(U) Evaluation of DoD Security and Life Support for Afghan Evacuees at Camp Bondsteel
(U) MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY EUROPE AND AFRICA

(U) SUBJECT: Evaluation of DoD Security and Life Support for Afghan Evacuees at Camp Bondsteel (Report No. DODIG-2023-008)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's evaluation. We coordinated a discussion draft of this report with officials from the offices of the Commander, U.S. Army Europe and Africa, the Inspector General for the 21st Theater Sustainment Command, and the Commander, Area Support Group-Balkans. We considered management’s comments on the discussion draft report, as well as actions taken during the project, when preparing the final report.

(U) Overall, we determined that the Area Support Group-Balkans may encounter future lodging, security, and medical care challenges for Afghan travelers as the length of stay for Afghan travelers increases. We recommended that the Commander, Area Support Group-Balkans document the lessons learned for lodging, security, and medical care for Afghan evacuees and provide the lessons learned through the chain of command for review and distribution to interagency partners. The Inspector General for the 21st Theater Sustainment Command provided evidence in response to the discussion draft that an After Action Review with 12 observations was completed by the Commander of Area Support Group-Balkans. Therefore, the recommendation is considered resolved and closed.

(U) We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the evaluation. Specifically, we would like to extend our gratitude to the personnel in the U.S. Army Europe and Africa, the Inspector General for 21st Theater Sustainment Command, and the Commander of Area Support Group-Balkans for their cooperation in this matter. If you have any questions, please contact [redacted]

Mr. Jefferson DuBinok
Acting Assistant Inspector General,
Programs, Combatant Commands,
and Overseas Contingency Operations Evaluations
(U) Executive Summary

(U) In August 2021, Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, was selected as one of several locations worldwide to process and temporarily house Afghan nationals who were evacuated from Afghanistan. Camp Liya is a separate camp established within the confines of Camp Bondsteel, where the Department of State (DOS) provides operational control for the evacuees, including lodging, sustainment, processing, and onward movement support to Afghan travelers. The DoD provides humanitarian support to the occupants through the U.S. Army Europe and Africa, 21st Theater Sustainment Command’s Area Support Group (ASG)-Balkans, and does not have a combat or detention mission. While evacuees, or travelers, are instructed to not leave the camp, the ASG-Balkans Security Forces (SF) personnel are not authorized to stop evacuees from leaving if they choose to do so.¹

(CUI) During our site visit in April 2022, we determined that the ASG-Balkans provided adequate support, such as lodging, security, and medical care, temporarily housed at Camp Liya. For example, the ASG-Balkans provided the Afghan travelers with individual beds inside tents with electricity and internet connectivity; food and water; layered security within Camp Liya; and medical exams, immunizations, access to specialty care, and off-base emergency medical care. However, the ASG-Balkans faces logistical challenges in providing continued lodging, security, and medical care for the travelers.

(U) During our evaluation, we learned that the ASG-Balkans Commander conducted After Action Reviews documenting lodging, security, and medical lessons learned. In September 2022, we were provided an After Action Review with 12 observations by the Inspector General for the 21st Theater Sustainment Command. In addition, the ASG-Balkans Commander stated that ASG-Balkans personnel have been conducting After Action Reviews since September 2021 because Camp Liya’s mission was extended until August 31, 2023, and to assist in the event that a similar operation occurs in the future. The ASG-Balkans Commander stated that ASG-Balkans maintains a running After Action Review in Microsoft TEAMs.

¹ (U) In this report, we use the word travelers, the term regularly used by officials at Camp Bondsteel and in related contracts, memorandums, and other documents, to describe Afghan nationals and their family members who evacuated from Afghanistan.
(U) **Objective**

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which the DoD provided adequate lodging, security, and medical care for Afghan evacuees diverted to Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, for further processing.

(U) **Background**

(U) In August 2021, Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, was selected as one of several locations worldwide to vet, process, and temporarily house Afghan nationals who were evacuated from Afghanistan.

(U) **Operation Allies Refuge**

(U) During Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, the U.S. Government employed Afghans in supporting roles to assist in the operations. As a result of that employment, some Afghans and their families faced serious and ongoing threats and increased risk of retaliation from the Taliban. On July 14, 2021, the President announced Operation Allies Refuge, with the DOS as the lead Federal agency, to support the relocation of interested and eligible Afghan nationals, and their immediate families, who had supported the U.S. Government in Afghanistan and applied for a Special Immigrant Visa (SIV).

(U) In August 2021, the Taliban rapidly gained control of Afghanistan’s cities, culminating in the seizure of the country’s capital, Kabul. On August 30, 2021, the DoD, in support of the DOS, began conducting the largest airlift in U.S. history, evacuating more than 120,000 people from Afghanistan in just 17 days. To support evacuees, the DOS requested and received DoD support in the form of temporary housing, sustainment, and other support at suitable DoD facilities both within and outside the continental United States.

(U) **Operation Allies Welcome**

(U) On August 29, 2021, the President announced that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would serve as the lead Federal agency for Operation Allies Welcome (OAW). OAW is a coordinated effort to implement initiatives across the Federal government to support displaced persons from Afghanistan through a broad range of services. The DHS, in coordination with the DoD, DOS, and other Federal agencies, processes, screens, and vets Afghan evacuees. The DOS and the Department of Health and Human Services are responsible for the final resettlement and integration efforts of the evacuees. The OAW screening and vetting process involves biometric and biographic screenings conducted by intelligence, law enforcement, and counterterrorism professionals from the DHS, DoD, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and additional Intelligence Community (IC) partners.
(U) DoD Roles and Responsibilities Supporting Operation Allies Welcome

as well as planners to support the DOS Interagency Afghan Coordination Task Force. On August 18, 2021, the Secretary of Defense issued Verbal Orders of the Commander to the Commander of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) authorizing the USEUCOM Commander to allow the DOS to use an area within Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, to house individuals at risk as a result of the situation in Afghanistan.

(U) Area Support Group–Balkans' Roles and Responsibilities

(U) Following the Kosovo War, which ended in June 1999, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and the military technical arrangement between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Kosovo Force and the former Republics of Yugoslavia and Serbia granted the DoD and the Department of the Army operational control of the area upon which Camp Bondsteel was established. The DoD and the Department of the Army, through the ASG-Balkans, continue to exercise operational control of Camp Bondsteel, with the base operations mission at Camp Bondsteel and a forward operating office at Camp Butmir, Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ASG-Balkans acts as the U.S. Army Europe and Africa Executive Agent for support of contingency operations in the Balkans. Additionally, the ASG-Balkans supervises and directs base camp activities and implements policies, procedures, and programs to ensure the safety and security of all Camp Bondsteel occupants.

(U) As part of the Secretary of Defense's authorization allowing the DOS to use the area within Camp Bondsteel to house Afghan evacuees, the Secretary made the use of the camp contingent upon agreement of the Kosovo government and a signed lease between the DoD and the DOS. On August 25, 2021, the government of Kosovo agreed to temporarily host Afghans for up to 365 days to facilitate U.S. efforts to resettle evacuees on a permanent basis in another location.

---

(U) **Camp Liya**

Camp Liya, a separate camp established within the confines of Camp Bondsteel, is the logistical support area in which the U.S. Government provides lodging, sustainment, processing, and onward movement support to Afghan travelers in Kosovo. Camp Liya was designed to support a maximum of 600 personnel, and at the time of our site visit in April 2022, there were 75 Afghan travelers housed and supported at Camp Liya. As of July 29, 2022, 759 Afghan travelers had cycled through the Camp.

(U) **The DoD's Role in the Security of Afghan Travelers**

(U) Although the DOS has operational control of Camp Liya, the DoD provides or facilitates the preponderance of support for the camp. According to ASG-Balkans personnel, the DoD's role is humanitarian, not a combat or detention mission. While ASG-Balkans personnel instruct the travelers not to leave Camp Liya, ASG-Balkans Security Forces (SF) personnel are not authorized to stop travelers from leaving if they choose to do so.³ For example, according to the terms of the U.S.-Kosovo agreement, travelers should not leave Camp Liya except for urgent or emergency care that could not be provided at Camp Liya and scheduled medical appointments at Kosovo hospitals or onward movement to the United States or another country. If a traveler leaves Camp Liya outside of the established process, it could result in the individual's disqualification from the SIV/Humanitarian Parole application process.

---

³ (U) The ASG-Balkans SF personnel are U.S. military Service members.
(U) Finding

(U) Area Support Group–Balkans Provided Adequate Lodging, Security, and Medical Care for Afghan Evacuees, but May Face Challenges with an Enduring Mission

During our site visit in April 2022, we observed that ASG-Balkans provided adequate support, such as lodging, security, and medical care, diverted to Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, for further processing. For example, ASG-Balkans provided the 75 Afghan travelers with:

- (U) individual beds inside tents with electricity and internet connectivity;
- (U) food and water;
- (U) layered security within Camp Liya; and
- (U) medical exams, immunizations, access to specialty care, and off-base emergency care.

However, ASG-Balkans personnel noted the following challenges with lodging, security, and medical care for Afghan travelers as OAW endures.

- (U) The lodging tent shape and layout installed by a contractor was different from the shape and layout that was requested by the ASG-Balkans in the service contract. According to ASG-Balkans personnel, the contractor was unable to procure the specified lodging tents in time to support the impending arrival of the refugees. During our site visit in April 2022, we observed that the current tent shape and layout could create a potential electrical and fire safety hazard because of the need to link multiple electrical cords to work around the structural problems posed by different tent configurations. However, ASG-Balkans personnel accepted the tents provided by the contractor and mitigated the risk of electrical and fire safety hazards by performing daily safety inspections to identify and address the potential hazards.

- (U) DOS delays in determining the status of the disposition of the Afghan travelers and notifying them of their status could result in dwindling morale among the Afghan travelers, potentially resulting in security challenges.

---

4 (U) ASG-Balkans personnel stated that they requested a higher quantity of smaller tents, but the contractor was only able to acquire larger tents in such a short period of time. The first Afghan refugees arrived at Camp Liya on September 4, 2021, just 11 days after the base was authorized to stand up, leaving little time for the contractor to procure the requested tents.
(U) The uncertain duration of the travelers’ stay at Camp Liya impacts decisions about their treatment of chronic medical conditions. For example, certain medical tests required to treat a traveler’s chronic medical condition may not be ordered because Camp Liya medical personnel do not know how long that traveler may stay at Camp Liya before departing.

(U) These challenges occurred because:

- (U) the contractor was unable to procure the specific lodging tents requested by the ASG-Balkans given the limited advance notice provided by the DOS and the Commander of U.S. European Command; and
- (U) the DOS has operational control of Camp Liya with the DoD in an assisting role, and the DOS, not the DoD, controls the length of stay of each Afghan traveler.

(U) ASG-Balkans officials stated that they will likely encounter challenges as the length of stay for the Afghan travelers’ increases. During our evaluation, Camp Liya was expected to conclude operations in August 2022 but, according to ASG-Balkans personnel, they were preparing for the mission at Camp Liya to continue beyond that date. On July 29, 2022, ASG-Balkans personnel informed us that Camp Liya is currently projected to close on August 31, 2023.

(U) We briefed the ASG-Balkans Commander on our findings at the end of our site visit to Camp Bondsteel in April 2022. We learned that the ASG-Balkans Commander conducted After Action Reviews documenting lodging, security, and medical lessons learned. In September 2022, we were provided an After Action Review with 12 observations by the Inspector General for the 21st Theater Sustainment Command. In addition, the ASG-Balkans Commander stated that he has conducted After Action Reviews since September 2021 because Camp Liya’s mission was extended until August 31, 2023, and to assist in the event that a similar operation occurs in the future. The ASG-Balkans Commander stated that ASG-Balkans maintains a running After Action Review in Microsoft Teams. The After Action Review will help the ASG-Balkans and other DoD organizations prepare for potential future large-scale evacuations and life support operations for civilians.
(U) Area Support Group—Balkans Provided Adequate Lodging, Security, and Medical Care to Afghan Evacuees

(U) At Camp Liya, we determined that ASG-Balkans provided adequate support for the Afghan travelers under OAW. Specifically, ASG-Balkans provided lodging, security, and medical care for the Afghan travelers awaiting further processing. Despite having had minimal time to prepare, ASG-Balkans had hosted 759 Afghan travelers as of July 29, 2022.

(U) Lodging, Food, Recreation, and Religious Services

(U) ASG-Balkans personnel provided the Afghan travelers with lodging, a variety of food options, recreation opportunities, and access to religious services.

(U) Lodging Facilities at Camp Liya

(U) ASG-Balkans personnel constructed 13 large temporary tents and 2 containerized units as living quarters to lodge a maximum of 600 Afghan travelers. Specifically, ASG-Balkans personnel constructed:

- (U) Tent 1 (unoccupied housing, designated as an isolation area for travelers presenting with communicable diseases);
- (U) Tents 2, 3, 4, 5, and 9 (housing for single males);
- (U) Tent 6 (used as a gym at the time of our site visit);
- (U) Tents 7 and 10 (housing for families);
- (U) Tent 12 (multipurpose area used as a library and mosque);
- (U) Tent 13 (multipurpose area used as a classroom and staging area for in-processing Afghan travelers);
- (U) Tent 14 (administrative area);
- (U) Tent 18 (kitchen and dining facility);
- (U) a containerized shower unit near Tent 12; and
- (U) a containerized latrine unit near Tent 7.

(U) All living quarters had electricity and mobile phone chargers. Internet was provided throughout Camp Liya via Wi-Fi. Camp Liya personnel assigned each Afghan traveler to an individual bed within the appropriate tent. We visually inspected the exterior of the tents and the containerized shower and latrine to

---

5 (U) Containerized units are designed for field operations. Containerized toilet units (CTUs) provide basic amenities inside a rugged 20-foot International Organization for Standardization (ISO) container. Each unit includes interior lighting, flushing toilets, sinks, ventilation, and privacy walls. Units can be operated independently or combined with additional restroom units to support larger events. They can be positioned on the ground or left on the chassis for added flexibility. CTUs are ideal for military exercises, special events, or disaster relief operations.
(U) identify any potential structural integrity, electrical system safety, wastewater, and storm water runoff control problems, or other hazards. Additionally, we visually inspected the interior of the tents and the containerized shower and latrine units to identify any potential fire protection, electrical system safety, heating, ventilation, air conditioning, mechanical, plumbing, or other problems or hazards. We did not identify any imminent threats to the health and safety of the occupants of the facilities.

(U) In addition, we visually inspected the current tent shape and layout and observed one instance where a resident had connected extension cords and power strips in a chain, which is a safety hazard. However, we also saw evidence that ASG-Balkans personnel attempted to mitigate electrical safety issues during daily safety walkthroughs of the tents.

(U) Food and Water

(CUI) Camp Liya has one dining facility that served three hot and culturally-appropriate meals per day present at the camp during the evaluation.6 Camp Liya personnel stated that Afghan travelers provided input on the content and preparation of their food through a 21-day menu. Camp Liya also provides Afghan travelers access to potable water by positioning bottled water throughout the camp.

(U) Shower and Restroom Facilities

(CUI) ASG-Balkans provided for the Afghan travelers on Camp Liya. Contractors maintain and clean the showers and restrooms three times daily. We observed that the showers and restrooms were segregated by gender, with clear signage indicating the appropriate gender for each facility. We observed that many of the shower and restroom facilities were vacant and there were no lines waiting to use the restroom or shower facilities. We concluded that there was an adequate number of restrooms and shower facilities for the Afghan travelers on Camp Liya.7

(U) Education and Recreation

(U) To ensure adult Afghan travelers are culturally equipped for relocating, ASG-Balkans personnel—in coordination with ASG-Balkans SF personnel, civil affairs personnel, and DOS personnel—host classes, including cultural integration lessons, parenting lessons, and a variety of vocational classes, such as first aid, computer skills, accounting, and sewing. We observed the daily class schedule in

---

6 (U) The dining facility is designed to, and can, accommodate three meals for 600 persons per day.

7 (U) The shower and restroom facilities meet the requirements to support a 600-person capacity camp.
(U) the dining room, and ASG-Balkans SF personnel stated that the Afghan travelers enjoy the classes. The classes are offered when either enough interest is expressed or instructors and resources become available.

(U) Children receive basic education in English, math, science, and history. Children are also offered opportunities to pursue art and recreational classes, such as music. Gender and age-specific classes are also offered on health, U.S. health care, mental health, and other topics that could be culturally insensitive to address in mixed age or gender environments. We also observed ASG-Balkans SF personnel doing CrossFit with the Afghan travelers.

**(U) Multi-Purpose Facility**

(U) To ensure that the religious needs of the Afghan travelers are met, ASG-Balkans personnel established a Multi-Purpose Facility at Camp Liya and stated that religious support is scheduled biweekly and is provided by an Imam from the local community. Additional support is coordinated, as needed, to ensure that religious support is available on significant holidays or as requested for significant events.

**(U) Physical Security and Security Procedures at Camp Liya**

(U) ASG-Balkans SF personnel maintain Afghan traveler accountability, perimeter security, and encampment security to ensure the environment at Camp Liya is safe for the Afghan travelers. Additionally, ASG-Balkans personnel established and maintain multiple lines of communication with Afghan travelers to maintain a safe environment at Camp Liya.

**(U) Accountability Screening**

(U) Upon the arrival of an Afghan traveler at Camp Liya, ASG-Balkans SF personnel document Afghan travelers on an accountability spreadsheet, which captures each individual’s name, age, and their assigned housing number. In addition, ASG-Balkans SF personnel account for each traveler when they receive their meals at the dining facility. ASG-Balkans SF personnel stated that if an Afghan traveler does not check in for two meals during the day, ASG-Balkans SF personnel search Camp Liya to ensure the well-being of the Afghan traveler and the safety of Camp Liya.

**(U) Perimeter Security**

(U) ASG-Balkans SF personnel stated that fencing was installed around Camp Liya to provide a boundary, but it is not a secure barrier. Within Camp Liya, we observed mobile fencing, approximately 6 feet tall, surrounding lodging, equipment such as generators, and the medical facility. ASG-Balkans SF personnel stated
(U) that the fencing is not intended to restrict Afghan traveler movement since the mission with regard to travelers is a humanitarian mission and not a combat or detention mission.

(U) **Encampment Security**

(U) ASG-Balkans SF personnel implemented a layered approach to security within Camp Liya. We observed several layers of security, including access control points, ASG-Balkans SF personnel roaming patrols, and observation posts. As part of the humanitarian mission, ASG-Balkans SF personnel maintain security and control of Camp Liya and provide immediate response to incidents posing a risk to security, life, limb, and eyesight, such as physical conflicts between Afghan travelers. However, they are not responsible for detaining Afghan travelers.

(U) **Afghan Evacuees’ Lines of Communication**

(U) To ensure safety and maintain morale, ASG-Balkans personnel stated that there are multiple lines of communication with Afghan travelers. For example, we observed one of the twice-weekly town halls with Afghan travelers that the Camp Bondsteel Commander held to provide information, address hygiene concerns, and discuss Camp Liya changes. ASG-Balkans personnel stated that the town hall is open to all the Afghan travelers and there are interpreters who attend the town halls to assist with translation. Additionally, ASG-Balkans SF personnel have regular one-on-one interaction with travelers and ASG-Balkans personnel coordinate closely with the DOS to share information.

(U) **Medical Care**

(U) Camp Liya medical personnel provided medical care, including:

- (U) initial medical screenings of all arriving Afghan travelers;
- (U) immunizations required by the immigration process; and
- (U) medical services to preserve the health and well-being of Afghan travelers.
ASG-Balkans personnel realized that this was a challenge due to the behavioral health needs of the traveler population and, in April 2022, Camp Liya transitioned to contracted medical facilities.

(U) Immigration Screenings and Vaccinations

To satisfy the immigration requirements and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention-mandated immigration vaccinations, Afghan travelers receive a medical screening that includes a routine physical examination. In addition, Camp Liya's contracted medical personnel provide Afghan travelers with vaccinations, medical screening and referral, and psychological assistance. Camp Liya's contracted medical personnel stated that if an inbound Afghan traveler with special needs is identified, the traveler is referred to the appropriate service provider onsite, and if the service is not available onsite then the traveler is referred to an offsite medical provider in Kosovo. Afghan traveler medical records generated during their time at Camp Liya are documented electronically and retained by the contracted medical personnel until the Afghan traveler is ready to depart Camp Liya. Each Afghan traveler receives a copy of their medical records, which includes their immunization record, when they depart Camp Liya.

(U) Access to Specialized Care

Camp Liya's contracted medical facility is equivalent to a Role 1 plus medical facility. A Role 1 facility provides basic healthcare, qualified medical care, triage, and stabilization of vitals. A Role 1 plus facility provides additional services, such as mental health. Camp Liya's contracted medical personnel include pediatrics, family medicine, obstetrics and gynecology specialists, and behavioral health psychologists. The contracted medical personnel told us that, with the Afghan travelers' extended stay at Camp Liya, mental health care is important.

(U) Emergency and Off-Base Medical Care

In addition to providing routine medical care, ASG-Balkans arranged for Afghan traveler transport to off-base hospitals for urgent or emergency care, such as dental procedures, that could not be provided by the contracted medical personnel at Camp Liya.
(U) ASG-Balkans Faces Potential Future Challenges for Lodging, Security, and Medical Care for Afghan Travelers

(U) ASG-Balkans could face challenges with lodging, security, and medical care for Afghan travelers as OAW endures.

(U) Lodging

(U) The current tent shape and layout may lead to potential electrical and fire safety hazards because of the need to link multiple electrical cords if the Camp Liya reaches its maximum capacity of Afghan travelers. Although it is possible for the residents of the tents to connect multiple power strips and extension cords, we observed that ASG-Balkans personnel attempted to mitigate electrical safety by conducting recurring safety walkthroughs of the tents, where they corrected the issues.

(U) Security

(U) ASG-Balkans SF personnel at Camp Liya stated that, in some cases, the screening and vetting process can be lengthy, which can result in some travelers having a lengthy stay at Camp Liya. The uncertainty associated with a traveler's length of stay could result in travelers' diminished morale, which could result in security challenges.

(U) Medical

(U) Contracted medical personnel stated that the uncertain duration of an Afghan travelers' stay at Camp Liya impacts decisions about the long-term treatment of any chronic medical conditions travelers may have. For example, certain medical tests required to establish or confirm long-term treatment of a traveler's chronic medical condition may not be ordered immediately because Camp Liya medical personnel do not know how long that traveler may stay at Camp Liya before departing.

(U) A Surge in Afghan Travelers Could Result in Challenges for Area Support Group–Balkans

(U) ASG-Balkans may encounter future lodging, security, and medical care challenges for Afghan travelers due to the limited advance notice provided before the arrival of Afghan travelers and the DoD’s reliance on the DOS to determine when each Afghan traveler will depart Camp Liya. ASG-Balkans officials stated that they will likely encounter additional challenges as the length of stay for Afghan traveler increases. The mission is currently expected to end on August 31, 2023.
(U) Recommendation

(U) We recommend that Commander of Area Support Group–Balkans document the lessons learned for lodging, security, and medical care for Afghan evacuees and provide the lessons learned through the chain of command for review and distribution to interagency partners.

(U) After Action Review

(U) During our evaluation, we learned that the ASG-Balkans Commander conducted After Action Reviews documenting lodging, security, medical, and other lessons learned, with input from interagency partners such as the DOS and DHS. In September 2022, we asked for and received an ASG-Balkans After Action Review from the Inspector General for the 21st Theater Sustainment Command.

(U) The ASG-Balkans Commander's After Action Review provided 12 observations with recommendations for improving five issues observed and sustaining the status quo of seven issues observed. For example, the ASG-Balkans Commander noted that ASG-Balkans food service professionals ensured quality and nutritious food options for Camp Liya's Afghan travelers and should continue sustaining this status. In another example, the ASG-Balkans Commander made a recommendation to account for items that pose a potential threat, such as scissors. ASG-Balkans SF personnel implemented an accountability system for scissors, which involves maintaining a log of the quantity available, number issued for use, and number of scissors returned. The ASG-Balkans Commander stated that ASG-Balkans maintains a running After Action Review in MS TEAMS. The ASG-Balkans Commander's After Action Review addressed the specifics of the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved and closed.

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from March 2022 through August 2022 in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation,” published in December 2020 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.
(U) We identified and reviewed policies, directives, and orders related to the lodging, security, and medical care of Afghan evacuees diverted to Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, for further processing to determine the extent to which the DoD has provided adequate lodging, security, and medical care while at Camp Liya. Specifically, our evaluation included the following criteria.

- (U) Joint Publication 3-68
- (U) Army in Europe Regulation 420-100
- (U) United Facilities Criteria 1-201-01
- (U) Army Field Manual 4-02, "Army Health System"
- (U) Army Techniques Procedure 4-02.55
- (U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01B, “Standing Rules for The Use of Force for U.S. Forces”
- (U) Army in Europe, “Standing Rules for The Use of Force for US Forces,” Appendix - AER 525-13
- (U) 10 U.S. Code 2561

(U) We conducted an entrance conference with personnel from the U.S. Army Europe and Africa to determine their respective roles and the extent to which the DoD has provided adequate lodging, security, and medical care for Afghan evacuees diverted to Camp Bondsteel for further processing.

(U) We conducted a site visit at Camp Bondsteel in April 2022 and met with ASG-Balkans personnel to discuss their role in providing lodging, security, and medical care for Afghan evacuees diverted to Camp Bondsteel for further processing. During our site visit, we focused on the adequacy of lodging, security, and medical care and the potential shortfalls, issues, and concerns related to those activities.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) From November 2021 through March 2022, the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) issued 12 reports on the DoD support for the relocation of Afghan Nationals. The DoD OIG reports can be accessed at http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/.
(U) DoD OIG


(U) This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from a DoD OIG site visit to Task Force (TF) Camp Atterbury, Indiana. The DoD OIG reviewed TF Camp Atterbury operations as part of the “Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals” (Project No. D2021-D000RJ-0154.000). While TF Camp Atterbury housed and sustained Afghan evacuees, task force personnel experienced challenges, such as communicating with Afghan evacuees, tracking medical records, and addressing security incidents. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.


(U) This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from a DoD OIG site visit to TF Holloman at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico. The DoD OIG reviewed TF Holloman operations as part of the “Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals” (Project No. D2021-D000RJ-0154.000). While TF Holloman housed and sustained Afghan evacuees, task force personnel experienced challenges due to limited resources in the local economy, such as purchasing needed supplies and providing medical care for Afghan evacuees. Additionally, the base operations and support services contractor experienced challenges hiring personnel. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.


(U) This management advisory informed DoD leadership of the lack of MOAs between the DoD and the DHS and DOS for DoD support for Operation Allies Welcome. As part of the “Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals” (Project No. D2021-D000RJ-0154.000), the DoD OIG visited eight DoD task forces at eight installations between September 16 and November 12, 2021. During those site visits, the DoD OIG identified the lack of MOAs as a systemic issue that caused confusion concerning the roles and
(U) responsibilities of DoD, DOS, and DHS personnel and limited the effectiveness of task force operations. The audit identified several areas where roles and responsibilities between the DoD, DOS, and DHS were unclear, including decision making at the task force level, accountability of Afghan evacuees, law enforcement jurisdiction, and provision of services beyond basic sustainment. In addition, not establishing an overarching MOA at the Department level or MOAs at the installation level created confusion and put the DoD at risk of not receiving reimbursement for all or part of the costs incurred on behalf of interagency partners. The DoD OIG made one recommendation that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy establish MOAs with the appropriate interagency partners to clarify roles and responsibilities and to define cost-sharing and reimbursement terms and conditions for Operation Allies Welcome, in accordance with DoD policy and the Economy Act.


(U) This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from a DoD OIG site visit to TF Bliss at Fort Bliss, Texas. TF Bliss used the Doña Ana Range Complex, New Mexico, to support the mission. The DoD OIG reviewed TF Bliss operations as part of the “Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals” (Project No. D2021-D000RJ-0154.000). While TF Bliss housed and sustained Afghan evacuees, task force personnel experienced challenges, such as contractor medical providers obtaining licenses to practice in New Mexico and inadequate implementation of security measures. Additionally, according to TF Bliss personnel, the extensive use of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, for the TF Bliss mission degraded the 2nd Brigade Combat Team’s ability to train for future combat missions. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.


(U) This evaluation determined that the DoD had a supporting role during the biometric enrollment of Afghan evacuees in staging locations outside the continental United States and assisted in screening SIV applicants. However, the DoD did not have a role in enrolling, screening, or overseeing the departure of Afghan parolees at temporary housing facilities (safe havens) within the continental United States. The evaluation found that Afghan evacuees were not vetted by the National Counter Terrorism Center using all DoD data prior
(U) to arriving in the continental United States. This occurred because Customs and Border Patrol enrollments were compared against the DHS Automated Biometric Identification System data, which did not initially include all biometric data located in the DoD Automated Biometric Identification System database. In addition, the DoD’s National Ground Intelligence Center has agreements with foreign partners that prohibit the sharing of some Automated Biometric Identification System data with U.S. agencies outside of the DoD. The evaluation also found that, during their analytic review, National Ground Intelligence Center personnel identified Afghans with derogatory information in the DoD Automated Biometric Identification System database who were believed to be in the United States. The DoD OIG made two recommendations, including that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security develop procedures for sharing derogatory information on Afghan evacuees with the DoD and interagency stakeholders.


(U) This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from a DoD OIG site visit to TF McCoy at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. The DoD OIG reviewed TF McCoy operations as part of the “Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals” (Project No. D2021-D000RJ-0154.000). While TF McCoy housed and sustained Afghan evacuees, task force personnel experienced challenges, such as maintaining dining facilities, identifying required contracted medical skill sets, providing behavioral health services, and holding Afghan evacuees accountable for misdemeanor crimes. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.


(U) This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from a DoD OIG site visit to TF Liberty at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey. The DoD OIG reviewed TF Liberty operations as part of the “Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals” (Project No. D2021-D000RJ-0154.000). While TF Liberty housed and sustained Afghan evacuees, the DoD OIG identified potential procedural obstacles for law enforcement officers investigating potential
(U) criminal activity and challenges for other security personnel ensuring only those with proper credentials could access the villages. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.


(U) This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from a DoD OIG site visit to TF Pickett at Fort Pickett, Virginia. The DoD OIG reviewed TF Pickett operations as part of the "Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals" (Project No. D2021-D000RJ-0154.000). While TF Pickett housed and sustained Afghan evacuees, task force personnel experienced challenges, such as providing medical screenings and medical care and ensuring accountability of Afghan evacuees. TF Pickett personnel also experienced security challenges, including controlling access to the joint operations area where Afghan evacuees were located and holding Afghan evacuees accountable for misdemeanor crimes. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.


(U) This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from the DoD OIG site visit to TF Quantico at Marine Corps Base (MCB) Quantico, Virginia. The DoD OIG reviewed TF Quantico operations as part of the "Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals" (Project No. D2021-D000RJ-0154.000). While TF Quantico housed and sustained Afghan evacuees, task force personnel experienced challenges, such as ensuring accountability of Afghan evacuees and providing Afghan evacuees with all 13 immunizations required by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. In addition, the 2nd Marine Logistics Group, the main Marine Corps unit supporting TF Quantico, dedicated resources to support the effort, including personnel, equipment, and supplies. The extensive use of the 2nd Marine Logistics Group personnel and equipment resulted in missed training opportunities and increased wear and tear on the 2nd Marine Logistics Group’s equipment. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.

(U) This management advisory provided the officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from the DoD OIG site visit to TF Eagle at Fort Lee, Virginia. The DoD OIG reviewed TF Eagle operations as part of the “Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals” (Project No. D2021-D000RJ-0154.000). TF Eagle housed and sustained Afghan evacuees, and aside from one fire and safety issue in the privately-owned hotel used for housing Afghan refugees, the DoD OIG did not identify any significant issues or challenges at TF Eagle. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.


(U) This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for the relocation of Afghan evacuees with the results from the DoD OIG site visit to Rhine Ordnance Barracks, Germany. The DoD OIG reviewed Rhine Ordnance Barracks operations as part of the ongoing “Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals” (Project No. D2021-D000RJ-0154.000). While Rhine Ordnance Barracks personnel provided sustainment resources and had security measures in place to help ensure Afghan evacuees, Service members, and volunteers were safe, the execution of this effort came at a significant cost to the 21st Theater Sustainment Command. Specifically, the 21st Theater Sustainment Command reported that, as of September 30, 2021, it had obligated $37.5 million in support of Operation Allies Refuge and anticipated that it would continue to incur additional costs in FY 2022. The 21st Theater Sustainment Command reported that Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid funding had replenished the majority of incurred costs. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.


(U) This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for the relocation of Afghan evacuees with the results from the DoD OIG site visit to Ramstein Air Base, Germany, on September 14, 2021, where the audit team observed the housing conditions and support of Afghan evacuees.
(U) The DoD OIG reviewed 86th Airlift Wing operations at Ramstein as part of the ongoing “Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals” (Project No. D2021-D000RJ-0154.000). The DoD OIG determined that the 86th Airlift Wing

(U) and other personnel supporting Operation Allies Refuge at Ramstein Air Base implemented procedures for identifying and screening Afghan evacuees and provided living conditions and other resources to meet Afghan evacuees’ basic needs. Additionally, the DoD OIG determined that 86th Airlift Wing personnel had security measures in place to help ensure that Afghan evacuees, Service member volunteers, and local residents were safe. However, the execution of this effort did come at a significant cost to the Command. The 86th Airlift Wing dedicated substantial resources, including funds, staff, equipment, and supplies, to support the effort. The 86th Airlift Wing reported approximately $56.3 million in FY 2021 funds spent on the Operation Allies Refuge effort at Ramstein Air Base. Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid funding replenished all costs. The 86th Airlift Wing expected an additional $50 million in FY 2022 costs. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.
Whistleblower Protection
U.S. Department of Defense

Whistleblower Protection safeguards DoD employees against retaliation for protected disclosures that expose possible fraud, waste, and abuse in Government programs. For more information, please visit the Whistleblower webpage at http://www.dodig.mil/Components/Administrative-Investigations/Whistleblower-Reprisal-Investigations/Whistleblower-Reprisal/ or contact the Whistleblower Protection Coordinator at Whistleblowerprotectioncoordinator@dodig.mil

For more information about DoD OIG reports or activities, please contact us:

Congressional Liaison
703.604.8324

Media Contact
public.affairs@dodig.mil; 703.604.8324

DoD OIG Mailing Lists
www.dodig.mil/Mailing-Lists/

Twitter
www.twitter.com/DoD_IG

DoD Hotline
www.dodig.mil/hotline