United States Army War College
Department of National Security and Strategy

Theory of War and Strategy



Course Directive **AY17**

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ACADEMIC YEAR 2017

THEORY OF WAR AND STRATEGY

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

COURSE OVERVIEW:

GENERAL 1

PURPOSE 1

OUTCOMES 1

FOCUS QUESTIONS 1

SCOPE 2

STUDENT READINGS 5

CURRICULAR RELATIONSHIPS 5

JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (JPME) 5

COURSE REQUIREMENTS 6

COURSE CALENDAR 9

BLOCK I: FOUNDATIONS OF WAR, POLICY AND STRATEGY 11

1-S THEORY, WAR, AND STRATEGY 13

2-S THUCYDIDES I: THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 17

3-S THUCYDIDES II: WAGING THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 21

4-S THUCYDIDES III: VICTORY AND DEFEAT 25

5-S WHAT IS WAR? CLAUSEWITZ I 29

6-S THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GEOPOLITICS 33

7-S THE CAUSES OF WAR AND CONFLICT PREVENTION 35

BLOCK II: THEORIES OF WAR AND STRATEGY 38

8-S MILITARY POWER, THE USE OF FORCE AND STRATEGIC CONSTRAINTS 41

9-S ANCIENT MASTERS – SUN TZU AND KAUTILYA 45

10-S JOMINI, CLAUSEWITZ II, & THEORY OF LANDPOWER 49

11-S THEORIES OF SEA POWER 53

12-L/S THEORIES OF AEROSPACE POWER 57

13-S NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND LIMITED WAR 61

14-S WAR AMONG THE PEOPLES: INSURGENCY, PEOPLE'S WAR,& C O I N 65

15-S VICTORY AND CONFLICT TERMINATION 69

16-L/S THE FUTURE OF WAR AND STRATEGY 73

APPENDIX I: WRITING A GUIDED RESPONSE PAPER: REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES 76

APPENDIX II: WRITING AN ANALYTICAL PAPER: REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES 79

APPENDIX III: USAWC PROGRAM LEARNING OUTCOMES 83

APPENDIX IV: JOINT LEARNING AREAS AND OBJECTIVES (JPME PHASE II) 85

APPENDIX V: AY17 THEMES 88
APPENDIX VI: OFFSITE ACCESS TO COURSE READINGS, LIBRARY DATABASES, AND BLACKBOARD 90
APPENDIX VII: PROGRAM LEARNING OUTCOMES—CURRICULUM MAP 92
APPENDIX VIII JOINT LEARNING AREAS AND OBJECTIVES—CURRICULUM MAP… 93

COURSE OVERVIEW

1. General. This course, which is the bedrock of the U.S. Army War College curriculum, introduces students to the theory of war and strategy. Theory, defined as a body of ideas and principles, provides a basis for the study of a particular subject and offers a framework within which professional discussions can occur. Theory generates and defines the common language that facilitates communication. It provides ways to think about issues. Theory also may provide advice on solving problems. Good theory, however, is not dogmatic—it allows, even encourages, debate. When theory no longer seems to explain or fit the situation, new theory emerges to supplement or replace the old. The military officer or national security professional must be well grounded in both the theory of war and the theory of strategy to be effective at the higher levels of the national security hierarchy. Theory is essential to comprehension, and is the basis of the sound thinking that wins wars. In essence, this course prepares students to think critically about strategy and the uses of military force and forces.

2. Purpose. The course purpose is two-fold:

a. To produce senior officers and leaders who understand the theory and nature of war and conflict, and who can evaluate the relationships between warfare and the contemporary strategic environment.

b. To produce senior officers and leaders conversant in strategic theory.

3. Outcomes. At the end of the course, the student should have developed a solid understanding of the theory of war and strategy that synthesizes past theory and practice with personal experience and ideas for the future. Specifically, students should be able to:

a. Analyze the theory of war, to include its enduring nature and its evolving character and conduct.

b. Analyze the theory and nature of strategy.

c. Apply the theories of war and strategy to the formulation and implementation of strategy in the contemporary international security environment.

4. Focus Questions.

a. The course will assist the student in thinking about several broad questions.

(1) What is war? What are the differences between the enduring nature of war versus the character of a particular conflict?

(2) Why do wars occur? Why do states decide to use force? What characteristics of the international system are important considerations for strategists?

(3) What is strategy? How does one think about and evaluate a strategy?

(4) How do states and non-state actors fight wars? What constraints or limits are imposed on the conduct of war? What influences tend to expand war?

(5) How do wars end? What constitutes winning and how does one know when victory is achieved?

(8) How will an understanding of strategy contribute to the conduct of war in the future?

b.When examining specific theories or theorists and strategies or strategists, one might find it helpful to consider the following:

(1) How does the theorist or strategist define war? (What is war?)

(2) Why does the theorist or strategist believe wars should be fought? (Why do wars occur? What is the object of war?)

(3) How does the theorist or strategist believe wars should be fought? (e.g., offense vs. defense, long vs. short wars, in what domains, etc.?)

(4) How does the theorist or strategist believe wars are won? (What constitutes victory and how is it achieved?)

(5) What concepts of enduring relevance does the theorist or strategist provide? How do those concepts influence contemporary strategic thinking?

5. Scope.

a. Strategy Construct (Ends/Ways/Means).

(1) Figure 1 on the next page offers a way to think about strategy. Both this course and the National Security Policy and Strategy course use this simple construct.

Figure 1.

(2) The construct postulates that strategy is the alignment of ends (aims, objectives), ways (concepts), and means (resources)—informed by risk—to attain goals. The depiction of the three-legged stool is a simple technique to portray that relationship. If the ends, ways, and means are in acceptable proportion (assuming that the legs of the stool are of nearly equal length), the strategy is probably in balance. However, that is an ideal state. In reality, because of the dynamic nature of the international system, there is always an imbalance among the three legs and strategists continually search for ways to achieve a better balance among the three elements. If the legs are of unequal length, implying the objective (end) is too big for the resources allocated, or the ways under consideration are inappropriate for the means or ends, or that the concept (way) envisioned is too grandiose for the available m e a n s and ends – the strategist has identified risk.

(3) Strategists can evaluate each leg of the stool by testing feasibility, acceptability, suitability, and risk. Is the strategy feasible? In short, do means exist or are means reasonably attainable to execute the ways? Is the strategy acceptable, and to whom? In other words, are the concepts appropriate? Do the ways have support from key domestic constituencies and governing bodies? Are they legal? Ethical? Is the end worth the cost? Will allies or coalition partners agree? In testing suitability, strategists must assess whether the strategy actually will achieve the desired end. A strategy that fails any one of those tests is unsound. Finally, strategists must assess risk. What type of risk may be involved? Who actually assumes the risk? Can the risks be mitigated? If so, how and by whom? Ignoring risk is foolhardy. Either the strategist must adjust the ends, ways, or means to rebalance the strategy, take steps in some other manner to ameliorate

the risk, or, having recognized the risk, determine if it is acceptable. See Figure 2 (next page)



Figure 2.

b. Course Organization. Two blocks constitute the course. The blocks and their constituent lessons are sequential and build on previous material.

(1) Block I: "Foundations of War, Policy, and Strategy" begins by building on the use of history as a tool for the strategist presented in the Introduction to Strategic Studies course. Using Thucydides' *The Peloponnesian War* as a vehicle, the course examines basic concepts related to war, policy, and strategy that are essential for students to understand. In addition, this block considers the nature and character of war through the theoretical lens of the great Prussian philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz. The block surveys concepts of international relations theory (such as constructivism, realism and liberalism), and geopolitics as a way of understanding why and how wars occur. The block also reviews a broader range of causes of war and examines ideas behind conflict prevention. At the end of this block, the student will understand the nature versus character of war, the basics of strategic theory, the uses of history, essential concepts from international relations theory and geopolitics, and causes of war that influence the development and execution of strategy.

(2) Block II: "Theories of War and Strategy," addresses, essentially, the question of how wars are fought. The block begins with an examination of military power and why states use force, as well as a review of the strategic constraints on the use of that power, such as ethics, just war theory, and international law and order. Relying heavily on primary materials of the various theorists and strategists, the block then analyzes theories regarding the employment of military power

both strategically and at the high-operational level. After exploring the ancient antecedents of modern strategy espoused by the Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu, and the Indian statesman, Kautilya, the block examines the foundational theorists of landpower, Jomini and Clausewitz, before offering a theory of landpower for the 21st century. With a foundation in classic military strategy established, the block next introduces theories of sea power and aerospace power as they emerged over time. Hewing to a chronological approach, the block then explores the rise of limited war theory and nuclear deterrence, followed by an investigation of "war among the peoples," that is the theories that undergird insurgency, people's war, and counterinsurgency. The block next turns to the vital question of conflict termination. How wars end, and what constitutes "winning" or "victory" are vital issues that remain elusive for modern-day strategists and national security professionals. The course concludes with a survey of emerging concepts that may influence strategy in the near- and mid-term. At the end of the block, students will be familiar with specific warfighting concepts and strategies and will be able to apply, analyze, and evaluate them and their applicability to past, current, and future military operations.

6. Student Readings. Student readings in this directive are annotated as follows:

a. "Student Issue"—Items received prior to the start of the academic year or distributed by the faculty during the year.

b. "Blackboard"—Copyright items provided digitally via Blackboard.

c. "Library Reserve"—Items placed on TWS reserve in the library. Please ask the librarians for assistance if you have any difficulty in locating a suggested reading.

d. "Database"—Library provided databases, such as "ProQuest," "JSTOR," "Taylor and Francis", "EBSCOHOST," or others. These resources are available through USAWC Library remote access. To link to the reading see Appendix VI and USAWC Library Staff for username and password.

e. "Online"—Open source online resources available on the Internet. All required reading internet accessible resources will have a hyperlinked web address to indicate that the material is an open source online document.

f. To view online resources we recommend using Firefox as your web

browser, especially when using government computers. Using Microsoft Explorer may result in denied access to a site and particularly pdf files.

7. Curricular Relationships. The course directly supports the Program Learning Outcomes (PLOs): (1) Evaluate theories of war and strategy in the context of national security decision making; (3) Apply strategic and operational art to develop strategies and plans that employ the military instrument of power in pursuit of national aims; (4) Evaluate the nature, concepts, and components of strategic leadership and synthesize their responsible application; (5) Think critically and creatively in addressing security issues at the strategic level; and (6) Communicate clearly, persuasively, and candidly.

8. Joint Professional Military Education (JPME II). Senior-level, Phase II joint education, is integrated into the resident core curriculum. The Theory of War and Strategy course provides students with the foundation for understanding the joint learning areas involving national security strategy, national military strategy, and theater strategy and campaigning. JPME II Learning Areas and Objectives may be found in Appendix IV. Specific JPME II Learning Areas and Objectives and their application to specific lessons may be found in Appendix VIII.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

1. General.

a. To accomplish the broad objectives of this course requires active contributions to seminar dialogue and activities. Active learning begins with thorough and thoughtful preparation that includes taking notes as you read the texts critically. Students are expected to contribute by accomplishing the required readings, research, and tasks listed in Paragraph 3, Student Requirements, as appropriate, for each lesson or as assigned or modified by your FI. Thorough study and preparation for each seminar supports active participation in seminar dialogue that allows students to contribute to the learning of others, and, in turn, learn from the contributions of others.

b. To complete Theory of War and Strategy successfully, students will meet established standards in each of the three specific requirements listed below. The FI will evaluate each requirement throughout the course and in a Course Evaluation Report (CER) at the end. The student's Faculty Advisor (FA) will use the CER as input to the year-end Academic Evaluation Report that the USAWC renders on each student.

2. Specific Requirements.

a. Contribution: The FI will evaluate contribution subjectively. There are no set numbers of times daily, weekly, or over the length of the course that a student must contribute to meet standards. Quality of contribution – in other words, the quality of contribution to seminar learning – is more important than frequency, although frequency counts in that all students are expected to be actively engaged. Contribution will equal 30 percent of the overall TWS grade.

b. Written Requirements: Each student will complete two written requirements. Written requirement 1 will comprise 20 percent of the overall TWS evaluation. Written requirement 2 will comprise 50 percent of the overall TWS grade.

(1) Writing requirement 1 is a guided response paper (so-called because you are responding to a specific question or set of questions) that uses Thucydides' *The Peloponnesian War.* The paper is to be 3-4 pages in length and must be submitted to the FI no later than 31 August. **For details on the guided response questions and guidance for preparing the paper, see Appendix I.**

(2) Writing requirement 2, **due to the FI no later than 21 September**, calls for each student to *research* and write a 5-6 page analytical paper on one of the following questions or topics:

(a) "Which *strategic* theory or theorist do you believe best explains the nature and character of warfare in the 21st century?"

(b) "Apply one or more strategic theories to a specific national security challenge currently facing the United States or its allies."

(3) **Refer to Appendix II for a detailed description of this requirement and guidance for preparing the paper.**

c. Evaluation Standard. Faculty will evaluate all writing requirements in accordance with the standards contained in the AY17 Communicative Arts Directive. Specifically, faculty will evaluate the content, organization, and style of the written submission. The criteria for evaluating the paper will address the student's ability to gather information, conduct research, organize material logically, compose and express thoughts clearly and coherently in effective writing, and use standard written English expected of educated senior officers and officials. Descriptions of the criteria for evaluations of "Outstanding," "Exceeds Standards," "Meets Standards" "Needs Improvement," and "Fails to Meet Standards" are found in the Communicative Arts Directive. The FI will return

papers that "Need Improvement" or “Fail to Meet Standards to the student for resubmission until the student achieves a “Meets Standard” evaluation or better. Students who fail to “Meet Standards” within a reasonable period will be referred to academic probation or an Academic Review Board, as appropriate, under provisions of Carlisle Barracks Memorandum 623-1, Student Evaluation, 7 January 2015. **Students will find more detailed evaluation rubrics in the respective appendices.**

d. Academic Integrity.

(1) The USAWC upholds the highest standards of academic integrity. This includes a strict academic code requiring students to credit properly the source of information cited in any written work, oral presentation, or briefing created to meet diploma/degree requirements. Simply put, plagiarism – the representation of someone else’s intellectual work as one’s own – is strictly prohibited. Plagiarism, along with cheating and misrepresentation (two other violations of academic integrity) are inconsistent with the professional standards required of military personnel and government employees. Furthermore, in the case of U.S. military officers, such conduct violates the “Exemplary Conduct Standards” delineated in Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 3583 (U.S. Army), 5947 (U.S. Naval Service), and 8583 (U.S. Air Force).

(2) Students with questions concerning academic integrity and plagiarism should confer with their faculty instructor, or consult the AY17 Communicative Arts Directive.

AY17 TWS Planning Calendar—August-September 2016

SUN	MON	TUES	WED	THURS	FRI	SAT
21	22	23 RWR	24 TWS-1 S Theory, War, and Strategy ----- Thucydides Lecture (1300)	25 TWS-2 Thucydides I: The Peloponnesian War	26 TWS-3 Thucydides II: Waging the Peloponnesian War -----	27
28	29 TWS-4 Thucydides III: Victory and Defeat ----- NTL Clausewitz Echevarria SHARP Summit	30 TWS-5 What is War? Clausewitz I ———	31 TWS-6 Theories of International Relations and Geopolitics ------ Guided Response Paper due	1 TWS-7 Causes of War and Conflict Prevention -----	2 RWR	
4	5 Labor Day Holiday	6 TWS-8 Military Power, Use of Force, and Strategic Constraints ----- NTL Kautilya—Goodson	7 TWS-9 L/S Ancient Masters- Sun Tzu and Kautilya ----- NTL Jomini—Johnsen	8 TWS-10 Landpower: Jomini, Clausewitz, and a Theory of Landpower ----- NTL Sea Power	9 TWS-11 Theories of Sea Power ———	10
11	12 TWS-12 L/S Theories of Aerospace Power ----- NTL Nuclear Theory Jones/Klinger	13 TWS-13 Nuclear Strategy and Limited War ----- NTL Irregular Warfare Keller	14 RWR	15 TWS-14 War Among the Peoples: Insurgency, People's War, COIN ———	16 TWS-15 Victory and Conflict Termination ———	17
18	19 TWS-16: L/S The Future of Strategy Neiberg ———	20 SGs 1-12 NSSR #1 Gettysburg Staff Ride	21 SGs 13-24 NSSR#1 Gettysburg Staff Ride Paper 2 Due	22	23	24

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BLOCK I:

FOUNDATIONS OF THEORY, WAR, AND STRATEGY

In this introductory block, students will learn some key concepts for understanding and analyzing war and strategy. We initially examine the nature and character of war and the concept of strategy, major themes for the remainder of the USAWC education program. We begin with the seminal ideas of B.H. Liddell Hart, the British strategic thinker whose works shaped much of strategic thought in the 20th century, and whose ideas still resonate today. Peter Layton offers a contemporary view of how grand

strategy has evolved and fits within the 21st century international security environment. We next turn to the USAWC strategy model, followed by Dr. J. Boone Bartholomees' essay that offers a sweeping overview of strategic thought.

The core of this block revolves around a case study using Thucydides' *The Peloponnesian Wars*. The purpose of this case study is an examination of the fundamental relationships among war, policy, and strategy. This text has long been foundational for historians, political scientists, policymakers, and military leaders. For example, in a 1947 speech at Princeton University, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, the general who also served as the U.S. Army's Chief of Staff during World War II, underscored the importance of the Peloponnesian War for an understanding of contemporary international affairs. He stated, "I doubt seriously whether a man can think with full wisdom and with deep convictions regarding certain of the basic issues today who has not at least reviewed in his mind the period of the Peloponnesian War and the fall of Athens."

Using Marshall's words as a prompt, we will deeply analyze the most salient insights from *The Peloponnesian Wars* over three consecutive lessons. We will study concepts such as power: What is power, from whence does it come, and how can it be used? We also assess the motivations of the actors by exploring culture, ideas, ideologies, and the tensions between values and interests. What are national or state interests? From whence do they come? We will also consider how uncertainty in the international system creates insecurity, that is, fear and mistrust among states as they vie for power or hegemony (domination) or an international order favorable to their interests. Modern theorists call this phenomenon the "security dilemma," whereby tensions and conflicts between states can occur, even unintentionally, as each side defensively reacts to the other's increase in military capacity or other seemingly belligerent measures.

Using Thucydides' landmark work as a basis, we will then move forward to more in-depth examinations of key threads of the course. We will examine the nature and the character of war through the lens of the great Prussian philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz. Theories of international relations and geopolitics will illuminate how some of the tensions within the international system can lead to war. The next two concluding lessons in the block examine more closely the causes of war, conflict prevention, and how military power and the use of force fit into grand strategy and diplomacy.

BLOCK I OUTCOMES. By the end of the block, students should be able to:

- Introduce and analyze the concepts of theory, war, and strategy for application in subsequent blocks and courses.
- Introduce and analyze the nature and character of war.
- Explain how uncertainty in the international system affects cooperation and conflict among nations.
- Analyze the relationship between geography and political power in the international system and their influence on strategy.

- Synthesize the theoretical concepts of war causation and conflict termination.
- Analyze the sources, dimensions, and complexity of power.
- Synthesize the theoretical concepts of military power, the use of force within the international system, and the constraints imposed on war and strategy by that system.
- Synthesize theories of strategic victory.

24 August 2016
(0830-1130)
Dr. Bill Johnsen 245-3293

LESSON 1: THEORY, WAR, AND STRATEGY

Mode: Seminar TWS-1-S

a. In this first lesson of the Theory of War and Strategy course, we begin our exploration of war and strategy. According to Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, "War is the socially sanctioned violence to achieve political purposes." (I-3) The nature of war, according to most military theorists and historians, is timeless. Certain fundamental aspects of war, such as the role of human decision-making, the impact of natural phenomena, passion, friction, and calculus of means and ways to achieve ends, persist over millennia despite differences in political systems, technologies, and geography, to name but a few considerations. The character of war, however, may radically change over time, highly dependent as it is on scientific innovation, technological changes, demographic shifts, national policies and international affairs, and even educational standards. Each war thus possesses its own distinct character, rooted in the context of its time and place, yet simultaneously shares a common nature with military conflicts from all eras.

b. "Strategy is the alignment of ends (aims, objectives), ways (concepts), and means (resources)—informed by risk—to attain goals." Strategy is appropriate at several levels – grand, national, and military. Grand strategy is the use of all elements of national power in peace and war to support a strategic vision of the nation's role in the world that will best achieve the nation's core objectives. National strategy, or "the alignment of ends, ways, and means to attain national policy objectives," provides components of a grand strategy. "Military strategy is the art and science of aligning military ends, ways, and means to support national policy objectives." (All quotations from Report, Strategy Education Conference, Community of Interest [SEC-COI], 22-24 September 2014.)

c. In this course, we will focus on strategy from a broad historical and international perspective.

d. Beyond the realm of strategy, "The operational level links strategy and tactics

by establishing operational objectives necessary to achieve the military end states and strategic objectives (JP 1, I-7.) “The tactical level of war is where battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or joint task forces (JTFs).” (JP 1, I7.)

e. One might evaluate each of these strategies using any number of approaches. The U.S. Army War College teaches the technique of evaluating feasibility, acceptability, and suitability (FAS). Feasibility assesses whether the means at hand or reasonably

available are sufficient to execute the proposed concepts. Acceptability tests whether the ways can produce the desired outcome without excessive expenditure of resources and within accepted modes of conduct. Suitability assesses whether the strategy is likely to achieve the desired end. One may evaluate strategy at any level using this construct. In this course, we will focus on military strategy from a broader, historical, and international perspective.

f. In addition, this lesson includes an introduction to the objectives, structure, and
requirements of the Theory of War and Strategy course. Students must be familiar with those basic administrative elements to proceed successfully through the course. Faculty Instructors will discuss most of the essential features of the course, but students must also use the assigned readings or other directions provided in the course directive.

2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to

a. Outline the Theory of War and Strategy course objectives, block structure, course
model, and the course contribution and written requirements.

b. Analyze the concept of strategy, the strategic ends-ways-means construct, and
techniques of evaluating strategies.

c. Describe the distinctions and differences among grand strategy, national strategy,
and military strategy.

d. Explain the differences between the nature of war and the character of war.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Army War College, Department of National Security and Strategy. Theory of War and Strategy Directive (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2016), 1-9 and

Appendices I and II. **[Blackboard]**

(2) Basil H. Liddell Hart, Part IV, "Fundamentals of Strategy and Grand Strategy," in *Strategy,* 2nd ed. (New York: Penguin, 1991), 319-330; 338-339; 353-360.

[Student Issue]

(3) Peter Layton, "The Idea of Grand Strategy," *RUSI Journal* 152, no. 4 (August/September2012): 56-61 in TAYLOR&FRANCIS (accessed May 18, 2016).

[Database]

(4) H. Richard Yarger, "Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the U.S. Army War College Strategy Model," in *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, 5th ed., Vol. I: *Theory of War and Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 45, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1109 (accessed May 18, 2016).

[Online]

(5) J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., "A Survey of the Theory of Strategy," in *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, 5th ed., Vol. I: *Theory of War and Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 2012): READ 13-27, SKIM rest of chapter, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1109 (accessed May 18, 2016). **[Online]** c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Bernard Brodie, "Strategic Thinkers, Planners, Decision Makers," in *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 433-496.

(2) Basil H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Penguin, 1991).

(3) Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

(4) Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

(5) Colin S. Gray, "The Dimensions of Strategy," in *Modern Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 16-47.

(6) Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," in *The Causes of War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 101-109.

(7) Edward N. Luttwak, "The Conscious Use of Paradox in War," in *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 3-15.

(8) William C. Martel, *Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

4. Points to Consider.

a. The readings contain various definitions of strategy. What definition do you find most useful and why?

b. Is the distinction between levels of strategy necessary? Is it helpful?

c. How does one distinguish between policy and strategy? Is such a distinction important?

d. What is the difference between the nature and character of war?

e. Do you agree with Liddell Hart's assertion that the goal of war is better peace? What are the implications of accepting that argument?

25 August 2016
(0830-1130) Dr. Craig
Nation 245-3281

LESSON 2: THUCYDIDES I: THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

Mode: Seminar TWS-2-S

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson begins our study of a classic of historical analysis and strategic thought, *The Peloponnesian War* written by the ancient Greek historian, Thucydides. The book is considered to be a classic for many reasons, not the least of which are the ways in which an analysis of the 5th century BCE war between Athens and Sparta can help us to interpret and understand the nature of contemporary strategic interaction. We study Thucydides in order to refine our ability to address enduring themes in the study of strategy, including the nature of war, the reasons why wars are fought, the ways in which war may be conducted and won, and the meaning of victory.

b. The first of the three lessons that we devote to Thucydides focuses on the nature and character of war itself, and analysis of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. The lesson assesses the roots of the war and the initial strategic assessments of the two major belligerents, Athens and Sparta. The assigned passages from Thucydides' text address the strategic environment in Greece of the classical age, the historical roots of the conflict, and the ways in which factors such as domestic politics, leadership, alliance commitments, and political and strategic culture affect decision–making.

c. Thucydides places particular emphasis on the Athenian leader Pericles. Our readings highlight Pericles' strategic assessment, his strategy for waging war, and his appreciation of the reasons why Athens is fighting. The latter question is addressed in the famous "funeral oration," still considered a foundation of modern democratic theory and political thought. Students should compare and contrast Thucydides' descriptions of Pericles with those of the Spartan leader Archidamus.

d. The Peloponnesian War (431-404 BCE) was primarily a clash between democratic Athens and its "empire" of tributary allies (the Delian League) and oligarchic Sparta and its allies (the Peloponnesian League). Thucydides seems to see the war as inevitable due to underlying power dynamics, but the course of the contest and the ultimate outcome were far from predetermined. When the war begins, Sparta sees itself as the undisputed leader of the Hellenic world. It embodies conservative, traditional values, is sustained by

an agrarian based slave economy, and is a dominant land power with the best-trained and only true professional army among the Greek city-states. Democratic Athens is a rising challenger, a wealthy trading state, and sea power whose national power rests upon its fleet.

e. In the readings for this lesson, Thucydides provides an assessment of the situation in Greece leading up to the war.

2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

a. Explain the distinction between the nature and character of war.

b. Demonstrate how to assess the strategic environment, using the origins of the Peloponnesian War as a case study.

c. Describe how "fear, honor, and interest," can affect strategic choices and inspire decisions for war.

d. Distinguish the strategic level of warfare.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None

b. Required Readings.

(1) Robert B. Strassler, ed., *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War* (New York: The Free Press, 1996). **[Student Issue]**

Thucydides' history is conventionally divided into eight books. We list passages by book number and corresponding passage number – for example, "1.66" indicates Book one, passage 1.66. This is clearly indicated in the Strassler text. Pay attention to the useful summaries provided in the page margins.

READ

(1) *Book One*

1.1 Introduction
1.22–1.54 (15-33)
1.65-1.88 (37-49)
1.119–1.127 (65-70)
1.131–1.146 (79-85)

(2) *Book Two*

2.7-2.25 (93-107)
2.34-2.48 (110-118)
2.55-2.65 (122-128)

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Edith Foster, *Thucydides, Pericles, and Periclean Imperialism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

(2) Victor David Hanson, *A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War* (New York: Random House, 2005).

(3) Donald Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969).

(4) Benard Knox, "Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War: Politics and Power," "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" *Naval War College Review*, 25, no 2 (January/February 1973) 3-15, USNWC Review (accessed May 6, 2016).

(5) J. E. Lendon, *Song of Wrath: The Peloponnesian War Begins* (New York: Basic Books, 2010).

(6) James V. Morrison, *Reading Thucydides* (Bloomington, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2006).

(7) Perez Zagorin, *Thucydides: An Introduction for the Common Reader* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

4. Points to Consider.

a. How does warfare in the ancient world differ from warfare today? What common features remain?

b. What were the underlying and proximate causes of the Peloponnesian War?

c. What are the strengths and weakness in the strategy and leadership style of Pericles? Which strategic leadership best exemplifies strategic visions, Pericles or Archidamus?

d. What are the political objectives of the main belligerents?

e. How do alliances affect the decision for war? Are there lessons to be learned here?

f. Thucydides implies that the Peloponnesian War was inevitable. Is he correct?

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26 August 2016
(0830-1130)

LESSON 3: THUCYDIDES II: WAGING THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

Mode: Seminar TWS-3-S

1. Introduction.

a. Athens and Sparta choose war as a means to achieve what they consider important objectives. However, the objectives, and the means selected to pursue them, are not static. Once joined, the dynamic of war imposes strategic adaptation. The strengths of the two major belligerents reflect asymmetries that make victory elusive. The strategies with which Athens and Sparta enter the war prove to be flawed and, as a result, the conflict devolves toward a stalemate. The struggle for hegemony becomes more intense and complex as it becomes protracted in time. In the readings assigned for today's lesson, Thucydides traces the strategic maneuvers that result as the war evolves, and describes ways in which values and culturally grounded restraints are undermined as the conflict extends in time and space.

b. The nature of warfare in ancient Greece has clear echoes down to the present. Morality, the search for power, fear, honor, interest, passion, chance, uncertainty, reason, courage, and leadership are all relevant variables that help us to understand the nature of armed conflict. They are brilliantly described in Thucydides' narrative.

c. Athens, with its powerful navy, relies on the tribute paid by allies to maintain its position. Athens is vulnerable to defection by its allies – a strategic weakness the Sparta, encouraged by the resourceful Brasidas, seeks to exploit. Sparta is reliant upon its slave- based agrarian economy, and must remain vigilant against slave rebellion—a concern that an Athenian base at Pylos on the Peloponnesus aggravates. Such concerns lead to the Peace of Nicias, a truce that, in principle, temporarily ends major fighting, but according to Thucydides does little to address the underlying sources of hostility.

d. Today's readings conclude with the famous Melian Dialogue, a powerful evocation of the problems of the application of power and respect for moral standards in warfare.

2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

a. Evaluate how national values, interests, and cultural factors effect strategic calculations. Outline how fear, honor, interest, and culture drive strategic decisionmaking.

b. Analyze the Athenian and Spartan strategies and the ways that they evolve as the war becomes protracted.

c. Using the Melian Dialogue as a foundation, describe ways in which ethical considerations can or should affect strategic priorities.

d. Explain the sources of national power and the ways that they can contribute to success in warfare.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None

b. Required Readings.

Robert B. Strassler, ed., *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to t h e Peloponnesian War* (New York: The Free Press, 1996). **[Student Issue]**

Thucydides' history is conventionally divided into eight books. We list passages by book number and corresponding passage number – for example, "1.66" indicates Book one, passage 1.66. This is clearly indicated in the Strassler text. Pay attention to the useful summaries provided in the page margins.

READ

(1) *Book Three*
3.1-3.19 (159-167)
3.25-3.50 (171-184)
3.70-3.86 (194-202)

(2) *Book Four*
4.1-4.41 (223-246)
4.78-4.88 (266-272)
4.102-4.119 (279-288)

(3) *Book Five*
5.1-5.26 (301-317)
5.84-5.116 (350-357)

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) William Desmond, "Lessons of Fear: A Reading of Thucydides," *Classical Philology* 101, no. 4 (October 2006): 359-379.

(2) Mary P. Dewald, *Thucydides War Narrative: A Structural Study* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

(3) Richard Ned Lebow, "Thucydides and Deterrence" in *Security Studies*, 16, no. 2 (April 2007): 163-188.

(4) Athanassios G. Platias and Constantinos Koliopoulos, *Thucydides on Strategy: Grand Strategies in the Peloponnesian War and their Relevance Today* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

(5) Lawrence A. Taylor, *A New History of the Peloponnesian War* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).

(6) Theodore George Tsakiris. “Thucydides and Strategy: Formations of Grand Strategy in the History of the Second Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC),” *Comparative Strategy* 25, no. 3 (July-September 2006): 173-208 in TAYLOR&FRANCIS (accessed 7 May 2016).

(7) Mary Frances Williams, *Ethics in Thucydides: The Ancient Simplicity* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1998).

(8) Bernard Knox, “Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War: Politic and Power,” *Navy War College Review*, 25, no 2 (January/February 1973) 3-15 in USNWC REVIEW (accessed May 6, 2016).

4. Points to Consider.

a. What role did justice play in the formulation of policy and strategy in ancient Greece? What role does it play today?

b. How do governmental institutions and procedures affect policy and strategy?

c. In his evaluation of the Corcyraean revolt, Thucydides remarks, “war takes away the easy supply of daily wants and so proves a rough master that brings most men’s character to a level with their fortune.’ (p. 199). Evaluate this meditation on the corrupting effect of protracted warfare.

d. Thucydides refers to the Peace of Nicias as a treacherous armistice. In fact, the settlement does not endure – what are the lessons of this episode for conflict termination and conflict resolution efforts?

e. “The strong do what they can while the weak suffer what they must.” What are the strategic implications of this statement made by the Athenian envoys to Melos?

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29 August 2016
(0830-1130) Dr. Craig Nation, 245-3281

LESSON 4: THUCYDIDES III: VICTORY AND DEFEAT

Mode: Seminar TWS-4-S

1. Introduction.

a. During a period of armistice in the war between Athens and Sparta, the conflict continues through indirect means up to the point where Athens, inspired by the brash young Alcibiades, opts to affect a decisive change in the balance of power by conquering the distant island of Sicily. The Sicilian Expedition is the most carefully elaborated episode in Thucydides' history. It provides complex examples of strategic planning and vision, operational design, theater campaigning, leadership, and the causes and consequences of defeat.

b. Athens' defeat on Sicily may be regarded as a turning point in the war, but it is not decisive. A third phase of the conflict follows ("the Ionian War"), culminating in a Spartan victory following the battle of Aegospotami in 404 BCE. Thucydides' history describes events down to the year 411. Thucydides' contemporary, Xenophon, records the "rest of the story" in his *Hellenica*. Athens' defeat is devastating. Explaining the reasons why their defeat occurs is the key problem confronted in today's lesson. What are the factors that spell the differences between victory and defeat in protracted conflicts? How are wars won, and how are they terminated? What is the meaning of victory? Thucydides' narrative gives us plenty of ammunition to take on these enduring themes in strategic analysis.

2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

a. Evaluate the reasons for Athens' defeat in Sicily.

b. Analyze the nature of conflict termination at the strategic level.

c. Explain why Athens loses the Peloponnesian War.

d. Use the example of the Peloponnesian War to develop a theory of victory.

e. Outline the sources of national power and the ways that they can contribute to success in warfare.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None

b. Required Readings.

Robert B. Strassler, ed., *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War* (New York: The Free Press, 1996). **[Student Issue]**

Thucydides' history is conventionally divided into eight books. We list passages by book number and corresponding passage number - for example, 1.66 indicates Book One,

passage 1.66. This is clearly indicated in the Strassler text. Pay attention to the useful summaries provided in the page margins.

READ

(1) *Book Six:*
6.1, (361)
6.6-6.34 (365-379)
6.45-6.49 (387-388)
6.61 (395-396)
6.89-6.105 (412-423)

(2) *Book Seven*:
7.1-7.24 (427-440) (the Sicilian Expedition – the battle for Syracuse)
7.36-7.78 (448-478) (Athens' defeat in Sicily)

(3) Epilogue (549-554)

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Peter Green, *Armada from Athens*, (Garden City NJ; Doubleday, 1970).

(2) Geoffrey Hawthorn, *Thucydides on Politics: Back to the Present* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014)

(3) Donald Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition (*Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).

(4) R. Craig Nation, "Thucydides and Contemporary Strategy," in *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, 4th ed., vol. I: *Theory of War and Strategy*, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July 2010).

(5) Mary P. Nichols, *Thucydides and the Pursuit of Freedom (*Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2015).

(6) Xenophon, *The Landmarks Xenophon Hellenika*, Robert B. Strassler ed., (New York: Anchor Books, 2009).

4. Points to Consider.

a. Was the Sicilian Expedition a viable strategy badly executed or was it poorly conceived from the start? What accounts for Athens' catastrophic defeat?

b. What are the strengths and weaknesses of Alcibiades and Nicias as strategic

leaders?

c. How would you describe and assess the evolving relations between civilian and military leaders in both Athens and Sparta during the course of the war?

d. How does the dynamic of sea power versus land power shape outcomes in the Peloponnesian War?

e. What can the experience of Athens teach us about the sorts of challenges democratic polities confront when engaged in protracted strategic competition against a determined, ideologically hostile adversary?

f. How can we explain the outcome and consequences of the Peloponnesian War?

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30 August 2016
(0830-1130)
Dr. Bill Johnsen 245-3126

LESSON 5: WHAT IS WAR? CLAUSEWITZ I

Mode: Seminar TWS-05-S

1. Introduction.

a. We begin this examination of war with its greatest philosopher, the Prussian Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz entered Prussian military service as an officer cadet at the age of twelve and participated in the wars against revolutionary France and Napoleon. The defining moment in his life came in October 1806, when Napoleon's *Grande Armee* destroyed the vaunted Prussian army at the twin battles of Jena and Auersrstadt and the ensuing pursuit. Clausewitz spent the rest of his life trying to come to grips with this traumatic event. His masterwork, *On War*, was his effort to understand the transformation of war from the limited dynastic wars of the 18th century to the national wars unleashed by the French Revolution and Napoleon.

b. *On War* is not easy to read. Writing in the style of 19th century German idealist philosophy, Clausewitz used a method known as the *dialectic*--in which opposite ideas (the *thesis* and the *antithesis*) are posed in contrast to one another. Moreover, Clausewitz wrote the book over many years, rarely a good thing for purposes of clear exposition. Lastly, Clausewitz died at the relatively young age of 51, and left behind notes indicating that he intended to revise his work. Unfortunately, the date of those notes is unclear. As a result, practitioners and scholars have been arguing about *On War* ever since.

c. Readings for the lesson begin with an introduction to Clausewitz, his times, and the context of Clausewitz's ideas in Peter Paret, "Clausewitz" in *Makers of Modern Strategy*: From *Machiavelli to the Nuclear* Age.

d. The readings next turn to Clausewitz's, *On War*. We begin with Clausewitz's description of theory, followed by his discussion of war. Book 1, Chapter 1, "What is War?" contains Clausewitz's two classic definitions of war ("an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will" and the "continuation of policy by other means," as well as his famous concept of the "remarkable trinity" (violence, chance, and reason). You will want to read this entire chapter carefully, absorbing its language, rhythms, and logic. Clausewitz's concept of the "trinity," in particular, has been the source of a great deal of confusion and misinterpretation within U.S. military culture.

e. Book Two, Chapter 3, "Art of War or Science of War," examines another important aspect of Clausewitz's views on art, science, and theory of war.

f. The next readings are from Book 8. In a note dated 10 July 1827, Clausewitz disclaimed, "Several chapters of it have been drafted, but they must not in any sense be taken in final form. They are really no more than a rough working over of the raw materials, done with the idea that the labor itself would show what the real problems

were." Nonetheless, this material represents some of his most refined thoughts on key theoretical concepts surrounding "absolute vs. real" war and the role of war as an instrument of policy.

g. In the last group of readings, we return to Book 1 and delve more deeply into the problems that Clausewitz identified as part of the very nature of war (i.e. present in all times and in all ages): fog, friction, danger, and the role that the "genius" of the commander can play in overcoming them.

2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

a. Analyze the meaning of war as an instrument of policy.

b. Analyze Clausewitz's distinction between absolute and real war.

c. Assess Clausewitz's theory of the "paradoxical trinity" and its application to current and future strategic problems.

d. Analyze Clausewitz's concept of military genius and the role of the commander.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None

b. Required Readings.

(1) Peter Paret, "Clausewitz," in *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 186-197. **[Student Issue]**

(2) Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). **[Student Issue]**

READ (in order):

(1) *Book Two*, Chapter 2, "Theory Should be Study, Not Doctrine," 141.

(2) *Book One*:
Chapter 1, "What is War?," 75-89.
Chapter 2, "Purpose and Means in War," 91-94, 99.

(3) *Book Two*, Chapter 3, "Art of War or Science of War," 148-150.

(4) *Book Eight*
Chapter 1, “Introduction, “577-578.
Chapter 2, “Absolute War and Real War,” 579-581.
Chapter 3a, “Interdependence of the Elements of War,” 582-584.
Chapter 3b, “Scale of the Military Objective and of the Effort to be Made,” 585-586 (end of second full paragraph: “…whether these roles are united in a single individual or not.”) and 593 (start of third full paragraph: “At this point our historical….”)-594.
Chapter 6b, "War is an Instrument of Policy," 605-608.

(5) *Book One*
Chapter 3, "On Military Genius," 100-112. Chapter 4, "On Danger in War," 113-114. Chapter 5, "Physical Effort in War," 115-116. Chapter 7, "Friction in War," 119-121.

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Michael Howard, *Clausewitz* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).

(2) Azar Gat, *The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz* (New York: Oxford, 1989). See Chapters 6 and 7.

(3) Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Clausewitz and Contemporary War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

(4) Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, *Clausewitz in the Twenty- First Century*, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

(5) Stuart Kinross, *Clausewitz and America: Strategic Thought and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq* (London: Routledge, 2008).

(6) Andreas Herberg-Rothe, “Clausewitz’s Concept of Strategy: Balancing Purpose, Aims, and Means,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 37, 6, pp. 903-925.

d. Optional Video Clips.

(1) Chris Bassford, “Clausewitz’s Trinity.” 0:20, http://www.clausewitz.com/Flash/FLVs/ROMP.htm (accessed May 4, 2016).

(2) Antulio Echevarria, “Clausewitz and Contemporary Warfare,” 64:00 (start at 4:00), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QqtOsMXMwEo (accessed May 4, 2016).

(3) Donald Stoker, “Clausewitz: His Life and Work,” 46:03. He addresses Clausewitz’s experience as a soldier up to minute 26. If you want to focus on theory, see 26:00 to 46:03, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g8K312sz9to (accessed May 4, 2016).

(4) For a differing interpretation of Clausewitz, see Jon Sumida, “Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to *On War*,” C-Span, December 2, 2011, 10:46, http://www.c- span.org/video/?303077-2/book-discussion-decoding-clausewitz (accessed May 4, 2016).

4. Points to Consider.

a. What are Clausewitz‘s two definitions of war? Are the two definitions contradictory? How does war in reality differ from war on paper? What are the practical implications of each?

b. What is the trinity Clausewitz describes, and, what is its applicability in the modern strategic environment?

c. What is “absolute war,” according to Clausewitz, and how is it different from “real war?” Is “real war” possibly interchangeable with “limited war?”

d. What are the key characteristics that Clausewitz identifies in an effective commander? Are the elements he discusses essential for today‘s commanders? At what level of command? Is any element obsolete today?

e. Given what you have read from Clausewitz, what is the relevance of Clausewitz's theory for both policymakers and strategists today?

f. Which areas of Clausewitzian theory do you think may be most susceptible to misinterpretation?

g. For Clausewitz, what constitutes the appropriate roles and relationships between the rulers or statesmen and the commander?

31 August 2016
(0830-1130)
Dr. Marybeth P. Ulrich, 245-3272

LESSON 6: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES AND GEOPOLITICS

Mode: Seminar TWS-6-S

1. Introduction.

a. In this lesson we move beyond the ancient world and begin to focus on the modern state system. This study will begin with an in-depth look at the major paradigms of international relations theory. In doing so you will add to your "strategist's toolkit" with each paradigm offering a different perspective on international relations phenomenon. The point when mastering each theoretical lens is not to identify as a "realist" or as a "liberalist" or as a "constructivist," but to appreciate the contributions that each lens makes to enhance your understanding of the issue.

b. We will also take the opportunity in this lesson to gain an overview of the origins of the Westphalian state system from which the modern day states, and nation-states emerged. Non-state actors play increasingly important roles as well.

c. Finally, the field of geopolitics will be introduced. We will explore the origins of the concept in the 19th century and its evolution through the 20th century culminating in the continued relevance of geopolitical frameworks in the current international system.

2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

a. Apply the main international relations paradigms: realism, liberalism, and constructivism in order to understand complex international phenomena.

b. Recall the origins of the modern state system, the role of states in the system, and the limits on state power.

c. Recall the evolution of the science of geopolitics and describe the continued relevance of geopolitical frameworks for understanding the current strategic environment.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Russell Bova, "How to Think About World Politics," in *How the World Works: A Brief Survey of International Relations,* 2nd ed. (Boston: Pearson Longman, 2012), 7-35. **[Blackboard]**

(2) Paul Wilkinson, "States," in *International Relations: A Very Short Introduction,* (Oxford University Press, 2007), 12-37. **[Student Issue]**

(3) Klaus Dodds, “An Intellectual Poison?” in *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction,* (Oxford University Press, 2014), 18-47. **[Student Issue]**

4. Points to Consider.

a. In hindsight, how do the various IR paradigms improve your understanding of the Peloponnesian Wars?

b. How can the application of multiple IR paradigms to a particular issue enhance your understanding of it?

c. What are the main characteristics of the Westphalian state system? Are there forces at play in the international system today that challenge the continued influence of this system?

d. Which factors contributed to the rise of geopolitics as a distinct subject? How have politics and geography combined to result in unique perspectives on international politics?

1 September 2016
(0830-1130)
Dr. Frank L. Jones 245-3126

LESSON 7: THE CAUSES OF WAR AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

Mode: Seminar Lesson TWS-7-S

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson examines two issues. The first is the causes of war. The reason why wars occur and recur is a significant topic in political science and diplomatic history, but it is an important subject in other disciplines such as anthropology and biology. We will explore how scholars in these various fields understand the origins of conflict. Using the international relations theory you studied in the previous lesson is a good place to start, with attention to the levels of analysis (system, state, individual). Yet, even this handy framework is not conclusive because of definitional problems and the lack of reliable linkages between cause and effect, as John Garnett points out in his essay. Further, as Robert Jervis asserts, psychology has a role too, including such elements as rational calculation (losses or costs versus gains), judgment, pessimistic or optimistic dispositions, and the capacity to estimate accurately the consequences of one's actions. Further, the issue is of importance to national security practitioners. Policymakers often want to know under what conditions a state will cooperate or how they can induce a potential adversary to commit to an enforceable agreement or submit to mediation rather than resort to war. Conditions are also important for conflict prevention, as there may be aggravating conditions that make an outbreak more probable or inhibiting conditions that restrain conflict. Lastly, our discussion of the causes of war should not be limited to inter-state war, but should assist us in studying civil wars, revolutions, or a state's decision to intervene militarily for humanitarian reasons.

b. A second component of this lesson, which directly supports the discourse on the theory of war, is the subject of how states and non-state actors attempt to prevent conflicts. Conflict prevention, referred to as preventive diplomacy in some cases, has long been an aspiration of humankind, but operative efforts to attain this goal have not always been realized. Some scholars believe attainment of this objective is illusory, but one should not discount the possibilities. As renowned political scientists Joseph Nye and David Welch have observed, even a belief in the inevitability of war can have a role in causing one. While such prevention efforts have not ensued in many instances, there are ones where it has, and, for that reason, pursuing diplomatic measures to prevent war, considering the cost in human life, the corrosion of societal norms, and other destructive outcomes, is a worthy aim. Examining and determining which tools policymakers have available to them and identifying institutional capacities may be

effective in preventing conflict are essential components of the study of war and strategy.

2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

a. Identify and analyze the various causes of war Garnett identifies in his essay, and analyze them within the context of the previous lessons (international relations theory, Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War, Clausewitz's theory, etc.).

b. Describe the areas of misperception that Jervis highlights and assess how they can lead to an outbreak of hostilities.

c. Define conflict prevention, and identify its importance to international relations by analyzing the mechanisms states and non-state actors can use to prevent conflict, and the challenges they confront in achieving their goal.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Read, understand, and analyze the causes of war from a multidisciplinary perspective and consider how war might be prevented using a variety of instruments of national power.

b. Required Readings.

(1) John Garnett, ""The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace," in *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, 4th ed., ed. John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray (Oxford: University Press, 2013), 19-38. **[Blackboard]**

(2) Robert Jervis, "War and Misperception," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 8, no. 4 (September 2009), 1-15, in JSTOR (accessed Mar 9, 2016). **[Database]**

(3) Lawrence Woocher, "Preventing Violent Conflict," Special Report 213, U.S. Institute of Peace, (September 2009), 1-15, http://www.usip.org/publications/preventing-violent-conflict (accessed March 30, 2016). **[Online]**

(4) Abidoun Williams, "The Use of Conference Diplomacy in Conflict Prevention," *UN Chronicle*, No. 3, (December 2014), 21-24, http://unchronicle.un.org/article/use- conference-diplomacy-conflict-prevention/, (accessed March 30, 2016). **[Online]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1988).

(2) David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel, eds., C*onflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion* (Tokyo; New York, United Nations University Press, 2003).

(3) Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

(4) Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).

(5) Michael Howard, *The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International Order* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000).

(6) Barry H. Steiner, *Collective Preventive Diplomacy: A Study in International Conflict Management* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004).

(7) Hidemi Suganami, *On the Causes of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

(8) Bruce Jentleson, ed., *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998).

4. Points to Consider.

a. Which of the causes of war that Garnett delineates do you find most credible as an explanation?

b. Is war inevitable? If it is, what are the conditions that promote its occurrence? If not, then are there conditions under which conflict can be prevented?

c. How do the three principal schools of international relations theory (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) understand the causes of war?

d. Historian Geoffrey Blainey argues, “Power is the crux of many explanations of war and peace.” How might the distribution of power among states promote war or peace?

e. Jervis offers some reasons why misperceptions contributed to the origins of World Wars I and II. Do you find his argument convincing? Provide evidence to support your position.

f. Is war an instrument of policy, as Clausewitz claims, or is it a failure of diplomacy because the parties could not reach an agreement about how to settle their dispute peacefully?

g. Woocher and Williams offer various conflict prevention tools, but tools are only as effective as the people who wield them. What influence do leadership and political will have in attaining successful conflict prevention?

BLOCK II

THEORIES OF WAR AND STRATEGY

This block moves from the general examination of war and strategy to address the more specific question of how to conduct war. As we study specific strategists and theorists, you should analyze how that strategist or theorist thinks about war, as well as why a strategist thinks wars should be fought. Your analysis also should consider how a theorist or strategist believes a state or a non-state actor should fight a war, and how such wars might be won.

We begin by considering what the ancient masters, Sun Tzu, the Chinese philosopher of war; and Kautilya, an early Indian theorist of statecraft, have to say about the nature and character of war, and about strategy. We do so not simply to find historical perspective, but because these theorists set the foundation for the study of war, strategy, and statecraft, and their concepts continue to resonate in the contemporary international security environment.

From this beginning, we consider several specific types of war. First, we will explore domain theories of warfare, beginning with an examination of landpower. We start with the concepts and theories of Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini, a Swiss military officer and contemporary of Napoleon and Clausewitz. Arguably, Jomini continues to exert tremendous influence over U.S. military strategy, and, as you will find in the Theater Strategy and Campaigning Course, operational art. We will then compare and contrast Jomini with the views of Clausewitz concerning strategy. We will look successively at their theories of war, their understanding of ends, ways, and means, and the relationship between war and policy. We will also consider how these theorists apply to modern warfare. The lesson closes with a proposed theory of landpower for the 21st century.

Next, we will move into an analysis of the other traditional domains of sea and aerospace power. In evaluating any military instrument of power, it is essential to understand the theory or theories upon which its utility rests. A fundamental question is, therefore: What is the mechanism that links the use of an instrument of military power with the political objective that one seeks to achieve by its use?

Chronologically, we begin with the theorists of sea or maritime power: American Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (who was also a geopolitical theorist), and the British strategist, Sir

Julian Corbett. Turning to aerospace power, we examine the foundational writings of Giulio Douhet and trace the development over time of, first, air power and, later, aerospace power. We will examine the utility, effectiveness, and decisiveness of the theories of the maritime and aerospace domains.

The investigation of strategy turns from domains to the strategies that emerged at the end of World War II, as the world tried to come to grips simultaneously with the theories of limited war and the new complexities of nuclear arms and nuclear deterrence. Issues surrounding nuclear power recently have regained relevance because of international concern about attainment of national strategic aims in a globalized world with increased interdependence and renewed nuclear proliferation. In the case of limited war, the experience of the last fifty years has made imperative a better understanding of the theories of insurgency, people's war, counterinsurgency, and terrorism. We will examine how these strategic theories complement classic concepts of strategy, as well as how they might add to the strategist's intellectual toolkit.

In light of the complexity of an increasingly volatile international security environment, the course turns to the vitally important matter of conflict termination. Specifically, given the experience of the United States and its allies and partners in the last fifteen years, we will examine the questions of what do "winning" or "victory" look like in the contemporary security environment?

Finally, we conclude the course by exploring concepts that have more recently emerged, such as cyber warfare and the so-called "gray area warfare," and investigate how such concepts might influence the future of strategy.

As we examine theories and theorists, we will continue to use the strategy construct – the relationship of ends, ways, and means – as a framework to guide our thinking. We will use historical examples to study various aspects of war and strategy. The ability to use historical analysis effectively and to assess the strategy of past conflicts is essential to progress as a strategic thinker. We are studying strategy at the national and theater levels and should strive to think expansively, creatively, and critically in dealing with the broad strategic problems.

BLOCK II OUTCOMES. By the end of the block, students should be able to:

- Synthesize the constraints imposed on war and strategy by ethical considerations.
- Analyze the writings of Sun Tzu and Kautilya as foundational theorists of war and strategy for the contemporary strategic environment.
- Analyze the theories and writings of Jomini and Clausewitz about strategy.
- Analyze theories of military power on the sea, in the air and space, and on land, comprehending their historical and contemporary strategic applications.
- Analyze the concept of limited war in the modern era, and assess the factors that constrain conflict in terms of ends, ways, and means.

- Analyze theories of nuclear power and deterrence and their contemporary and future strategic applicability.

- Analyze the theories of insurgency, people's war, counterinsurgency, and terrorism.
- Analyze what "winning" and "victory" mean in the contemporary international security environment.

- Analyze the nature and character of war in the future and the implications for strategy formulation and execution.

LESSON 8: MILITARY POWER, THE USE OF FORCE, AND STRATEGIC CONSTRAINTS

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson, which directly supports the discourse on the role of war, is the subject of how military power can be used. While the conventional perspective is to focus on military power as a means of effecting defeat through violence and damage to persons and property, political leaders do not always seek destruction as a means of attaining a policy objective. Thus, military power is useful in a number of ways other than using socalled “kinetic” measures. These components of security policy include reassurance of allies and strategic partners through presence, and dissuasion, whereby a nation uses its military strength to preclude an adversary or potential adversary from seeking parity or surpassing it.

b. The nature of war is also a philosophical subject with immediate practical implications for the military leader and the strategist. Thomas Schelling, who received the 2005 Nobel Prize in economics for enhancing an understanding of conflict and cooperation using game-theory analysis, wrote in his classic work, *Arms and Influence*, that the concept of the power to hurt, as opposed to the power to seize and hold, is essential to understanding the nature of military power. From this distinction and working in an era under the Soviet nuclear threat, Schelling drew conclusions about coercion and deterrence theory and their relation to the human psyche that are essentially a different way of envisioning war and the political use of force. Schelling, like other nuclear strategists (such as Brodie, Wohlstetter, Kahn, and Jervis), recognized that the existence and potential employment of weapons of mass destruction with their catastrophic effects required civilian and military leaders to consider three new and critical elements. First, to avert major or total war because of the destructive power of nuclear weapons because "winning" a nuclear war might be meaningless. Second, to consider how limited war was no longer simply involved the use of conventional force. There was now the possibility of tactical nuclear weapons being used, thereby leading to an escalation of a conflict between nuclear powers. Thus, the concept of limited war needed further refinement. Lastly, to improve their understanding of the impact that behavioral and structural factors have on the causes of war and use that knowledge to prevent a nuclear war but retain credibility.

c. It is important to remember that war is never conducted in a vacuum, and many of the factors that influence its environment provide opportunities for, or impose constraints upon, strategic leaders and strategists. Understanding those factors is essential to success in the strategic arena. One of the largest, most effective (at least for traditional western strategy), and most potentially limiting strategic considerations is the moral philosophy of war and its major expression in the just war tradition and the laws of modern warfare.

d. The just war tradition is ancient. Warriors have always had some moral norm for issues like the treatment of women, children, and prisoners. This was often evident in terms of honor; some acts have commonly been deemed honorable, while others are dishonorable. The specifics of what is considered honorable may differ from age to age and culture to culture, but the concept is widespread, if not universal. What we study today as just war theory is derived from Greek and Roman philosophy, Jewish and Christian theology, and secular military customs. Influential thinkers in the just war tradition include Cicero, Augustine, Aquinas, Vitoria, and Grotius, along with modern ethicists Paul Ramsey, Michael Walzer, James Turner Johnson, and Anthony Coates.

e. International law and the law of armed conflict are closely related to the just war tradition. Some argue that international law is mere window dressing—usually based on the argument of the 17th century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes that “covenants, without the sword, are but words”— but it exists and affects state behavior as well as the behavior of many responsible non-state actors. With the creation of the International Criminal Court and its entering into force in 2002, international law is now designed to help end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.

2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

a. Analyze and evaluate the role of military power in international relations and describe its application to attain national objectives.

b. Analyze Schelling's concept of "hurting" as a violent diplomatic tool.

c. Analyze the strategic considerations inherent in the concept of just war.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Read, understand, and analyze the required essays about the role of war in its historical context and for its current and future application.

(1) As you read, use the following questions to help organize your thoughts.

(a) How does the strategist define war? (What is war for?)

(b) Why should war be fought? (What is the object of war?)

(c) How should war be fought? (Offense vs. defense, long vs. short, etc.)

(2) Based on your study of the theorists, identify concepts of enduring relevance that influence modern strategic thinking.

b. Required Readings.

(1) John F. Troxell, ""Military Power and the Use of Force," Read 1-10.

[Blackboard]

(2) Thomas C. Schelling, "The Diplomacy of Violence," in *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 1-34. **[Blackboard]**

(3) J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., ed. *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues,* 5th ed., vol. II: *National Security Policy and Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2012),: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1110.pdf. (accessed April 9, 2016). **[Online]**

(a) Martin L. Cook, "Ethical Issues in War: An Overview." Read pp. 217-223.

(b) Thomas W. McShane, "International Law, Sovereignty, and World Order Revisited." Read pp. 236-239.

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, 6th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004).

(2) Daniel Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

(3) Wendell John Coats, *Armed Force and Moderate Political Life: Essays on Politics and Defense, 1983-2008* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2009).

(4) Stephen D. Biddle**,** *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*, **(**Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

(5) Colin McInnes and C. D. Sheffield, eds., *Warfare in the Twentieth Century: Theory and Practice* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988).

(6) Patrick M. Cronin, *The Impenetrable Fog of War: Reflections on Modern Warfare and Strategic Surprise* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008).

(7) Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, 4th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 3-20.

4. Points to Consider.

a. What are the political purposes of military power?

b. Is the use of force a failure of diplomacy?

c. Is force a last resort for a state? Alternatively, is it a viable policy option at every step of the foreign policymaking process?

d. Does Schelling's concept of using military force to hurt or coerce have practical applicability? How or why not?

e. What does the Just War tradition attempt to achieve? Has it been an effective constraint on war making?

f. How does international law differ from domestic law? What are the ramifications of those differences for strategic leaders?

g. Is international law effective? Why or why not? Why should a strategist consider it in his/her deliberations?

7 September 2016
(0830-1130)
Dr. Paul Kan, 245-3021
Dr. Larry Goodson 245-3176

LESSON 9: ANCIENT MASTERS – SUN TZU AND KAUTILYA

Mode: Seminar/Lecture TWS-9-L/S

1. Introduction.

a. Although Clausewitz enjoys a hallowed place in the canon of theorists of war and strategy, strategic thought did not begin with him. Twenty-five centuries earlier, the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu (also known as Sun Zi) formulated a theory of war (*The Art of War*) that is the earliest existing work about military affairs. While present-day scholars generally understand Sun Tzu's writing to have evolved during the last half of the 4th century BCE, that the chapters were written at different times, and that it was likely the effort of more than one person, this work has influenced modern thinking on strategy as much as Clausewitz or others you will read in this course. We will begin our lesson today with a Bliss Hall lecture explaining the historical and personal context of Sun Tzu's life and times.

b. Sun Tzu begins his book on strategic thought with the observation that war is of vital importance to the state and deserves thorough study. Best known for aphoristic comments on how to conduct war—such as "All warfare is based on deception" (p.66) — Sun Tzu's work should not be understood simply as a collection of proverbs. Instead, his style of writing is a form of wisdom literature, a philosophical guide through which the student learns the art of generalship by internalizing certain principles. A state must sometimes go to war to protect its interests and conceivably to ensure its survival, but war is the final option, and when taken, it should be conducted with the least effort and risk, with the least expenditure of resources and loss of life. The most adept general, therefore, is the one who can defeat the enemy without fighting. Sun Tzu's writing has had a substantial influence on Chinese military strategy in the past two millennia, and *The Art of War* occupies an important place in East Asian intellectual history. Mao Zedong, the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and of the People's Republic of China, deemed Master Sun's tenet that if one knows oneself and one's adversary, one will not be vanquished in a thousand battles (p.84), to be of immense value. Mao accorded this precept the status of a "scientific truth." Western military leaders and thinkers have also embraced Master Sun's work. So valued is Sun Tzu in China and around Asia, that the leaders of today's China sees him as a cultural icon who can be exported as a part of "soft power" along with other towering Chinese figures like Confucius.

c. Kautilya (also known as Chanakya) wrote his treatise *Arthashastra* (often translated from the Sanskrit as *The Science of Polity*) in the 4th century BCE. As is the case with Sun Tzu, the text is likely the product of his work and later modifications by

his followers. Regardless, Kautilya served as an advisor to the Indian king Chandragupta Maurya, founder of the Maurya Empire (ruled circa 320 BCE – 298 BCE). The purpose of the *Arthashastra* was to educate the king on how to rule and inform him of the elements necessary for maintaining power while undermining the capabilities of his enemies. In other words, it is a manual of statecraft. While the text discusses bureaucratic administration of the state like other texts of this type of political writing (called "mirrors for princes"), it pays particular attention to war, preparation for it, and its successful execution. Kautilya's instructions are considered a forerunner of political realism (realpolitik), earning him comparison with Machiavelli, the great Italian Renaissance thinker and his work, *The Prince*, for its practical insights. In some ways, Kautilyan theory also foreshadows Bismarckian diplomacy that characterized the second half of the 19th century in Europe.

2. Lesson Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

a. Outline Sun Tzu's theory of war and compare it to Kautilya's theories.

b. Analyze and synthesize the fundamental concepts of both theorists in light of rising Asian power, and assess their value to the modern student of war, policy, and strategy.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 63-110, **skip secondary commentators' remarks**. **[Student Issue]**

(2) Roger Boesche, "Kautilya's *Arthashastra* on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India," *The Journal of Military History* 67, no. 1 (January 2003): 9-37 in PROQUEST (accessed 23 March 2016). **[Database]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Mark McNeilly, *Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

(2) Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought,* 3rd ed. (Portland, OR: Cass, 2001).

(3) Chester W. Richards, *A Swift, Elusive Sword: What if Sun Tzu and John Boyd Did a National Defense Review?* (Washington, DC: Center for

Defense Information, 2003. Farid Ahmed Bhuiyan, “Sun Tzu, Kautilya and Clausewitz: A Brief Study of Asian and Non-Asian Strategic Thoughts,” in *Mirpur Papers,* no. 5, ed. Muhammad Siddique Alam (Mirpur Dhaka, Bangladesh: Defence Services Command and Staff College, 1998).

(4) Robert E. Neilson, *Sun Tzu and Information Warfare: A Collection of Winning Papers from the Sun Tzu Art of War in Information Warfare Competition* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997).

(5) Michael I. Handel, *Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: The Art of War and On War Compared* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1991).

(6) Charles Chao Rong Phua, “From the Gulf War to Global War on Terror—A Distorted Sun Tzu in US Strategic Thinking?” *RUSI Journal* 152, no. 6 (December 2007): 46-53.

(7) Kautilya, *The Arthashastra*, edited, rearranged, translated, and introduced by L.N. Rangarajan (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1992).

(8) Roger Boesche, *The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya and his Arthashastra* (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2002).

(9)) P.K. Gautam, **“**Relevance of Kautilya’s *Arthashastra*,” *Strategic Analysis*, 3 7 , no. 1 (January/February 2013): 21–28 in TAYLOR&FRANCIS (accessed March 23, 2016).

(10) Rashed Uz Zaman, “Kautilya: The Indian Strategic Thinker and Indian Strategic Culture,” *Comparative Strategy* 25, no.3 (2006): 231-247 in TAYLOR&FRANCIS (accessed March 23, 2016).

(11)) Torkel Brekke, “Wielding the Rod of Punishment – War and Violence in the Political Science of Kautilya,” *Journal of Military Ethics* 3, no. 1 (2004): 40-52 in TAYLOR&FRANCIS (accessed March 23, 2016).

(12)) George Modelski, “Kautilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu World,” American Political Science Review 58, no. 3 (September 1964): 549-560 in JSTOR (accessed March 23, 2016).

(13) Michael Warner, “The Divine Skein: Sun Tzu on Intelligence,” *Intelligence and National Security* 21, no. 4 (August 2006): 483-92.

(14) Edward O’Dowd and Arthur Waldron, “Sun Tzu for Strategists,” *Comparative Strategy* 10, no. 1 (1991), 25-36 in TAYLOR&FRANCIS (accessed March 23, 2016)

(15) Glenn K. Cunningham, "Eastern Strategic Traditions: Un-American Ways of War," in *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues,* 5th ed., vol. I: *Theory of War and Strategy* ed. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2012), 133-141, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=1109 (accessed 10 June 2016)

(16) Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. by Tim Parks (Penguin Classics, 2011).

4. Points to Consider.

a. If war is of vital interest to the state, what are the motives of political leaders and the generals for conducting war in the manner Sun Tzu advocates?

b. What lessons does Sun Tzu have for contemporary strategic leaders regarding unconventional warfare?

c. Does Sun Tzu promote a form of Just War theory (during war and in its aftermath)?

d. How does Sun Tzu understand the relationship between the political leader and the general (i.e., civil-military relations)? How does Kautilya?

e. What lessons do Kautilya or Sun Tzu offer contemporary strategic leaders regarding unconventional or irregular warfare?

f. Does Kautilya's concept of permanent war fit the modern democratic state or the current international order?

g. What elements of Kautilya's and Sun Tzu's theories do you find useful for modern strategists? Are there anachronistic elements? Are there ideas that are too culturally specific to their time and place?

8 September 2016
(0830-1130)
Dr. Bill Johnsen, 245-3259

LESSON 10: JOMINI, CLAUSEWITZ, AND A THEORY OF LANDPOWER FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson adds to our understanding of landpower by first addressing the seminal contributions of Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, perhaps one of the most influential military thinkers of the 19th and 20th centuries. Using extracts from his influential work, *The Art of War*, you will explore Jomini's ideas on war, strategy, and operational art, to include Jomini's considerable and continuing influence on U.S. Joint and Army doctrine.

b. In the second portion of the lesson, you will assess Jomini's principles by comparing and contrasting them with those of Clausewitz.

c. The third element of the lesson examines a proposed theory of landpower for the 21st century. Such a theory is important for, while the nature of war may be immutable, the character of warfare is not. As warfare evolves beyond the concept of joint or even interdependent operations, national security professionals require a firm conceptual understanding of landpower if national and military leaders are fully to integrate and synthesize all aspects of military power into a coherent whole to serve national interests.

d. As you examine landpower as a theory, recall Clausewitz's observation: "Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult." (Book 1, Chapter 7, p. 119.) Consider, for example, that while the concept of landpower may be obvious to many, it is opaque to others. In exploring the theory of landpower, ask yourself, what is it? How should we define the concept in modern terms? What constitutes landpower? How might landpower interact with the theories of the aerospace and sea power, as well as the emerging concepts of cyberpower and cyberwar?

2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

a. Analyze the ideas of Antoine Henri de Jomini and their utility to the modern student of war, policy, and strategy.

b. Compare and contrast the key tenets of Clausewitz and Jomini.

c. Outline a modern theory of landpower and assess its value for modern warfare.

d. Use the modern theory of landpower to assess the role of landpower in modern warfare, especially concerning the theories of aerospace power, sea power, and the emerging concepts of cyberpower that will follow.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None.

b. Required Readings.

(1) John Shy, “Jomini,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 143-155 in **[Student Issue]**

(2) Extracts, Antoine Henri Jomini, *The Art of War*, Translated from the French by Capt. G.H. Mendell, Corps of Topographical Engineers, U.S. Army, and Lieut. W.P. Craighill (Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. Originally published in 1862) from Jomini, *The Art of War,* Memphis TN: Bottom of the Hill Press, 2011, pp. 8-20 and 36-39.

[Blackboard]

(3) Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). **[Student Issue]**

READ (in order):

(1) *Book Two,* Chapter 1, "Classifications of the Art of War," 127- end of paragraph on top of p. 129 (line 10); and page 131, next to last paragraph ("To sum up:...")-132.

(2) *Book Three*
Chapter 1, "Strategy," 177-178.
Chapter 2, "Elements of Strategy," 183.
Chapter 3, "Moral Factors," 184-185.

(3) *Book Eight*, Chapter 9, "The Plan of War Designed to Lead to the Total Defeat of the Enemy," 617-618.

(4) William T. Johnsen, “Toward a Theory of Landpower for the 21st Century.” **[Blackboard]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Bassford, “Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction.” An edited version of a paper presented to the 23rd Meeting of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe at Georgia State University February 26, 1993, at: [http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Jomini/JOMINIX.htm] (accessed 17 February 2016).

(2) Col. (ret.) Michael R. Matheny, Ph.D., “The Roots of Modern American Operational Art” (n.d.), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/modern_operations.pdf. (accessed 26 May 2016).

(3) Headquarters, Department of the Army, The Army, ADP-1, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 17 September 2012),

http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adp1.pdf (accessed 26 May 2016).

(4) Headquarters, Department of the Army, Unified Land Operations, ADP 3-0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 10, 2011), http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adp3_0.pdf (accessed 26 May 2016).

(5) William T. Johnsen, Re-Examining the Roles of Landpower in the 21st Century and Their Implications, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2014, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1237 (accessed 26 May 2016).

(6) Michael Evans, *The Continental School of Strategy: The Past, Present, and Future of Land Power*, Land Warfare Studies Centre Study Paper No. 305 (Duntroon ACT, Australia: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2004), http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/Publications/Research-Papers/StudyPapers/SP305 (accessed 26 May 2016).

(7) Harry Richard Yarger, "Land Power: Looking Towards the Future through a Green lens," *Strategic Review* (Winter 1999): 22-30 **[USAWC library periodical holdings].**

(8) Optional Video Clip. "Albert Comments on Jomini and Clausewitz," November 18, 2010, *YouTube*, streaming video, 8:39, https://youtu.be/82_lNcKwToo (accessed 26 May 2016).

4. Points to Consider.

a. Jomini generally is considered the father of western operational theory, although he believed himself to be a strategist. Do Jomini's views on war and strategy remain valid? Can we extrapolate from his operational ideas into the realm of modern strategy?

b. Where do Clausewitz and Jomini converge? Diverge? Does it matter?

c. What are the strengths and weaknesses of landpower in the modern strategic environment?

d. What constitutes a theory of landpower in the 21st century?

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9 September 2016
(0830-1130)
CAPT Wade Turvold, 245-3022

LESSON 11: THEORIES OF SEA POWER

Mode: Seminar TWS-11-S

Whether they will or not, Americans must now begin to look outward.

- Alfred Thayer Mahan

Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided – except in the rarest cases – either by what your army can do against your enemy's territory and national life, or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do.

- Julian Corbett

1. Introduction.

a. America is fundamentally a maritime power, and this lesson examines sea power and grand strategy. American geostrategist Alfred Thayer Mahan was the first to codify a theory of sea power in the late nineteenth century, several millennia after trade by sea began, and navies were created. Mahan's timing was not accidental. The United States had recently concluded the Civil War and connected its internal lines through completion of the transcontinental railroad. Mahan urged America, growing in might, to turn its focus away from its own shores and to look outward. He advocated for access and basing throughout the world to advance America's economy through trade and to establish the country as a global maritime power. Recognizing the sea as a great commons, he further argued for a powerful navy to command the seas to protect America's economic interests and as an instrument of military might. Mahan argued that throughout history, all great powers have been maritime powers, and his strategic vision has had profound and lasting impact on the character of the United States.

b. British theorist Julian Corbett, a near contemporary of Mahan, wrote on maritime strategy in a way that was less grand but more sophisticated than Mahan. Although he accepted that sea power was essential to the economy of a nation, he focused his thinking more on naval power and in military strategic terms that Clausewitz would recognize. Arguing that concentration of naval power to command the seas was not necessarily practical or advantageous, he argued instead that sea control, local and temporal as needed, was the key enabler to employing land power. To Corbett, armies and navies must be used interdependently to achieve political purpose.

c. John Gooch summarizes the momentous works of these two sea power theorists in a contemporary reading that brings them to life.

d. Geoffrey Till, a contemporary naval historian and maritime theorist, argues that globalization is the key feature of the strategic environment at the beginning of the current century. The world is increasingly interconnected through the exchange of ideas in cyberspace, and through economic exchange in international trade, bringing with it unfamiliar threats to the world's sea-based trading system. How nations approach the 'borderless world' that globalization is creating will determine grand strategy as well as defense and maritime policies. Globalization, Till argues, demands that nations and their navies be more cooperative and less competitive than in the past. This has significant implications for strategy and the composition and use of navies. Differing schools of thought exist that portend divergent visions of the nature of sea power in the future.

e. Hew Strachan explores the inherent difficulty facing strategists in defining the terms that are used to formulate policy and strategy. Noting that the evolution of sea power was linked to economic and legal theory, he attempts to put sea power in its proper place "athwart the line between strategy and national policy." Acknowledging that geography fundamentally influences strategy, he observes that globalization and the shifting of world population and therefore conflict areas, resulted in the rebalancing of U.S. strategy to now emphasize the Asia Pacific theater. This pragmatic strategy move has had particular impact on naval power. Developing a maritime strategy that includes missions to secure trade, exercise political influence, sustain order at sea in the control of terrorism and piracy, and maintain a nuclear deterrent within national policy will be challenging in the complex and dynamic modern environment.

f. This lesson on sea power, therefore, aims to assist student understanding of the use and exploitation of one of the world's three global commons. The application of naval power from the sea diminishes sovereignty issues; thus, making sea power, often in concert with land and air power, a practical tool in influencing events on land. Maritime power has tangible links to economy and geopolitics as 70 percent of the earth's surface covered by ocean, 80 percent of the world's population lives within 100 km of the sea, 90 percent of world commerce travels by sea, 90 percent of military assets move by sea and 95 percent of international communication is accomplished by undersea cable. These figures are intended to illustrate that how a nation approaches access to the sea, its basing, and its naval power will fundamentally affect its ability to develop and execute national and military strategy.

2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

a. Analyze the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett and apply them in the modern strategic environment.

b. Describe how sea power encompasses maritime power and naval power, and is linked to economy and globalization.

c. Outline the concept of the sea as a global commons.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None.

b. Required Readings.

(1) John Gooch, “Maritime Command: Mahan and Corbett,” in Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett, eds., *Seapower and Strategy* (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 1989), 27-46. **[Blackboard]**

(2) Geoffrey Till, “Seapower in a Globalized World: Two Tendencies,” in *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*, 3rd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 27-44. **[Blackboard]**

(3) Hew Strachan, “Maritime Strategy and National Policy,” in *The Direction of War* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 151-165.

[Student Issue]

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) A.T. Mahan, “Discussion of the Elements of Sea Power,” in *The Influence of Sea Power upon History: 1660-1783* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1890).

(2) Philip A. Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 444-477.

(3) Colin S. Gray, “Mahan was (Mainly) Right,” in *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 217-227.

(4) Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1911).

(5) Michael I. Handel, "Corbett, Clausewitz, and Sun Tzu," *Naval War College Review* 53, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 106-124.

(6) Geoffrey Till, "Who said what and why it matters," in *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2013), 45-86.

(7) Norman Friedman, The Cold War as a Maritime War," in *Seapower as a Strategy: Navies and National Interests* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 201-207.

(8) Geoffrey Till, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: A View from Outside," *Naval War College Review* 61, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 25-38.

(9) Colin S. Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power (New York: The Free Press, 1994).

(10) Bernard D. Cole, *Asian Maritime Strategies* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013).

4. Points to Consider.

a. What are the differences between the theories of Mahan and Corbett? Which theorist has had more influence on the development of sea power over time? Which is more applicable today?

b. How do Mahan and Corbett view sea power as an element of grand strategy?

c. What role does economics play in Mahan's or Corbett's view of sea power?

d. What aspects of sea power have remained constant over time? Does technology change the nature of sea power or only the "grammar?"

e. Has the proliferation of modern domains reduced the impact and importance of geography to sea power?

f. How do Till's thoughts on sea power compare to Mahan's and Corbett's theories? How does globalization influence modern sea power?

g. What are the roles of navies in modern warfare? How do changes in the geostrategic environment influence maritime strategy?

h. In what ways do information warfare, intelligence, and asymmetric capabilities play a role in modern sea power? Can the center of gravity on land still be effectively manipulated through the use of sea power?

12 September 2016
(0830-1130) Dr. Tami Davis
Biddle, 245-3298

LESSON 12: THEORIES OF AEROSPACE POWER

Mode: Lecture and Seminar TWS-12-L/S

> In my view, air power is an immense entity in itself, but it is interlocked with sea and land power, and all three are interdependent.
>
> —Lord Tedder Marshal of the RAF Deputy Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Forces, WWII
> (from *Air Power in War*)

1. Introduction.

a. In evaluating any military instrument of power it is essential to understand the theory or theories upon which its utility rests. A fundamental question is, therefore: What is the mechanism that links the use of an instrument of military power with the political objective that one seeks to achieve by its use? In this lesson, we ask: How does the use of aerospace power contribute to achieving the political aims an actor is seeking, either in wartime or in peacetime? In this lesson, we will discuss theories of air power, and emerging theories of space power.

b. The readings open with an examination of aircraft as instruments of military power. As airplanes were first used in war, theories about their potential efficacy were developed and articulated. How did the presence of airplanes change – immediately – the way that field commanders had to conceptualize the battlespace? What advantages did aircraft convey to those who employed them in war? Why was it important to be able to protect your own airspace and penetrate your adversary's airspace?

c. On completion of the readings, you should be in a position to identify some of the key theorists of early aviation, and the arguments they put forward. Why did many of them believe that long-range bombing, in particular, would have a radical (indeed revolutionary) impact on war? What claims did they make? What social and political factors may have influenced their assumptions? To what extent do these early assumptions (or echoes of them) still affect and/or influence contemporary thinking about air power?

d. As you discuss air power as a coercive tool, realize that you must understand and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of your adversary. You must understand your adversary's domestic power structure, resource utilization, sources of resilience and resistance, and civil-military relations.

e. Nearly all nations adopting aircraft as instruments of military power saw struggles (sometimes-protracted struggles) over the question of who should own and control such assets. There was no simple answer to this question, leading to a myriad of individual outcomes in different places. This struggle was largely unavoidable since aircraft proved, very quickly, to be essential assets in nearly all realms of warfare. (The problem is not unlike the contemporary problem of cyber or space assets today: they are extremely useful, so everyone wants them.)

f. Adaptations to the employment of air power are emerging from the U.S. experience in combatting terrorism abroad. Could these adaptations lead to an overall change in the future character of war? Based on the readings for this lesson, you will be asked to contemplate the implications of the extensive use of remotely piloted vehicles for targeted killing.

g. Finally, this lesson will ask you to contemplate "space power." To what extent is there a theory of "space power" that informs our thinking about the potential use of assets located in low earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit? Can we envision the space well above the earth as both a commons and a potential zone of conflict/combat?

2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

a. Assess the roles of air power in deterrence and in war fighting, to include the strengths and weaknesses of air power as a component of modern combined arms.

b. Outline the essential elements underpinning the theories about aerial bombing as an independent coercive instrument. Describe how they were applied in the past, and where application revealed gaps between expectations and realities.

c. Assess the roles of aerospace power in the 21st century, especially the advantages and disadvantages of the increasing use of remotely piloted vehicles.

d. Describe emerging ideas and theories about the use of space (low earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit, LEO and GEO) and potential for conflict in space.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None

b. Required Readings.

(1) Tami Davis Biddle, "The Aerospace Realm: Theory and History" (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 2016).
[Blackboar d]

(2) Michael Hayden, "To Keep America Safe, Embrace Drones, The Case for Drones," in *New* York *Times*, op-ed, 19 February 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/opinion/sunday/drone-warfare-preciseeffective-imperfect.html (accessed 13 July 2016).
[Online]

(3) Letters to the Editor (in response to the Hayden op-ed), "Do Drones Really Make Us Safer?" in *New York Times*, 21 February 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26 (accessed 5 May 2016).
[Online]

(4) Burton Catledge, “Space Power Theory” *AU-18 Space Power Primer*
(Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 2009), 29-41 (12 pp.)
[Blackboard]

(5) Philip Swarts, “Space Wars: The Air Force Awakens, in *Air Force Times*, 15 February 2016, www.airforcetimes.com/story/military/2016/02/15/space-wars-air-force-awakens/79804228/ (accessed May 5, 2016).
[Online]

(6) “Putin says Russia will ‘neutralize threats’ after US opens missile base,” BBC
News, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36289155 (accessed 10 Jun 16).
[Online]

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Clayton K. S. Chun, Aerospace Power in the Twenty-First Century: A
Basic Primer (Colorado Springs, CO and Maxwell AFB, AL: U.S. Air Force Academy in cooperation with Air University Press, July 2001), http://aupress.au.af.mil/digital/pdf/book/b_0080_chun_aerospace_power_primer.pd f (accessed May 5, 2016).

(2) Eliot Cohen, “The Mystique of US Air Power,” *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 1 (January/February 1994): 109 in PROQUEST (accessed May 5, 2016).

(3) David MacIsaac. “Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).

(4) Barry D. Watts, The Foundations of US Air Doctrine: The Problem of Friction in War (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1984), http://aupress.au.af.mil/bookinfo.asp?bid=52 (accessed May 5, 2016).

(5) Mark Bowden, “The Killing Machines: How to Think about Drones,” *The Atlantic Monthly* (14 August 2013): 58-70, in PROQUEST (accessed 26 May 2016).

(6) Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

4. Points to Consider.

a. How have theories about the employment of air power in war been shaped by the period in which they were created?

b. What is the relationship between air power theory and technological innovation?

c. Why does a strategist considering the coercive use of air power need to know a lot about the domestic political and economic structure of an adversary?

d. What are the ethical ramifications associated with the employment of remotely piloted vehicles? How do these affect one's strategic calculus?

e. Can theories and theorists from other domains, including the sea and air power domains, help clarify our thinking about the way that space-based assets may be used in wartime?

12 September 2016
(0830-1130) Dr. Frank L. Jones, 245-3126

LESSON 13: NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND LIMITED WAR

Mode: Seminar Lesson TWS-13-S

1. Introduction.

a. The advent of the nuclear age, resulting from the development and use of the atom bomb in World War II, produced new schools of theory that generally saw nuclear weapons fundamentally changing the nature of war and altering global power relationships. Even before the Soviet Union tested its first atomic weapon in 1949, scholars began debating the employment of these weapons. The ideas of these "Wizards of Armageddon," as Fred Kaplan called them, influenced U.S. policy and nuclear strategy, even to present day, and subsequently migrated into nonnuclear theory. Some of these academicians shared the optimistic belief that nuclear war could be limited or fought rationally, but alarm about the consequences of a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union was another matter because of the dire consequences.

b. These same scholars also reexamined Clausewitz's famous maxim, "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means," that emphasized that political objectives shape the conduct of war. Essentially, Clausewitz argued that all wars are limited by their very nature—otherwise they would escalate unavoidably to total commitment of all existing resources regardless of the objective. In a limited war, at least one of the adversaries does not seek the total destruction of the other. Instead, war is a form of bargaining through graduated military response to achieve a negotiated settlement short of either side's annihilation. Other aspects of limited war are based on the degree of limitation on the military effort, restrictions on targets, geographical bounds, or the quantities and destructiveness of weaponry. However, these limitations are still commonly the result of the war's political objective. As Clausewitz noted, "The political objective—the original motive for the war—will determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires."

c. Just a few years ago, some of the concepts found in nuclear strategy and related military doctrine were considered relics of the Cold War. In truth, nuclear strategy and limited war never went out of fashion. For example, strategic leaders

and strategists are rediscovering the importance of deterrence theory. Related concepts such as legitimacy, escalation control, and assurance, are still important in the strategic arena although their use is more subtle and has been modified to address specific challenges.

d. Therefore, today's aspiring strategist must understand the historic basis for elements of nuclear theory in order to adapt or develop theories and concepts for confronting the challenges of the 21st century, or to mine this rich literature for a better understanding of force and power and their application in more conventional situations. There has also been considerable discussion recently among military officers and academics about limited war and nuclear escalation in South Asia and the Middle East. Other current events suggest war can also be a model of limited confrontation between a non-state actor and a state, with the ensuing difficulty of defining and achieving political and military objectives in this type of confrontation. It is for this reason that these concepts have pertinence, as they did for political and military leaders more than six decades ago.

2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

a. Identify the theoretical foundations of limited war in the modern era, and assess the factors that may limit a conflict in terms of securing national interests.

b. Distinguish the strategies associated with nuclear weapons developed in the Cold War era and assess their application to the contemporary security environment.

c. Analyze how nuclear aspirant's motives and strategic thinking lead to concerns about nuclear proliferation in the Second Nuclear Age.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None

b. Required Readings.

(1) Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Security*
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1957), 1-4, 13-27. **[Blackboard]**

(2) John Baylis and John Garnett, "Introduction," in *Makers of Nuclear Strategy*
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 1-18. **[Blackboard]**

(3) Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, “Conclusion: Thinking about Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age,” in *Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 225-238. **[Blackboard]**

(4) Shlomo Brom, “Political and Military Objectives in a Limited War against a Guerrilla Organization,” in *The Second Lebanon War: Strategic Perspectives*, ed. Shlomo Brom and Meir Elran (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2007), 13- 23. **[Blackboard]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Ingo Trauschweizer**,** “Atomic Weapons and Limited War,” *The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 41-80.

(2) Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner, eds., *On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2014).

(3) Christopher Gacek, *The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy* **(**New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

(4) Gregory D. Koblentz, *Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2014).

(5) Ian Clark, *Limited Nuclear War: Political Theory and War Conventions* **(**Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982).

(6) Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, *The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, 1969-1970: A Case Study of Limited Local War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).

(7) Morton Halperin, *Limited War in the Nuclear Age* (New York, Wiley, 1963).

4. Points to Consider.

a. How does the factor of time influence the waging of limited war? Does time

favor one party to the conflict over the other? What role does domestic public opinion have in keeping limited wars short?

b. Has technological advantage on the part of one of the parties in a limited war led to an overreliance on military means and a failure to set realistic political objectives?

c. What assumptions underlie the principles that Osgood espouses in his essay regarding the theory of limited war? How well does this theory explain the use of force in the Persian Gulf War (1991) that you studied in the Introduction to Strategic Studies course? Does it explain Israel's actions in the 2006 Lebanon War?

d. How does the miscalculation of the enemy's intent affect the conduct of limited war? Do mistaken calculations and assessments weaken deterrence as the principal theory underlying limited war?

e. How does public opinion (domestic and international) as well as international norms (e.g., legitimacy, international law) affect the waging of limited war? Are these factors a constraint on how political and military leaders devise their strategy and how they employ weaponry?

f. How does Sun Tzu's maxim that knowing your enemy as a path to victory relate to the bargaining and signaling aspects of limited war theory? How does strategic culture influence these aspects of limited war theory?

g. Could a massive nuclear exchange accomplish a political purpose other than retaliation? What are the ethical dilemmas of using nuclear weapons associated with retaliation or first use?

h. What is the role of nuclear weapons as a deterrent in the current international security environment?

15 September 2016
(0830-1130)
Dr. Christian B. Keller, 245-3176

LESSON 14: WAR AMONG THE PEOPLES: INSURGENCY, PEOPLE'S WAR, AND COIN

Mode: Seminar TWS-14-S

1. Introduction.

a. Clausewitz's famous maxim, "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means," emphasizes that political objectives shape the conduct of war. Indeed, Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (March 2013) implicitly recognizes one of Clausewitz's definitions of war noting that: "War is socially sanctioned violence to achieve a political purpose." However, some observers, such as Martin Van Creveld, John Keegan, or proponents of 4th Generation Warfare, like William Lind and T.X. Hammes suggest that Clausewitz's ideas apply only to conventional state versus state wars, and that the significant presence and influence of non-state actors in insurgencies, guerilla wars, and terrorism may have reduced the contemporary relevance of the Prussian philosopher of war.

b. An overarching question for this lesson, therefore, regards how Clausewitz's ideas may apply to contemporary small wars, insurgencies, and COIN. We begin by revisiting the writings of the Prussian himself. His chapter in *On War* entitled "The People in Arms" provides insights into his theoretical intent regarding these non-conventional wars.

c. Next, we will examine topics that some scholars argue are subsets of limited wars: guerrilla warfare, insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, and terrorism. Guerrilla warfare as a technique used by an inferior power against a superior power is as old as war itself. The addition of a nationalistic element during the French Revolution and a set of theoretical writings in the Twentieth Century turned a tactical technique into a strategic way. Strategists must understand the theories that underlie insurgencies and guerrilla warfare before developing effective counter-strategies. Strategists must also understand that not all irregular wars and insurgencies are limited in their character, especially from the perspective of the irregular fighter or insurgent.

d. Irregular warfare, and especially counterinsurgency warfare, is not easy. This is particularly true when guerrilla warfare is the technique used by an efficiently organized, politically or ideologically motivated, and effectively led group of dedicated insurgents. Such was the case for Chinese insurgent leader—and later Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party—Mao Tse-tung. Successful insurgents (those who last long enough to cause major problems for states) tend to be more than simply armies of the disaffected. They invariably have some political, ideological, or religious grievance that strikes enough of a chord in the minds of the population in which they operate to generate at least neutrality, if not support. Effective insurgent movements tend to be tactically ruthless, seek more unlimited strategic ends compared to their adversaries (such as the overthrow of a state), and frequently do not feel bound by the same set of rules by which the government operates. This gives them a certain freedom of choice and makes available types of actions (like kidnappings, torture, summary executions, or terrorism) that a state fighting an insurgency cannot adopt without losing its most basic advantage—legitimacy. Insurgents usually operate in small groups in complex terrain and are difficult to locate, and are increasingly adept at using technology to their advantage (such as ISIS's use of the internet). Intelligence is at a premium in a counterinsurgency; it is also difficult to obtain when the insurgents are even modestly competent. As Anthony Joes points out, successful prosecution of irregular war by either insurgents or counterinsurgents requires patience, motivation, strong leadership, popular support, and most significantly, good political and military strategy.

e. Finally, in this lesson we will analyze Anthony Joes' historically based arguments regarding successful counterinsurgent strategy. Joes, a leading scholar of the history of insurgency and COIN, offers a compelling synthesis of how nation-states in different eras and diverse geopolitical situations successfully—or less successfully—resisted insurgency and rebellion. Integrating the classical theories of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao, and others, Joes deduces the key elements of victorious COIN strategies over time and presents us with some applicative theories on how best to conduct future counterinsurgencies and even small wars.

2. Lesson Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

a. Analyze the theory of people's war according to Carl von Clausewitz and guerrilla warfare according to Mao Tse-Tung.

b. Analyze the nature and strategies of insurgencies in their historical and contemporary contexts.

c. Analyze the nature and strategies of counter-insurgencies in their historical and contemporary contexts.

d. Outline the strengths and weaknesses of terrorism as a tool for irregular warfare and insurgencies.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None

b. Required Readings.

(1) Carl von Clausewitz, Book 6, Chapter 26, "The People in Arms," in *On War*, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). 479-483. **[Student Issue]**

(2) Mao Tse-Tung, "What is Guerrilla Warfare?" in *Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare,* Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-18 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, 1989), 41-50. http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/FMFRP%2012-18%20%20Mao%20Tse- tung%20on%20Guerrilla%20Warfare.pdf (accessed May 6, 2016). **[Online]**

(3) Anthony J. Joes, "Prologue: Guerrilla Insurgency as a Political Problem" and "Guerrilla Strategy and Tactics," in *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2006), 1-23 EBSCO (accessed May 6, 2016). **[Database]**

(4) Anthony J. Joes, "Elements of a Counterinsurgent Strategy," in *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2006), 232-46 in EBSOHOST (accessed May 6, 2016). **[Database]**

(5) JP-1, "Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States" (March 25, 2013), 6-7 **(Scan Only),** http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf (accessed May 5, 2016). **[Online]**

(6) Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” *International Security,* vol. 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006), 49-80 in JSTOR. **[Database]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Max Boot, “The Evolution of Irregular War: Insurgents and Guerrillas from Akkadia to Afghanistan,” *Foreign Affairs* 92, no. 2 (March-April 2013): 100114.

(2) Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967).

(3) Robert R. Mackey, *The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865* (Norman Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004).

(4) Jeffrey Record, *Beating Goliath: Why Insurgences Win* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007).

(5) I. F. W. Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750* (New York: Routledge, 2001). 6) David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1964), 63-86.

(7) John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (Westport CT: Praeger, 2002).

(8) Che Guevara, “Guerrilla Warfare: A Method,” in *Guerrilla Warfare* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 142-158.

(9) Steven Metz, *Learning From Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub752.pdf (accessed 5 May 2016).

(10) Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1998).

4. Points to Consider.

a. How does Clausewitz define “people’s war?” and its nature?

b. How does Mao Tse-tung define guerrilla war and its nature?

c. What is the relationship between people's war/guerrilla warfare and political goals in Clausewitz's and Mao Zedong's theories? According to Anthony Joes? Is Maoist doctrine still applicable for insurgents in the modern world?

d. Is there such a thing as a bona fide "guerrilla strategy" or "irregular strategy?" How has the concept of a successful insurgency changed over time?

e. Do you agree with Joes' assessment of what makes an insurgency successful or not, particularly his assertion that factors intrinsic to the state (geography, government effectiveness) are the primary determinants?

f. What are the elements of a successful counterinsurgent strategy?

g. Is terrorism a useful tool in a peoples' war?

16 September 2016
(0830-1130)
COL Tom Sheperd, 245-3349

LESSON 15: VICTORY AND CONFLICT TERMINATION

Mode: Seminar TWS-15-S

1. Introduction.

a. Today's lesson continues the process of thinking about the nature and character of war and builds upon the previous lessons about what causes war. The lesson explores conflict termination and conflict resolution, as well as what these terms mean for the strategist. In simple terms, the concept of victory forms the essence of effective strategy. The decision to terminate fighting, whether unilaterally or as part of a negotiated settlement, must be based on the ends that defined the conflict in strategic terms. However, understanding when and how "victory" has been attained is essential. For this good reason, Clausewitz observes in *On War* "In war, the result is never final." (*On War*, 80.) This leaves the conundrum of how can the winner in war secure victory, and thereby the better peace, even if only from the victor's own point of view (Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 353). A strategic victory, in other words, one capable of securing the

peace by dealing with the underlying political causes of a conflict, still has a temporal aspect to it. We see these issues reflected in the idea that strategy focuses on root causes and purposes as well as having a symbiotic relationship with time. Thus, the conditions under which fighting terminates have significant implications for post-conflict order due to their impact on the achievement of lasting desirable political results.

b. This observation takes us directly to the idea that conflict termination not only encompasses the formal end of fighting but also post-conflict transition as well. Thus, achieving victory requires extensive thought, planning, preparation, and resources in direct relation to the desired policy objective; otherwise one risks setting conditions where, as Geoffrey Blainey states, "victory is invariably a wasting asset" (*The Causes of War*, 294) with conflict reappearing later. Thus, victors may find themselves in the position where successful post-conflict transition requires the reconstruction or even the restoration of political order in a defeated, weak, or non-functional state. In today's strategic environment, even if state building is not the prime objective, strategists should not be surprised to find themselves involved in institution building in order to secure a better peace. Thus, state building may have a role in securing strategic victory.

c. The lesson begins with an overview of theories of victory and how to think about victory and the post-conflict phase of wars. It then offers an explanation of the difference between state building and nation building after winning a war. The lesson ends with a historical case study examining the conclusion of World War II in light of conflict termination theory and its linkage to state and institution building after winning a war.

2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

a. Analyze the nature of conflict termination at the strategic level.

b. Analyze theories of victory as they relate to strategic thought.

c. Outline key conceptual schools associated with the state-building process.

d. Analyze the local and international dimensions in resolving wars and achieving peace.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None

b. Required Readings.

(1) J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., ed. "A Theory of Victory," in *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues,* 5th ed., vol. I: *National Security Policy and Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2012), 91-101, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1109 (accessed April 21, 2016). **[Online]**

(2) Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, "Statebuilding without Nation-building? Legitimacy, State Failure, and the Limits of the Institutionalist Agenda," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 3, no.1 (March 2009): 21-45 in http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17502970802608159 (accessed 12 March 2016). Read page 23 (The Institutional Approach) – to page 35 (up to "…; both approaches imply interference), and pages 40-41 (Conclusion). **[Blackboard]**

(3) Michael S. Neiberg, *Potsdam*, (New York, NY: Perseus Books, 2015) **READ** Introduction (pp. xi-xx); Chapter 9 Dismemberment as a Permanent Fate? Solving the Problem of Germany (pp. 183-204); Conclusion (pp. 247-256). **[Blackboard]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Rich Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.cfm?pubid=641 (accessed March 16, 2016).

(2) Dominic D. P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney, *Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

(3) Robert C. Orr, ed., *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post- Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), See Part 1, 1-19.

(4) William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success." *Parameters* 33 (Autumn 2003): 95-112.

(5) Shmuel Tzabag, “Termination of the Yom Kippur War between Israel and Syria: Positions, Decisions and Constraints at Israel’s Ministerial Level,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 37, no. 4 (October 2001): 182-205.

(6) Colin S. Gray, *Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub272.pdf (accessed March 15, 2016).

(7) Douglas Borer, “Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 39, no. 1 (March 2009): 163-165.

(8) Greg Mills, “The Stabilization Dilemma,” *Prism* 3, no. 4 (September 2012): 77- 89, http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_3-4/prism76-89_mills.pdf (accessed April 19, 2016).

(9) Ken Menkhaus, “State Fragility as a Wicked Problem,” *Prism* 1, no. 2 (March 2010): Read page 89 (Typologies by Type of Failure) – to page 98, http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_1-2/6_Prism_85-100_Menkhaus.pdf (accessed April 20, 2016).

(10)) Jakub Grygiel, “Vacuum Wars,” *The American Interest* (July/August 2009): 40-45, http://www.the-american-interest.com/2009/07/01/vacuum-wars/ (accessed April 12, 2016).

4. Points to Consider.

a. How is victory defined? Is it the imposition of one’s will, the creation of a better peace, or merely the end of hostilities?

b. What conditions have to exist before a state can assess that it has achieved strategic victory? Can a state attain military victory without securing political ends and vice versa?

c. Is there a temporal aspect to victory? How long does a strategic success have to last before a state can declare victory? Do other actors, including the defeated, have a voice in this process? How do the concepts of nation building and state building affect this dynamic?

d. Is there a difference between winning and winning decisively? Why or why not?

e. How do strategists determine when their side has lost? Alternatively, how do strategists convince their adversary that they are beaten?

f. What is the role of will in victory? Whose will counts? How is it expressed?

g. What are nation building and state building? Can one separate these two concepts? Consider the differences between the two concepts of state building: the "institutional" and the "legitimacy" approaches. How might the local dimensions of a conflict influence the approach that becomes the main effort to "lock-in" victory?

h. Armed conflict in the 21st century often can result from state failure while transnational threats emanate from ungoverned spaces within weak and failing states. How does one achieve strategic victory in the face of today's increasingly uncertain and complex strategic environment in which threats come from multiple directions and the chameleon-like character of war can take many forms?

i. How does international competition or differing views of strategic ends affect U.S. and the international community's approach to conflict termination, conflict resolution, state building, or nation building? How does this relate to the relationship between winning and victory?

19 September 2016
(0830-1130)
Dr. Michael Neiberg 245-3259

LESSON 16: THE FUTURE OF WAR AND STRATEGY

Mode: Lecture and Seminar TWS-16-L/S

1. Introduction

a. The only reliable prediction we can make about the future is that we are bound to get it wrong. Most people in their own time failed to predict even major historical events like the French Revolution, the First World War, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is not hard to see why people consistently guess wrong about the future. Crystal balls are rarely without their flaws and there are economic, social, and political events occurring now that may not seem momentous to us but will have an impact on our future. There will also be so-called "Black Swan" events like September 11, 2001, the

fall of the Berlin Wall, and the stock market crash of 1929 that will bring with them large- scale and unforeseen structural change to the international system.

b. Despite the challenges of doing so, strategists and policymakers must learn to think about the future in order to plan and prepare. This lesson will help you think about how (and how not) to conceptualize the future. One way is to look backwards. As the expression goes, new things are only old things happening to new people. Put slightly differently, if a pattern has been true since the time of Thucydides, it is likely to remain true for the foreseeable future. To make such a statement does not mean that nothing changes, but it does mean that the burden of proof should fall on those predicting that some technology or political movement will cause radical change to the nature and character of war and strategy. Here we can derive great value from Clausewitz's insight about the nature of and character of warfare. A study of the fundamental principles of strategy should help you to be critical of fashionable buzzwords and of theorists claiming that a revolutionary change is underway. They may be right, but the patterns they identify may not be so new after all. We have given you one such concept to wrestle with in this lesson, the idea of "gray zone" conflict. Is it really "new"? Does it add any analytic and conceptual value for you as a strategist?

c. Several scholars do try to see through the fog into the future. Hew Strachan in "Change and Continuity" will give you some analytic tools to help you look forward. Barry Posen, the director of the security studies program at MIT, has proposed a grand strategy for the United States based both on his understanding of the past and his best guesses about the future. Army officers in particular may not like some of his conclusions, but the point here is to wrestle with them intellectually. What does he use to base his predictions and conclusions? Are they consistent with your own? Above all, take this lesson to utilize all of the skills you have developed at the War College thus far to make your analysis about the future of strategy.

2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

a. Assess the challenges that strategists face when trying to develop plans for the future.

b. Evaluate the utility of the theorists we have studied so far (Thucydides, Clausewitz, etc.) in helping strategists determine the enduring nature of strategy.

c. Evaluate the usefulness of the concept of "gray zone" wars by comparing and contrasting two arguments about the idea.

d. Analyze Barry Posen's proposed national strategy of "Restraint." The point is less to agree or disagree with him than to use analytic concepts developed in TWS to understand and critique his views.

e. Describe the emerging concepts of cyber war and cyber power and identify the

difficulties of articulating a comprehensive theory of cyber power.

3. Student Requirements

a. Tasks. None

b. Required Readings.

(1) Colin Gray, "Been There! Done That! Blood in the Crystal Ball," *Historically Speaking* (January/February 2006), 25-28. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/423525/pdf (accessed 02 May 2016). **[Online]**

(2) Hew Strachan, "Strategy: Change and Continuity," in *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective* (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, December 5, 2013), 253-282. **[Student Issue]**

(3) Adam Elkus, "50 Shades of Gray: Why the Gray War Concept Makes No Sense," War on the Rocks, 15 December 2015, http://warontherocks.com/2015/12/50- shades-of-gray-why-the-gray-wars-concept-lacks-strategic-sense/ (accessed May 2, 2016). **[Online]**

(4) Michael J. Mazarr, "Struggle in the Gray Zone and World Order," War on the Rocks, December 22, 2015, http://warontherocks.com/2015/12/struggle-in-the-gray- zone-and-world-order/ (accessed May 2, 2016). **[Online]**

(5) Barry Posen, Preface and Introduction from *Restraint: A New Foundation for a U. S. Grand Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014). **[Blackboard]**

(6) Gregory Rattray, "Comparing Airpower and Cyberpower," in Emily O. Goldman and John Arquilla, eds., *Cyber Analogies* (Monterrey: Naval Post Graduate School, 2014), 44-63. http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/40037/NPS-DA-14001.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 13 July 2016) **[Blackboard]**

4. Points to Consider.

a. Colin Gray asserts "... that enormous changes in the tactical and operational grammar of strategy matter not at all for the nature and function of war and strategy." Do you agree with his contention? Why or why not?

b. How can strategists prepare for an uncertain future? How can they prepare for a variety of threats? What are the potential consequences for strategy of more intra-state rather than inter-state wars? How might strategies of conflict affect the application of military power?

c. Has warfare remained primarily Clausewitzian (determined by the interplay of violence, chance, and reason) or has it become non-Clausewitzian as critics like Martin Van Creveld claim? Or, is it something else entirely? If it is now mainly non-Clausewitzian, does it matter to a strategist in an unquestionably trinitarian United States?

d. What is the relationship between technology/science and warfare? How might changes in this relationship affect the nature, character, or characteristics of war?

e. Is strategy an art, a science, or does it contain elements of both? How does one's understanding of the nature of strategy influence how wars are fought and won?

APPENDIX I

WRITING A GUIDED RESPONSE PAPER: REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES

1. *General*. The first writing requirement for the Theory of War and Strategy (TWS) course is a paper using Thucydides' *The Peloponnesian War* as the principal source. The requirement is called a guided response paper because you will respond to a specific question or set of questions using critical analysis. The paper is not a research paper.

2. *Purpose*. The purpose of this TWS paper is to enhance your ability to think critically and analytically. Writing of this type is an essential competency for senior leaders and those who advise them. This requirement also seeks to make you a more careful and attentive reader, another important skill for those who hold senior positions. Successful completion of this requirement demonstrates a student's capacity to analyze, refine, evaluate, and synthesize material in a coherent and persuasive manner.

3. *Assignment*. You have read Thucydides and have examined his views on war, policy, and strategy as they relate to the Peloponnesian War. For this paper, you will respond to one of the following four sets of questions.

a. Using the ends-ways-means paradigm, identify and analyze the Athenian and Spartan strategies as they were initially formulated and then evolved over the course of the war. How much did Spartan strategy change, and why? How much did Athenian strategy change, and why? Which belligerent was better able to adapt its strategy as the realities, risks, and length of the war changed, and why?

b. Using the ends- -ways-means construct, analyze the motivations behind the planning for and execution of the Athenian expedition to Sicily. How well did Athenian leaders formulate their objectives in light of their national interest and the means available to them at the time? How successfully did their ways support achieving those objectives? Were the means adequate? How well did Athenian leaders evaluate risk? Why, in your opinion, did the expedition ultimately fail?

c. At the outbreak of the war, you are the most esteemed strategist of the ancient Greek world and may choose your allegiance. Which side will you choose and why? Consider the cultures, national interests, strengths, and weaknesses of Athens and Sparta at the outbreak of the war as you make your choice. Placing yourself in the context of the time and knowing only what an ancient Greek strategist world likely know, how would your strategy differ from those promoted by Archidamus and Pericles?

d. War can have a corrosive effect on a democracy. What can we learn from Thucydides' account of this ancient struggle that informs us about the consequences that protracted conflict has on political culture, decision-making, national values, ethics, domestic politics, and a state's economic viability?

4. *Method.* Back up your points with good evidence. You are not required to use any other source beyond Thucydides' *The Peloponnesian War*. However, you may use other course readings and outside sources (see the suggested readings for Lessons 24) should you desire. If you quote directly from the text or use thoughts that are not your own, such as paraphrasing Thucydides or borrowing from another's article or book, then cite your source appropriately as outlined in the Communicative Arts Directive using endnotes. (See the "Guide to Writing and Researching for Strategic Leaders" and the "Endnote Citation Format" sections of the directive for detailed information.)

4. *Formatting*. Line spacing will be two (double-spaced); the font will be Arial 12 point, left justified. There will be a one-inch margin on all sides. Ensure your name is in the header of each page, and that you number all pages. Print only on one side if submitting a hard copy. (For other specific information regarding formation to include

page numbering punctuation spacing, and paragraph indentation, see the “Document Formatting” section of the Communicative Arts Directive.) A title page is required (Guided Response Paper, your name, and the course title). The requirement for a paper of 3-4 pages applies to the main body of the paper. Neither the title page nor endnotes count toward this requirement.

5. *Preparing to Write*. Review the sections of the book you are going to use for your paper carefully and thoroughly; take notes as needed.

6. *Evaluation*.

a. In general, your faculty instructor will evaluate your paper in accordance with the criteria in “Assessment of Student Work--Written Work” section of the Communicative Arts Directive. Papers that receive an overall grade of “needs improvement” will be resubmitted according to directions from your FI until a “meets standards” effort or better is recorded. Generally, an evaluation of needs improvement will result in the student being placed on academic probation until the rewrite meets standards. More specific guidance on evaluation criteria follow.

b. A “meets standards” paper must first address the specific questions asked. Answers to those questions must be clear, coherent, and logical. Responses carefully integrate information from Thucydides and appropriately document that information.
Analysis stems from evidence, and conclusions flow logically from the analysis. Answers have a clear beginning, middle, and end. Writing style is clear, concise, and generally free of grammatical, punctuation, and typographical errors. Meets standards is equivalent to a graduate school “B,” and is the most typical grade. In a professional vein, “meets standards” indicates that the paper is suitable for review by a flag officer.

c. An “exceeds standards” paper must address all the requirements of a “meets
standards” paper, and more. The paper demonstrates a superior grasp of the material. Analysis offers deeper insights into the questions posed. The proposed response integrates and synthesizes across all subordinate questions, offering a coherent whole. The paper integrates and synthesizes differing perspectives. The paper reflects appropriate documentation. Clarity and concise thought mark the paper. The organization of the paper flows logically and smoothly from theme to theme. The writer displays a command of the written word, and the paper is free of grammatical, punctuation, and typographical errors. Exceeds standards is graduate level “A” work. This is a rare grade.

d. An ”outstanding” paper exemplifies excellence in written communication. The

paper reflects broad and compelling evidence that is appropriately documented. Analysis routinely includes differing perspectives or discussion of contrary evidence. An outstanding paper demonstrates integration and synthesis of evidence that leads to well-founded conclusions. The organization carries the reader along effortlessly. Writing style is clear, coherent, and concise. The paper does not contain spelling, grammar, or typographical errors. Such a paper is “A+” level work and is quite rare.

7. I***mportant Date*****. The paper is due to the course FI no later than 31 August 2016.**

APPENDIX II

WRITING AN ANALYTICAL PAPER: REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES

1. *General*. The second writing requirement for the Theory of War and Strategy (TWS) course evaluates the student's ability to communicate his or her understanding of the course objectives, outcomes, and content. Specifically, the requirement is for you to write an analytical paper that addresses a specific question or topic. The paper should present a clear and logical argument supported by authoritative sources. (Wikipedia, for example, is not an authoritative source.) In other words, this paper requires outside research. (See, Paragraph 4, below.)

2. *Purpose*. The purpose of this TWS paper is to further your ability to think critically and analytically about war and strategy. Successful completion of this requirement demonstrates the student's ability to evaluate and synthesize the material presented in the course in a coherent and persuasive manner.

3. *Topic*. Students will write on one of the following questions or topics:

a. "What strategic theory or theorist do you believe best explains the nature and character of warfare in the Twenty-First Century?"

b. "Apply one or more strategic theories to a specific national security challenge currently facing the United States or its allies."

Students may refine that basic question, if desired, but must do so in coordination with the FI. Students considering modifying the topic question in any manner should not begin their papers until the FI has specifically approved the modification.

4. *Research*. Regardless of which topic you choose, an acceptable course paper will require you to conduct research and document sources using the guidance in the Communication Arts Directive. While TWS readings can be helpful and are a good starting point, this paper requires the use of sources beyond the readings. Once your research is complete, you must synthesize that research into a clear, concise, and logical presentation. The "Rules for Writing and Research" section of the Communicative Arts Directive provides useful information as well as documentation policies and some example citations. Individual FIs may require submission of an outline or a working bibliography to monitor progress on the paper.

5. *Content*.

a. While it is possible for example, to answer topic question 3a in one sentence that, of course, would not meet the standards. You must explain and rationalize your selection. As a minimum, question 3 a. requires a description of the strategic

environment you envision and a detailed discussion and analysis of the theory or theorist selected. Acceptable papers may also discuss the reasons for rejecting other theories or theorists as not applicable to the strategic environment in which warfare will occur. Superlative papers will analyze additional theories or theorists you have studied, select the most appropriate ideas of each, and synthesize those ideas into a coherent whole to define the nature and character of war.

b. Topic 3b is a different, but related, task because it also requires you to examine the theorists you have read to support your arguments about what constitutes war and how it may be manifested in the near future concerning an issue of national security. This topic seeks a direct analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of several of the major concepts found in the course and application of those concepts to a current strategic or grand strategic problem facing the United States and/or its allies. Possible national security issues might include, but are not limited to: the continuing war against terror; the future of U.S.-China relations; North Korean threats and aggression; cyber-attacks on national security networks and infrastructure; Russian nationalism; Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons; the future of NATO; intervention in Syria; and global climate change. Appropriate references are required to support the analysis, which should describe and synthesize the work of several theorists. Superlative papers will address the same basic areas with discussion enriched by detailed analysis of theories and concepts examined but rejected with appropriate reasoning that reflects the evaluation of competing theories and concepts.

c. *Formatting*. Line spacing will be 2 (double-spaced); font will be Arial 12 point, left justified. There will be a one-inch margin on all sides. Section headings, introductory quotations, and other material that consumes space without conveying information are discouraged. A title page (title, name, and course title) and endnotes are required and should be formatted as explained in the section “Guide to Writing and Research for Strategic Leaders” in the Communicative Arts Directive as well as those sections dealing with source documentation and citation requirements and format. The requirement for a paper of 5-6 pages applies to the body of the paper. The title page and endnotes do not count toward this requirement.

6. *Notes On Sources*.

a. TWS readings are a necessary starting point for your research; however, as noted

previously, you will need to explore specific theories/theorists in more detail. The suggested readings for appropriate lessons offer ideas for more detailed examination of the theories/theorists. Your FI can also recommend sources.

b. You must cite and reference in endnotes any exact quotations, paraphrases,

ideas, facts, data, or other materials derived directly from, or inspired by, the work of someone else. Failure to document such information is plagiarism. For more on this subject, see “Rules for Writing and Research” in the Communicative Arts Directive.

7. *Evaluation*.

a. In general, your paper will be evaluated in accordance with the criteria in “Assessment of Student Work--Written Work” section of the Communicative Arts Directive. Papers that receive an overall grade of “needs improvement” will be resubmitted according to directions from your FI until a “meets standards” effort or better is recorded. Generally, an evaluation of needs improvement will result in the student being placed on academic probation until the rewrite meets standards. More specific evaluation criteria follow.

b. Regardless of the chosen topic, an acceptable course paper will require research beyond assigned course readings. Once your research is complete, you must synthesize that research into a clear, concise, and logical presentation. You must document that research. The “Rules for Writing and Research” section of the Communicative Arts Directive provides useful information as well as documentation policies and some example citations. Individual FIs may require submission of an outline or bibliography to monitor progress on the paper.

c. “Meets standards.” Foremost, a “meets standards” paper must address the chosen topic. The paper must have a clear and unambiguous thesis. The paper must offer substantive evidence that supports the stated thesis. The paper must appropriately document the sources of the evidence per the Communicative Arts Directive. Analysis must be clear, coherent, and logical. Conclusions flow logically from the analysis. The paper, paragraphs, and sentences have a clear beginning, middle, and end. Writing style is clear, concise, and generally free of grammatical, punctuation, and typographical errors. “Meets standards” is equivalent to a graduate school “B,” and is the most typical grade. In a professional vein, “meets standards” indicates that the paper is suitable for review by a flag officer.

d. An “exceeds standards” paper must address all the requirements of a “meets standards” paper, and more. The paper demonstrates a superior grasp of the material. Analysis offers deeper insights into the topic. The analysis integrates and synthesizes evidence, offering a comprehensive treatment of the material. The paper acknowledges and reconciles competing or differing viewpoints. The paper reflects appropriate documentation. Clarity and concise thought mark the paper. The organization of the paper flows logically and smoothly from theme to theme. The writer displays a command of the written word, and the paper is free of grammatical, punctuation, and typographical errors. “Exceeds standards is graduate level “A” work. This is a rare grade.

e. An “outstanding” paper exemplifies excellence in written communication. The paper reflects broad and compelling evidence that is appropriately documented. Analysis routinely includes differing perspectives or discussion of contrary evidence. An outstanding paper demonstrates integration and synthesis of evidence that leads to well-founded conclusions. The organization carries the reader along effortlessly. Writing style is clear, coherent, and concise. The paper does not contain spelling, grammar, or typographical errors. An “outstanding” paper is “A+” level work and is quite rare.

9. Important Dates.

a. Topic approved by course FI NLT: 12 September 2016

b. Paper due to course FI NLT: 21 September 2016

APPENDIX III

SCHOOL OF STRATEGIC LANDPOWER PROGRAM LEARNING OUTCOMES

MISSION

The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application of Landpower.

INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING OUTCOMES (ILO)

Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war. In pursuit of these goals, they study and confer on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

Achieving this objective requires proficiency in four domains of knowledge:

- Theory of war and peace
- U.S. national security policy, processes, and management
- Military strategy and unified theater operations
- Command and leadership

And the ability and commitment to:

- Think critically, creatively, and strategically.
- Frame national security challenges in their historical, social, political, and economic contexts.
- Promote a military culture that reflects the values and ethic of the Profession of Arms.
- Listen, read, speak, and write effectively.
- Advance the intellectual, moral, and physical development of oneself and one's subordinates.

AY17 PROGRAM LEARNING OUTCOMES (PLOs)

The School of Strategic Landpower (SSL) establishes PLOs that delineate critical fields of knowledge and appropriate jurisdictions of practice for our students to master. The core competence of our graduates is leadership in the global application of strategic land power.

To accomplish this mission, SSL presents a curriculum designed to produce graduates who can:

PLO 1: Evaluate theories of war and strategy in the context of national security decision making.

PLO 2: Analyze, adapt, and develop military processes, organizations, and capabilities to achieve national defense objectives.

PLO 3: Apply strategic and operational art to develop strategies and plans that employ the military instrument of power in pursuit of national aims.

PLO 4: Evaluate the nature, concepts, and components of strategic leadership and synthesize their responsible application.

PLO 5: Think critically and creatively in addressing security issues at the strategic level.

PLO 6: Communicate clearly, persuasively, and candidly.

APPENDIX IV

SERVICE SENIOR-LEVEL COLLEGE JOINT LEARNING AREAS AND OBJECTIVES (JPME-II)

The REP and DEP curricula address requirements for JLAs and JLOs derived from CJCSI 1800.01E, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)*, 29 May 2015.

1. Overview. Service SLCs develop strategic leaders who can think critically and apply military power in support of national objectives in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment. Service War Colleges hone student expertise and competency on their respective Service's roles, missions, and principal operating domains and focus on integrating them into the joint force, unfettered by Service parochialism across the range of military operations.

2. Mission. Each Service SLC is unique in mission and functional support. However, a fundamental objective of each is to prepare future military and civilian leaders for high- level policy, command and staff responsibilities requiring joint and Service operational expertise and warfighting skills by educating them on the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military and economic), the strategic security environment and the effect those instruments have on strategy formulation, implementation, and campaigning. The goal is to develop agile and adaptive leaders with the requisite values, strategic vision, and thinking skills to keep pace with the changing strategic environment. SLC subject matter is inherently joint; JPME at this level focuses on the immersion of students in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment and completes educational requirements for JQO (level 3) nomination.

3. Learning Area 1 - National Strategies.

a. **Apply** key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy.

b. **Analyze** the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels.

c. **Evaluate** historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations.

d. **Apply** strategic security policies, strategies, and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives.

e. **Evaluate** how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense, and military strategies.

4. Learning Area 2 - Joint Warfare, Theater Strategy, and Campaigning for Traditional and Irregular Warfare in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Environment.

a. **Evaluate** the principles of joint operations, joint military doctrine, joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment), and emerging concepts across the range of military operations.

b. **Evaluate** how theater strategies, campaigns, and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations.

c. **Apply** an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns.

d. **Analyze** the role of OCS in supporting Service capabilities and joint functions to meet strategic objectives considering the effects contracting and contracted support have on the operational environment.

e. **Evaluate** how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions.

f. **Evaluate** key classical, contemporary, and emerging concepts, including IO and cyberspace operations, doctrine and traditional/irregular approaches to war.

5. Learning Area 3 - National and Joint Planning Systems and Processes for the Integration of JIIM Capabilities.

a. **Analyze** how DoD, interagency and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate, and apply national ends, ways and means.

b. **Analyze** the operational planning and resource allocation processes.

c. **Evaluate** the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives.

d. **Value** a joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational efforts.

e. **Analyze** the likely attributes of the future joint force and the challenges faced to plan, organize, prepare, conduct, and assess operations. f.

6. Learning Area 4 - Command. Control and Coordination.

a. **Evaluate** the strategic-level options available in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment.

b. **Analyze** the factors of Mission Command as it relates to mission objectives, forces, and capabilities that support the selection of a command and control option.

c. **Analyze** the opportunities and challenges affecting command and control created in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment across the range of military operations, to include leveraging networks and technology.

7. Learning Area 5 - Strategic Leadership and the Profession of Arms.

a. **Evaluate** the skills, character attributes, and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational strategic environment.

b. **Evaluate** critical strategic thinking, decision-making, and communication by strategic leaders.

c. **Evaluate** how strategic leaders develop innovative organizations capable of operating in dynamic, complex, and uncertain environments; anticipate change; and respond to surprise and uncertainty.

d. **Evaluate** how strategic leaders communicate a vision; challenge assumptions; and anticipate, plan, implement and lead strategic change in complex joint or combined organizations.

e.**Evaluate** historic and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives.

f. **Evaluate** how strategic leaders foster responsibility, accountability, selflessness
and trust in complex joint or combined organizations.

g. **Evaluate** how strategic leaders establish and sustain an ethical climate among joint and combined forces, and develop/preserve public trust with their domestic citizenry.

APPENDIX V

AY17 THEMES

ENDURING THEMES

Elihu Root's challenge provides the underpinnings for enduring themes within the USAWC curriculum. The enduring themes stimulate intellectual growth by providing continuity and perspective as we analyze contemporary issues.

1. STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP AND THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETIONARY JUDGMENT.

   - Evaluate leadership at the strategic level (national security policy and strategy, especially in war)
   - Understand the profession's national security clients and its appropriate jurisdictions of practice
   - Evaluate leadership of large, national security organizations.
   - Evaluate strategic thinking about the future (2nd and 3rd order effects) ○ Analyze the framework for leadings and managing strategic change, specifically the components of organizational change and the process by which organizations change.

2. RELATIONSHIP OF POLICY AND STRATEGY (RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENDS, WAYS, AND MEANS).

   - Analyze how to accomplish national security aims to win wars ○ Analyze how to connect military actions to larger policy aims ○ Analyze how to resource national security
   - Evaluate international relations as the context for national security

3. INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER AND POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATIONAL SECURITY.

   - Comprehend Diplomatic Power ○ Comprehend Informational power ○ Evaluate Military Power ○ Comprehend Economic power

4. PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.

   - Evaluate the ethics of military operations (to include *jus in bello* and *post bello*) ○ Evaluate the ethics of war and the use of force (to include *jus ad*

bello) ○ Evaluate the ethics of service to society (domestic civil-military relations)

5. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS.

- Evaluate relationships between military and civilian leadership ○ Evaluate relationships between the military and domestic society ○ Evaluate relationships between armed forces and foreign populations

6. INSTRUMENTS OF WAR AND NATIONAL SECURITY.

- Joint: Evaluate the capabilities and domains of joint forces (especially land, maritime, air, space, cyber)
- Interagency: Understand other U.S. government agencies and departments
- Intergovernmental; Understand potential relationships with other national governments
- Multinational: Understand potential relationships with armed forces or agencies of other nations/coalition partners

7. HISTORY AS A VEHICLE FOR UNDERSTANDING STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES AND CHOICES.

- Identify and analyze relevant historical examples of strategic leadership and strategic choices (across time and around the world)
- Evaluate historical examples relevant to war and other national security endeavors

ENDURING LANDPOWER THEME (BY CORE COURSE)

Theories of War and Strategy: Evaluate Armies/landpower as instruments of war. Evaluate relative decisiveness and adaptability of landpower as it affects the control of people, territory, and resources.

APPENDIX VI

OFFSITE ACCESS
TO COURSE READINGS AND LIBRARY DATABASES

EZproxy - Enables access to licensed database content when you are not in Root Hall. It operates as an intermediary server between your computer and the Library's subscription databases.

Links - You will find EZproxy links to full text readings in online syllabi, directives, bibliographies, reading lists, and emails. Usually, instructors and librarians provide these links so that you can easily access course materials anytime, anywhere. It also helps us comply with copyright law and saves money on the purchase of copyright permissions.

Library Databases - You can use EZproxy to access Library databases when you are away from Root Hall. Go to the Library's webpage http://usawc.libguides.com/home, click on any database in the Library Databases column, such as ProQuest, EBSCO OmniFile, or FirstSearch, and then use your EZproxy username and password to login.

Username and Password - From home, when you click on a link that was built using EZproxy, or you are accessing a particular database, you will be prompted to provide a username and password. You only need to do this once per session. You will find EZproxy login information on the wallet-size card you were given by the Library. If you have misplaced yours, just ask at the Access Services Desk for another card, contact us by phoning (717) 245-4288, or email usawc.libraryr@us.army.mil <mailto:usawc.libraryr@us.army.mil>. You can also access the library portal from the Army War College homepage at: https://internal.carlisle.army.mil/Pages/default.aspx. Please do not share EZproxy login information with others.

Impact of Firewalls - Most Internet service providers (ISPs) do not limit the areas you can access on the Internet, so home users should not encounter problems with firewalls. However, corporate sites often do employ firewalls and may be highly restrictive in what their employees can access, which can impede EZproxy.

ACCESS SOLUTIONS

Try Again! Many problems with EZproxy are caused simply by login errors. If your first login attempt fails, try again. Check to make sure the Caps Lock is not on. Or, if you

see a Page Not Found message after you do login, use the Back button and click on the link again. It may work the second time

Broken Link - If a link appears to be broken, you can find the article by using the appropriate database instead. Go to the Library's webpage www.carlisle.army.mil/library, click on the database name, type in.

Browsers - EZproxy works independently from operating systems and browsers, but your browser may cause problems if you have not downloaded and installed the newest version. Also, it is a good idea to check to make sure that the security settings on your browser are not too restrictive and that it will accept cookies and allow popups. Be aware ISPs that use proprietary versions of browsers, such as AOL, can interfere with EZproxy. A simple workaround is to connect to your provider, minimize the window, and then open a browser such as Mozilla Firefox or Microsoft Internet Explorer.

Databases - Not all remote access problems are caused by EZproxy. Occasionally databases will have technical problems. Deleting cookies might help. You may successfully pass through EZproxy only to find an error caused by the database. If this happens, back out of the database and try using another one. It is unlikely that both providers would be having technical problems at the same time.

Help and Tips - For assistance, please contact the USAWC Research Librarians by phoning (717) 245-3660, or email usawc.libraryr@us.army.mil.

Blackboard Access – All syllabus and digitally available media will be made available at Blackboard.com at https://proedchallenge.blackboard.com/webapps/login/?action=relogin, please contact Mr. Christopher Smart at Christopher.a.smart.civ@mail.mil, or 245-4874.

Appendix VIII Program Learning Outcomes Curriculum Map

SSL REP TWS Lesson Crosswalk with PLOs, AY17

Program Learning Outcomes	PLO 1: Evaluate theories of war and strategy in the context of national security decision-making	PLO 2: Analyze, adapt, and develop military processes organizations, and capabilities to achieve national defense objectives	PLO 3: Apply strategic and operational art to develop strategies and plans that employ the military instrument of power in pursuit of national aims.	PLO 4: Evaluate the nature, concepts, and components of strategic leadership and synthesize their responsible application.	PLO 5: Think critically and creatively in addressing national security issues at the strategic level.	PLO 6: Communicate clearly, persuasively, and candidly.
THEORY OF WAR AND STRATEGY (TWS)						
TWS-1-S Theory, War, and Strategy	X		X		X	
TWS-2-S Thucydides I: The Peloponnesian War	X		X	X	X	X
TWS-3-L/S Thucydides II: Waging the Peloponnesian War	X		X	X	X	X
TWS-4-S Thucydides III: Victory and Defeat	X		X	X	X	X
TWS-5-S What is War? Clausewitz I	X		X	X	X	X
TWS-6-S Theories of International Relations and Geopolitics	X		X		X	X
TWS-7-S Causes of War and Conflict Prevention	X		X		X	X
TWS-8-S Military Power, the Use of Force and Strategic Constraints	X		X		X	X
TWS-9-S Ancient Masters: Sun Tzu and Kautilya	X		X		X	X
TWS-10-S Jomini, Clausewitz II, and a Theory of Landpower	X		X		X	X
TWS-11-L/S Theories of Sea Power	X		X		X	X
TWS-12-S Theories of Aerospace Power	X		X		X	X
TWS-13-S Nuclear Strategy and Limited War	X		X		X	X
TWS-14-S War Among the Peoples	X		X		X	X
TWS-15-S Victory and Conflict Termination	X		X		X	X
TWS-16-S The Future of Strategy	X		X		X	X
TWS Course Totals:	16	0	16	4	16	15

APPENDIX VIII CURRICULUM MAP

JOINT LEARNING AREAS AND OUTCOMES CURRICULUM MAP

SSL REP TWS Lesson Crosswalk with JLAs, AY17

Learning Areas:		JLA 1: National Strategies					JLA 2: Joint Warfare						JLA 3: National and Joint Planning Systems/Processes					JLA 4: Command, Control, Coordination			JLA 5: Strategic Leadership/ Profession of Arms						
Lesson	Learning Area Objectives (LAOs):	a	b	c	d	e	a	b	c	d	e	f	a	b	c	d	e	a	b	c	a	b	c	d	e	f	g
STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP (SL)																											
TWS-1-S	Theory, War, and Strategy	x	x	x	x							x										x					
TWS-2-S	Thucydides I: The Peloponnesian War	x	x	x	x				x			x										x	x				
TWS-3-L/S	Thucydides II: Waging the Peloponnesian War	x	x	x	x				x			x										x	x				x
TWS-4-S	Thucydides III: Victory and Defeat	x	x	x	x				x			x										x	x				
TWS-5-S	What is War? Clausewitz I	x	x	x	x							x										x					
TWS-6-S	Theories of International Relations and Geopolitics	x		x	x							x										x					
TWS-7-S	Causes of War and Conflict Prevention	x	x	x	x							x										x					
TWS-8-S	Military Power, the Use of Force and Strategic Constraints	x	x	x	x							x										x					x
TWS-9-S	Ancient Masters: Sun Tzu and Kautliya	x	x	x	x				x		x	x										x					
TWS-10-S	Jomini, Clausewitz II, and a Theory of Landpower	x	x	x	x							x										x					
TWS-11-L/S	Theories of Sea Power	x	x	x	x		x					x										x					
TWS-12-S	Theories of Aerospace Power	x	x	x	x		x	x				x										x					
TWS-13-S	Nuclear Strategy and Limited War	x	x	x	x						x	x										x					
TWS-14-S	War Among the Peoples	x	x	x	x				x		x	x										x					
TWS-15-S	Victory and Conflict Termination	x	x	x	x							x										x					
TWS-16-S	The Future of Strategy	x	x	x	x						x	x										x					
	TWS Course Totals:	16	15	16	16		2	1	5		4	16										16					2