
BY THE U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Report To The Secretary Of Transportation

Readiness Of The U.S. Coast Guard

Continuing problems may prevent the Coast Guard from successfully carrying out its ongoing peacetime missions and assuming additional tasks to support Navy operations in wartime.


Specifically, GAO found

- difficulties in assigning the Coast Guard wartime tasks to support Navy operations and in developing viable plans for carrying out the tasks,

- readiness problems which impair peacetime operations and which would affect Coast Guard performance of wartime missions, and

- a need to better coordinate the Coast Guard's port security wartime mission with other Federal agencies and to improve the peacetime Reserve training program and planning for the logistical support of the Reserves at mobilization.

This report contains several recommendations to improve Coast Guard readiness.



GAO/PLRD-82-98
AUGUST 18, 1982



UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

PROCUREMENT, LOGISTICS,
AND READINESS DIVISION

B-207216

The Honorable Drew Lewis
The Secretary of Transportation

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This report discusses the readiness of the U.S. Coast Guard and its Selected Reserve. We made the review to evaluate the Coast Guard's and Navy's mobilization planning and to determine whether improvements have been made in this area since we issued our 1978 report 1/ on the same subject.

We did our work at Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington, D.C., at two Coast Guard Districts, and at other Federal maritime agencies with wartime port activity responsibilities. We interviewed appropriate officials at each location visited and examined documents on mobilization planning, readiness, and Coast Guard capabilities.

Our 1978 report expressed concerns about (1) the need to more fully evaluate the Coast Guard's wartime roles and missions, (2) the adequacy of plans for using the Coast Guard in wartime, and (3) the readiness of Coast Guard forces--both Active and Reserve. The report contained no recommendations because of initiatives planned then to address and, possibly, alleviate these problems.

Our current review focused on these same issues and disclosed several problems which raise questions about the Coast Guard's ability to successfully carry out its ongoing peacetime missions and to assume additional ones to support Navy operations in wartime. Our findings are summarized below and are discussed in detail in appendix I.

NAVY AND COAST GUARD PLANNING FOR WARTIME

For some time, difficulties have existed in assigning Coast Guard wartime tasks to support Navy operations and in developing viable plans for carrying out the tasks. The primary problem has been the inability to realistically match the Coast Guard's assigned wartime tasks and its existing or planned capabilities.

1/Letter report to the Secretaries of Transportation and Defense (LCD-78-424, July 13, 1978).

Several studies of the Coast Guard's wartime tasks and basic roles and missions--some dating back to the early 1960s--have been done. These efforts, however, have had limited impact because the Coast Guard's wartime duties--the peacetime functions that continue in wartime, as well as possible missions to support Navy operations--have not been adequately evaluated.

More recent major efforts on the Coast Guard's wartime tasks include a report by the Navy/Coast Guard Board and one mandated by the House Committee on Appropriations. The Navy/Coast Guard Board report, which was completed in April 1981, recommended

- new wartime tasks for the Coast Guard in the mission areas of (1) naval control of shipping, (2) harbor defense and security, and (3) mine countermeasures, and
- expanded tasks in the areas of (1) inshore undersea warfare, (2) antisubmarine warfare, (3) search and rescue/salvage, (4) surveillance and interdiction, and (5) convoy escort.

The report concluded that, for the recommendations to be implemented, the resource levels currently being made available to the Coast Guard would have to be increased.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Coast Guard approved the report with the understanding that specific force levels and resource decisions would be studied by joint, ad hoc working groups acting at the direction of the Navy/Coast Guard Board and would be subject to the budget priorities of both services. The report's specific recommendations are now being studied by ad hoc Navy/Coast Guard working groups.

In addition to the Navy/Coast Guard Board analysis of wartime tasks, the House Appropriations Committee, in its report No. 96-1193, called for a Coast Guard roles and mission study. According to the report, the Committee expected this review to result in something more comprehensive than a simple reaffirmation of all the Coast Guard's existing tasks. The objectives of the study were to (1) analyze current Coast Guard functions, (2) determine those functions that should be continued or eliminated, and (3) identify the resources required to carry out the agreed-upon Coast Guard roles and missions. The report was submitted to the Congress in March 1982 and recommended no fundamental changes to the Coast Guard's major operating programs.

In our opinion, major questions remain regarding the tasks that should be assigned to the Coast Guard in wartime and the ability of Active and Reserve forces to effectively carry out these tasks. This is particularly true considering the current status and capabilities of the Coast Guard.

PEACETIME PROBLEMS AFFECT READINESS

Overall, we found that, while the Coast Guard possesses considerable military capabilities in those mission areas that are natural extensions of its routine peacetime functions, its ability to effectively perform more demanding naval wartime tasks appears to be quite constrained because of (1) an overall shortage of resources, such as money and personnel, and (2) inherent equipment limitations. We found that these same factors adversely affect the Coast Guard's ability to adequately perform its routine peacetime functions, and that the readiness trend of the Coast Guard, as reported through the unit status and identity reporting system, has been declining. Thus, a basic question to be addressed and resolved is, "How can the Coast Guard be expected to assume, and effectively perform, additional and more demanding wartime missions to support the Navy, when it is experiencing significant problems performing its peacetime functions due to force structure and resource limitations?"

USE OF THE COAST GUARD SELECTED RESERVE

The Coast Guard maintains a Selected Reserve force of approximately 12,000 personnel, although current funding provides for only slightly over 10,000. Most of these reservists would be assigned to the port security and safety mission in wartime. The objective of this mission is to ensure, in the event of war or a major contingency, the uninterrupted flow of supplies and material in support of the strategic mobility of U.S. military forces, as well as the flow of cargoes that are critical to the Nation's economic health. The Coast Guard's ability to effectively carry out this mission is adversely affected because (1) coordination with other Federal maritime agencies with wartime port responsibilities is inadequate, (2) planning for the logistical support requirements of the Reserve at mobilization is weak, and (3) the Reserve training program needs to be improved.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

While each of the problem areas discussed in this report is significant, we believe that the most pressing issue is determining what wartime missions and tasks can be realistically assigned to the Coast Guard. Until this issue is resolved, the Coast Guard and Navy have no established baseline against which to make effective decisions concerning the wartime use of the Coast Guard or its force structure and resource requirements.

Accordingly, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the Commandant of the Coast Guard and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reach agreement with the Secretary of the Navy on the specific wartime missions and tasks that should be assigned to the Coast Guard, taking into account the Coast

Guard's ability to perform such assignments. Assignment of the wartime missions/tasks to the Coast Guard should be based on (1) detailed threat assessments of all assigned functions and (2) analysis and comparison of Coast Guard capabilities with the resource and force structure requirements needed to provide reasonable assurance that the Coast Guard could adequately perform its agreed-upon wartime tasks.

Further, this effort should recognize and incorporate the responsibilities and capabilities of the other Federal maritime agencies involved in port security and strategic mobility activities. Once these steps are accomplished, a time-phased plan to implement the necessary changes and adjustments to the size, organization, and structure of the Coast Guard (and any other affected agencies) should be developed and submitted to the Congress.

Additionally, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to take the following actions:

- Sponsor an interagency working group to fully resolve the coordination problems between the Coast Guard and other agencies with wartime and mobilization port responsibilities.
- Develop specific and reasonably dependable sources to satisfy logistical support requirements for the Reserve at mobilization.
- Emphasize Reserve training to ensure that mobilization training of individual reservists is maximized. Increased formal training should be provided to those rates (job specialties) for which adequate training is not provided through augmentation.


AGENCY COMMENTS

We discussed a draft of this report with Department of Transportation and Coast Guard officials, as well as Department of Defense representatives. The draft contained four recommendations. Initial agency comments indicated disagreement with the overall thrust of our recommendations. For example, the Coast Guard stated that our recommendation that it be assigned specific roles and missions was out of date because much effort had been spent during the last 2 to 3 years in defining wartime missions in detail. After some discussion, however, it became evident that the disagreement dealt more with semantics than substance. Appropriate changes to the report have been made based on these discussions and are discussed in appendix III.

As you know, section 236 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 requires the head of a Federal agency to submit a written statement of actions taken on our recommendations to the House Committee of Government Operations and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs not later than 60 days after the date of the report and to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.

In addition to the above committees, we are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen, House and Senate Committees on Armed Services, the Secretary of Defense; and the Secretary of the Navy.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Donald J. Horan".

Donald J. Horan
Director

READINESS OF THE U.S. COAST GUARDBACKGROUND

The U.S. Coast Guard is a unique military service because it functions as the principal U.S. Government agency responsible for regulating and enforcing maritime laws and treaties during peacetime. However, at mobilization or at the direction of the President, the Navy assumes operational control of the Coast Guard, and the Coast Guard takes on additional missions to support Navy operations. These are missions in addition to the Coast Guard's peacetime duties, most of which continue in wartime.

Legislation establishing the peacetime/wartime relationship of the Navy and Coast Guard requires the Navy, in peacetime, to (1) mutually establish with the Coast Guard an appropriate balance of naval warfare tasks to be assigned to the Coast Guard when operating as a service of the Navy and (2) plan, program, and budget, within overall Navy priorities, for Navy military equipment and logistical support requirements to ensure that the Coast Guard is prepared to carry out its assigned wartime tasks.

In peacetime, the Secretary of Transportation is responsible for providing the Coast Guard the facilities, training, and planning for an organized, manned, equipped, and ready Coast Guard for wartime operation. Occasionally, the Secretaries of the Navy and Transportation may exchange information; make available to each other personnel, vessels, facilities, and equipment; and agree to undertake necessary and desirable assignments and functions for each other.

In wartime, the Coast Guard is subject to the direction of the Secretary of the Navy who may, to the extent he deems advisable, order changes in Coast Guard operations to make them compatible with Navy operations. When the Coast Guard is serving under the Navy, applicable Navy appropriations become available for the expenses of the Coast Guard and applicable Coast Guard appropriations are available for transfer to the Navy.

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

Our objectives were to (1) evaluate the Navy's and Coast Guard's progress in improving mobilization planning and correcting other problems discussed in our July 1978 ¹/ report and (2) identify other impediments to the effective wartime use of Coast Guard resources.

¹/Letter report to the Secretaries of Defense and Transportation (LCD-78-424, July 13, 1978).

We did our work at Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington, D.C., and at two Coast Guard Districts--New Orleans, Louisiana, and San Francisco, California. We also did work at the Maritime Administration, the Military Traffic Management Command, and the Navy's Military Sealift Command to determine the roles and missions of these agencies and their relationship to those of the Coast Guard in U.S. ports and harbors.

We interviewed appropriate officials at each location. We also examined and reviewed documents on Coast Guard readiness and capabilities and assessments of potential threats to U.S. ports and harbors. In reviewing the types and quality of Coast Guard Selected Reserve training, we used statistical sampling techniques (see app. II).

We performed our review in accordance with our current "Standards for Audit of Governmental Organizations, Programs, Activities, and Functions".

Our review disclosed several problems which raise questions about the Coast Guard's ability to successfully carry out its ongoing peacetime missions and to assume additional ones to support Navy operations in wartime. Specifically, we found

- continuing difficulties in assigning the Coast Guard wartime tasks to support Navy operations and in developing viable plans for carrying out the tasks,
- readiness problems which impair peacetime operations and which would affect Coast Guard performance of wartime missions, and
- a need to better coordinate the Coast Guard's port security wartime mission with other Federal agencies and to improve the peacetime Reserve training program and planning for the logistical support of the Reserves at mobilization.

ADEQUACY OF NAVY AND COAST GUARD PLANNING FOR WARTIME

The successful mobilization of military forces--providing the personnel and other resources when and where needed--largely depends on adequate peacetime planning to develop a detailed course of action to satisfy identified military objectives and respond to perceived enemy threats.

Historically, however, peacetime planning between the Navy and Coast Guard has not received the emphasis needed for effectively using the Coast Guard in wartime. The primary problem in the planning area has been the inability to realistically match the Coast Guard's assigned wartime tasks and its existing or planned capabilities. Several studies of the Coast Guard's

wartime tasks and basic roles and missions--some dating back to the early 1960s--have been done. These efforts, however, have had limited impact because the Coast Guard's wartime duties--the peacetime functions that continue in wartime, as well as possible missions to support Navy operations--have not been adequately evaluated. This evaluation should consider (1) the criticality of all functions, (2) the Coast Guard's capability to respond in a contingency, and (3) the Coast Guard's resource and force structure requirements to successfully carry out assigned functions and tasks. Thus, important questions remain regarding the tasks the Coast Guard should be assigned in wartime and whether the Coast Guard would be capable of effectively carrying them out.

Past Navy/Coast Guard planning initiatives

Our 1978 report expressed concerns about (1) the need to more fully evaluate the Coast Guard's roles and missions and (2) the adequacy of plans for using the Coast Guard in wartime. The report contained no recommendations because of the initiatives planned then to address and, possibly, alleviate these problems. These initiatives included

- a study to evaluate Coast Guard wartime capabilities with the objectives of (1) identifying the wartime tasks that might be assigned to the Coast Guard and (2) determining how much and what kinds of equipment should be provided by the Navy to carry out these tasks and

- a request by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to Naval Intelligence to assess potential wartime threats to U.S. ports and harbors.

Generally, the wartime capabilities study, completed in early 1980, only examined the Coast Guard's major assets (for example, cutters and aircraft) to determine their present capabilities and possible capabilities with different and/or additional equipment. The study made no attempt to determine or project the workload or level of effort that would be required of the Coast Guard during mobilization and wartime to carry out its various functions. Such an analysis is essential to ascertain which Coast Guard resources could or should be used in potential military roles in support of the Navy. The study, for example, did not address the possible tasks of the Coast Guard to perform in the areas of port defense, control of merchant shipping, and mine warfare.

The threat assessment on U.S. ports and harbors, completed in 1978, addressed several types of threats--sabotage and mine warfare--but did not attempt to quantify the level of threat to U.S. ports, to determine the requirements needed to counter such threats, or to identify the organization(s) responsible for

dealing with such possibilities. For example, it discussed in detail the state of the art in mine warfare and the overall Soviet capability in this area, but did not indicate to what degree, if any, this capability would or could be used against U.S. ports and harbors in wartime.

Other initiatives were undertaken to improve coordination between the two services, including (1) issuance of instructions setting forth policy for Navy support of the Coast Guard and (2) designation of service contact points to coordinate key functions and programs. These initiatives proved to be of limited usefulness, however, due to their narrow scope. The basic problems identified in 1978, thus, remain matters of concern.

Current Navy/Coast Guard planning initiatives

The Navy and Coast Guard have several ongoing initiatives designed to address some of the basic weaknesses in their wartime planning and coordination efforts. These include the establishment of (1) a Navy/Coast Guard Board responsible for coordinating major policy matters and (2) a new mobilization planning system 1/ for the Coast Guard's port security wartime mission.

Navy/Coast Guard Board

This board, composed of senior officers of CNO and Coast Guard Headquarters, was established in November 1980 to review policy matters and issues of mutual Navy/Coast Guard interest and to make recommendations to the CNO and Coast Guard Commandant on such matters.

One of the Board's first undertakings was a report on the Coast Guard's wartime tasks. This report, which was completed in April 1981, recommended

- new wartime tasks for the Coast Guard in the mission areas of (1) naval control of shipping, (2) harbor defense and security, and (3) mine countermeasures, and
- expanded tasks in the areas of (1) inshore undersea warfare, (2) antisubmarine warfare, (3) search and rescue/salvage, (4) surveillance and interdiction, and (5) convoy escort.

No changes were suggested for such areas as port security and safety and aid to navigation. The report concluded that,

1/The Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Operation Planning System, which has been in existence for years but only recently adopted by the Coast Guard.

for the recommendations to be implemented, the resource levels currently being made available to the Coast Guard would have to be increased. The study also concluded that the Coast Guard Area Commanders (Pacific and Atlantic) should become the organizational element responsible to the Fleet Commanders for planning and coordinating the coastal defense of the United States.

The CNO and Commandant of the Coast Guard approved the report with the understanding that specific force levels and resource decisions would be studied by joint, ad hoc working groups acting at the direction of the Navy/Coast Guard Board and would be subject to the budget priorities of both services. The specific recommendations of this report are now being studied by ad hoc Navy/Coast Guard working groups.

In addition to the Navy/Coast Guard Board analysis of wartime tasks, the House Committee on Appropriations, in its report No. 96-1193, called for a Coast Guard roles and mission study. According to the report, the Committee expected that this review would result in something more comprehensive than a simple reaffirmation of all the Coast Guard's existing tasks. The objectives of the study were to (1) analyze current Coast Guard functions, (2) determine those functions that should be continued or eliminated, and (3) identify the resources required to carry out the agreed-upon Coast Guard roles and missions. The report was completed and issued in March 1982 and is being reviewed and evaluated. It recommended no fundamental changes to the Coast Guard's major operating programs.

New mobilization planning system

When in place, the Coast Guard's new mobilization planning system will consist of planning zones that coincide with the Captains of the Port areas. Organizations comprised primarily of reservists will be responsible for performing the planning functions for the port security and safety mission area with guidance from Coast Guard Headquarters. If implemented as designed and if adequate personnel resources are assigned to perform this function (a problem in the past), the new system should result in better planning for this mission area.

PEACETIME PROBLEMS AFFECTING READINESS

Overall, we found that the Coast Guard possesses considerable military capability in those mission areas which are natural extensions of its routine peacetime functions. However, its ability to effectively perform more demanding naval wartime tasks, such as antisubmarine warfare and ocean escort of convoys, appears to be quite constrained because of (1) an overall shortage of resources and (2) inherent equipment limitations. In fact, these same factors affect the Coast Guard's ability to adequately perform its routine peacetime functions. These problems are

reflected in the Joint Chiefs of Staff's unit status and identity readiness reporting system.

Capability of Navy-provided equipment is limited

The Coast Guard operates a significant number of ships, aircraft, and boats that have military capability. It also possesses a number of trained personnel who could perform a variety of important tasks in wartime. Missions to support the Navy involve using the Coast Guard's high- and medium-endurance cutters and some patrol boats and are in addition to the Coast Guard's peacetime missions, most of which continue in wartime--although at different levels of effort. To support potential naval warfare tasks, the Coast Guard has an inventory of 18 high-endurance and 22 medium-endurance cutters and about 73 patrol boats. Total operating and support funding for these vessels for fiscal year 1980 was about \$111 million.

The Navy funds the equipment--radios, naval guns, and sonars--which provides much of the Coast Guard's military capability. In the past, Navy funding has been modest--a few million dollars per year--and has been provided at a fairly constant rate. An increased funding level is now projected for the next 5-year planning period; however, the increase likely will not materially increase the Coast Guard's ability to support the ocean-going Navy missions now assigned to it.

Much of the military-type equipment provided in the past by the Navy for the Coast Guard's vessels is quite limited in capability when compared to the more modern equipment found on Navy ships. For example, the high-endurance cutter is equipped with a single 5"/38 MK 30 gun, a design that dates back to World War II. The Coast Guard's antisubmarine capability is limited by its sonar, a SQS-38 medium-frequency, low power, active system designed specifically for the Coast Guard. Current plans call for the SQS-38, the only shallow water sonar in the U.S. military inventory, to be used in deep-water missions. Further, the Coast Guard's military equipment requires considerably more personnel to operate it than more modern gear. Plans, however, have been developed to upgrade some equipment on the high-endurance cutter. Further, the new "FAMOUS" class medium-endurance cutter being procured will be better equipped in some respects.

Peacetime operating difficulties

As reported in our prior report, "The Coast Guard--Limited Resources Curtail Ability to Meet Responsibilities" (CED-80-76, Apr. 3, 1980), the Coast Guard is experiencing difficulty in adequately performing its routine peacetime mission and duties. Specific problems cited in this report included:

--The lack of adequate numbers of vessels to carry out the Coast Guard's responsibilities. Further, a number of the available vessels were in poor operating condition due to age and logistical support problems.

--Too few people to meet Coast Guard responsibilities, a situation aggravated by a low personnel retention rate.

These problems, coupled with the equipment available on most of the Coast Guard's larger vessels, raise questions about the Coast Guard's potential ability to effectively carry out some of its Navy-assigned missions.

Readiness reporting

Like the other services, the Coast Guard reports on the readiness of the assets that will be used to carry out Navy-assigned wartime tasks through the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Unit Status and Identity Report (UNITREP) readiness reporting system.

A trend analysis of the operational availability, or readiness, of the Coast Guard's high- and medium-endurance cutters for November 1978 through November 1980 indicated a general decrease in readiness. This was due to rising operating requirements and equipment support problems. Most equipment problems affecting the availability of these vessels were in the areas of hull, propulsion and electrical, command and control, and combat system.

COAST GUARD RESERVE PEACETIME PLANNING AND TRAINING FOR WARTIME

The Coast Guard's Selected Reserve force totals approximately 12,000 personnel, although current funding provides for only slightly over 10,000. In wartime, most of these reservists would be assigned to the port security and safety mission--a longstanding Coast Guard responsibility. The balance would be used to augment active Coast Guard units.

The port security mission involves the protection of vessels, cargoes, and facilities in strategic U.S. ports, harbors, and waterways. The objective of this mission area is to ensure, in the event of a war or a major contingency, the uninterrupted flow of supplies and materials in support of the strategic mobility of U.S. military forces, as well as the flow of cargoes that are critical to the Nation's economic health.

The Coast Guard's ability to carry out this mission is adversely affected because

- coordination with other Federal maritime agencies with port security-related mobilization responsibilities is inadequate,
- planning for the logistical support of the Reserve at mobilization is weak, and
- the Reserve training program needs to be improved.

Coordination and planning with other Federal agencies

Several Federal agencies, as well as the Coast Guard, have duties and responsibilities in U.S. ports and harbors during wartime. Proper planning during peacetime is essential for these agencies to reduce the frictions caused by potentially overlapping missions and authorities among these agencies and to reduce coordination difficulties that will likely result because some of the agencies must create offices and assign personnel to the ports after mobilization has been declared. The Coast Guard maintains a permanent presence in the ports and can expect to be a major focus of early coordination efforts. However, the current authority and perceived roles of several agencies may cause confusion. Problem areas requiring attention include security requirements determinations, terminal and terminal service contracting, and delineation of Navy and Coast Guard responsibilities. These problems must be addressed because of the Coast Guard's involvement in all these areas and its ongoing efforts to determine the optimal size of its Active and Reserve forces.

According to officials we interviewed, the flow of action in U.S. ports during mobilization is expected to be as follows. The Military Sealift Command will control the operation of ships provided by the Maritime Administration (MARAD) under General Agency Agreements with the maritime industry. MARAD will contract for these ships and for terminals and terminal services at the ports. The Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) will move military goods into the ports to load these ships. Additionally, MTMC will do limited amounts of berth and stevedore contracting. The Coast Guard will assure security of ships and cargoes in the ports and provide for safe loading procedures and for safe vessel operations. The ships will then move under the control of the Naval Control of Shipping organization. The Navy will protect the ships with escorts at sea as appropriate.

Security requirements

The Coast Guard needs a better planning picture for determining the size of the port security portion of its Reserve. In the strategic ports, several agencies have overlapping responsibilities for determining what facilities will require security and how the security will be provided.

The Coast Guard is responsible for protecting facilities in strategic port areas and inland waterways. However, the size of the threat to these facilities has not been adequately identified by the appropriate agencies. Additionally, the agencies need to identify the most important facilities requiring security.

"Land side" protection of facilities along inland waterways is another potential problem. As pointed out in recent Defense exercises, such facilities require both land and water-side protection; however, responsibility for the land side is somewhat unclear.

In the ports, the terminal companies and the various port authorities generally have private guards and police-empowered individuals available in peacetime to provide security. Identifying which terminals in a strategic port will need protection and how much protection will be needed is a complex planning process. Two factors which have not been fully considered in planning are (1) the expected degree of security available from the private guards or police-empowered individuals available through the Port Authorities or the terminal companies and (2) a determination of which terminals need protection and training for this purpose. Because of the overlap in responsibilities between MTMC and MARAD, such determination has not always been possible or has been made more difficult for the Coast Guard.

Terminal and terminal services

At the time of a "full" mobilization, MARAD would contract for terminals and terminal services at strategic U.S. ports and lease ships to support U.S. seaborne mobility requirements. MARAD expects to carry out its functions through the Federal Port Controller, a part of the National Shipping Authority, which would be established at mobilization. MARAD plans to contract for entire terminals based on its perception that such terminals would be used to satisfy all Government shipping requirements--civilian as well as military--and has started to establish standby port contracts to be activated when needed. The absence of firm decisions regarding which terminals in which ports are to be used has hampered the development of these contracts.

MARAD's authority in these areas is dependent upon the declaration of a full mobilization. In periods of rising tension or during limited mobilization, MARAD must receive specific congressional authority to obligate funds to support such a mobilization. A number of Joint Chiefs of Staff-projected scenarios, however, call for or expect only limited mobilization. Although MARAD could be legally constrained from prompt action in such situations, we found that military planning for

limited scenarios often does not reflect this constraint and assumes that MARAD could and would provide the needed ships and facilities as would happen under full mobilization.

In the area of planning coordination, MARAD efforts to establish the Federal Port Controller and the National Shipping Authority have not been fully integrated with MTMC and Coast Guard Captains of the Port planning efforts. Some MARAD plans, if carried out, could interfere with these two agencies' planning efforts.

For example, MTMC is the Army command responsible for moving military-related goods inside the United States to the ports for overseas shipment. In the ports, MTMC has standby contracts for stevedoring, use of specific berths, and storage space if needed on mobilization. The existing standby contracts appear to duplicate MARAD's planned standby contracts for similar terminal services now in effect. Contracting for specific berths is potentially more expensive on a "per berth" basis than contracting for whole terminals, as the overhead costs for an entire terminal (potentially 10 or 12 berths) could be distributed over the 3 or 4 berths in that terminal that MTMC has contracted for. Also, such overhead cost could include storage and stevedoring the terminal would normally provide. MTMC, in some cases, has separate standby contracts for these services.

All of this increases the Coast Guard's need to have either MARAD or MTMC or both firmly identify which terminals will need security in the strategic ports. This will allow the Coast Guard to size its Reserve to provide the necessary personnel and training for protection of these sites.

Navy/Coast Guard roles for ship movement

One additional confused mission area is the movement of shipping. In peacetime, the Coast Guard's Captains of the Port perform a mission in U.S. ports similar to that of the Naval Control of Shipping organization's mission during wartime. The exact delineation of responsibility between this organization and the Coast Guard's permanent mission is unclear.

In wartime, Naval Control of Shipping will martial all convoys and assign ships to berths for loading on the U.S. side and for unloading in the receiving ports. Warships to escort such convoys will also be controlled by this command. In most ports, it is anticipated that the officer assigned this responsibility will work directly out of the Captain of the Port's office. In peacetime, the Captain of the Port performs a similar function in controlling shipping, less the convoy and escort requirements.

Coast Guard Reserve's logistical support

The major types of logistical support required by reservists at mobilization include facilities, vehicles, boats, and radio communication equipment. According to Coast Guard officials, most of these requirements are neither sophisticated nor uniquely military. Therefore, they can be readily obtained from local commercial or other Government sources. For these reasons, equipment and supplies are not stockpiled and support plans assume that these needed resources will be provided from such sources. In reporting logistics readiness, the Reserves need only indicate that sources of support have been identified. There is no requirement for prearranging, through contact or other means, a guarantee that these resources will be available for use in wartime or other national emergencies.

While this system or approach to satisfying mobilization support requirements is no doubt cost effective, it appears overly dependent on emergency authority to provide resources, which, if not available as anticipated, could lead to considerable confusion and force ineffectiveness in the early days of a crisis. Details on specific logistical requirements follow.

Facilities

Upon mobilization, reservists will require administrative, berthing, and messing facilities. We found that plans have been made in some districts to use commercial space, hotels, and restaurants to satisfy this requirement. Specific facilities had been identified through annual Coast Guard surveys and reported in the Navy's Non-Industrial Facilities for Mobilization Inventory. According to current guidelines, owners and operators are not to be informed during the course of these surveys that the Coast Guard is considering the use of their facilities for mobilization contingencies, and specific arrangements are not to be made for their use.

Vehicles

All vehicle mobilization requirements are for commercial-type vehicles, for example, sedans, station wagons, and vans. Identified sources are the General Services Administration, the Navy, and commercial lease/purchase agencies. In some districts, none of these sources have been approached about the use of their vehicles.

Boats

Reserve mobilization requirements are for patrol-type craft which do not require any uniquely military-type equipment. According to officials, a sufficient number of suitable craft have been committed through the Coast Guard Auxiliary program.

Radio equipment

The lack of secure communications equipment below the district organizational level poses a critical problem in mobilization scenarios. These radios require special frequencies. Plans do not identify specific sources for satisfying these requirements.

Coast Guard Reserve training

The Coast Guard Reserve training program is made up of three distinct types--augmentation, formal, and unit administration--which are explained as follows.

- Augmentation training is on-the-job training in which reservists support a mission or unit of the Active Coast Guard. In other words, they support or replace an Active Coast Guard member during training periods. Coast Guard guidelines state 65 percent of Reserve training should be in this category.
- Formal training is oriented along academic lines and includes instruction obtained in the classroom, schools, lectures, and correspondence courses. Twenty-five percent of Reserve training should be formal.
- Unit administration is routine administrative activity at the unit and includes inspections, formations, meetings, and career counseling. Coast Guard guidelines state this should account for 10 percent of Reserve training.

The premise behind Coast Guard training is that reservists, well trained in their rates, are basically prepared for mobilization. Therefore, Coast Guard guidelines state that, in the order of priority, augmentation training should be:

1. Directly related to both the reservists' rates and mobilization assignments.
2. Directly related to the reservists' rates but only indirectly related to their mobilization assignments.
3. Directly related to the reservists' mobilization assignments but only indirectly related to their rates.

Recent statistical samples of reservist training covering a 1-year period in the San Francisco and New Orleans districts revealed that there was reasonable success in meeting the established training percentage goals. However, further analysis of the test results indicated that overall percentages were maintained because about half of the reservists in the samples spent most of their total training time doing augmentation, while

the other half spent considerably less. Many reservists may not be receiving adequate training for their mobilization assignments. Some observations from the samples are listed below:

- The range of individual augmentation training varied between 0 to 100 percent of total training time.
- Not all augmentation performed related to the individual's rate and/or mobilization assignment.
- Much of the augmentation training performed would not fully satisfy the training requirements of the individual reservist.
- Reservists filling many mobilization billets requiring rates, such as electronic radiation and explosive ordnance, receive little augmentation training.

Factors affecting the range of training received included the individual's training site location, assigned rating, etc.

SAMPLE METHODOLOGY,
PROFILE, AND APPLICATIONS

ORIGINAL SAMPLE

We obtained a universe of selected reservists from alphabetical Reserve status listings as of June 30, 1980. The total population of selected reservists was reduced because we eliminated those reservists who

- were not authorized to train regularly or were not eligible to perform augmentation training during inactive duty training,
- had been assigned to a drilling unit within the district for less than a year, and
- were seeking lateral rate changes because reservists keep their original mobilization assignment while training for their new rate.

For our 100 randomly selected reservists, we examined the Districts' Unit Personnel Listing as of June 30, 1980, to determine the reservists' mobilization assignments. Next, we reviewed unit monthly attendance records to determine what type of inactive duty training they performed from July 1979 through June 1980.

With Reserve officials, we determined what inactive duty training augmentation training codes were commensurate with reservists' mobilization assignment and rate. We also analyzed the inactive duty training of our sample.

Our sample of 100 selected reservists was representative of the ratings, units/groups, mobilization assignments, and mobilization facilities in the Districts. We based the samples on a 95-percent confidence level.

EXTENDED SAMPLE

Our original sample indicated that reservists with electronic radiation, explosive loading, facility inspection and survey, and fireboat crew mobilization assignments and the port securityman rating were receiving little or no mobilization-related augmentation training. We examined the inactive duty training for all of the selected reservists in the

aforementioned mobilization assignments and took a random sample of port securitymen. Our methodology for picking the universe and analyzing the data was the same as the original sample except that we

- required reservists to be on board for at least 6 months instead of 12 and

- only analyzed the samples by inactive duty training drills.

SUMMARY OF AGENCY COMMENTS

Our draft report contained four recommendations. The first and major recommendation addressed the specific roles and missions that should be assigned to the Coast Guard and the important elements that should be considered in assigning these roles and missions.

Specifically, we recommended that:

"The Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reach agreement on the specific roles and missions, both peacetime and wartime, that should be assigned to the Coast Guard using as a basis the recently completed studies sponsored by the Navy/Coast Guard Board and House Appropriations Committee or any other source deemed appropriate. This effort should recognize the responsibilities and capabilities of the other Federal maritime agencies involved in port security and strategic mobility activities.

Further, development of the Coast Guard's missions should be based on (1) detailed threat assessments and (2) analyses of the resource and force structure requirements needed to provide reasonable assurance that the Coast Guard could adequately perform its agreed-upon missions. Once these steps are accomplished, a time-phased plan to implement the necessary changes and adjustments to the size and structure of the Coast Guard (and any other affected agencies) should be developed and submitted to the Congress."

Initially, the Coast Guard disagreed with the overall thrust of this recommendation. Representatives stated that it was out of date because much effort had been spent during the last 2 to 3 years in defining wartime missions in detail, as reflected by the Navy/Coast Guard Board wartime tasks study and the recently completed roles and missions study.

After some discussion, it became evident that the disagreement dealt more with semantics than substance. For example, in its comments on our draft report, the Coast Guard stated that:

"The major issue is not identification of tasks assigned in wartime, but identification of level or degree of wartime functions and the corresponding force structure and resource levels required to conduct those functions."

We stated on page 4 of our draft that:

"Until this issue is resolved, major questions will remain regarding the tasks the Coast Guard should be assigned in wartime and the ability of the Coast Guard forces--both active and Reserve--to effectively carryout certain functions and tasks." (Underscoring added.)

We also asked, on page 5 of the draft report:

"How can the Coast Guard assume, and effectively perform, additional and more demanding missions to support Navy operations in wartime, when it is having significant problems performing its peacetime missions?"

In addition, the Coast Guard stated:

"We're in the process of establishing a baseline against which to make a decision concerning the wartime use of our forces and to establish funding levels to train and equip, not only the Reserve, but also active duty personnel in their mobilization assignments."

In the conclusion section on page 7 of the draft, we stated:

"Until resolved the Coast Guard and Navy have no established baseline against which to make effective decisions concerning the wartime use of the Coast Guard or its force structure and resource requirements."

Based on these discussions, we revised the recommendation to read:

"The Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reach agreement with the Secretary of the Navy on the specific wartime missions and tasks that should be assigned to the Coast Guard taking into account the ability of the Coast Guard to perform such assignments. Assignment of the wartime missions/tasks to the Coast Guard should be based on (1) detailed threat assessments of all assigned functions and (2) analysis and comparison of Coast Guard capability with the resource and force structure requirements needed to provide reasonable assurance that the Coast Guard could adequately perform its agreed upon wartime tasks.

Further, this effort should recognize and incorporate the responsibilities and capabilities of the other Federal maritime agencies involved in port security and

strategic mobility activities. Once these steps are accomplished, a time-phased plan to implement the necessary changes and adjustments to the size, organization, and structure of the Coast Guard (and any other affected agencies) should be developed and submitted to the Congress."

Our second recommendation stated that the Commandant of the Coast Guard should:

"* * * sponsor, perhaps through the Navy/Coast Guard Board, the establishment of an interagency working group to fully resolve the coordination problems between the Coast Guard and other agencies with wartime and mobilization port responsibilities."

The agency representatives indicated that this recommendation expressed a valid concern; however, they believed that the Navy/Coast Guard Board was not an appropriate vehicle for this effort. We agreed to so modify the recommendation to read that the Commandant:

"* * * sponsor the establishment of an interagency working group to fully resolve the coordination problems between the Coast Guard and other agencies with wartime and mobilization port responsibilities."

Our third recommendation stated that the Commandant should:

"* * * require the Selected Reserve to develop specific and reasonably dependable sources to satisfy logistics support requirements for mobilization."

The Coast Guard representatives indicated that determining logistical requirements was a Coast Guard, not Reserve, function. We modified our recommendation to read that the Commandant:

"* * * require development of specific and reasonably dependable sources to satisfy logistics support requirements for the Reserve at mobilization."

Our fourth and final recommendation was that the Commandant:

"* * * require increased emphasis on Reserve training to insure that mobilization training of individual reservists is maximized. Increased formal training should be provided to those rates for which adequate training is not provided through augmentation."

No change to our last recommendation was necessary based on official comments.