


**U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
ACADEMIC YEAR 2017**

CORE CURRICULUM

**THEATER STRATEGY AND
CAMPAIGNING COURSE**

DIRECTIVE



**U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA 17013-5050
21 November 2016 – 10 February 2017**

Middle States Accreditation

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AY 2017

**THEATER STRATEGY
AND
CAMPAIGNING**

**COURSE DIRECTOR:
COL Douglas W. Bennett**


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COL DARRELL AUBREY
COL JOEL CLARK
Col ROBERTO GOMEZ, SSR
CAPT WILLIAM GROTEWOLD
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COL DOUGLAS WINTON



**TARN D. WARREN
COLONEL, USA
CHAIRMAN, DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY
STRATEGY, PLANNING, AND OPERATIONS**



**RICHARD A. LACQUEMENT, JR., Ph.D.
DEAN, SCHOOL OF STRATEGIC
LANDPOWER**

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COURSE OVERVIEW

General. *Theater Strategy and Campaigning focuses on the study of strategic and operational art to employ the military instrument of national power in pursuit of achieving national goals.* This course explores and evaluates U.S. military ways and means to connect operational efforts to strategic ends (policy aims) through the understanding, analysis, synthesis and application of doctrine, organizations, and concepts, translated into theater strategies and campaign plans to conduct joint, unified, and multinational operations. TSC also maintains complementary links with the Regional Studies Program (RSP) to emphasize contemporary application of U.S. operational doctrine in relation to U.S. national security interests in specific regions.

TSC aims to build upon the subjects already covered in the core curriculum to develop leaders capable of translating strategic policy and guidance into theater campaign plans that support national objectives. A few students have had personal experience planning at the operational and strategic levels using the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) and most students have some experience at the tactical level using the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). TSC leverages those experiences to examine the subtle differences in planning that exist between the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The focus of the JOPP is on the interaction between an organization's commander and staff, the commanders and staffs of the next higher and lower commands, as well as with supporting commanders' staffs. You should continuously ask yourself "what is different at this level?"

You will also conduct a detailed examination of operational design. Operational design is a creative and cognitive *commander-centric* methodology that seeks to develop an understanding of the strategic (national and/or multinational) guidance and objectives combined with a thorough understanding of the operational environment prior to and during campaign planning. This methodology leads to the development of the commander's vision for the conduct of the campaign, which enables the application of operational art through the JOPP. The result is an enduring strategic concept for sustained employment of military power to facilitate the realization of national and/or multinational policy.

You will apply strategic leader skills and incorporate national strategies as we participate in an active learning environment. At the conclusion of the course, you will have studied the art and science of applying the military instrument of power at the theater-strategic level. You must actively contribute and participate, think critically, creatively, and systematically at the strategic and operational levels, and apply innovative solutions to complex, ill-defined problems created by uncertainty and dynamic change in the world.

The course flows from understanding the environment of the combatant commander to application of operational design and the Joint Operation Planning Process. Vexing and complex problems associated with traditional warfare, irregular warfare, stability operations, unified commands, theater of war organization, and multinational operations

are addressed throughout the course, culminating with an in-seminar practicum. The practicum is a scenario set in Southeast Asia that provides the foundational background for a hypothetical contingency.

COURSE STRUCTURE

1. General. The course contains five blocks. **Block I:** “The Combatant Commander and Operational Art,” is the bridge from the concepts taught in *National Security Policy and Strategy* to the application of those concepts at the theater level in TSC. It reviews strategic guidance through the lens of the combatant commander (CCDR) and develops understanding of the operational environment at the theater strategic level. Block I leverages systems thinking from *Strategic Leadership* course and should enable the students to understand operational art and operational design as it is applied in the formulation and execution of theater campaign planning, execution, and assessment and to demonstrate the value of design methodology as a way to address complex problems. **Block II:** “Theater Strategy and JIIM” provides the “ways and means” of implementing theater strategy using all elements of national power through a unified approach in concert with our allies and coalition partners in the context of a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment (JIIM). It also considers the cornerstone and top priority of all military efforts, homeland defense and security, through the actions and activities of the NORTHCOM combatant commander. Students should proceed from this block with an understanding of theater strategy implemented through unified action in coordination with our allied and coalition partners to ultimately protect the homeland, our interests and our alliances. **Block III:** “Joint and Service Operating Concepts,” explores each of the joint service and emerging concepts and how these notions are shaping the future Joint and Service approaches to meeting the national security threats. During this block, the students will connect the concepts of the domains introduced in *Theory of War and Strategy*, through the lens of each service operating concept, with a view toward what future force and capabilities they will provide to combatant commanders to execute operations and approach emerging concepts. **Block IV:** “Joint Functions,” explores each of the joint functions and evaluates how a commander integrates these functions to produce synergistic effects within a theater of operations towards the application of military power. Additionally, the block will examine other aspects inherent to military operations (setting and maintaining a theater, strategic communication and information operations) and culminate in a Joint Functions Integration exercise. **Block V:** “Strategic and Operational Planning,” generates and reinforces student competence and confidence with operational design and the JOPP at the operational and theater levels of conflict through a series of exercises. During this block, you will apply operational art, operational design, and the Joint Functions within the JOPP to develop an operational approach and conduct MA within a JIIM environment from combatant command perspective.
2. Purpose. This course explores and evaluates U.S. military ways and means to connect operational efforts to strategic ends (policy aims) through the application of joint doctrine, translated into theater strategies and campaign plans to conduct joint, unified, and multinational operations.

3. Scope. TSC examines and applies joint doctrine in planning and conducting unified and multinational operations and analyzes the process through which national strategies are synthesized and translated into theater strategies and campaign plans. You will study the relationships that the military departments, functional components, and other governmental agencies have with Combatant Commanders. Recognizing that we exist in a dynamic international environment, your intellectual pursuits will encompass difficult issues such as the future of joint warfare and the complex issues involved when working with governmental and non-governmental agencies throughout the range of military operations. Recent and current events, as well as historical case studies, are woven throughout the fabric of the course.

4. Course Learning Outcomes.

In a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment, graduates of TSC must be able to:

a. Translate national strategic goals into military objectives and provide military advice to civilian leaders in the development of policy and strategy affecting national security. (PLOs 3, 5)

b. Develop strategic options and operational approaches and evaluate campaign plans to achieve military objectives, in concert with other instruments of national power, which realize national strategic goals. (PLOs 3, 5)

c. Integrate individual service capabilities, framed through the joint functions across multiple domains, into a Joint Force that accomplishes military objectives across the range of military operations. (PLOs 2, 3)

d. Evaluate landpower as part of the Joint Force to implement theater strategies and execute campaigns in a theater of operations. (PLO 3)

5. Curriculum Relationships.

a. TSC seeks to apply knowledge and skills derived from previous courses. In turn, students develop new skills that are essential to developing the requisite expertise to function at the theater-strategic level. TSC integrates operational design and operational art in pursuit of national security objectives while applying the military instrument of power.

b. Theater Strategy and Campaigning is an application course. Specifically, TSC draws upon lessons from the Introduction to Strategic Studies Course to build on the introduction of key concepts. Lessons in the *Strategic Leadership* course provide the basis to examine “complex problems” using critical and creative thought, viewed through a systems lens and cultural realities. Concurrently, students are exposed to the unique aspects of senior leaders and a very complex set of circumstances that require senior officer decisions. TSC also draws on the *Theory of War and Strategy* course,

which provides the underpinnings of why wars are waged, ends, ways, means, and a theoretical foundation of doctrinal concepts. The *National Security Policy and Strategy* course provides an excellent precursor to understanding the environment of the Theater Commander, as he/she accepts, derives, and builds upon national guidance to accomplish theater requirements. Finally, TSC and the *Regional Studies Program* (RSP) are conducted concurrently. TSC maintains complementary links with the RSP to emphasize contemporary application of U.S. operational doctrine in relation to U.S. national security interests in specific regions.

c. During the elective period, among other offerings, the Joint Warfighting Advanced Studies Program, and a selection of Campaign Analysis Courses, use and apply the concepts and doctrine taught during TSC. TSC is a vital part of the holistic experience of the U.S. Army War College. TSC will help prepare you to function effectively in roles as a strategic advisor, theorist, planner, or leader.

6. Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). Phase II, senior level, consists of 5 learning areas supported by 26 learning objectives focused primarily on the operational and theater strategic level. See Appendix C. All of the course learning outcomes and lessons in TSC support one or more of the JPME Phase II learning objectives. See Appendix E for detailed crosswalk. The TSC teaching faculty provides representation from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, NSA, the German Army, and a civilian university. Jointness is a part, directly or indirectly, of every lesson in TSC.

7. Complementary Programs. The Noontime Lecture Program provides supplementary material to TSC. Noontime lectures occur periodically in Wil Washcoe Auditorium. Attendees may bring and eat their lunch during the lecture.

8. Course Critique. The computerized Course Critique will be available for you to complete O/A 10 February 2017. After Action Reviews (AAR's) occur mid-course as well as at the end of the course. You may provide feedback at any time during the course, and you are encouraged to do so. You may provide comments directly to your Faculty Instructor or the Course Director.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

1. General. This course lends itself to the active learning process, requiring imaginative thought and student interaction. A simplified model to follow is to ask the WHAT of a topic or issue, the WHY of its significance, and the HOW of its utility to professional military responsibilities. The answer to many of these questions is subjective; often no clear-cut solution exists. Do not feel uncomfortable; uncertainty and ambiguity are frequently the norm. Honing creative thinking skills is central to the educational experience of TSC. Meaningful research, diligent preparation, thought-provoking presentations, and participation and contribution in seminar discussions are the principle ingredients in making the active learning process successful.

2. Daily Reading.

a. Required Readings. You must read this material prior to the class because seminar discussions are based on the readings. Readings provide basic knowledge and analysis of the topic and lesson authors select specific readings to support lesson learning outcomes. In general, you can accomplish the readings in about 2 ½ to 3 hours for each 3-hour seminar session. Follow-on discussions in the seminar room build upon that knowledge and aim to achieve analysis, synthesis, and application of the topic. In seminar, you will review, refine, and integrate previous work into seminar solutions for complex problems. Please note that TSC uses “enabling outcomes” in some lessons. Accomplish these outcomes during your preparation for seminar. The seminar builds upon the enabling outcomes to accomplish lesson outcomes.

b. Suggested and Focused Readings. These readings provide material for additional research. Faculty Instructors may assign these readings to selected students and ask them to provide a brief oral report and analysis to the seminar. These reports may offer an opposing point of view from the required reading, provide a degree of understanding beyond that required in the lesson outcomes, or support one or more of the “Points to Consider” for the lesson.

3. Student Academic Evaluation/Assessment Methods. Students are evaluated on their demonstrated performance towards achieving course learning outcomes. All student coursework and seminar contribution will be assessed by faculty and provide the foundation for the student’s overall course evaluation. TSC assessment methodology is based on two components: 50% for the two writing requirements and 50% for seminar contribution which includes exercise participation and oral presentations (if used). See below for specific details.

a. Writing Requirements.

(1) Students will complete two writing requirements. The first will be a one- to two-page position/information paper focused on responding to questions from a four-star commander, due **13 January 2017**. Your instructor will provide detailed guidance. This first paper will be 20% of the overall evaluation.

(2) The second writing requirement will be a five- to seven-page paper, due **3 February 2017**. Your faculty instructor will provide more detail on this paper as well. The intent of the second paper is to synthesize major points in the course. Topics are related to different aspects of the course learning outcomes. You and your Faculty Instructor will work together to select a topic during the course. A format will be provided. Papers will be evaluated in consonance with the AY2017 Communicative Arts Directive and worth 30% of the overall course evaluation. The Faculty Instructor will provide a copy of the evaluation to the students, identifying strengths, shortcomings, and recommendations.

b. Writing with Integrity.

(1) You must avoid plagiarism. Hugo Bedau wrote in *Thinking and Writing About Philosophy*, p. 141: "Writers plagiarize when they use another's words or ideas without suitable acknowledgement. Plagiarism amounts to theft -- of language and thought. Plagiarism also involves deception...[Plagiarism] wrongs the person from whom the words or thoughts were taken and to whom no credit was given; and it wrongs the reader by fraudulently misrepresenting the words or thoughts as though they are the writer's own." Although it sounds like a cliché, when you plagiarize you cheat yourself: first, by not developing the discipline and diligence to research, write, and edit well; second, because taking credit for other people's ideas will induce outrage and resentment against you; and third, because the habit of plagiarism can end your career and destroy your reputation.

(2) To avoid plagiarism, you must cite your sources everywhere in your paper where you use the ideas of others. You must cite them when you quote them directly, and where you paraphrase their points in your own words. In general, you should only use direct quotes when you find the author's wording to be especially effective. Your paraphrasing or summarizing other authors' points should be thorough. It is not fair to an author to change only a couple of words in a paragraph and then imply (by not using direct quotes) that the paragraph is entirely your own prose. It might help to imagine the author reading over your shoulder. Finally, using other's thoughts in academic writing is beneficial especially when you are not an expert in the field. Their research, their expertise, their conclusions, or analysis can strengthen your paper's argument and, therefore, their work should be used to good effect to make your paper more persuasive.

c. Seminar Contribution.

(1) Students must be actively involved in the seminar learning process - sharing ideas, analyses, and knowledge - and have a responsibility for establishing and contributing to seminar goals. Contribution involves being a good listener, an articulate spokesperson for a particular point of view, and an intelligent, tactful questioner or challenger of ideas. Contribution can include student performance in the seminar discussions and group work during Seminar Practicum, as well as formal and informal oral presentations and exercises. The Faculty Instructor will provide a copy of the evaluation, identifying strengths, shortcomings, and recommendations to the students.

(2) Practicum. A course of study designed for the supervised practical application of previously studied theory. The practicum will explore the characteristics of hypothetical current and future issues or conflicts, which allows participants the opportunity to consider and discuss strategic and operational concepts in a realistic situation. You will develop solutions and build upon them to arrive at seminar consensus. Written and oral responses will be required as products from the exercises and comprise 20% of the overall evaluation.

d. Oral Requirements. Students will routinely prepare and present short oral presentations to their respective seminars. Oral presentations will be evaluated by the Faculty Instructor in accordance with the AY2017 Communicative Arts Directive and included in the “contribution” section of the final course evaluation. Execution of oral presentations are at the discretion of the Faculty Instructor, but if used will be evaluated as a maximum of 10% of the overall course evaluation. Students will be notified in advance of graded oral requirements. The Faculty Instructor will provide a copy of the evaluation to the students, identifying strengths, shortcomings, and recommendations.

4. Additional Student Requirement.

a. Read **the Exercise Scenario Material for the Block V exercise NLT 3 February 2017**. It will be used for all subsequent lessons.

b. Faculty Instructors may designate individual or group projects for presentation to the seminar.

Course Overview

Block I - The Combatant Commander and Operational Art

- TSC-01: (21 Nov) Intro to TSC, The Combatant Commander (3 hrs)
- TSC-02: (22 Nov) Applying Strategic Direction (3 hrs)
- TSC-03: (29 Nov) The Theater Campaign – Using Operational Art (3 hrs)
- TSC-04: (30 Nov) Operational Design Theory (3 hrs)
- TSC-05: (1 Dec) Operational Design Practice (3 hrs)

Block II - Theater Strategy and JIIM

- TSC-06: (2 Dec) Theater Strategy and Campaign Planning (3 hrs)
- TSC-07: (5 Dec) Theater Strategy – Planning and Options (3 hrs)
- TSC-08: (6 Dec) Unified Action (3 hrs)
- TSC-09: (8 Dec) Multinational Operations (3 hrs)
- TSC-10: (9 Dec) Homeland Defense and DSCA (3 hrs)

Block III - Joint and Service Operating Concepts

- TSC-11: (12 Dec) Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, JOAC & Joint OPS (3 hrs)
- TSC-12: (14 Dec) Cyberspace (3 hrs)
- TSC-13: (4 Jan) Army Operating Concept & SOF (3 hrs)
- TSC-14: (6 Jan) Naval & Marine Operating Concepts (3 hrs)
- TSC-15: (9 Jan) Air Force Operating Concept and Space (3 hrs)
- TSC-16: (11 Jan) Emerging Concepts (3 hrs)

Block IV - Joint Functions

- TSC-17: (12 Jan) Command Structures and IO (3 hrs)
- TSC-18: (18 Jan) Sustainment: Set and Maintain the Theater (3 hrs)
- TSC-19: (20 Jan) Intelligence and Protection (3hrs)
- TSC-20: (23 Jan) Movement & Maneuver and Fires (3 hrs)
- TSC-21: (26 Jan) Integration of the Joint Functions (3 hrs)

Block V - Strategic and Operational Planning

- TSC-22: (27 Jan) Joint Operation Planning Process: Plan Initiation and Mission Analysis (3 hrs)
- TSC-23: (30 Jan) JOPP Course of Action Development (3 hrs)
- TSC-24: (3 Feb) Completing JOPP and Crisis Action Planning (3 hrs)
- TSC-25-29: (6-8 [AM] Feb) Operational Design Exercise and Brief (15 hrs)
- TSC-30-32: (8 [PM]-9 Feb) JOPP Missions Analysis Exercise and Brief (9 hrs)
- TSC-33: (10 Feb) Course Synthesis and End of Course AAR (3 hrs)

November

Academic Planning Schedule AY17 - Version 9.4

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Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
		1 1300-1430 Comdt's Time NSPS 7	2 RWR 1700 IFs "Know Your World" Event	3 NSPS 8	4 NSPS 9	5
6	7 NSPS 10	8 1300-1430 Comdt's Time NSPS 11	9 NSPS 12	10 USMC Birthday NSPS 13	11 Veteran's Day Holiday	12
13	14 NSPS 14	15 1300-1430 Comdt's Time NSPS 15	16 SRP 5	17 NSPS 16	18 NSPS Ends NSPS 17	19
20	21 Block I TSC/RSP Begins Intro to TSC, The Combatant Commander TSC 1	22 1300 Recess Begins Applying Strategic Direction TSC 2	23	24 Thanksgiving Holiday	25 Training Holiday	26
27 Fall Recess	28 RWR	29 0830 Classes Resume NTL - History of Op Art 1300-1430 Comdt's Time The Theater Campaign Using Operational Art TSC 3	30 SPKR - AFRICOM CDR Operational Design Theory TSC 4			2016

December

Academic Planning Schedule AY17 – Version 9.4

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
				1 Operational Design Practice TSC 5	2 Block II Theater Strategy 1 TSC 6	3 Christkindlesmarkt
4	5 1145-1230 USAWC B-day/ Outstanding Alumni 1300-1430 Comdt's Time	6 ICS Panel-WWA Qtrs 1 Holiday Reception NTL - PKSOI	7 RWR	8 Student Army/Navy Game (T) Multinational Opns TSC 9	9 DSCA Panel - WWA National Guard Birthday Celebration (T) NTL - DSCA Wargame HLD/ HLS, DSCA TSC 10	10 Army Navy Game
Student Holiday Socials						
	SPKR - JS DJS Theater Strategy 2 TSC 7	Unified Action TSC 8				
11 Block III 1300-1430 Comdt's Time TSC 11 CCJO, JOAC & Joint OPS	12	13 RSP 1	14 SPKR - Cyberspace Cyberspace TSC 12	15 RSP 2	16 SRP 6 1300 Recess Begins	17
18	19	20	21	22	23 Training Holiday	24
Winter Recess						
25 Christmas Day	26 Holiday Observed	27	28	29	30 Training Holiday	31
Winter Recess						

2016

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January

Academic Planning Schedule AY17 – Version 9.4

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
1 New Year's Day	2 Holiday Observed	3 0830 Classes Resume RSP 3	4 NTL - UNCLOS 1300-1430 Comdt's Time Army Operating Concept & SOF TSC 13	5 RSP 4	6 Naval & Marine Operating Concepts TSC 14	7
8 Winter Recess	9 Air Force Operating Concept and Space TSC 15	10 RSP 5	11 1300-1430 Comdt's Time Emerging Concepts TSC 16	12 Block IV NTL – Command Structures Command Structures and IO TSC 17	13 RWR TSC Paper 1 Due	14
15	16 MLK, Jr. Holiday	17 RSP 6	18 1300-1430 Comdt's Time Sustainment- Set the Theater TSC 18	19 RSP 7	20 Intelligence and Protection TSC 19	21
22	23 Movement, Maneuver and Fires TSC 20	24 RSP 8	25 SRP 7	26 1300-1430 Comdt's Time Academic Planning Conference	27 Block V Civilian Social/ Chili Cookoff Intro to JOPP & Missions Analysis TSC 22	28
29 NTL WWA	30 1300-1430 Comdt's Time JOPP Course of Action Development TSC 23	31 RSP 9		Joint Functions Integration Exercise TSC 21		2017

February

Academic Planning Schedule AY17 - Version 9.4

12

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
			1 RWR	2 RSP 10	3 TSC Paper 2 Due Completing JOPP and Crisis Action Planning TSC 24	4
5	6 Operational Design I Operational Design II TSC 25/26	7 Operational Design III Operational Design IV TSC 27/28	8 Operational Design Brief JOPP Missions Analysis I TSC 29/30	9 JOPP Missions Analysis II JOPP Mission Analysis Brief TSC 31/32	10 TSC Ends Course Synthesis and AAR TSC 33	11
12	13 SRP 8	14 DM Begins 1300-1430 Comdt's Time	15	16	17 RWR	18
		IFs Carnegie-Mellon University CyLab Program				
		DM 1	DM 2	DM 3		
19	20 Washington's Birthday Holiday	21	22	23	24	25
		IF Unified Command Field Studies Trip				
		DM 4	1300-1430 Comdt's Time DM 5	DM 6	DM 7	
26	27	28 Industry Day (T)				
	IF Unified Command Field Study Course					
	DM 8	DM 9				

2017

Block I Intent “The Combatant Commander and Operational Art”

Block Chief: Prof Al Lord

Purpose: Introduce the Theater Strategy and Campaigning course. Analyze the global and regional roles of the combatant commanders in the execution of national security policy. Synthesize the concept of operational art as it is applied in the formulation and execution of theater campaign planning, execution, and assessment. Enable the students to understand and apply operational art and operational design and to demonstrate the value of design methodology as a way to address complex problems in the operational environment.

Method: Leveraging previous instruction from the ISS, TWS, SL, and especially the NSPS course, facilitate applicable lessons to achieve the block purpose. Use the Unified Campaign Plan to describe the roles and missions of the combatant commanders. Describe operational art and review the lexicon as it pertains to the strategic level. Use design methodology to describe a likely approach to a real world security problem.

End state: At the end of the block students should understand the purpose and requirements of the TSC course, analyze the role and authorities of the combatant commanders, and have a working knowledge of operational art and the use of the design methodology.

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TSC COURSE INTRODUCTION & ENVIRONMENT OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDER

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-00/01-S

1. Introduction.

a. Theater Strategy and Campaigning Course (TSC) Introduction. During the first hour, the Faculty Instructor (FI) will introduce TSC. Key points to cover will be the course outcomes, linkages to other courses, schedule, sequence of lessons, expected outcomes, course requirements, and student assessments. The FI will also introduce the students to the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) (<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/>) and Joint Doctrine, Education & Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS) for access to joint publications (<https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=0>). NOTE: A DOD Common Access Card (CAC) is required to access the JDEIS site.

b. Environment of the Combatant Commander.

(1) The Unified Command Plan (UCP) directs the establishment of the combatant commands (CCMD) as provided in the National Security Act of 1947 and Title 10 of the United States Code (USC). Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) receive strategic direction from the President and Secretary of Defense through a variety of formal and informal methods (to be covered in TSC-02) and are responsible for planning and executing operations to achieve US strategic ends. Geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) are the senior Department of Defense representatives in their respective areas of responsibility (AORs). Functional combatant commanders (FCCs) provide support across all regions. CCDRs must accurately understand their environment and problems they face or will face, then fashion an adaptable strategy that meets current challenges while preparing for future threats, challenges, and opportunities. This strategy must be flexible enough to prevent threats and challenges from arising when possible, mitigate threats when necessary, and take advantage of opportunities that might be “hidden” within the larger dynamic strategic environment. Therefore, before we undertake operational design and joint operational planning, we must first understand the nature and characteristics of the contemporary – and evolving – environment of the CCDR.

(2) This lesson will examine the nature and characteristics of the CCDR’s environment. Its purpose is to assist you in framing the scope and complexity of the challenges and opportunities inherent in the evolving 21st Century environment and their impact on the CCDR’s ability to understand, envision, prioritize, and plan to meet current, as well as future, challenges and opportunities while managing risk and time.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Evaluate** difficulties combatant commanders face in envisioning, understanding, and prioritizing challenges and opportunities in complex environments while managing risk.

b. **Analyze** the nature, character, and characteristics of the evolving contemporary environment facing combatant commanders when developing and executing military strategy for their geographic region.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Comprehend** and be prepared to discuss the roles and responsibilities of the CCDR in the formulation, articulation, translation, dissemination, and implementation of strategic direction.

b. **Comprehend** the role of the combatant commander in influencing long-term processes such as research and development, acquisition, and global posture and basing.

c. **Know** the six Geographic Combatant Commands' (GCC) Areas of Responsibility (AORs) and at least three responsibilities common to all GCCs.

d. **Know** the three Functional Combatant Commands (FCC) and at least one responsibility unique to each FCC.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Complete the required readings and be prepared to discuss the points to consider in seminar.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Cynthia Watson, *Combatant Commands* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, June 8, 2010), <http://psi.praeger.com/doc.aspx?d=/books/gpg/E1380C/E1380C-48.xml> (accessed June 8, 2016). Read Introduction and Origins of the Geographic Combatant Command System, pp. 2-20. **[Open Source URL]**

(2) President of the United States (POTUS), *Unified Command Plan* (April 6, 2011 with Change-1 dated 12 September 2011); For Official Use Only (FOUO). Read pp. 1-4, scan remainder. **[DMSPO Student Issue]**

(3) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf (accessed June 20, 2016). Read pp. III-7 to III-12. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(4) James R. Clapper, *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 9, 2016), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/SASC_Unclassified_2016_ATA_SFR_FINAL.pdf (accessed June 20, 2016). Read pp. 1-15. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(5) US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operating Environment 2035* (Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 14, 2016), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joe/joe_2035_july16.pdf (accessed July 25, 2016). Read “Executive Summary” and pp. 5-9. **[Open Source URL]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Barack Obama, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” (Washington, DC, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf (accessed June 22, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(2) Andrew Feickert, *The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2013), <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/202875.pdf> (accessed June 22, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(3) Michael O’Hanlon, “Do U.S. Military Commands Really Need Reorganizing?” *Brookings*, entry posted January 5, 2016, <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/01/05-do-us-military-commands-need-reorganizing-ohanlon> (accessed June 23, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(4) *Title 10 and Title 32, United States Code*, Public Law 1028, 84th Cong., 2nd sess. (August 10, 1956), <http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title10/subtitleA/part1/chapter6&edition=prelim> (accessed June 23, 2016). Read sections 161-168. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. What role do combatant commanders have regarding national security and policy? What are the associated responsibilities and authorities and where do they come from?

b. What are the predominant characteristics of the contemporary and evolving operational environment and their impact on CCDRs' ability to shape their AORs on terms favorable to national interests while managing risk?

c. What are the implications of an "over focus" of Joint Force capabilities on any one region of the conflict continuum? What are the associated impacts on long-term processes such as research and development, acquisition, and global posture and basing in an increasingly resource-constrained environment?

APPLYING STRATEGIC DIRECTION

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-02-S

1. Introduction.

a. The National Security Policy and Strategy (NSPS) course introduced national-level policy and strategy formulation. This lesson is a “bridge” from that national-level focus to the theater-level focus of the combatant commander (CCDR) in the Theater Strategy and Campaigning (TSC) course. Joint planning and design must account for the strategic ends contained in strategic guidance documents and ensure that campaigns are consistent with national priorities and appropriate for the achievement of national security objectives derived from the available strategic direction whether formal or informal. Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines strategic direction as:

*The processes and products by which the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide strategic guidance to the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies.*¹

b. Combatant commanders receive strategic guidance both formally and informally. Examples of formal strategic direction include the Unified Command Plan (UCP), National Security Strategy (NSS), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (aka Defense Strategy Review in NDAA FY2015), National Military Strategy (NMS), Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG), and Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). The President of the United States (POTUS) and Secretary of Defense (SecDef) may also provide strategic direction to CCDRs informally in Presidential Policy Decisions (PPDs), policy speeches, press conferences, public statements, other written guidance, and personal interaction with CCDRs. Some of this informal guidance may amend or cancel formal strategic direction.

c. CCDRs and staffs also monitor a variety of “strategic influencers” to anticipate changes to strategic direction. These influencers include the media, think tanks, interest groups, and public opinion. Although they do not provide strategic direction, they can influence policy and subsequent strategic direction. In many cases these

¹Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 8 November 2010, as amended through 15 June 2015, p. 228; incorporated from Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, 11 August 2011, p. GL-15.

influencers have a bearing on the CCDR's interpretation and application of strategic guidance and inform their judgment and interaction with POTUS and the SecDef.

d. This lesson examines the formulation, articulation, dissemination, and interpretation of strategic direction. It will examine the relationships between various strategic direction products and the management of national military resources. These topics contribute to the foundation of Theater Strategy and Campaigning.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Analyze** the doctrinal process and procedures by which Combatant Commanders receive strategic guidance and the relationships between the various strategic documents (UCP, NSS, DSR/QDR, NMS, GEF, DPG, JSCP, GFMIG, and GFMAP).

b. **Evaluate** how strategic documents influence the Global Force Management process and how Combatant Commanders use this process to receive forces required to accomplish assigned tasks.

c. **Analyze** how Combatant Commanders assess the strategic environment and evaluate both informal and formal strategic direction to accomplish mission achieve national security objectives in their theater using a contemporary example.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Know** the party responsible and purpose for the following strategic direction documents: UCP, NSS, DSR/QDR, NMS, GEF, DPG, JSCP, GFMIG, and GFMAP.

b. **Know** the definition of Assignment, Allocation, and Apportionment.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Complete the required readings; refer frequently to learning outcomes, enabling outcomes, and points to consider.

(2) Be prepared to discuss the relationships among the various strategic direction documents.

b. Required Readings (in order).

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 August 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed July 12, 2016). Read Chapter II, "Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning," pages II-1 to II-6, paras. 1 to 6 and Appendix H, "Global Force Management," pp. H-1 to H-5. **[Open Source URL], [TSC AY17 CD Rom] and [Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2017). Read Chapter 1, "National Strategic Direction and Guidance," pp. 3-9 and Appendix B: Global Force Management. **[Student Issue], [TSC AY17 CD Rom] and [Blackboard]**

(3) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 2015), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/National_Military_Strategy_2015.pdf (accessed July 12, 2016). *NSPS Lesson 15*, scan 1-17. **[Open Source URL], [TSC AY17 CD Rom] and [Blackboard]**

(4) Barack Obama, *Statement by the President on ISIL*, transcript of speech, September 10, 2014, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1> (accessed July 13, 2016) and/or *YouTube*, streaming video, 15:15, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=splWGoNZnaU> (focus on 4:57 to 8:57) (accessed August 4, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(5) Barack Obama, *Remarks by the President on Progress in the Fight Against ISIL*, transcript of speech, July 6, 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/06/remarks-president-progress-fight-against-isil> (accessed July 13, 2016) and/or *C-Span*, streaming video, 19:22, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?326940-3/president-obama-statement-us-strategy-isis> (focus on 2:47 to 8:42) (accessed August 4, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(6) Barack Obama, *Remarks by the President After Counter-ISIL Meeting*, transcript of speech, June 14, 2016, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/14/remarks-president-after-counter-isil-meeting> (accessed July 13, 2016) and/or *C-Span*, streaming video, 25:42, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?411147-1/president-obama-delivers-statement-us-operations-isis> (focus on 0:00 to 10:52). (accessed August 4, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Incorporating Change 1*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 25 March 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf (accessed July 12, 2016). Read pp. II-1 to II-7, paragraphs 1 & 2. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, *NWC 2061E, A Primer for: Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the Adaptive Planning and Execution System, and Global Force Management (GFM)* (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, July 23, 2015), <https://jsou.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/library/Library%20Content/JSOU%20References/SOPC/A%20Primer%20for%20Guidance%20for%20Employment%20of%20the%20Force%20%28GEF%29%2C%20Joint%28A9R725%29.pdf> (accessed July 14, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(3) Charles T. Hagel, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, March 2014), http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf (accessed July 13, 2016). Read “Chairman’s Assessment,” pp. 59-64. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(4) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3141.01E, *Management and Review of Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)-Tasked Plans* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 15, 2011) http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3141_01.pdf (accessed July 12, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(5) Jon C. Wilkinson, “The Resurrection of Adaptive Planning,” *Army War College Review* 1, no. 2 (May 2015), <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/AWCReview/Issues/May2015.pdf> (accessed July 13, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(6) Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed July 13, 2016). *NSPS Lesson 15*, scan pp. 1-14. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(7) Charles T. Hagel, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, March 2014), http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf (accessed July 13, 2016). *NSPS Lesson 15*, scan cover letter and Executive Summary (pp. III-XV). **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

5. Points to Consider.

- a. What are the key differences between strategic direction and operational or tactical orders or guidance?
- b. Which document do you believe Combatant Commanders consider the most important and why?
- c. How effective is strategic direction in guiding the Combatant Commander's use of the military instrument of power to achieve strategic ends?
- d. How do assigned, allocated, and apportioned forces influence Combatant Commanders' plans?
- e. Does Global Force Management enable or constrain Combatant Commanders?
- f. How does the Combatant Commander translate strategic direction into a plan? What types of guidance should be considered?

THE THEATER CAMPAIGN—USING OPERATIONAL ART

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-03-S

The essential task of operational art [is] mediating between abstract conception and concrete action.

–Huba Wass de Czege, 2011

1. Introduction. Joint Publication 5-0 *Joint Operation Planning* defines three related concepts (page III-1) for this lesson.

a. *Operational art* is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations and organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. Operational art promotes *unified action* by helping Joint Force Commanders (JFC) and staffs understand how to facilitate the integration of other agencies and multinational partners toward achieving strategic and operational objectives.

b. *Operational design* is a process of iterative understanding and problem framing that supports commanders and staffs in their application of operational art with tools and a methodology to conceive of and construct viable approaches to operations and campaigns. Operational design results in the commander's *operational approach*, which broadly describes the actions the joint force needs to take to reach the end state. We will cover operational design in lessons TSC-04 and TSC-05.




Figure III-1. Operational Art

(JP 5-0, 11 August 2011)

c. Finally, the **Joint Operation Planning Process** (JOPP) is an orderly, analytical process through which the JFC and staff translate the broad operational approach into detailed plans and orders. We will cover the JOPP in lessons TSC-22 through TSC-32.

d. During *Theory of War and Strategy*, you studied several strategic theorists, including the work of Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini (arguably the foremost influence on American military thinking about *operational art*). Operational art carries out the strategy that puts policy into action, as you saw in *National Security Policy and Strategy*. We revisit this concept (and its complement, *operational design*) early in TSC to practice their application before using them in Joint Operation Planning.

e. The title of this course, *Theater Strategy and Campaigning*, has two elements. As you will learn in future lessons, the military component of national strategy is accomplished as “Theater Strategy” by the Geographic Combatant Commanders, while the term “Campaigning” describes how these commanders design and implement military strategy. According to JP 5-0, they use operational art to link ends, ways, and means (with an eye on risk) to achieve the desired end state by answering the following questions:

(1) What is the necessary military end state related to the strategic end state, and what objectives must be achieved to enable that end state? (Ends)

(2) What sequence of actions is most likely to achieve those objectives and the end state? (Ways)

(3) What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions, within constraints? (Means)

(4) What is the chance of failure or unacceptable consequences in performing that sequence of actions? (Risk)

f. Operational design supports operational art with a methodology to apply cognitive skills using tools called *elements of operational design* for understanding the situation and the problem and visualizing approaches to the problem. Note: Some military planners (for example, see Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0) advocate for referring to these joint tools as *elements of operational art*, to prevent confusion with the three broad aspects of operational design you will study and practice in the next two g. The links to the readings for this lesson are found in paragraph (4). This section includes instructional commentary for each of the Required Readings—the reason for asking you to spend your time reading it.

(1) The short reading in the DMSPO *Campaign Planning Handbook Academic Year 2017* will help you achieve the enabling outcome for this lesson, setting the stage for the remainder of your readings.

(2) You read the joint doctrinal definition of operational art on the first page of the TSC-03 lesson directive. This reading from JP 5-0 lays out some doctrinal tools to help the commander employ operational art (and operational design, for that matter).

(3) As you now know, JP 5-0 espouses 13 elements of operational design (page III-18). The DOCNET vignettes cover eight of them, while the remaining five illustrate

elements appearing in the 2006 edition of JP 5-0 but are no longer doctrinal today. Do the “obsolete” elements seem useful?

(4) How does Brigadier General (retired) Wass de Czege believe operational art and campaign planning should be improved? How does he differentiate between “tactics and planning” and “strategy and design”?

(5) What do you think about Dr. Foley’s argument about operational art? How would you incorporate it into a “new understanding of ‘campaign planning’ ”?

(6) The final reading by James Schneider offers a historical example of operational art centered around seven proposed attributes (you do not need a deep knowledge of the American Civil War to understand the author’s arguments). Do you agree with Schneider’s relation of the practice of operational art to a commander’s freedom of action, instead of the classical emphasis on positional advantage or annihilation?

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Analyze** the use of operational art by commanders to provide the vision that links tactical actions to strategic objectives.

b. **Evaluate** the utility of the elements of operational design through case studies and vignettes.

3. Enabling Outcome. **Understand** that operational design is a recursive methodology with three aspects: understanding the environment, defining the problem, and developing an operational approach.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Required Readings.

(1) Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook Academic Year 2017* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2016-2017). Read “An Operational Design Approach to Campaigning,” to the end of para. 2.a., pp. 23-25. **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**, **[DMSPO Student Issue]** and **[Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed June 30, 2016). Read “Elements of Operational Design,” pp. III-18 through III-38. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**, and **[Blackboard]**

(3) Doctrine Networked Education & Training (DOCNET), *Case Studies in Operational Art and Design*, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Electronic Library, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/docnet/courses/supplemental/case-studies.htm> (accessed June 30, 2016). **[Open Source URL]** and **[Blackboard]**

- Anticipation—DESERT STORM, 1991 (11 slides)
- Arranging Operations—URGENT FURY, 1983 (11 slides)
- Center of Gravity—Vicksburg, 1862-63 (10 slides)
- Decisive Point—The Meuse River, 1940 (12 slides)
- Direct and Indirect Approach—Spain, 1808-1813 (7 slides)
- Forces and Functions—DESERT STORM, 1991 (9 slides)
- Operational Reach—Sherman's Campaign, 1864-65 (12 slides)
- Termination—throughout history (16 slides)
- [2006] Balance—Soissons, 1918 (13 slides)
- [2006] Leverage—DESERT STORM, 1991 (12 slides)
- [2006] Simultaneity and Depth—Grant's Campaign, Spring 1864 (12 slides)
- [2006] Synergy—Evacuation of Kham Duc, 1968 (12 slides)
- [2006] Timing and Tempo—New Guinea, 1942 (9 slides)

(4) Huba Wass de Czege, "Operational Art: Continually Making Two Kinds of Choices in Harmony While Learning and Adapting," *ARMY* 61, no. 9 (September 2011), [Proquest](#), (accessed July 26, 2016). Read pp. 46-56. **[USAWC Library Online Database]**

(5) Robert T. Foley, "Operational Level and Operational Art: Still Useful Today?" *Defence-in-Depth*, entry posted September 14, 2015, <https://defenceindepth.co/2015/09/14/operational-level-and-operational-art-still-useful-today/> (accessed June 30, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(6) James J. Schneider, "Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the Foundations of Operational Art," Theoretical Paper No. 4 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, June 16, 1992), <http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll11/id/9/rec/67> (accessed August 28, 2016). Read "Section 6. The Structure of Operational Art," pp. 35-62. **[Open Source URL]** and **[Blackboard]**

b. Focused Readings. None.

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Dale Eikmeier, "Operational Art, Design and the Center of Gravity, Part 1 of 4," October 13, 2015, *U.S. Army Command and General Staff College YouTube Channel*, streaming video, 11:19, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nBStKk3fE4E> (accessed June 30, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(2) Michael R. Matheny, "The Roots of Modern American Operational Art" (n.d.), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/modern_operations.pdf (accessed August 23, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

Eikmeier presents one way to step through a critical factors analysis to determine the *critical capabilities*, *critical requirements* and *critical vulnerabilities* that allow planners to design an approach to optimally address (or attack) a COG.

(3) Dale Eikmeier, "Operational Art, Design, and the Center of Gravity, Part 3 of 4," October 13, 2015, *U.S. Army Command and General Staff College YouTube Channel*, streaming video, 11:26, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9WnmVlybFG0> (accessed June 30, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(4) Dale Eikmeier, "Operational Art, Design, and the Center of Gravity, Part 4 of 4," October 13, 2015, *U.S. Army Command and General Staff College YouTube Channel*, streaming video, 15:41, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-RYbtzfb1w> (accessed June 30, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(5) Lawrence Freedman, "Stop Looking for the Center of Gravity," *War on the Rocks*, entry posted June 24, 2014, <http://warontherocks.com/2014/06/stop-looking-for-the-center-of-gravity/> (accessed July 21, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(6) Daniel Steed, "Strategy: Renewing the Center of Gravity," *War on the Rocks*, entry posted July 17, 2014, <http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/strategy-renewing-the-center-of-gravity/> (accessed July 21, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(7) Joe Strange and Richard Iron, "Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant," *Joint Force Quarterly* 35 (October 2004), <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a520980.pdf> (accessed September 1, 2016). Read pp. 20-27. **[Open Source URL]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. How does the definition of operational art found in JP 5-0 compare to that given by Wass de Czege and Foley? How would you define operational art to make it most suitable to your own concept of modern warfare?

b. Do you think the elements of operational design (art) are enduring? Would you change any of them to be more useful in warfare today?

c. What modern examples of Schneider's seven attributes can you envision? How do these attributes relate to the elements of operational design (art) in JP 5-0?

d. What is the relationship between end state, termination criteria, and objectives?

e. What is an effect? How can a description of desired and undesired effects assist in linking objectives to activities?

f. What is a center of gravity (COG)? What is the relationship between a COG and objectives?

g. How can an analysis of a COG, through describing its critical capabilities (CC), critical requirements (CR), and critical vulnerabilities (CV), help the commander and staff formulate approaches to solving a problem?

h. What is a decisive point? How can one develop potential decisive points?

i. What are lines of effort? How do they differ from lines of operation?

j. What is the relationship between a COG, decisive points, and lines of operation/lines of effort?

OPERATIONAL DESIGN THEORY


Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-04-S

1. Introduction.

a. Recall from TSC-03 that operational design is a process of iterative understanding and problem framing that supports commanders and staffs in their application of operational art; it provides a methodology to conceive of and construct viable approaches to operations and campaigns. Operational design results in the commander's operational approach, which broadly describes the actions the joint force needs to take to reach the end state. The elements of operational design can best be thought of as the language of the operational approach and will be essential in the structured planning of the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP).

b. After the commander and planners understand the strategic direction, JP 5-0 describes three inter-related and recursive activities (or frames) of operational design: *understand the operational environment, define the problem, and develop an operational approach*. The Army War College *Campaign Planning Handbook* states that operational design provides an organized way to think through the complexity of the environment and the ill-structured problems that may require the use of force. (You learned about such problems as complex, adaptive systems during Strategic Leadership.) Operational design's logical approach to thinking about a system seeks wider and deeper understanding, not necessarily closure. Its recursive nature emerges from the synthesis of these three frames to help the commander decide if change, or "reframing", is needed. For example, work on developing an approach may reveal unaddressed problems or unconsidered aspects of the environment.



USAWC Campaign Planning Handbook, Fig. 9

c. You might ask: “Why not simply use the Military Decisionmaking Process (MDMP) spelled out in the Army’s ADRP 5-0 that serves tactical planners so well?” The MDMP begins with “Receipt of Mission” and proceeds in a linear fashion to produce a plan to accomplish this specified mission. Operational design, on the other hand assumes that you have not received a mission that lets you begin structured planning; it could be called a sensemaking activity to discover the actual problem which can be addressed by a mission statement.

d. You will apply the aspects of operational design during an exercise in TSC-05.

e. The links to the readings for this lesson are found in paragraph (4). This section includes instructional commentary for each of the Required Readings—the reason for asking you to spend your time reading it. Before you begin the readings, reflect on the TSC-03 article where Wass de Czege interweaves operational design throughout his discussion of operational art.

(1) Now, let’s address the question “Is operational design a concept invented by the military?” The first two readings (Camillus and Fast Company Staff) should give some perspective on complex problems and the concepts of “design” and “design thinking” that have evolved to address them in the art and engineering industries.

(2) The DMSPO Campaign Planning Handbook Academic Year 2017 amplifies the joint doctrine of operational design found in JP 5-0. It will highlight how its joint focus differs from that of the Army Design Methodology while pointing out their underlying similarities. Watch for parallels with the Fast Company Staff blog post.

(3) The next two short readings (Lewis and Vozza) give a practical perspective to problem definition. Lewis uses the language of commercial design thinking but his questions seek to answer aspects of a problem similar to those in the sights of military “designers.”

(4) The vignette from Army Design Methodology, ATP 5-0.1 ties together the three aspects of operational design as “an example of framing an operational environment from a systems perspective.” Presented from an admittedly Army perspective, it demonstrates a way to aid this visualization and sketches out identifying key nodes to target with an operational approach.

(5) This lesson closes with a historical case. The British counterinsurgency campaign during the 1948–1960 Malayan Emergency, after several attempts, eventually settled into an integrated civil-military command structure that led to victory. As you read Ladwig, look for the points of change in the environment, problem and approach; did the British reframe at the right times?

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Analyze** the concept of operational design.

b. **Evaluate** the use of the operational design methodology to help the commander understand and develop an approach to address complex, ill-structured problems.

3. Enabling Outcome. **Comprehend** the nature of an ill-structured (“wicked”) problem.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Required Readings.

(1) John Camillus, “Strategy as a Wicked Problem,” *Harvard Business Review* (May 2008), <https://hbr.org/2008/05/strategy-as-a-wicked-problem> (accessed August 2, 2016). Read the sidebar, “The 10 Properties of Wicked Problems,” located after paragraph 6 of the linked article. **[Open Source URL]**

(2) Fast Company Staff, “Design Thinking ...What is That?” *6 Minute Read* blog, entry posted on March 20, 2006, <http://www.fastcompany.com/919258/design-thinking-what> (accessed June 30, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(3) Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook Academic Year 2017* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2017). Read Chapter 3 “Operational Design,” pp. 21-51. **[TSC AY17 CD Rom], [DMSPO Student Issue] and [Blackboard]**

(4) Jonathan Lewis, “Asking Good Questions is Essential for Great Design,” *InVision* blog, entry posted February 22, 2016, <http://blog.invisionapp.com/asking-good-questions-is-essential-for-great-design/> (accessed July 29, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(5) Stephanie Vozza, “Three Ways to Reframe a Problem to Find an Innovative Solution,” *3 Minute Read* blog, entry posted September 8, 2015, <http://www.fastcompany.com/3050265/hit-the-ground-running/three-ways-to-reframe-a-problem-to-find-innovative-solution> (accessed July 29, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(6) Department of the Army, *Army Design Methodology*, ATP 5-0.1, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, July 1, 2015). Read Appendix B “Vignette,” pp. B-1 to B-6. **[Blackboard] and [TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

(7) Walter C. Ladwig III, “Managing Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Malaya,” *Military Review* (May-June 2007), http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20070630_art011.pdf (accessed July 29, 2016). Read pp. 56-66. **[Open Source URL]**

b. Focused Readings. None.

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed August 2, 2016). Scan pp. III-1 to III-17. **[Open Source URL]** and **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

(2) Dale Eikmeier, "Operational Art, Design, and the Center of Gravity, Part 2 of 4," October 13, 2015, *U.S. Army Command and General Staff College YouTube Channel*, streaming video, 12:56, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h7poQ87Nf0A> (accessed June 30, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(3) Adam Elkus, "A Critical Perspective on Operational Art and Design Theory," *Small Wars Journal* Online (April 30, 2012), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/a-critical-perspective-on-operational-art-and-design-theory> (accessed July 21, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(4) James Stultz and Michael Buchanan, "A New Theory to Avoid Operational Level Stagnation," *Army Press Online Journal* (April 1, 2016), <http://armypress.dodlive.mil/files/2016/03/16-14-Stultz-and-Buchanan-1Apr161.pdf> (accessed July 30, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(5) Ben Zweibelson, "Three Design Concepts Introduced for Strategic and Operational Applications," *PRISM* 4, no. 2 (2013), http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_4-2/prism87-104_Zweibelson.pdf (accessed July 21, 2016). Read pp. 87-104. **[Open Source URL]**

5. Points to Consider.

- a. How would you characterize operational design's relationship to operational art?
- b. What conditions prompt us to employ operational design instead of the Military Decisionmaking Process?
- c. What are some questions that operational design should reveal in the current and future operational environments?
- d. What are some issues that may arise during the work to define the problem?
- e. What choices must the design team make when they identify potential undesired effects on the environment caused by the proposed operational approach?
- f. Does operational design support or conflict with what you learned during the lesson "Leading Organizational Change and Vision" in Strategic Leadership?

OPERATIONAL DESIGN PRACTICE

Mode: Instructor Facilitated Exercise

Lesson: TSC-05-EX

1. Introduction. This is a three-hour demonstration of the design methodology. Your faculty instructor will lead you through a real world scenario that will develop a framework for an operational assessment. You are members of a Combatant Commander's study group and have been assigned to conduct an analysis of a regional issue. Your work will inform the Combatant Commander and staff as they consider solutions and make recommendations to national security leadership.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Synthesize** the role and perspective of the Combatant Commander and the CCDR staff in developing approaches to address current or future regional threats to U.S. national interests.

b. **Evaluate** the operational design methodology by understanding the operational environment, defining the problem, and developing an operational approach given a regional scenario.

c. **Evaluate** the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities across the range of military operations and plans.

3. Enabling Outcomes. None.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Using the readings, you should develop a sense for regional U.S. policy and existing diplomatic, information, military, and economic conditions, initiatives and activities to form an understanding of the environment.

(2) During the three-hour exercise, the seminar will move back and forth between the three interconnected cognitive activities of operational design (understanding the environment, defining the problem, and developing an approach). This will enable a synthesized understanding and visualization of goals and objectives to achieve desired strategic outcomes in a particular CCDR area of responsibility (AOR). Although the allocation of time to each of the three activities is not bound by the course titles, the first hour should be used to achieve an understanding of the environment that will act as the foundation for framing the CCDR's recommended goals and objectives. At some point during the second hour, the seminar will shift their primary effort to defining the problem that the CCDR must solve (what must change in the environment to achieve our policy

aims). During the third hour, the seminar must develop an approach that will address the problem, which may very well create more questions to be asked about the environment, which may in turn trigger a need to refine the problem statement. The iteration of these three frames should enable the group to develop the basis for coherent regional goals and objectives.

(3) At the end of the lesson students will have the ingredients to produce a coherent brief. Although time limitations will preclude a formal presentation this time, another design exercise is part of block 5. A successful operational approach should include the following elements:

(a) A description of the most important aspects of the environment.

(b) Desired theater outcomes and their linkage to national interests and goals or objectives.

(c) A definition or description of the problem(s).

(d) An approach which describes how resources will be applied with a timeframe for expected outcomes.

(e) A description of risks inherent to the approach.

(f) A strategic narrative that will explain the approach to the broadest range of stakeholders.

b. Required Readings. The faculty instructor will select from one of the following three scenarios to conduct the demonstration:

(1) Countering China Scenario:

(a) Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic China 2016* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2016), <http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf> (accessed August 2, 2016). Read "Executive Summary," pp. i–iii; Chapter 2, pp. 40-51; and Chapter 3, pp. 56-74. **[Open Source URL], [TSC AY17 CD Rom] and [Blackboard]**

(b) Anthony Cordesman, "China Military Organization and Reform," August 1, 2016, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinese-military-organization-and-reform?block1> (accessed August 2, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(c) Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, "Future Warfare in the Western Pacific" *International Security* 41, no. 1 (Summer, 2016), http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00249 (accessed August 17, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(d) OPTIONAL SCAN: Russell N. Bailey, et al., *Duffer's Shoal: A Strategic Dream of the Pacific Command Area of Responsibility* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, August 2015), <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1278> (accessed August 2, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(2) Russia and the Baltics Scenario:

(a) Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Obama to the People of Estonia," September 3, 2014, *The White House Home Page*, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/03/remarks-president-obama-people-estonia> (accessed August 1, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(b) Douglas Mastriano, *Project 1721: Assessment of Russian Strategy Landpower in Europe* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, August 2016), <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/PDFfiles/PCorner/Project1721.pdf> (accessed August 19, 2016). Read pp 7-23 and 128-140. **[TSC AY17 CD Rom], [Blackboard] and [Open Source URL]**

(c) Kathleen Hicks, Heather Conley, et al., *Evaluating Future U.S. Army Force Posture in Europe: Phase I Report* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2016), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/160203_Hicks_ArmyForcePosture_Web.pdf (accessed August 2, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(3) Defeating ISIL Scenario:

(a) Anthony Cordesman, "Obama and U.S. Strategy in the Middle East," June 23, 2016, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/obama-and-us-strategy-middle-east> (accessed August 1, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(b) Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, et al, "Al Qaeda and ISIS: Existential Threats to the U.S. and Europe," January 16, 2016 <http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/PLANEX%20Report%201%20--%20FINALFINALFINAL.pdf> (accessed September 27, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(c) SCAN: Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, et al., "Competing Visions for Syria and Iraq: The Myth of an Anti-ISIS Grand Coalition," January 20, 2016, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/PLANEX%20Report%202%20FINAL_FINAL_0.pdf (accessed September 27, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(d) SCAN: Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, et al., "Jabhat Al Nusra and ISIS: Sources of Strength" February 10, 2016, <http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/PLANEX%20Report%203%20FINAL.pdf> (accessed September 27, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

c. Focused Readings. None

d. Suggested Readings. None.

5. Points to Consider.

a. Does the concept of operational design add value to problem solving at the strategic level? How?

b. How can we best use operational design to influence policy options or strategic guidance? What is the role of the Combatant Commander in the policy making or determining the regional strategic guidance?

c. How can the fruits of applying operational design inform theater strategy and the theater campaign plan?

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Block II Intent “Theater Strategy and Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational”

Block Chief: Prof Mike Marra

Purpose: After considering strategic direction, operational design and the theater campaign as viewed by the geographical combatant commander, Block II provides the “ways and means” of implementing theater strategy using all elements of national power through a unified approach in concert with our allies and coalition partners in the context of a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment. We also consider the cornerstone and top priority of all military efforts, homeland defense and security through the actions and activities of the NORTHCOM combatant commander.

Method: This module features student readings, guest lectures, guest panels, seminar instruction, case studies, and optional student oral presentations on selected readings in support of programed learning outcomes (PLOs), Joint Learning Areas (JLAs) and Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs).

End state: Students should proceed from this block with an understanding of theater strategy implemented through unified action in coordination with our allied and coalition partners to ultimately protect the homeland, our interests and our alliances.

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THEATER STRATEGY AND THEATER CAMPAIGN PLANNING

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-06-S

1. Introduction.

a. Geographic Combatant Commanders translate national policy and strategy into theater strategy and executable Theater Campaign Plans. Functional Combatant Commanders must also translate national policy/strategy into functional strategy for specified global problems and develop those strategies into Global Campaign Plans.

The Combatant Command (CCMD) Theater Strategy is the Combatant Commander's first opportunity to put national strategic guidance into a regional context. In it he or she describes the environment, the regions multiple challenges and his or her approach toward advancing U.S. National Interests.

The Theater Strategy sits in an interesting place in the hierarchy of guidance documents that echelon down from the President to individual soldiers. The various strategies written in Washington D.C. provide 10-30 year goals, broad interests, and conceptual ways. The GEF, signed by the SECDEF, on the other hand provides operational level guidance focused on specific problem sets in the 3-5 year horizon. Theater Strategies must balance the need to look more broadly conceptually and deeper temporally than the GEF while also bringing national strategic guidance into their regions in a way that provides guidance to planners -- who have to turn concepts into actual operations, actions and activities.

b. In the first part of today's lesson we will discuss how a Combatant Commander translates national strategic direction into a theater strategy, and then into a Theater Campaign Plan (TCP). We will discuss the linkages between the NSS, NMS, GEF, JSCP, PPDs, speeches, and other relevant sources of guidance. We will look at the balance of military art and planning science that goes into these documents and what balance Theater Strategies strike. We will explore the limits, or lack thereof, that a Combatant Commander faces as he/she writes his/her highest level document.

c. For the second topic of today's discussion, we will address planning from the Combatant Commander's point of view. Military planning is integrated within a more comprehensive environment in order to produce plans and orders that achieve the national objectives established by the President, and to consider the objectives and capabilities of other relevant actors. Joint operational planning harmonizes military actions with those of other instruments of national power, and our multinational partners, in time, space, and purpose to achieve a specified end state. The first real deliberate planning that a CCMD produces are Theater and Functional Campaign Plans (TCP/FCP). They are the basis for execution of operations plans, contingency plans (which are branches to the TCP/FCP), and supporting plans of various types. All

geographic CCDRs are currently required by the GEF and JSCP to develop and execute TCPs. Functional CCDRs, and occasionally Geographic CCDRs, may be directed to lead the deliberate planning of specified FCPs.

TCPs/FCPs take the next logical step in translating national level guidance into executable actions. They take longer range ends from the Theater Strategy, tie it to mid-range GEF objectives, and blend in activities from other USG entities and multinational partners to describe where the CCMD will go for the next 1-5 years. TCPs also lay out what contingencies may occur (GEF, JSCP, and/or Commander envisioned) and how the USG will prevent or manage those contingencies.

Deliberate planning is an iterative process and is adaptive to situational changes within the operational and planning environments. The process allows for changes in plan priorities, changes to the review and approval process, and contains the flexibility to adjust the specified development timeline to produce and refine plans. TCPs and FCPs are aimed at desired steady-state strategic conditions, and therefore must be inherently flexible to react to changing assumptions.

We will discuss how the operational design seen in the Theater Strategy translates into the planning done for the TCP/FCP. We will discuss the “crossover” from strategy to operational and the inherent tensions and challenges accompanying that transition.

In the third part of today’s discussion we’ll look at the parts of the Theater Campaign Plan and how they tie together. For steady-state affairs, two key documents stand out – the Theater Security Cooperation Plan and the Theater Posture Plan. Closely linked to those two documents are the various operations plans, contingency plans and supporting plans.

The Theater Posture Plan (TPP) is a key component to laying out how the CCMD interacts with the Services. It lays out current and proposed bases, where forces might and will go, describes access, basing and overflight agreements, and helps shape where service infrastructure money is spent in the region. The Theater Security Cooperation Plan lays out how the U.S. military will interact with other nations during steady-state. Written in conjunction with the DOS and others, it blends diplomacy and military activities to advance USG interests short of hostilities (or in support of hostilities).

We will look at the challenges to building CCMD TPPs in the complex environments of today and the methods by which DoD executes the Theater Security Cooperation Plan. We will discuss how these activities enable us to assist other nations in the development of their defense and security capabilities, while also posturing us to achieve our own national objectives.

Lastly we'll discuss how these deliberate, time-intensive plans set the stage for operations plans, contingency plans, supporting plans, and other activities that occur as the real world interacts with the mental model leaders, strategists and planners had envisioned.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Synthesize** the relationship of a CCMD's Theater Strategy with the NSS, NDS, NMS, other CCMD Theater/Functional Strategies, the GEF, and the CCMD's Theater Campaign Plan.

b. **Evaluate** how a Theater Strategy translates into a Theater Campaign Plan, its structure and purpose, and its relationship to the Theater Security Cooperation Plan, Theater Posture Plan, Contingency plans, and other supporting plans.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Comprehend** the components of Theater Strategy and Theater Campaign Planning.

b. **Comprehend** the challenges facing DoD in developing plans and executing military strategy in a dynamic environment.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSM 3130.01A, *Campaign Planning Procedures and Responsibilities* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 25, 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/m313001.pdf (assessed 26 Aug 2016). Read Enclosures A, B and C. **[Open Source URL], [TSC AY17 CD Rom] and [Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed October 23, 2015). Read II-6 (para 7.a) through II-10, and II-11 (para 11) through II-14. **[Open Source URL], [TSC AY17 CD Rom] and [Blackboard]**

(3) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2017). Skim pp. 53-57, read pp. 63-67 of Chapter 4, "Development of Theater Strategy and Campaign Plans." **[DMSPO Student Issue], [TSC AY17 CD Rom] and [Blackboard]**

(4) Gen Philip M. Breedlove, *United States European Command Theater Strategy* (Stuttgart, GE: USECOM, October 2015). **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(5) Taylor White, "Security Cooperation: How it All Fits," *Joint Force Quarterly* 72, (First Quarter 2014), [Proquest](#) (accessed August 26, 2016). **[USAWC Library Online Database]**

(6) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, DoD Instruction 3000.12, *Management of U.S. Global Global Defense Posture (GDP)* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 6, 2016), <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300012p.pdf> (assessed 26 Aug 2016). Read pp. 5-7 (para 2.1 – 3.2), pp. 11 (para 4.1-4.2), pp 18-19 (para 6.1-6.2), and pp. 22-23 (Definitions). **[Open Source URL], [TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

c. Focused Readings.

(1) Commander, United States Central Command, *Commander, Theater Strategy 2013 with Change 1* FOUO (MacDill AFB: USCENTCOM, November 6, 2013). **[FI will email document via .mil accounts to students]**

(2) Commander, United States Pacific Command, *Commander, Theater Strategy* (Honolulu, HI: TBD, currently pending publication) FOUO. **[FI will email document via .mil accounts to students]**

(3) Review: Commander, United States Africa Command, *Commander, Theater Campaign Plan 2000-16* FOUO (Stuttgart, GE: AFRICOM, August 18, 2015). Read pp. iv-ix and 15-54. **[FI will email document via .mil accounts to students]**

(4) Commander, United States Southern Command, *Command Strategy 2020* (Doral, FL: USOTHCOM, July 2010). **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3141.01E, *Management and Review of Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)-Tasked Plans* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 15, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3141_01.pdf (accessed August 29, 2016). Read Enclosure A, pp. A-1 through A-3 and Enclosure B, pp. B-1 through B-16. **[Open Source URL]**

(2) James M. Dubik, "Partner Capacity Building and U.S. Enabling Capabilities," *ARMY Magazine* 62, no. 5 (May 2012), [Proquest](#) (accessed August 29, 2016). **[USAWC Library Online Database]**

(3) Robert M. Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance," *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 3 (May/June 2010), [Proquest](#) (accessed August 29, 2016). **[USAWC Library Online Database]**

(4) Tom Galvin, "Extending the Phase Zero Campaign Mindset," *Joint Force Quarterly* 45 (2nd Quarter 2007), [Proquest](#) (accessed August 29, 2016). **[USAWC Library Online Database]**

5. Points to Consider.

- a. How does theater strategy relate to national strategy and military strategy?
- b. How does the CCDR translate national level strategy and direction plus operational level guidance and direction into a theater strategy?
- c. How does the CCDR integrate interagency and multi-national activities into the Theater Strategy and Theater Campaign Plan?
- d. What are the intended audiences for the Theater Strategy and how does that impact how it is written?
- e. What is needed in a Theater Posture plan to support steady state military operations, ongoing and contingency operations, and to enable the services, other government agencies, and other nations to interact with the Combatant Commander on budgets, forces, infrastructure, etc.
- f. What is security cooperation and what are some types of associated activities?
- g. How does the theater strategy and the Theater Campaign Plan lay the groundwork for operations and contingency plans?

Theater Strategy – Planning and Options

Mode: Speaker and Seminar

Lesson: TSC-07-S

1. Introduction.

a. The nation is always pursuing policy objectives and the military, as an instrument of national power, is always implementing a strategy to set conditions for their achievement. The Joint Force operationalizes strategy and maintains unity of effort by synchronizing multiple activities into a campaign to achieve a common political objective. Geographic Combatant Commanders and Functional Combatant Commanders are directed in the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) to develop plans for specific contingencies as branches to their theater campaign plan or functional campaign plan. These contingency plans are executed during a situation that cannot be adequately addressed by the campaign's everyday phase 0 actions.

b. Joint planning integrates military actions across combatant commands and the joint force, with other instruments of national power, and our multinational partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve a specified end. Joint operation planning focuses on two types of planning: deliberate planning and crisis action planning. Both use the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) and relate equally to operational design. Deliberate planning occurs in non-crisis situations. It produces Theater and Functional Campaign Plans (TCP/FCP) that are the basis for execution of theater strategies, and contingency plans that are branches to the TCP/FCP, along with supporting plans of various types. Crisis action planning follows a similar process on a reduced timeline to address unforeseen situations.

c. A major function of the Combatant Commander is to assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide the "best military advice" to the President and Secretary of Defense. Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO) or Flexible Response Options (FRO) are scalable actions developed along with contingency plans. They provide a wide range of actions that are bounded by the range of political objectives contained in the original contingency planning guidance. However, when an unforeseen crisis emerges, civilian leaders often have not decided yet which policy objectives to pursue and ask military leaders for options. The purpose of the military advice they seek in this situation is not about which course of military action to approve, but the policy objectives the military instrument of power can enable. Options developed to inform policy decisions during a crisis require a different model than those developed as part of contingency planning.

d. The first part of the lesson will be a speaker in Bliss Hall who will address strategy and planning from the senior leader perspective. The second part of the lesson will address how military options are developed in an emerging crisis and the civilian-military tension during the process.

e. There are numerous readings in this lesson that support the learning outcomes and points to consider. The following guide will help focus your reading on the specific learning outcome or point to consider that each of the numerous readings addresses.

(1) The JP 5.0 and Campaign Planning Handbook readings will help explain how the theater strategy and Theater Campaign plan lay the ground work for contingency plans.

(2) The JP 5.0, Campaign Planning Handbook, Mintzberg, Finkel, and Strachan readings will help you understand the utility of deliberate planning and how adaptive it really is. These readings also help explain how combatant command level plans anticipate and respond to uncertainty, surprise, and emerging conditions

(3) The Strachan, Hooker, Davidson, Rapp, and Dempsey readings will also help you understand how the political context of a situation impacts the development of military options and contingency plans, the friction points between civilian and military leaders during the production of military options and contingency plans, and will help you identify what an advisor to senior military leaders should consider when developing "best military advice" to senior civilian leaders during an emerging crisis.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Evaluate** how combatant command level plans anticipate and respond to uncertainty, surprise, and emerging conditions.

b. **Evaluate** the development of military options that support national decision making and strategic goals.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Understand** the difference between courses of action and military options.

b. **Comprehend** the iterative nature of policy, strategy, options, and contingency plan development.

c. **Comprehend** the difference between flexible deterrent options, flexible response options, and military options to assist the decision making of civilian leaders.

d. **Comprehend** the sources of friction between military and civilian decision makers during the development of policy objectives.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed August 29, 2016). SCAN pp. I-3 (para 3) through I-4, II-6 (para 7.a) through II-9 (para 8.c), II-11 (para 11) through II-13, E-1, and F-1. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2016). Read Chapter 2 “Joint Operations Planning,” pp. 11-20 and pp. 46-51 “Options.” **[DMSP0 Student Issue]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(3) Henry Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), pp. 172-175 and 252-254. **[Blackboard]**

(4) Meir Finkel, *On Flexibility, Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011). Read pp. 223-225. **[Blackboard]**

(5) Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2013). Read pp. 217-220 and 248-251. **[USAWC Library Issued Text]**

(6) Richard D. Hooker, Jr., Joseph J. Collins, eds., *Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War* (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, September 1, 2015), <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/lessons-encountered/lessons-encountered.pdf> (accessed July 27, 2016). Read pp. 410-416. **[Open Source URL]**

(7) Janine Davidson, “The Contemporary Presidency: Civil-Military Friction and Presidential Decision Making: Explaining the Broken Dialogue,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 42, no. 1 (March 2013) <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/psq.12006/pdf> (accessed August 3, 2016). Read pp. 129-144. **[Open Source URL]**

(8) William E. Rapp, “Civil-Military Relations: The Role of Military Leaders in Strategy Making,” *Parameters* 45, no.3 (Autumn 2015), [Proquest](#) (accessed August 29, 2016). Scan pp. 13-18. Read pp. 19-26. **[USAWC Library Online Database]**

(9) Martin E. Dempsey, “From the Chairman, An Interview with Martin E. Dempsey,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 78 (Third Quarter 2015), <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-78/jfq-78.pdf> (accessed July 27, 2016). Read pp. 5-7. **[Open Source URL]**

(10) Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Letter to the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 19, 2013, http://thehill.com/images/stories/news/2013/07_july/22/dempsey.pdf (accessed August 29, 2016). Addresses options for the use of force in the Syrian Conflict. **[Open Source URL]** and **[Blackboard]**

c. Focused Reading. This reading will be used in the event the Bliss Hall speaker cancels: Jon C. Wilkinson, "The Resurrection of Adaptive Planning," *Army War College Review* 1, no. 2 (May 2015), <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/AWCReview/Issues/May2015.pdf> (accessed August 29, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) Milan N. Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare*, (Newport, Rhode Island: U.S. Naval War College, 2009). Read "Campaigns" pp. V-5 to V-10.

(2) Graham Allison and Phillip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999). Read pp. 109-120 and 338-347.

(3) Boone J. Bartholomees, "Theory of Victory," *Parameters* 38, no. 2 (Summer 2008). Read pp. 25-36.

(4) Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007). Read pp. 13-18.

5. Points to Consider.

a. How does the theater strategy and the Theater Campaign Plan lay the groundwork for contingency plans?

b. What is the utility of deliberate planning, given that we have rarely executed a prepared contingency plan?

c. What is adaptive planning and how adaptive is it?

d. How does the political context impact the development of military options and contingency plans?

e. What are the friction points between civilian and military leaders during the production of military options and contingency plans?

f. What should an advisor to senior military leaders consider when developing "best military advice" to senior civilian leaders during an emerging crisis?

UNIFIED ACTION

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-08-S

1. Introduction.

a. According to former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton, “joint warfare is team warfare” and “the nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team.” In other words, success in conflict requires **unified action** – as described in Joint Publication 1 as “the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.” This unified action, however, is not automatic and takes place only when clear command relationships and unity of understanding and effort exist at all levels. The advantages of unified action are numerous. Nonetheless, given disparate service, departmental, and interagency cultures and biases, working together in an integrated, cohesive manner requires much more than a simple willingness to do so and is not achieved without effort and diligence. The U.S. Congress, in recognition of these facts, set forth the principles of unified action in the National Security Act of 1947, the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, and more recently in the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986.

b. In the pursuit of American policy objectives, all agencies of the U.S. Government (USG) are charged with promoting political and economic freedom, as well as fostering peaceful relations among nations. In peace, crisis, and war, the centerpiece of USG success is achieving **unified action** that brings all elements of U.S. diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power to bear in a coordinated, synchronized, and effective manner. The key to that success will be in integrating the cooperative efforts of all departments and agencies through a **comprehensive approach** to achieve a common set of goals that result in policy success. In recent years, the complexities of the operational environment and evolving challenges by irregular and non-state actors have made Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational operations imperatives for strategic success. To envision, plan, and synchronize such efforts effectively, the combatant commander must understand the organization and processes employed by our interagency partners in pursuing comprehensive goals. While combatant commanders may have varying degrees of influence in the policymaking process, this lesson is first and foremost an examination of how interagency actions are synchronized with combatant command theater strategy and actions to achieve comprehensive political-strategic effect.

c. This lesson on **unified action** and the **comprehensive approach** should serve as a fundamental and foundational lesson in your Army War College education. As a strategic leader, you will increasingly face challenges in which your ability to enhance unified action and craft comprehensive solutions will yield more effective achievement of

national political-strategic objectives. This lesson delves into the details of interagency planning and clarifies the similarities and differences with military planning. Additionally, it will show the linkages between the planning methods to attain unity of effort.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Analyze** the comprehensive approach in integrating all instruments of national power — Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) — to achieve political-strategic effect. (what)

b. **Analyze** the primary actors, their authorities and processes that facilitate the synchronization and implementation of national strategy at the theater level. (who)

c. **Analyze** the primary ways the U.S. achieves Unified Action. (how)

3. Enabling Outcomes. **Comprehend** the complex relationship the Department of Defense and specifically, the geographic and functional combatant commander, has with his/her interagency counterparts as well as the unique role he/she has in implementing national military strategy to achieve political effects.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Complete the required readings, reflect on the “points to consider,” and be prepared to contribute to seminar dialogue concerning the role of the President, Secretary of Defense, combatant commanders, and interagency leaders in achieving unified action and comprehensive political-strategic effect.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper – Interorganizational Coordination*, Fourth Edition (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/fp/fp_ia_coord.pdf (accessed July 11, 2016). Read pp. 1-20. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf (accessed July 11, 2016). Read Chapter II, “Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces,” paragraph 3, “Unified Action,” sections a, b and c on pages II-7 and II-8. Also, paragraph 10, “Interagency Coordination,” pages II-13 to II-19. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(3) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction (CJCSI) 3141.01E, "Management and Review of Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) Tasked Plans," September 8, 2014, http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3141_01.pdf (accessed July 11, 2016). Read Enclosure D, Planning for Interagency Integration, pages D-1 and D-2. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(4) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction (CJCSI) 5715.01C, "Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs," January 18, 2012 (recertified January 7, 2014), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/5715_01.pdf?ver=2016-02-05-175048-170 (accessed August 4, 2016). Read pp. 1-4 and Enclosure A, "The National Security Council System," pp. A-1 to A-2. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(5) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-08 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 24, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_08.pdf (accessed July 11, 2016). Read "Executive Summary" and "Commanders Overview," ix through xxi. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(6) U.S. Department of State, "Integrated Country Strategy Overview," May 2012. **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

c. Focused Readings.

(1) Jesse P. Pruett, "The Sound of One Hand Clapping: The Expeditionary Imperative of Interagency Integration," Inter Agency Essay Number 12-03W, (The Simons Center: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas July 2012), <http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/IAE-12-03W-JUL2012.pdf> (accessed July 11, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(2) Atlantic Council, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, *All Elements of National Power – Moving Toward a New Interagency Balance for U.S. Global Engagement* (Washington, DC: The Atlantic Counsel of the United States, July, 2014), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/All_Elements_of_National_Power.pdf (accessed July 11, 2016). Read Executive Summary and pp. 1-12. **[Open Source URL]**

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) Harry Tomlin, "Speaking with One Voice," Occasional Paper, September 10, 2010, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, U.S. Army War College. **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and U.S. Department of Defense, *3D Planning Guide – Diplomacy, Development, Defense* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and U.S. Department of Defense, July 31, 2012), https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/3D%20Planning%20Guide_Update_FINAL%20%2831%20Jul%2012%29.pdf (accessed July 11, 2016). Read pages 4-26. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(3) U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, “Integrated Country Strategy Guidance & Instructions,” July 2012, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PBAAA879.pdf (accessed July 11, 2016). Read pp. 1-13. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. Given the current division between functional commands with global responsibilities and geographic commands with regional responsibilities, is there a potential for mission overlap and institutional impediments to unity of effort?

b. What are the characteristics of the interagency that influence the combatant commander and the development/execution of Theater Strategy?

c. What are some of the issues associated with the 3D Planning methodology, and how can the DOD integrate within the Integrated Country Strategy rubric used by the interagency?

d. What are some shortcomings of the current combatant command structure with regard to unified action across the DIME, and what are some possible options for organizational reform to underpin the comprehensive approach?

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-09-S

1. Introduction.

a. As early as the American Revolution, and in particular during the prominent Yorktown Campaign (1781), the United States has engaged in wars and conflicts as part of multinational efforts. As stated in the National Security Strategy, in subsequent department strategies, and in military doctrine, the United States will continue to confront security challenges in a multinational manner.

b. There are at least three reasons why nations conduct multinational operations: to achieve common policy aims; to distribute military tasks, responsibilities, and resource burdens; and to provide political legitimacy for military action that is required by the international community. Purely military benefits of multinational operations may be, at times, insignificant to U.S. conduct of war, but the political advantages of multinational operations can be substantial in increased legitimacy and support in a skeptical world.

c. The two principal manifestations of multinational operations are alliances and coalitions. Some argue that in an increasingly complex and globalized security environment coalitions will be the most prevalent form of multinational operations. However, unity of effort remains essential to mission success. While critical for success, unity of effort can be difficult to achieve and maintain. History is replete with examples of salient tensions between stated multinational goals and competing national interests.

d. The U.S. Army War College can draw upon distinctive experience from its International Fellows, composed of 74 officers from 70 nations. Their experiences in multinational operations are a great source of insight and knowledge about coalition warfare. Over a full year, they also expose U.S. students to foreign cultures, practices and traditions, which offers great opportunity to improve mutual interoperability.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Analyze** the characteristics of alliances and coalitions and evaluate their inherent strengths and weaknesses.

b. **Evaluate** the opportunities and challenges of multinational operations and command structures in potential future crises.

c. **Comprehend** best practices and lessons learned for future multinational exercises and operations.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Comprehend** the importance of assured interoperability with all its features for any successful conduct of multinational operations.

b. **Know** about friction in previous multinational operation and understand the resulting effects on mission success.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Complete the required readings with frequent reference to both learning outcomes and points to consider.

(2) Be prepared to discuss the relationships among the various actors as reflected in the processes and products.

(3) (International Fellows only) Be prepared to present and discuss your armed forces' specific culture, tradition and procedures as well as your experiences in multinational operations as directed by your TSC Faculty Instructor.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Multinational Operations*, Joint Publication 3-16 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 16, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_16.pdf (accessed August 1, 2016). Read "Executive Summary," ix-xxviii; and Chapter I. Scan Chapter II. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(2) Keith Neilson and Roy A. Prete, eds, *Coalition Warfare – An Uneasy Accord* (Ontario, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1983). Read Chapter 1, "Military Coalitions and Coalitions Warfare Over the Past Century," by Paul Kennedy, pp. 3-15. **[Blackboard]**

(3) Richard O'Connor, *The Spirit Soldiers: A Historical Narrative of the Boxer Rebellion* (New York: G.P. Putman's Sons, 1973). Read pp. 217-227 and 237-245. **[Blackboard]**

(4) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Case Studies in Joint Functions* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2013). Read "Operation Allied Force: NATO and U.S. Operations in Kosovo." **[Blackboard]**

c. Focused Reading. Michael Codner, *Hanging Together: Military Interoperability in an Era of Technological Innovation*, Whitehall Paper 56 (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 2003), [Taylor Francis Online](#) (accessed August 2, 2016). Read Chapters: “The Dimensions of Interoperability,” pp. 29-33, and “Behavioral Interoperability,” pp. 51-67. **[USAWC Library Online Database]**

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) Richard Cobbold, “RUSI Interview with General David Richards,” *RUSI Journal* 152, no. 2 (April 2007), [Proquest](#) (accessed August 29, 2016). Read pp. 24-32. **[USAWC Library Online Database]**

(2) Bart Howard, “Preparing Leaders for Multinational Operations,” *Army* 58, no. 3 (March 2008), [Proquest](#) (accessed August 29, 2016). Read pp. 21-24. **[USAWC Library Online Database]**

(3) Dwight D. Eisenhower, Alfred D. Chandler, ed, *The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower: The War Years III* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970). Read “Memorandum for an Allied Command. For Lord Louis Mountbatten,” pp. 1420-1424.

(4) Robert Selig, *March to Victory: Washington, Rochambeau, and the Yorktown Campaign of 1781* (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 2007), <http://www.w3r-us.org/pdf/cmh70-104-1.pdf> (accessed August 2, 2016). Read “Introduction” and pp. 3-12. **[Open Source URL]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. A multinational approach to an emerging security problem presents both opportunities and challenges. What are the fundamental reasons for and advantages of multinational operations as well as their disadvantages, restraints, and constraints?

b. What are the major factors to consider when participating within an ad hoc coalition versus operations executed by an alliance? How should senior political and military leaders command and manage coalitions?

c. Are there any characteristics of multinational operations that transcend time and geography? If so, what are they and why are they persistent?

d. Under what conditions would multinational operations *not* be advisable?

e. How do commanders deal with participating nations that do not use mission-type orders and do not have a military culture based on initiative and independent action?

f. Which interoperability issues might cause the greatest friction for the strategic level?

g. How can a lack of interoperability endanger mission success in a coalition? How can a commander mitigate this friction?

The Military's Domestic Imperative: Homeland Defense, and Defense Support of Civil Authorities

Mode: Lecture/Seminar

Lesson: TSC-10-L/S

Maintaining the capability to deter and defeat attacks on the United States is the Department's first priority, and reflects an enduring commitment to securing the homeland at a time when non-state and state threats to U.S. interests are growing. Protection of the homeland will also include sustaining capabilities to assist U.S. civil authorities in protecting U.S. airspace, shores, and borders, and in responding effectively to domestic man-made and natural disasters.

- Quadrennial Defense Review, March 2014

1. Introduction. To fully understand the Department of Defense (DoD) and military role in the homeland, it is important to understand the distinction between homeland security, homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities. The first – *homeland security* - is effectively a whole-of-government enterprise, for which the military's role is a component of government contribution at federal, state and local levels. Homeland Defense (HD) and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), on the other hand, are doctrinal mission areas that are identified as DoD's "most fundamental duty" in the *2014 Quadrennial Defense Review*.² It is therefore important to think critically about the Defense Department's preparedness to support homeland security and its readiness to execute its priority HD and DSCA missions.

Following the attacks of 9/11 and the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, the United States responded in part by interagency reorganization within the federal government and a new focus on intergovernmental preparations, response, and recovery against both man-made and natural disasters. This also created the need to re-examine the role of the military when employed in the domestic environment. Accordingly, this lesson examines the inter-related missions and organizations providing overall security to the homeland.

The following key distinctions are important to consider.

a. Federal Government: Our federal form of government is one of the overriding factors dictating how military activities are conducted inside our borders. The sovereign right of state governments is upheld in the U.S. Constitution, and in many ways the states' governors have significantly more authority to operate inside the boundaries of their jurisdictions than does the federal government and its agencies. This holds true for disaster response and law enforcement. The use of federal military units in the

² Chuck Hagel, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, March 4, 2014), 13. The 2014 QDR updated the defense strategy to reflect three overriding priorities or "pillars" for the DoD: (1) Protect the Homeland, (2) Build Security Globally, and (3) Project Power and Win Decisively.

homeland is defined by this relationship; thus federal support is subject to a governor's request for assistance, and subordinate to state's authority in all but the most extreme circumstances. A fundamental premise of national incident management is tiered response. The primary responsibility for incident management rests with the lowest level of government – local, state, and then federal - that has the capability and capacity for incident management. When overwhelmed, local authorities are expected to seek assistance from neighboring jurisdictions and then from the state if necessary. The same applies at the state level before federal assistance is requested. However, in the event of a very large or catastrophic event, federal aid may be provided while mutual aid agreements and compacts are still being coordinated. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) establishes a core set of concepts, principles, terminology and organizational processes to enable effective, efficient, and collaborative incident management at all levels of government. Responding agencies retain all their jurisdictional authorities and responsibilities, and they maintain operational control of their functions. Thus, another critical concept is that domestic emergency management operations are much more about unity of effort than about unity of command.

b. Homeland Security: Homeland security is defined in joint doctrine as, the “concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur.” The *2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review* similarly defines it as “as a concerted national effort to ensure a Nation that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards where American interests, aspirations, and way of life can thrive.” Led by the Department of Homeland Security (or in some cases the Department of Justice), this complex and evolving mission set includes not just terrorist related events, but preparedness for and recovery from all disasters impacting the American people.

c. Homeland Defense (HD): While threats to the U.S. homeland have changed considerably over time, the U.S. Armed Forces have always played a key role in countering them. Prior to World War II, hemispheric defense was the top planning priority for the War Department. During the Cold War, the threat of nuclear attack posed an enormous challenge to continental defense efforts. The homeland is now confronted with a wide spectrum of threats ranging from ballistic missile attack by nation-states to a variety of possible air, land, sea, space, or cyber attacks by national, transnational, and subnational groups. The DoD has evolved to address these threats, most notably through the creation of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, and the creation of the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) charged with the responsibility to provide command and control of DoD homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities.

d. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA): The *2013 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities* defines DoD’s role in DSCA as assisting with protecting our populace and critical infrastructure from both natural and

manmade threats. Throughout our history, military forces have supported civil authorities during domestic disasters, emergencies, and operations other than combat within U.S. borders. Civil disturbance operations, support to law enforcement agencies, domestic disaster relief, and support to special events are only a few of the missions ably performed by American military forces every day. Several contemporary national and homeland security trends have raised the visibility and priority of DSCA missions in recent years. Historically, the military capabilities associated with accomplishing Civil Support were viewed as imbedded within the warfighting mission. However, increased emphasis and growing national expectations have resulted in reshaping DoD's thinking of DSCA which has resulted in a broadening of roles and authorities for this mission. This recent shift in mission emphasis and the inherent legal, policy, organizational, doctrinal, training, and resourcing implications has profound impact on when, how, and with what resources DoD responds.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Understand** the conceptual and practical responsibilities, authorities, and limitations of the DoD for planning and executing HD and DSCA missions.

b. **Analyze** the factors that make the homeland unique as an area of operations: implications of our federal form of government; active layered defense; legal and policy restrictions on the employment of force; and unique capabilities required to respond to current and future threats in the land, maritime, air and space, and cyber domains.

c. **Understand** the DoD's and USNORTHCOM's role as a component of the federal government in support of civil authorities in disaster response; the authorities and limitation surrounding the military's support to law enforcement agencies; and the legal, political and practical factors that limit a commander's options in domestic security operations.

d. **Analyze** the command and control challenges and options for achieving unity of effort within the military response to civil requirements in times of crises, to include interaction between the active component and the National Guard in Title 10, Title 32 and State Active Duty statuses.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Comprehend** the interrelated yet distinct HD and DSCA missions and how they support homeland security.

b. **Comprehend** the roles/missions of DoD forces in support of civil authorities.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Complete the required readings and be prepared to discuss the points attained therein, and from the speaker's presentation, in a seminar environment.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Ivan Luke, "DOD Operations in the Homeland: Context and Issues for the Commander," NWC 2067D (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, July 2016). Read pp. 1-19. **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2013), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=732192> (accessed July 29, 2016). Read pp. 1-18. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**, and **[Blackboard]**

(3) U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework*, 3rd Edition (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, June 2016), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1914-25045-1246/final_national_response_framework_20130501.pdf (accessed Aug 1, 2016). Read pp. 1-7, scan pp. 8-54. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**, and **[Blackboard]**

c. Focused Readings. None.

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) USAWC Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook*, 2015-2016 (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, August 28, 2015), <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/orgs/SSL/dclm/pubs/HTAR.pdf> (accessed July 29 2016). Read Chapter 20, "Defense Support of Civil Authority." **[Open Source URL]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Homeland Defense*, Joint Publication 3-27 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 29, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_27.pdf (accessed July 29, 2016). Read "Executive Summary" and Chapter I. **[Open Source URL]** and **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

(3) Jeh Charles Johnson, *The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, June 18, 2014), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=755060> (accessed July 29, 2016). Read pp. 1-8, scan through end. **[Open Source URL]** and **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. What are the boundaries and intersections of DoD's HD and DSCA missions?

b. What unique legal, policy, organizational, geographic, and operational factors and challenges must planners take into consideration during the campaign design process

for HD and DSCA? Do these factors vary significantly by domain (land, maritime, air and space, or cyber)?

c. How should the DoD allocate its resources and activities among forward regions, approaches and the homeland in order to fulfill the HD and DSCA missions?

d. How does the National Response Framework (NRF) frame DoD's role in interagency cooperation for incident response? What similar guidance would facilitate interagency cooperation in support of DoD pertaining to the homeland defense mission?

Block III Intent “Joint and Service Operating Concepts”

Block Chief: COL Joel Clark

Purpose: After considering strategic direction, operational design, and the theater campaign as viewed by the geographical combatant commander, and the “ways and means” of implementing theater strategy using all elements of national power through a unified approach we present overarching Joint, Service and emerging concepts for comprehension and analysis. The block will also discuss at length the impacts of the Cyberspace domain and its impacts on today’s battlefield in terms of effects to the Combatant Commander.

Method: This module features student readings, seminar instruction, case studies, and optional student oral presentations on selected readings in support of program learning outcomes (PLOs), Joint Learning Areas (JLAs) and Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs).

End state: Students should proceed from this block with an understanding of the current Joint, Service, and emerging operating concepts and how these documents are shaping the future Joint and Service approaches to meeting the national security threats. Students should also obtain a greater understanding of the far reaching effects of the Cyberspace domain and its potential impacts on the Joint Force and the Nation.

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CAPSTONE CONCEPT FOR JOINT OPERATIONS, JOAC & JOINT OPS

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-11-S

1. Introduction.

a. The United States military is in an era characterized by four environments: 1) a global political environment dominated by disparate and conflicting state (non-state) and regional interests, creating potentially volatile security areas exacerbated due to the availability and proliferation of advanced weapon systems; 2) a global social environment where the world's populace continues to migrate to the littorals, creating governance and resource challenges that could potentially lead to strife and conflict fueled by the collision of differing cultures in congested spaces; 3) a global physical environment subjected to rapid, unpredictable, and sometimes catastrophic weather patterns due to climate change; and 4) a domestic economic environment that will likely drive the Joint Force to operate under fiscal austerity for at least the near, and possibly mid-term. Simply put, the U.S. military will likely continue to shrink just as the potential need for its rapid worldwide engagement grows. As such, it is paramount that the future, smaller Joint Force operates as efficiently as possible across the domains and spectrum of conflict. An understanding of the emerging issues surrounding how best to operationalize "cross-domain synergy," as described in the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2030* (CCJO), is thus fundamental in the development of tomorrow's military strategic leader.

b. *Capstone Concepts for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2030* (CCJO) is a draft concept that builds on CCJO published in 2012. The CCJO "establishes an aim point for the development of the Joint Force out to 2030" as laid out by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This foundational document discusses the Future Security Environment and Globally Integrated Operations (GIO) as well as persistent trends taking place in the world. In the first hour to hour and a half, students will evaluate this foundational document as a precursor to discussion on emerging concepts like the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) and the effects of these new doctrinal concepts and implications for the future of the Joint Force.

c. One family of emerging concepts which has recently migrated into doctrine is comprised of the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) and its subordinate, supporting concepts, Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC), and the Joint Concept for Entry Operations (JCEO). Though designed to address a specific problem set in the context of the current and future Operational Environment (OE), the proliferation of Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities and the challenges which they pose to the Joint Force in carrying out their missions, the JOAC family of concepts also provides a useful vehicle to examine the future of domain integration. JOAC's core concept of "cross-domain synergy" begs the question of just

how far the services have come since the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. In an environment of increasingly constrained resources, rising peer competitors and technological challenges to U.S. access, the JOAC challenges the Joint Force to, in former Chairman Dempsey's words, "drive jointness deeper."

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Analyze** emerging doctrine and current dialogue surrounding the concepts Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) and the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC).

b. **Evaluate** the underpinnings for each of the concepts discussed and potential areas for synergy or friction between the services.

c. **Evaluate** each concept discussed and the implications for the future force.

3. Enabling Outcome. None.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Department of Defense, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2030 (CCJO)*, [Draft Working Document, Predecisional](#) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, as of June 28, 2016). **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC)*, Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 17, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf (accessed July 13, 2016). Read pp. 1-27. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**, and **[Blackboard]**

(3) William O. Odom and Christopher D. Hayes, "Cross-Domain Synergy: Advancing Jointness," *Joint Force Quarterly* 73 (2nd Quarter, 2014), http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-73/jfq_123-128_Odom-Hayes.pdf (accessed July 13, 2016). Read pp. 123-128. **[Open Source URL]**

b. Focused Readings.

(1) U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Concept for Entry Operations (JCEO)*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 7, 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/jceo.pdf (accessed August 6, 2015). Read pp. 1-35. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**, and **[Blackboard]**

(2) United States Joint Staff Joint Force Development (J7), Future Joint Force Development, *Cross-Domain Synergy in Joint Operations: Planners Guide*, Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 14, 2016), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/cross_domain_planning_guide.pdf (accessed July 13, 2016). Read pp. 1-21. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**, and **[Blackboard]**

5. Points to Consider.

- a. What are CCJO and JOAC? What are they not? What assumptions are these concepts predicated upon? Are the assumptions valid? How does each concept relate to the others and other operational concepts and strategic guidance documents?
- b. What is meant by cross-domain synergy? How can the joint force maximize it? How do we “drive jointness deeper?” What does that mean and what might it look like in terms of the future joint force?
- c. What improvements might be made to better align tomorrow’s Joint Force to meet the demands of operating in megacities? Are these changes compatible with other force structure initiatives, such as JOAC? Where might there be areas of friction?

CYBERSPACE

Mode: Lecture/Seminar

Lesson: TSC-12-L/S

1. Introduction.

a. Cyberspace (often called Cyber) is the newest of the defined military domains. In cyberspace, specific roles and “lanes in the road” within the U.S. government are often “crossed” and not clearly “marked.” Lines become blurred as we view cyberspace through different lenses. There are numerous cyberspace stakeholders; military, law enforcement, intelligence community, diplomatic, political, and commercial. Attribution is very difficult. Congress is continually looking at numerous pending cyberspace security bills which continue to adjust responsibilities and authorities. Even at the Congressional level, there are equities amongst the various committees – Intel, Armed Services, Commerce, Homeland Defense, and others. Recent increased malicious cyberspace activity has caused the U.S. government to increase its “whole of government” reaction, working toward extensive cooperation “behind the scenes” with regards to identification and mitigation of cyberspace threats.

b. Students should leave the class with an appreciation for the complexity but also the strategic value of the cyberspace domain, understanding of what is cyberspace, current U.S. national policies related to cyber, the current and emerging technologies used by state and non-state actors to conduct cyber activities, and the challenges that exist in developing policy, strategy, and tactics related to and for operating within and across the cyberspace domain in both Defense Cyberspace Operations (DCO) and Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO). Students should use a whole-of-government approach to cyberspace and understand the appropriate limitations placed on the military by current legislation, and where the “lanes in the road” are for the military, DHS, and other government organizations. Students should also better understand the role of NSA, US CYBERCOM, the Service cyberspace components, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Intelligence Community (IC), and private industry concerning cyberspace.

2. Learning Outcomes.

- a. **Comprehend** current and evolving cyberspace definitions and structures.
- b. **Analyze** the interaction of commercial, federal government, DoD, and international interests in the cyberspace domains.
- c. **Analyze** how the GCC integrates cyberspace to achieve the theater strategy.

3. Enabling Outcomes. None.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Complete the required readings and be prepared to discuss the points to consider in the seminar.

b. Required Readings.

(1) James R. Clapper, *Statement for the Record Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*, 114th Congress, 2nd Session, February 9, 2016, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/SSCI_Unclassified_2016_ATA_SFR%20_FINAL.pdf (accessed September 2, 2016). Review pp. 1-4. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(2) Center for Strategic Leadership, *Strategic Cyberspace Operations Guide*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, June 1, 2016), http://www.csl.army.mil/usacsl/Publications/Strategic_Cyberspace_Operations_Guide_1_June_2016.pdf (accessed July 15, 2016). Read pp. 6-20. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(3) Keith B. Alexander, *Prepared Statement on Digital Acts of War: Evolving the Cyberspacesecurity Conversation before the Subcommittees on Information Technology and National Security of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform*, 114th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 13, 2016, <https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Gen-Alexander-Statement-Digital-Acts-of-War-7-13.pdf> (accessed July 15, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(4) U.S. Department of Defense, "Fact Sheet: The Department of Defense (DOD) Cyber Strategy," April 2015, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyberspace-strategy/Department_of_Defense_Cyberspace_Strategy_Fact_Sheet.pdf (accessed July 15, 2106). **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(5) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Cyberspace Operations*, Joint Publication 3-12 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 5, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_12R.pdf (accessed July 15, 2016). Read Chapter 3: "Authorities, Roles and Responsibilities," and Chapter 4: "Planning and Coordination." **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(6) Brett T. Williams, "The Joint Force Commander's Guide to Cyberspace Operations," *Joint Force Quarterly* 73 (Second Quarter, 2014), [Proquest](#) (accessed July 15, 2016). Read pp. 12-19. **[USAWC Library Online Database]**

(7) Admiral Michael S. Rogers, United States Cyberspace Command, *Statement Before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities*, 114th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 16, 2016, <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS26/20160316/104553/HHRG-114-AS26-Wstate-RogersM-20160316.pdf> (accessed July 18, 2016). Read pp. 1-16. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(8) U.S. Department of Defense, *The DoD Cyber Strategy*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 2015), http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyberspace-strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBERSPACE_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf, (accessed July 15, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

c. Supplemental Readings.

(1) Gary D. Brown and Owen W. Tullos, "On the Spectrum of Cyberspace Operations," *Small Wars Journal Online* (December 11, 2012), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/on-the-spectrum-of-cyberspace-operations> (accessed July 15, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(2) Aaron Hughes, *Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyberspace Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense "Digital Acts of War: Evolving the Cybersecurity Conversation," Before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Joint Information Technology and Subcommittee on National Security*, 114th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 13, 2016, <https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Hughes-Statement-Digital-Acts-of-War-7-13.pdf> (accessed July 15, 2016). Read pp. 1-4. **[Open Source URL]**

(3) Sean Kanuck, *Statement for the Record at the Hearing on "Digital Acts of War: Evolving the Cybersecurity Conversation," Before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Joint Information Technology and Subcommittee on National Security*, 114th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 13, 2016, <https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Kanuck-Statement-Digital-Acts-of-War-7-13.pdf> (accessed July 15, 2016). Read pp. 1-8. **[Open Source URL]**

(4) M.E. Painter, Coordinator for Cyberspace Issues, U.S. Department of State, *Testimony at the Hearing on "Digital Acts of War: Evolving the Cybersecurity Conversation" Before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Joint Information Technology and Subcommittee on National Security*, 114th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 13, 2016, <https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Painter-Statement-Digital-Acts-of-War-7-13.pdf> (accessed July 15, 2016). Read pp. 1-13. **[Open Source URL]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. Is the U.S. government's organizational construct effective to conduct cyberspace operations and defend cyberspace in the future? What is USCYBERCOM's role?

b. How are commercial, civil, DOD, and international interests intertwined in the cyberspace domain? How does this impact the way we plan and execute operations? What are the challenges and opportunities?

c. Are commanders prepared to execute their missions when faced with degraded or denied cyberspace environment? How might a loss of confidence in systems affect operations and sustainment?

d. Are the critical infrastructures of the U.S. appropriately defended? What policy or technology changes need to happen to remedy the situation?

e. When a cyberspace-attack is detected, who has the lead? What if the attack originates from within the U.S.? How can sensitive (classified) attack information be passed to commercial interests or allies? Where do we draw the line between crime, hackers, industrial espionage, foreign intelligence, and insider threats and how does that affect operations and U.S. policies?

ARMY OPERATING CONCEPT & SPECIAL OPERATING FORCES

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-13-S

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson continues the dialogue on Landpower in the core curriculum. The *Theory of War and Strategy* course considered the land theorists and Landpower's role in national security. The *National Security Policy and Strategy* course analyzed the use of Landpower as a means of national policy. This lesson furthers that dialogue with an analysis of the land domain and Landpower in its application in the operational domains. The lesson also addresses the U.S. Army's operating concept and the Special Operations Force's (SOF) operating concept. Lastly, this lesson examines Army and SOF Service capabilities and how these forces are presented to a Joint Commander.

b. Long before man thought of venturing on the sea or into the air, he lived on the land. He found food on the land. He built shelter on the land. He raised children on the land. When his aspirations conflicted with that of another, he fought and died on the land. Landpower in its various forms has been at the core of warfare since time immemorial. Furthermore, technical advancements, particularly those in the past 100 years, have not altered the facts that man is a land creature and war is a human endeavor almost exclusively conducted on the land. Indeed, as other forms of military power like air and sea power were being developed, man defined these in relation to the land domain and the use of land forces.

c. Ironically, some argue that Landpower's pervasiveness in the vernacular of warfare has now become its greatest impediment to understanding. As Samsung's 'next big thing is here' ad campaign demonstrates, people primarily equate new with better. For this reason, technological innovations, mainly originating in the air, sea, cyber, and space domains, capture the attention of the American public and U.S. Congress. Combined with the ethical uncomfortableness associated with close-proximity warfare, some may gravitate towards military advancements promoting sterile, offset, push button conflict. Standing in contrast, Landpower is not defined by gadgets but by "young men in the mud."³ At its core land warfare has changed little in the past 1,000 years. Ultimately, it is simple and messy, but effective. But Landpower's timelessness is perhaps its undoing. Though still considered the bedrock of national security, land warfare may also be perceived as yesterday's smartphone. It is not surprising that in an era of declining budgets juxtaposed to a myriad of security challenges, the U.S. land forces are engaged in a twofold mission: first, to refocus public attention on the where and why human beings collide; and, second, to define how U.S. Army and SOF remain relevant in tomorrow's world.

³ T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War* (Potomac Books: New York, 2001), p. 290.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Analyze** the U.S. Army's new operating concept and how its implementation might affect the way the Service trains, organizes, and equips its force.

b. **Evaluate** the use and role of Landpower as part of the Joint Force in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations (JIIM).

c. **Analyze** the role of Special Operations Forces as part of the Joint Force in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations (JIIM).

d. **Comprehend** how U.S. Army and SOF units are presented to a Joint Force Commander.

3. Enabling Outcomes. None.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Required Readings.

(1) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *The Army*, Army Doctrine Publication 1 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, September 2012). Read pp. 1-1 thru 1-8. **[Blackboard]** and **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

(2) Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World*, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, October 31, 2014), <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-1.pdf> (accessed July 25, 2016). Read pp. iv and 7-25. **[Open Source URL]**, **[Blackboard]** and **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

(3) H. R. McMaster, "Continuity and Change: The Army Operating Concept and Clear Thinking About Future War," *Military Review* 95, no. 2 (March/April 2015), http://minerva.dtic.mil/doc/McMaster_Continuity_and_Change_article.pdf (accessed July 25, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(4) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, Joint Publication 3-05 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 16, 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf (accessed July 26, 2016). Read Chapter I, "Overview of Special Operations," pp. I-1 thru I-9. **[Open Source URL]**, **[Blackboard]** and **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

(5) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *ARSOF Operating Concept 2022*, (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, September 26, 2014), <http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages/ARSOF%20Operating%20Concept%202014.pdf> (accessed July 25, 2016). Read Chapters 1, 2, and 4. **[Open Source URL]**, **[Blackboard]** and **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

(6) Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “The Army Gropes Toward a Cultural Revolution,” *Breaking Defense*, October 22, 2014, <http://breakingdefense.com/2014/10/the-army-gropes-toward-a-cultural-revolution/> (accessed July 25, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(7) Bill Van Auken and David North, “The Army Operating Concept (AOC): U.S. Army Drafts Blueprint for World War III,” *Global Research*, October 14, 2014, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/us-army-drafts-blueprint-for-world-war-iii/5407869> (accessed July 25, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

b. Focused Readings.

(1) U.S. Naval War College, NWC 3153N, *Joint Military Operations Reference Guide: Forces Capabilities Handbook* (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, June 2014). Read “U.S. Army,” pp. 30-66. **[Blackboard]** and **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

(2) U.S. Naval War College, NWC 3153N, *Joint Military Operations Reference Guide: Forces Capabilities Handbook* (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, June 2014). Read “Special Operations Forces,” pp. 142-154. **[Blackboard]** and **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) William T. Johnsen, “Toward a Theory of Landpower for the 21st Century.” **[Blackboard]**

(2) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *The Army*, ADP 1, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, September 2012 with Change 1, dated November 7, 2012). Read Chapter 3. **[Blackboard]** and **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

(3) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Unified Land Operations*, ADP 3-0 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2011). Read pp. 1-14. **[Blackboard]** and **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

(4) Headquarters, U.S. Special Operations Command, *United States Special Operations Command Special Operations Forces Operating Concept* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: United States Special Operations Command, May 2013), <https://fortunascorner.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/final-low-res-sof-operating-concept-may-2013.pdf> (accessed July 26, 2016). Read pp. 3-18. **[Open Source URL]**

(5) Headquarters, U.S. Special Operations Command, *United States Special Operations Command Special Operations Forces 2020: Forging the Tip of the Spear* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: United States Special Operations Command, May 2013), <http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/SOCOM2020Strategy.pdf> (accessed September 15, 2015). Read pp. 1-8. **[Open Source URL]**

(6) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *ARSOF 2022* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School), <http://www.soc.mil/USASOCTalks/ARSOF2022Pt1.html> (accessed July 26, 2016). Read pp. 8-18. **[Open Source URL]**

(7) Major Fernando M. Lujan, *Light Footprints: The Future of American Military Intervention* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, March 2013), http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_LightFootprint_VoicesFromTheField_Lujan.pdf (accessed July 26, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(8) G. K. Cunningham, "Landpower: Foundations and Contemporary Applications," *Guide to National Security and Strategy*, 2nd Edition, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, June 2006), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/policy_strategy.pdf (accessed July 26, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(9) William T. Johnsen, *Re-Examining the Roles of Landpower in the 21st Century and Their Implications* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2014), <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1237> (accessed September 15, 2015). **[Open Source URL]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. What is Landpower? What is the relationship between the land domain and Landpower? What is the difference between Landpower and land forces? Why do we care? Is the distinction important?

b. How are the land forces of the United States seen in the context of national strategy and securing objectives? How are they viewed as a means to an end? What is the value of land forces? What are some of the stigmas associated with land forces?

c. How does the U.S. Army's new operating concept differ from that of AirLand Battle? Why the change? What training, organizational, and equipment changes will likely be needed to create the force needed for the new operating concept? What opportunities and challenges might be presented during this transformation?

d. What is the role of Special Operations Forces and how do they contribute to the Joint land fight? What possible problem sets are appropriate for the application of special operations forces and, by contrast, which ones are not?

e. How are SOF and U.S. Army forces presented to a Joint Commander? What are the capabilities and limitations of SOF, and what relationship should exist between general purpose land forces and special operations forces?

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS OPERATING CONCEPT

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-14-S

1. Introduction.

a. The nation's founders viewed the United States as a maritime nation, dependent on unfettered access to the seas for trade, transportation, communication, and defense. The importance of maritime forces was a legacy the founders understood as former colonists under the British Empire, the great sea power of that age. They formalized their view within the U.S. Constitution by the requirement that Congress "maintain a Navy." In today's dynamic security environment, with multiple challenges from state and non-state actors that are often fed by social disorder, political upheaval, and technological advancements, that requirement is even more prescient.

b. The domains of conflict and the conduct of warfare have continued to evolve, challenging theorists and strategists for much of recorded history. The *Theory of War and Strategy* (TWS) course addressed land, maritime, and air theorists and provided a basic understanding of the nature and characteristics of war and warfare. At first, conflict was of necessity limited to the original domain: land. Maritime domain considerations quickly came about as man ventured forth upon the sea. With the advent of flight, air domain considerations have added to and complicated the thinking about the operational domains. Most recently, ventures into domains not traditionally geographically defined, such as space and cyberspace, further add to the number of dimensions a commander must consider in employing the Joint Force. The *National Security Policy and Strategy* (NSPS) course provided insights into how the Joint Force – arrayed across the domains - is a "means" of national policy that is wielded in "ways" to achieve national "ends." The U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard – known collectively as the Sea Services – provide the principal contribution to the military instrument of national power in the maritime domain, continuing in many ways the legacy of Mahan and Corbett discussed in the TWS course.

c. This lesson will focus on how the domains interface with each other as well as examining the unique impact of each upon the conduct of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps military operations. The lesson also addresses the U.S. Navy's and Marine Corps' operating concepts and the respective services' unique capability to exploit the air, land, sea as maneuver space, providing CCDRs with persistent, self-sustaining, sea based forces to meet the full range of military operations. Lastly, this lesson examines U.S. Navy and Marine Corps service capabilities and how these forces are presented to a Joint Commander. Seminar dialogue will focus on the respective service operating concepts and how they impact the CCDR's employment of military forces across the full range of military operations in contemporary and future operating environments.

2. Learning Outcomes.

- a. **Evaluate** the use and role of Seapower as part of the Joint Force in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.
- b. **Evaluate** the maritime, land, and air domains and the role of Sea, Land, and Airpower as they relate to the U.S. Navy's and Marine Corps' operating concepts.
- c. **Analyze** the U.S. Navy's and Marine Corps' Operating concepts in the context of today's dynamic security environment potential future operating environments.
- d. **Comprehend** how the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps present forces to the joint commander.

3. Enabling Outcome. **Comprehend** the characteristics, capabilities, limitations, and basic force presentation of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and USSOCOM organizations.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Complete the required readings and reflect on the "points to consider."

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Naval War College, NWC 3153N, Joint Military Operations Reference Guide, "*Forces Capabilities Handbook*" (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, June 2014). Scan pp. 2-28, 67-77, and 125-131. **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(2) Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Navy), <http://www.navy.mil/local/maritime/150227-CS21R-Final.pdf> (accessed August 29, 2016). Read pp. 1-26. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(3) Geoffrey Till, "The New U.S. Maritime Strategy: Another View From Outside," *Naval War College Review* 68, no. 4 (Autumn 2015), <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/dbd0a88b-81c4-4de3-9314-927dd42214bc/The-New-U-S--Maritime-Strategy--Another-View-from-.aspx> (accessed August 19, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(4) Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command, *Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century* (Quantico, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Capabilities Development and Integration, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, September 2016), <http://www.mccdc.marines.mil/Portals/172/Docs/MCCDC/MOC/Marine%20Corps%20Operating%20Concept%20Sept%202016.pdf?ver=2016-09-28-084156-190> (accessed September 27, 2016). Read pp. 1-10 and scan pp. 11-27. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(5) Headquarters, U.S. Navy, *A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority: Version 1.0* (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, January 2016), http://www.navy.mil/cno/docs/cno_stg.pdf (accessed August 29, 2016). Read pp. 1-8. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Frank Hoffman, "No Strategic Success Without 21st Century Seapower: Forward Partnering," *War On The Rocks*, entry posted July 1, 2014, <http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/no-strategic-success-without-21st-century-seapower-forward-partnering/> (accessed August 19, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(2) Bryan McGrath, "America's New Maritime Strategy: How Will China Respond?" *The National Interest*, entry posted April 10, 2015, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/americas-new-maritime-strategy-how-will-china-respond-12592> (accessed August 19, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(3) Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command, *U. S. Marine Corps Concepts & Programs 2015* (Quantico, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Capabilities Development and Integration, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, December 2014), <https://marinecorpconceptsandprograms.com/organization/marine-air-ground-task-force> (accessed August 29, 2016). Located under the *Marine Air Ground Task Force* tab. **[Open Source URL]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. What is seapower? What is the value of maritime forces? How are the maritime forces of the U.S. seen in the context of national strategy and protecting national interests?

b. What level of control do the current maritime forces enjoy in each domain (supremacy, superiority, parity, inferiority) across the range of military operations? What level is required in order to meet the strategic requirements of the GCCs?

c. How are the maritime services' operating concepts shaped by the domains in which they operate? How do the maritime forces influence the land domain?

d. What capabilities, limitations, and comparative advantages do the Sea Services (Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard) provide to Geographic Combatant Commanders in executing their mission at the theater level across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO)?

e. What training, organizational, and equipment changes will likely be needed to create the forces needed for the maritime operating concept? What opportunities and challenges might be this present?

AIR FORCE OPERATING CONCEPT & SPACE

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-15-S

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson focuses on the vertical (or third dimensional) domains of air and space. Although relatively new in the long and extensive history of human warfare, the advent of military operations in both the air and space domains has had a profound impact on how we wield the military instrument of power in pursuit of our national interests. From providing additional military options for civilian leaders to developing military strategy and doctrine to planning and executing joint and coalition military operations, the character of war has changed dramatically in the last century once we learned how to slip “the surly bonds of Earth.”⁴ It is natural for any military organization to search for ways to gain an asymmetric advantage over a current or potential adversary. Through technological advances and a culture of bold innovation, exploiting the vertical flank in pursuit of the unfair fight has become an indispensable component in the evolution of U.S. military strategy, planning, and operations.

b. During the *Theory of War and Strategy* course, you read about and discussed air and space power theorists and their views on how best to utilize these domains in a military context. This lesson will expand on what you learned in TWS-12 as we move from theory to current and future application. Your readings and discussions will focus on current and future operating concepts in the air and space domains as well as some service-specific aspects of the U.S. Air Force with regards to presentation of forces and command and control of joint air operations.

c. Although this lesson is the last domain and service centric lesson during TSC, it is important to understand that although any single lesson typically focuses on just one or two aspects of military operations (e.g. domains, joint functions), none of these can successfully operate independently from any other. Although this lesson focuses on air and space domains and concepts, you need to also think in a broader context during your readings and in seminar dialog, to include the impact on national strategy and implications for the future joint force.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Evaluate** the role of Airpower as part of the Joint Force in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.

b. **Analyze** the role of Spacepower as part of the Joint Force in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.

⁴ Magee, Jr, John Gillespie, “High Flight.”

c. **Comprehend** how U.S. Air Force forces are presented to a Joint Force Commander.

d. **Analyze** the U.S. Air Force Posture Statement and Future Operating Concept and how its implementation might affect the way the Service trains, organizes, and equips its force.

3. Enabling Outcomes. None.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Required Readings.

(1) Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, *Volume 1 – Basic Doctrine* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Curtis E. Lemay Center, February 27, 2015), <https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=Volume-1-Basic-Doctrine.pdf> (accessed August 23, 2016). Read pp. 23-35. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(2) Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, *Annex 3-30 Command and Control* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Curtis E. Lemay Center, November 2014), <https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=3-30-Annex-COMMAND-CONTROL.pdf> (accessed August 23, 2016). Read pp. 38-39 and 54-62. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(3) United States Joint Staff Joint Force Development (J7) – Future Joint Force Development, *Cross-Domain Synergy in Joint Operations* (Joint Electronic Library, January 14, 2016), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/cross_domain_planning_guide.pdf (accessed August 25, 2016). Read pp. 33-37 and 46-49. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(4) Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, *USAF Posture Statement 2016*, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, February 10, 2016), http://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/airpower/FY16_AF_PostureStatement_FINALversion2-2.pdf (accessed August 23, 2016). Read pp. 1 thru 6. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(5) Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, *USAF Strategic Master Plan*, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, May 2015), http://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/Force%20Management/Strategic_Master_Plan.pdf (accessed August 23, 2016). Read pp. 3-4, 13-16, 25-29, 37-38, 41-42, 45-48, and 53-56. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(6) Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, *Air Force Future Operating Concept*, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, September 2015), <http://www.af.mil/Portals/1/images/airpower/AFFOC.pdf> (accessed August 23, 2016). Read pp. 7-12. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

b. Focused Readings. None.

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Benjamin S. Lambeth, *The Transformation of American Air Power* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000).

(2) Mark Clodfelter, *The Limits of Air Power – The American Bombing of North Vietnam* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1989).

(3) Karl P. Mueller, ed., *Precision and Purpose – Airpower in the Libyan Civil War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015).

(4) Alan J. Vick, *Proclaiming Airpower – Air Force Narratives and American Public Opinion from 1917-2014* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015).

(5) Daniel Goure' and Christopher M. Szara, eds., *Air and Space Power in the New Millennium* (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006).

(6) Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win – Airpower and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

5. Points to Consider.

a. What is Airpower? What is the relationship between the air domain and Airpower? What is the difference between Airpower and air forces? Why do we care? Is the distinction important?

b. How is Airpower perceived in the context of U.S. national strategy and achievement of political objectives? How is it viewed as a means to an end? What is the value of Airpower? What are some of the concerns associated with civilian leadership and the general population's perception of Airpower?

c. Are single domain operations decisive in contemporary operational environments? Why, or why not?

d. How are U.S. Air Force forces presented to the Joint Force Commander?

e. What capabilities, limitations, and comparative advantages does the Air Force provide to Geographic Combatant Commanders in executing their mission at the theater level across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO)?

f. What is the role of Space in joint military operations? What are some concerns regarding space capabilities from a joint force perspective?

g. What are some of the unique challenges, if any, to coalition operations with regards to the air and space domains?

h. What are the implications of the USAF Posture Statement 2016 for the joint force? What are the Air Force's major concerns? Where does the Air Force expect to assume risk? How will this impact the joint force?

i. How is the Air Force Future Operating Concept shaped by the unique nature of the air and space domains? What areas do you agree or disagree with the concept? Why, or why not?

EMERGING CONCEPTS

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-16-S

1. Introduction.

a. The spectrum of conflict shaped by twenty-first century trends has tested U.S. warfighting paradigms in the last decade and a half. Global competition between state and non-state actors will continue to evolve and challenge national interests during peace, war and within the blurred lines that connect them – referred to as the gray zone. In an environment of contested norms and persistent disorder, the Department of Defense (DoD) developed a family of emerging concepts to address specific problems in the context of the current and future Operational Environments (OE). As a result, DoD is moving towards a Third Offset Strategy to sustain a power projection advantage against threats who are adapting their methods to subvert, coerce, disrupt, or undermine a security environment favorable to the United States and its allies. The department seeks to adapt the Joint Force in ways to successfully campaign across a continuum of conflict by viewing the strategic environment beyond a binary peace, war paradigm. The technologies demanded by the Third Offset, the trend of military commitments beyond sustained combat, and competition within a globally empowered human domain requires great emphasis on planning, balancing resources, and ensuring intergovernmental and multi-national cooperation.

b. This session will examine initiatives designed to adapt the Joint Force to sustain outcomes during conflict and throughout the spectrum of peace, war and operations short of war. The Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC) developed by the Joint Staff proposes a change to the dynamics of operational practice and seeks to clearly articulate more relevant and broader interpretations of successful campaigning not found in current doctrine. The JCIC represents an alternate method of planning and campaigning across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO) as a different construct for synchronizing military activities with the whole of government in support of national security objectives.

2. Learning Outcomes.

- a. **Analyze** how the 3rd Offset Strategy proposes to maintain a competitive advantage over a wide range of threats to U.S. and allied interests.
- b. **Evaluate** the potential merits and/or shortcomings of the emerging JCIC initiative.
- c. **Analyze** each concept discussed and the implications for the future force.

3. Enabling Outcome. **Comprehend** how the 3rd Offset Strategy, Gray Zone interaction, and emerging concept for campaigning aim to enable the U.S. military to confront future global security challenges.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*, Draft Working Document, Predecisional VO.40 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, as of September 9, 2016). **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning, Executive Overview Brief," briefing slides (Washington, DC: Joint Staff (J7), October, 2016). **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(3) Frank G. Hoffman, "The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone, Ambiguous, and Hybrid Modes of War," <http://index.heritage.org/military/2016/essays/contemporary-spectrum-of-conflict/> (accessed September 12, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

b. Focused Readings.

(1) Team One (3rd Offset Strategy):

(a) Bob Work, "The Third U.S. Offset Strategy and its Implications for Partners and Allies," public speech, Willard Hotel, Washington, DC, January 28, 2015, <http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606641/the-third-us-offset-strategy-and-its-implications-for-partners-and-allies> (accessed July 20, 2016). Review pp. 1-14. **[Open Source URL]**

(b) John Louth and Trevor Taylor, "The U.S. Third Offset Strategy: Hegemony and Dependency in the Twenty-First Century," *The RUSI Journal* 161, no. 3, [Taylor & Francis](#) (accessed August 5, 2016). Read pp. 66-71. **[USAWC Library Online Database]**

(c) Robert Martinage, *Toward a New Offset Strategy: Exploiting U.S. Long-Term Advantages to Restore U.S. Global Power Projection Capability* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, 2014), https://issuu.com/csbaonline/docs/csba6102_offset_strategy_report_fin_12d361be465156?e=15123547/10908051 (accessed July 20, 2016). Read "Executive Summary," pp. iii-viii, and scan remaining document. **[Open Source URL]**

(2) Team Two (Gray Zone):

(a) Philip Kapusta, "The Gray Zone," *Special Warfare* 28, no. 4 (October – December 2015), <http://www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWmag/archive/SW2804/October%202015%20Special%20Warfare.pdf> (accessed August 5, 2016). Read pp. 18-25. **[Open Source URL]**

(b) Joseph L. Votel, *United States Special Operations Command Strategic Appreciation 2015 - Finding Balance in a Shifting World* (December 2015). Read pp. 1-7. **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(c) Antulio J. Echevarria, "How Should We Think About 'Gray-Zone' Wars?" *Infinity Journal* 5, no. 1 (Fall 2015), https://www.infinityjournal.com/article/158/How_Should_We_Think_about_GrayZone_Wars/ (accessed September 12, 2016). Requires individual registration to access. **[Open Source URL]**

(d) Hal Brands, "Paradoxes of the Gray Zone," *Foreign Policy Research Institute: E-Notes*, entry posted February 5, 2016, <http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/paradoxes-gray-zone/> (accessed September 12, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

c. Suggested Readings. All team readings.

5. Points to Consider.

a. What is the Third Offset Strategy and how might it significantly change defense, collective security, and allied partnerships?

b. In what ways might the Third Offset strategy mitigate strategic risk? Is the strategy an adaptable and balanced approach to deter, deny, or defeat conventional and unconventional threats? Is it a strategy?

c. Will it feasibly offset competition in the Gray Zone? Is our emphasis on anti-access/area denial and contested operating environments distracting us from confronting non-traditional adversarial approaches?

d. In what ways is our current phasing model useful or outmoded in terms of campaigning now and in the future? Is our traditional approach inadequate?

e. How might JCIC provide an improved roadmap to consolidate military success and outcomes? Is it trying to solve the wrong problem?

f. As a Joint document, do other US government entities have any obligation to adhere to the concept? What will be the friction between DoD and other government agencies?

Block IV Intent “Joint Functions”

Block Chief: COL Douglas V. Mastriano

Purpose: After developing an understanding of strategic direction, operational art and design, the perspective of the geographical combatant commander, the domains and the other armed services, Block IV provides the “ways and means” of implementing theater strategy using the Joint Functions. The Joint Functions, according to JP 3-0, are Command & Control, Information Operations, Intelligence, Protection, Movement, Maneuver, and Fires. Block IV highlights how the integration and application of the Joint Functions serve to support the accomplishment of the geographical combatant commander’s ends.

Method: This module features student readings, guest lectures, seminar instruction, case studies, a Joint Functions Integration Exercise and optional student oral presentations on selected readings in support of program learning outcomes (PLOs), Joint Learning Areas (JLAs) and Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs).

End state: Students should proceed from this block with an understanding of how the integration and application of the Joint Functions supports the accomplishment of the geographical combatant commander’s ends and are essential to any strategy and operational approach.

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COMMAND STRUCTURES AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-17-S

1. Introduction.

a. **Command Structures.** An essential joint warfighting function is command and control (C2). Command encompasses the authority and responsibility to use available resources to accomplish assigned missions. Control is the management and direction of forces and functions consistent with command authority. Control is essential before any operation begins. Yet, too often, the analysis is done quickly, the units are thrown together, and the command structure is inadequate. To succeed, an understanding of how to organize a joint headquarters, to implement control measures, and staff planning mitigates the fog and friction of operations.

b. **Theater Organization.** This lesson analyzes the options available to GCCs and JFCs to organize their areas of responsibility (AORs) and command and control their forces. Each C2 architecture is designed to operate across a range of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environments.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Evaluate** the command authorities of a combatant commander and command relationships with subordinate components and how these affect theater organization.

b. **Synthesize** C2 doctrine to create a theater command and control structure that accounts for systems complexity within a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment.

c. **Analyze** information operations as an integral component of joint and multinational operations.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Comprehend** the doctrinal terms and options used for organizing a theater of operations.

b. **Comprehend** the command authorities available to a joint force commander.

c. **Comprehend** the doctrinal organization of the operational environment of a joint force operating within a combatant commander's area of responsibility (AOR) to include the joint operations area, the area of influence, and the area of interest.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Complete the required readings with frequent referral to both learning outcomes and points to consider.

(2) Be prepared to discuss the relationships among the various actors as reflected in the processes and products.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf (accessed July 22, 2016). Read Chapter IV, "Joint Command Organizations," pp. IV-1 to IV-10; and Chapter V, "Joint Command and Control," pp. V-1 to V-10. **[Open Source URL], [Blackboard] and [TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf (accessed July 22, 2016). Read Chapter III, "Joint Functions," "Command and Control," III-2 to III-10. **[Open Source URL], [Blackboard] and [TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

(3) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*, Joint Publication 3-31 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 24, 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_31.pdf (accessed July 22, 2016). Read Chapter II, "The Joint Force Land Component Command," pp. II-1 to II-13. **[Open Source URL], [Blackboard] and [TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

(4) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, J7, Deployable Training Division, "Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Geographic Combatant Commanders Command and Control Organizational Options," (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, J7, March 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/fp/fp_gcc.pdf (accessed July 22, 2016). **[Open Source URL], [Blackboard] and [TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

(5) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Information Operations*, Joint Publication 3-13 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 27, 2012, incorporating Change 1 of November 20, 2014), www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf (accessed July 22, 2016). Read "Executive Summary," pp. ix - xvi, "Chapter II: Information Operations," pp. II-1 to II-13. **[Open Source URL], [Blackboard] and [TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

c. Suggested Reading. Joe Quartararo, Sr., Michael Rovenolt, and Randy White, "Libya's Operation Odyssey Dawn. Command and Control," *Prism* 3, no. 2 (2011), www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA558261 (accessed July 22, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. What are the doctrinal designations for the physical areas in the operational environment?

b. How does the designation of the area of influence and interest assist the commander and staff in both planning efforts and execution of missions?

c. What are a combatant commander's options to organize the joint force, and what are the authorities and command relationships that affect it?

d. What are a combatant commander's options to organize the multinational or coalition force, and what are the authorities and command relationships that affect it?

e. Describe OPCON, TACON, and supporting/supported relationships. Does the JFC require OPCON of forces operating in his area of operations to sufficiently execute the doctrinal responsibilities of a joint force commander?

f. What circumstances influence the way a joint force commander would organize US force components by service, by function, or a combination of the two?

g. Mutual trust is an inherent element of mission command. How does one achieve this in an environment of rotating forces, multinational partners, rotational teams of brigades and battalions, and individual augmentees?

h. Using the case studies, describe the challenges each JFC faced and how each solved/did not solve the control issues through the command structure used.

i. How do joint force commanders (JFCs) ensure the integrated employment of information-related capabilities?

j. How do JFCs ensure communications strategies nest with and support USG communications strategies, programs, and actions to influence key audiences?

SUSTAINMENT: SET AND MAINTAIN THE THEATER

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-18-S

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson provides an introduction to the discussion of the joint function sustainment, its related tasks, and key considerations. The lesson also introduces the requirements and challenges in establishing/setting and supporting/sustaining a military theater of operations. Senior U.S. military officers often face restraints and constraints in applying the right force mix, timing, and resources needed to set a theater of operations quickly and effectively. We need to be ready for any future contingency environment to include the ability to execute rapid response with minimal staging, extended operational reach, and prolonged endurance. The commander is the individual who must ultimately balance the competing elements of mission, time, resources, capabilities, and risk. The commander's vision and intent for the campaign or operation provides the foundation upon which everything else rests.

b. A theater is never completely "set"; setting the theater is a continual process the Combatant Commander uses to shape the theater for strategic success. Included in setting the theater are those strategic activities directed at establishing favorable conditions for conducting Army and Joint operations. These activities identify priorities for theater shaping, force posture and access, partner capacity building, and steady-state operations that support achieving theater strategic end-states. Setting the theater includes the identification of lines of effort in accordance with the commander's objective, as well as whole-of-government initiatives, including bilateral or multilateral diplomatic agreements. These agreements allow U.S. forces to access ports, terminals, airfields, and bases within the area of responsibility to support future military contingency operations within Joint Operations Phases 0, I, and II. Setting the theater implies that forces must conduct Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration.

c. Sustainment operations enable the continuity and survivability of a military force capable of avoiding or withstanding hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission. Sustainment must be capable of supporting sustained high-tempo operations to achieve objectives with numerous partners in future complex, uncertain, and austere environments, often at the ends of extended and contested lines of communications, requires the ability to operate in multiple domains with reduced vulnerability to interdiction. While sustainment remains a Service responsibility, there are exceptions such as arrangements described in Service support agreements, CCDR-directed common-user logistics, Directed Authority for Logistics (DAFL), lead Service, or DoD agency responsibilities.

d. Today's lesson will explore a few of the issues and considerations associated with setting and sustaining a military theater. This realm is not just that of the Service logistician or contracting officer. The Combatant Commander, Joint Force Commander, J5, J4, and J3 all have an important role to play in developing the vision for the theater. Operational design provides the initial approach to the theater set, from which planners, logisticians, and subordinate units create detailed plans.

e. The focused readings illustrate the challenges faced and lessons learned during Operations DESERT STORM and UNITED ASSISTANCE.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Comprehend** the key considerations and challenges required to plan, synchronize, and execute sustainment operations.

b. **Evaluate** the roles, responsibilities, and missions of the Joint Force Commander (JFC) and the Army Service Component Commands in planning, setting, and sustaining a theater of operation.

c. Using the Operation Desert Storm and Operation United Assistance case studies, **analyze** the challenges associated with planning and executing sustainment in a theater of operation.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Comprehend** the doctrinal foundation and underpinnings of the Joint functions.

b. **Comprehend** the totality of the theater, i.e. infrastructure, bases, ports, distribution systems, protection, and C2, and corresponding commands responsible for its development and operation.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Self-Paced Tutorial. **(All U.S. Students Only)** "Operational Contract Support (OCS) Flag Officer-General Officer (FOGO) Essentials Course," <https://jkodirect.jten.mil/Atlas2/faces/page/login/Login.seam?ORG=JKO&cid=509967> **(It will take you approximately 1 hour to go through the course.)**

(1) After clicking link above, log in with your CAC. It will take you to the JKO homepage. Click on the "Course Catalog" tab.

(2) In the "Title Key Word Search" block type "Operational Contract Support (OCS) Flag Officer-General Officer" and click the purple "Search" icon. That title will come up as Course J4S-T-US429. Click "Enroll." A small window will open to ask if you want to enroll. "Click Continue."

(3) A black header will scroll down to indicate you are now enrolled. Click on the “My Training” tab at the top of the page and you’ll see the course listed at the bottom of the page. Click “Launch.”

(4) A new window will open with an explanation of all the tabs and buttons used throughout the course.

(5) On the top left side of that new page click on the title “Start” button and the course will start. You will need to click on the six module links on the left side of the page and complete each to finish the course.

(6) After completion, print your certificate and turn in to your FI.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Logistics*, Joint Publication 4-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 16, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_0.pdf (accessed July 22, 2016). Read pp. I-1 through I-11, II-1 through II-2, II-7 through II-12, III-1 through III-18, V-I through V-5. **[Open Source URL], [Blackboard] and [TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 16, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf (accessed September 12, 2016). Read pp. III-35 through III-39. **[Open Source URL], [Blackboard] and [TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

(3) U.S. Department of the Army, *Theater Army Operations*, ATP 3-93 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, November 2014). Read pp. 5-1 to 5-2 and 6-1 to 6-10. **[Blackboard] and [TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

c. Focused Readings/Student Presentations.

(1) United States Army Combined Arms Center, “Operation United Assistance - Setting the Theater: Creating Conditions for Success in West Africa,” *OUA Newsletter Online*, no. 15-09 (June 2015), <http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/15-09%20OUA%20Newsletter.pdf> (accessed July 22, 2016). Read pp. 1-5, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4. **[Open Source URL], [Blackboard] and [TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

(2) Jeff Reibestein, “Logistics in Support of Operation United Assistance: Teamwork, Transition and Lessons Learned,” *United States Africa Command*, June 19, 2015, <http://www.africom.mil/newsroom/article/25458/logistics-in-support-of-operation-united-assistance-teamwork-transition-and-lessons-learned> (accessed July 22, 2016). **[Open Source URL], [Blackboard] and [TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

(3) Final Report to Congress, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*, April 1992, <http://www.ssi.army.mil/!Library/Desert%20Shield-Desert%20Storm%20Battle%20Analysis/Conduct%20of%20the%20Persian%20Gulf%20War%20-%20Final%20Rpt%20to%20Congress.pdf> (accessed July 22, 2016). Read pp. 295-296, 408-410, 416-418, 434-445, 458-478, 481-499, 504-510, 517-520 and 525-547. **[Open Source URL]**, **[Blackboard]** and **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

(4) Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Final Report to Congress, *Transforming Wartime Contracting, Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks*, August 2011, http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cwc/20110929213820/http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_FinalReport-lowres.pdf (accessed July 22, 2016). Read “Foreword,” Chapter 3, and F.R. 5 or “Foreword” and Chapter 6. **[Open Source URL]**, **[Blackboard]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

(5) United States Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, “Contingency Contracting: A Framework for Reform 2012 Update,” Report No, DODIG-2012-134, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 18, 2012), <http://www.dodig.mil/Audit/reports/fy12/DODIG-2012-134.pdf> (accessed July 22, 2016). Read Appendix E, pp. 56-59. **[Open Source URL]**, **[Blackboard]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations*, Joint Publication 4-08 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 21, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_08.pdf (accessed July 22, 2016). Read “Executive Summary.” **[Open Source URL]**, **[Blackboard]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**

(2) Joseph T. Boos, “Developing a Multinational Logistics Common Operational Picture,” *Army Sustainment Magazine Online*, September-October 2015, http://www.army.mil/article/153756/Developing_a_multinational_logistics_common_operational_picture/ (accessed July 22, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(3) Theresa D. Christie, “Multinational Logistics Interoperability,” *Army Sustainment Magazine Online*, September-October 2015, <http://go.usa.gov/3625Y> (accessed July 25, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(4) Department of Defense Executive Agent List, <http://dod-executiveagent.osd.mil/agentList.aspx> (accessed July 25, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(5) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Operational Contract Support*, Joint Publication 4-10 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 16, 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_10.pdf (accessed July 25, 2016). Read “Executive Summary,” ix to xvii and III-1 to III-35, “Contract Support Integration Process.” **[Open Source URL]**

5. Points to Consider.

- a. What is the role of sustainment in establishing and maintaining the theater?
- b. How should commanders and staffs integrate and synchronize U.S. forces, contractors, host-nation (HN)/Coalition assets, other governmental agencies (OGA), and non-governmental agencies (NGO), in a theater?
- c. What are the different challenges/considerations to setting and maintaining both a mature and immature theater of operation?
- d. What are the consequences of insufficient oversight and planning regarding Operational Contracting Support?

INTELLIGENCE AND PROTECTION

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-19-S

1. Introduction. This lesson focuses on two of the joint functions, intelligence and protection. The intelligence portion links to the earlier *National Security Policy and Strategy* (NSPS) Lesson 14 on the instruments of national power in conflict. Effective intelligence support is foundational to a focused and nuanced application of the instruments of national power.

a. Intelligence. Part one of this lesson analyzes intelligence with an emphasis on the scope and depth of U.S. “all-source” intelligence support to the Combatant Commander (CCDR), though much is also applicable to other Joint Force Commanders (JFC). The CCDR provides guidance, prioritization, and feedback to ensure that joint intelligence effectively enhances understanding of the Operational Environment (OE) at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels across the theater. This informs CCMD strategy and planning at all levels. The J-2 leads the CCMD intelligence enterprise, leveraging and integrating capabilities assigned to the CCMD, the Service Components, multinational partners, and within the greater Intelligence Community (IC). The Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) is the focal point for intelligence analysis and production at the regional and functional CCMDs. Though these differ in actual size and capability across the CCMDs, they all share the same fundamental purpose. These organizational structures trace their roots to the Joint Intelligence Collection Agencies (JICA) of WWII. Lessons learned from Operation Desert Shield/Storm, the 9/11 attacks, and Operation Iraqi Freedom have resulted in CCMD intelligence capabilities that are better integrated and collaborative. Overall, the CCDR relies on timely intelligence and analysis to assess the developing situation and inform his decisions on the employment of military forces. In addition, timely intelligence reporting better enables participating elements of national and coalition power to achieve their desired end states.

b. Protection. Part two analyzes the CCDR's roles and responsibilities for protection, which focuses on preserving the fighting potential of the joint force. The basic approach to this is twofold. First, using active defensive measures that protect the joint force, its bases, necessary infrastructure, and LOCs from enemy attack. Second, using passive defensive measures that make friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. This is frequently expanded to include designated non-combatants, systems, and infrastructure of friendly nations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and other government agencies (OGAs). Protection considerations impact the planning of joint operations at all levels and involve a wide range of protection tasks executed across the range of military operations. Overall, multiple layers of protection for joint forces and facilities at all levels, beginning at home, enable freedom of action from pre-deployment through employment and redeployment. The fluid OE, with the ability of adversaries to

orchestrate threats against joint forces, necessitates that the CCDR to seek all available means of protection.

c. Intelligence Support to Force Protection. The joint functions are mutually reinforcing. They complement each other and integration across them is essential to mission accomplishment. This is true of intelligence and force protection. Understanding the nature of threats to DoD personnel and resources across the Joint Security Area (JSA) requires accurate and timely intelligence. DoD counterintelligence (CI) elements have a directed responsibility to ensure comprehensive, aggressive, and integrated support to force protection across the CCMD area of responsibility (AOR).

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Analyze** the CCDR's role and key considerations in the planning, integration, synchronization, and execution of intelligence as a joint function across the area of responsibility.

b. **Analyze** the CCDR's role and key considerations in the planning and implementation of protection as a joint function across the area of responsibility.

3. Enabling Outcomes. To prepare for seminar:

a. **Comprehend** the intelligence resources and capabilities available to the CCDR.

b. **Comprehend** the CCDR's role and responsibilities for protection across the Joint Security Area.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Complete the required readings with frequent referral to both learning outcomes and points to consider.

(2) Be prepared to discuss the relationships among the various actors as reflected in the processes and products.

b. Required Readings (Intelligence).

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf (accessed July 25, 2016). Read pp. III-20 to III-22. [**Open Source URL**], [**TSC AY17 CD Rom**], and [**Blackboard**]

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Intelligence*, Joint Publication 2-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 22, 2013) http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp2_0.pdf (accessed July 25, 2016). Read pp. ix to xi, xiv to xvi, I-6 to I-9, II-2 to II-3, II-4 to II-6, III-1 to III-13, and V-8 to V-10. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**, and **[Blackboard]**

(3) Department of Defense Directive, *Combat Support Agencies (CSAs)*, Number 3000.06 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, June 27, 2013, Incorporating Change 1, July 8, 2016), <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300006p.pdf> (accessed July 25, 2016). Read Directive and Enclosure 2, p.8 and p.10. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**, and **[Blackboard]**

- Required Readings (Protection).

(4) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Security Operations in Theater*, Joint Publication 3-10 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 13, 2014) http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_10.pdf (accessed July 25, 2016). Read pp. I-1 to I-7, III-1 to III-21. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**, and **[Blackboard]**

c. Focused Readings (Intelligence).

(1) U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, *Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Storm*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 16, 1993), <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a338886.pdf> (accessed July 25, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**, and **[Blackboard]**

- Focused Readings (Protection).

(2) Vincent P. O'Hara and Enrico Cernuschi, "Frogmen Against A Fleet," *Naval War College Review* 68, no. 3 (Summer 2015), <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/f9f595b1-7547-4929-8d05-b2e798390a3c/Frogmen-against-a-Fleet--The-Italian-Attack-on-Ale.aspx> (accessed July 25, 2016). Read pp. 119-137. **[Open Source URL]**

d. Suggested Readings (Intelligence).

(1) The White House, *United States Intelligence Activities*, Executive Order 12333 as Amended by Executive Orders 13284, 13355, and 13470 (Washington, DC: The White House, 2008), <https://www.ise.gov/sites/default/files/EO12333.pdf> (accessed July 25, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**, and **[Blackboard]**

(2) James R. Clapper, *The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America 2014*, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, September 17, 2014), http://www.odni.gov/files/documents/2014_NIS_Publication.pdf (accessed July 25, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**, and **[Blackboard]**

(3) Department of Defense Directive, *Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)*, Number 5105.21 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 18, 2008), <http://dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/510521p.pdf> (accessed July 25, 2016). Read pp. 1-5. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**, and **[Blackboard]**

(4) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Intelligence Operations, First Edition (Reprint)*, (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff J7, Deployable Training Division, July 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/fp/fp_intel_ops.pdf (accessed July 25, 2016). Read pp. 1-12. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**, and **[Blackboard]**

(5) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, Joint Publication 2-01 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 5, 2012), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp2_01.pdf (accessed July 25, 2016). Read pp. I-1 to I-5, II-1 to II-6, and II-24 to II-27. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**, and **[Blackboard]**

(6) James D. Marchio, "Days of Future Past: Joint Intelligence in World War II," *Joint Force Quarterly* 11 (Spring 1996), <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq-11.pdf> (accessed July 25, 2016). Read pp.116-123. **[Open Source URL]**

(7) Central Intelligence Agency, "The Evolution and Relevance of the Joint Intelligence Centers," in *Studies in Intelligence* 49, no. 1 (2005), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no1/html_files/the_evolution_6.html (accessed July 25, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(8) Tyler Akers, "Taking Joint Intelligence Operations to the Next Level," *Joint Force Quarterly* 47, (4th Quarter 2007), <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq-47.pdf> (accessed July 25, 2016). Read pp. 69-71. **[Open Source URL]**

- Suggested Readings (Protection).

(9) Richard E. Berkebile, "Thoughts on Force Protection," *Joint Force Quarterly* 81, (2nd Quarter 2016), <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq-81.pdf> (accessed July 25, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(10) Department of Defense Instruction, *Counterintelligence Support to Force Protection*, Number 5240.22 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, September 24, 2009, Incorporating Change 1, October 15, 2013), <http://dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/524022p.pdf> (accessed July 25, 2016). Read pp. 1, 4-5, and 7-8. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**, and **[Blackboard]**

(11) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf (accessed July 25, 2016). Read pp. III-29 to III-34. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**, and **[Blackboard]**

(12) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Protection*, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-37 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, August 2012, Incorporating Change 1, February 28, 2013). Read Chapter 1, pp. 1-1 through 1-3. Scan Chapter 1, pp. 1-4 thru 1-15. Read Chapter 4, pp. 4-1 through 4-4. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**, and **[Blackboard]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. How does the CCDR provide the guidance, prioritization, and feedback essential to the ability of joint intelligence to facilitate understanding the operational environment and ensure mission accomplishment?

b. How does the J-2 lead and synchronize the CCMD intelligence enterprise, to include the Service components, in support of joint and multinational operations?

c. How do CCDRs and their J-2s leverage external strategic intelligence resources, capabilities, and information in support of the range of military operations?

d. How does the House Armed Services Committee Report on Intelligence Successes/Failures in Operation Desert Shield/Storm illustrate CCDR and J-2 challenges working across multiple organizations/nations and echelons in support of joint and multinational operations? How has this changed since 1990-1991?

e. How does a CCDR conduct military Joint Security Operations (JSO) across an area of responsibility outside the homeland?

f. What are key considerations in the planning and implementation of JSO across the range of military operations?

g. How does the 1941 Italian special operations attack against the British Mediterranean fleet in Alexandria Harbor illustrate the difficulties of active and passive protection against an innovative and determined enemy in the Joint Security Area?

h. How does intelligence support protection?

MOVEMENT & MANEUVER AND FIRES

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-20-S

1. Introduction.

a. Combatant Commanders direct the movement of forces to the AOR (movement), to deliver an effect on a target (fires). Any mission, task, or operation opposed by an adversary will require joint forces to secure positional advantage (maneuver) as a means of accomplishing military tasks and achieving national security goals. This lesson examines two joint functions -- Movement & Maneuver and Fires. It is important to distinguish between Movement and Maneuver although they comprise one joint function.

b. The generic phasing construct presented in JP 3-0 provides a backdrop for considering the different ways in which combatant commanders integrate these two joint functions in joint operations.⁵ Movement & Maneuver and Fires have the predominance of import when Joint Forces are seizing the initiative and dominating adversaries.

c. Use a historic case study to demonstrate Movement & Maneuver and Fires. During Operation CHROMITE (the September 1950 Battle of Inchon and Second Battle of Seoul) the joint force commander's use of movement, maneuver, and fires produced cross-domain synergy and battlefield success.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Analyze** joint doctrine for maneuver, movement, fires, and campaign phasing for major operations and campaigns.

b. **Explain** how Joint Force Commanders seize the initiative and dominate adversaries.

c. **Evaluate** the effectiveness of Movement & Maneuver and Fires in Operation CHROMITE.

⁵ See Antulio J. Echevarria, "On America's Way of Battle" in *War on the Rocks* September 22, 2015, available at <http://warontherocks.com/2015/09/on-americas-way-of-battle/> for a critique of this phasing construct as an ideal model for joint planning. Consider also Charles T. Cleveland, Shaw S. Pick, and Stuart L. Farris, "Shedding Light on the Gray Zone: A New Approach to Human-Centric Warfare," *ARMY Magazine* Vol. 66, No. 6 (June 2016), available at <http://www.armymagazine.org/2015/08/17/shedding-light-on-the-gray-zone/>, for a brief description of the joint concept for integrated campaigning which could refine or replace the current phasing construct in joint doctrine.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

- a. **Comprehend** the difference between movement and maneuver.
- b. **Know** the six phases of the joint phasing model (JP 3-0 Figure V-3, pg. V-6).

4. Student Requirements.

- a. Tasks. None
- b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf (accessed July 19, 2016). Read: “Fires” pp. III-22 to III-27, “Movement and Maneuver” pp. III-27 to III-29, “A Phasing Construct” pp. V-5 to V-9, “Considerations for Seizing the Initiative” pp. V-43 to V-50 and “Considerations for Dominance” pp. V-50 to V-58. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Fire Support*, Joint Publication 3-09 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 12, 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_09.pdf (accessed July 19, 2016). Read pp. III-1 to III-11. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(3) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations*, Joint Publication 3-35 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 31, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_35.pdf (accessed July 19, 2016). Read pp. V-6 to V-13. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(4) Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June – November 1950)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961), <http://www.history.army.mil/books/korea/20-2-1/sn25.htm> (accessed July 19, 2016). Skim pp. 492-501 and read pp. 501-536. **[Open Source URL]**

c. Focused Readings.

(1) David Gioe, “Can the Warfare Concept of Maneuver be Usefully Applied in Cyber Operations?” *The Cyber Defense Review*, January 14, 2016, <http://www.cyberdefensereview.org/2016/01/14/warfare-concept/> (accessed July 19, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(2) Edward C. Cardon, “The Future of Army Maneuver–Dominance in the Land and Cyber Domains,” *The Cyber Defense Review* 1, no. 1 (Spring 2016), <http://www.cyberdefensereview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/CDR-SPRING2016.pdf> (accessed July 19, 2016). Read pp. 15-20. **[Open Source URL]**

(3) Toshi Yoshihara, "The 1974 Paracels Sea Battle: A Campaign Appraisal," *Naval War College Review* 69, no. 2 (Spring 2016), <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/7b5ec8a0-cc48-4d9b-b558-a4f1cf92e7b8/The1974ParacelsSeaBattle.aspx> (accessed July 19, 2016). Read pp. 41-65. **[Open Source URL]**

(4) Eric Lindsey, *Beyond Coast Artillery: Cross-Domain Denial and the Army* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2014), <http://csbaonline.org/publications/2014/10/beyond-coast-artillery-cross-domain-denial-and-the-army> (accessed August 24, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(5) Robert H. Scales, "Russia's Superior New Weapons," *The Washington Post* Online, August 5, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/russias-superior-new-weapons/2016/08/05/e86334ec-08c5-11e6-bdcb-0133da18418d_story.html?utm_term=.5a11ded82ce0 (accessed August 24, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) Donald W. Boose, Jr., *Over the Beach: U.S. Army Amphibious Operations in the Korean War* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008) <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/boose.pdf> (accessed July 19, 2016). Read Chapter 4, "CHROMITE: The Incheon Landing," pp. 162-168, 176-183, and 186-203. **[Open Source URL]**

(2) Headquarters X Corps, "Operation CHROMITE: 15 August – 30 September, 1950," <http://www.paperlessarchives.com/FreeTitles/OperationChromiteInchonLandingXCorpsReport.pdf> (accessed July 19, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(3) Allan R. Millett, *The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came from the North* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2010). Read "From Incheon to Seoul," Chapter Seven, pp. 239-256.

(4) Conrad C. Crane, "The Lure of Strike," *Parameters* Vol. 43 No. 2 (Summer 2013), [Proquest](#) (accessed July 19, 2016). Read pp. 5-8. **[USAWC Library Online Database]**

(5) Jody Jacobs et al, *Enhancing Fires and Maneuver Capability Through Greater Air-Ground Joint Interdependence* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG793.pdf (accessed July 19, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(6) Scott D. Applegate, "The Principle of Maneuver in Cyber Operations," 2012 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (5-8 June 2012 in Tallinn, Estonia), C. Czosseck, R. Ottis, and K. Ziokowski, eds. (Piscataway, NJ: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2012), https://ccdcoe.org/publications/2012proceedings/3_3_Applegate_ThePrincipleOfManeuverInCyberOperations.pdf (accessed July 19, 2016). Read pp.183-195. **[Open Source URL]**

(7) A.H. Farrar-Hockley, "The October War," U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Arab-Israeli War - October 1973: A Case Study*, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, January 6, 2005), pp. 7-29.

(8) Thomas E. Griess, ed, *The Arab-Israeli Wars, the Chinese Civil War, and the Korean War* (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group Inc., 1987). Read "1973—The War of Many Names," in Chapter 1 "Recurrent Conflict and Elusive Peace: The Arab-Israeli Wars," pp. 16-23.

(9) Martin van Creveld, *Military Lessons of the Yom Kippur War: Historical Perspectives* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications Inc., 1975).

(10) T. N. Dupuy, "The War of Ramadan," *Army* (March 1975). Read pp. 48-57.

(11) Douglas C. Dildy, *Fall Gelb 1940 (1): Panzer Breakthrough in the West* (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2014).

(12) Douglas C. Dildy, *Fall Gelb 1940 (2): Airborne Assault on the Low Countries* (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2015)

(13) Robert A. Doughty, *The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940* (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1990).

5. Points to Consider.

a. What are the strategic implications of the joint force achieving operational reach through movement and positional advantage through maneuver?

b. How does the Phasing Construct, described in Chapter V of JP 3-0, facilitate or hinder the joint force commander's integration of joint functions?

c. What are the likely roles of movement, maneuver, and fires when Joint Force Commanders want to "Seize Initiative"?

d. What are the likely roles of movement, maneuver, and fires when Joint Force Commanders want to establish "Dominance" in an Area of Operations?

e. What are the risks and opportunities that joint force commanders must consider when integrating and synchronizing maneuver and fires?

f. How did the joint force commander attain operational reach, achieve positional advantage, and employ fires to create desired effects during Operation CHROMITE? How did the operational reach, positional advantage, and desired effects contribute to achieving strategic or policy objectives?

INTEGRATION OF THE JOINT FUNCTIONS

Mode: Exercise

Lesson: TSC-21-EX

1. Introduction.

a. The previous four lessons have focused on the joint functions, each of which contributes to mission success across the range of military operations. The skillful integration of these functions by military commanders and their staffs results in a synergistic effects in battles, operations, and campaigns. No joint function can serve its purpose independent of the others. A force cannot maneuver for far or long without sustainment. Fires cannot be effective without proper command and control or intelligence. Protection concerns often influence movements as well as maneuvers.

b. Launched on the evening of July 9-10, 1943, Operation HUSKY (aka Allied Invasion of Sicily) was a large amphibious and airborne operation that commenced the Allies' Italian Campaign. After six weeks of fighting, Allied forces had conquered the island of Sicily, but Axis forces safely evacuated much of their personnel and equipment to bolster defenses in Italy. During this lesson, we will examine the challenges and successes of integrating the joint functions experienced by the Allied and Axis forces during combat operations on Sicily from 9 July – 17 August, 1943.

c. Based on previous Faculty Instructor assignments to guide research and preparation, the seminar will divide into two Joint Planning Groups (JPG) with one representing the Allied forces and one representing the Axis forces. Each JPG will meet for 90 minutes to assess how their side used the joint functions during the campaign and develop a presentation to generate seminar dialogue on the insights of the campaign and implications for future military operations. Potential student assignments for the exercise are below:

Role	Axis JPG	Allies JPG
1. Command and Control		
2. Sustainment		
3. Protection		
4. Intelligence		
5. Movement and Maneuver		
6. Fires		
7. IO & Strat Comm		
8. Setting the Theater		
9. General Guzzoni or General Patton		
10. General Hube or Field Marshall Montgomery		

d. JPG presentations should not be a series of eight different explanations about the strength or weakness of a given joint function. Rather, based on each JPG members' focused research, the JPG should present a holistic assessment of the integration of joint functions by their side using appropriate vignettes from the case study as evidence.

e. The case study in the lesson's Required Reading provides essential and foundational information for understanding Allied and Axis forces' actions and decisions; however, additional research will add depth and breadth to understanding. Students should focus their research in identifying the use and integration of the various joint functions, as well as use of strategic communications and information operations.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Evaluate** the benefits, risks, and considerations for planning and executing an operation using a combined and joint force.

b. **Evaluate** the options to integrate the joint functions, examining German/Italian defensive operations and British/American offensive operations.

c. **Propose** lessons from Operation HUSKY that are applicable in the contemporary Joint Operating Environment.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Comprehend** the doctrinal foundations and concepts of the joint functions.

b. **Comprehend** the role of specific operations within a larger campaign.

c. **Know** key dates, events, commanders, and decisions from Operation HUSKY with detailed knowledge relating to the use of the assigned Joint Function.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Using the Case Study in the Required Readings, come to seminar prepared to discuss your assigned individual or function and your assessment of how and how well the operational commanders integrated the functions.

(2) Conduct additional research as required.

b. Required Reading. U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, Case Study: "Operation HUSKY, The Invasion of Sicily" in *Case Studies in Joint Functions* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2015).
[Blackboard]

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Matthew G. St. Clair, "The Twelfth U.S. Air Force: Tactical and Operational Innovations in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, 1943-1944," (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2007), <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a466970.pdf> (accessed July 8, 2016).

(2) Center of Military History, *Sicily*, Pub 72-16 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2004) <http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/72-16/72-16.htm> (accessed July 20, 2016).

(3) Ben Macintyre, *Operation Mincemeat: How a Dead Man and a Bizarre Plan Fooled the Nazis and Assured an Allied Victory* (New York: Harmony Books, 2010). D810.S7 M246 2010

(4) Ewen Montagu, *The Man Who Never Was, 1901-1985* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). D810.S8 M61 1996

(5) Rick Atkinson, *The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944* (New York: Henry Holt, 2008). D763.I8 A85 2007

(6) Tristan T. A. Lovering, *Amphibious Assault: Manoeuvre From the Sea: Amphibious Operations from the Last Century* (Great Britain, 21 December 2005). U261.A43 2005

(7) John C. Hatlem, *The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2005). D769.A533 V.5 PT.1 2005

(8) Samuel W. Mitcham, "How the Allies Lost Their Chance for Total Victory," in *The Battle of Sicily*, 1st ed (New York: Orion Books, 1990). D763.S5 M58 1991

(9) David Jablonsky, *War by Land, Sea, and Air: Dwight Eisenhower and the Concept of Unified Command* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010). E836 J33 2010

(10) Evelyn M. Cherpak, *The Memoirs of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004). V63.H49 A3 2004

(11) Albert N. Garland, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy* (Washington, D.C., Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2002). D769.A533 V.11 PT.2 2002

(12) James E. Prescott, *What Operational Level of War Lesson Can be Learned from the Allied Invasion of Sicily?* (Newport, RI: Department of Operations, U.S. Naval War College, 1994). V420 .P74 1994

- (13) John L. La Monte, *The Sicilian Campaign, 10 July-17 August 1943* (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1993). D763.S5 L3 1993
- (14) Carlo D'Este, *Bitter Victory: The Battle for Sicily, 1943* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1988). D763.S5 D47 1988
- (15) Joseph Edward Browne, "Deception and the Mediterranean Campaigns of 1943-1944," U.S. Army War College Military Studies Program Paper (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 31 March 1986). AD-A 168 052 1986
- (16) Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe, 1890-1969*, 1st ed. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1948). D743 .E35 1948
- (17) Martin Blumenson, *The Patton Papers, 1940-1945* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1996). E745.P3 B551 1996
- (18) *The Thousand Days Sicily, Key to Victory, [videorecording]*: United States, Office of War Information (Chicago, IL: International Historic Films, 1980). D768.15 .T56 1980
- (19) David Jablonsky, *War by Land, Sea, and Air: Dwight Eisenhower and the Concept of Unified Command* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010). E836 .J33 2010
- (20) U.S. Army, 7th Army, "Report of Operations of the United States Seventh Army in the Sicilian Campaign, 10 July - 17 August 1943", 1943. 03 -7 1943 OVERSIZE
- (21) Allied Force Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief's dispatch: Sicilian Campaign/[Dwight D. Eisenhower], Headquarters, Allied Forces, 1943). D763.S5 A44 1943a
- (22) Ian Blackwell, *The Battle for Sicily: Stepping Stone to Victory*, (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2008). D763.S5 B54 2008
- (23) Robert L. Clifford and William J. Maddocks, "Naval Gunfire Support of the Landing in Sicily" (Oklahoma City, OK: 45th Infantry Division Museum, 1984). D763.S5 C65 1984
- (24) James S. Corum, *Wolfram von Richthofen: Master of the German Air War*, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006). D604 .C67 2008
- (25) Ken Ford, *Assault on Sicily, Monty and Patton at War* (Phoenix Mill, Thrupp, Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton, 2007). D763.S5 F67 2007

(26) D. J. Haycock, *Eisenhower and the Art of Warfare: A Critical Appraisal* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2004). E836 .H39 2004

(27) Albert Kesselring, *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring*, translated by Lynton Hudson (London: W. Kimber, 1953). DD247.K45 .A3213 1953

5. Points to Consider.

a. Questions for those assigned a joint function:

(1) How did your joint function influence the outcome of the battle? Was the execution different from the planned role for the function? What factors contributed to or hindered the effectiveness of the joint function?

(2) To what degree was your joint function integrated with other functions? Analyze the reasons for this integration or lack of integration.

b. Questions for those assigned a senior leader:

(1) How well did your senior leader balance operational art and science? What factors may have influenced his performance?

(2) Assess your leader's integration of the joint functions. What were some of the results of this integration?

(3) Was your leader effective? Why or why not?

c. Questions for all:

(1) Using the joint functions as a lens, describe the changes that should have been made to improve the outcome for either side.

(2) What were some of the challenges of conducting joint and multinational operations? How could some of these challenges been overcome?

(3) Do you see evidence of mission command in use during the battle? Where? What parts of Operation HUSKY should have been centralized or decentralized for planning and execution? Why?

(4) Describe what could have been the strategic themes and messages for your side. Analyze how strategic communication and information operations played, or could have played, a role in the battle.

(5) How effective was each side in establishing a viable theater of operations? What could have been done differently to improve the outcome?

(6) What lessons can we learn from Operation HUSKY for future operations?

Block V Intent “Strategic and Operational Planning”

Block Chief: Dr. P.C. Jussel

Purpose: Generate and reinforce student competence and confidence with the JOPP at the operational and theater levels of conflict. Develop student ability to analyze and apply the concepts of operational art, operational design, and the joint functions within the JOPP to develop an operational approach and conduct mission analysis within a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational environment from combatant command perspective.

Method: Combining seminar dialogue and a scenario-driven exercise, students will evaluate the interaction between op art, op design, and the joint functions through the lens of the JOPP by developing a mission for a theater contingency. Readings will focus on joint doctrine and a given scenario to introduce planning TTPs and reinforce service, interagency, and multinational contributions to the proposed mission.

End state: Although we are not creating planners, students should possess confidence in and a working knowledge of the integration of op art, op design, and the joint functions through the JOPP to visualize complex problems, develop solutions in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational environment, and communicate those solutions to a commander and subordinate components at the theater and operational levels.

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THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS: PLAN INITIATION AND MISSION ANALYSIS

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-22-S

1. Introduction.

a. The purpose of this lesson is to analyze the joint operation planning process (JOPP) and its relationship to operational design, operational art, and the joint functions. Together, these relationships and procedures establish the intellectual framework that guide the remainder of this block of lessons.

b. This lesson weaves together your understanding of the previous lessons on operational design, operational art, and the joint functions through the JOPP to find potential solutions for complex and unfamiliar problems. The JOPP is how the joint planning and execution community ultimately converts the results of operational art and operational design into clear tasks, objectives, and effects for members of the joint force. The JOPP is not simply service doctrine with “bigger arrows on the map.” It deals with far greater ambiguity, unclear guidance, and “wicked problems.” The JOPP also serves as a common language for problem solving across the entire joint force, driving jointness deeper.

c. The JOPP, while a military planning process, is very similar to civilian problem solving processes. In addition to gaining a better understanding of what the JOPP is, this lesson will analyze the opening steps of the JOPP: planning initiation and mission analysis. Both of these steps are the same in civilian problem solving processes.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Analyze** the JOPP as a problem-solving process and how it relates to and benefits from operational design, operational art, and the synchronization of the joint functions.

b. **Synthesize** the planning initiation and mission analysis steps of the JOPP.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Comprehend** operational design, operational art, and the joint functions.

b. **Comprehend** the joint operation planning process (JOPP) as a problem-solving process.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Master the enabling outcomes in paragraph 3 through required readings and personal research. As needed, review TSC Block IV notes, products, and readings.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook, AY 17* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2017). Read pp. 46 to 51 and review section on options. **[DMSPO Issue], [TSC AY17 CD Rom] and [Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Planner's Handbook for Operational Design* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-7, October 7, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/jwfc/opdesign_hbk.pdf (accessed July 26, 2016). Read pp. VII-1 to VII-8. **[Open Source URL], [TSC AY17 CD Rom] and [Blackboard]**

(3) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed July 26, 2016). Scan chapter IV, pp. IV-1 to IV-16. **[Open Source URL], [TSC AY17 CD Rom] and [Blackboard]**

(4) Review: U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Southeast Asia Scenario* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2017). **[DMSPO Issue], [TSC AY17 CD Rom] and [Blackboard]**

c. Suggested Readings. None.

5. Points to Consider.

a. What are the differences and similarities between the JOPP at the CCMD level and a tactical level planning process?

b. How would you characterize the relationship and dependencies between operational design, operational art, the joint functions, and the JOPP?

c. In what ways do operational art and operational design remain alive inside of JOPP?

d. In what ways do the joint functions remain alive inside of JOPP?

e. How is the JOPP applicable to problems that do not lend themselves to the clear use of military force?

f. How do steps 1 and 2 (initiate planning and mission analysis) of the JOPP shape the remainder of planning?

JOPP COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-23-S

1. Introduction.

a. The purpose of this lesson is to develop student understanding of how a course of action (COA) and related actions are developed to ensure the requirements identified from operational design, mission analysis, and planning guidance are met.

b. This lesson focuses on the nuances of developing and refining Step 3 of the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP). COA development parallels the tactical planning process, but involves significantly different perspectives. Students will examine not only the aspects of COA development, but potential flexible deterrent options that may result from the critical thinking involved in COA development. They will also examine wargaming as a technique to examine and refine separate COAs.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Analyze** how mission analysis, operational design, the joint functions and command structures influence and are influenced by course of action development at the operational and theater-strategic levels.

b. **Synthesize** the inputs and outputs of JOPP Step 3 required to develop a course of action that is adequate, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete.

c. **Evaluate** the usefulness of FDOs/FROs as products of COA development.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Comprehend** the information outputs from Steps 1 (planning initiation) and 2 (mission analysis) of the JOPP.

b. **Examine** Step 3 of the JOPP (course of action development) of the JOPP (reading).

c. **Comprehend** the value and meaning of FDOs/FROs.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Complete required readings and master the enabling outcomes listed in paragraph 3. Reflect on the “points to consider” below, and be prepared to contribute to seminar dialogue on the learning outcomes.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook*, Academic Year 2017 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2017). Read pp. 83 to 98. **[TSC CD Rom - Entire Document]**, **[Available Digitally]**, and **[DMSPO Student Issue]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed August 3, 2016). Read pp. IV-17 to IV-26. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]**, and **[Blackboard]**

(3) Review: U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Southeast Asia Scenario* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2017). **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[DMSPO Student Issue]**

c. Suggested Reading. Michael A. Santacroce, *Planning for Planners, Volume I, Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) Joint Planning and Global Force Management (GFM) Processes Explained* (iUniverse, Bloomington IN, 2013). Read pp. 291 to 307.

5. Points to Consider.

a. How do planning assumptions affect COA development? How does a staff articulate and mitigate the concept of “risk” at the theater-level?

b. How does a Joint Force Commander arrange a campaign? Why are phasing and transitions important during a joint operation?

c. How does the joint military planner integrate other national power instruments to support a campaign?

d. In what ways do the elements of Operational Design and the Joint Functions shape COA Development?

e. How do FDOs/FROs help national leaders with strategic decision making?

f. How are FDOs/FROs developed?

COMPLETING THE JOPP AND CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-24-S

1. Introduction.

a. The purpose of this lesson is to complete the examination of the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP). It will explore how selected COAs turn into OPLANs and are synchronized across the government. We will also assess the Crisis Action Planning process, its relationship to deliberate planning, and see how operational design continues to be an important methodology.

b. Once a COA is selected and approved, the most significant challenge comes as the final details are worked out not only with military headquarters, but also with civilian agencies and organizations. The lesson will explore the socialization process, and the final recording of the OPLAN. Finally, the seminar will explore the relationship between CAP and deliberate planning within the APEX system.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Analyze** how courses of action developed in JOPP Step 3 are transformed into plans and orders in JOPP Steps 4 through 7.

b. **Synthesize** the plan synchronization process and its relationship to the theater campaign plan.

c. **Evaluate** the utility of crisis action planning (CAP) to help the Joint Force Commander and other strategic leaders respond to crises.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Comprehend** JOPP Steps 4 through 7.

b. **Comprehend** the linkages between tasks, effects, decisive points, objectives, and endstate throughout those JOPP steps.

c. **Comprehend** the components, products and personnel roles involved in CAP.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Complete the required readings, reflect on the “points to consider” below, and be prepared to contribute to seminar dialogue on the learning outcomes.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2017). Read Chapter 5 “JOPP Steps 4-7,” Appendix A “APEX IPR Process,” Appendix D “CAP: General.” Scan Appendix D “CAP: 6 Components.” **[DMSPO Student Issue], [TSC AY17 CD Rom], and [Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed August 2, 2016). Scan Appendix G “COA Comparison,” G-1 to G-5; read Chapter II “Orders Produced during CAP,” II-28 to II-35. **[Open Source URL], [TSC AY17 CD Rom], and [Blackboard]**

(3) Ronald H. Cole, *Operation URGENT FURY Grenada* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/history/urgfury.pdf> (accessed August 3, 2016). Scan “Overview,” 1-8. Read “Planning for Military Operations,” 19-22, and “Final-Political Military Coordination 23 October 1983,” 32-34 and 39-40. **[Open Source URL], [TSC AY17 CD Rom], and [Blackboard]**

c. Suggested Reading. Doctrine Networked Education and Training (DOCNET), “Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning,” *DOCNET*, streaming video podcast, 50:08, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/docnet/podcasts/JP_5-0/podcast_JP_5-0.htm (accessed August 3, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. What are the critical linkages between a contingency plan (completed product) and the theater campaign plan and theater security cooperation plan?

b. What are the challenges in coordinating and harmonizing the contingency plan across the whole of government?

c. What are the different aspects of assessing a plan?

d. How do considerations of risk, time, and future posture influence a CCDR’s judgment in the formulation of an operational approach to respond to a crisis?

e. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the CAP process?

f. What is the relationship between CAP and the TCP?

6 February 2017 (0830-1600)

7 February 2017 (0830-1600)

8 February 2017 (0830-1130)

Lesson Author: COL Erik Anderson, 245-3810

OPERATIONAL DESIGN EXERCISE AND BRIEFING

Mode: Exercise

Lessons: TSC-25-EX
TSC-26-EX
TSC-27-EX
TSC-28-EX
TSC-29-EX

1. Introduction. Serving as members of a notional geographic combatant commander's (GCC) staff, students use operational design to gain situational understanding, frame current and emerging problems, and develop strategic options, and develop an operational approach to address a hypothetical regional contingency over the course of this three day (15-hour) exercise. The situational understanding, options, and approach developed during these lessons informs the follow-on Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) Mission Analysis exercise during TSC lessons 30, 31, and 32.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Apply** operational design to understand the GCC's operational environment and frame the hypothetical problem to U.S. national interests in the area of responsibility (AOR).

b. **Synthesize** joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities through the development of military options and an operational approach that advances U.S. national interests in the hypothetical scenario.

c. **Evaluate** operational design as a way to inform U.S. policy and drive the Joint Operation Planning Process.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Comprehend** the nature of an ill-structured ("wicked") problem.

b. **Understand** the difference between courses of action and strategic options.

c. **Comprehend** the iterative nature of policy, strategy, options, and contingency plan development.

d. **Comprehend** how a campaign to achieve over-arching political objectives is comprised of multiple operations to achieve subordinate military objectives.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) The TSC Southeast Asia Scenario provides the foundational background for the hypothetical regional contingency used throughout this exercise. Students must be familiar with the scenario to fulfill the objectives of this exercise.

(2) Working as Joint Planning Group (JPG) members, students will apply operational design to develop situational understanding and strategic options that address potential threats to U.S. national interests within the GCC's AOR. At the close of the first day, JPGs will brief their developed options to help shape the U.S. response to a potential crisis.

(3) After presenting the strategic options, JPGs will continue to refine their operational design to develop an operational approach that continues to inform U.S. policy while concurrently driving the JOPP for the GCC's subordinate commands. The JPGs will present their respective operational approach at the start of the third day.

(4) At the conclusion of the operational approach briefings, students will evaluate operational design as a way to inform senior U.S. policy makers, shape the operational environment in a way favorable to U.S. interests, and drive the JOPP.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Read U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Southeast Asia Scenario* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2017). **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[DMSPO Issue]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed August 26, 2016). Review Chapter III. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(3) Review U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2017). **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[DMSPO Issue]**

c. Suggested Readings. None.

5. Points to Consider.

a. How does operational design assist in understanding the environment and addressing complex problems at the theater strategic level?

b. How can we best use operational design to provide value to the planning process?

- c. What is the role of the combatant commander in operational design?
- d. How does the CCDR provide strategic options to national leadership?

JOPP MISSION ANALYSIS EXERCISE AND BRIEF

Mode: Exercise

Lessons: TSC-30-EX
TSC-31-EX
TSC-32-EX

1. Introduction.

a. These lessons are the mission analysis portion of a multi-day exercise focusing on a fictitious future complex regional scenario in Southeast Asia. Students will practice how a geographic combatant commander and staff might apply the concepts of operational design, operational art, and the joint functions within the mission analysis portion of the JOPP to understand the scope, nature, and context of the command's tasks and mission. Over the course of this exercise, as directed by the seminar FI, the seminar will develop a mission analysis briefing based on the provided scenario.

b. During this three-lesson exercise, the seminar will execute JOPP steps 1 and 2 as directed by the FI. This effort will focus on the synthesis of operational design and mission analysis and will result in a mission analysis briefing during lesson 32.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Synthesize** operational design, operational art, the joint functions, and the JOPP to conduct mission analysis.

b. **Evaluate** mission analysis within the context of a fictitious regional exercise with a complex problem set.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Comprehend** JOPP Steps 1 (Planning Initiation) and 2 (Mission Analysis).

b. **Comprehend** the SEA exercise materials and possess an understanding of the scenario's operational environment to include the capabilities, limitations, activities, and desired outcomes of U.S., friendly, neutral, and adversarial state/non-state and military/non-military actors and the regional political, economic, and diplomatic trends.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Homework. Master the enabling outcomes in paragraph 3 through required readings and personal research. As needed, review previous TSC notes, products, and readings.

(2) In-Class Work. Seminar planning team exercise.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2017). Read and review pp. 71-83 and 65-77. **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[DMSPO Issue]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed August 26, 2016). Review Chapter IV, pp. 1-16. **[Open Source URL]**, **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[Blackboard]**

(3) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Southeast Asia Scenario* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2017). Review as needed. **[TSC AY17 CD Rom]** and **[DMSPO Issue]**

c. Suggested Readings. None.

5. Points to Consider.

a. How do operational design and mission analysis influence each other during planning?

b. In what ways is the commander's planning guidance to the staff critical while planning in an environment with complex and unfamiliar problems?

c. How would you characterize the relationship between planning assumptions, risk, and commander's critical information requirements (CCIR)?

d. In what ways does the nature of specified and implied tasks change at the operational and theater-strategic levels (in the JOPP) as compared to the tactical level (in MDMP for example)?

e. How does mission analysis shape COA development in the JOPP?

COURSE SYNTHESIS AND END-OF-COURSE AAR

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-33-S

1. Introduction.

a. The purpose of this lesson is to assess the students' attainment of Theater Strategy and Campaigning (TSC) course learning outcomes. It is enabled both by the students' papers and the points to consider in the lessons that synthesize key points from the course. The lesson offers an opportunity to review the course outcomes and allows students to share their insights from these outcomes and their course papers. While the emphasis will be on assessing achievement of course learning outcomes, current doctrine and ongoing efforts in current operations may also be discussed.

b. The final hour of this lesson is dedicated to conducting an end-of-course After Action Review (AAR).

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Synthesize** the integration of military capabilities (including limitations) across the range of military operations and plans to achieve strategic objectives using the joint operation planning process in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment.

b. **Evaluate** the principles of joint warfare, joint military doctrine and emerging concepts across the range of military operations, and the role of landpower as part of the Joint Force in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.

c. **Synthesize** the development of theater strategies and theater campaign plans to meet national strategic goals in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment at all levels of war.

3. Enabling Outcomes. None.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None.

b. Required Reading. Review TSC course directive, learning outcomes and "points to consider."

5. Points to Consider.

a. For the near future, the United States will likely exercise military power as a member of a multinational alliance or coalition, with interagency and intergovernmental partners. What are the challenges and opportunities posed to the Combatant Commander or Joint Force Commander in conducting operations in such an environment in pursuit of national strategic goals?

b. Analyze the military objectives necessary to achieve national strategic goals. Using the 2015 NSS, 2015 NMS, and speeches or articles from senior U.S. officials (POTUS, VP, SECDEF, SECSTATE, NSA, etc.) since January 1, 2015, establish the three top national strategic goals for any AOR represented by a U.S. GCC. Establish military objectives and explain how they contribute to achieving the national strategic goals. Evaluate the risks and opportunities created by pursuing these military objectives.

c. You are a planner for a geographic combatant commander. Select one of the six “contexts of future conflict” on page 21 of the *Joint Operating Environment 2035*. Within your particular context, identify one contemporary, real-world example of a problem—or propose a reasonable future problem—that threatens U.S. interests in your command’s area of responsibility. Use operational design to develop two strategic options to address this threat for presentation to a Deputies Committee of the National Security Council. Ensure you mention the time horizon, and military forces and interagency assistance required. What are the strengths and weaknesses (risk) of your options? Finally, you must communicate your military advice in a clear, concise manner that enables these senior civilian leaders to understand it and make a recommendation to the President.

d. Evaluate operational design as a cognitive framework for strategy formulation at the theater strategic level. Used together, are Operational Design and the Joint Operation Planning Process sufficiently adaptable and robust to capture and address the complexity and threats in the operational environment? Are they capable of delivering adequate, feasible, acceptable and complete approaches to these problems? Explain your answers.

e. You have studied several new or emerging concepts this year, such as the *Joint Operational Access Concept*, *Joint Concept for Entry Operations*, *Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons*, *Joint Concept for Rapid Aggregation*, and the *Army’s Regionally Aligned Forces*. Select one or more of these concepts (or another not listed here) and: (1) Use the elements in the CCJO as criteria to evaluate the integration and utility of your chosen concept(s) into existing joint doctrine. (2) Assess whether your emerging concept enables greater jointness, or promotes Service parochialism, or both, and why?

f. Analyze the joint force required to achieve military objectives using the 2016 Posture Statement of any GCC. Establish one critical military objective for the AOR, design the joint force required to achieve that objective and using the joint functions as a framework, explain the integration of Service capabilities.

g. Discuss the relevant interdependencies of transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional as they relate to the application of Landpower anywhere in the world. Highlight the unique role of Landpower in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment, either as part of a U.S. joint force or as a member of an alliance/coalition.

h. Analyze the role of landpower in implementing a theater strategy by using the 2016 Posture Statement of any GCC. Describe the unique contributions landpower can make in achieving the GCC's objectives and how land forces must be integrated with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, or multinational partners.

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APPENDIX A

USAWC MISSION

The USAWC educates and develops leaders for service at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application of Landpower.

USAWC INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING OUTCOME AY17

Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war. In pursuit of these goals, they study and confer on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

Achieving this objective requires proficiency in four domains of knowledge:

- Theory of war and peace
- U.S. national security policy, processes, and management
- Military strategy and unified theater operations
- Command and leadership

And the ability and commitment to:

- Think critically, creatively, and strategically.
- Frame national security challenges in their historical, social, political, and economic contexts.
- Promote a military culture that reflects the values and ethic of the Profession of Arms.
- Listen, read, speak, and write effectively.
- Advance the intellectual, moral, and physical development of oneself and one's subordinates.

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APPENDIX B

PROGRAM LEARNING OUTCOMES (PLOs)

The School of Strategic Landpower (SSL) establishes Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) that relate to critical fields of knowledge and appropriate jurisdictions of practice for our students to master. The core competence of our graduates is leadership in the global application of strategic landpower. The curriculum addresses the “great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.”

To accomplish its mission, SSL presents a curriculum designed to produce graduates who are able to:

PLO 1. Evaluate theories of war and strategy in the context of national security decisionmaking.

PLO 2. Analyze, adapt and develop military processes, organizations, and capabilities to achieve national defense objectives.

PLO 3. Apply strategic and operational art to develop strategies and plans that employ the military instrument of power in pursuit of national policy aims.

PLO 4. Evaluate the nature, concepts, and components of strategic leadership and synthesize their responsible application.

PLO 5. Think critically and creatively in addressing national security issues at the strategic level.

PLO 6. Communicate clearly, persuasively, and candidly.

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APPENDIX C

SERVICE SENIOR-LEVEL COLLEGE JOINT LEARNING AREAS AND OBJECTIVES (JPME Phase II)

SOURCE: The REP and DEP curricula address requirements for JLAs and JLOs derived from CJCSI 1800.01E, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)*, May 29, 2015, Enclosure E-E-1.

1. Learning Area 1 - National Security Strategy.

- a. Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy.
- b. Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels.
- c. Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations.
- d. Apply strategic security policies, strategies and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives.
- e. Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense and military strategies.

2. Learning Area 2 - Joint Warfare, Theater Strategy and Campaigning for Traditional and Irregular Warfare in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational Environment.

- a. Evaluate the principles of joint operations, joint military doctrine, joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment), and emerging concepts across the range of military operations.
- b. Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations.
- c. Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns.

d. Analyze the role of OCS in supporting Service capabilities and joint functions to meet strategic objectives considering the effects contracting and contracted support have on the operational environment.

e. Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions.

f. Evaluate key classical, contemporary and emerging concepts, including IO and cyber space operations, doctrine and traditional/ irregular approaches to war.

3. Learning Area 3 - National and Joint Planning Systems and Processes for the Integration of JIIM Capabilities.

a. Analyze how DoD, interagency and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate and apply national ends, ways and means.

b. Analyze the operational planning and resource allocation processes.

c. Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives.

d. Value a joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational efforts.

e. Analyze the likely attributes of the future joint force and the challenges faced to plan, organize, prepare, conduct and assess operations.

4. Learning Area 4 - Command, Control and Coordination.

a. Evaluate the strategic-level options available in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment.

b. Analyze the factors of Mission Command as it relates to mission objectives, forces and capabilities that support the selection of a command and control option.

c. Analyze the opportunities and challenges affecting command and control created in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment across the range of military operations, to include leveraging networks and technology.

5. Learning Area 5 - Strategic Leadership and the Profession of Arms.

a. Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment.

b. Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making and communication by strategic leaders.

c. Evaluate how strategic leaders develop innovative organizations capable of operating in dynamic, complex and uncertain environments; anticipate change; and respond to surprise and uncertainty.

d. Evaluate how strategic leaders communicate a vision; challenge assumptions; and anticipate, plan, implement and lead strategic change in complex joint or combined organizations.

e. Evaluate historic and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives.

f. Evaluate how strategic leaders foster responsibility, accountability, selflessness and trust in complex joint or combined organizations.

g. Evaluate how strategic leaders establish and sustain an ethical climate among joint and combined forces, and develop/preserve public trust with their domestic citizenry.

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APPENDIX D

AY17 ENDURING THEMES

Elihu Root's challenge provides the underpinnings for enduring themes within the USAWC curriculum. The enduring themes stimulate intellectual growth by providing continuity and perspective as we analyze contemporary issues.

- Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment
 - Evaluate leadership at the strategic level (national security policy and strategy, especially in war)
 - Understand the profession's national security clients and its appropriate jurisdictions of practice
 - Evaluate leadership of large, national security organizations
 - Evaluate strategic thinking about the future (2nd and 3rd order effects)
 - Analyze the framework for leadings and managing strategic change, specifically the components of organizational change and the process by which organizations change.

- Relationship of policy and strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means)
 - Analyze how to accomplish national security aims to win wars
 - Analyze how to connect military actions to larger policy aims
 - Analyze how to resource national security
 - Evaluate international relations as the context for national security

- Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security
 - Comprehend Diplomatic Power
 - Comprehend Informational power
 - Evaluate Military Power
 - Comprehend economic power

- Professional ethics
 - Evaluate the ethics of military operations (to include jus in bello and post bello)
 - Evaluate the ethics of war and the use of force (to include jus ad bello)
 - Evaluate the ethics of service to society (domestic civil-military relations)

- Civil-Military Relations
 - Evaluate relationships between military and civilian leadership
 - Evaluate relationships between the military and domestic society
 - Evaluate relationships between armed forces and foreign populations

- Instruments of war and national security
 - Joint: Evaluate the capabilities and domains of joint forces (especially land, maritime, air, space, cyber)
 - Interagency: Understand other U.S. government agencies and departments
 - Intergovernmental: Understand potential relationships with other national governments
 - Multinational: Understand potential relationships with armed forces or agencies of other nations/coalition partners

- History as a vehicle for understanding strategic alternatives and choices
 - Identify and analyze relevant historical examples of strategic leadership and strategic choices (across time and around the world)
 - Evaluate historical examples relevant to war and other national security endeavors

APPENDIX E

CROSSWALKS

Lesson Crosswalk

		Joint Learning Area (JLA)																													
		1					2					3					4					5									
		a	b	c	d	e	a	b	c	d	e	f	a	b	c	d	e	a	b	c	a	b	c	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	
TSC Lesson		AY17 THEATER STRATEGY AND CAMPAIGNING (TSC) COURSE																													
TSC-04	Operational Design Theory	C		C				C				C			C	C										C		C			
TSC-05	Operational Design Practice	C	A	C	C			C	A		C			C		C	C	C										C			
TSC-06	Theater Strategy 1	C	C		A	C	C	A	C					A	C	C		C	A	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C				
TSC-07	Theater Strategy 2				A			A			A			C		C	A		C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C					
TSC-08	Unified Action		A	C	A			A			A			C		A	A		C		C				C	C					
TSC-09	Multinational Operations	C		C	C		A	C	C		C			C		A	A		A	C	A	C								C	
TSC-10	Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, DSCA	C	C	C	C						C			C		C	C			C	C							C		C	
TSC-11	Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, JOAC & Joint OPS	A	C	C	C	C	C				C	A					A	C		C	C						C	C		C	
TSC-12	Army Operating Concept & SOF	C				C					C	C				C															
TSC-13	Navy and Marine Corps Operating Concepts	C				C					C	C				C															
TSC-14	Air Force Operating Concept and Space	C				C					C	C				C															
TSC-15	Cyber	C				C	A				C	A				C															
TSC-16	Emerging Concepts	C	C	C	C		A				A	A				C		C		C		C					C	C			
TSC-17	Command Structures and Information Operations	C					C	C						A			C	C		C	C						C	A	A	C	
TSC-18	Sustainment- Set the Theater			C				C	C	A	A						C	C		C	C										
TSC-19	Intelligence and Protection							C	C								C														
TSC-20	Movement & Maneuver and Fires							C	C								C													C	
TSC-21	Joint Functions Integration Exercise	C	C	C	A		A	C						C	C		C	A	C		C	C						C			C
TSC-22	Intro to the JOPP and JOPP Mission Analysis		C		C	C	A	C			A			A	C	A	C	C													
TSC-23	JOPP Course of Action Development	C	C	C	C	C	A	C	A					C	C	C	A	A		A	C	C									
TSC-24	Completing JOPP and Crisis Action Planning		A		C	C	C	C						A	C	A	C	C									C	C		C	
TSC-25-28	Operational Design I, II, III, IV	A	C	A	C	C	C	A	C						C	C	C		A												
TSC-29	Operational Design Brief	A	C	A	C	C	C	A	C						C	C	C		A												
TSC-30-31	JOPP Mission Analysis I, II		C		C		A	A	C					C	C	C	A	C	C		C	C									
TSC-32	JOPP Mission Analysis Brief		C		C		A	A	C					C	C	C	A	C	C		C	C									
TSC-33	Course Synthesis and AAR			A	A		A								C			C	A	C										C	

Joint Learning Areas and Joint Learning Objectives highlighted in green indicate DMSPO lead within SSL. Highlight suggests only weight of effort in REP core curriculum for that particular JLA/JLO—not exclusive responsibility

A = Achieves the learning objective

C = Contributes to achieving the learning objective

Course Learning Outcomes/Joint Learning Areas Crosswalk

Joint Learning Area (JLA) Joint Learning Objectives (JLO)		1					2					3					4					5									
		a	b	c	d	e	a	b	c	d	e	a	b	c	d	e	a	b	c	a	b	c	d	e	f	g					
TSC Course Learning Outcome		AY17 THEATER STRATEGY AND CAMPAIGNING (TSC) COURSE																													
(a)	Translate national strategic goals into military objectives and provide military advice to civilian leaders in the development of policy and strategy affecting national security.	C			C					A		C								A					C	C		C			
(b)	Develop strategic options and operational approaches and evaluate campaign plans to achieve military objectives, in concert with other instruments of national power, which realize national strategic goals.	A	C		A					A	C		C	C	C					A					C						
(c)	Integrate individual service capabilities, framed through the joint functions across multiple domains, into a Joint Force that accomplishes military objectives across the range of military operations.				C	C	A				A	A	A				A	A	C		A	A							C		
(d)	Evaluate Landpower as part of the Joint Force to implement theater strategies and execute campaigns in a theater of operations.				C		C				C						C					C	C								
A = Achieves the learning objective C = Contributes to achieving at least 50% of the learning objective (% is tentative)																															
Joint Learning Areas / Joint Learning Objectives (CJCSI 1800.01E <i>Officer Professional Military Education Policy</i>)																															
Learning Area 1 - National Security Strategy. [DNSS Lead]		Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives. [DMSPD—TSC]																													
a. Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy. [DNSS—NSPS]		d. Value a joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational efforts. [DMSPD—TSC]																													
b. Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels. [DNSS—NSPS]		e. Analyze the likely attributes of the future joint force and the challenges faced to plan, organize, prepare, conduct and assess operations. [DCLM—DM]																													
c. Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations. [DNSS—NSPS]		Learning Area 4 - Command, Control and Coordination. [DMSPD—Lead]																													
d. Apply strategic security policies, strategies and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives. [DMSPD—TSC]		a. Evaluate the strategic-level options available in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment. [DMSPD—TSC]																													
e. Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense and military strategies. [DCLM—DM]		b. Analyze the factors of Mission Command as it relates to mission objectives, forces and capabilities that support the selection of a command and control option. [DMSPD—TSC]																													
Learning Area 2 - Joint Warfare, Theater Strategy and Campaigning for Traditional and Irregular Warfare in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational Environment. [DMSPD—Lead]		c. Analyze the opportunities and challenges affecting command and control created in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment across the range of military operations, to include leveraging networks and technology. [DMSPD—TSC]																													
a. Evaluate the principles of joint operations, joint military doctrine, joint functions (command & control, intelligence, fires, movement & maneuver, protection, and sustainment), and emerging concepts across the range of military operations. [DMSPD—TSC]		Learning Area 5 - Strategic Leadership and the Profession of Arms. [DCLM—Lead]																													
b. Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations. [DMSPD—TSC]		a. Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment. [DCLM—SL]																													
c. Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns. [DNSS—TWS]		b. Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making and communication by strategic leaders. [DCLM—SL]																													
d. Manage the resources (operational, contracting support) in supporting service capabilities and joint functions to meet strategic objectives considering the effects contracting and contracted support have on the operational environment. [DMSPD—TSC]		c. Evaluate how strategic leaders develop innovative organizations capable of operating in dynamic, complex and uncertain environments; anticipate change; and respond to surprise and uncertainty. [DCLM—SL]																													
e. Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions. [DMSPD—TSC]		d. Evaluate how strategic leaders communicate a vision, challenge assumptions; and anticipate, plan, implement and lead strategic change in complex joint or combined organizations. [DCLM—SL]																													
f. Evaluate key classical, contemporary and emerging concepts, including IO (Information Operations) and cyber space operations, doctrine and traditional/irregular approaches to war. [DMSPD—TSC]		e. Evaluate historic and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives. [DCLM—SL]																													
Learning Area 3 - National and Joint Planning Systems and Processes for the Integration of JIIM Capabilities. [National—DCLM Lead, Joint—DMSPD Lead]		f. Evaluate how strategic leaders foster responsibility, accountability, selflessness and trust in complex joint or combined organizations. [DCLM—SL]																													
a. Analyze how DoD, interagency and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate and apply national ends, ways and means. [DNSS—NSPS]		g. Evaluate how strategic leaders establish and sustain an ethical climate among joint and combined forces, and develop/preserve public trust with their domestic citizenry. [DCLM—SL]																													
b. Analyze the operational planning and resource allocation processes. [DCLM—DM]																															

APPENDIX F

POSITION PAPER RUBRIC

	Criteria	Outstanding	Exceeds Standards	Meets Standards	Needs Improvement	Fails to Meet Standards
Content 50%	<p>Content</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> + Answers the question, with a focus on key issues. + Appropriate for audience. + Confirms facts. + Identifies assumptions. + Analyzes 2nd and 3rd order effects. + Identifies risk of both action and inaction. + Makes feasible, acceptable, suitable recommendations to mitigate risk. 	<p>Point value: 50</p> <p>Ready for reading by a senior leader with no changes to content.</p>	<p>Point value: 45</p> <p>Ready for reading by a senior leader with only minor refinement.</p>	<p>Point value: 40</p> <p>Persuasive. Does not waste reader's time. Perhaps a few unanswered questions. Most facts and assumptions are essential.</p>	<p>Point value: 35</p> <p>Somewhat persuasive. Many unanswered questions and facts and assumptions that do not clarify the topic.</p>	<p>Point value: 30</p> <p>Reader is confused about paper's intent. Riddled with inappropriate or inaccurate facts and assumptions.</p>
	<p>Formatting, Grammar, Syntax and Spelling</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> + Arial, 12-point. + Single space within a paragraph. + Grammar, syntax, spelling complies with USAWC Communicative Arts Directive. 	<p>Point value: 10</p> <p>No discernible errors.</p>	<p>Point value: 9</p> <p>A very few discrepancies exist, but no consistent patterns.</p>	<p>Point value: 8</p> <p>Some noticeable discrepancies, but not enough to distract the reader.</p>	<p>Point value: 7</p> <p>Multiple errors with noticeable patterns but still understandable.</p>	<p>Point value: 6</p> <p>Distracting errors that preclude reader from understanding the paper.</p>
Style 25%	<p>Readability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> + Uses short, simple words with one thought per sentence. + Includes no "fluff": excessive words that do not communicate new information to the reader. + Writes in active versus passive voice. + Writes in 3rd person and without contractions. + Military terminology, acronyms, abbreviations are consistent with Joint Pub 1-02. + Does not use an acronym unless term occurs more than once in the text and spells it out on first use. + Spells out "United States" when used as a noun and "U.S." (no spaces) when used as an adjective. 	<p>Point value: 15</p> <p>Exceptionally tightly written. Language use is crystal clear, nuanced, and economical.</p>	<p>Point value: 13.5</p> <p>Ready for reading by a senior leader with only minor refinement.</p>	<p>Point value: 12</p> <p>Writing is clear and understandable in a single reading. Conforms to DoD style in references (a) and (b).</p>	<p>Point value: 10.5</p> <p>Language is minimally understandable and meaning is sometimes fuzzy. Sometimes uses contractions, slang, unexplained acronyms or jargon.</p>	<p>Point value: 9</p> <p>Writing is choppy, awkward and riddled with casual, unprofessional language. The reader is left puzzled about the meaning of the paper.</p>

	Criteria	Outstanding	Exceeds Standards	Meets Standards	Needs Improvement	Fails to Meet Standards
Organization 25%	<p>Purpose + clearly communicates in 1 or 2 lines a specific description of memo's content.</p> <p>Significant Issues + Only those pertinent to reader's comprehension.</p> <p>Discussion & Background + What has happened? + What is happening now? + Risk identification.</p> <p>Recommendation + Risk mitigation. + Includes desired outcomes and some supporting key points.</p>	<p>Point value: 25</p> <p>Work is exceptionally organized, with a logical, compelling flow of ideas; nothing superfluous.</p>	<p>Point value: 22.5</p> <p>Work is efficiently organized, with a logic flow that clearly conveys meaning.</p>	<p>Point value: 20</p> <p>Work is generally well organized, with a logic flow that adequately conveys meaning.</p>	<p>Point value: 17.5</p> <p>Work is weakly organized, with a logic flow that is sometimes confusing.</p>	<p>Point value: 15</p> <p>Work is disorganized and the logic flow is indiscernible.</p>
Add Up Total Points:						

References: (a) "Writing Style Guide and Preferred Usage for DoD Issuances," April 14, 2015, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/writing/Writing_Style_Guide.pdf; (b) DODM 5110.04-M-V1 "DoD Manual for Written Material: Correspondence Management," October 26, 2010; (c) USAWC Communicative Arts Directive.

Assessment Guidance. USAWC Memorandum 623-1 states that assessment of written work centers on its Content, Organization, and Style with Content being paramount. A paper in which Content receives an assessment of Needs Improvement or Fails to Meet Standards cannot receive an overall assessment of Meets Standards—even if both Organization and Style were assessed Outstanding.

APPENDIX G

LONG ESSAY RUBRIC

	Criteria	Outstanding	Exceeds Standards	Meets Standards	Needs Improvement	Fails to Meet Standards
Content 50%	Substantive Content Focus on academic approach and quality of research.	Point value: 25 Reflects both depth and balance of research. Demonstrates an exceptional grasp of doctrinal concepts, using joint and Service publications and/or other reputable literature to support discussions.	Point value: 22.5 Demonstrates an above average grasp of doctrinal concepts, using joint and Service publications and/or other reputable literature to support discussions.	Point value: 20 Demonstrates a good grasp of doctrinal concepts. Well supported, often with reputable sources. Minimal use of personal opinion, and sources are well documented.	Point value: 17.5 Demonstrates fair grasp of doctrinal concepts, Marginally supported, using some joint and Service publications. Excessive reliance on quotations and Internet sources. Weak documentation of sources.	Point value: 15 Demonstrates poor grasp of doctrinal concepts, Weakly supported, using personal opinion. Excessive reliance on quotations and Internet sources. Does not use or cite reputable sources.
	Critical Thinking Evidence of analysis, synthesis, and evaluation.	Point value: 25 Advances a thoughtful explication of a problem, question or subject. Challenges assumptions and creatively defends positions. Provides innovative solutions to problems.	Point value: 22.5 Goes beyond mere grasp of essentials to incorporate evaluation, synthesis, and analysis in using sources and concepts. Challenges assumptions somewhat effectively. Suggests solutions to problems.	Point value: 20 Displays a firm grasp of essentials to incorporate evaluation, synthesis, and analysis in using sources and concepts. Identifies and resolves problems and issues.	Point value: 17.5 Compares and contrasts positions, concepts, and data; identifies contradictions and gaps and routinely resolves most issues and problems when presented with them. Pragmatically applies concepts and experiences.	Point value: 15 Merely summarizes known information. Rarely displays detailed analysis or creative approaches to problem solving. Fails to apply concepts and experiences to practical uses.
Style 25%	Formatting Following USAWC guidelines for citations and references.	Point value: 5 All writing format, mechanics, in-text crediting, and foot- or endnote entries follow the AY17 CAD with no errors.	Point value: 4.5 Almost all writing format, mechanics, in-text crediting, and foot- or endnote entries follow the AY17 CAD. A few errors may exist.	Point value: 4 Most writing, in-text crediting, and reference page entries follow the AY17 CAD, but some minor format errors exist.	Point value: 3.5 Writing and in-text crediting is generally sound; however, the paper does not adequately follow AY17 CAD. Multiple errors exist.	Point value: 3 Not evident that the provisions of the AY17 CAD are understood or followed.
	Grammar and Spelling In this respect, it should be perfect!	Point value: 5 No errors in grammar and spelling.	Point value: 4.5 All grammar, syntax, spelling, and punctuation conform to the AY17 CAD. Some discrepancies exist, but not consistent patterns.	Point value: 4 Most grammar, syntax, spelling, and punctuation conform to the AY17 CAD. Some noticeable discrepancies, some pattern errors exist.	Point value: 3.5 Grammar, syntax, spelling, and punctuation somewhat conform to the AY17 CAD, but major noticeable discrepancies exist, including pattern errors.	Point value: 3 Noticeable and distracting errors in grammar, syntax, spelling, and punctuation. Inattention to details and patterns of consistent errors are excessive.

	Criteria	Outstanding	Exceeds Standards	Meets Standards	Needs Improvement	Fails to Meet Standards
	Readability Writing flows naturally and is readable, reflecting an academic tone of voice.	Point value: 15 Resonates in smooth expository prose, using concrete imagery and pertinent examples. Language is erudite and direct without ostentation. Incorporates examples and sources with the context effortlessly.	Point value: 13.5 Resonates in smooth expository prose. Language is direct and exhibits a command of the language. Incorporates examples and sources with the context with minimum effort.	Point value: 12 Communicates in straightforward manner and academic voice. Language is usually understandable and includes examples and sources efficiently.	Point value: 10.5 Writes clearly, but without flair. Language is usually understandable and includes examples and sources that fit the context. Sometimes uses contractions, slang, or jargon.	Point value: 9 Writing is choppy, forced, or gilded. Examples and illustrations do not fit the context. Uses contractions, slang, or jargon, and reverts to statements of opinion and authorial intrusion.
Organization 25%	Organization Work well organized with logical flow. Makes coherent sense.	Point value: 25 Work is well organized, with coherent, unified paragraphs and seamless transitions. A clear statement of purpose, summary of research and doctrine, well-supported with compelling rhetorical argument, sound conclusions, and recommendations.	Point value: 22.5 Work is well organized, with coherent, unified paragraphs, and effective transitions. A clear statement of purpose, summary of research and doctrine, the argument is well-supported and theory and research are clearly stated.	Point value: 20 Work is generally well organized, in clear expository prose. There is a discernible introduction, main body, and conclusion. Transitions are generally effective in maintaining a logical flow of ideas.	Point value: 17.5 Work is weakly organized, with no clear statement of problem or purpose and weak theory and argument. Conclusions are a mere summary of previous points. Transitions are somewhat weak or ineffective.	Point value: 15 Work is disorganized and makes an argument that is inconclusive and hard to follow. Prose is rambling and the rhetoric is unfocused. Conclusions are nonexistent or weak, merely repeating previous statements. Transitions are awkward or entirely absent.

Assessment Guidance. USAWC Memorandum 623-1 details that assessment of written work centers on the Content, Organization, and Style of a paper with Content being paramount. A paper in which Content receives an assessment of Needs Improvement or Fails to Meet Standards cannot receive an overall assessment of Meets Standards—even if both Organization and Style were Outstanding.

APPENDIX H

ORAL PRESENTATION STANDARDS RUBRIC

Oral Presentation Standards	
Outstanding (5)	The presentation not only exceeds standards in every salient respect, but stands as an exemplar of human excellence in oral communication. It (a) displays exceptional creativity, solid research, able analysis, and perceptive synthesis, (b) employs an efficient and economical organizational scheme, (c) reflects both depth and balance, (d) is delivered clearly and articulately, and (e) displays confidence derived from grounded knowledge and experience, on the one hand, and openness to the possibility of change on the other.
Exceeds Standard (4)	The presentation is impressive and clearly above the norm. The speaker is an able communicator who is responsive to the task/opportunity. The presentation is (a) thoughtfully organized, (b) germane to the audience/situation, (c) alive with well-constructed arguments that are ably-supported with relevant evidence and solid reasoning. The speaker's facility with analytical reasoning and the ability to synthesize and integrate material is strong. The presentational delivery is clear, crisp, reasonably persuasive, and consistently articulate.
Meets Standard (3)	The presentation is a competent and fully acceptable response to a speaking opportunity, suggesting that even better oral work will be forthcoming. It (a) is informative, perhaps somewhat persuasive, (b) includes evidence, some of which is grounded in research, (c) has a reasonable organizational structure that brings unity to the presentation, (d) appropriately addresses clearly identified major points, often with support from credible and acknowledged sources. The stated purpose is accomplished while favorably accommodating the intended audience. Oral delivery does not distract from the speaker's substantive message.
Needs Improvement (2)	The presentation is weaker than it should be and possibly deficient in one or more salient respects. The content might be weak, the organization unclear and/or the delivery uninspired. Deficiencies with respect to content, however, are the gravest concern because the absence of anything worthwhile to say inherently undercuts the need to organize, or to present as an invested and articulate spokesperson. A presentation that is characterized by minimal analysis, deficient insight, lack of evidence, inadequate preparation, poor organization or a cavalier presentational style which leaves some listeners confused and disoriented —needs improvement.
Fails to Meet Standards (1)	The presentation is more than weak or deficient—it misses the task substantially, if not completely. The content or substance of the presentation is unsubstantiated, illogical or exceedingly shabby; the organizational scheme is unorganized and unfocused; the delivery is uninspired and characterized by inarticulate speaking. Nonperformance also —fails to meet standards.

Assessment Guidance. CBKs Memorandum 623-1 details that assessment of oral performance centers on presentational Content, Organization, and Delivery with Content being paramount. A presentation in which Content receives an assessment of Needs Improvement or Fails to Meet Standards cannot receive an overall assessment of Meets Standards—even if both Organization and Delivery were Outstanding. The Overall assessment cannot be higher than the Content assessment. Overall assessment equals Content assessment, so long as both Organization and Delivery are assessed at the minimal level of Needs Improvement.

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APPENDIX I

ORAL PRESENTATION CONTENT, ORGANIZATION AND DELIVERY RUBRIC

ORAL PRESENTATION (Content) 50%	
Outstanding	The presentation displays exceptional creativity, solid research, able analysis, and perceptive synthesis, reflecting both depth and balance, with confidence derived from grounded knowledge and experience on the one hand and openness to the possibility of change on the other.
Exceeds Standard	The presentation is impressive and clearly above the norm. The arguments are well constructed and ably supported with relevant evidence and solid reasoning. The speaker's facility with analytical reasoning and the ability to synthesize and integrate material is strong.
Meets Standard	The presentation is informative, perhaps somewhat persuasive, and includes evidence, some of which is grounded in research as well as experience. Major points are identified clearly and appropriately addressed, often with support from credible and acknowledged sources. The stated purpose is accomplished while favorably accommodating the intended audience.
Needs Improvement	The presentation is weaker than it should be and is characterized by minimal analysis, deficient insight, lack of evidence, or inadequate preparation. Deficiencies with respect to content are the gravest concern because the absence of anything worthwhile to say inherently undercuts the need to organize, or to present as an invested and articulate spokesperson.
Fails to Meet Standards	The presentation is more than weak or deficient—it misses the task substantially, if not completely. The content or substance of the presentation is unsubstantiated, illogical or exceedingly soft-headed. Nonperformance also “fails to meet standards.”
ORAL PRESENTATION (Organization) 25%	
Outstanding	The presentation exceeds standards for organization, delivering content within the context of an efficient and economical organizational scheme
Exceeds Standard	The presentation is thoughtfully organized and germane to the audience/situation.
Meets Standard	The organization is reasonable and brings unity to the presentation. Major points are identified clearly and appropriately addressed.
Needs Improvement	The organization is unclear and fails to bring unity or clarity to the presentation. Major points are not clearly identified or are presented in an illogical manner or sequence.
Fails to Meet Standards	The organizational scheme is unorganized and unfocused, and detracts significantly from the effectiveness of the presentation.
ORAL PRESENTATION (Delivery) 25%	
Outstanding	The presentation exceeds standards as an exemplar of human excellence in oral communication, and is delivered clearly, articulately, and with confidence.
Exceeds Standard	The presentational delivery is clear, crisp, reasonably persuasive, and consistently articulate.
Meets Standard	The stated purpose is accomplished while favorably accommodating the intended audience. Oral delivery does not distract from the speaker's substantive message.
Needs Improvement	The presentational delivery is uninspired or characterized by lack of preparation or a cavalier presentational style which leaves some listeners confused and disoriented.
Fails to Meet Standards	The presentational delivery is uninspired and characterized by inarticulate speaking, detracting critically from its objective.

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APPENDIX J

SEMINAR CONTRIBUTION RUBRIC

Seminar Contribution Standards	
Outstanding (5)	Consistently exhibits sustained superior performance in seminar dialogue. Consistently offers insightful analysis, without prompting, which advances the dialogue. Comments demonstrate a depth of knowledge of the subject and assigned readings beyond that of peers and demonstrate active listening to other participants. Comes to the seminar prepared, often with notes and annotated readings, and frequently offers novel ideas which enhance learning. Consistently demonstrates the ability to synthesize material from previous lessons and personal experience which directly supports the lesson objectives. Consistently supports others. Respects ideas, feedback and diverse opinions. Avoids use of logical fallacies.
Exceeds Standard (4)	Performed above the standard in contributions during seminar dialogue. Consistently offers solid analysis, without prompting, which advances the dialogue. Comments reflect a deep knowledge of subject matter and assigned readings and demonstrate active listening to other seminar members. Comes to the seminar prepared, often with notes or annotated readings. Demonstrates the ability to synthesize material from previous lessons and personal experience which directly supports the lesson objectives. Rarely resorts to inaccurate assumptions, inferences, biases and heuristics..
Meets Standard (3)	Met the standard in contributions during seminar dialogue. Offers solid analysis without prompting. Comments reflect a solid knowledge of the subject matter and assigned readings and demonstrate active listening to other seminar members. Comes to the seminar prepared and offers insight and personal experience during seminar dialogue which contributes to group understanding of the lesson objectives. Occasionally exhibits use of logical fallacies and bias.
Needs Improvement (2)	Participated in seminar dialogue. Offers some analysis, but often needs prompting from the seminar leader and/or others. Comments demonstrate a general knowledge of the material and assigned readings. Sometimes seems unprepared, with few notes and no marked/annotated readings. Actively listens to others, but does not offer clarification or follow-up to others' comments. Relies more upon personal opinion and less on the readings to support comments.

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APPENDIX K

OFFSITE ACCESS TO COURSE READINGS AND LIBRARY DATABASES

Blackboard

Blackboard is a Web-based learning management system (LMS) designed to support fully online courses or provide a space for face-to-face course supplementation. The USAWC uses Blackboard as a means to deliver USAWC curriculum content to mobile devices. Communication and collaboration opportunities are accessible with a wide variety of personal computing devices such as desktops, laptops, tablets, netbooks, e-readers, media players, smart phones, and others. All syllabus and digitally available media will be made available at Blackboard.com at <https://usawc.blackboard.com/>, please contact Mr. Christopher Smart at Christopher.a.smart.civ@mail.mil, or 245-4874.

EZproxy

EZproxy enables access to licensed database content when you are not on Carlisle Barracks. It operates as an intermediary server between your computer and the Library's subscription databases.

Links

You will find EZproxy links to full text readings in online syllabi, directives, bibliographies, reading lists, and emails. Usually, instructors and librarians provide these links so that you can easily access course materials anytime, anywhere. It also helps us comply with copyright law and saves money on the purchase of copyright permissions.

Library Databases - You can use EZproxy to access Library databases when you are away from Root Hall. Go to the Library's webpage <http://usawc.libguides.com/current>, click on any database in the Library Databases column, such as ProQuest, EBSCO OmniFile, or FirstSearch, and then use your EZproxy username and password to login.

Username and Password - From home, when you click on a link that was built using EZproxy, or you are accessing a particular database, you will be prompted to provide a username and password. You only need to do this once per session. You will find EZproxy login information on the wallet-size card you were given by the Library. If you have misplaced yours, just ask at the Access Services Desk for another card, contact us by phoning (717) 245-3660, or email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.libraryr@mail.mil <usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.libraryr@mail.mil>. You can also access the library portal from the ArmyWar College homepage at: <https://internal.carlisle.army.mil/Pages/default.aspx>. Please do not share EZproxy login information with others.

Impact of Firewalls

Most Internet service providers (ISPs) do not limit the areas you can access on the Internet, so home users should not encounter problems with firewalls. However, corporate sites often do employ firewalls and may be highly restrictive in what their employees can access, which can impede EZproxy.

ACCESS SOLUTIONS

Try Again!

Many problems with EZproxy are caused simply by login errors. If your first login attempt fails, try again. Check to make sure the Caps Lock is not on. Or, if you see a Page Not Found message after you do login, use the Back button and click on the link again. It may work the second time.

Broken Link - If a link appears to be broken, you can find the article by using the appropriate database instead. Go to the Library's webpage <http://usawc.libguides.com/current>, click on the database name, type in your EZproxy username and password to login, and then search for the specific article.

Browsers

EZproxy works independently from operating systems and browsers, but problems may be caused by your browser if you have not downloaded and installed the newest version. Also, it is a good idea to check to make sure that the security settings on your browser are not too restrictive and that it will accept cookies and allow pop ups. Be aware ISPs that use proprietary versions of browsers, such as AOL, can interfere with EZproxy. A simple workaround is to connect to your provider, minimize the window, and then open a browser such as Mozilla Firefox or Microsoft Internet Explorer.

Databases

Not all remote access problems are caused by EZproxy. Occasionally databases will have technical problems. Deleting cookies might help. You may successfully pass through EZproxy only to find an error caused by the database. If this happens, back out of the database and try using another one. It is unlikely that both providers would be having technical problems at the same time. Generally, database problems are resolved quickly.

Help and Tips - For assistance, please contact the USAWC Research Librarians by phoning (717) 245-3660, or email: usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.library@mail.mil. Or Root Hall, **ACCESS SERVICES, INTERLIBRARY LOAN, and COURSE RESERVES**, (717) 245-4288; (717) 245-4298; (717) 245-4610. Email: usawc.library@us.army.mil.

APPENDIX L

DMSPO STUDENT CRITIQUE

1. Analyses of student views of the USAWC courses are an extremely important input to the curriculum planning process. The course evaluation consists of a computer-assisted questionnaire. You can access the computerized survey system through any of the computers in the Executive Skills Center or your seminar room in Root Hall. Directions on how to use the computer survey system are in your *Automation Handbook*.

2. You will be contacted via email once the computer survey is available, and you will be notified of the desired completion date at that time. Questions on the survey should be directed to the Director of Institutional Assessment, 245-3365.

3. The stated outcomes of “Theater Strategy and Campaigning” are on page 3 of the Course Directive. For your convenience, they are listed below. Please review them prior to completing the course evaluation survey.

a. **Translate** national strategic goals into military objectives and provide military advice to civilian leaders in the development of policy and strategy affecting national security. (PLOs 3, 5)

b. **Develop** strategic options and operational approaches and evaluate campaign plans to achieve military objectives, in concert with other instruments of national power, which realize national strategic goals. (PLOs 3, 5)

c. **Integrate** individual service capabilities, framed through the joint functions across multiple domains, into a Joint Force that accomplishes military objectives across the range of military operations. (PLOs 2, 3)

d. **Evaluate** landpower as part of the Joint Force to implement theater strategies and execute campaigns in a theater of operations. (PLO 3)

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APPENDIX M

BLOOM'S TAXONOMY *

BLOOM'S TAXONOMY OF CATEGORIES IN THE COGNITIVE DOMAIN*
 From OPMEP, CJCSI 1800.01E, 29 May 2015. Appendix A to Enclosure E. "Levels of Learning Achievement. Below is a list of descriptive verbs representative of "Bloom's taxonomy," which constitutes a useful hierarchy of possible levels of learning. The verbs are used to define the JPME objectives..."

Level	Illustrative Level	Definitions
Knowledge	arrange, define, describe, identify, know, label, list, match, memorize, name, order, outline, recognize, relate, recall, repeat, reproduce, select, state	Remembering previously learned information.
Comprehension	classify, comprehend, convert, define, discuss, distinguish, estimate, explain, express, extend, generalize, give example(s), identify, indicate, infer, locate, paraphrase, predict, recognize, rewrite, report, restate, review, select, summarize, translate	Grasping the meaning of information.
Application	apply, change, choose, compute, demonstrate, discover, dramatize, employ, illustrate, interpret, manipulate, modify, operate, practice, predict, prepare, produce, relate, schedule, show, sketch, solve, use, write	Applying knowledge to actual situations.

Analysis	analyze, appraise, breakdown, calculate, categorize, classify, compare, contrast, criticize, derive, diagram, differentiate, discriminate, distinguish, examine, experiment, identify, illustrate, infer, interpret, model, outline, point out, question, related, select, separate, subdivide, test	Breaking down objects or ideas into simpler parts and seeing how the parts relate and are organized.
Synthesis	arrange, assemble, categorize, collect, combine, comply, compose, construct, create, design, develop, devise, explain, formulate, generate, plan, prepare, propose, rearrange, reconstruct, relate, reorganize, revise, rewrite, set up, summarize, synthesize, tell, write	Rearranging component ideas into a new whole.
Evaluating	appraise, argue, assess, attach, choose, compare, conclude, contrast, defend, Evaluating describe, discriminate, estimate, evaluate, explain, judge, justify, interpret, relate, predict, rate, select, summarize, support, value	Making judgments based on internal evidence or external criteria.
Creating	categorize, combine, compile, compose, create, devise, design, explain, generate, modify, organize, plan, rearrange, reconstruct, relate, reorganize, revise, rewrite, summarize	Building a structure or pattern from diverse elements.

* Adapted from: Bloom, B. S., ed. Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The Classification of Educational Goals. Handbook I, Cognitive Domain. New York: Longmans, Green, 1956.