




# INSPECTOR GENERAL

*Department of Defense*

January 5, 2015



## Evaluation of Defense Sensitive Support (U)

INTEGRITY ★ EFFICIENCY ★ ACCOUNTABILITY ★ EXCELLENCE

Derived from: Multiple Sources  
Reason: 1.4(a),(c),(e), and (g)  
Declassify on: 15 January 2040

Released in response to  
FOIA-2015-00264

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# Results in Brief

## *Evaluation of Defense Sensitive Support*

January 5, 2015

### (U) What We Did

(U//~~FOUO~~) We conducted an evaluation of the Defense Sensitive Support (DSS) process, to determine if the authorities, roles, responsibilities, and oversight procedures are compliant with policy.

### (U) What We Found

(U//~~FOUO~~) The DSS process is not as efficient as it could be due to outdated DoD-level policy or non-existent DoD component-level policy.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Four of the DoD components evaluated lacked internal controls for obtaining and tracking reimbursements of DSS.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Periodic oversight is conducted during DSS; however, no requirement exists for DoD personnel to provide an after action report or like product verifying the support provided was what was coordinated and approved.

### (U) What We Recommend

(U) Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) (USD(I)) update the DoD Directive (DoDD) S-5210.36, "Provision of DoD Sensitive Support to DoD Components and Other Department and Agencies of the U.S. Government" Dated November 6, 2008 to include reference to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3213.03F.

(U//~~FOUO~~) DIA designate a DSS Office (DSSO) in accordance with CJCSM 3213.03F as well as create an internal DSS policy to establish a formal DSS program that will improve its request process, track reimbursable expenses, and institute an oversight mechanism.

(S//~~NF~~//~~ACCM~~ ~~OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)~~) ~~OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)~~

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Defense Sensitive Support Activity Office (DSSAO) implement a validation process to verify the DSS provided by DoD was the support requested and approved.

### (U) Management Comments

(U) The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), non-concurred with portions of the recommendations made in the report.

(U) Director, DIA, non-concurred with all recommendations in the report.

(U) The comments of the Director, NSA; Director, NRO, Director, NGA; and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, & Requirements, Headquarters Air Force, were responsive to the recommendations and identified actions that met our recommendations' intent.

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**(U) Recommendations Table**

<i>Management (U)</i>	<i>Recommendations Requiring Comment (U)</i>	<i>No additional Comments Required (U)</i>
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) to include the Defense Sensitive Support Activity Office (U)		A.1.a., A.2.a., A.1.b., A.2.b., A.2.c.; B.1., B.2.; C.1.a., C.1.b., C.2.a., C.2.b.1,2,3,4
Headquarters Air Force (HAF), Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements (U)		A.4.
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) (U)		A.3.; A.4.; B.3.
Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) (U)		A.4.; B.3.
Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) (U)		A.4.; B.3.
Director, National Security Agency (NSA) (U)		B.3.

(U) This table is unclassified.





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JAN 5 2015


(U) MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY  
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE  
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

(U) SUBJECT: Final Report--Evaluation of Defense Sensitive Support  
(Report No. DODIG-2015-065)

(U) We are providing this report for your information and action. We conducted an evaluation of the Defense Sensitive Support process. This evaluation derived from information received during fieldwork related to a previous report, "Release of Department of Defense Information to the Media," Report Number 2013-092.

(U) We considered comments received from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Director, Special Management, U.S. Air Force; Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; [REDACTED] NRO: (b)(3) 10 USC 424 [REDACTED] National Reconnaissance Office; Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and Chief of Staff, National Security Agency, in preparing the final report. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, did not concur with all recommendations in the report. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, responded with a non-concurrence to our recommendations. Our responses to management comments are on pages 11-14, 24-27, and 34.

(U//FOUO) We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff. Please direct questions to me at (703) 882-[REDACTED] DODIG (b)(6) DSN 499-[REDACTED] DODIG (b)(6)

  
Anthony C. Thomas  
Deputy Inspector General for  
Intelligence and Special  
Program Assessments

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**(U) Introduction**

## **(U) Introduction**

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### **(U) Objective**

(U//~~FOUO~~) We conducted an evaluation of the Defense Sensitive Support (DSS) process. Specifically, we evaluated the authorities, roles, responsibilities, and oversight procedures for provisions of DSS to non-DoD federal departments and agencies (NDFDAs) to verify if the DoD components are compliant with policy.

### **(U) Background**

#### ***(U) Prior Reporting***

---

(U) On August 9, 2011, then-Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, the Honorable Peter King, wrote a letter to both the DoD and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Inspectors General (IG) regarding his concerns over “leaks of classified information regarding sensitive military operations.” Chairman King was particularly concerned about a New York Times column published on August 6, 2011, that claimed a named movie producer had received “top-level access to the most classified mission in history,” in reference to the operation to kill Usama bin Laden.

(U) Representative King requested that the DoD and CIA Inspectors General conduct an investigation and provide a classified briefing related to the alleged release of classified and sensitive information to movie producers regarding the Usama bin Laden raid operation. In response, the DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued Report No. 2013-092, “Release of Department of Defense Information to the Media,” on June 14, 2013.

(~~TS//NF//ACCM~~)

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

### ***(U) Defense Sensitive Support***

---

(~~S//NF~~)

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)



## (U) Introduction

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Defense Sensitive Support Activity (DSSA) is the required system for processing, approving, and executing DSS requests. The DSSAO is the USD(I)'s organizational element responsible for oversight of the DSSA and the primary point of entry for all DSS requests.

(S//~~NF~~//ACCM

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

(U//~~FOUO~~) The DoDD S-5210.36 requires establishing a DSS Office (DSSO) at the Joint Staff and the Military Departments (MILDEPs) and requires the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities to designate a point of contact to process DSS requests. The CJCSM 3213.03F increases the number of DoD components required to establish a DSSO to also include the Combatant Commands, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and National Security Agency (NSA).

---

<sup>1</sup> CJCSM 3213.03E updated during this evaluation: CJCSM 3213.03F issued on April 15, 2013. Applicability did not change. CJCSM 3213.03F referenced throughout the report for accuracy.

(U) Finding A

## (U) Finding A

### (U//~~FOUO~~) DSS policy is lacking or outdated

(U) The DSS process is not as efficient as it could be because:

- (U//~~FOUO~~) DoDD S-5210.36 does not identify CJCSM 3213.03F as a reference of detailed guidance for the DSS program;
- (U//~~FOUO~~) DoD component-level issuances identifying DSS requirements or responsible offices are either outdated, incomplete, or non-existent;
- (U//~~FOUO~~) DIA does not have a DSSO, as CJCSM 3213.03F requires; and
- (S//NF//ACGM ~~OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)~~) ~~OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)~~

(S//NF//ACGM ~~OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)~~) ~~OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)~~

## (U) Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff

### (U) Defense Sensitive Support Staffing

(U//~~FOUO~~) The two capstone issuances for DSS are DoDD S-5210.36 and CJCSM 3213.03F. DoDD S-5210.36 requires that: all requests for DSS be processed through the DSS activity (DSSA); the DSSA be managed by the DSSA Office (DSSAO); and the DSSA have a process for staffing, as required, throughout DoD. According to the Joint Staff, J-39, Support Activities Branch (SAB), the DSSAO validates the requirement and obtains a SAS-D number (OSD Staffing number provided through the Staff Action Control and Coordination Program (SACCP). The SACCP is the OSD's program for staffing management. The SAB--Joint Staff's DSSO--uses the Joint Staff Action Process (JSAP) to staff, track, manage, and obtain concurrences and non-concurrences of all DSS requests.

**(U) Finding A**

(U//~~FOUO~~) All DSS requests are required to enter DoD through the DSSAO, which staffs DSS requests with OSD and courtesy copies the SAB. The SAB staffs the DSS request using the Joint Staff Action Process to the MILDEPs, Combatant Commands, and Combat Support agencies.

(U//~~FOUO~~) In some cases, prior to submitting a DSS request to the DSSAO, the NDFDAs conduct pre-coordination with DoD component DSSOs and/or organizations they assume will be supporting their request. The CJCSM 3213.03F authorizes pre-coordination at the DSSO level, although the CJCSM does not specifically authorize lower level pre-coordination. Generally, pre-coordination of DSS requests scopes the requirement sent to the DSSAO. In some cases, DoD component DSSOs said pre-coordination below the DSSO level occurs and is inappropriate because their DoD component, the Joint Staff, or OSD may not agree with providing the specific pre-coordinated request.

**(U) Defense Sensitive Support Approvals**

(S//NF) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF//ACCM) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c); DODOIG (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)(1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Finding A

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

(U//~~FOUO~~) *Defense Sensitive Support Activity Approval Levels (Chart Provided by DSSAO)*

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

(S//~~ACGM~~) Table classified as ~~SECRET//ACGM~~

## (U//~~FOUO~~) DoD Component Defense Sensitive Support Offices and Issuances

(U//~~FOUO~~) Of the components evaluated, the MILDEPs, NGA, NRO, and NSA all have an established DSSO. DIA is the only component included in this evaluation that lacked an established DSSO; but DIA has designated the Executive Assistant to the Director, DIA, as the DIA DSS point of contact. Our reference to a “component DSSO” is the official designation of a person or office in writing by that organization’s competent authority as the component DSSO responsible to carry out the DSS process for that component.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The OSD, Joint Staff, Department of the Army (DA), and Department of the Navy (DON) have specific issuances addressing DSS and for identifying their components’ DSSO. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) and NSA have directives identifying offices responsible for DSS in their components, but lack specific issuances for carrying out or establishing component-level DSS requirements. The DAF, NRO, and NGA are developing specific issuances for their components’ DSS activities, while DIA has no issuance carrying out DSS or issuance identifying the DIA DSSO or DIA DSS point of contact.

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2 (U) The Operations Integration Office was later replaced by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (DUSD(I&S)).

(U) Finding A

(S//NF) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

[Redacted]

(S//NF) DoD Cover and Cover Support Concerns

(S//NF//ACGM OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

[Redacted]

(S//SI//NF//ACGM OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

[Redacted]

(S//SI//NF//ACGM OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

[Redacted]

(S//NF//ACGM OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a), 1.4(c); DODOIG (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)(1)

[Redacted]



(U) Finding A

(S//NF//ACGM [redacted])

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a), 1.4(c); DODOIG (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)(1)

(S//NF//ACGM [redacted])

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

(S//NF)

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a), 1.4(c); DODOIG (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)(1)

## (U//~~FOUO~~) Defense Sensitive Support Outreach and Training

(U//~~FOUO~~) The DSSAO has a robust training program in place; but sequestration severely hampered DSSAO's ability to provide it. In addition to the formal training, the DSSAO Director stated that he conducts quarterly meetings he considers a "DSS 101 class." The "DSS 101" meetings rotate between different Combatant Commands and are open to all DSSOs. The MILDEPs also have mechanisms in place that can support outreach or provide a training mechanism. The MILDEP DSSOs brief individuals who will be assigned to particular DSS and ensure that they know what they can and cannot do; these briefs could be considered a type of training. The issuances that the DON and DA publish can be considered a form of outreach.

(S//NF//ACGM [redacted])

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

(U) Finding A

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

(S//NF//ACGM) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

(U) Conclusion

(S//NF//ACGM) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

(S//NF) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

(S//NF//ACGM) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a), 1.4(c); DODOIG (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)(1)

(U) Finding A

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a), 1.4(c); DODIG (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)(1)

(U//~~FOUO~~) The DIA has not complied with the requirement identified in CJCSM 3213.03F to establish a DSSO, but does have a point of contact as required by DoDD S-5210.36.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Structured training for personnel new to DSS helps mitigate issues related to the intricacies of DSS.

## (U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

A.1. (U) We recommend that the USD(I) update the DoDD S-5210.36 to:

A.1.a. (U//~~FOUO~~) Include the specific OSD approval levels for specific categories of DSS, as identified in the USD(I) Memorandum; and

A.1.b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Direct DoD components to create and maintain internal DSS issuances as a means to identify their organizational DSSO similar to the language in the CJCSM 3213.03F. This recommendation was modified in response to management comments.

A.2. (U//~~FOUO~~) We recommend the DSSAO:

A.2.a. (U//~~FOUO~~) Ensure all support meeting the criteria for DSS is staffed in the DSSA;

A.2.b. (~~S//NF~~) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

and

A.2.c. (U//~~FOUO~~) Continue the formal training program to all personnel assigned to DSS duties.

A.3. (U//~~FOUO~~) We recommend that the Director, DIA, establish a DSS Office to receive, store, coordinate, staff, plan, and obtain respective component concurrence for DSS actions.

**(U) Finding A**

A.4. (U//~~FOUO~~) We recommend the that Headquarters Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans & Requirements; Director, DIA; Director, NRO; and Director, NGA, each designate in writing:

A.4.a. (U//~~FOUO~~) Component-level DSS policy; and

A.4.b. (U//~~FOUO~~) A component DSS Office

A.5. (U//~~FOUO~~) We recommend that the Director, NSA designate NSA's DSS policy in writing.

*(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Comments<sup>3</sup>*

(U) The USD(I) concurred with recommendation A.1.a. and A1.b., providing the following comments:

(U) USD(I) concurs with recommendation A.1.a.

(U) DoD components that support DSS and component responsibilities are currently identified in DoDD 5210.36, enclosure 2.

(U) The USD(I) concurred with recommendation A.2.a., providing the following comments:

(U) USD(I) concurs with recommendation A.2.a. DSSAO will continue to ensure all DSS support is staffed in the DSSA through its existing oversight, outreach, and training practices.

(U) The USD(I) non-concurred with recommendation A.2.b., providing the following comments:

(S//~~ACCM~~ ~~OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)~~) ~~OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a), 1.4(c); DODOIG (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)(1)~~  
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<sup>3</sup> Recommendations to USD(I) and comments from USD(I) include actions required by the DSSAO.

(U) Finding A

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a), 1.4(c); DODOIG (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)(1)

(U) The USD(I) concurred to recommendation A.2.c., providing the following comments:

(U) USD(I) concurred with recommendation A.2.c. The DSSAO will continue to provide formal DSSA training to all personnel assigned to DSS duties described above.

*(U) Our Response*

(U) The comments of the USD(I) for recommendation A.1.a. were responsive and required no further action.

(U) Recommendation A.1.b. is still applicable.

(U) The comments of the USD(I) for recommendation A.2.a. and A.2.c. were responsive and required no further action.

(~~S//NF//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

*(U) Department of the Air Force Comments*

(U) The Director, Special Management, U.S. Air Force (Air Force/~~(b) (7)(E)~~), concurred with recommendation A.4. providing the following comments:

(~~S//NF//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

a. (~~S//NF//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)



(U) Finding A

b. (~~S//NF//ACCM~~ ~~OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)~~) ~~OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)~~

[REDACTED]

*(U) Our Response*

(U) The comments of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters Air Force, were responsive and required no further action.

*(U) Defense Intelligence Agency Comments*

(U) The Deputy Director, DIA, non-concurred with recommendations A.3 and A.4, providing the following comments:

(U) "Recommendations A.3 and A.4 recommend Director, DIA comply with CJCSM 3213.03F and establish a DSS Office and following that, designate in writing component level DSS policy and a component DSS Office. CJCSM 3213.03F is rescinded and is superseded by CJCSM 3213.03F, which states that select heads of DoD components (including DIA) are charged by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to establish a Defense Sensitive Support Office (DSSO), referring to DOD Directive S-5210.36. However, DOD Directive S-5210.36 does not charge DIA to establish a DSSO; instead it directs Defense Agencies to designate their respective points of contact to process DSS requests; review for supportability and concur or non-concur with all DSS proposals involving their organizations; forward all DSS requirements to the Director, DSSAO, for appropriate staffing; and restrict DSS information to essential personnel. Based on DOD Directive S-5210.36 which CJCSM 3213.03F refers to, DIA is fully in compliance with this direction and therefore disagrees with the recommendation. DIA does not process a sufficient volume of DSS actions to warrant a DSSO (only one or two a month), and processing these requests is a collateral duty. DIA suggests that CJCSM 3213.03F be updated to reflect the correct direction from Directive S-5210.36."

**(U) Finding A**

*(U) Our Response*

(U) Recommendations A3 and A4 are still applicable. We are concerned that if DIA does not solidify its DSS procedures in a formal internal policy, to include with whom to coordinate DSS activities, the potential exists for DIA components to provide DSS without proper approval and/or oversight. This concern derived from the following information obtained during our evaluation:

(S//NF//ACCM) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(U) Additionally, while DIA may be compliant with DoDD S-5210.36 in that a DSS representative is appointed, the directive does not indicate what office or with whom to contact to coordinate a DSS activity. An internal issuance would alleviate doubt and provide a structured program making DIA's DSS program more effective.

*(U) National Reconnaissance Office Comments*

(U) NRO: (b)(3) 10 USC 424 [REDACTED], NRO, concurred with recommendations A.4.a and A4b, providing the following comments:

a. (U) This Recommendation (A.4.a) has been accomplished. The NRO has established written guidance and policy for DSS activities in the form of NRO: (b)(3) 10 USC 424 [REDACTED], 15 November 2012."

b. (U) This Recommendation (A.4.b) has been accomplished. NRO: (b)(3) 10 USC 424 [REDACTED] designated in a written memorandum on February 26, 2008, to NRO: (b)(3) 10 USC 424 [REDACTED], that:

(S//NF) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c); NRO: (b)(3) 10 USC 424 [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

---

**(U) Finding A**OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c); NRO: (b)(3) 10 USC 424  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]*(U) Our Response*

(U) The comments of [REDACTED], NRO, were responsive and require no further action.

*(U) National Geospatial Intelligence Agency Comments*

(U) The Director, NGA, concurred with recommendation A.4., providing the following comments:

(U//~~FOUO~~) "NGA concurs with the recommendation. Within this policy, a component DSS Office will be designated. NGA will complete this policy no later than 30 April 2014."

*(U) Our Response*

(U) The comments of the Director, NGA, were responsive and require no further action. NGA followed through implementing DSS policy and identifying their DSSO by April 30, 2014.

*(U) National Security Agency Comments*

(U) The Director, NSA, concurred with recommendation A.5, providing the following comments:

(U//~~FOUO~~) "NSA agrees with this recommendation. NSA is drafting a policy for the provision of the sensitive support to DoD components and non-DoD Federal departments and agencies (NDFDAs). The policy identifies the Cover, Controlled and Special Access Programs office as the NSA Defense Sensitive Support Activity Office (DSSAO) and outlines the roles and responsibilities of the DSSAO. Working with NSA Finance, this policy is projected to be approved by late Summer 2014."

*(U) Our Response*

(U) The comments of the Director, NSA, were responsive and require no further action.

**(U) Finding B****(U) Finding B****(U) Lack of reimbursement documentation and accountability**

(U//~~FOUO~~) The MILDEP DSSOs track and obtain DSS reimbursements, while the other evaluated DoD component DSSOs lack internal controls for obtaining and tracking reimbursements because:

- (U//~~FOUO~~) The DSS program is not executing DoD's Strategic Management Plan to ensure audit readiness and instilling a cost culture;
- (U//~~FOUO~~) The DoD agencies evaluated do not conduct financial management or oversight at their DSS Offices as do the MILDEPs, possibly due to the inconsistent requirements in DoDD S-5210.36;
- (U//~~FOUO~~) General oversight of DSS at the component level varies greatly; and
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Approval documents for DSS requests do not specify how reimbursements are to occur.

(U//~~FOUO~~) As a result, a lack of financial management and accountability of DSS has occurred, which degrades the DoD's ability to achieve audit readiness.

**(U) Reimbursement Requirements**

(U//~~FOUO~~) DoDD S-5210.36 states DoD's policy is that "the Department of Defense shall provide DSS between and among DoD Components and NDFDAs to the maximum extent possible if such support...is reimbursable in accordance with section 1535 of title 31, USC (the Economy Act), or section 6307 of title 41, USC (the Project Order Statute), unless designated non-reimbursable."

(U//~~FOUO~~) The DA, DON, and DAF DSSOs account for their respective DSS financial information, while the NSA, NRO, NGA, and DIA (with the exception of the DCO) have not centralized the accountability of their DSS financial information.

**(U) Finding B**

***(U) Department of Defense Audited Financial Statements***

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(U) Public Law 103-356, enacted in 1994, amended Public Law 101-576 that requires the government to have audited financial statements. The Office of Management and Budget Circular A-136 requires DoD and other major agencies to prepare agency-wide quarterly unaudited financial statements. DoD Regulation 7000.14, "Financial Management Regulation," June 2012, identifies that the Chief Financial Officer Council, the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and other interested parties have established formats and instructions for financial statements.

(U) Audited financial statements fall under the Government Accountability Office's Key Issue Area of Transforming DoD's Business Operations. DoD has developed a Strategic Management Plan that supports DoD's efforts to resolve this key issue. This plan's second of four goals is to "Strengthen DoD financial management to respond to Warfighter needs and sustain public confidence through auditable financial statements." A guiding principle of this plan is to instill a cost culture, using cost data to develop a true understanding of operational business expenditures. "Knowing what it costs to deliver business capabilities will allow leaders to assess the return on investment, leading to improved decision making," the plan states.

(U) DoD has also developed the Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) program, led by the Office of Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to support DoD's efforts for audit readiness. Former SecDef Panetta further emphasized the importance of financial audit readiness in a memorandum of October 13, 2011, entitled, "Improving Financial Information and Achieving Audit Readiness." In a video message hosted on the FIAR website, SecDef Hagel gave audit readiness high priority, pointing out that law requires it. He added that the right systems must have financial information, and that DoD must have auditable financial statements by September 2014.

***(U) Intragovernmental Transactions***

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(U) Volume 6B of DoD 7000.14-R identifies multiple requirements for intragovernmental transactions. Of specific note is the "Significant Accounting Policy" 1.G. "Accounting for Intragovernmental Activities":



**(U) Finding B**

(U) "Describe the reporting entity's: (1) methodology for eliminating transaction among entities within DoD and between other Federal agencies; (2) any limitation that prevents the elimination of the intragovernmental transactions; and (3) actions the reporting entity is taking to correct the problem(s)."

(U) DoD 7000.14-R identifies a reconciliation process that requires the component to identify resources used to finance activities inclusive of obligations incurred; transfers in/out without reimbursement; and attribute financing from cost absorbed by others.

**(U) Intra-Governmental Payment and Collection System (IPAC)**

(U) The IPAC system is an automated, standardized, interagency funds expenditure transfer mechanism for Federal Program Agencies. IPAC carries out intergovernmental federal e-commerce by transferring funds, with related descriptive data, from one Federal Program Agency to another on a real-time basis. The system sets up standardized interagency payment, collection, and adjustment procedures through an Internet-based application, and aids in the reconciliation process.

**(U//~~FOUO~~) Designated non-reimbursable Defense Sensitive Support**

(S//NF//ACCM) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF//ACCM) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a), 1.4(c); DOD/IG (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)(1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Finding B

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a), 1.4(c); DODOIG (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)(1)

(~~S//NF//ACGM~~)

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

## (U//~~FOUO~~) Defense Sensitive Support Oversight at DoD Component Level

(U//~~FOUO~~) The level of oversight greatly varies in the DoD components. Two categories of oversight highlight this variation: the component's DSSO, or lack thereof; and the component's audit and oversight organization's ability to oversee the program. We describe both in detail below. This variation is consistent with the differences between DoDD S-5210.36 and CJCSM 3213.03F requirements. As identified previously, the DoDD S-5210.36 and the CJCSM 321303E require establishing DSSOs, but the DoDD identifies different baseline requirements for different DoD Component DSSOs, while the CJCSM identifies the same requirements for all DSSOs.

### (U//~~FOUO~~) Defense Sensitive Support Offices' Role with Funding and Reimbursements

(U//~~FOUO~~) Throughout DoD, the representative offices that manage their components' DSS oversee funding differently. Of the MILDEP DSSOs, all receive, manage, and track their components' reimbursements, albeit in different ways. In contrast, most of the other DSS representative offices we visited (NSA, NRO, NGA, and DIA) do not track or receive the reimbursements.

**(U) Finding B**

*(U) Military Departments*

(~~S//NF//ACGM~~ <sup>OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)</sup>) <sup>OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)</sup> [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

*(U) Defense Intelligence Agency*

(~~S//NF//ACGM~~ <sup>OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)</sup>) <sup>OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c); DOD OIG (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)(1)</sup> [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(~~S//NF//ACGM~~ <sup>OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)</sup>) <sup>OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)</sup> [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

*(U) National Security Agency*

(~~S//NF//ACGM~~ <sup>OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)</sup>) <sup>OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)</sup> [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

*(U) National Geospatial Intelligence Agency*

(U//~~FOUO~~) The NGA POC said that the financial management or general counsel would conduct the financial management when NGA provides DSS.

**(U) Finding B**

*(U) Defense Sensitive Support Activity Office Pilot Project--Special Operations Command Reimbursements*

(S//NF//ACGM

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]

**(U//~~FOUO~~) Audit and Inspection Organizations at the DoD Component Level**

(U//~~FOUO~~) DoD components authorize different numbers of personnel to oversee DSSA at the component level. This disparity is due in part to the component level issuance, or lack thereof, authorizing access to its component-level-oversight organizations.

*(U) Department of the Army and Department of the Navy*

(S//NF)

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]

*(U) Department of the Air Force*

(S//NF)

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]

**(U) Finding B**

**(U) National Security Agency**

(S//NF) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

**(U//~~FOUO~~) Approval Documents Do Not Identify Specific Funding Transfer Requirements**

(S//NF) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

(U//~~FOUO~~) DoD has a standing Memorandum of Agreement with one NDFDA establishing a framework for providing DSS. In addition to the broad Memorandum of Agreement, some DSS also uses more specific Memorandums of Agreement or Terms of Reference. These Memorandums of Agreement and Terms of Reference identify the limits and explicit requirements of the support and are signed by the agency or department representatives and the individual(s) providing and receiving DSS. However, the DSSAO does not require DoD components to brief all personnel providing DSS on Terms of Reference or a similar document.

**(U) Conclusion**

(U//~~FOUO~~) The DoD organizations evaluated did not have financial management oversight in place and there were different reimbursements methods used. DoD implemented a Strategic Management Plan that supports resolution of the Government Accountability Office's Key Issue of Transforming DoD's Business Operations. This plan includes requiring audited financial statements and instilling a cost culture in DoD. To align with this plan, the DSS program should account for and ensure audit readiness of all costs associated with DSS and DSS requests, especially non-reimbursable DSS requests. Additionally, if all reimbursable payments were received using the IPAC system it would help increase audit readiness of reimbursable DSS.



(U) Finding B

(~~S//NF//ACGM~~)

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

(~~S//NF~~)

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

(U//~~FOUO~~) Clarifying the threshold requirements for non-reimbursable DSS in the DoDD would offer a source to help educate and guide DoD component financial oversight and financial management of support defined as DSS. Clarifying the threshold requirements could ensure that DoD does not get “too far down a path of non-reimbursable detailing... before someone realizes that [the DSS request] does not meet the criteria, or is a violation of the Economy Act.”

## (U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

B.1. (U//~~FOUO~~) We recommend that the USD(I) update DoDD S-5210-36 to:

B.1.a. (U) Ensure all DSS activities obtain financial management and oversight;

B.1.b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Amplify, and ensure consistency with, the CJCSM 3213.03F requiring DSS Offices at multiple DoD components, and with the same requirements for all DSS Offices; and

**(U) Finding B**

B.1.c. (U//~~FOUO~~) Ensure that DoD component oversight offices have access to DSS information.

B.2. (U//~~FOUO~~) We recommend that the DSSAO develop an accounting measure to obtain the costs associated with the DSS program, inclusive of the costs to staff, manage, and conduct DSS.

B.3. (U//~~FOUO~~) We recommend that the Director, DIA; the Director, NRO; the Director, NGA; and the Director, NSA, each designate in writing:

B.3.a. (U//~~FOUO~~) An office with the responsibility, clearance, and access to conduct financial management of its component's DSS and issue quarterly and annual financial statements of its DSS activities; and

B.3.b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Component oversight offices for audits, inspections, and investigations of their component's DSS activities.

*(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Comments*

(U) All USD(I) comments include a response to our recommendations to the DSSAO.

(U) The USD(I) concurred to recommendation B.1., providing the following comments:

(U) USD(I) concurs with the above recommendations.

(U) The USD(I) was uncertain how to respond to recommendation B.2., providing the following comments:

(S//~~ACCM~~ ) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) ) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]

**(U) Finding B**

*(U) Our Response*

(U) The comments to B.1. by the USD(I) were responsive and require no further action.

(~~S//NF//ACGM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

*(U) Defense Intelligence Agency Comments*

(U) The Deputy Director, DIA, non-concurred with recommendation B.3 providing the following comment:

(U) “Recommendation B.3 recommends that the Director, DIA designate an office to conduct financial management of its DSS and designate an oversight office of DSS activities. DIA disagrees with this recommendation as DIA does not process a sufficient volume of DSS actions to warrant an office to conduct financial management and oversight of its DSS activities. Dependent on the type of DSS requested, different mission organizations within DIA are responsible for providing the DSS support. Each specific mission organization’s budget and financial representatives track the financial management of its mission organization’s DSS. In accordance with the Economy Act, non-DoD Federal Departments and Agencies reimburse DIA for actual costs associated with DSS requests unless designated as non-reimbursable.”

*(U) Our Response*

(U) Recommendation B.3., is still applicable. We are concerned that if DIA does not solidify its DSS procedures in a formal internal policy, the potential exists for a lack of, or improper reimbursements to, DIA for its DSS activities to occur. This concern derived from the following information obtained during our evaluation:

(U) Finding B

(~~S//NF//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]

(~~S//NF//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) This same recommendation was made to other DoD components, one of which implemented the financial management oversight office recouping a substantial amount of reimbursable expenses.

*(U) National Reconnaissance Office Comments*

(U) NRO: (b)(3) 10 USC 424 [REDACTED], NRO, concurred with recommendations B.3.a and B.3.b, providing the following comments:

a. (U) NRO: (b)(3) 10 USC 424

[REDACTED]

---

**(U) Finding B**

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) NRO: (b)(3) 10 USC 424

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

*(U) Our Response*

(U) The comments to B.3.a and B.3.b by NRO: (b)(3) 10 USC 424, NRO, were responsive and require no further action.

*(U) National Geospatial Intelligence Agency Comments*

(U) The Director, NGA, concurred with recommendation B.3 (B.3.a and B.3.b), providing the following comments:

(U//~~FOUO~~) "NGA concurs with the recommendation. NGA will appoint a component DSS financial management officer and oversight office. NGA will complete this policy no later than 30 April 2014."

*(U) Our Response*

(U) The comments of the Director, NGA, were responsive and require no further action. NGA implemented its DSS policy and identified their DSSO in NGA Directive S-5250 on 30 April 2014.

*(U) National Security Agency Comments*

(U) The Director, NSA, concurred with recommendation B.3 (B.3.a and B.3.b), providing the following comments:

(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA concurs with this recommendation. In the new NSA DSS draft policy, the Director, NSA will designate the NSA DSSAO to oversee the financial reimbursement in coordination with NSA Finance's process to ensure payments associated with DSS actions are received in accordance with Title 31 U.S.C. Section 1535 [The Economy Act]. This policy will also identify the roles and responsibilities for the NSA DSSAO and the NSA Finance oversight of general DSS activities as NSA.

**(U) Finding B**

*(U) Our Response*

(U) The comments of the Director, NSA, were responsive and require no further action.

(~~TS//SI//NOFORN//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]

(U) Finding C

## (U) Finding C

### (U//~~FOUO~~) The DSS process lacks a method to verify if the DSS activity was beneficial to DoD

(U) DoD cannot corroborate if the DSS provided was what was approved because:

- (U) Once a DSS is completed, DoD does not typically receive feedback on the support provided;
- (U) No requirements exist in relevant DoD issuances to obtain such information; and
- (U) The supported NDFDAs assert control of the records for operational

(S//NF//ACCM

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

### (U) Benefit to the Department

(U//~~FOUO~~) No requirement exists for a validation process of the DSS conducted. Multiple DSSO staff members interviewed said a validation process like an After Action Report (AAR) of DSS did not exist; however, the Joint Staff DSSO suggested that an AAR would help validate continuing support or future support and generally improve the DSSA. DSSAO personnel said one program has started providing AARs, which according to the DSSAO staff, has proved beneficial. Carrying out an AAR would benefit the DSS process by maximizing awareness, enhance oversight and quality, and improve procedures.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Director, DSSAO, noted that DSS does receive oversight, but believes an AAR is not germane to the DSS program. Nevertheless, military members should be required to provide an AAR because they are acquainted with the AAR process and it will provide additional oversight. The AAR could be done in a debrief format upon the

**(U) Finding C**

Service member(s)' return.

(~~TS//NF//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c); DODOIG (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)(1)  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

## **(U) Supported organization control of information**

(U//~~FOUO~~) The DoDD S-5210.36 requires the Director, DSSAO, to archive DSSA matters in the OSD on behalf of the USD(I). The DSSAO staff said operational information developed during the DSS belongs to the supported organization. This information is stored and managed according to the supported organization's requirements. However, other information pertaining to the support (for example, administrative information) belongs to the supporting organization; DoDD S-5210.36 does not identify this criterion.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Some DSS requests explicitly state the records management requirements and responsibilities. For example, the Memorandum of Agreement between the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity and the Air Force Research Laboratory not only identifies general records management requirements, but also explicitly states what each organization is required to do to meet the records management requirements. Other DSS requests do not identify records management requirements, while some requests do contain public affairs guidance and requirements with explicit guidance for both the supported and supporting organizations. Some requests lack records management or public affairs guidance or requirements.

## **(U//~~FOUO~~) Potential Congressional Reporting Requirements for Defense Sensitive Support**

(U//~~FOUO~~) Fiscal year 2014 legislation demonstrates Congressional interest in DoD providing reports to Congress regarding the support DoDD S-5210.36 defines as DSS.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Classified Annex to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014 established a reporting requirement relevant to the DSS program. The NDAA's specific language for 2014, Section 1041 "Congressional Notification of Sensitive Military Operations," states:



**(U) Finding C**

(U) “The Secretary of Defense shall promptly submit to congressional defense committees notice in writing of any sensitive military operation conducted under this title following such operation. Department of Defense support to operations conducted under the National Security Act of 1947 (50 USC 3001 et seq.) is addressed in the classified annex prepared to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014.”

(U) The Classified Annex referenced above:

(S//NF)

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

(S//NF)

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

(S//ACCM

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

(U) Additionally, the Defense Subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees filed a “Classified Annex on Intelligence and Other Classified Activities” to accompany “Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2014, and for other purposes.” Below is an excerpt from these annexes.

(U) Finding C

(TS//NF) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]

(TS//NF) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]

(U) Conclusion

(S//NF) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF//ACCM OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]

**(U) Finding C**

(U//~~FOUO~~) AARs would establish an auditable record to verify that DoD provided DSS within the approved terms; identify benefits gained to the Department; and validate that the support benefited or was in DoD's interests.

## **(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

C.1. (U//~~FOUO~~) We recommend that the USD(I) update the DoDD S-5210.36 to:

C.1.a. (S//~~NF~~) ~~OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)~~;  
and

C.1.b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Require an AAR/Trip Summary be provided to the USD(I).

C.2. (U//~~FOUO~~) We recommend that the DSSAO:

C.2.a (U//~~FOUO~~) Obtain and maintain from all personnel providing DSS written acknowledgement of, and consent to, the risks, limitations, and possible consequences of DSS assignments.

C.2.b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Develop Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) with all NDFDAs to establish records management requirements for information developed during the DSS request, during DSS, and close out of a DSS, inclusive of

- C.2.b.1. (U) Operational information;
- C.2.b.2. (U) Administrative information;
- C.2.b.3. (U) Public affairs information; and
- C.2.b.4. (U) Records management of all information.

### ***(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Comments***

(U) The USD(I) concurred with recommendation C.1.a, providing the following comments:

(U) USD(I) concurred with recommendation C.1.a. ~~OSD/JS: (b)(1) 1.7(e)~~

**(U) Finding C**

(U) The USD(I) non-concurred with recommendation C.1.b., providing the following comments:

(~~S//ACGM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
[Redacted]

(U) The USD(I) concurred with recommendation C.2.a, providing the following comments:

(~~S//ACGM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
[Redacted]

(~~S//NF//ACGM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
[Redacted]

(~~S//NF//ACGM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
[Redacted]

(~~S//ACGM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
[Redacted]

(U) Finding C

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

(U) The USD(I) was uncertain on how respond to recommendation C.2.b. 1, 2, 3, and 4, providing the following comments:

(S//ACCM ) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

*(U) Our Response*

(U) The comments to C.1.a. by the USD(I) were responsive and require no further action.

(S//ACCM ) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

(U) The comments to C.2.a. by the USD(I) were responsive and require no further action.

(S//NF//ACCM ) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

**(U) Appendix A**

## **(U) Appendix A**

### **(U) Scope and Methodology**

(U//~~FOUO~~) The project's scope was limited to DoD components in the National Capital Region, which DSSAO personnel identified as providing DSS on a reoccurring basis. These components included OSD, Joint Staff, Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, Department of the Air Force, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Agency. We did not travel to Combatant Commands.

(U//~~FOUO~~) This evaluation did not intend to provide an impact assessment of the actual type of DSS provided. Nor did this evaluation involve an audit of the financial accounting of the DSS program.

(U//~~FOUO~~) We conducted an evaluation of the defense sensitive support (DSS) process. Specifically, we reviewed and evaluated the authorities, roles, responsibilities, and oversight procedures for provisions of DSS to non-DoD federal departments and agencies. To that end, we visited different DoD components to examine how consistently the DSS program was actually organized, delivered, and overseen.

(U) This evaluation included reviews of the oversight issuances to include laws, Executive Orders, DoD issuances, Joint Staff issuances, and DoD component specific issuances. This information provided the baseline of standards set up for the program and its oversight.

(U//~~FOUO~~) We conducted reviews of communications associated with the DSS program and conducted interviews and follow-up discussions via phone and email with personnel from DSSOs or assigned as DSS points of contact. This information identified how the DSSAO managed the DSS program, the program's effectiveness, and its financial management at the evaluated DoD component level and above.

**(U) Appendix B****(U) Appendix B****(U) Organizations Visited and Contacted**

Department of the Army
Personnel Management Directorate
Department of the Navy
Operations Integration Group
Department of the Air Force
Headquarters Air Force (b) (7) (F)
Air Force Audit Agency
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Deputy Director for Global Operations, Support Activities Division, Support Activities Branch (J-39)
Department of Defense
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Defense Sensitive Support Activity Office
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight
Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight
Defense Intelligence Agency
Defense Cover Office
Defense Clandestine Service
National Reconnaissance Office
NRO: (b)(3) 10 USC 424
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
Special Security Division, Operations Support Team
National Security Agency
Cover, Controlled and Special Access Programs NSA: (b)(2)

(U) Management Comments

## (U) Management Comments

### (U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Comments



INTELLIGENCE

~~TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) ~~TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN//ACCM~~  
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

3 AUG 2014

SAS-D-140710

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: (U) USD(I) Response to the DoD Deputy IG Draft Evaluation of Defense Sensitive Support

(U) On February 26, 2014, the DoD Deputy IG for Evaluations provided the USD(I) with the Draft Report of Evaluation of Defense Sensitive Support for comment. The following constitutes USD(I)'s official response:

- ~~(TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN//ACCM)~~ Introduction (Pg 1): OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)
  - ~~(TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN//ACCM)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)
  - ~~(TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN//ACCM)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)
- (U) Finding A (Pg 3): "DoD Components have provided support DoDD S-5210.36 defined as DSS without receiving required DSS approval."
  - ~~(TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN//ACCM)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

Classified by: Multiple Sources  
Declassify on: 3 April 2038



(U) Management Comments

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence  
Comments (cont'd)

~~TOP SECRET//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) ~~//NOFORN~~

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

- "A DoD Component provided support DoD Directive S-5210.36 defines as DSS without receiving DSS approval."

- (S//NF) Conclusion (Pg 8): OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

- (S//ACCM) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

- OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

- (S//ACCM) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

- (U) Finding A (Pg 3): "Minimal outreach and training exists in the DSS enterprise."

- (S//ACCM) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

~~TOP SECRET//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) ~~//NOFORN~~

(U) Management Comments

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence  
Comments (cont'd)

~~TOP SECRET//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) ~~//NOFORN~~

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c); DODOIG (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)(1)

- (U) In addition to the above stated training, considerable DSSA outreach to the DSSA enterprise is conducted by the DSSAO, Joint Staff J-39 Special Activities Branch (SAB), and Service DSSA offices. This outreach is in the form of regular staff assistance visits, monthly DSSA reconciliation meetings, and oversight visits.
- (U) **Recommendations A.1** (Pg 9): “We recommend the USD(I) update DoDD 5210.36 to: A.1.a include the specific OSD approval levels for specific categories of DSS identified in the USD(I) Memorandum; and A.1.b. identify DoD Components which provide support defined as DSS in DoDD S-5210.36.”
  - (U) USD(I) agrees with recommendation A.1.a.
  - (U) DoD components that support DSS and component responsibilities are currently identified in DoDD 5210.36, enclosure 2.
- (U) **Recommendation A.2** (Pg 9): “We recommend the DSSAO: A.2.a ensure all support meeting the criteria for DSS is staffed in the DSSA; A.2.b. ~~OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e)~~ ~~OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e)~~ A.2.c. develop a formal training program to be provided to all personnel assigned to DSS duties.”
  - (U) USD(I) agrees with recommendation A.2.a. DSSAO will continue to ensure all DSS support is staffed in the DSSA through its existing oversight, outreach, and training practices.
  - ~~(S//ACCM)~~ ~~OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a), 1.4(c); DODOIG (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)(1)~~ ~~OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a), 1.4(c); DODOIG (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)(1)~~
    - (U) USD(I) agrees with recommendation A.2.c. The DSSAO will continue to provide formal DSSA training to all personnel assigned to DSS duties as described above.
- (U) **Finding B** (Pg 10): The DSSA program is not executing the DoD’s Strategic Management Plan to ensure audit readiness and instilling a cost culture.

~~TOP SECRET//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) ~~//NOFORN~~

(U) Management Comments

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Comments (cont'd)

~~TOP SECRET//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) ~~//NOFORN~~

- o ~~(S//ACCM)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

- (U) **Finding B (Pg 10):** The DoD agencies evaluated do not conduct financial management or oversight at their DSS Offices as the MILDEPs do, possibly due to inconsistent requirements in the DoDD S-5210.36.

- o ~~(S//ACCM)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

- (U) **Finding B (Pg 10):** Approval documents for DSS requests do not specify how reimbursements are to occur.

- o ~~(S//ACCM)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

- ~~(S//ACCM)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

~~TOP SECRET//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) ~~//NOFORN~~

(U) Management Comments

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence  
Comments (cont'd)

~~TOP SECRET//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) // ~~NOFORN~~

- (S//ACCM) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
[REDACTED]
- (S//ACCM) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
[REDACTED]
- (S//ACCM) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a), 1.4(c); DODOIG (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)(1)  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a), 1.4(c); DODOIG (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)(1)  
[REDACTED]
- (U) **Recommendations B.1. (Pg 17)** We recommend the USD(I) update DoDD S-5210.36 to: B.1.a ensure all DSS activities obtain financial management and oversight; B.1.b. amplify, and ensure consistency with, the CJCSM 3213.03E requiring DSS Offices at multiple DoD Components, with the same requirements for all DSS Offices; and B.1.c. authorize that DoD Component oversight offices have access to DSS information.
  - (U) USD(I) agrees with the above recommendations.
- (U) **Recommendations B.2. (Pg 17)** We recommend the DSSAO develop an accounting measure to obtain the costs associated with the DSS program, inclusive of the costs to staff, manage, and conduct DSS.
  - (S//ACCM) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) // ~~NOFORN~~

(U) Management Comments

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence  
Comments (cont'd)

~~TOP SECRET//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) ~~//NOFORN~~

- (U) **Recommendation C.1 (Pg 23)** We recommend the USD(I) update the DoDD S-5210.36 to: C1.a. OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e) and C1.b. Require an AAR/Trip Summary be provided to the USD(I).
  - ~~(S//ACCM)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)
  - ~~(S//ACCM)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)
- (U) **Recommendation C.2 (Pg 23)** We recommend the DSSAO: C.2.a obtain and maintain from all personnel providing DSS, written acknowledgement of, and consent to, the risks, limitations, and possible consequences of DSS assignments; and C.2.b develop Memorandums of Agreement with all NDFDAs to establish records management requirements for information developed during the DSS request, during DSS, and close out of a DSS, inclusive of: C.2.b.1 operations information; C.2.b.2 administrative information; C.2.b.3 public affairs information; and C.2.b.4. records management of all information.
  - ~~(S//ACCM)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)
  - ~~(S//NF//ACCM)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)
  - ~~(S//NF//ACCM)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)
  - ~~(S//ACCM)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

~~TOP SECRET//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) ~~//NOFORN~~

(U) Management Comments

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence  
Comments (cont'd)

~~TOP SECRET//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) ~~//NOFORN~~

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

- o ~~(S//ACCM)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

(U) Questions relating to this matter should be referred to Defense Sensitive Support  
Activity Office at ~~DODIG (b)(6)~~

  
Michael G. Vickers

~~TOP SECRET//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) ~~//NOFORN~~

(U) Management Comments

## (U) Department of the Air Force, Director Special Management, USAF DSSO, DCS Operations, Plans and Requirements Comments



~~SECRET//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) ~~NF~~  
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON DC

26 Mar 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR DOD IG

FROM: HQ USAF, DoD OIG: (b) 1480 Air Force Pentagon DoD OIG: (b)(7) Washington, DC 20330-1480

SUBJECT: (U) USAF Defense Sensitive Support (DSS) Office's Interim Response to Draft DoD IG Report, dated 26 Feb 14

1. ~~SECRET//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) ~~NF~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

a. ~~SECRET//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) ~~NF~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

b. ~~SECRET//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) ~~NF~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c)

2. (U) The USAF POC for this action is

RUSSELL E. LEE, Colonel, USAF  
Director Special Management  
USAF Defense Sensitive Support Office  
DCS Operations, Plans and Requirements

Derived from: ~~ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) SCG  
Declassify on: 26 Mar 2039

~~SECRET//ACCM~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) ~~NF~~



(U) Management Comments

## (U) Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Comments

UNCLASSIFIED



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100



MAR 26 2014

U-14-0539/CE

(U) MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General, Department of Defense, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

(U) SUBJECT: Defense Intelligence Agency Comments on Draft Report - Evaluation of Defense Sensitive Support (Project Number: D2012-DINT01-0079.002)

1. (U) Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report on the evaluation of Defense Sensitive Support (DSS). The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) disagrees with the report recommendations assigned to DIA for the following reasons:
2. (U) Recommendations A.3 and A.4 recommend Director, DIA comply with CJCSM 3213.03E and establish a DSS Office and following that, designate in writing component level DSS policy and a component DSS Office. CJCSM 3213.03E is rescinded and is superseded by CJCSM 3213.03F, which states that select heads of DOD components (including DIA) are charged by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to establish a Defense Sensitive Support Office (DSSO), referring to DOD Directive S-5210.36. However, DOD Directive S-5210.36 does not charge DIA to establish a DSSO; instead it directs Defense Agencies to designate their respective points of contact to process DSS requests; review for supportability and concur or non-concur with all DSS proposals involving their organizations; forward all DSS requirements to the Director, DSSAO, for appropriate staffing; and restrict DSS information to essential personnel. Based on DOD Directive S-5210.36 which CJCSM 3213.03F refers to, DIA is fully in compliance with this direction and therefore disagrees with the recommendation. DIA does not process a sufficient volume of DSS actions to warrant a DSSO (only one or two a month), and processing these requests is a collateral duty. DIA suggests that CJCSM 3213.03F be updated to reflect the correct direction from Directive S-5210.36.
3. (U) Recommendation B.3 recommends that the Director, DIA designate an office to conduct financial management of its DSS and designate an oversight office of DSS activities. DIA disagrees with this recommendation as DIA does not process a sufficient volume of DSS actions to warrant an office to conduct financial management and oversight of its DSS activities. Dependent on the type of DSS requested, different mission organizations within DIA are responsible for providing the DSS support. Each specific mission organization's budget and financial representatives track the financial management of its mission organization's DSS. In accordance with the Economy Act, non-DoD Federal Departments and Agencies reimburse DIA for actual costs associated with DSS requests unless designated as non-reimbursable.

UNCLASSIFIED




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(U) Management Comments

(U) Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency  
Comments (cont'd)

UNCLASSIFIED

4. (U) The DIA POC for this action is [REDACTED]

  
DAVID R. SHEDD  
Deputy Director

2

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(U) Management Comments

(U) National Reconnaissance Office,

NRO: (b)(3) 10 USC 424

NRO: (b)(3) 10 USC 424

## Comments

NRO: (b)(3) 10 USC 424

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**(U) Management Comments**


**(U) National Reconnaissance Office,**

NRO: (b)(3) 10 USC 424

NRO: (b)(3) 10 USC 424

**Comments (cont'd)**

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a) and 1.4(c); NRO: (b)(3) 10 USC 424



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**(U) Management Comments**


**(U) National Reconnaissance Office,**

NRO: (b)(3) 10 USC 424

NRO: (b)(3) 10 USC 424

**Comments (cont'd)**

NRO: (b)(3) 10 USC 424



(U) Management Comments

## (U) Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Comments



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

### NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

7500 GEOINT Drive  
Springfield, Virginia 22150

U-2014-1011

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR  
EVALUATIONS

SUBJECT: (U) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Response to  
Project No. D2012-DINT01-0079.002

REFERENCE: a. (U) DoDIG Draft Report - Evaluation of Defense Sensitive  
Support (Project No. D2012-DINT01-0079.002) (~~TS//SI//ACCM~~-  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)  
and 1.4(c))

1. (U) Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the subject draft report. This memorandum is in response to the recommendations issued in the reference.

2. (U) Recommendation A.4.

a. (U) DoDIG Recommendation: That the Headquarters Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans & Requirements; Directors of DIA, NGA, and NRO, each designate in writing:

- i. (U) A.4.a. Component level DSS policy; and
- ii. (U) A.4.b. A component DSS Office.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) NGA Response: NGA concurs with the recommendation. Within this policy, a component DSS Office will be designated. NGA will complete this policy no later than 30 April 2014.

3. (U) Recommendation B.3.

a. (U) DoDIG Recommendation: That the Directors of DIA, NGA, NRO, and NSA each designate in writing:

- i. (U) B.3.a. An office with the responsibility, clearance, and access to conduct financial management of its component's DSS and issue quarterly and annual financial statements of its DSS activities; and
- ii. (U) B.3.b. Component oversight office for audits, inspections, and investigations of their component's DSS activities.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) NGA Response: NGA concurs with the recommendation. NGA will appoint a component DSS financial management officer and oversight office. NGA will complete this policy no later than 30 April 2014.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(U) Management Comments

**(U) Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency  
Comments (cont'd)**

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

U-2014-1011

SUBJECT: (U) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Response to Project No.  
D2012-DINT01-0079.002

4. (U//~~FOUO~~) The NGA points of contact for this matter are [REDACTED] NGA (b)(3) 10 USC 424, (b)(6)  
NGA (b)(3) 10 USC 424, (b)(6)



Letitia A. Long  
Director

(U) Management Comments

## (U) National Security Agency, Chief of Staff Comments

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

31 March 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: (U) National Security Agency Response to the Department of Defense (DoD)  
Deputy Inspector General Evaluation of Defense Sensitive Support-  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

REFERENCE: (U) Department of Defense (DoD) Deputy Inspector General Draft Report  
of Evaluation of Defense Sensitive Support, dated 26 February 2014

(U) On 26 February 2014, the Department of Defense (DoD) Deputy Inspector General (IG) for Evaluations provided the National Security Agency (NSA) with the Draft Report of Evaluation of Defense Sensitive Support (DSS) for comment. The following constitutes NSA's official response to the recommendations.

(U) Finding A: "DoD Components have provided support [that] DODD S-5210.36 defines as DSS without receiving required DSS approval because DoD Component-level issuances identifying DSS requirements or responsible offices are either outdated, incomplete, or non-existent; [and] ... (m)inimal outreach and training exists in the DSS enterprise..."

(U) Recommendation A.5: (U) We recommend the Director, NSA designate NSA's DSS policy in writing.

(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA agrees with this recommendation. NSA is drafting a policy for the provision of sensitive support to DoD components and non-DoD Federal departments and agencies (NDFDAs). The policy identifies the Cover, Controlled and Special Access Programs office as the NSA Defense Sensitive Support Activity Office (DSSAO) and outlines the roles and responsibilities of the DSSAO. Working with NSA Finance, this policy is projected to be approved by late Summer 2014.

(U) Finding B: "...DoD Component DSSOs lack internal controls for obtaining and tracking reimbursements because: ...The DOD agencies evaluated do not conduct financial management or oversight at their DSS Offices...; General oversight of DSS at the component level varies greatly; and [a]pproval documents for DSS requests do not specify how reimbursements are to occur. As a result, a lack of financial management and accountability of DSS has occurred..."

(U) Recommendation B.3: (U) We recommend that the Director, DIA; the Director, NRO; the Director, NGA; and the Director, NSA, each designate in writing:

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(U) Management Comments

(U) National Security Agency, Chief of Staff Comments  
(cont'd)

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B.3.a. (U) An office with the responsibility, clearance, and access to conduct financial management of its component's DSS and issue quarterly and annual financial statements of its DSS activities; and

B.3.b. (U) Component oversight offices for audits, inspections, and investigations of their component's DSS activities.

(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA agrees with this recommendation. In the new NSA DSS draft policy, the Director, NSA will designate the NSA DSSAO to oversee the financial reimbursement in coordination with NSA Finance's process to ensure payments associated with DSS actions are received in accordance with Title 31 U.S.C. Section 1535 [The Economy Act]. This policy will also identify the roles and responsibilities for the NSA DSSAO and NSA Finance oversight of general DSS activities at NSA.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The NSA point of contact for this action is [REDACTED].

(NSA: (b)(6))

Chief of Staff

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**(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations**

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**(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations**

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<b>AAR</b>	After Action Report
<b>ACCM</b>	Alternative Compensatory Control Measure
<b>CIA</b>	Central Intelligence Agency
<b>CJCS</b>	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
<b>CJSCM</b>	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
<b>CA</b>	Covert Action
<b>DA</b>	Department of the Army
<b>DAF</b>	Department of the Air Force
<b>DCO</b>	Defense Cover Office
<b>DIA</b>	Defense Intelligence Agency
<b>DON</b>	Department of the Navy
<b>DSS</b>	defense sensitive support
<b>DSSA</b>	defense sensitive support activity
<b>DSSAO</b>	Defense Sensitive Support Activity Office
<b>DSSO</b>	Defense Sensitive Support Office
<b>DoD</b>	Department of Defense
<b>DoDD</b>	Department of Defense Directive
<b>DoDI</b>	Department of Defense Instruction
<b>DASSP</b>	Department of the Army's Sensitive Support Program
<b>DDO</b>	Deputy Director of Operations
<b>D&amp;F</b>	Determination and Finding
<b>EO</b>	Executive Order
<b>FAR</b>	Federal Acquisition Regulation
<b>IPAC</b>	Intra-Governmental Payment and Collection
<b>JSAP</b>	Joint Staff Action Process
<b>MILDEP</b>	Military Department
<b>NGA</b>	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
<b>NRO</b>	National Reconnaissance Office
<b>NSA</b>	National Security Agency
<b>NDFDA</b>	Non-DOD Federal Departments and Agencies
<b>OIG</b>	Office of Inspector General
<b>OSD</b>	Office of the Secretary of Defense
<b>OUSD(I)</b>	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
<b>SecDef</b>	Secretary of Defense
<b>SCG</b>	Security Classification Guide
<b>SACCP</b>	Staff Action Control and Coordination Program
<b>SAB</b>	Support Activities Branch
<b>USD(I)</b>	Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
<b>USC</b>	United States Code
<b>USG</b>	United States Government

## **Whistleblower Protection**

### **U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

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## **For more information about DoD IG reports or activities, please contact us:**

### **Congressional Liaison**

703.604.8324

### **DoD Hotline**

800.424.9098

### **Media Contact**

Public.Affairs@dodig.mil; 703.604.8324

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Department of Defense | INSPECTOR GENERAL

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