<b>242</b>	<b>38%</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>23%</b>	
<b>Collective Training</b>					
Squad/Section/Platoon/Company Tactics	66	10%	0	0%	▼ / ▼
Day and Night Patrolling, Scouting and Observing	16	2%	0	0%	▼ / ▼
Other (Collective Training):	24	4%	0	0%	▼ / ▼
<b>Collective Training Total:</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>16%</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0%</b>	<b>▼ / ▼</b>
<b>Initial Soldier Training Totals</b>	<b>644</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>560</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>-13% / ▼</b>

*Adapted from: War Department, Mobilization Training Program 7-1, Individual Training Program, Individual Training for Infantry Regiment and Armored Infantry Regiment, 1943, 23-24; Department of the Army, Army Training Program 21-1, Basic Military Training Program (14 Weeks) for Newly Enlisted Men, 1949, 4. All percentages were rounded to the nearest whole number.*

## *SLAM Effect: S.L.A. Marshall's Korean War Observations*

In late 1950, now-BG S.L.A. Marshall deployed to Korea under the auspices of the Operations Research Office (ORO) at Johns Hopkins University (under contract to the Army) to conduct studies similar to those he had run during World War II. His findings on Soldier fatigue and the Soldier load mirrored those he had found during the previous conflict. His findings on weapons, however, were even more notable.

**Rifle:** Marshall discovered that Soldiers in Korea were firing their weapons at a much greater rate than had Soldiers in World War II:

But there is no doubt that when the ground and situation permitted, the measure of willing participation is more than double World War II averages. In nighttime perimeter defense, the majority of those present actually take a personal part in the return of fire. The chronic nonfirer is an exception under the conditions of the Korean fighting.<sup>43</sup>

Marshall attributed the change partially to greater fire discipline, which was influenced by terrain and situation. Soldiers reported more often than not that they withheld fire due to inability to see a target, rather than fear. Marshall also credited better training for junior officers and NCOs, many of whom were World War II veterans. He noted that in Korea when combat action began junior leaders moved among the Soldiers, encouraging them and directing their fire, rather than simply taking a position and firing their own weapons, assuming that everyone else would fire with him.<sup>44</sup>

**Bayonet:** The bayonet achieved an almost mythical status during the Korean War, based largely on legend and rumor. While there were several examples of bayonet charges, and perhaps more so than at any time in modern U.S. history, the number and ferocity of those charges grew with each telling of the tale. Marshall estimated that as much as 80 percent of the reports of bayonet charges were false. The bayonet, however, was believed to imbue a spirit of aggressiveness, as COL Christian Bach had pointed out some three decades earlier.

There were numerous examples of authentic bayonet charges, perhaps the most famous led by CPT Lewis Millett of Company E, 27th Infantry Regiment in February 1951. Marshall conducted detailed interviews with the men of Easy Company five days after the attack, and uncovered some strongly-held beliefs about both bayonet training and its necessity in combat. Marshall reached no firm conclusions on the efficacy of the bayonet as a weapon or as a motivational tool, nor how much time should be spent on it

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<sup>43</sup> S.L.A. Marshall, *Commentary on Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea, Winter of 1950-51* (Chevy Chase, MD: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University), 4.

<sup>44</sup> Marshall, *Commentary on Infantry*, 4-5, 60-62.

in training. Marshall determined that the bayonet had been “stressed far beyond its intrinsic importance.”<sup>45</sup>

**Grenades:** Marshall’s comments on grenades were much more pointed. Noting that although almost all combat actions in Korea involved the use of grenades, the Soldiers were ill-trained in their use and there were few experienced junior leaders to help them. The training they had received had never anticipated that grenades would be so important. Marshall argued that grenade training had really peaked during World War I for use against trenches, but had dropped off in the years since. “In more recent years, we have proceeded more or less according to the theory that since an average American knows how to throw a rock, it is a waste of training time to devote any large amount of attention to grenade technique.”<sup>46</sup> He recommended that the Army restore grenade training to its former importance.

Considering S.L.A. Marshall’s controversial findings about infantry performance in World War II, the reaction to his Korean studies was immediate. The Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, published a memo on January 6, 1953, praising Marshall’s reports and enumerating OCAFF responses to his recommendations. Specifically, it mentioned that grenade training had been increased by 33 percent over the previous training plan. The evidence does not support this specific claim with regard to grenades (the training plan for 1954 reduced grenade training time to 6 hours from 8 hours) but other moves show that the Army took Marshall’s findings seriously. These Korean War experiences drove the Army to refine the training process, placing a renewed emphasis on tactical training at the expense of garrison-type requirements. Comparisons between the pre-war and post-war training plans show a clear movement back towards combat and survivability skills based on the Korean experience (see Table 5). Recognizing the need for more advanced training after BCT, the OCAFF instituted an Advanced Individual Training (AIT) program in 1953. Each branch school conducted AIT for its various military occupational specialties (MOS) and required successful completion before a Soldier reported to his assigned unit. The additional school allowed the Army to shorten and redesign basic training which reverted back to an 8-week cycle. Trainers needed to be as efficient as possible with training time now reduced by one third (560 hours to 372).<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Marshall, *Commentary on Infantry*, 103-108; S.L.A. Marshall, *Notes on Infantry Tactics in Korea* (Chevy Chase, MD: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1951), 68-81. CPT Lewis Millett was awarded the Medal of Honor for his assault on Hill 180 at Soam-Ni, Korea, on February 7, 1951. Marshall’s interview occurred five days later, and could possibly have been used as part of the background research for the award.

<sup>46</sup> Marshall, *Commentary on Infantry*, 99. In addition to lethality, Marshall had studied the issues of fatigue, fear, and Soldier load extensively.

<sup>47</sup> Department of the Army (DA), memorandum from DA, Assistant Chief Staff, G3, Operations, to Holders of Subject Report, Subject: “ORO-R-13, ‘Commentary on Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea,’” January 6, 1953, bound in S.L.A. Marshall, *Commentary on Infantry Operations and*

Garrison training time dropped from 53 percent (299 hours) in 1949 to 26 (101 hours) five years later, with time spent on orientation and drill and ceremonies nearly halved and other garrison tasks reduced by three quarters. The time reductions affected individual soldier skills as well, with the greatest decreases in marches and bivouacs and physical training, both of which suffered cutbacks greater than 60 percent. The new training plan, however, increased the amount of training time dedicated to defense against chemical attack, land navigation, and individual tactical training, while adding basic military communications.

The 1949 training plan dedicated 34 hours to weapons familiarization, which represented 6 percent of the available training time. Under the 1954 plan, the number of hours for weapons familiarization decreased to 30, but because the total number of hours available decreased, the percentage of time for weapons familiarization increased to 8 percent. This indicates that, even though basic training time was reduced, weapons familiarization was a more important training task than it had been. Table 6 notes similar examples with first aid and grenade training.

The 1954 program placed a heavy emphasis on familiarizing recruits with combat and imparting critical survivability skills. Lethality training increased from 126 hours to 154 hours, a 22 percent increase. Moreover, lethality training now constituted more than 40 percent of the available training time. Developers reintroduced bayonet training with six hours of instruction and added other lethality training such as:

- Combat Firing Techniques (16 hours)
- Mines and Booby Traps (8)
- Night Firing and Night Vision (6)
- Hasty Fortifications (5)
- Individual Day Training (4)
- Individual Night Training (4)
- Concealment and Camouflage (4)

Squad and platoon tactical training, including patrolling, received an additional 22 hours. Tactical instruction included an infiltration course, self-defense against tanks and aircraft, night operations familiarization, creating hasty fighting positions, and anti-mine and booby trap training. The new schedule provided time for individual weapon qualification and familiarization with the light machine gun and both the 2.36 and 3.5 inch versions of the rocket launcher. Trainers also re-introduced squad and platoon level collective training to tie the individual tactical tasks together and assess how well the recruits worked together during simulated combat operations.<sup>48</sup>

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*Weapons Usage in Korea, Winter of 1950-51* (Chevy Chase, MD: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University).

<sup>48</sup> Department of the Army, Army Training Program 21-114. *Basic Combat Training (8 weeks) for Male Military Personnel without Prior Service*, 1954, 39-41.

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Table 6: Basic Combat Training Program Comparison, 1949 and 1954

Training Type	1949 14 weeks		1954 8 weeks		Hours/ % Trend
	Hours: 560	% Total	Hours : 372	% Total	
<b>Garrison Training</b>					
Administrative Processing	50	9%	20	5%	▼/▼
Drill and Ceremonies	53	9%	20	5%	▼/▼
Proficiency Testing	4	1%	6	2%	▲/▲
Inspections	24	4%	10	3%	▼/▼
Intelligence Training	2	0%	4	1%	▲/▲
Other Garrison Tasks	166	30%	41	11%	▼/▼
<b>Garrison Total:</b>	<b>299</b>	<b>53%</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>27%</b>	<b>▼/▼</b>
<b>Individual Soldier Skills</b>					
First Aid/Personal Hygiene/Sanitation	12	2%	8	2%	▼/NC
Physical Training	55	10%	20	5%	▼/▼
Marches and Bivouacs	34	6%	8	2%	▼/▼
Basic Military Communications	0	0%	6	2%	▲/▲
Defense against Chemical Attack	2	0%	10	3%	▲/▲
Land Navigation and Map Reading	16	3%	10	3%	▲/NC
Individual Tactical Training (Fieldcraft)	16	3%	17	5%	▲/▲
<b>Individual Soldier Skills Total:</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>24%</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>21%</b>	<b>▼/▼</b>
<b>Lethality</b>					
Bayonet Training	0	0%	6	2%	▲/▲
Hand-to-Hand Combat (Combatives)	0	0%	0	0%	NC
Weapon Familiarization	34	6%	30	8%	▼/▲
Hand Grenades	8	1%	6	2%	▼/▲
Basic Rifle Marksmanship	80	14%	90	23%	▲/▲
Other Lethality	4	1%	22	7%	▲/▲
<b>Lethality Total:</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>23%</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>41%</b>	<b>▲/▲</b>
<b>Collective Training</b>					
Squad Tactical Training	0	0%	16	4%	▲/▲
Squad and Platoon Patrolling	0	0%	6	2%	▲/▲
Other (Collective Training):	0	0%	16	4%	▲/▲
<b>Collective Training Total:</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0%</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>10%</b>	<b>▲/▲</b>
<b>Initial Soldier Training Totals</b>	<b>560</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>372</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>-33%/▼</b>



*Adapted from:* Department of the Army, Army Training Program 21-1, *Basic Military Training Program (14 Weeks) for Newly Enlisted Men*, 1949, 4; Department of the Army, Army Training Program 21-114, *Basic Combat Training Program (8 weeks) for Male Military Personnel without Prior Service*, 1954, 4-5. All percentages were rounded to the nearest whole number.

### *SLAM Effect: TRAINFIRE I: A New Course in Basic Rifle Marksmanship*

Army Chief of Staff GEN J. Lawton Collins provided the guiding principle for the Basic Rifle Marksmanship Program: “The primary job of the rifleman is not to gain fire superiority over the enemy, but to kill with accurate, aimed fire.”<sup>49</sup> The Human Resources Research Office (HUMRRO) at George Washington University conducted studies under a U.S. Army contract in parallel with ORO and Marshall. The HUMRRO findings bore out Marshall’s assertions, and HUMRRO used them to develop a new method of teaching Basic Rifle Marksmanship (BRM) called TRAINFIRE. Initial tests conducted at Fort Benning in 1952 and 1953 revealed that the use of sub-caliber ammunition did little to improve firing scores. Increasing the amount of time spent and full-caliber ammunition fired, however, improved shooting abilities for even for the poorest marksmen.<sup>50</sup>

The premise of the changes was to make BRM training more realistic. A HUMRRO study argued that:

An emphasis on safety seems to be characteristic of conventional marksmanship training. Undue emphasis on this point can give an artificial aspect to the training procedures. . . . The end result is reduction in the trainee’s self-confidence and thus the possibility of less efficient combat performance.<sup>51</sup>

Human Research Unit No. 3 at Fort Benning conducted an experiment in 1954 using three basic training companies in order to compare and contrast the conventional method of teaching BRM with a new, experimental course. One company at Fort Benning would use the experimental course, taught by NCOs and officers specially trained to deliver the course. The other two companies, one at Fort Benning and one at Fort Jackson, were taught BRM using the conventional program. All three companies had the same number of troops, all were demographically matched as closely as

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<sup>49</sup> Quoted in McFann, Hammes, and Taylor, *TRAINFIRE I*, 5.

<sup>50</sup> McFann, Hammes, and Taylor, *TRAINFIRE I*, 5-6.

<sup>51</sup> McFann, Hammes, and Taylor, *TRAINFIRE I*, 22.

possible, and the remainder of basic training (with the exception of BRM) was conducted identically in all three companies.<sup>52</sup>

The conventional course had little training in detecting targets and estimating ranges; used stationary, highly visible targets; did not require the Soldier to reload; and had Soldiers train without combat equipment. Most firing was also done from the unsupported position. The experimental program reversed all of these, while reducing the amount of time spent waiting on known distance ranges; using pop-up targets which gave an immediate confirmation of hits; and restructured the training process so that training in one class period was reinforced by the next.<sup>53</sup>

The results showed that the group using the experimental new training plan proved superior to the two control group companies in terms of number of hits on target; proficiency in firing at stationary targets and from supported positions; target detection; and range estimation. In total training time, TRAINFIRE allowed the BRM course to be reduced from 90 hours (377 rounds) to 74 hours (343 rounds) but with an increase in training performance. TRAINFIRE I was implemented Army-wide in 1961.

Despite this increase in quality in the marksmanship program, the 1961 plan still reduced the number of available training hours from 372 to 352 (see Table 6). As with most postwar training plans, however, the number of hours spent doing garrison duties soared to over one-third of the available time. Training in Soldier skills saw moderate increases in physical training, land navigation, and marches and bivouacs, yet communications and individual tactical training were eliminated altogether. Some of the additional time gained from the change in marksmanship training was used to bring back hand-to-hand combat and to add other topics such as mines, but familiarization with other U.S. weapons was also eliminated. The most drastic change came in collective training, which lost one-half of its available time. Some of these courses were shifted to infantry AIT, but this did not provide training for Soldiers in noncombat MOSs.<sup>54</sup>

The Army's changes to training after the Korean War did not precisely follow the typical postwar pattern. While overall training time had been reduced by 33 percent in 1954, marksmanship training had actually increased. Building on the findings of Marshall and others, the Army began to evaluate its training quality as well as its quantity (see Table 7).

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<sup>52</sup> McFann, Hammes, and Taylor, *TRAINFIRE I*, 13-15.

<sup>53</sup> McFann, Hammes, and Taylor, *TRAINFIRE I*, 22-27.

<sup>54</sup> McFann, Hammes, and Taylor, *TRAINFIRE I*, 42-44.

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Table 7: Basic Combat Training Program Comparison, 1954 and 1961

Training Type	1954 8 weeks		1961 8 weeks		Hours/ % Trend
	Hour s 372	% Total	Hour s 352	% Total	
<b>Garrison Training</b>					
Administrative Processing/Orientation	20	5%	16	5%	▼/▼
Drill and Ceremonies	20	5%	25	7%	▲/▲
Proficiency Testing	6	2%	6	2%	NC
Inspections	10	3%	22	6%	▲/▲
Intelligence Training	4	1%	3	1%	▼/NC
Other Garrison Tasks	41	11%	50	14%	▲/▲
<b>Garrison Total:</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>27%</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>35%</b>	▲/▲
<b>Individual Soldier Skills</b>					
First Aid/Personal Hygiene/Sanitation	8	2%	10	3%	▲/▲
Physical Training	20	5%	24	7%	▲/▲
Basic Military Communications	8	2%	0	0%	▼/▼
Defense against Chemical Attack	6	2%	8	2%	▲/NC
Land Navigation and Map Reading	10	3%	12	3%	▲/NC
Marches and Bivouacs	10	3%	12	3%	▲/NC
Individual Tactical Training (Fieldcraft)	17	5%	0	0%	▼/▼
<b>Individual Soldier Skills Total:</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>21%</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>19%</b>	▼/▼
<b>Lethality</b>					
Bayonet Training	6	2%	8	2%	▲/NC
Hand-to-Hand Combat (Combatives)	0	0%	8	2%	▲/▲
Weapon Familiarization	30	8%	0	0%	▼/▼
Hand Grenades	6	2%	8	2%	▲/NC
Basic Rifle Marksmanship	90	24%	74	21%	▼/▼
Other Lethality	22	6%	49	14%	▲/▲
<b>Lethality Total:</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>41%</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>42%</b>	▼/▼
<b>Collective Training</b>					
Squad Tactical Training	16	4%	17	5%	▲/▲
Squad and Platoon Patrolling	6	2%	0	0%	▼/▼
Other (Collective Training):	16	4%	0	0%	▼/▼
<b>Collective Training Total:</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>10%</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>5%</b>	▼/▼
<b>Initial Soldier Training Totals</b>	<b>372</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>352</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>-5% / ▼</b>

Adapted from: Department of the Army, Army Training Program 21-114, *Basic Combat Training Program (8 weeks) for Male Military Personnel without Prior Service*, 1954, 4-5; Department of the Army, Army Training Program 21-114, *Male Military Personnel without Prior Service*, 1961, 5-6. All percentages were rounded to the nearest whole number.

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## **Vietnam War**

The Army continued refining Soldier basic training into the 1960s. The Continental Army Command (CONARC) supervised all aspects of individual training, operating 27 Army service schools producing 150,000 students per year, as well as 17 training centers with an annual throughput of 300,000.<sup>55</sup> The Drill Sergeant Program was incorporated in 1964 to improve the effectiveness of recruit training. This change, however, also signaled another shift away from combat-related skills. Training plans focused instead on creating “a disciplined and highly motivated Soldier who was qualified in his basic weapon, physically conditioned, and drilled in the fundamentals of Soldiery.”<sup>56</sup> After more than 50 years, drill and ceremonies training and BRM had become bellwether indicators of the direction of training. As the time allotted for drill and ceremonies went up, it generally indicated an increase in garrison training time, while increased hours for BRM indicated a rise in lethality training. By 1964, drill and ceremonies training consumed 40 hours, double the time allotted only ten years before. All other garrison activities had risen by nearly 40 percent over the same period (101 hours to 141 hours). The reductions in BRM due to TRAINFIRE notwithstanding, lethality training had dropped by more than 20 percent over the same period (154 hours to 121).<sup>57</sup>

These changes to basic training classes did not provide adequate training for combat in Vietnam. Shifting training hours to more garrison-related subjects directly affected units deploying to Vietnam in 1965, as it had in Korea. U.S. forces in Vietnam sustained 1,928 Soldiers killed in action (KIA) in 1965, eight more than during the entirety of Operation Iraqi Freedom between 2003 and 2011.<sup>58</sup> MG William E. DePuy, Commanding General of the 1st Infantry Division from 1966-1967, commented on the replacement troops the division received in Vietnam:

I realized I was seeing the same problems occur all over again. They [new troops] weren't trained and were stumbling into battles. Mind you, they stumbled into battles under me too, but I wanted to try to help all I could in that respect. So I started putting out instructions on overwatches and finding out where the enemy

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<sup>55</sup> Moenk, 45.

<sup>56</sup> Department of the Army, Army Training Program 21-114, *Male Military Personnel without Prior Service*, 1966, 1.

<sup>57</sup> Department of the Army, Army Training Program 21-114, *Male Military Personnel without Prior Service*, 1964, 4.

<sup>58</sup> National Archives, “Vietnam War U.S. Military Fatal Casualty Statistics,” <https://www.archives.gov/research/military/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics#date> (accessed October 31, 2018); Department of Defense, “U.S. Military Casualties - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Casualty Summary by Casualty Category,” Defense Casualty Analysis System, [https://dcas.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report\\_oif\\_type.xhtml](https://dcas.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report_oif_type.xhtml) (accessed October 31, 2018).

was by using only a small number of people, but using lots of firepower and frontal parapet foxholes, and things of that nature.<sup>59</sup>

Innovative commanders such as DePuy and MG Frederick C. Weyand, Commanding General of the 25th Infantry Division, created division training schools to familiarize new officers and Soldiers with tactics specific to unit operations. DePuy personally instructed squads and platoons on occasion. The Army continued to refine new recruit training into the 1980s, and the end of the Vietnam War provided senior Army leadership with an opportunity to reshape the force, including improving basic training yet again.<sup>60</sup>

### *Advanced Individual Training (AIT)*

Most of this study compares basic combat training programs between eras, which tended to follow a now familiar pattern of increasing and decreasing combat training. A comparison of the AIT programs at the beginning of large scale commitment of troops to Vietnam (1966) and the height of Vietnam (1971) reveals that some traditional basic training tasks had been shifted to AIT, and that the training programs were influenced by current events and conflicts (see Table 7).

Basic training in both 1966 and 1971 extended to 8 weeks, however the number of training hours differed slightly due to different training days per week. The 1966 schedule used a 44-hour training week (352 hours), while the 1971 schedule used a 42-hour training week (337 hours). AIT in 1966 also used an 8-week (44 hours) schedule. By 1971 however, AIT had stretched to 9 weeks (532 hours). The qualitative differences between these two training plans illustrates the effect of the Vietnam War on Soldier training.

Most of the administrative training in 1966 had been completed during basic training, so the number of hours spent in garrison activities was greatly reduced during AIT. These were limited primarily to proficiency testing, inspections, and a small amount of drill and ceremonies. Most of the administrative processing came in the final week, when Soldiers were preparing to go to their first units. There were minor adjustments for administrative tasks in 1971, perhaps the most significant being the addition of a one-hour intelligence training class titled, "Crack and Thump: Recognition of Foreign Weapons." The large difference in training hours between 1966 and 1971 meant that sometimes even small changes in the number of training hours resulted in much larger changes in the percentage of training time spent. For instance, the entire time spent in

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<sup>59</sup> Interview with GEN William E. DePuy, Senior Officer Oral History Program, interview by COL Romie L. Brownlee and BG William J. Mullen III, CMH Publication 70-23, March 19, 1979, 140.

<sup>60</sup> Department of the Army, "25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, Tropic Lightning: Ready to Strike! Anywhere, Anytime..." 25th Infantry Division History, <https://www.garrison.hawaii.army.mil/tlm/files/history-25th.pdf> (accessed November 13, 2018).

garrison training dropped by only 9 hours, but that reduction dropped the total amount of training time spent on these tasks to 12 percent.

The changes to individual Soldier skills were not particularly significant in terms of the number of hours of training. The details of that training, however, were significant and worthy of examination. First aid retained the 4-hour training period used in both basic training and AIT, but added another hour on "Health Problems in Southeast Asia." Both courses featured a 9-hour block on Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE). Defense against chemical attack was not included in 1966 curriculum, but Soldiers received four hours of training during BCT. In 1971, however, the Army added two hours of chemical defense training to AIT. This was probably due to the use of riot control agents by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces and the potential for accidental injury, rather than the use of any such agents by the enemy. Changes in methods of transportation were also easy to see: Soldiers in 1954 received training on mounting and dismounting trucks; in 1966, they were used to the personnel carrier; and in 1971 they received a two hour helicopter orientation.

The changes to lethality training between 1966 and 1971 were small but significant. Bayonet training doubled to four hours, but it remained a very small percentage of the overall training time. Weapons familiarization completely eliminated automatic rifles, probably reflecting the phase-out of the CAR-15, but the schedule retained familiarization on the pistol, grenade launcher, small antitank weapon, and both M-60 and M2 .50 caliber machine guns while adding demolition techniques and landmine warfare. Other training worthy of note included introduction to forward observation and close air and artillery support. Perhaps most significantly, the 1966 AIT training plan had eliminated rifle marksmanship; the 1971 version added 24 hours to the schedule.

Most increases in training time in the 1971 schedule came in collective training, which accounted for nearly half of the amount training time in AIT. Squad tactics experienced only a slight reduction in the number of hours, however patrolling was reduced by nearly half (32 hours to 18). This allowed time to add the following training which had obvious roots in current operations in Vietnam:

- Counter Ambush Techniques (2 hours)
- Cordon and Search (2)
- Perimeter Defense (night) (4)
- Stream Crossing (2)
- Searching and Clear Operations (4)
- Road Clearing Operations (4)

The primary reason for the extension of AIT to nine weeks was the addition of a Southeast Asia focused Field Training Exercise (FTX) which consumed one week (168 hours) of the training schedule.



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Table 8: Advanced Individual Training Program Comparison, 1966 and 1971

Training Type	1966 AIT 8 weeks		1971 AIT 9 weeks		Hours/ % Trend
	Hours: 352	% Total	Hours: 532	% Total	
<b>Garrison Training</b>					
Administrative Processing/Orientation	44	13%	42	8%	▼/▼
Drill and Ceremonies	12	3%	8	2%	▼/▼
Proficiency Testing	4	1%	4	<1%	NC
Inspections	14	4%	10	2%	▼/▼
Intelligence Training	0	0%	1	<1%	▲/▲
Other Garrison Tasks	0	0%	0	0%	NC
<b>Garrison Total:</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>21%</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>▼/▼</b>
<b>Individual Soldier Skills</b>					
First Aid/Personal Hygiene/Sanitation	4	1%	5	<1%	▲/NC
Physical Training	24	7%	24	5%	NC/▼
Marches and Bivouacs	0	0%	0	0%	NC
Basic Military Communications	10	3%	12	2%	▲/▼
Defense against Chemical Attack	0	0%	2	<1%	▲/▲
Land Navigation and Map Reading	18	5%	21	4%	▲/▼
Individual Tactical Training (Fieldcraft)	28	8%	17	3%	▼/▼
<b>Individual Soldier Skills Total:</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>24%</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>15%</b>	<b>▼/▼</b>
<b>Lethality</b>					
Bayonet Training	2	1%	4	<1%	▲/NC
Hand-to-Hand Combat (Combatives)	0	0%	0	0%	NC
Weapon Familiarization	90	25%	62	12%	▼/▼
Hand Grenades	0	0%	3	<1%	▲/▲
Basic Rifle Marksmanship	0	0%	24	5%	▲/▲
Other Lethality	14	4%	31	6%	▲/▲
<b>Lethality Total:</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>30%</b>	<b>124</b>	<b>23%</b>	<b>▲/▼</b>
<b>Collective Training</b>					
Squad Tactics	56	16%	50	9%	▼/▼
Patrolling	32	9%	18	3%	▼/▼
Other	0	0%	25	5%	▲/▲
Southeast Asia (SEA) FTX	0	0%	168	32%	▲/▲
<b>Collective Training Total:*</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>25%</b>	<b>261</b>	<b>49%</b>	<b>▲/▲</b>
<b>Initial Soldier Training Totals</b>	<b>352</b>	<b>99%</b>	<b>532</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>51%/▲</b>

Adapted from: Department of the Army, Army Subject Schedule 7-11B10, MOS Technical and Refresher Training of Light Weapons Infantryman MOS 11B10, April 1966, 4; Department of the Army, Army Subject Schedule 7-11B(C)(H)10, MOS Technical Training of Light Weapons Infantryman MOS 11B10, Infantry Indirect Fire Crewman MOS 11C10, and Infantry Direct Fire Crewman MAO 11H10 (Southeast Asia Oriented), January 1971, 4. All percentages were rounded to the nearest whole number.

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### III. Building a Professional Army

The Army previously attempted a unit-directed individual advanced training program prior to the Korean War, which proved unsuccessful. The war exposed flaws within this system when operational necessities required commands to deploy directly into combat with undertrained Soldiers. This initiative's dire consequences forced the Army to implement regulated and codified AIT programs for all MOS in 1953. All Soldiers after 1953 were required to graduate from advanced training prior to reporting to their assigned unit.

The end of conscription in 1973 signaled an opportunity for the Army to select recruits, ending the dependence on the draft to fill the ranks. The Army began re-designing basic training and introducing courses to prevent difficulties that had developed during the preceding conflict. The Army also addressed unforeseen challenges resulting from social issues and vices that affected morale and unit cohesion in Vietnam.<sup>61</sup>

The Army's uneven approach to training management over the previous six decades led in 1973 to the creation of Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to manage all training development, conduct all individual training, and provide training standardization. The initial training plans produced after the end of the Vietnam War showed the customary post-war reduction in basic Soldier skills that had marked the end of the three previous conflicts. These cuts reflected more than the normal postwar reduction, however. The Army sought to build an All-Volunteer Force in the wake of a deeply unpopular war. Using recruiting slogans such as "Today's Army Wants to Join You" (1971-1973) and "Join the People Who've Joined the Army" (1973-1980), the Army sought to make training less threatening and more enticing to young people struggling in the midst of the worst economic recession since World War II. High unemployment made the military an attractive choice, but the stigma of Vietnam tended to counteract the advantages.<sup>62</sup>

Basic training remained at 8 weeks, but the training weeks were shortened from 44 hours to 42 hours (see Table 8). This shortened time schedule resulted in across-the-board reductions in nearly every important training area, while garrison related tasks increased to nearly half the total amount of time allotted for basic training. Some garrison training also experienced reductions, such as drill and ceremonies (40 hours to 18, a 55 percent drop) and inspections (28 hours to 10, 64 percent drop), but administrative processing and orientation swelled from 37 hours to 56, while other

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<sup>61</sup> Department of the Army, ATP 21-114, *Basic Combat Training (BCT) Program for Male Military Personnel without Prior Service and Modified Basic Training (MBT) Program for Conscientious Objectors without Prior Service*, 1973, 4.

<sup>62</sup> For an explanation of how the current Army Commands (ACOM) structure developed, see Conrad Crane, Michael E. Lynch, and Shane Reilly, "Changing the Institutional Army: 1962-2018" (Case study, Historical Services Division, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, 2018).

garrison tasks doubled. Some of this garrison training time, however, addressed social issues that were important to developing a professional Army.

Basic training classes dating back to World War I had addressed the “citizen Soldier,” and patriotism was an essential element. First aid and personal hygiene addressed combat injury as well as social issues such as venereal disease. The Vietnam War had exposed social problems that eroded unit morale and readiness, including racial strife, alcoholism, and drug abuse. Training developers addressed racial and substance abuse issues that arose during Vietnam and threatened unit cohesion and morale. New recruits received training on:

- Discipline, Morality, and Traditions (7 hours)
- Race Relations (4)
- Alcohol and Substance Abuse (2)<sup>63</sup>

As the training program developed over the next several decades, the Army added more social, cultural, and moral training, befitting a more professional force. Each change to basic training addressed the need for more well-rounded Soldier citizens who understood the need for good citizenship as well as lethality.

The reduction in training time fell most heavily on the individual Soldier skills and lethality training. Marches and bivouacs fell by 78 percent (32 hours to 7) in 1973, and individual tactical training dropped from 11 hours to 7. Trainers reduced rifle marksmanship from 83 hours to 72. Bayonet training (12 hours) and hand-to-hand combat (10 hours) both dropped to 4 hours, a reduction of more than 60 percent. Soldiers still received familiarization classes on the M18A1 “Claymore” mine, the M72A2 Light Anti-Tank Weapon (LAW), the M203 40 mm grenade launcher, and the M60 machine gun. Recruits also received new classes on Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) and completed a confidence course.

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<sup>63</sup> War Department, Training Circular No. 5, *Infantry Training*, 1918, 9; Richard Stewart, ed., *American Military History: The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2008*, vol. II (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2010), 350.

## *Advanced Individual Training in Units*

The Army experimented with a new program in 1971 called Advanced Individual Training in Units (AIU), which contained similarities to unit-directed advanced individual training programs created prior to the Korean War. Following Vietnam, the Army focused on developing programs to rebuild personnel strength and readiness as the force transitioned to an All-Volunteer Force (AVF). Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) GEN William C. Westmoreland authorized seven units to begin AIU in November 1971. The program was used in conjunction with the Unit of Choice (UOC) program, which allowed recruits in select high density Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) to choose their initial assignment. The initiative required cadre from assigned units to conduct Advanced Individual Training (AIT) for basic training graduates. The intent was to efficiently move new Soldiers to units by eliminating AIT at Army Training Centers (ATC).<sup>64</sup>

AIU permitted unit commanders a great deal of latitude in developing and planning the training. The program expanded in 1972 to thirteen different test units with varying missions and produced 4,571 graduates. The following year another unit joined the program and authorized an additional fourteen combat support MOS to the initiative. Graduates more than quintupled in 1973 to 15,329 combat troops and another 8,000 support personnel.<sup>65</sup>

Increasing graduation numbers concealed program problems reported by participating commands. AIU affected unit readiness by depriving battalions of key company grade officers and non-commissioned officers (NCO) tasked to serve as training cadre. The program required commanders to use organic equipment for new Soldier training, creating additional wear and tear on weapons, vehicles, and electronics. AIU participants—considered non-deployable until AIT completion—adversely affected personnel readiness ratings. Varied unit training within branches posed additional problems. MG Frederick Kroesen, Commanding General of the 82nd Airborne Division, observed that an AIU graduate trained in his division as a light infantryman required additional training if transferred to a mechanized unit, which

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<sup>64</sup> The AIU/UOC initially included six combat arms MOSs: three in infantry (11B, 11C, and 11H), two in armor (11D and 11E), and one in artillery (13A). Army Training and Doctrine Command, *Advanced Individual Training in Units* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), 10.

<sup>65</sup> Army Training and Doctrine Command, *Advanced Individual Training*, 10, 67. MOSs added later included: Pioneer (12A), Field Artillery Cannon Operation Fire Direction Assistant (13E), Honest John Rocket Crewman (15F), Chaparral Crewman (16P), Vulcan Crewman (16R), Counterbattery/Counter mortar Radar Crewman (17B), Sound Ranging Crewman (17C), Field Wireman (36K), Rough Terrain Forklift and Loads Operator (62M), Motor Transport Operator (64C), Telephone Switchboard Operator (72C), Data Analysis Specialist (74C), Artillery Surveyor (82C), and Voice-Radio Operator (05E).

affected the gaining unit's readiness. General Kroesen concluded, "This is a disservice to the Soldier and to other units which receive him as a replacement."<sup>66</sup>

The newly-created TRADOC Headquarters continued receiving concerns and complaints about the stresses created on units by AIU. ATCs provided resources, staffs, and cadres focused on Soldier training and permitted Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) unit commanders to focus training on their wartime mission. TRADOC officially terminated the AIU program in October 1973 and tasked ATCs with authority for conducting AIT.

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<sup>66</sup> Army Training and Doctrine Command, *Advanced Individual Training*, 3.

## ***From an All-Volunteer Force to a Professional Army***

As the Army adopted the AirLand Battle doctrine in the early 1980s, the basic training plan made its largest peacetime shift toward combat preparation in decades. The conversion to the All-Volunteer Force was complete, and the new Army recruiting slogan, "Be All You Can Be," generated enthusiasm. Recruiting soared even in a strong economy. Garrison training time dropped in 1980 by 10 percent (seven hours), field training doubled from 7 to 14 percent (24 to 57 hours), and combat training time grew by 7 percent (42 hours). Administrative processing time dropped from 56 to 14 hours while proficiency testing increased by 14. Bivouacs and marches received the largest increase for field training with 18 hours added and field training exercises were re-introduced, with a three-hour allocation (see Table 8).<sup>67</sup>

Defense against chemical attack and physical training received increases of 10 and 13 hours, respectively. Some lethality tasks, such as bayonet training and hand-to-hand combat were removed from the curriculum completely and marksmanship received two fewer hours than in 1973. Other combat training increased by 30 hours and included:

- Close Combat Course
- Infiltration Course
- Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE)
- Collective training events ranging from squad to battalion level

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<sup>67</sup> The data format used for publications dated 1980 and afterwards do not specifically break out collective training by unit level, therefore any collective training task time was contained under the combat training category.



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Table 9: Basic Combat Training Program Comparison, 1973 and 1980

Training Type	1973 8 weeks		1980 8 weeks		Hours/ % Trend
	Hours 337	% Total	Hours 405	% Total	
<b>Garrison Training</b>					
Administrative Processing/Orientation	56	17%	14	3%	▼/▼
Drill and Ceremonies	18	5%	21	5%	▲/NC
Proficiency Testing	6	2%	20	5%	▲/▲
Inspections	10	3%	19	5%	▲/▲
Intelligence Training	0	0%	0	0%	NC
Other Garrison Tasks	74	22%	83	20%	▲/▼
<b>Garrison Total:</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>49%</b>	<b>157</b>	<b>39%</b>	<b>▼/▼</b>
<b>Individual Soldier Skills</b>					
First Aid/Field Sanitation/Personal Hygiene	9	3%	13	3%	▲/NC
Physical Training	27	8%	40	10%	▲/▲
Basic Military Communications	0	0%	8	2%	▲/▲
Defense against Chemical Attack	4	1%	14	3%	▲/▲
Land Navigation and Map Reading	8	2%	8	2%	NC
Marches and Bivouacs	7	2%	25	6%	▲/▲
Individual Tactical Training (Fieldcraft)	7	2%	39	10%	▲/▲
<b>Individual Soldier Skills Total:</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>▲/▲</b>
<b>Lethality</b>					
Bayonet Training	4	1%	0	0%	▼/▼
Hand-to-Hand Combat (Combatives)	4	1%	0	0%	▼/▼
Weapon Familiarization	16	5%	12	3%	▼/▼
Hand Grenades	5	1%	8	2%	▲/▲
Basic Rifle Marksmanship	72	21%	70	17%	▼/▼
Other Lethality	10	3%	8	2%	▼/▼
<b>Lethality Total:</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>33%</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>24%</b>	<b>▼/▼</b>
<b>Collective Training</b>					
Platoon/Squad Tactics	17	5%	39	10%	▲/▲
Field Training Exercises	0	0%	3	<1%	▲/▲
<b>Collective Training Total:*</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>&lt;1%</b>	<b>▲/▲</b>
<b>Initial Soldier Training Totals</b>	<b>337</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>405</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>20%</b>

Adapted from: Department of the Army, ATP 21-114, *Basic Lethality (BCT) Program for Male Military Personnel without Prior Service and Modified Basic Training (MBT) Program for Conscientious Objectors without Prior Service*, 1973, 4-5; Department of the Army, Program of Instruction (POI) 21-114, *U.S. Army Basic Training*, 1980, pages unnumbered. All percentages were rounded to the nearest whole number.

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*Figure 5: One Station Unit Training (OSUT)*

TRADOC teams began testing One Station Unit Training (OSUT) for armor and infantry in 1974. OSUT merged BCT and AIT into one training cycle at a single location managed by the same cadre. Planners hoped to save on both time and cost by conducting all required initial and advanced training at the same location. OSUT consists of five phases. The first three phases (red, white, and blue) followed the traditional format first established during World War II with the administrative, technical, and tactical training phases. The final two phases, black and gold, varied by MOS. There was also a split option version for Reserve Component (RC) recruits divided into two consecutive summer training cycles. A 1976 TRADOC study of 17,000 trainees concluded:

OSUT programs produced qualified graduates more quickly than separate basic combat and advanced individual training. . . . [The report] also showed that trainee attitudes and morale were at least as high as those in separate BCT and AIT units.

The Army also experimented with Two Station Training (TST), consisting of Infantry OSUT split into two phases, with the first at Fort Benning, Georgia, and the second at Fort Knox, Kentucky. In a Congressionally-mandated study of the two programs, TRADOC concluded that “there was no statistical difference in trainee performance between the two methods” and found that OSUT saved the Army more than \$7 million in comparison with TST.<sup>1</sup> OSUT proved so successful that by 1981 Fort Leonard Wood joined Forts Benning and Knox as installations employing OSUT programs.

The OSUT model did not fit all combat arms branches. The Field Artillery School followed the traditional Initial Entry Training (IET)—BCT and AIT—format. Field Artillery (FA) specialities encompassed seven different MOS with varying training times ranging from 39 days for a cannon crewmember (13B) to 79 days for a field artillery meteorological survey crewmember (13T). The MOS length and range of occupations made the OSUT model unsuitable for use by the FA school.

*Source:* Karl E. Cocke, et al., *Department of the Army Historical Summary (DAHSUM): Fiscal Year (FY) 1976* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History), 23; *DAHSUM: FY 1979*, 26; *DAHSUM: FY 1981*, 45-46.

By January 2000 the conversion to a professional Army was complete and the Army had proved itself in conflicts large and small, including Grenada, the Balkans, Somalia, and Operation Desert Storm, but had also learned some hard lessons. These experiences highlighted the necessity to further hone individual and small-unit skills, and drove further changes to the basic training program. The new training plan increased the total BCT cycle time to nine weeks, totaling 645.5 hours (an increase of 240.5 hours) (see Table 9).<sup>68</sup>

The Army had squandered that 60 percent growth, however, dedicating more than 40 percent of it to garrison activities. Administrative tasks and training grew from 157 hours in 1980 to 274 in 2000, a nearly 75 percent increase. These classes or events included commander's time, climate of command, reenlistment, and chaplain's orientations. In a move that defied that typical pattern, drill and ceremonies training time actually dropped by two hours. The schedule did, however, add one hour of intelligence training, which had been missing from the curriculum for nearly three decades.

The changes in individual soldier skills show a net gain in number of hours, but the change in basic training length resulted in a reduction in the percentage of total hours spent on these skills. First aid training increased, reflecting the introduction of combat lifesaver training, as did map reading and land navigation. The credible threat of chemical weapons dropped with the demise of the Soviet Union, so defense against chemical attack also fell. Physical training, however, grew by 85 percent (40 hours to 74), reflecting the arrival of millennial recruits in the force with a lower perceived physical conditioning. Despite this, the time dedicated to marches and bivouacs also declined, reflecting a largely mechanized Army.

The greatest gains in the curriculum came in lethality training. Bayonet training and combatives were re-introduced, and rifle marksmanship grew by 11 hours (70 hours to 81). Those eleven hours, however, came at the expense of weapons familiarization and other lethality training (mine emplacement, etc.). Collective training also saw a fairly large increase from three hours to 80, which included a 72 hour field training exercise. Infantry OSUT provided more Soldier skills, lethality, and collective training than did regular basic training.

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<sup>68</sup> Department of the Army, Program of Instruction 21-114, *U.S. Army Basic Training*, 2000, pages unnumbered.

Table 10: Basic Combat Training Program Comparison, 1980 and 2000

Training Type	1980 8 weeks		2000 9 weeks		Hours/ % Trend
	Hours 405	% Total	Hours 645.5	% Total	
<b>Garrison Training</b>					
Administrative Processing/Orientation	14	3%	181	28%	▲ / ▲
Drill and Ceremonies	21	5%	18	3%	▼ / ▼
Proficiency Testing	20	5%	14	2%	▼ / ▼
Inspections	19	5%	16	2%	▼ / ▼
Intelligence Training	0	0%	1	<1%	▲ / ▲
Other Garrison Tasks	83	20%	44	7%	▼ / ▼
<b>Garrison Total:</b>	<b>157</b>	<b>39%</b>	<b>274</b>	<b>42%</b>	<b>▲ / ▲</b>
<b>Individual Soldier Skills</b>					
First Aid/Field Sanitation/Personal Hygiene	13	3%	19	3%	▲ / NC
Physical Training	40	10%	74	11%	▲ / ▲
Basic Military Communications	8	2%	2	<1%	▼ / ▼
Defense against Chemical Attack	14	3%	9	1%	▼ / ▼
Land Navigation and Map Reading	8	2%	11.5	2%	▲ / NC
Marches and Bivouacs	25	6%	16	2%	▼ / ▼
Other Individual Soldier Skills	39	10%	43	7%	▲ / ▼
<b>Individual Soldier Skills Total:</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>174.5</b>	<b>27%</b>	<b>▲ / ▼</b>
<b>Lethality</b>					
Bayonet Training	0	0%	13	2%	▲ / ▲
Hand-to-Hand Combat (Combatives)	0	0%	6	1%	▲ / ▲
Weapon Familiarization	12	3%	9	1%	▼ / ▲
Hand Grenades	8	2%	8	1%	NC / ▼
Basic Rifle Marksmanship	70	17%	81	13%	▲ / ▼
Other Lethality	8	2%	0	0%	▼ / ▼
<b>Lethality Total:</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>24%</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>▲ / ▼</b>
<b>Collective Training</b>					
Field Training Exercises	0	0%	72	11%	▲ / ▲
Other Collective	3	<1%	8	1%	▲ / ▲
<b>Collective Training Total:</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1%</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>▲ / ▲</b>
<b>Initial Soldier Training Totals</b>	<b>405</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>645.5</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>59% / ▲</b>

Adapted from: Department of the Army, Program of Instruction (POI) 21-114, *U.S. Army Basic Training*, 1980, pages unnumbered; Department of the Army, Program of Instruction (POI) 21-114, *U.S. Army Basic Training*, 2000, pages unnumbered. All percentages were rounded to the nearest whole number.

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## IV. The Long War

### *Before the Surge*

The Army training philosophy in September 2001 was running true to historical trends—more weighted toward administrative tasks than combat skills. Despite the increased garrison or administrative time, however, the Army that deployed to Iraq in 2003 was the best educated, equipped, experienced, and trained Army the nation had ever put in the field. In 2000, 42 percent (274 hours) of a Soldier's 645.5 hours of Basic Training (9 weeks) was garrison related (see Table 11). Of that 42 percent, 28 percent (181 hours) was absorbed by administrative and orientation duties. The rest of Basic Training consisted of the following major categories and totals: individual soldier skills, 27 percent (174.5 hours); lethality, 18 percent (117 hours); and collective training, 12 percent (80 hours).

Most of a Soldier's individual skills time was spent in physical training (11 percent, 74 hours). First aid, basic military communications, defense against chemical attacks, navigation, and marches each received 3 percent and under (2-19 hours) of the total basic training time. Tactical training did better than those categories, but worse than the aforementioned physical training: 7 percent (43 hours). Lethality training time fared poorly, except for basic rifle marksmanship (13 percent, 81 hours). A Soldier spent 1-2 percent each (6-13 hours) of basic training on bayonet, hand-to-hand combat, weapon familiarization, and grenade training. Additionally, Soldiers had a little time to get comfortable working as part of a unit: 11 percent (72 hours) of basic training was spent in collective field training exercises.

In FY 2002-2003, following the initial deployments to Afghanistan, President George W. Bush requested more than \$2.163 trillion in budget authority, to fund the biggest increase in 20 years in order to pay for the war and also to modernize the Cold War military. Like their fathers and grandfathers in World War II, the senior leaders of this Army had been junior leaders on the same battlefield, against the same enemy, during Operation Desert Storm only 12 years before. Some of those leaders and Soldiers had even more recent combat experience in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom, which had begun 18 months before. The Army had been hardened by two decades of tough collective training at Combat Training Centers (CTCs) as well as the smaller conflicts and multiple rotations to the Balkans. Training continued after deployment as well. As Soldiers arrived in the staging area in Kuwait 2002 and 2003 before moving onto Iraq, the units began aggressive individual and collective training programs to further prepare them for the rigors of the war ahead. According to one battalion commander, his "Soldiers spent three austere months in hard training with daily force-on-force exercises, live fires, urban combat training, and operating in a chemically contaminated environment."<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Association of the United States Army (AUSA), *Fiscal Year 2003 Army Budget: An Analysis* (Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare, AUSA, June 2002), 1; Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David



Initial operations in Iraq were very successful. Yet LTG Scott Wallace, Commanding General, V Corps, commented in March 2003 during the assault on Baghdad, “The enemy we’re fighting is different from the one we wargamed against.”<sup>70</sup> What many believed would be a short war became a protracted struggle against a thinking, adaptive enemy that used increasingly sophisticated techniques and inexpensive yet plentiful weapons. Engaging that enemy in a long war forced the Army to adapt its training as it had in past conflicts, but unlike previous experiences, the professional Army was able to adapt to changing conditions and new requirements much more quickly. GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army from 2003-2007, pushed “increased training focus on the Warrior Ethos, including marksmanship, hand-to-hand combat, live-fires, and physical fitness.”<sup>71</sup>

### *After the Surge*

To meet the requirements of a two-front war for several years while maintaining other commitments abroad and transforming the tactical Army at home, the Army end strength began to increase. By 2007 the war in Iraq had fundamentally changed, and with it the strategy shifted. GEN David Petraeus, Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq, led a new counterinsurgency campaign to put more Soldiers among the people on the ground in Iraq. This required a “surge” of additional Soldiers to Iraq, which required a higher end strength. President Bush announced a plan to “grow” the Army in 2007 by a further 65,000 Soldiers between 2008 and 2013 (see Fig. 6).<sup>72</sup>

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
Tohn, *On Point: The US Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 58.

<sup>70</sup> Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 124-25.

<sup>71</sup> Conrad C. Crane, Michael E. Lynch, and Shane P. Reilly, “GEN Peter J. Schoomaker,” in *Passing the Colors: Transitions of U.S. Army Chiefs of Staff* (Case study, Historical Services Division, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, 2015), 1. Tabs numbered individually.

<sup>72</sup> Crane, Lynch, and Reilly, “Schoomaker,” *Passing the Colors*, 3. Tabs numbered individually.

Figure 6: Army End Strength, 2002-2012



Sources: DAHSUM: FY 2002, 13-14; DAHSUM: FY 2005, 6-10; DAHSUM: FY 2006, 9-13; DAHSUM: FY 2007, 14-15; DAHSUM: FY 2008, 9-13; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Defense Manpower Requirements Report: Fiscal Year 2005, March 2004, 10; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2015, April 2014, "Table 7-5: Department of Defense Manpower," 255-56.

That surge in end strength threatened to overwhelm an institutional Army that had seen decreases in manpower rather than increases in order to fill urgent personal requirements in the operational Army. The need to adapt training based on combat experience combined with larger numbers of trainees drove changes in the basic training schedule (see Table 11). Basic training in 2007 remained at 9 weeks, but the total hours increased by 87.5 to 733. This increase required an extended training day, but the added hours also reflected a growing emphasis on night training. The Army had begun including night training decades before, but it had grown in importance in the last two decades.

The qualitative changes to the training reflected both lessons learned and adaptation to the current environment. Garrison training dropped from 274 hours to 228.9, but still consumed nearly one-third of the available time. Individual Soldier Skills decreased overall from 27 percent of basic training to 19 percent (139.7 hours), but some of the changes were significant: first aid training added seven hours (19 to 26), while individual tactical training was eliminated altogether. These two changes reflect the nature of the environment in which the Soldiers would soon be operating. The potential for combat action at any point required every Soldier to be able to provide self and buddy aid, but the improved living conditions on most Forward Operating Bases did not require extensive knowledge of fieldcraft.

Lethality training grew overall, with increases in key areas. Combatives class was eliminated, but BRM increased from 81 hours to 100.9, a growth of nearly 25 percent. Weapons familiarization doubled, from 9 to 21.9 hours. The largest increases in training time came in collective training, which grew from a mere 80 hours (12 percent of the training time) in 2000 to 221.2 hours (30 percent of the training time) in 2007. This shift reflected the increased lethality of the battlefield, and emphasis on small unit action.

Table 11: Basic Combat Training Comparison, 2000 and 2007

Training Type	2000 9 weeks		2007 9 weeks		Hours/ % Trend
	Hours 645.5	% Total	Hours 733	% Total	
<b>Garrison Training</b>					
Administrative Processing/Orientation	181	28%	11.5	2%	▼/▼
Drill and Ceremonies	18	3%	16	2%	▼/▼
Proficiency Testing	14	2%	0	0%	▼/▼
Inspections	16	2%	10	1%	▼/▼
Intelligence Training	1	<1%	0	0%	▼/NC
Other Garrison Tasks	44	7%	191.4	26%	▲/▲
<b>Garrison Total:</b>	<b>274</b>	<b>42%</b>	<b>228.9</b>	<b>31%</b>	▼/▼
<b>Individual Soldier Skills</b>					
First Aid/Personal Hygiene/Sanitation	19	3%	26	4%	▲/▲
Physical Training	74	11%	73.5	10%	▼/▼
Basic Military Communications	2	0%	4	4%	▲/▲
Defense against Chemical Attack	9	1%	6.7	1%	▼/▼
Land Navigation and Map Reading	11.5	2%	19	3%	▲/▲
Marches and Bivouacs	16	2%	10.5	1%	▼/▼
Individual Tactical Training (Fieldcraft)	43	7%	0	0%	▼/▼
<b>Individual Soldier Skills Total:</b>	<b>174.5</b>	<b>27%</b>	<b>139.7</b>	<b>19%</b>	▼/▼
<b>Lethality</b>					
Bayonet Training	13	2%	12.5	2%	▼/▼
Hand-to-Hand Combat (Combatives)	6	1%	0	0%	▼/▼
Weapon Familiarization	9	1%	21.9	3%	▲/▲
Hand Grenades	8	1%	8	1%	NC
Basic Rifle Marksmanship	81	13%	100.8	14%	▲/▲
Other Lethality	0	0%	0	0%	NC
<b>Lethality Total:</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>143.2</b>	<b>20%</b>	▲/▲
<b>Collective Training</b>					
Field Training Exercises	72	11%	122.7	17%	▲/▲
Other Collective	8	1%	98.5	13%	▲/▲
<b>Collective Training Total:*</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>221.2</b>	<b>30%</b>	▲/▲
<b>Initial Soldier Training Totals</b>	<b>645.5</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>733</b>	<b>100%</b>	13% / ▲

Adapted from: Department of the Army, Program of Instruction (POI) 21-114, U.S. Army Basic Training, 2000, pages unnumbered; Department of the Army, Program of Instruction 21-114, Basic Combat Training, 2007, pages unnumbered. All percentages were rounded to the nearest whole number.

By 2010, the annual increases in end strength and further necessary adaptation to combat conditions required more changes to basic training. The schedule extended to 10 weeks, constituting 754.5 training hours. The schedule included a small growth in garrison time, reflecting additional Soldierization training, and individual Soldier skills, primarily in physical training and individual tactical training. The greatest increases came in lethality training. BRM increased to 130.9 hours with additional small growth in weapons familiarization. Inexplicably, grenade training was eliminated altogether but combatives returned, reflecting a war among the people that could turn quickly from peaceful to violent. Bayonet training again waned, eliminated from the schedule. Collective training dropped by 25 percent, but remained a large part of the basic training curriculum (see Table 12).

Table 12: Basic Combat Training Comparison, 2007 and 2010

Training Type	2007 9 weeks		2010 10 weeks		Hours/ % Trend
	Hours 733	% Total	Hours 754.5	% Total	
<b>Garrison Training</b>					
Administrative Processing/Orientation	11.5	2%	149.5	20%	▲ / ▲
Drill and Ceremonies	16	2%	18	2%	▲ / NC
Proficiency Testing	0	0%	0	0%	NC
Inspections	10	1%	0	0%	▼ / ▼
Intelligence Training	0	0%	0	0%	NC
Other Garrison Tasks	191.4	26%	86.5	11%	▼ / ▼
<b>Garrison Total:</b>	<b>228.9</b>	<b>31%</b>	<b>254</b>	<b>34%</b>	<b>▲ / ▲</b>
<b>Individual Soldier Skills</b>					
First Aid/Personal Hygiene/Sanitation	26	4%	26.6	4%	▲ / NC
Physical Training	73.5	10%	82.6	11%	▲ / ▲
Basic Military Communications	4	4%	1.8	0%	▼ / ▼
Defense against Chemical Attack	6.7	1%	10	1%	▲ / NC
Land Navigation and Map Reading	19	3%	16.6	2%	▼ / ▼
Marches and Bivouacs	10.5	1%	0	0%	▼ / ▼
Individual Tactical Training (Fieldcraft)	0	0%	16.6	2%	▲ / ▲
<b>Individual Soldier Skills Total:</b>	<b>139.7</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>154.2</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>▲ / ▲</b>
<b>Lethality</b>					
Bayonet Training	12.5	2%	0	0%	▼ / ▼
Hand-to-Hand Combat (Combatives)	0	0%	22	3%	▲ / ▲
Weapon Familiarization	21.9	3%	23.1	3%	▲ / ▲
Hand Grenades	8	1%	0	0%	▼ / ▼
Basic Rifle Marksmanship	100.8	14%	130.9	17%	▲ / ▲
Other Lethality	0	0%	5	1%	▲ / ▲
<b>Lethality Total:</b>	<b>143.2</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>181</b>	<b>24%</b>	<b>▲ / ▲</b>
<b>Collective Training</b>					
Field Training Exercises	122.7	17%	135.4	18%	▲ / ▲
Move under Fire	0	0%	2.7	0%	▲ / ▲
Other Collective	98.5	13%	27.2	4%	▼ / ▼
<b>Collective Training Total:</b>	<b>221.2</b>	<b>30%</b>	<b>165.3</b>	<b>22%</b>	<b>▼ / ▼</b>
<b>Initial Soldier Training Totals</b>	<b>733</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>754.5</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>3% / ▲</b>

*Adapted from:* Department of the Army, Program of Instruction 21-114, *Basic Combat Training*, 2007, pages unnumbered; Department of the Army, Program of Instruction 21-114, *Basic Combat Training*, 2010, pages unnumbered. All percentages were rounded to the nearest whole number.

After ten years of war in two theaters, the Army ended Operation Iraqi Freedom in December 2011. From 2000 to 2010, garrison tasks had held fairly stable (282 hours to 254), while at the same time there was a steady rise in BRM (81 hours to 130.9). However, the numbers for 2015 follow the predictable pattern of U.S. Army post-war training for much of the last century: increase in garrison, decrease in combat. Between 2010 and 2015, total garrison training increased from 34 percent (254 hours) to 38 percent (276.8 hours), while weapons familiarization and BRM decreased from 3 percent (23.1 hours) to 1 percent (9 hours) and 17 percent (130.9 hours) to 11 percent (83 hours) (see Table 13).

### *Soldierization*

With garrison or administrative tasks approaching 40 percent of the available training time, there was cause for concern about direction that training was taking. This study has thus far considered such training (with the exception of drill and ceremonies, inspections, proficiency testing, and intelligence training) as a distractor from necessary Soldier skills, lethality, and collective training. There is value, however, in considering what some of that training means. The making of a Soldier includes not just weapons, physical, and tactical training, but also intangibles, such as “development of discipline, motivation, and commitment [which] starts the first day of IET and continues throughout the program.” The Army created a word for it: Soldierization – the process of transforming an individual from a citizen to a Soldier. Soldiers are expected to “think, look, and act as Soldiers always.”<sup>73</sup>

Some of the training included in “Soldierization” dates back to the early 20th century, as Soldiers were schooled in the Articles of War before going overseas. Likewise, military customs and courtesies have been a part of Soldier training from the Army’s earliest days. Other topics have arisen more recently as the Army has addressed the consequences of Soldier misconduct in both peacetime and wartime. In 1998, training in human relations, values, rigor, and Army traditions were added to Basic Training POIs, totaling 54 hours. Since then, numerous topics have been added to training, including:

- Warrior Ethos
- Army Values
- Spiritual Orientation and Readiness
- Legal Issues
- SHARP Training
- Army Heritage and Traditions
- Army’s Suicide Prevention Program
- Equal Opportunity

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<sup>73</sup> Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), TRADOC Regulation 350-6, *The Army School System*, May 1, 2018, 4.



- Law of War
- Morality of War
- Rules of Engagement
- Code of Conduct
- Managing Personal Finances
- Total Army Sponsorship Program
- Naturalization of Non-Citizen Soldiers<sup>74</sup>

This training in the intangible aspects of being a Soldier may sometimes be seen to distract from other combat-focused training, but these characteristics are the essence of what it means to be a Soldier-citizen.

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<sup>74</sup> “Changes to BCT/OSUT 1998 to 2017” (Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA, 2017), slide 1; “Infantry OSUT Course Map: 11B10,” version 6 (Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA, circa 2018), 1-3; “11B10 OSUT Validated POI 7.0 FY 17” (Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA, 2017), 8-10; “22 Week 11B10 IN OSUT Rationale and Path” (Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA, 2018), slide 2.

Table 13: Basic Combat Training Comparison, 2010 and 2015


Training Type	2010 10 weeks		2015 10 weeks		Hours/ % Trend
	Hours 754.5	% Total	Hours 725.8	% Total	
<b>Garrison Training</b>					
Administrative Processing/Orientation	149.5	20%	84.3	12%	▲/▲
Drill and Ceremonies	18	2%	19.9	3%	▲/▲
Proficiency Testing	0	0%	0	0%	NC
Inspections	0	0%	10	1%	▲/▲
Intelligence Training	0	0%	0	0%	NC
Other Garrison Tasks	86.5	11%	162.6	22%	▲/▲
<b>Garrison Total:</b>	<b>254</b>	<b>34%</b>	<b>276.8</b>	<b>38%</b>	▲/▲
<b>Individual Soldier Skills</b>					
First Aid/Personal Hygiene/Sanitation	26.6	4%	25	3%	▼/▼
Physical Training	82.6	11%	75.7	10%	▼/▼
Basic Military Communications	1.8	0%	1.8	0%	NC
Defense against Chemical Attack	10	1%	9.7	1%	▼/▼
Land Navigation and Map Reading	16.6	2%	19	3%	▲/▲
Marches and Bivouacs	0	0%	17	2%	▲/▲
Individual Tactical Training (Fieldcraft)	16.6	2%	0	0%	▼/▼
<b>Individual Soldier Skills Total:</b>	<b>154.2</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>148.2</b>	<b>20%</b>	▼/▼
<b>Lethality</b>					
Bayonet Training	0	0%	0	0%	NC
Hand-to-Hand Combat (Combatives)	22	3%	22	3%	NC
Weapon Familiarization	23.1	3%	9	1%	▼/▼
Hand Grenades	0	0%	7.6	1%	▲/▲
Basic Rifle Marksmanship	130.9	17%	83	11%	▼/▼
Other Lethality	5	1%	0	0%	▼/▼
<b>Lethality Total:</b>	<b>181</b>	<b>24%</b>	<b>121.6</b>	<b>17%</b>	▼/▼
<b>Collective Training</b>					
Field Training Exercises	135.4	18%	138.3	19%	▲/▲
Move under Fire	2.7	0%	0	0%	▼/NC
Other Collective	27.2	4%	40.9	55%	▲/▲
<b>Collective Training Total:*</b>	<b>165.3</b>	<b>22%</b>	<b>179.2</b>	<b>55%</b>	▲/▲
<b>Initial Soldier Training Totals</b>	<b>754.5</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>725.8</b>	<b>130%</b>	▼/▼

*Adapted from:* Department of the Army, Program of Instruction 21-114, *Basic Training*, 2000, pages unnumbered; Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), TRADOC Regulation 350-6, *Enlisted Initial Entry Training (IET) Policies and Administration*, May 8, 2007; Department of the Army, Program of Instruction 21-114, *Basic Combat Training*, 2015, pages unnumbered. All percentages were rounded to the nearest whole number.

## V. Conclusion and Observations:

Historical trends generally show that during conflict, training developers placed an increased emphasis on combat-related events and tasks. The Army's experience of the last half-century indicates that after every major conflict, the training plan changed. The Army invariably reduced the amount of time spent on tasks Soldiers need for combat, and increased time for garrison operations. Those tables customarily reverse after the next conflict shows that BRM prepares a Soldier better than drill and ceremonies. It is significant to note that BRM began at 20 percent of the training time in 1918, increased to as much as 25 percent just after the Korean War, but by 2015 had returned to 11 percent. Cyclical patterns aside, trendlines over the last century indicate a general downward trend in lethality training with an accompanying rise in garrison training. Notably, as lethality training decreased, garrison training remained high (see Table 14). The development of a professional army grew out of a tradition of "citizen Soldiers," but that development did not eliminate the need for social responsibility. Today's professional Army needs Soldier citizens, highly trained in their combat tasks but just as competent in civil tasks. Today's Army recruit demands quality training.

*Table 14: Basic Combat Training Program Comparison, 1918-2015*



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### Observations:

- CSA GEN J. Lawton Collins observed, “The primary job of the rifleman is not to gain fire superiority over the enemy, but to kill with accurate, aimed fire.”<sup>75</sup> Each new period of peace seems to bring a reduction in marksmanship training, the *sine qua non* of the Soldier.
- “Every man a Rifleman.” The Marines have it right, and the Army’s experience at war for nearly two decades supports the conclusion. The nature of war has changed and every Soldier, not just the Infantry, may engage the enemy. The Army approved the new Combat Action Badge (CAB) in explicit recognition of the fact that Soldiers in all units may find themselves under fire. Adding hours of marksmanship training to Infantry AIT helps Infantry Soldiers, but most of the remainder, especially those in sustainment MOSs, receive none.<sup>76</sup>
- Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan tested the training levels of American troops and commanders under combat conditions as never before. A 2015 survey of some 27,000 commanders, officers, and NCOs, however, revealed that “there was too much of a sense of entitlement [among new Soldiers], questioning of lawful orders, not listening to instruction. Too much of a buddy mentality with officers and NCOs. . . . There’s a lot of folks who say . . . we’ve lost a lot of the discipline of what it means to be a United States Army Soldier.”<sup>77</sup> The importance of these commanders’ observations cannot be overstated, and have influenced the development of future training.
- The Army experimented with having MTOE units provide Advanced Individual Training (AIT) to newly assigned basic training graduates. The premise is that it moves new Soldiers to units faster. The Army tested this concept following World War II and in the early 1970s. Instead of improving unit readiness and strength, observers found the opposite true. The program impaired unit readiness because it required the assigned unit to provide training cadre, use organic resources (i.e. vehicles, weapons, ammunition, etc.), and consumed valuable training time. The unit AIT program instituted following World War II met with near disaster when Eighth Army units containing undertrained recruits deployed to Korea to attempt to stop the North Korean invasion in June 1950. A similar, experimental program began two decades later ended after corps and division commanders expressed concerns that the advanced training in units (AIU) adversely impacted unit readiness.

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<sup>75</sup> Quoted in McFann, Hammes, and Taylor, *TRAINFIRE I*, 5.

<sup>76</sup> Brian F. Neumann, *Department of the Army Historical Summary (DAHSUM): Fiscal Year 2005* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2013), 14.

<sup>77</sup> Meghann Myers, “Land nav, iron sights and more discipline: Big changes were coming to Army Basic Training,” *Army Times*, <https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2018/02/09/land-nav-iron-sights-and-more-discipline-big-changes-were-coming-to-army-basic-training/> (accessed August 29, 2018).

- Garrison training time, however well spent, has historically grown at the expense of Soldier skills and lethality training. Sacrificing combat training for garrison type tasks in peacetime can result in individual unpreparedness and disaster during the opening stages of a conflict. Soldiers want to be challenged, and quickly figure out the difference between “garrison based” training and “make work” details to fill time.
- The next war will be more like the Korean War than Operation Iraqi Freedom – without the luxury of time to prepare. The planned extension of OSUT to 22 weeks removes the burden of additional training from the commander and potentially provides a Soldier ready to deploy upon arrival in the unit. U.S. Army history holds many examples of Soldiers deployed into combat without adequate training, usually with disastrous results.
- There are potential complications for the month-long extension. The four-week extension may increase the potential for recruit injuries or “wash outs” prior to completing the training cycle.
- There is some concern about the physical fitness of today’s recruiting pool and doubts about their ability to complete a difficult training regimen. These doubts are unfounded. The 16 million men and women who helped win World War II had survived the Great Depression, and most were not in good physical condition when they arrived for induction.
- Our Army is more technologically enhanced than ever before, and it struggles to recruit specialists in the highly technical MOSs, especially in a good economy boasting low unemployment. The training, however, must not return to the “Today’s Army Wants to Join You” model of the 1970s.

In conclusion, this case study details how all of our interwar periods have been marked by a loss of combat focus in the training base, resulting in a reduction in readiness when war came again. Additionally, the means of delivering training have evolved as the Army experimented and figured out what worked and what did not. The Army must recognize the current period as an “interwar” period rather than peacetime, and maintain that sharp edge of training. Failure to do so will lead back to the historic trend, reflected in the title of a popular marching cadence: “Here we go again...”

## Appendix 1: Terms of Reference

Most of the basic training tasks and categories over the last century have used either identical or remarkably similar language. In most cases where the language differs, it is easily understandable, for example, musketry = rifle marksmanship. This glossary primarily addresses categories or classes that are either generic or have shifted definitions over the years. Although the names or terminology may have changed, the tasks remained within in the four categories used in the tables.

### **Category: Garrison Training**

- Administrative Processing/Orientation: Introductory classes or tasks designed to familiarize recruits with the military lifestyle and prepare them for training.
  - Articles of War = Uniform Code of Military Justice
  - Military Discipline and Courtesy
  - Arms, Uniforms, and Equipment
  - School of the Soldier
  - School of the Squad
  - Army Regulations
  - Organization and Role of the Army
  - Orientation Course
  - Personal Affairs of Military Personnel and Their Dependents
  - Achievements and Traditions of the Army
  - Maintenance, Clothing, Equipment, and Quarters
  - Defense Establishment
  - Troop Information Program
  - Classification and Processing.
  - Rules of Land Warfare and the Geneva Conventions
  - Character Guidance
  - Administrative Processing
  - Command Information
  - Discipline, Morality, Traditions
  - Race Relations
  - Hazards of Alcohol and Drug Abuse
  - Reception Station/Fill Week Processing
  - Climate Orientation
  - National Holiday
  - Code of Conduct
  - Equal Opportunity
  - SAEDA Orientation (Intelligence Awareness)
  - Rape Prevention
  - Responsibilities of the Soldier
  - Appropriate Behavior



- Army Family Team Building
  - Army Values
  - Maintain Spiritual, Emotional, and Mental Fitness/Chaplain's Orientation
  - Managing Personal Finances
  - Personal Affairs
  - Serve as a Member of a Team
  - Equal Opportunity and Sexual Harassment Policies and Programs/Rape Prevention
  - Soldierization
  - In-Processing
  - Out-Processing
  - Enhancement Training
- Proficiency Testing: Training Circular No. 5, *Infantry Training* dated August 1918 allocated time for individual Soldier testing. Time allocations have varied over the years from a peak of 44 hours in 1943 to none listed in the 2010 and 2015 programs of instruction (POI).
  - Intelligence Training: Military intelligence training has also varied throughout the years discussed in this study. Combat intelligence classes were first included in recruit training in 1943 (6 hours), which is also the largest time allocation for the subject. In the 2000 POI recruits received one hour of general intelligence training, which was removed from the subsequent POIs used in this study. The intelligence training category does not include theater specific topics. These are included under the other lethality tasks.
  - Other Administrative/Garrison Tasks: This list includes any additional or garrison tasks or classes that recruits were required to complete as part of their initial indoctrination into the Army or required routine garrison duties.
    - Guard Duty
    - Theoretical
    - Completion of Training in Specialties
    - Care of Clothing and Equipment
    - Open Time
    - Review and Retraining
    - Commander's Time
    - Departure Day
    - Maintenance, Supply, Economy, and Cost Consciousness
    - Administrative Processing
    - Inspections and Training Evaluation

- Driver's Education for Basic Trainees
- Graduation
- Reinforcement, Training, and Review
- Equipment Maintenance and Turn-In
- Out-Processing
- Immunization
- Uniform Fitting
- Reinforcement Training
- Payday Activities
- Environmental Awareness
- After Action Review
- CIF (Central Issue Facility) Issue/Turn In
- Commander's Time
- Counseling

### **Category: Individual Soldier Skills**

- First Aid: The first aid category includes training time for personal hygiene and field sanitation. This collective time can include training for specialized health topics such as "Sex Hygiene" (1943), "Venereal Disease" (1973), "Female Hygiene" (2000), and "HIV/AIDS" (2000). Hours for theater-specific health training such as "Health Problems in SEA [Southeast Asia]" (1971, Infantry Advanced Individual Training) are included in the first aid cumulative total.
- Physical Training: Time allocations for physical training include scheduled collective physical training, group games, mass athletics, obstacle and confidence courses, and the Victory Tower.
- Marches and Bivouacs: This category includes tasks associated with recruits moving to and establishing operations in a field environment. Requirements can include physical activities such as foot marches and instructional classes such as packing and tent pitching. Time for these tasks varied in the time period surveyed, ranging from 40 hours in 1943 to seven in 1973.
- Land Navigation and Map Reading: These tasks included map and aerial photograph reading, use of compass, dead reckoning, and map reading and terrain association. The hours allocated for land navigation fluctuated between 1918 and 2018. Eight hours for this task was officially included in the 1943 mobilization training plan (MTP) and varied by training publication. In 1980 land navigation was listed for eight hours, but more than doubled to 16.6 in the 2010 POI.

- Individual Tactical Training (Fieldcraft): Fieldcraft classes instructed recruits how to live and survive in a field environment. These courses included general subjects such as field training exercises (FTX), field fortifications, and camouflage and could include specialized topics such as motor movement, trucking and detucking (1943) or stream crossing (1971) based on operational requirements.


### **Category: Lethality**

- Weapon Familiarization: Training designed to familiarize recruits with systems other than their assigned individual weapon. Tasks type and hours varied by contemporary weapons systems used at the time. Familiarization in 1943 included the M1 carbine and by 1971 included the M60 machine gun and the M72A2 light anti-tank weapon (LAW). Familiarization hours included weapons demonstrations for new recruits.
- Hand Grenades: The hand grenade category can include time for rifle grenade and grenade launcher instruction based on the training publication.
- Other Lethality Training: These tasks prepared recruits for tactical operations and survivability on the contemporary battlefield. Areas of instruction can be broad based such as individual tactical training and infiltration courses, or very specific theater or doctrine-related subjects. Soldiers in 1918, for example, received doctrinal training in both open and trench warfare. This training transitioned to a mechanized warfare focus in 1943 with required classes on anti-tank and anti-personnel mines and booby traps, and identification of friendly armored vehicle and aircraft. The focus shifted again during the Vietnam War when recruits received training on conventional warfare topics such as helicopter orientation and mechanized infantry techniques and counterinsurgency subjects including counter ambush techniques, cordon and search, and search and clear operations. Experiences during recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan necessitated the addition of improvised explosive device (IED) detection in the 2010 and 2015 POIs for recruit training.


### **Category: Collective Training**

- Recruit collective training was conducted generally at company level and below. There were exceptions to this in the 1941 Field Manual, which prescribed training at the battalion and regimental levels and the 1943 Mobilization Training Programs, which dictated battalion training exercises. Subjects included patrolling, day and night operations, and situational training exercises.

## Appendix 2: Building Divisions



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### Appendix 3: Army Replacement Training Centers (RTC)

RTC/Program	Description
Broad AGF RTC Mission	Train newly inducted Soldiers in basic military subjects and elementary specialist techniques in the arm or service to which they were assigned. Replacement Training Center (RTC) training generally consisted of two phases: basic training and advanced, branch-specific training. The initial training phase included initial indoctrination to the Army, individual tactical training, and squad-level, collective, infantry training. The second phase focused on training the Soldier in his MOS, both individually and collectively. Training duration followed AGF-directed timelines (13 weeks in 1942, 17 weeks in 1943). All training was conducted at the individual rather than unit level, with Soldiers designated to serve as division fillers or casualty replacements.
Infantry	Basic Combat Training for infantry-related MOS: rifleman, heavy weapons crewman, infantry cannon crewman, and antitank gunner.
Armor	BCT and MOS training at Fort Knox, KY, for tank crewmen and support personnel including mechanics, supply, and mess.
Field Artillery	BCT and MOS training for cannon crewmembers on heavy, medium, and light artillery pieces for nondivisional artillery units and fillers for division artillery. The Field Artillery Center trained nondivisional artillery units
Cavalry	BCT and MOS training at Fort Riley, KS, for cavalry scouts and associated specialties (vehicle crewmembers, mechanics, support personnel).
Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA)	BCT and MOS training at Fort Bliss, TX, for AAA weapon systems. Personnel selected for advanced technical training (i.e., radar operator) reported to the AAA School after completing their RTC requirements.
Tank Destroyer	BCT and MOS training at Camp Hood, TX, designed to familiarize new Soldiers with vehicles, crew operations, and basic maintenance functions. The Tank Destroyer (TD) Center also trained TD units.
Branch Immaterial	Opened in January 1942 and initially conducted an eight-week, infantry-focused basic training program. Army Ground Forces changed this to a six-week basic training program in 1944. Uniform basic training at Branch Immaterial RTCs permitted the AGF to assign RTC graduates to different MOS to meet changing personnel requirements.
Army Service Forces (ASF)	The ASF conducted training for all service branch personnel not assigned to divisions, following the same training plans as other RTCs. Soldiers assigned to divisions trained with their units.

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