Ukraine Oversight

Since February 2022, Congress has appropriated more than $15 billion for Department of Defense (DoD) assistance to Ukraine. Recognizing the potential for fraud, waste, and abuse, the DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) continues to prioritize targeted oversight of the DoD’s expenditures and provision of military equipment in support of Ukraine.

On September 19, the DoD OIG issued its second management advisory on the DoD’s use of funds appropriated for Ukraine assistance. This advisory focuses on the DoD’s use of $20.1 billion provided in the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022, enacted in May 2022. A summary and link to the full report are included below.

In addition, the DoD OIG continues work on six ongoing projects. As part of this oversight, Deputy Inspector General for Evaluations Michael Roark led a team of evaluators to Germany in September to continue the DoD OIG’s evaluation of Army prepositioned equipment in response to Ukraine and in support of NATO defense forces.

Meanwhile, the DoD OIG’s Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) is engaged in proactive efforts designed to assess potential fraud vulnerabilities. DCIS special agents in the U.S. and abroad have initiated a series of mission briefings designed to educate relevant stakeholders regarding the DoD OIG’s anti-fraud responsibilities and the various mechanisms available to report fraud and other criminal activity associated with the DoD’s Ukraine-related efforts. Principal Deputy Director of DCIS Jim Ives recently led a team of DCIS investigators to Germany and Poland to obtain a “boots on the ground” perspective of Ukraine mission support operations and to engage with law enforcement and oversight partners in the region.

Additionally, the DoD OIG is chairing a joint working group with representatives from partner oversight organizations to promote comprehensive, strategic oversight of U.S. Government support to Ukraine. On September 12, the DoD OIG finalized the charter for the Ukraine Oversight Interagency Working
Ukraine Oversight (cont’d)

Group, which comprises representatives from the DoD OIG, Intelligence Community IG, DoD audit agencies, Government Accountability Office, and the OIGs of the U.S. Agency of International Development and the Departments of State, Treasury, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, and Justice.

Finally, the DoD OIG issued its first Oversight Update on Ukraine Assistance in September to provide an overview of recent oversight activities related to Ukraine. You can find the DoD OIG’s oversight update, recently issued management advisory, and body of completed and ongoing work related to Ukraine and the U.S. European Command at the following link:  https://www.dodig.mil/Ukraine/

Management Advisory: The DoD’s Use of Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 Funds

This management advisory determined that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, DoD (OUSD[C]/CFO), continued to implement and improve procedures for DoD Components to follow in reporting, through Advancing Analytics (Advana), the execution of the additional $20.1 billion appropriated to the DoD to provide further assistance to Ukraine. Advana is the official reporting system for Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 funds. It is a common enterprise data repository and a centralized data and analytics platform that provides DoD users with common business data, decision support analytics, and data tools. OUSD(C)/CFO personnel have improved the functionality of Advana to increase the traceability, transparency, and reporting of Ukraine supplemental funds execution, including the tracking of journal vouchers and the reporting of Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funds. However, as the DoD is building processes and procedures to ensure the transparency of the reporting for the Ukraine supplemental funds, the DoD OIG identified areas of concern that, if not adequately addressed, could cause the DoD to inaccurately report the budget execution status of Ukraine supplemental funds in Advana. These areas of concern are the DoD’s processes for reporting the movement of funds to the Foreign Military Sales Trust Fund, the DoD’s use of journal vouchers limiting Advana’s reporting, and the DoD’s inconsistent recording of allotments received. The DoD OIG made one recommendation that the USD(C)/CFO update Advana’s business rules to ensure it accurately captures the budgetary status of the Ukraine supplement funds for all DoD Components.

Recently Issued Reports (To view the reports, click on the title)

Audit of DoD Component Insider Threat Reporting to the DoD Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center

This audit determined that the DoD Component Hubs reviewed—the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and Defense Health Agency (DHA)—did not consistently report to the DoD Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center (DITMAC) insider threat incidents that involved a covered person and met one or more of the reporting thresholds. Specifically, of the 215 insider threat incidents the DoD OIG reviewed from those Hubs, 200 incidents involved a covered person and met one or more of the thresholds. Of those 200 incidents, the Hubs reported 115 to DITMAC, but did not report the other 85. Furthermore, of the 115 insider threat incidents that the Hubs reported to DITMAC, the time it took the Hubs to report the incidents ranged from 1 day to over 2 years. Insider threat incidents have resulted in harm to the United States and the DoD through espionage, terrorism, unauthorized disclosure of national security information, and the loss or degradation of DoD resources and capabilities. Unless the Hubs consistently report insider threat incidents to DITMAC as required, DITMAC cannot fully accomplish its mission to
Recently Issued Reports (cont’d)

provide the DoD with a centralized capability to identify, mitigate, and counter insider threats and reduce the harm to the United States and the DoD by malicious insiders. The DoD OIG made nine recommendations, including that the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps require their Insider Threat Hub Director to review the insider threat incidents that the DoD OIG determined should have been reported to DITMAC and report those incidents as required.

Audit of U.S. Southern Command’s Execution of Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act Funding

This audit determined that U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) officials generally used Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act funds to support the COVID-19 pandemic response and operations in accordance with Federal laws and DoD policies. For 83 of the 85 projects reviewed, USSOUTHCOM officials used $32.34 million in CARES Act funds to prepare for, prevent, and respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, for the two remaining projects reviewed, USSOUTHCOM officials used $1.10 million in CARES Act funds to construct maternity wards, a purpose that did not meet the requirements of the CARES Act. In addition, USSOUTHCOM officials committed $2.11 million in DoD humanitarian assistance and disaster relief funds for 10 projects before obtaining the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s concurrence to execute costs more than 10 percent above the approved project amounts. Following existing requirements and establishing additional controls can help the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and USSOUTHCOM improve oversight over humanitarian assistance projects and ensure that future emergency funding will be executed in accordance with Federal laws and DoD policies. The proper execution of USSOUTHCOM’s CARES Act funds strengthens the public trust in the DoD’s ability to safeguard taxpayer dollars, and provides Congress with greater assurance that CARES Act funds were spent to address DoD requirements and partner nation requests for the COVID-19 pandemic response. The DoD OIG made three recommendations, including that the USSOUTHCOM Humanitarian Assistance Program Manager take steps, such as issuing procedures or training briefs, to ensure the combatant command submits changes in project funding for approval from officials from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and USSOUTHCOM, and documents the resulting decision.

Audit of the Military Services’ Award of Cost-Reimbursement Contracts

This audit determined that the Military Service contracting officials did not consistently award cost-reimbursement contracts in accordance with Federal and DoD regulations and guidance. Contracting officials consistently complied with cost-reimbursement contract requirements when awarding 38 of 83 cost-reimbursement contracts, valued at $20.54 billion. However, contracting officials did not consistently award the remaining 45 cost-reimbursement contracts, valued at $6.94 billion, in accordance with Federal and DoD regulations and guidance. As a result, Military Service contracting officials potentially increased contracting risks when awarding cost-reimbursement contracts without proper approvals, justifications, transition strategies, adequate Government resources, and adequate accounting systems. Cost-reimbursement contracts are high risk for the DoD due to the potential for cost escalation and because the Government pays a contractor’s costs up to the amount obligated on the contract, even without a final deliverable. The DoD OIG made 13 recommendations, including that the Principal Director of Defense Pricing and Contracting clarify whether any exemptions exist regarding the applicability of current regulations for contracting officials to document in the contract file approval for the use of cost-reimbursement contracts. The DoD OIG also recommended that the Principal Director issue guidance to emphasize coordination
Recently Issued Reports (cont’d)

between contracting officials and the Defense Contract Management Agency, as part of acquisition planning, to ensure adequate Government resources are available to award and manage cost-reimbursement contracts before contract award.

Management Advisory: Audit of the Navy’s Accelerated Promotion Programs

This management advisory informed Congress and DoD leadership of the status of the audit of the Navy’s Accelerated Promotion Programs (APPs). The objective of the audit is to determine whether employees hired at the Navy’s four public shipyards were affected by the suspension of the Accelerated Promotion Program in 2016 and, if so, determine the number of employees affected and the monetary impact to those employees and whether they are entitled to additional compensation. Section 1115 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2022 requires the DoD OIG to conduct an assessment of the impacts resulting from the Navy’s suspension of the Entry Level Naval Shipyards Engineer APP from January 23, 2016, through December 22, 2016. This advisory determined that the majority of Navy shipyard personnel hired at the four public shipyards from January 23, 2016, through December 22, 2016, received accelerated promotions through a Navy APP. Specifically, 544 of 603 Navy shipyard personnel (90 percent) received accelerated promotions, and 59 of 603 Navy shipyard personnel (10 percent) did not receive accelerated promotions through a Navy APP. For the 59 personnel who did not receive an accelerated promotion through a Navy APP, this management advisory determined that 11 Navy shipyard personnel were eligible for a promotion through a Navy APP, and that 48 Navy shipyard personnel were not. The final audit report will address the remaining congressionally requested actions and additional areas identified during the audit. The DoD OIG did not make recommendations in this management advisory.

Audit of the DoD Certification Process for Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act Section 4003 Loans Provided to Businesses Designated as Critical to Maintaining National Security

This audit determined that officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (OUSD[A&S]) did not adequately support their verifications that businesses held DX priority contracts or top secret facility clearances. In addition, OUSD(A&S) officials did not adequately support their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense to certify businesses as critical to maintaining national security for loans under section 4003 of the CARES Act. Of the 74 businesses that Treasury Department officials provided to the DoD for review, OUSD(A&S) officials verified the DX priority or top secret facility clearances for 16 businesses, and based on recommendations from the OUSD(A&S), the Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense certified that 19 other businesses were critical to maintaining national security. In addition, a Secretary of Defense memorandum to the Secretary of the Treasury certified a 20th business not included in the OUSD(A&S) recommendations. The DoD did not verify or certify the remaining 38 businesses to receive consideration for loans under section 4003 of the CARES Act. As a result, the OUSD(A&S) implemented a process that was inconsistent and ineffective for verifying or certifying businesses as critical to maintaining national security, possibly enabling unqualified businesses to receive section 4003 loans. Ultimately, Treasury Department officials made the final decision to approve section 4003 loans; however, Treasury Department officials relied on the analysis performed by OUSD(A&S) officials to initiate the loan underwriting process. Furthermore, the DoD’s lack of a documented definition and documentation trail put the Treasury Department at risk of potentially providing loans to companies that were not critical to maintaining national security. The DoD OIG made two recommendations, including that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy perform an after-action
Recently Issued Reports (cont’d)

review to document decisions, actions, best practices, and lessons learned when operating in a pandemic environment or other national emergency in which the DoD is tasked to provide critical information and analysis to support decisions in a short timeframe.

Audit of Department of Defense Stipends Provided to the Vetted Syrian Opposition from the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund

This audit determined whether the DoD verified that Vetted Syrian Opposition groups met DoD requirements when providing the groups with stipends from the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund for Syria. Additionally, the audit determined whether the DoD established internal controls to ensure the stipend payments were accurately distributed to Vetted Syrian Opposition groups. This report is classified.

Audit of DoD Other Transactions and the Use of Nontraditional Contractors and Resource Sharing

This audit determined that, although DoD agreement officers awarded Other Transactions (OT) for prototypes in accordance with the United States Code, additional OT policies are needed. This audit reviewed 34 prototype OT awards, valued at $5 billion, and found agreement officers did not always verify the status of nontraditional defense contractors (NDC), validate NDCs participating in prototype awards actually completed the significant work, or approve costs incurred prior to award or appropriately award resource share OTs. The DoD takes on more risk when it uses OTs to get participation from NDCs. However, without validating NDC status, conducting appropriate oversight to ensure the NDC performs the requirements of the OT agreement as proposed, and validating resource share contributions, agreement personnel may not meet the conditions of the United States Code. In addition, the Government may be paying more than the amount required in the resource share agreement, and traditional contractors may obtain an OT for which they are ineligible. Because of agreement personnel's noncompliance with the United States Code and failure to approve costs incurred before award, the Department of the Navy incurred $800,000 in questioned costs associated with an Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle Research Area 2 Full-System Technology Demonstrator. The DoD OIG made five recommendations, including that the Principal Director of Defense Pricing and Contracting require agreement officers to validate the NDC status prior to award and include documentation of the verification in the OT file.

Audit of the Department of the Navy’s Controls over the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act Program

This audit determined that the Department of the Navy did not effectively manage the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA) Program. The Department of the Navy commands reviewed did not consistently implement the FECA Program, such as assigning staff, completing chargeback reviews, and tracking and monitoring overpayments. In addition, the Injury Compensation Program Administrators generally processed initial claims with the Department of Labor Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs as required. However, the Injury Compensation Program Administrators did not always maintain complete records needed to implement the FECA Program, perform annual reviews of a sample of long-term claim files, request current medical reports from the Department of Labor Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, or identify claimants who could return to work. As a result, the Department of the Navy did not have the ability to verify the accuracy of the Department of the Navy FECA chargeback costs, overpaid at least $325,070 for FECA benefits that claimants or their beneficiaries were not entitled to receive, and
missed opportunities to return employees to work. The DoD OIG made 10 recommendations, including that DoD officials update FECA guidance to clearly establish the Injury Compensation Program Administrator roles and responsibilities, and develop and issue guidance providing a consistent approach for implementing the FECA Program and command assessments.

**Special Report: Lessons Learned From Security Cooperation Activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa**

This special report summarizes challenges and lessons learned in 37 reports issued from 2015 to 2021 by the DoD OIG, Government Accountability Office, and Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction relating to U.S. and Coalition efforts to provide security cooperation to foreign partners in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa. This special report may inform and assist current and future U.S. security cooperation activities worldwide. For example, problems with accountability and control of U.S.-provided equipment could result in loss of sensitive equipment that is susceptible to theft, misuse, or diversion. Additionally, systemic challenges with training and advising resulted in partner nation over-reliance on U.S. and Coalition forces to execute essential functions, such as logistics, maintenance, and support. The DoD OIG did not make new recommendations in this report.


This evaluation determined that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD[P&R]) and the Service-level diversity and inclusion offices took some actions but did not fully implement 12 of 18 recommendations identified in the 2011 Military Leadership Diversity Commission report. The OUSD(P&R) and Service-level diversity and inclusion offices did not oversee implementation of the recommendations because the DoD does not have an official who is responsible for conducting oversight of the implementation of the recommendations. Additionally, officials for the Office for Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion, aligned under the OUSD(P&R), stated that they have no programs or requirements to track this progress. As a result of a lack of defined policy, roles and responsibilities, and data collection, the DoD cannot determine what progress has been made and what still needs to be accomplished. The DoD OIG made 44 recommendations, including that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness appoint an official responsible for oversight of progress toward implementing recommendations from the Military Leadership Diversity Commission.

**Evaluation of the Department of Defense’s Reform of Privatized Military Housing Oversight Related to Health, Safety, and Environmental Hazards**

This evaluation determined that DoD officials have taken steps to implement FY 2020 NDAA provisions related to health, safety, and environmental hazards in military housing. Specifically, DoD officials issued policies to require installation military housing officials to perform the FY 2020 NDAA oversight provisions. They also issued policies to require the inclusion of FY 2020 NDAA provisions in future legal agreements, and sought agreement from landlords to retroactively include FY 2020 NDAA provisions in existing legal agreements. However, despite DoD officials’ attempts to seek agreement from the landlords, not all landlords have agreed to voluntarily include three FY 2020 NDAA provisions retroactively in existing legal
agreements. This occurred because the landlords are not legally required to retroactively include the three FY 2020 NDAA provisions in existing legal agreements. As a result, tenants whose landlords refused to voluntarily include the FY 2020 NDAA provisions retroactively in existing legal agreements do not have access to the same rights as tenants whose landlords agreed to include those provisions. The DoD OIG did not make recommendations in this report. This report is the second of three DoD OIG reports required by the FY 2020 NDAA. We published the first report, DODIG-2022-004, “Evaluation of the Department of Defense's Implementation of Oversight Provisions of Privatized Military Housing,” on October 21, 2021.

Evaluation of the U.S. Special Operations Command Armed Overwatch Program

This evaluation determined the extent to which the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Armed Overwatch program met established operational and mission program requirements. The evaluation focused on USSOCOM, the Joint Special Operations Command, the U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command, and other DoD Components that support the procurement and development of the Armed Overwatch program. This report is classified.

Evaluation of High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse Life Cycle Testing and Facility Infrastructure

This evaluation determined the extent to which DoD program managers for mission-critical aircraft planned and conducted high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) life-cycle testing in accordance with DoD Instruction 3150.09. The evaluation also determined whether HEMP testing facilities possessed the necessary infrastructure to support mission-critical aircraft life-cycle testing. This report is classified.

Evaluation of Kinetic Targeting Processes in the U.S. Africa Command Area of Responsibility

This evaluation determined whether the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and USSOCOM established and followed targeting procedures in the USAFRICOM area of responsibility to reduce civilian casualties and collateral damage. The evaluation also determined whether USAFRICOM and USSOCOM followed civilian casualties report procedures in the USAFRICOM area of responsibility. This report is classified.

Upcoming Reports

Audit of the Department of Defense Federal Mall Purchases

This audit determines whether the DoD made purchases through Federal Mall in accordance with Federal and DoD policies.

Evaluation of the DoD’s Notification Procedures for the Presidential Emergency Satchel

This evaluation determines the extent to which DoD processes and procedures are in place and adequate to alert DoD officials in the event that the Presidential Emergency Satchel is lost, stolen, or compromised. This evaluation also determines the adequacy of the procedures the DoD has developed to respond to such an event. This report will be classified.
Florida Man Pleads Guilty to $223,000 Money Laundering Conspiracy

On September 19, 2022, Franklin D. Huggins pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering for his role in an e-mail hacking scheme that targeted a program at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, as well as victims in Tennessee and Idaho. From January 2017 to January 2019, Huggins participated in a money-laundering conspiracy related to a $223,000 wire fraud scheme in which his co-conspirators targeted Fort Leonard Wood and two businesses through a business e-mail compromise scheme. The co-conspirators hacked into a business e-mail account and sent an e-mail from what appeared to be an employee of the business, instructing that money be sent to certain bank accounts. DCIS investigated this matter jointly with the Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID).

Wisconsin Man Charged with Wire Fraud and False Statements

On September 15, 2022, Jonathan Walker was indicted on charges alleging that he engaged in a scheme to defraud the United States and to obtain money by making false representations. Walker was the owner and operator of Walker Investment Properties, LLC (WIP), a mechanical contracting business that provided electrical services and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) services. The indictment alleges that, from July 2015 to June 2019, Walker sought and obtained Federal contracts by claiming that WIP was a Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business (SDVOSB). The indictment alleges that Walker did not suffer a disability incurred in the line of duty while in the military, nor was he a veteran. The DoD awarded two contracts to WIP, valued at approximately $1.9 million, for HVAC services and fire alarm installation at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. The indictment alleges that Walker caused WIP to issue invoices for services provided under the contracts that resulted in payments to WIP totaling $482,577. DCIS investigated this matter jointly with the General Services Administration OIG.

Florida Businessman Pleads Guilty in Conspiracies to Commit Health Care Fraud, Pay and Receive Kickbacks, and Money Laundering

On September 15, 2022, Daniel Hurt pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit health care fraud, pay and receive unlawful kickbacks, and commit money laundering. As part of his plea, Hurt agreed to pay $97,360,452 in restitution to Medicare, TRICARE, and CHAMPVA. Hurt has separately agreed to forfeiture money judgments totaling $31,148,625 and to forfeit his luxury watercraft. DCIS investigated this matter jointly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) OIG, Internal Revenue Service–Criminal Investigation, Department of Labor Employee Benefit Security Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) OIG, Food and Drug Administration OIG, and Army CID.

Companies and Owner Sentenced for Defrauding Government Agencies

On September 14, 2022, Juan Guillermo Gonzalez and his companies, Accelogic LLC and Intellectual Property Systems LLC (Intellep) were sentenced for their roles in obtaining information from U.S. departments and agencies and improperly using it for commercial advantage and private financial gain. Gonzalez was sentenced to 32 months in Federal prison, followed by 1 year of supervised release, and ordered to pay
$1.7 million in restitution. Accelogic and Intellep were ordered to pay $2.9 million in restitution and placed on probation for 3 years. The defendants cannot participate in any Government contracts while on supervised release or probation. Money judgments also were imposed against each defendant to forfeit their ill-gotten gains. DCIS investigated this matter jointly with Homeland Security Investigations, Department of Energy OIG, National Aeronautics and Space Administration OIG, and Army CID.

**Medical Technology Company President Convicted in $77 Million COVID-19 and Allergy Testing Scheme**

On September 2, 2022, Mark Schena, President of Arrayit Corporation, was convicted of participating in a scheme to mislead investors, commit health care fraud, and pay illegal kickbacks in connection with the submission of over $77 million in false and fraudulent claims for COVID-19 and allergy testing. The evidence presented at trial showed that Schena engaged in a scheme to defraud Arrayit’s investors by claiming that he had invented revolutionary technology to test for virtually any disease using only a few drops of blood. In meetings with investors, Schena and his publicist claimed that Schena was the “father of microarray technology” and falsely stated that he was on the shortlist for the Nobel Prize. Additionally, Schena falsely represented to investors that Arrayit could be valued at $4.5 billion based on purported revenues of $80 million per year. DCIS investigated this matter jointly with the FBI, HHS OIG, VA OIG, and Postal Inspection Service.

**Announced Projects** (To view the announcement letters, please click on the title)

**Audit of the Joint Program Office’s Reporting of Joint Strike Fighter Assets in the Defense Property Accountability System**

The objective of this audit is to determine the progress made by the Joint Strike Fighter Joint Program Office to remediate material weaknesses and conditions identified by the DoD Agency Wide Financial Statement audit.

**Audit of the Department of Defense Oversight of Cost-Plus-Award-Fee Contracts**

The objective of this audit is to determine whether DoD contracting officials oversaw contractor performance and justified award fees paid for cost-plus-award-fee contract actions in accordance with Federal and DoD policies.

**Audit of Department of Defense Management of Hazardous Waste Disposals**

The objective of this audit is to determine whether the Military Services and DLA Disposition Services provided oversight and processed hazardous waste disposals in accordance with DoD, Federal, and state requirements.

**Evaluation of DoD Financial Responsibility Reviews on Prospective DoD Contractors**

The objective of this evaluation is to determine whether DoD contracting officers are performing effective financial responsibility reviews on prospective DoD contractors as required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation and DoD Component policies.
Evaluation of DoD Support to Other Agencies’ Requests for the Screening of Displaced Persons from Afghanistan

The objective of this evaluation is to determine the extent to which the DoD supported other agencies’ requests for screening Afghan evacuees by reviewing DoD databases. In addition, this evaluation will determine the extent to which DoD personnel are authorized to remove biometrics information from DoD databases.

Evaluation of the Air Force’s Next-Generation Air Dominance Program Technology Maturity

The objective of this evaluation is to determine the extent to which the Air Force demonstrated that the critical technologies used in the Next-Generation Air Dominance fighter aircraft were mature enough to support entry into the engineering and manufacturing development phase of the Next-Generation Air Dominance program’s acquisition timeline.

In Case You Missed It (To view the report, please click on the title)

FY 2023 Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Overseas Contingency Operations

The FY 2023 Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) describes projects that the Lead Inspector General agencies and the OCO Joint Planning Group members expect to conduct during FY 2023. This comprehensive oversight plan contains 130 ongoing and planned oversight projects for FY 2023, some of which apply to multiple OCOs.

Technical Director for Followup and Quality Assurance on the Compendium of Open Recommendations to the Department of Defense

Valerie McMichael, Technical Director for Followup and Quality Assurance for Audit, discusses the Compendium of Open Recommendations to the DoD with Federal News Network.