

A STAFF STUDY ON  
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE  
OFFICE OF OPERATIONS

SUBMITTED  
TO RADM R. W. GOEHRING  
CHIEF, OFFICE OF OPERATIONS

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## PREFACE

This staff report was researched while the author served as a member of a three-man study group convened to examine the organization, workload, and personnel resources of the Office of Operations. Subsequent developments reduced the study group to one member, the author. The pace of Headquarters reorganization has accelerated dramatically in recent weeks, so much so that if this report is to be of other than historical value, it must be submitted now. This paper attempts to place in perspective the major factors involved, and to recommend alternatives for reorganization and reallocation of personnel resources. In so doing it will hopefully serve as a convenient, current reference to decision-makers within the Office of Operations.

RGK

## A STUDY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF OPERATIONS

### THE PROBLEM

1. Personal interviews with the Chief, Office of Operations, the Deputy Chief, and the Chiefs of Divisions and Staffs within the Office of Operations elicited several "problems."

a. The Chief of "O" has too many programs (currently sixteen in six programs areas).

b. The Chief, of "O's" span of control is too large. In addition to its multiple programs, the Office of Operations is responsible for the coordination of many facilities.

c. Current operations occupy too much time of the Program Director and his Program Managers. This disproportionate attention to current operations interferes excessively with the other functions of these key individuals.

d. The Office of Operations is understaffed for the workload it must perform. The major impact of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System with its attendant study groups, etc., has been on the Office of Operations.

### ASSUMPTION

1. That in the aggregate requests for resources for all Coast Guard programs will always exceed available Coast Guard resources, and hence the entire matrix of competing Coast Guard programs will require adjustment. This process of allocation of resources

among competing programs includes not only the allocation of funds, but the allocation of services provided by Coast Guard facilities and personnel, also.

#### FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The organization of the Coast Guard is built on the "vertical general staff system", which vests control and responsibility for administration and logistic support as well as operational control in the military chain of command. (1/11)\*
2. The military character of the Coast Guard was distinctly clarified in 1949 when Congress declared "The Coast Guard as established January 28, 1915, shall be a military service and a branch of the Armed Forces of the United States at all times."  
(2/4)
3. The Commandant, assisted by the Headquarters staff, plans, supervises and coordinates Coast Guard activities within the several districts. (3/1-3)
4. The Area Commanders act as intermediate echelons of operational command between the Commandant and the District Commanders. They exercise operational control in certain specified instances where coordination between districts is required, e.g., major search and rescue cases, Ocean Station vessel operation, etc.

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\* The parenthetical note (1/11) indicates the source as reference number 1 of enclosure A to this report. Page 11 of the referenced document is where specific information may be located.

5. District Commanders provide regional direction and coordination of the performance of duties by individual field units.

6. Duties of the Coast Guard are in most instances actually performed by individual operating units such as ships, aircraft, air, light, radio, and lifeboat stations; marine inspection offices; and individual logistics units such as training centers, bases and depots, and repair shops. (3/1-3) The Coast Guard has historically operated multi-functional facilities, i.e., facilities which serve more than one mission area, either serially or concurrently. The natural bias of this multi-functional aspect has been to develop a facilities oriented organization.

7. The chain of military command and operational and administrative control ordinarily runs from the Commandant to the District Commander, and in turn...to the Commanding Officer... of a particular operating or logistics unit. (3/1-4.)

8. With respect to the actual performance of its missions, the Coast Guard operates on a highly decentralized basis. Subject to the policy of the Commandant, District Commanders enjoy considerable autonomy in fulfilling the demands of their responsibilities.

9. The organizational structure of Coast Guard Headquarters reflects a piecemeal growth pattern. The additions of the Lighthouse Service in 1939 and the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation in 1946 typify this pattern. Offices have been

created along classic functional lines and areas of special technical competence; e.g., Personnel, Engineering, Merchant Marine Safety, Operations, etc.

10. In recent years both the Coast Guard and the Federal Government have taken significant steps to implement a "management by objectives" concept. This concept is commonly known in its Coast Guard application as "mission management." A mission may be defined as the objective to which specific programs are directed. A program is a means of achieving a mission or objective. (4/24) Chronologically, several events stand out in the ongoing evolution of the mission management concept:

- ✓ 1948 -- Ebasco Study: First effort to analyze Coast Guard Objectives.
- ✓ 1961 -- Department of Defense initiated Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS).
- ✓ 1962 -- Roles and Missions Study: Defined nine Coast Guard missions. Recommended adoption of a program budget.
- ✓ 1963 -- Office of Operations reorganized with an Assistant Chief for Roles and Missions and an Assistant Chief for Facilities and Services.
- ✓ 1965 -- President Johnson directed implementation of PPBS concepts throughout the Federal Government.
- 1965 -- Budget and Cost Analysis Division moved from the Office of the Comptroller to the Office of the Chief of Staff.

✓ 1965 -- Office of Operations reorganized. Deleted  
Assistant Chief for Roles and Missions and  
Assistant Chief for Facilities and Services.  
Added a Plans and Programs Staff.

✓ 1966 -- Coast Guard began work on the first Program Budget  
under PPBS (FY 1968)

✓ 1967 -- Office of Operations reorganized along mission lines  
with five Mission Divisions and four staffs.

✓ 1967 -- Coast Guard entered the newly formed Department of  
Transportation.

1967 -- Commandant declared a condition of "Administrative  
General Quarters" at Headquarters to meet the demands  
for studies required by the Bureau of the Budget,  
the Department of Transportation, and the Marine  
Sciences Council.

1967 -- Office of the Chief of Staff reorganized and augmented.  
Primary PPBS oriented components established as:

Plans Evaluation Division (CPE)  
Programs Division (CPA)  
Budget Division (CBU)

Data Systems Division (CDS) moved from Office of  
the Comptroller to the Office of the Chief of Staff.

1968 -- Office of Boating Safety created.

1969 -- Office of Oceanology approved in principle by the Comman-  
dant.

11. In essence, the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System calls for:

a. Designing for each government agency an output-oriented program structure under which data on all operations and activities can be presented in categories that reflect the agency's purposes or objectives.

b. Making analyses in terms of costs, effectiveness, and benefits of possible alternatives for meeting agency program objectives.

c. Translating decisions on programs into financial budgets for consideration and action by the President and the Congress with subsequent devising of operating budgets for management control purposes.

In general, documented objectives, criteria and benefits become a significant part of the analytical process to aid higher authority in arriving at informed judgement on alternative courses of action and assist in establishing program priorities within limited resources. Also, much improved coordination is achieved in developing viable long-range plans which are essentially valid over a period of years, yet amenable to annual adjustments.

(5/I-1)

12. The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System is by its design, one with strong centralizing tendencies. Its main thrust is to make available to top management well-documented alternatives which provide the basis for crucial decisions on the

allocation of limited resources. Rapid communications and electronic computers can greatly enhance the use of PPBS techniques. Both contribute to the centralizing bias of PPBS. The Coast Guard is just entering the threshold to the advanced management information systems that these technological advances make possible.

13. The central theme of the PPBS concept...has been that management planning should be more directly concerned with accomplishment of missions than with operation of facilities.

(6/11)

14. In implementing the PPB System, the Coast Guard found it necessary to superimpose the basic PPBS organizational structure onto the existing Headquarters organization. Essentially, then, at Headquarters...management responsibility for an approved Coast Guard program rests with the Commandant. He carries out his responsibility through the Chief of Staff who coordinates the efforts of the Program Directors. The Program Director gives effect to his programs through designated Program Managers

(5/II-1)

15. The tasks of Program Directors were assigned to selected Office Chiefs, with the Chief, Office of Operations absorbing some seventeen programs distributed through several program areas. Prior to the 1968 creation of the Office of Boating Safety, the only program areas outside the mantle of operations were Merchant Marine Safety, Reserve Training, and General Support. (5/II-3)

16. The Chief, Office of Operations, besides being responsible for the coordination of multitudinous operating facilities, found himself as the Director for seventeen programs, immersed in a flood of PPBS documentation requirements. Basically, there are eight PPBS documents submitted annually for each Coast Guard program. By title these documents are:

- a. Resource Change Proposal
- b. Program Proposal
- c. Data Summary
- d. AC&I Sheets
- e. Program Definitions
- f. Determinations
- g. Planning Factors
- h. Data Book Material

Some of these documents require updating and revision throughout the fiscal year. Some must be prepared to cover multiple years. All require extensive coordination with the Program Managers and the Chief of Staff's organization (5/IV-1 thru 12)

17. In addition to the regularly recurring documents cited above, the implementation of the PPB System emphasized the intermittent need for analytical efforts such as position papers, issue papers, and special studies. The Administrative General Quarters of 1967 was convened to direct all available resources toward studying several areas of critical importance to the Coast Guard. Enclosure B is a list of topics the Commandant deemed in need of study at that time. (7/Enclosure # 1) Many of these studies were vitally related to several programs under the auspices of the Chief, Office

of Operations.

18. Besides reviewing the analytical paper flow associated with the documentation of programs, the Chief, Office of Operations is also required to personally attend and provide input to briefings, conferences, hearings, etc., including those of the Department of Transportation, the Bureau of the Budget, and of the Congress. His workload associated with regular and intermittent documentation requirements and with personal appearances for hearings, briefings, etc., is directly proportional to the number of programs under his cognizance.

19. The 1960's brought many changes which contributed to the workload of all Headquarters personnel.

a. The mere mechanics of implementing the several organizational changes in both the Office of the Chief of Staff and the Office of Operations created short-term workloads. The same was true of the several new offices that appeared during this period; e.g., Office of Public and International Affairs (A); Office of Research and Development (D); Office of Boating Safety (B); Office of Civil Rights (H); etc.

b. Entry into the Department of Transportation similarly brought about added workload. The Coast Guard played an important role in the setting up of the new department, and its involvement in transportation affairs increased commensurately. Interfaces with other department elements demanded extensive Coast Guard participation which contrasted sharply with former relationships in the Treasury Department.

c. The initial study efforts undertaken in 1967 were staffed "out of the hide" by having each Office identify ten per cent of its personnel resources for study participation. In addition to performing increasingly more complex tasks with fewer people, due to study group attrition, Offices also faced demands for substantive inputs from these same study groups.

d. Implementation of PPBS techniques required personnel to learn a whole new vocabulary, as well as the theory and practical applications of the PPBS process. This was of necessity largely a "boot-strap" effort, since it was not feasible to provide everyone with extensive schooling on PPBS.

e. During the 1960's the Coast Guard experienced growth in every program area. Search and Rescue responses increased over five per cent annually. Recreational Boating expanded at an explosive rate. Waterborne commerce increased over three per cent per year. The Viet Nam situation escalated dramatically. Coast Guard efforts in Aids to Navigation were highlighted by our LORAN programs, both military and civil. The National Navigation Plan Study and participation in the OMEGA project represented other important initiatives. Foreign fishing fleet activities, the presence of "spy ships" off our coasts, and the Cuban situation placed added burdens on our Law Enforcement mission. Renewed ? emphasis in Marine Sciences required Coast Guard participation in numerous conferences and studies, e.g., the National Data Buoy Development Project, as well as in operational efforts such as BOMEX. Polar operations assumed added stature when we took over the Navy's icebreakers, and subsequently total helicopter

support of icebreaker operations. Discovery of oil on the North Slope of Alaska led to Coast Guard involvement in the MANHATTAN Project. New responsibilities under the Department of Transportation contributed significantly to our workload; for example:

(1) Administration of Oil Pollution laws demanded greatly increased effort with each major "spill".

(2) The administration of bridges over navigable waters required development of an entirely new area of expertise.

(3) On a lesser scale, Emergency Transportation Planning required inputs to DOT's Office of Emergency Transportation; and

(4) The potential benefits of increased Domestic Icebreaking pointed to the need for further study and participation by the Coast Guard.

20. Current operations consume formidable amounts of the time available to both the Chief, Office of Operations and his Division Chiefs. Since these same individuals serve as the Program Director and the Program Managers, respectively, of sixteen Coast Guard programs, the impact is to lessen the time available for other longer range aspects of the PPBS process. Prolonged preoccupation with current operations serves to disrupt the continuity that is vital to successful planning. Certain operational events unavoidably require the discretion of the Commandant. Such circumstances might involve sensitive political issues, international relationships, reprogramming of resources, etc.; all

of which could require further policy, or policy clarification from the Commandant. During FY 1969 examples of these situations would include the Presidential Transport Operation in Miami; Search and Rescue efforts for an airliner crash near Monterrey, Mexico, and the Union Oil offshore Pollution problem near Santa Barbara, California. Office of Operations involvement in current operations also includes more routine matters such as:

- a. The scheduling of icebreakers by the Marine Sciences Division;
- b. The scheduling of administrative flights for CGAS Arlington by the Search and Rescue Division (OSR);
- c. The operation of Flag Plot by OSR; and
- d. The operation of the Communications Center by the Communications Staff.

Current operations also precipitate numerous congressional letters, the responses to which are staffed primarily within the mission divisions.

21. Personal interviews and review of former studies on reorganization indicate that the Intelligence Staff (OI) serves the Office of Personnel (P) and the Office of Merchant Marine Safety (M) as well as the Office of Operations. In fact, only the Operational Intelligence Branch provides a direct input to Operations. Recommendations to retain the Operational Intelligence function within Operations, and to transfer the remainder of the Intelligence functions to the Office of Personnel have

been made previously.

### DISCUSSION

1. The events of the past decade have served to bring several points into sharp focus:

a. The organization of Headquarters is undergoing an accelerating evolution, and further significant changes are imminent. Several facts document this view:

(1) The 1963, 1965, and 1967 reorganizations of the Office of Operations.

(2) The 1965 and 1967 reorganizations of the Office of the Chief of Staff.

(3) The recent creation of the Offices A, B, D, and H; the pending Office of the Chief Medical Officer; and the pending Office of Oceanology.

b. The Coast Guard has firmly embraced the concept of mission management and the use of PPBS techniques. Several facts confirm this statement:

(1) The published policy directives which detail the PPBS organization.

(2) The establishment of Program Directors; Program Managers; Coast Guard programs; Program Areas; augmented planning and programming staffs for Program Managers and Program Directors; the development of the PPBS-oriented staff elements of the Chief of Staff; the use of the Program Budget; etc.

c. Several factors have imposed multiple demands upon the Office of Operations, and the net effect has been to stress severely its organizational structure. Examples of these factors

are:

(1) The demands for extensive PPBS documentation of the many programs under the Chief, Office of Operations.

(2) The demands occasioned by our entry into DOT.

(3) The demands of increased coordination required due to the emergence of several staff components at the Chief of Staff level and higher.

(4) The demands of increased coordination required of Operations as Headquarter's primary facilities manager due to new initiatives, expanding missions, and shifts in mission emphasis.

(5) The demands of current operations which cover the broad spectrum of missions under the management of the Chief, Office of Operations.

Evidence which acknowledges the stress that the Office of Operations has experienced is readily found in:

(6) The numerous efforts by the Office of Operations to reorganize within its own bounds (1963; 1965; 1967).

(7) The 1968 separation of the Boating Safety Program Area from the Office of Operations which resulted in the creation of the Office of Boating Safety.

(8) The pending 1969 separation of parts or all of the Oceanography, Meteorology and Polar Operations Program Area from the Office of Operations, which will result in the creation of the Office of Oceanology.

(9) Personal interviews with the personnel of the Office

of Operations.

2. The three reorganizations of Operations cited above all emphasized the importance of mission management. All were constrained by:

a. The manpower resources already established within the Office.

b. The existing functional organization of Headquarters. The 1963 setup featured a Captain as Assistant Chief for Roles and Missions, and a Captain as Assistant Chief for Facilities and Services. Each of these officers had one GS-6 for secretarial services, and no additional staff. As such they constituted an administrative layer (bottleneck) above those divisions that reported to them. The incumbents of these billets soon realized the nature of their situation, and together they recommended the reorganization that resulted in the creation of the Plans and Programs Staff in 1965. The 1967 reorganization featured an attempt to reduce the span of control of the Chief, Office of Operations, and to give Program Managers "maximum influence" over the facilities required to support their mission areas. These concepts were implemented by reducing the facilities divisions to branches and assigning facilities management to the Program Manager who qualified as the "primary user." The former Aviation Units Division became a branch under the Search and Rescue Division (OSR). The responsibilities of the former Floating Units Division were divided among the Search and Rescue Division, the Aids to Navigation Division (OAN), and the Marine Sciences Division (OMS).

The responsibilities of the former Shore Units Division were for the most part retained within the Shore Facilities Branch of OSR.

3. Enclosure (C) contains an analysis of the personnel structure of the Office of Operations. Table 9 provides a summary of the net changes in personnel allowances for the 1967-1969 period. Table 10 is more descriptive in that it shows changes in personnel strength with respect to the functions gained or lost over the same interval. It may be observed from Table 10 that the Office of Operations was augmented substantially, particularly with respect to officer billets. If one subtracts the 12 officer billets lost due to losses of functional responsibilities from the 89 billets authorized in 1967, a base of 77 billets remains. Fourteen billets were subsequently added due to increases in functional responsibilities, which, when combined with 23 more billets justified and added through the PPBS process, totals out to an increase of 37 billets. These 37 billets represent an increase of some 48 per cent in officer strength over the base of 77 derived above. A similar exercise indicates that the civilian positions were augmented some 20 per cent, also. The thrust of these increases has been to enhance the PPBS capabilities of the Office of Operations; e.g., the Plans Staff grew from 3 to 12 billets/positions.

4. In briefings to incoming officials of the DOT, several areas of approved Commandant's policy were recently stated. One policy particularly relevant to this study was that the Coast

Guard can best serve the nation by remaining intact as a military organization under the Department of Transportation (8/Sup. #1). To this end, Secretary Volpe was quoted as having stated: "The Coast Guard...will be in the forefront of any civil marine activity. The Coast Guard is a complete unit representing a base of competence and facilities upon which to build any civil organization to do things on or near the water." In summarizing the possible consequences of failing to embark upon an extensive program to strengthen the Coast Guard's involvement in Marine affairs, the same briefing pointed out the "possibility of fractionation and piecemeal assimilation [Of the Coast Guard] by other agencies."

5. Development and maintenance of the Coast Guard as an entity in the spirit of the stated Commandant's policy requires several inputs. The recent emphasis on PPBS has brought to the fore the need for thorough analysis and justification for each Coast Guard program. This bias has quite naturally caused each Program Manager to attempt to sub-optimize his specific program. The ultimate in this approach is complete "control" by the Program Manager of those resources necessary to accomplish program objectives. This control would extend over funds, personnel and facilities. Using the individual program as a point of reference, this concept is reasonable, and the sub-optimization of a given program appears plausible.

6. However, when the point of reference is shifted to include the entire Coast Guard; i.e., to regard the Coast Guard as a system, it is necessary to consider other factors. First, limited resources require the allocation of available resources

among the various Coast Guard programs. The allocation process is a continuing one, and includes within its scope the reprogramming of resources. Second, with due regard to the multifunctional character of our facilities the Coast Guard's system of facilities must be optimized; i.e, designed by virtue of type, mix, location and workload to best serve all Coast Guard objectives.

7. The above factors clearly indicate that "control" as espoused by some Program Managers is simply not feasible, subject to the constraint of preserving the Coast Guard as a viable, functioning entity. The optimization of the Coast Guard system may well mean that individual programs will not reach their theoretical sub-optimums. None the less, this optimization implies maximization of total benefits derived from Coast Guard service to the nation.

8. Several factors mitigate against a complete swing of the pendulum of control toward the Program Managers. The allocation of resources and the optimization of facilities were mentioned above. A third factor concerns the workload that devolves upon the operating units of the Coast Guard. Several levels of constraint must be operative if the cumulative requirements of all the Program Managers are to be kept within reasonable bounds by the time they reach the output-oriented operating units.

a. The highest level of constraint must be exercised by a centralized organizational component within Headquarters, which acts on behalf and with the direction of the Commandant to effect

a synthesis of program efforts through allocation of resources and the approval of program policies.

b. An intermediate level of constraint must be exercised by District and Area Commanders in their interpretation of Commandant's policy with respect to the appropriate use of available resources in the conduct of current operations.

c. The final level of constraint must be exercised by Commanding Officers of operating units through their interpretation and implementation of policy from all echelons of higher authority in the conduct of current operations.

9. The function of allocation of resources at the Headquarters level requires not only PPBS inputs from Program Directors (Managers), but also an overall, Coast Guard system input with respect to our facilities. If the "primary user" concept for the management of major mobile facilities is pursued as new Offices are created to manage programs formerly under the Office of Operations, a proliferation of facilities managers could result. Such a fractionation of facilities management among Offices would unduly compound any effort to optimize the total Coast Guard facilities system. It would also serve to identify facilities "dedicated" to certain programs, and in turn make them more susceptible to pirating by other governmental agencies.

10. The thrust of the above factors is to point to the desirability of a centralized system of facilities management. In essence, one could envision a buyer/seller relationship, wherein Program Directors justify program funds through the PPB System, and

then use these funds to "buy" the necessary services (personnel, facilities) to carry out these programs. "Control" by Program Directors would be in a broad sense rather than in a specific sense. It would be sought through the creation of management information systems to provide indications of outputs, benefits, and costs, which in turn would provide input for both the PPB System and the initiation of Commandant's policy. Thus, Program Directors would seek means of evaluating performance, comparing it with program objectives, and then closing the gap between the two through the medium of the PPBS process and Commandant's policy. The logic of this approach is even more appealing when one considers the rapidity with which a given program can wax or wane, dependent upon variables such as the political environment, etc. The Coast Guard must maintain the flexibility to cope with these shifts in emphasis, if it is to survive as a viable entity.

11. Any discussion of the organizational structure that can best provide the desired flexibility for the Coast Guard must first establish its point of reference. Since this study is sponsored by the Office of Operations, one approach might be to use the Office of Operations as the basic point of reference, and theorize that sub-optimization of Operations would achieve the desired end. This approach would be particularly suitable if all other aspects of Headquarters organization were being held constant. The facts in evidence, however, clearly show that this is not the case. Major steps in reorganization of Headquarters have been taken, and more are obviously imminent. The appropri-

ate point of reference is therefore; the entire Coast Guard system of organization, with particular emphasis upon the Headquarters sub-system. Having established the point of reference, the next step is to determine the basic characteristics of the desired organization. Then it is necessary to determine where we are now, and what logical evolutionary steps are required to reach the desired endpoint. In this regard, it should be noted that this desired endpoint is not an organization that is cast in concrete, but rather one that is open-ended, and capable of adapting to change as required by its environment.

12. Bearing in mind the basic concepts of management by objectives, multifunctional operating units, and preservation of the Coast Guard as a military entity, some primary characteristics of a "desired" organization for Headquarters are listed below.


a. The allocation of resources (funds, personnel, facilities) among programs and the approval of program policies are functions that must be vested in a level of authority above the Program Directors.

b. Headquarters Staff elements should be primarily concerned with the initiation of policy and with the high level planning, programming, and budgeting functions of the Coast Guard. Field commands should be primarily concerned with the implementation of policy and the actual conduct of operations. Thus,

(1) Management planning should be more directly concerned with accomplishment of missions than with operation of facilities; and

(2) Current operations should be accorded due attention, but must not be permitted to subvert the basic, longer-term

PROPOSED ORGANIZATION FOR COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS



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FIGURE 1.

functions of Headquarters Staffs.

c. The organization must be amenable to shifts in program emphasis as well as changes in the program structure of the Department of Transportation. Thus, the Program Director/Manager staff structure should be modular in nature, such that programs (and staffs) can be:

(1) Shifted from Program Area to Program Area.

(2) Created or eliminated, or increased or decreased as circumstances require.

d. The organization should by its nature integrate the components of the Coast Guard such that the service is strengthened as an entity. Toward this end it should facilitate the flow of management information needed to optimize the Coast Guard's force structure with respect to all Coast Guard objectives. The organization should reflect a synthesis of PPBS techniques with military concepts of organization, and provide clear delineations of responsibility and authority for each organizational element. It should specify those elements which have program management responsibility, and those which have program support responsibility, as well as the intended relationship between the two.


13. Figure 1. is an abridged organization chart for Coast Guard Headquarters that embodies the desired characteristics.

It features Mission Offices (buyers) and Support Offices (sellers), both categories of which report directly to the Chief of Staff.

The Chief of Staff is assisted by his several staff elements (CBU, CPE, CPA, CDS, etc.) which coordinate the flow of management information vital to high-level decision-making.

PROPOSED ORGANIZATION FOR THE

CURRENT OPERATIONS DIVISION (CCO)



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FIGURE 2.

This flow includes input from both the Program Directors and the Support Directors, who are the chiefs of the Mission Offices and Support Offices, respectively.

14. Figure 2. is an organization chart for the Current Operations Division (CCO). The Current Operations Division reports to the Chief of Staff and has direct access to the Mission Offices. As the Headquarters focal point for current operations, its functions include:

- a. Coordination of non-programmed requests for Coast Guard resources that require immediate response time.
- b. Preparation and delivery of Current Operations briefings as required; e.g., for the Commandant, Chief of Staff, Program Directors, etc. This function includes coordinating responses to requests from the Public Information Division (API).
- c. Preparation and/or coordination of Current Operations related "Congressional."
- d. Supervision of Flag Plot.
- e. Supervision of the Communications Center.
- f. Operational control over CGAS Arlington (the air station to be staffed to both schedule and fly all VIP operations).

15. The Office of Facilities and Material is responsible for centralized facilities management for the Headquarters system. Headed by a Support Director, it is comprised of personnel resources selected from those formerly in the facilities elements of the Office of Operations and in the entire Office of Engineering.

Initial investigation clearly indicates that consolidation of personnel resources into this Office will yield significant returns, both in the form of manpower savings and in increased efficiency. The precise organization of this proposed Office should be the subject of an immediate study. In view of current efforts to reform the accounting system and to simplify the subhead structure, (9/Encl: #1) it might well be divided into divisions for Vessels, Aircraft, Shore Structures, Navigational Aids, Telecommunications, etc. In addition to providing the technical expertise that underscores the quality of our facilities, this Office is responsive to Program Directors in the development of operational requirements, and to the Chief of Staff for inputs with respect to the optimization of the overall system of Coast Guard facilities. In its role as a centralized facilities manager, this Office is primarily concerned with assisting in the PPBS process and the evolution of policy as it affects facilities, and not with the actual operation of facilities.


16. A typical Mission Office is headed by a flag rank Program Director who is responsible for a limited number of related programs. These programs are assigned to designated Program Managers. The Program Director is responsible for the initiation of policy, PPBS documents, and analytical studies for his programs. For these purposes he has staffs of sufficient size and quality to meet these requirements, including short-term analyses, without augmentation. Studies projected to exceed, say, three months duration, would be comprised of members from

the Program Director's staff and from other sources; e.g., members of a centralized pool of Operations Researchers and/or staffs of other Program Directors. These long-term studies would report to the leader specified by the Chief of Staff. This designation would depend upon the scope of the study; i.e., whether it crossed program boundaries, etc.

17. Under this scheme of organization -- which merges the basic concepts of mission management, multifunctional operating units, and preservation of the Coast Guard as an entity -- Program Directors are relieved of the burden of facilities management and much of the pressure generated by current operations. These factors, coupled with the fact that a given flag officer is responsible for only a limited number of programs, permits Program Directors to develop sophisticated management information systems; to justify operational requirements; to initiate plausible policy; to visit field commands; to attend national and international conferences, etc.; in short, to professionally further the objectives of their programs.

18. The present situation of the Office of Operations can be summarized as follows: The Office is a conglomerate of multiple programs which is encumbered with facilities management and preoccupied with current operations. Despite substantial increases in its personnel allowance, the Office has been unable to effectively cope with its changing environment, due primarily to an unwieldy, obsolescent organization.

PROPOSED INTERIM ORGANIZATION  
FOR THE OFFICE OF OPERATIONS



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FIGURE 3.

19. The logical, evolutionary steps which lead from the present organization toward the desired Headquarters organization are as follows:

a. The Chief, Office of Operations forwards to higher authority his plan for the proposed organization of Headquarters.

b. Since creation of the Office of Oceanology is imminent, and since the new Office will probably seek facilities management of those ships needed for the prosecution of its programs, this plan should be accompanied by an interim plan which vests centralized facilities management in the Office of Operations.

c. The interim plan should also provide for the setting up of a Current Operations Staff within the Office of Operations.

20. Figure 3. is a proposed interim organization for the Office of Operations, pending enactment of the desired Headquarters organization. Resources for this interim organization may be obtained from within the Office of Operations as follows:

a. The Aviation Staff can be lifted in toto from the Search and Rescue Division (OSR).

b. The Surface Staff can likewise be extracted from OSR. It is comprised primarily of personnel from the Cutters Branch and the Shore Units Branch of OSR. These two branches have been combined in a temporary reorganization within OSR since February, 1969, and have worked together very effectively. To assume facilities management for Ice Breakers, High Endurance Cutters, and Buoy Tenders, the Surface Staff should be augmented by three

officers. These billets exist within the Marine Sciences (OMS) and Aids to Navigation (OAN) Divisions. If absolutely necessary, the Surface Staff could sustain the added load with only two extra officers.

c. The Current Operations Staff can be staffed by assigning:

(1) An O-6 billet from the Intelligence Staff (OI).

(2) An O-4 billet from OSR (Ft. Rucker liaison).

d. Action should be initiated to move the Intelligence Staff from the Office of Operations to the Office of Personnel. The Operational Intelligence Branch should be retained and assigned to the Law Enforcement Division.

21. It should be stressed that the interim plan is a stop-gap measure, and not a substitute for the desired Headquarters organization. Its primary virtues are that it will:

a. Preclude the fractionation of major mobile facilities among several Offices, and thereby preserve the continuity desired in facilities management under the proposed Headquarters organization.

b. Relieve the Mission Divisions of the burdens of facilities management and of some of the pressure of current operations. Its basic limitations are discussed below.

22. Each successive splitting-off of programs from the Office of Operations accentuates the anomalous nature of the Office with respect to the remainder of Headquarters. Thus if major changes are not made, we will find the Office of Operations:

a. Analyzing and recommending allocations of resources for the several program areas under its direction.

b. Managing facilities which serve program areas outside the Office of Operations.

c. Coordinating operational requirements for facilities with the Office of Engineering for program areas outside the Office of Operations. In each of these items duplication of effort and/or possible "conflict of interest" situations exist as follows:

d. Item a. represents overlap with the allocation functions of the Chief of Staff. In essence, program areas within the Office of Operations are subjected to an intermediate round of analysis and competition before competing with program areas outside the Office of Operations. The staff necessary to conduct this intermediate analysis represents a duplication of the staff required to analyze the entire matrix of Coast Guard programs.

e. Item b. indicates a possible conflict of interest situation. A facilities manager who has mission responsibilities, also, cannot be expected to be as objective as one who does not.

f. Item c. contains elements of both duplication of effort and conflict of interest. The Office of Operations in essence represents an unnecessary third party, a party with program loyalties other than those under consideration. (Under the proposed organization, negotiations for operational requirements would be between the concerned Program Director and the Support Director.)

## CONCLUSIONS

1. The present situation of the Office of Operations can be summarized as follows: The Office is a conglomerate of multiple programs which is encumbered with facilities management and preoccupied with current operations. Despite substantial increases in its personnel allowance, the Office has been unable to effectively cope with its changing environment, due primarily to an unwieldy, obsolescent organization.
  2. As the evolution of Headquarters organization continues, the Office of Operations becomes more and more an anomaly with respect to the rest of Headquarters. It performs duplicative functions that are more properly vested in either other Offices or in an echelon of authority above that of Program and Support Directors.
  3. The problems that beset the Office of Operations are integrally related to the problems that beset the entire Coast Guard system of organization. The proper point of reference for solving these problems is the entire Coast Guard system, with particular emphasis on the Headquarter's sub-system of organization.
  4. The "desired" Coast Guard organization must be an optimum blend of these basic concepts:
    - a. Mission management (management by objectives).
    - b. Multifunctional operating units.
    - c. Preservation of the Coast Guard as a military entity.
- It should by its nature integrate the components of the Coast Guard such that the service is strengthened as an entity.

Toward this end, it should facilitate the flow of management information needed to optimize the Coast Guard's force structure with respect to all Coast Guard objectives. The organization should reflect a synthesis of PPBS techniques with military concepts of organization, and provide clear delineations of responsibility and authority for each organizational element. It should specify those elements which have program management responsibility, and those which have program support responsibility, as well as the intended relationship between the two.

5. The responsibility and authority for the following functions must be vested in an echelon above the Program and Support Directors:

- a. Allocation of resources (funds, personnel, facilities) among competing Coast Guard programs.
- b. Approval of policy.
- c. Optimization of the entire Coast Guard system of facilities.

6. Headquarters staffs should be primarily concerned with the initiation of policy and with the high level planning, programming and budgeting functions of the Coast Guard. Field commands should be primarily concerned with the implementation of policy and the actual conduct of operations. Thus, at Headquarters:

- a. Management planning should be more directly concerned with accomplishment of missions than with operation of facilities.
- b. Current operations should be accorded due attention, but must not be permitted to subvert the basic, longer-term functions of Headquarters staffs.

7. Control by Program Directors should be in a broad sense rather than in a specific sense. It should be sought through the creation of management information systems to provide indications of outputs, benefits, and costs, which in turn provide input for both the PPBS process and the initiation of Commandant's policy.

8. The organization of Headquarters must be amenable to shifts in program emphasis, as well as to changes in the program structure of the Department of Transportation. Thus, the Program Director/Manager staff structure should be modular in nature, such that programs (and staffs) can be:

a. Shifted from Program Area to Program Area.

b. Created or eliminated, or increased or decreased as circumstances dictate.

9. Facilities management should be centralized in a Support Office which is responsive to Program Directors in the development of operational requirements, and to an echelon of authority above the Program and Support Directors for inputs with respect to the optimization of the overall system of Coast Guard facilities. The fractionation of facilities management among Offices would unduly compound any effort to optimize the total Coast Guard facilities system. It would also serve to identify facilities "dedicated" to certain programs, and make them more susceptible to pirating by other governmental agencies.

10. A definite need exists for a Current Operations Division (CCO) which would serve as a focal point for current operations

within the Headquarters organization. This Division should report directly to the Chief of Staff, and have direct access to the Mission Offices. Headquarter's involvement in certain aspects of current operations is necessary and entirely proper. The Headquarters organization should insure that urgent matters pertaining to current operations are expeditiously coordinated in a manner which least disturbs the longer-term functions of the Mission Offices. Routine current operations such as supervision of Flag Plot and the Communications Center, and the operational control of CGAS Arlington should be removed from the Mission Offices and vested in the Current Operations Division.

11. Adequate personnel exist within Headquarters to implement the organization depicted in Figure 1. Elimination of duplication of effort, the consolidation of facilities management, and the clarification of organizational responsibilities will increase management efficiency and make available personnel resources for further reallocation.

12. Adequate personnel resources exist within the Office of Operations to implement the interim organization depicted in Figure 3. The limitations of this interim organization preclude its adoption on a permanent basis.

13. Essentially, three alternatives are available to the Chief, Office of Operations.

a. Alternative #1: Maintain the status quo. Attempt to conform to changes as they are brought by forces outside the

Office of Operations. Fight a war of attrition, the attrition of the Office of Operations.

b. Alternative #2: Attempt to sub-optimize the existing Office of Operations by taking action to:

(1) Consolidate facilities management within the Office of Operations.

(2) Set up a Current Operations Staff.

Then face essentially the same battles of Alternative #1.

c. Alternative #3: Initiate a strong bid for reorganization of Headquarters. Support this proposal with an interim plan for the Office of Operations and an overall plan for the Headquarters organization. Participate actively in a joint Headquarters effort to implement the proposed organization as a planned evolution.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the Chief, Office of Operations approve in principle the proposed Headquarters organization developed in this study.
2. That if the entire proposal cannot be ratified, the following specific concepts be considered for approval:

a. Mission Offices featuring

(1) A limited number of related programs.

(2) A "modular" staff structure.

b. A Current Operations Division.

c. Centralized facilities management vested in a Support Office.

3. That the Chief, Office of Operations pursue Alternative #3 of this study; namely, that he:

a. Initiate a strong bid for reorganization of Headquarters supported by:

(1) An overall plan for the proposed Headquarters organization.

(2) An interim plan for the Office of Operations.

b. Participate actively in a joint Headquarters effort to implement the proposed organization as a planned evolution.

RICHARD G. KERR  
COMMANDER, USCG

29 August 1969

ATTACHMENTS:

- ENCLOSURE A: References
- ENCLOSURE B: COMDT list of 1967 Study Topics
- ENCLOSURE C: Office of Operations Personnel Allowance Analysis; 1967-1969

## REFERENCES

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5. U.S. Coast Guard, HEADQUARTERS INSTRUCTION 5010.1A Implementation of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System, October 11, 1968.
6. U.S. Coast Guard, Budget and Cost Analysis Review, June 30, 1968.
7. U.S. Coast Guard, Commandant Memorandum to Chiefs of Offices, Temporary Details for Staff Studies, August 7, 1967.
8. U.S. Coast Guard, Commandant's Bulletin No: 23-69, June 6, 1969.
9. U.S. Coast Guard, HEADQUARTERS NOTICE 7300 Potential Improvements in Financial and Workload Management, April 4, 1969.

ENCLOSURE A

COMMANDANT'S LIST OF 1967 STUDY TOPICS (7/Encl: 1)

I. AREAS OF IMMEDIATE EMPHASIS

- (1) Analysis of alternative resources and policies for aircraft. Analysis of interface between FAA and Coast Guard air operations.
- (2) Analysis of alternative resources and policies for domestic icebreaking.
- (3) Development of National Navigation Plan.
- (4) Analysis of Recreational Boating Safety.
- (5) Analysis of alternative resources and policies for underwater SAR.
- (6) Position papers on Revision of National SAR Plan (definitive study/studies).
- (7) Development (with Interior) of Oil Pollution Program.
- (8) Analysis of current and future requirements for polar icebreakers. ✓
- (9) Analysis of OS program in preparation for NAOS Conference. ✓
- (10) Analysis of submersible Regulation program. ✓

II. OTHER STUDY AREAS

- (1) Analysis of Coast Guard and private aids to navigation systems and policies.
- (2) Analysis of offshore enforcement program.
- (3) Analysis of Port Safety (including Port Security) program.
- (4) Analysis of Continental Shelf Safety Program.
- (5) Feasibility of National Data Buoy System (including analysis of Coast Guard role in eventual program). ✓
- (6) Analysis of Merchant Vessel Inspection System.
- (7) Analysis of Merchant Marine Personnel Program.
- (8) Analysis of MMT posture for surface vessels.

- (9) Completion of analysis of requirements for Reserve Training.
- (10) Position paper on Coast Guard capabilities for Contingency Operations.
- (11) Completion of analysis of supply and inventory policies.
- (12) Analysis of maintenance and replacement policies for aircraft, vessels, shore units and small boats (including requirements for Coast Guard bases, depots, and yard).
- (13) Analysis of alternative housing policies.
- (14) Analysis of officer needs and training requirements (including rotation policies).
- (15) Analysis of enlisted needs and training requirements.
- (16) Analysis of civilian personnel policies and management.
- (17) Organizational study of headquarters, district/area offices, and selected field units (probably subsequent to realignment of DOT programs and Coast Guard program elements).

- ENCLOSURE B

OFFICE OF OPERATIONS PERSONNEL ALLOWANCE ANALYSIS

1967-1969

1. Tables 1 through 10 provide essential data on the billet/position structures for every organizational component within the Office of Operations. These tables are footnoted to indicate the relationships of billet/position changes to changes of functional responsibility.

2. Column I of Tables 1 through 8 indicates the proposed structure for the 1967 Reorganization, including in parentheses "new" billets/positions for which off-setting resources did not exist in 1967.

Column II indicates the authorized personnel allowance for the dates shown in 1969. Column III shows net changes from the proposed 1967 structure (not net changes from the 1967 authorized allowance).

Column III can be converted to show net changes from the 1967 personnel allowance by adding algebraically the "new" billets of Column I to the changes shown in Column III.

3. Tables 9 and 10 show the net changes in the 1967 and 1969 personnel allowances for the Office of Operations.

ENCLOSURE C

TABLE I

Column I	Column II	Column III	Column IV
<u>1967 Proposed Billet Structure</u> <u>"new" billets in parens</u>	<u>Auth. Positions,</u> <u>7/1/69</u> <u>Auth. Billets,</u> <u>5/31/69</u>	<u>Changes with</u> <u>Respect to</u> <u>Column I</u>	<u>FY 1970</u> <u>BUDGET</u>
<hr/>			
OFFICE OF OPERATIONS (O)			
1 RADM	1 RADM		
1 CAPT	2 CAPT	+ 1 CAPT <sup>3</sup>	
2 CDR <sup>1</sup>		- 2 CDR <sup>4</sup>	
(1 CDR) <sup>2</sup>	1 CDR		
	1 GS-16	+ 1 GS-16 <sup>5</sup>	
1 GS-8	1 GS-9		
1 GS-7	1 GS-8		
<hr/>			
PROGRAMS STAFF (OP)			
1 CAPT	1 CAPT		
1 CDR	1 CDR		
(1 LCDR)	1 LCDR		
1 WO	1 WO		
1 GS-6	2 GS-6		
(1 GS-4)		- 1 GS-4 <sup>6</sup>	
1 GS-5			
<hr/>			
PLANS STAFF (OS)			
1 CDR	1 CAPT	+ 1 CAPT	
1 GS-14	1 CDR	+ 2 LCDR	
1 GS-6	2 LCDR	+ 3 LT	
(1 LT)	4 LT	+ 1 GS-13	
	1 GS-14		
	1 GS-13		
	1 GS-6	+ 1 GS-5	
	1 GS-5		
<hr/>			

FOOTNOTES:

- 1 Liaison, SACIANT, Norfolk, Va., Liaison CNO (Air)  
2 Proposed Admin Asst.  
3 CAPT for the Manhattan Project  
4 CNO (Air) deleted; Admin. Asst. not issued  
5 Physical Science Administrator  
6 Proposed position not issued

TABLE 2

INTELLIGENCE STAFF (OI)

Column I	Column II	Column III	Column IV
1967 Proposed Billet Structure "new" billets in parens	Auth. Positions, 7/1/69 Auth. Billets, 5/31/69	Changes with respect to Column I	FY 1970 BUDGET
1 CAPT	1 CAPT		
1 CDR	1 CDR		
2 LT	2 LT		
1 LTJG/ENS	1 LTJG/ENS		
1 WO	2 WO <sup>1</sup>	+ 1 WO	
3 Enl.	5 Enl. <sup>1</sup>	+ 2 Enl.	
1 GS-12	1 GS-13		
1 GS-11	1 GS-12		
1 GS-9	2 GS-9	+ 1 GS-9	
2 GS-7	2 GS-6	- 2 GS-3	
4 GS-5	4 GS-5	- 3 GS-2	
4 GS-4	5 GS-4		
10 GS-3			
3 GS-2	7 GS-3		

FOOTNOTES:

1 1 WO, 1 Enl. on assignment to DOT

TABLE 3

COMMUNICATIONS STAFF (OC)

Column I	Column II	Column III	Column IV
1967 Proposed Billet Structure "new" billets in parens	Auth. Positions, 7/1/69 Auth. Billets, 5/31/69	Changes with respect to Column I	FY 1970 BUDGET
1 CAPT	1 CAPT		
2 CDR	2 CDR		
3 LCDR	4 LCDR	+ 1 LCDR	
5 LT	5 LT		
5 WO	4 WO	- 1 WO	
18 Enl.	17 Enl.	- 1 Enl.	
1 GS-10	1 GS-11	+ 1 GS-11	
1 GS-9	1 GS-10		
2 GS-6	1 GS-9	+ 1 GS-4	
1 GS-5	1 GS-7		
1 GS-4	1 GS-6		
2 GS-3	1 GS-5		
	3 GS-4		
	1 GS-3		

TABLE 4  
SEARCH AND RESCUE DIVISION (OSR)

Column I	Column II	Column III	Column IV
1967 Proposed Billet Structure "new" billets in parens	Auth. Positions, 7/1/69 Auth. Billets, 5/31/69	Changes with respect to Column I	FY 1970 BUDGET
3 CAPT	3 CAPT		
6 CDR	8 CDR	+ 1 CDR <sup>1</sup>	
(1 CDR)	10 LCDR		+ 1 LCDR <sup>2</sup>
8 LCDR	2 LT <sup>2</sup>	- 2 LT	
(2 LCDR)	8 LTJG	+ 3 LTJG	
3 LT	1 WO <sup>3</sup>	- 1 WO	
(1 LT)	3 Enl.		
5 LTJG/ENS			
2 WO	1 GS-14	+ 1 GS-14	
3 Enl.		- 1 GS-11	
	1 GS-11		
	1 GS-7	+ 1 GS-4	
2 GS-11	2 GS-6		
3 GS-6	3 GS-5		
3 GS-5	9 GS-4 <sup>3</sup>		
(1 GS-5)			
7 GS-4			
3 GS-3	3 GS-3		

FOOTNOTES:

<sup>1</sup> Budget/Planning OSR

<sup>2</sup> Domestic Icebreaking

<sup>3</sup> Hull allowance section (to be transferred to F 7/1/69)  
1 Enl. and 1 GS-4

TABLE 5

LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION (OLE)

<u>Column I</u>	<u>Column II</u>	<u>Column III</u>	<u>Column IV</u>
1967 Proposed Billet Structure "new" billets in parens	Auth. Positions, 7/1/69 Auth. Billets, 5/31/69	Changes with respect to Column I	FY 1970 BUDGET
2 CAPT <sup>1</sup>	1 CAPT	+ 1 CDR <sup>2</sup>	+ 1 YN1
4 CDR <sup>1</sup>	4 CDR	+ 2 LCDR	
3 LCDR <sup>1,3</sup>	3 LCDR	+ 1 LCDR	
3 LT <sup>1</sup>	3 LTJG	- 2 LT	
(1 LT)		+ 2 LTJG/ENS	
1 LTJG	1 GS-13 <sup>4</sup>	+ 1 GS-13	
1 Enl. <sup>1</sup>	1 GS-6		
	2 GS-5		
1 GS-14 <sup>3</sup>			
1 GS-13 <sup>1</sup>			
1 GS-11 <sup>3</sup>			
3 GS-6 <sup>1</sup>			
5 GS-5 <sup>1,3</sup>			
1 GS-4 <sup>1</sup>			
2 GS-3 <sup>1</sup>			

FOOTNOTES:

<sup>1</sup> Recreational Boating Safety Branch: 1 CAPT 1 GS-13  
(transferred to ORB Division and 1 CDR 2 GS-6  
subsequently to the Office of B) 2 LCDR 2 GS-5  
The loss of these billets is not 2 LT 1 GS-4  
reflected in Col. III. 1 Enl. 2 GS-3

<sup>2</sup> Pollution Control Branch

<sup>3</sup> Hazardous Materials Group, Port Security Branch: 1 LCDR  
(transferred to MHM) 1 GS-14  
The loss of these billets is not reflected 1 GS-11  
in Column III. 1 GS-5

<sup>4</sup> 1 GS-13 Anchorage Administrator

TABLE 6

MARINE SCIENCES DIVISION (OMS)

Column I	Column II	Column III	Column IV
<u>1967 Proposed Billet Structure</u> <u>"new" billets in parens</u>	<u>Auth. Positions,</u> <u>7/1/69</u> <u>Auth. Billets,</u> <u>5/31/69</u>	<u>Changes with</u> <u>respect to</u> <u>Column I</u>	<u>FY 1970</u> <u>BUDGET</u>
1 CAPT	1 CAPT		
2 CDR	4 CDR <sup>1</sup>		
(2 CDR)	3 LCDR		
2 LCDR	1 LT		
(1 LCDR)			
1 LT			
1 GS-6		- 1 GS-5 <sup>2</sup>	
(1 GS-5)	1 GS-7		
1 GS-4	3 GS-4		
(1 GS-4)			
(1 GS-3)			

FOOTNOTES:

<sup>1</sup> 1 CDR Liaison

<sup>2</sup> 1 GS Position never assigned

TABLE 7

MILITARY READINESS DIVISION (OMR)

<u>Column I</u>	<u>Column II</u>	<u>Column III</u>	<u>Column IV</u>
<u>1967 Proposed Billet Structure</u> <u>"new" billets in parens</u>	<u>Auth. Positions,</u> <u>7/1/69</u> <u>Auth. Billets,</u> <u>5/31/69</u>	<u>Changes with</u> <u>respect to</u> <u>Column I</u>	<u>FY 1970</u> <u>BUDGET</u>
1 CAPT	1 CAPT	- 1 CDR	
2 CDR	2 CDR		
(1 CDR)	5 LCDR	+ 1 LCDR	
4 LCDR	2 LT	+ 1 LT	
1 LT	1 LTJG		
1 LTJG	2 WO	+ 1 WO	
1 WO	4 Enl.	+ 3 Enl.	
1 Enl.			
1 GS-7	1 GS-7		
2 GS-6	2 GS-6		
5 GS-5	5 GS-5		

TABLE 8

AIDS TO NAVIGATION DIVISION (OAN)

Column I	Column II	Column III	Column IV
1967 Proposed Billet Structure "new" billets in parens .	Auth. Positions, 7/1/69 Auth. Billets, 5/31/69	Changes with respect to Column I	FY 1970 BUDGET
1 CAPT	2 CAPT <sup>1</sup>		
3 CDR	5 CDR <sup>1</sup>	+ 1 CDR <sup>3</sup>	+ 1 CDR <sup>4</sup>
3 LCDR	7 LCDR <sup>1</sup>	+ 1 LCDR <sup>3</sup>	+ 2 LCDR <sup>4</sup>
1 LT	4 LT <sup>2</sup>	+ 3 LT	+ 2 LT <sup>4</sup>
2 LTJG	2 LTJG	+ 1 WO	
1 WO	3 WO		
(1 WO)	3 Enl. <sup>1</sup>		
1 Enl.			
1 GS-12	1 GS-15	+ 1 GS-15	
2 GS-5	1 GS-14 <sup>3</sup>	+ 1 GS-14 <sup>3</sup>	
4 GS-4	3 GS-13 <sup>3</sup>	+ 3 GS-13 <sup>3</sup>	
(2 GS-4)	1 GS-12	+ 1 GS-7 <sup>3</sup>	
1 GS-3	1 GS-7 <sup>3</sup>	+ 1 GS-6	
	1 GS-6		
	4 GS-5		
	5 GS-4		

NOTE: Column #2 (FY 1969) includes National Navigation Plan billets; however, due to detached nature of NNP these billets are not shown as net additions in Column #3 (Changes to 1967).

FOOTNOTES:

<sup>1</sup> National Navigation Plan: 1 CAPT  
1 CDR  
3 LCDR  
2 Enl.

<sup>2</sup> 1 LT USAF COMBATAID Liaison.

<sup>3</sup> Bridges: 1 CDR 1 GS-7  
1 GS-14 1 GS-5  
3 GS-13 1 GS-4

<sup>4</sup> Plans and Programs: 2 billets.  
Radioaides: 3 billets

<sup>5</sup> OMEGA Project Officer

Table 9

## Summary: Net Changes in the Office of Operations

	<u>1967 Reorganization</u>	<u>5/31/69</u>	<u>Net Change</u>
Officers:	89	114	+ 25
Warrants:	11	13	+ 2
Enlisted:	28	32	+ 4
Civilians:	92	94 <sup>a</sup>	+ 2

<sup>a</sup> civilian positions as of 7-1-69

TABLE 10

SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES LOST OR  
GAINED BY OFFICE OF OPERATIONS SINCE 1967.

<u>FUNCTIONS LOST</u>	<u>BILLETS/POSITIONS LOST:</u>			
	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>WARRANTS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>CIVILIANS</u>
Boating Safety Division	6	0	1	8
Auxiliary Staff	4	0	1	3
Hazardous Materials Section	1	0	0	3
<u>CNO(Air) Liaison</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS	12	0	2	14

<u>FUNCTIONS GAINED</u>	<u>BILLETS/POSITIONS GAINED:</u>			
	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>WARRANTS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>CIVILIANS</u>
Domestic Ice Breaking	1	0	0	0
Manhattan Project	1	0	0	0
Physical Science Administrator	0	0	0	1
Pollution Control Branch	3	0	0	0
Anchorage Administrator	0	0	0	1
National Navigation Plan	5	0	2	0
Bridge Branch	1	0	0	7
OMEGA Project Officer	1	0	0	0
Emergency Transportation Plans	0	0	0	0
USAF COMBATAID Liaison	1	0	0	0
<u>COMNAVSUPFORANTARTICA Liaison</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS	14	0	2	9

	<u>1967</u>	<u>-LOSSES</u>	<u>+GAINS</u>	<u>+ADD-ONS<sup>a</sup></u>	=	<u>1969 STRENGTH</u>
<u>OFFICERS</u>	89	-12	+14	+23	=	114
<u>WARRANTS</u>	11	- 0	+ 0	+ 2	=	13
<u>ENLISTED</u>	28	- 2	+ 2	+ 4	=	32
<u>CIVILIANS</u>	92	-14	+ 9	+ 7	=	94

<sup>a</sup> ADD-ONS: Billets/Positions which were justified and added via the PPBS process to cope with added workload associated with both existing and new functional responsibilities.