



INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

June 27, 2017



Evaluation of Military Services' Compliance with Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest Program Security Reviews and Monitoring Programs

INTEGRITY * EFFICIENCY * ACCOUNTABILITY * EXCELLENCE

Classified By:
Derived From:

DoD OIG: (b) (6), ODIG-ISPA
Classified ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~,
Counterintelligence (CI) Security
Classification Guide (SCG),
DoDI C-5240.08, USD(I)
Dated 20111128
20420627

Declassify On:

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
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20420627

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Results in Brief

Evaluation of Military Services' Compliance With Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest Program Security Reviews and Monitoring Programs

June 27, 2017

(U) Objective

(U) Our objective was to determine whether the Military Services implemented a continuous monitoring¹ and comprehensive counterintelligence (CI)-focused security review program² for the length of each Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) recruit's enlistment or obligation.

(U) Background

(U) In November 2008, the Secretary of Defense authorized the implementation of the MAVNI program. This pilot program expanded the military recruiting market to include certain legal, non-immigrant aliens. The application of this limited authority under Title 10, United States Code, §504(b)(2), is contingent upon a case-by-case determination that each MAVNI enlistment is vital to the national interest.

(U) The Deputy Secretary of Defense's memorandum, "Two-Year Extension of Military Accessions Vital to National Interest (MAVNI) Pilot Program," August 17, 2010, states that "Each Service establishes a comprehensive CI-focused security review and monitoring program for MAVNI recruits" and "Each Service shall

(U) Background (cont'd)

submit a security review and monitoring plan to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence for review and approval within 60 days of this memo."

(U) The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) memorandum, "Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) Program Security Reviews and Monitoring Programs," February 16, 2012, also directed the Military Departments to establish comprehensive CI-focused security reviews and continuous monitoring programs for the length of each MAVNI recruit's enlistment.

(U) On September 30, 2016, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD(P&R)) issued another memorandum, "Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest Pilot Program Extension." The memorandum extends the MAVNI program until September 30, 2017, and implements revised eligibility requirements. It serves as the single source document for the administration of the MAVNI program and replaces all previously issued program guidance.

(U) Findings

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g)
[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g)
[Redacted]

¹ (U) A MAVNI continuous monitoring plan should include, ARMY INSCOM: (b) (3), 50 USC § 3024(i), (b) (7)(E)
[Redacted]

² (U) A CI-focused security review program includes name checks of: OSD/JS, AFOSI: (b) (7)(E)
[Redacted]



Results in Brief

Evaluation of Military Services' Compliance With Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest Program Security Reviews and Monitoring Programs

(U) Findings (cont'd)

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(U) The Marine Corps does not participate in the MAVNI program.


(U) Observation

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(U) Recommendations

(S//NF) Among other things, we recommended that:

- (S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]
- (S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]
- (S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]
- (S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]



Results in Brief

Evaluation of Military Services' Compliance With Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest Program Security Reviews and Monitoring Programs

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]



Results in Brief

Evaluation of Military Services' Compliance With Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest Program Security Reviews and Monitoring Programs

(U) Comments (cont'd)

OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

[Redacted text block]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

[Redacted text block]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

[Redacted text block]

OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

[Redacted text block]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

[Redacted text block]

(U) Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence	1.b	1.a	None
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness	None	2.a., 2.b, 2.c	None
Secretary of the Army	3.b	3.a	None
Secretary of the Navy	None	4.a, 4.b	None
Secretary of the Air Force	None	5.a, 5.b	None

Please provide Management Comments by July 31, 2017.

(U) NOTE: The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **(U) Closed** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.





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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

June 27, 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Military Services' Compliance with Military Accessions Vital
to the National Interest Program Security Reviews and Monitoring Programs
(Report No. DoDIG-2017-089)

(U) We are providing this final report for your review and comments. This report relates to the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program. It was completed in accordance with the OIG's oversight responsibilities, as described in Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. We conducted this evaluation in accordance with Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation.

(U) We determined whether the Military Services established a continuous monitoring and comprehensive counterintelligence-focused security review program for the length of each MAVNI recruit's enlistment or obligation. This report identifies shortfalls within the Services' review and monitoring programs and identifies possible solutions.

(U) We considered management comments on the draft of this report. DoD instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Comments from the OUSD(I), Director for Defense Intelligence (Intelligence and Security) addressed recommendations 1.a, and partially addressed recommendation 1.b. Therefore, recommendation 1.a. is resolved. Recommendation 1.b is unresolved and we require additional comments. The OUSD(P&R), Senior Official Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, addressed recommendations 2.a, 2.b, and 2.c, therefore, these recommendations are resolved. The comments from the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs also addressed recommendation 3.a, therefore recommendation 3.a. is resolved. The comments did not address recommendation 3.b, therefore it is unresolved and we require additional comments no later than July 31, 2017. Comments from the Deputy Secretary of the Navy for Military Manpower and Personnel's addressed recommendations 4.a and 4.b, therefore, these recommendations are resolved. Comments from the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs addressed recommendations 5.a and 5.b, therefore, these recommendations are resolved. We will close all recommendations upon completion and verification of the proposed actions.

**Regrade UNCLASSIFIED when Separated
From Classified Report**

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
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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

(U) Please send a PDF file containing your comments to [redacted] no later than July 31, 2017. Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We cannot accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature.

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at [redacted], DSN [redacted], or [redacted] at [redacted], DSN [redacted].


Anthony C. Thomas
Deputy Inspector General for
Intelligence and Special
Program Assessments

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(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) Our objective was to determine whether the Military Services implemented a continuous monitoring and comprehensive counterintelligence (CI)-focused security review program for the length of each Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) recruit's enlistment or obligation.

(U) Background

(U) Title 10, United States Code, §504(b)(2), is the founding document covering the MAVNI program. Under this law, the Secretaries of the Military Departments may authorize the enlistment of "a person" who is not a national of the United States or an alien who is lawfully admitted for permanent residency, if the Secretary determines that the enlistment is vital to the national interest. The memorandum signed by the Secretary of Defense, "Pilot Evaluation of Military Recruiting of Certain Legal, Non-Immigrant Aliens", November 25, 2008, states that "The application of this limited authority under Title 10, United States Code, §504(b)(2), is contingent upon a case-by-case determination that each such enlistment is vital to the national interest...for which the Department currently has a critical shortfall."

(U) In the memorandum, "Pilot Evaluation of Military Recruiting of Certain Legal, Non-Immigrant Aliens," November 25, 2008, the Secretary of Defense authorized the Military Services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) to recruit, on a case-by-case basis, legal non-immigrant aliens³ whose skills, such as language and medical, are considered to be vital to the national interest and critical to the Military Services, to join the Armed Forces in exchange for expedited United States citizenship. The MAVNI program was originally established as a one-year pilot program, conducted from November 25, 2008, through December 31, 2009, with an initial enlistment goal of 1,000 recruits combined for all Services.

³ (U) Legal non-immigrant status includes asylee (granted asylum), refugee, Temporary Protected Status, or 1 of 19 non-immigrant visa categories who are seeking temporary entry into the United States for a specific purpose.

(U) On February 17, 2010, James R. Clapper, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), sent a memorandum, "Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI)," to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) stating concern that:

Personnel on active duty under this program did not undergo screening as part of their security vetting process. This lapse creates an unacceptable vulnerability that could have a serious impact on the safety and security of our personnel, equipment, and operations. To mitigate that vulnerability, I recommend your office take immediate steps to direct the Army, Navy, and Air Force to conduct a comprehensive security review of all personnel who entered active duty under the MAVNI program.

(U) On August 17, 2010, the MAVNI program was extended by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, through December 31, 2011. The USD(I) concurred with the extension with the following conditions:

- (U) The Services must establish a security review and monitoring program to mitigate the risks that MAVNI recruits may pose to the Department.
- (U) MAVNI recruits will be subjected to Single Scope Background Investigations (SSBI).
- (U) MAVNI recruits should not be placed in career fields that require a security clearance at the time of enlistment.
- (U) MAVNI recruits who have not served in the military and lived in the United States (or its territories) for enough time to allow a thorough background investigation and monitoring should not be considered for security clearances or for positions in the Intelligence Community.

(U) The OUSD(I) memorandum, "Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) Program Security Reviews and Monitoring Programs," February 16, 2012, directed the Military Departments to establish comprehensive CI-focused security reviews and continuous monitoring programs for the length of each MAVNI recruit's enlistment.

(U) According to the "Naturalization Through Military Service: Fact Sheet," published by the United States Customs and Immigration Services (USCIS), there have been a total of 109,321 naturalized service members. The MAVNI population account for approximately 10 percent of the reported total by USCIS. This means approximately 90 percent of the foreign nationals entering into the Military Services are through other naturalization programs within the DoD. (See Appendix E for detailed information)

(U) Counterintelligence-Focused Security Review

(U) Specifically, according to OUSD(I) memorandum, dated February 16, 2012, , the CI-focused security review for all MAVNI program participants (new MAVNI applicants and those currently on active duty through the MAVNI program) must include:

- (U) [Redacted]
- (U) [Redacted]
- (U) [Redacted]
- (U) [Redacted]
- (U) [Redacted]
- (U) [Redacted]
- (U) [Redacted]

4 (U) [Redacted]

5 (U) [Redacted]

6 (U) [Redacted]

7 (U) [Redacted]

8 (U) [Redacted]

9 (U) [Redacted]

- (U) CI Interview
 - (U) In coordination with the appropriate recruiting command, an issue-oriented CI interview¹⁰ may be conducted [REDACTED] ARMY INSCOM (b) (3), 50 USC § 3024(i), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED], or issues raised in the SSBI that cannot be mitigated in accordance with DoD 5200.2-R, "Personnel Security Program", as amended, February 23, 1996, paragraph C2.1.3, Military Service Standard. The results of these checks will be provided to the appropriate Service CI organization conducting the interview.
 - (U) MAVNI applicants may undergo an issue-specific polygraph examination¹¹ with their consent or at their request if the CI/security interview fails to resolve questionable information.

(U) The MAVNI monitoring plan should also include, [REDACTED] ARMY INSCOM (b) (3), 50 USC § 3024(i), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

(U) On August 17, 2010, the Deputy Secretary of Defense authorized an extension of the MAVNI Program through December 31, 2011.¹³ The extension contained increased security requirements designed to strengthen the program and mitigate potential CI and security concerns by requiring all MAVNI applicants to undergo an SSBI and each Service to establish a comprehensive CI-focused security review and monitoring program for all MAVNI recruits. The Deputy Secretary of Defense delayed the reinstatement of the MAVNI program from August 17, 2010, to May 16, 2012, pending

¹⁰ (U) ARMY INSCOM (b) (3), 50 USC § 3024(i) [REDACTED]

¹¹ (U) A polygraph examination will include a period referred to as a pre-test interview, a chart collection phase, and a test data analysis phase.

¹² (U) ARMY INSCOM (b) (3), 50 USC § 3024(i), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]

¹³ (U) The August 17, 2010 memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense authorizing the extension of the MAVNI program was delayed until all security protocols and monitoring was in place. The August 17, 2010 memorandum took effect on May 16, 2012.

completion of the increased security protocols and additional monitoring requirements. At the completion of the MAVNI program security review, the pilot program was reinstated for two years on May 16, 2012, with a new goal of 1,500 total annual recruits.

(U) On September 25, 2014, the OUSD(P&R) memorandum, "MAVNI Program Changes," authorized an extension of the MAVNI program until September 30, 2016. The MAVNI enlistment goal for Fiscal Year 2015 was raised to 3,200 (3,000 Army, 65 Navy, 65 Marine Corps, and 70 Air Force) and the enlistment goal for Fiscal Year 2016 was raised to 5,200 (5,000 Army, with the other Services allotments remaining the same as Fiscal Year 2015).

(U) Since the MAVNI program began, the Army has recruited more than 10,000 MAVNI personnel. AFOSI (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. The Navy has [REDACTED] MAVNI personnel assigned to OSD/JS (b) (7)(E). The Marine Corps does not participate in the MAVNI program.

(U) Continuous Monitoring

(U) The Deputy Secretary of Defense's memorandum, "Two-Year Extension of Military Accessions Vital to National Interest (MAVNI) Pilot Program," Tab B, August 17, 2010, defines the monitoring plan as: "A MAVNI monitoring plan will include, ARMY INSCOM (b) (3), 50 USC § 3024(i), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Finding

~~(C//NF)~~ OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

~~(C//NF)~~ OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

- ~~(C//NF)~~ OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

- ~~(C//NF)~~ OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

- ~~(C//NF)~~ OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

- ~~(C//NF)~~ The Marine Corps did not participate in the MAVNI program.

~~(C//NF)~~ OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(U) United States Army

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

¹⁴ (U) The Director of the DMDC Continuous Evaluation Cell is detailed to DMDC from the OUSD(I).
¹⁵ (U) Mirador replaced ACES as the DoD's continuous monitoring system developed by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Defense Manpower Data Center to be used on DoD personnel who have access to classified information.

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

¹⁶ (U) DataMarts are small specific slices of a data warehouse that are relevant to a particular group.

¹⁷ (S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Each organization provided the following MAVNI personnel numbers:

- USAREC: ~~OSD/JS (b) (7)(F)~~
- ASA M&RA: ~~OSD/JS (b) (7)(F)~~
- DoD CAF: ~~OSD/JS (b) (7)(F)~~

(U//~~FOUO~~) ~~OSD/JS (b) (7)(F)~~
[Redacted]

(~~C//NF~~) ~~OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g)~~
[Redacted]

(~~C//NF~~) ~~OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g)~~
[Redacted]

(~~C//NF~~) ~~OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g)~~
[Redacted]

¹⁸ (U) ~~OSD/JS, AFOSI (b) (7)(E)~~
[Redacted]

OSD/JS: (b)(1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b)(1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b)(1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

[Redacted]

¹⁹ (U) The Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility determines security clearance eligibility of non-Intelligence Agency Department of Defense personnel occupying sensitive positions and/or requiring access to classified material or information.

²⁰ (U) The Army Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (ACICA) coordinates all counterintelligence activities within the Army.

OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(U//FOUO) OSD/JS: (b) (7)(F) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

²¹ (U) In FY 2016, OPM changed the names and criteria of background investigations being conducted by the Federal Investigative Service to a Tiered investigation system. The Single Scope Background Investigation is now a Tier 5 investigation and the National Agency Check with Law and Credit is now a Tier 3 investigation.

OSD/JS: (b)(1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)
[Redacted]

~~(C//NF)~~ OSD/JS: (b)(1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)
[Redacted]

~~(C//NF)~~ OSD/JS: (b)(1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)
[Redacted]

~~(C//NF)~~ OSD/JS: (b)(1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)
[Redacted]

~~(U//FOUO)~~ OSD/JS: (b)(7)(F)
[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(U) Subject Interview Reports of Investigation on Army MAVNI Personnel

(U) Tier 5 background investigation Reports of Investigation (ROI) provided by the Office of Personnel Management, Federal Investigative Service revealed instances where Army MAVNI personnel had:

- (U//~~FOUO~~) roommates who were associated with terrorist organizations;
- (U//~~FOUO~~) close and continuous contact with foreign intelligence services and personnel;
- (U//~~FOUO~~) allegiance, loyalty, and blackmail concerns;
- (U//~~FOUO~~) weapons charges and was removed from the college campus;
- (U//~~FOUO~~) expressed support for terrorist groups;
- (U//~~FOUO~~) declined to become United States citizens; and
- (U//~~FOUO~~) indicated that he would voluntarily support his home country in a time of crisis.

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(U) United States Navy

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

- (S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]
- (S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]
- (S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]
- (S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]
- (S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

²² (U) NAVY: (b) (5) [Redacted]

OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

²³ (U) In FY 2016, OPM changed the names and criteria of background investigations being conducted by the Federal Investigative Service to a Tiered investigation system. The Single Scope Background Investigation is now a Tier 5 investigation and the National Agency Check with Law and Credit is now a Tier 3 investigation.

(U) Finally, DoD 5200.2-R states: "The appointment, enlistment, and induction of each member of the Armed Forces or their Reserve components shall be subject to the favorable completion of a personnel security investigation."

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(U) United States Air Force

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(U) AFOSI: (b) (7)(E) [Redacted]

(U) ~~AFOSI (b) (7)(E)~~ [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted].

(S//NF) ~~OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g)~~ [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
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[Redacted]
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[Redacted]

(S//NF) ~~OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g)~~ [Redacted]
[Redacted]
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[Redacted]
[Redacted]
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(S//NF) ~~OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g)~~ [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) Conclusion

(S//NF) ~~OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g)~~ [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(U) Management Actions

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) On September 30, 2016, the USD(P&R) (Acting) issued another memorandum, "Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest Pilot Program," addressed to the Secretary of the Army. This memorandum addresses a number of MAVNI applicants who are in the Delayed Entry Program and have fallen out of a valid immigration status while waiting to join the Army. In his September 30, 2016, memorandum, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (Acting) stated that: "This raises concerns in that many such applicants may not ultimately qualify for enlistment, and as a result, will be released from the Delayed Entry Program in an undocumented status making them vulnerable to deportation." The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (Acting) also directed the Army to conduct a review of the immigration status of all MAVNI applicants currently in the Delayed Entry Program.

(U) On September 30, 2016, the USD(P&R) issued an additional memorandum, "Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest Pilot Program Extension." This memorandum extends the MAVNI program until September 30, 2017, and implemented revised eligibility requirements such as MAVNI personnel not being eligible for a security clearance until they have completed their first enlistment and undergoing a CI-focused interview. It also provides new guidance that changes the original investigative criteria for MAVNI applicants set forth by the Deputy Secretary of Defense's August 17, 2010, memorandum, which stated that all MAVNI applicants would be subjected to a Single Scope Background Investigation. This new guidance establishes two categories of MAVNI applicants: Category 1 will be subjected to a Tier 3 investigation (Moderate Risk) and Category 2 will be subjected to a Tier 5 investigation (High Risk) (See Appendix C for a comparison of the Tier 3 and Tier 5 investigations).

(U) The additional September 30, 2016, USD(P&R) memorandum addressed to the Services, serves as the single source document for the administration of the MAVNI program and replaced all previously issued program guidance. For the full text of the memorandum, see Appendix D.

(U) Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response

(U) Army

(U) The Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA M&RA), provided the following comments on the Finding. For the full text of the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the ASA M&RA comments, see the Management Comments in the back of the report.

(U) The Senior Official Performing the Duties of the ASA M&RA comments on the draft report

(U) The Senior Official Performing the Duties of the ASA M&RA stated that our draft report appears to assess the Army's implementation of the MAVNI program from 2010-2016 through the updated standards OSD published on September 30, 2016. She also stated that the Army endeavors at all times to adhere to OSD guidance in effect at that point in time and when OSD published updated guidance the office immediately began efforts to comply.

(U) The Senior Official Performing the Duties of the ASA M&RA also stated that the Army sees great value in the MAVNI program. According to the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the ASA M&RA, the Army must continue to honor our commitment to those individuals who enlisted via the MAVNI program to include those who currently reside in the Delayed Entry Pool (DEP) and the Delayed Training Program (DTP). Additionally, she added that “notwithstanding that the current security screening and vetting process for each MAVNI applicant is burdensome, we continue to vet this population to ensure we mitigate risk to an acceptable level.”

(U) Our Response

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(U) The Senior Official Performing the Duties of the ASA M&RA stated that the Army believed the release of MAVNI recruits to basic training was in full compliance with OSD policy. Upon issuance of a revised policy by OSD on September 30, 2016, the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the ASA M&RA stated that the Army immediately took action to implement the additional screening requirements more broadly across the entire MAVNI population.

(U) Our Response

(U) DoD 5200.2-R, section C3.3.1 states that “The appointment, enlistment, and induction of each member of the Armed Forces or their Reserve components **shall** be

subject to the favorable completion of a personnel security investigation.” The March 25, 2010 OUSD(I) Memorandum, specifically states that MAVNI recruits will be subjected to the SSBI (Tier 5).

~~(S//NF)~~ OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(U) Our Response

~~(S//NF)~~ OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

[Redacted]

(U) NAVY

(U) The Assistant Secretary of the Navy, M&RA, provided the following comments on the Finding. For the full text of the Assistant Secretary comments, see the Management Comments in the back of the report.

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

[Redacted]

(U) Our Response

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

[Redacted]

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments and Our Response

(U) Recommendation 1

(U) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence:

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]
- b. ~~(S//NF)~~ OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]
- OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]
- OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]
- OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

~~(S//NF)~~ OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(U) Our Response

~~(S//NF)~~ OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(U) Recommendation 2

(U) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness:

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]
- b. ~~(S//NF)~~ OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]
- c. ~~(S//NF)~~ OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(U) Our Response

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(U) Recommendation 3

(U) We recommend that the Secretary of the Army:

a. (S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

b. (S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(U) Senior Official Performing the Duties of the ASA M&RA

(U) OSD/JS: (b) (7)(E) [Redacted]

(U) Our Response

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(U) Recommendation 4

(U) We recommend that the Secretary of the Navy:

a. (S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

b. (S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(U) Assistant Secretary of the Navy, M&RA

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g)

(U) Our Response

(U) The comments from the Navy addressed the intent of recommendations 4.a and 4.b, therefore, we consider the recommendations resolved. We will close these recommendations upon receipt and review of the proposed policies to ensure they meet all aspects of the recommendations.

(U) Recommendation 5

(U) We recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force:

- a. **(S//NF)** OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]
- b. **(S//NF)** OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(U) Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, M&RA

(U) AFOSI: (b) (7)(E) [Redacted]

(U) Our Response

(U) The comments from the Air Force met the intent of our recommendations 5.a and 5.b, therefore, we consider the recommendations resolved. We will close these

recommendations upon verification that the new plan has been accepted by OUSD(I) and implemented by the Air Force.

(U) OBSERVATIONS

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(C//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

OSD/JS (b)(1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

²⁴ (U) The Submitting Security Office is an agency's Security Office which is responsible for receiving completed investigations from OPM-FIS, controlling the agency's cases, and making the suitability and security determinations on individuals being investigated for employment.

(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from June 2016 to March 2017 in accordance with Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we plan and perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for findings and conclusions based our evaluation objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our evaluation objectives.

(U) We interviewed more than 50 personnel from U.S. Army G-1, G-2, Office of the ASA M&RA, OUSD(P&R), OUSD(I), the DoD Consolidated Adjudications Facility, Army Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, DoD OIG Defense Criminal Investigative Service, Air Force A1, Navy N1, Federal Bureau of Investigation, OPM Federal Investigative Service, Naval Special Warfare Group, Air Force Special Operations, and the Army Intelligence and Security Command. We reviewed hundreds of pages of regulations, directives, guidance, memoranda, personnel security records, information intelligence reports, and standard operating procedures. We also travelled to Monterey, California to review the databases at the Defense Manpower Data Center and to Edison, New Jersey to interview Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Investigations special agents.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) None.

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]


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
(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]


(S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g) [Redacted]


(U) Appendix C


(U//~~For Official Use Only~~) Tier 3 and Tier 5 Comparison Chart


(U//FOUO) Tier 3	Tier 5
OSD/JS: (b) (7)(E) 	

<p>(U//FOUO)</p> <p>Tier 3</p>	<p>Tier 5</p>
<p>OSD/JS: (b) (7)(E)</p> 	

<p>(U//FOUO)</p> <p>Tier 3</p>	<p>Tier 5</p>
<p>OSD/JS: (b) (7)(E)</p> 	

<p>(U//FOUO)</p> <p>Tier 3</p>	<p>Tier 5</p>
<p>OSD/JS. (b) (7)(E)</p> 	

(U//FOUO) Tier 3	Tier 5
 <p>OSD/JS (b) (7)(E)</p>	

(U//FOUO) Tier 3	Tier 5
OSD/IS (b) (7)(E) 	

(U) Appendix D

(U) September 30, 2016 MAVNI Program Extension



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SEP 30 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest Pilot Program Extension

The Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) pilot program is currently set to expire on September 30, 2016. This memorandum was developed in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and extends the MAVNI pilot program through September 30, 2017, and implements revised eligibility requirements. This guidance will serve as a single source document for the administration of the MAVNI program and replaces all previously issued program guidance.

The application of the limited authority under section 504(b)(2) of title 10, United States Code, allows the Services to expand the military recruiting market to include certain non-immigrant aliens. The authority is contingent upon a case-by-case determination by the Secretary of the Military Department concerned that each such enlistment is vital to the national interest. The exercise of such authority regarding health care professionals shall be limited to those holding medical specialties for which a Service has a critical shortfall. The recruitment of persons with special language and associated cultural backgrounds shall be limited to those with qualifications necessary to support current and projected future military operations, and for which the Military Service concerned currently has a critical shortfall. Persons enlisted under this program shall be screened and identified for eligibility for special operations and special operations support career fields, and if eligible, assignment priority will be given to those units.

Changes reflected in the enclosed guidance will strengthen and improve the execution of the MAVNI program. These changes are the result of a comprehensive review of the program and include specific security and mission requirements outlined below and also in the enclosure. The Secretaries of the Military Departments will ensure adequate controls and audit processes are in place for compliance with all administrative, security, and suitability requirements outlined in this memorandum.

The Service MAVNI program allocations for the maximum number of annual accessions will be: Army - 1,200; Navy - 65; Marine Corps - 65; and Air Force - 70. Within 60 days of the date of this memorandum, the Secretaries of the Military Departments will provide a report to the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs detailing the methodology supporting requested accession allotments against critical manpower gaps and operational requirements.

In execution of the enclosed guidance, the Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:

- limit the accession of individuals with language/culture skills to not more than 10 percent of the total Service allocation for reserve accessions;
- access medical personnel for Active and Reserve enlistments as needed;

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From Classified Report


- limit the number of annual accessions for any one language/associated culture capabilities to not more than 10 percent of total MAVNI Service authorization.
- prohibit Category 2 language/associated culture applicants from shipping to basic training or serving for any period of time on active duty until the Military Service certifies in writing to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD (P&R)) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) their ability to meet administrative, security, and suitability protocols mandated herein prior to accessing any new applicants into the Delayed Entry Pool (DEP).

Updated guidance regarding program eligibility, languages, security reviews, and screening processes, eligibility for a security clearance, suitability determination, and military endorsement for naturalization are necessary to ensure the security, success and sustainability of the MAVNI program. Specific policy details and methodologies are outlined in the enclosed guidance.

- The guidance within this memorandum applies to all MAVNIs currently in the DEP, all future applicants, and all Reserve accessions who enter Service or ship to basic training on or after the date of this memorandum. Those persons in the DEP who were recruited under the eligible language list in effect since 2014 may continue in the accession process, but they must be satisfactorily screened under the revised screening protocols found in this memorandum.
- All personnel accessed through the MAVNI program since its inception in 2009 must be continuously monitored and accounted for throughout the duration of their affiliation with the Department of Defense (e.g. active duty, Reserve, government civilian, or contractor).
- No Service member accessed under language/associated culture MAVNI eligibility is eligible for a security clearance until they have satisfied time in service requirements and have received an updated and favorable determination by the Consolidated Adjudications Facility.

All costs associated with the accession of MAVNI applicants are borne by the contracting Service. Services recruiting under MAVNI will provide to USD(P&R) and USD(I) a MAVNI report by accession cohort at the end of each quarter and annually following the end of each fiscal year. Complete reports listing all MAVNIs in service will be provided to USD(P&R) and USD(I) on an annual basis. The Services shall notify USD(P&R), USD(I), and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) when individuals become classified as "unsatisfactory participants" and/or are administratively separated from the military.

Any clarification required concerning this guidance shall be requested prior to program implementation by the Military Departments concerned. Services may not deviate from these requirements without a written approval to do so from the USD(P&R) in coordination with USD(I).


Peter Levine
Acting

Attachments:
As stated

cc:
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Chief of the National Guard Bureau
Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs

Program Eligibility

Overall Eligibility:

1. Eligibility is extended to aliens in one of the following categories at time of enlistment:
 - a. Asylee, refugee, Temporary Protected Status (TPS), or
 - b. Nonimmigrant categories E, F, H, I, J, K, L, M, O, P, Q, R, S, T, TC, TD, TN, U, or V.
2. Additionally, program applicants:
 - a. Must have been in a valid status in one of those categories for at least the 2 years immediately prior to the enlistment date. However, it does not have to be the same category as the one held on the date of enlistment;
 - b. Must not have had any single absence from the United States of more than 90 days during the 2-year period immediately preceding the date of enlistment; and
 - c. Are rendered ineligible by virtue of having a pending application for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence. In the specific case of an alien with H nonimmigrant status at the time of filing a pending application for adjustment of status who has lost such status while his or her application for adjustment was pending, and who is otherwise eligible for enlistment under the MAVNI program, the military Service may on a case by case basis waive the requirement that the alien be in a status described in paragraph 1 above at the time of enlistment; however, the Service will ensure the applicant in DEP maintains an immigration status or obtains Deferred Action from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or the applicant in DEP will no longer qualify for enlistment.
3. Individuals who have been granted deferred action by the DHS pursuant to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals process are eligible.

Program Specific Eligibility (Services may add additional requirements)

1. Health Care Professionals

- a. Applicants must be recruited specifically to fill medical specialties wherein the Service has a critical shortfall.
- b. Applicants must meet all qualification criteria required for their medical specialty.
- c. Applicants must meet the criteria required for foreign-trained Department of Defense medical personnel recruited under other authorities.
- d. Applicants must demonstrate proficiency in English – reading, speaking, and listening – on a standardized test in accordance with all existing Service criteria for commissioned officers.

Attachment 1

c. Enlistments must be for at least 3 years of Active Duty or 6 years of SELRES service.

2. Enlisted Individuals with Special Language and Culture Backgrounds

Enlistments must be for at least 3 years of Active Duty or 6 years of SELRES service, and enlistees must:

- a. Possess capability in a specific language with the associated cultural background from the list of critical eligible languages (below), and
- b. Demonstrate language proficiency at the 2/2/2 level on the Defense Language Proficiency Test or 2/2 on the Oral Proficiency Interview; or as needed for the career field, but not at less than 1+ on any modality.

Eligible Languages

Services may recommend additional languages to meet emerging needs or request exceptions to policy for especially meritorious individual cases to the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy.

Category 1

Albanian	Dhivehi (language of Maldives)	Portuguese
Bengali	Haitian-Creole	Sinhalese
Bulgarian	Hungarian	Tagalog
Cebuano	Malayalam	Tamil
Czech	Polish	Thai

Category 2

Amharic	Igbo	Sindhi
Arabic	Indonesian	Somali
Azerbaijani	Kashmiri	Swahili
Burmese	Kurdish	Tajik
Cambodian-Khmer	Lao	Turkish
French (limited to individuals possessing citizenship from an African country)	Malay	Turkmen
Georgian	Moro	Ukrainian
Hausa	Nepalese	Urdu
Hindi	Pahari	Uzbek
	Punjabi	Yoruba
	Pushtu (aka Pashto)	
	Serbo-Croatian	

Security and Suitability Screening Requirements

1. **Applicability.** Services may not deviate from the following requirements without written approval from the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)).
2. **Initial Screening.** Prior to shipping to basic training or serving for any period of time on active duty in the Armed Forces, each MAVNI applicant must satisfactorily complete all security screening requirements. Services shall clearly annotate MAVNI in all Service Component Accessions Systems and use the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) (or its successor, the Defense Information System for Security (DISS)) Agency Use Block and indicate MAVNI to ensure the Department's ability to track MAVNI's period of military service. Sequencing of security screening (NIACs, Counterintelligence (CI)-Security Interviews, Tier 3 or Tier 5 background investigations, polygraphs) as applicable is critical and provided at Enclosure 2.
 - a. **National Intelligence Agency Check (NIAC):** The NIAC will include at a minimum a name check of the following databases:
 - i. CIA External Name Trace System
 - ii. PORTICO (USD(I)-approved CI information system)
 - iii. National Crime Information Center
 - iv. Defense Central Index of Investigations
 - v. FBI Checks (Name and Foreign Terrorism Tracking Task Force)
 - vi. Foreign Travel (Advance Passenger Information System or similar system when available)
 - vii. Public Records, Commercial Data, Social Media (as appropriate)

Services will forward the results of the NIAC to the DoD Consolidated Adjudications Facility (CAF) leading to a National Security Determination in support of a suitability for service determination.

b. **CI-Security Interview:** The Service counterintelligence element will conduct the CI-Security Interview. The CI-Security Interview will be based upon the findings of the completed NIAC, a review of the subjects SF-86, and standard questions from the Services and the DoD CAF. Results of the CI-Security Interview will be forwarded to the DoD CAF to support the National Security Determination.

c. **Military Suitability Determination:** The DoD CAF will render a National Security Determination based on 13 National Adjudicative Guidelines. JPAS will then be coded as "No Determination Made" (MAVNIs are not eligible for a security clearance during their initial accession, see Para 4 below for security clearance eligibility requirements). The DoD CAF will forward a notification to the Service recruiting command, via the Case Adjudication Tracking System, with one of the following decisions: 1) The subject has a non-favorable national security determination based on unmitigated derogatory or missing information or; 2) A non-favorable national security determination solely because of citizenship with the absence, or successful mitigation, of other derogatory information. If derogatory information was revealed, the DoD CAF will provide information to the accessing service via the Case Adjudication Tracking System. The accessing service will use this information to then render the final military suitability determination in accordance with DoDI 1304.26 and any service specific policies.

d. **Health Care Professionals and Category 1 Language Requirements:** Will have a completed Tier 3 background investigation, a completed NIAC, a completed CI-security interview, a National Security Determination by the DoD CAF, and a favorable military suitability determination rendered by the Service accession organization. If derogatory information is revealed in the background investigation or NIAC and cannot be mitigated, the DoD CAF may request a polygraph examination as applicable. The Military Service may either administer a polygraph to resolve the issue or separate the individual. Applicants refusing to consent to a polygraph examination will be separated. A Category 1 MAVNI's country of origin should be taken into consideration to determine whether a Tier 5 investigation is more appropriate vice a Tier 3 investigation.

e. **Category 2 Language Requirements:** Will have a completed Tier 5 background investigation, a completed NIAC, a completed CI-security interview, a National Security Determination by the DoD CAF, and a favorable military suitability determination rendered by the service accession organization. If derogatory information is revealed in the background investigation or NIAC and cannot be mitigated, the DoD CAF may request a polygraph examination as applicable. The Military Service may either administer a polygraph to resolve the issue or separate the individual. Applicants refusing to consent to a polygraph examination will be separated.

3. **Continuous Monitoring (CM).** The Services will execute annual comprehensive counterintelligence CM throughout each MAVNI's period of military service. Services shall use the JPAS (or its successor DISS) to record completion of annual CM and vetting status throughout their periods of military and government service.


a. **Continuous Monitoring requirements:** The Service CI-element will conduct, at a minimum, a NIAC on each MAVNI serving, annually. Any derogatory information identified by CM (or separately by the unit) will be reported per DoDI 5200.02. If the CAF cannot mitigate derogatory information, the DoD CAF may request a CI-security interview and/or a polygraph examination, as applicable. The Military Service may administer a polygraph and/or interview to resolve the issue or separate the individual. Service members refusing to consent to a polygraph examination and/or interview will be separated. This process will serve as CM until further capabilities are available.

b. **Reporting requirements:** Annually in September, each Service Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Personnel will submit a comprehensive report of all MAVNIs serving in all Components to its Service CI-element, USD(I), and USD(P&R). An initial submission is due to those organizations within 60 days of the date of this memorandum. The listing shall include at a minimum the name, DoD ID number, job title, unit of assignment, country of origin, native language, and security clearance classification if any. This reporting requirement is intended to inform and facilitate Service CI-elements execution of CM.

4. **Security Clearance Eligibility Requirements.** MAVNIs will be designated in JPAS (or its successor DISS) as not eligible for an interim security clearance or access until the completion of first enlistment and a positive national security eligibility determination is made by the DoD CAF. Commands may request eligibility for a clearance for MAVNIs through its Service security manager after ensuring MAVNIs have completed the first enlistment and meet all other requirements for a clearance. The DoD CAF is responsible for adjudicating completed personnel security background investigations to render a determination of each individual's eligibility to access classified information and may require the Military Components to submit a request for an updated background investigation, updated CI-security interview, or NIAC as

applicable, prior to rendering a security clearance eligibility determination. If the CAF cannot mitigate derogatory information, the DoD CAF may request a CI-security interview and/or a polygraph examination, as applicable. The Military Service may administer a polygraph and/or interview to resolve the issue or separate the individual.

DoD MAVNI Security and Suitability Sequence Map



Attachment 2

(U) Appendix E

(U) Naturalization Through Military Service: Fact Sheet

<https://www.uscis.gov/news/fact-sheets/naturalization-through-military-service-fact-sheet>



Naturalization Through Military Service: Fact Sheet

Special provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorize U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to expedite the application and naturalization process for current members of the U.S. armed forces and recently discharged service members. Generally, qualifying military service includes service with one of the following: Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and National Guard. In addition, spouses of members of the U.S. armed forces who are or will be deployed may be eligible for expedited naturalization. Other provisions of the law also allow certain spouses to complete the naturalization process abroad.

Qualifications

A member of the U.S. armed forces must meet the requirements and qualifications to become a citizen of the United States. He or she must demonstrate:

- Good moral character,
- Knowledge of the English language,
- Knowledge of U.S. government and history (civics), and
- Attachment to the United States by taking an Oath of Allegiance to the U.S. Constitution.

Qualified members of the U.S. armed forces are exempt from other naturalization requirements, including residence and physical presence in the United States. These exceptions are listed in Sections 328 and 329 of the INA.

All aspects of the naturalization process, including applications, interviews and ceremonies are available overseas to members of the U.S. armed forces and certain "command-sponsored" spouses.

Last Reviewed/Updated: 12/22/2016

**Regrade UNCLASSIFIED when Separated
From Classified Report**

<https://www.uscis.gov/news/fact-sheets/naturalization-through-military-service-fact-sheet>

A person who obtains U.S. citizenship through his or her military service and separates from the military under "other than honorable conditions" before completing five years of honorable service may have his or her citizenship revoked.

Service in Peacetime

Section 328 of the INA applies to all members of the U.S. armed forces and those already discharged from service. An individual may qualify for naturalization if he or she has:

- Served honorably in the U.S. armed forces for at least one year,
- Obtained lawful permanent resident status, and
- Filed an application while still in the service or within six months of separation.

Service during Periods of Hostilities

Under special provisions in Section 329 of the INA, the President signed an executive order on July 3, 2002, authorizing all noncitizens who have served honorably in the U.S. armed forces on or after Sept. 11, 2001, to immediately file for citizenship. This order also covers veterans of certain designated past wars and conflicts. The authorization will remain in effect until a date designated by a future presidential executive order.

Naturalization at Basic Training

USCIS established the Naturalization at Basic Training Initiative in August 2009 with the Army to give noncitizen enlistees the opportunity to naturalize when they graduate from basic training. Under this initiative, USCIS conducts all naturalization processing including the capture of biometrics, the naturalization interview and administration of the *Oath of Allegiance* on the military installation. Since 2009 USCIS has expanded the initiative to the Navy, Air Force, and finally to the Marine Corps in 2013, giving enlistees of these branches equal opportunity to (in most cases) leave basic training as U.S. citizens.

How to Apply

Every military installation has a designated point-of-contact, generally in the personnel division or the Judge Advocate General's Office, to assist members of the military prepare and file their naturalization application packet. That packet includes:

Last Reviewed/Updated: 12/22/2016

<https://www.uscis.gov/news/fact-sheets/naturalization-through-military-service-fact-sheet>

- Application for Naturalization, USCIS Form N-400 (Members of the military are not charged a fee to file the Form N-400.)
- Request for Certification of Military or Naval Service, USCIS Form N-426 (The military must certify this form before sending it to USCIS. Individuals separated from the military may submit an uncertified Form N-426 with their DD Form 214.)

Once the packet is complete, send it to the specialized military naturalization unit at the USCIS National Benefits Center for expedited processing using the addresses listed on the form's web page.

Customer Service to Assist the Military

USCIS customer service specialists are available to respond to inquiries from military members and their families Monday through Friday from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. (Central), except federal holidays. Military families may contact USCIS by:

- Calling the military toll-free telephone help line -- 1-877-CIS-4MIL (1-877-247-4645), or
- Sending an e-mail to the military customer service specialists at: militaryinfo.nsc@dhs.gov.

Posthumous Benefits

Section 329A of the INA provides for grants of posthumous citizenship to certain members of the U.S. armed forces. A member of the U.S. armed forces who served honorably during a designated period of hostility and died as a result of injury or disease incurred in or aggravated by that service (including death in combat) may be eligible to receive posthumous citizenship, as long as the next-of-kin applies for posthumous citizenship within two years of the service member's death. Other provisions of the law extend immigration benefits to the service member's surviving spouse, children and parents.

Statistics (through Fiscal Year 2015)

- Since Oct. 1, 2001, USCIS has naturalized 109,321 members of the military, with 11,069 of those service members becoming citizens during USCIS naturalization ceremonies in 34 foreign countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Australia, Bahrain, China (Hong Kong), Cuba (Guantanamo), Djibouti, El Salvador, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iraq, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Mexico, the Philippines, Qatar, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom.

Last Reviewed/Updated: 12/22/2016

<https://www.uscis.gov/news/fact-sheets/naturalization-through-military-service-fact-sheet>

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Last Reviewed/Updated: 12/22/2016

<https://www.uscis.gov/news/fact-sheets/naturalization-through-military-service-fact-sheet>

Military Spouses Naturalized Abroad

Location of Ceremony	TOTAL	FY-08	FY-09	FY-10	FY-11	FY-12	FY-13	FY-14	FY-15
Afghanistan	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Australia	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
Bahrain	9	0	0	0	1	1	4	1	2
Bulgaria	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chile	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
China (Hong Kong)	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Cuba	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
El Salvador	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Georgia	3	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0
Germany	964	10	173	154	155	146	135	86	105
Greece	11	0	0	0	11	0	0	0	0
Hungary	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
India	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Italy	246	4	51	45	35	21	28	31	31
Jamaica	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Japan	675	5	73	144	61	133	83	68	108
Kuwait	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
Mexico	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Moldova	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Norway	3	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1
Oman	2	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Panama	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Philippines	5	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	1
Poland	3	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1
Portugal	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
Singapore	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
South Korea	464	11	58	63	62	87	61	62	60
Spain	63	0	3	23	8	14	8	5	2
Tanzania	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Thailand	5	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	1
Turkey	12	0	0	3	2	3	3	1	0
United Arab Emirates	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
United Kingdom	164	0	21	28	25	20	28	25	17
TOTAL	2,650	30	380	473	368	430	358	279	332

Last Reviewed/Updated: 12/22/2016

<https://www.uscis.gov/news/fact-sheets/naturalization-through-military-service-fact-sheet>

Service Members Naturalized Abroad

Location of Ceremony	TOTAL	FY-08	FY-09	FY-10	FY-11	FY-12	FY-13	FY-14	FY-15
Afghanistan	1017	105	183	208	288	99	100	30	4
Albania	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
Bahrain	20	0	0	2	2	2	6	8	0
China (Hong Kong)	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0
Cuba (Guantanamo)	4	0	0	3	0	0	1	0	0
Djibouti	6	0	2	0	0	3	0	1	0
El Salvador	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
Georgia	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4
Germany	764	135	137	152	131	87	51	41	30
Greece	12	0	1	2	8	0	0	1	0
Haiti	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Honduras	5	0	2	1	0	2	0	0	0
Iceland	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Iraq	1839	644	678	427	88	2	0	0	0
Italy	150	13	26	26	37	12	10	14	12
Jamaica	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
Japan	1553	349	282	288	224	183	117	55	55
Jordan	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Kenya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kosovo	34	0	0	29	1	2	0	2	0
Kuwait	399	110	167	58	4	45	5	6	4
Kyrgyzstan	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Libya	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Mexico	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Philippines	7	0	4	0	3	0	0	0	0
Qatar	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
South Korea	904	149	171	198	107	64	48	104	63
Spain	28	0	1	9	10	3	2	2	1
Thailand	9	0	0	1	7	1	0	0	0
Turkey	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
U.A.E.	3	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	0
United Kingdom	9	1	1	0	4	1	0	2	0
TOTAL	6790	1509	1655	1411	918	509	344	269	175




Last Reviewed/Updated: 12/22/2016

(U) Management Comments

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Director for Defense Intelligence

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

MAY 05 2017

INTELLIGENCE

**MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS-
EVALUATIONS**


SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of Military Services Compliance with Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest Program Security Reviews and Monitoring Programs (Project Number D2016-DISPA-0162,000)

(U) The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) submits the following in response to the Department of Defense Inspector General's (DoDIG) compliance evaluation of DoD's Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) Program Security Reviews and Monitoring Programs. OUSD(I) is appreciative of DoDIG efforts and the opportunity to comment on your recommendations. As a result of the close and ongoing coordination with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD(P&R)) and the Services, many of your recommendations have been implemented.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)


(U) My point of contact is ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ DoD OIG: (b) (6) at ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ DoD OIG: (b) (6) or ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ DoD OIG: (b) (6)



Gary P. Reid
Director for Defense Intelligence
(Intelligence and Security)

Classified by: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ DoD OIG: (b) (6)
Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: May 5, 2042

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1500 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1500

005 4 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS-
EVALUATIONS

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Military Services Compliance with Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest Program Security Reviews and Monitoring Programs (Project Number D2016-DISPA-0162.000)

(U) The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD(P&R)) would like to thank the Department of Defense Inspector General team for their efforts in the evaluation of the Military Accessions Vital to National Interest program. Identification of program weaknesses has led OUSD(P&R) and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to work closely with the Military Services to remediate the issues identified. To date much progress has been made. In particular, the Army team has produced a dedicated effort that is making significant progress towards strengthening program compliance.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ OSD/S: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)
[Redacted]

Stephanie Barua
Acting

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Assistant Secretary of the Army, M&RA



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS
111 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0111

5 MAY 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense Inspector General

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of Military Services' Compliance with Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest Program Security Reviews and Monitoring Programs (Project No. D2016-DISPA-0162.000)

1. (U) Thank you for the opportunity to provide Army comments on the draft of report D2016-DISPA-0162.000. We, in coordination with OSD, have already implemented many of the recommended changes. Our response to your report is enclosed. We also provide the following for your consideration:

a. (U) The draft report appears to assess the Army's implementation of the MAVNI program from 2010-2016 through the updated standards OSD published on 30 September 2016. The Army endeavors at all times to adhere to OSD guidance in effect at that point in time. When OSD published guidance on 30 September 2016, we immediately began efforts to comply.

b. (U) The Army sees great value in the MAVNI program. We must continue to honor our commitment to those individuals who enlisted via the MAVNI program to include those who currently reside in the Delayed Entry Pool (DEP) and the Delayed Training Program (DTP). Notwithstanding that the current security screening and vetting process for each MAVNI applicant is burdensome, we continue to vet this population to ensure we mitigate risk to an acceptable level.

2. (U) Thank you for your consideration.

Diane M. Randon
Senior Official Performing the Duties of the
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

Enclosure

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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(U) Army (cont'd)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

9 May 2017

Corrected Enclosure

(U) Army Input to the Draft DoDIG Report dated 10 Apr 17, Subject: Evaluation of Military Services' Compliance with Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) Program Security Reviews and Monitoring Programs

Findings:

A. ~~(S//NF)~~ DoD IG Finding: ~~OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)~~ (Army Concur's with Comment).

(U) ~~OSD/JS: (b) (7)(E)~~

B. ~~(S//NF)~~ DoDIG Finding: ~~OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)~~ (Army Concur's with Comment).

(U) ~~OSD/JS: (b) (7)(E)~~

C. ~~(S//NF)~~ DoDIG Finding: ~~OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)~~ (Army Concur's with Comment).

(U) ~~OSD/JS: (b) (7)(E)~~

(U) ~~OSD/JS: (b) (7)(E)~~ Army has implemented the following actions that meet or exceed the OUSD (Personnel & Readiness) 30 Sep 16 policy memo.

Classified By: David Salo, SES, ASA(MR&A)
Derived From: DoD IG Report on Evaluation of Compliance with MAVNI, dated 10 Apr 17
Declassify on: 20270531

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Army (cont'd)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

a. (U) OSD/JS: (b) (7)(E)

[Redacted]

b. (U) OSD/JS: (b) (7)(E)

[Redacted]

c. (U) OSD/JS: (b) (7)(E)

[Redacted]

d. (U) OSD/JS: (b) (7)(E)

[Redacted]

e. (U) OSD/JS: (b) (7)(E)

[Redacted]

f. (U) OSD/JS: (b) (7)(E)

[Redacted]

g. (U) OSD/JS: (b) (7)(E)

[Redacted]

D. (U) DoDIG Finding: OSD/JS: (b) (7)(E)

[Redacted]
(Army Non-Concurs).

(U) OSD/JS: (b) (7)(E)

[Redacted]

(U) The Army understands it is responsible for certifying qualifying service; it understands the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services office is the governmental agency responsible for conferring citizenship upon non-US citizens.

E. (S//NF) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

[Redacted] (Army Concurs with Comment).

(U) The Army has addressed this issue in section C above.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Army (cont'd)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

F. ~~(FOUO)~~ DoDIG Finding: Subject Interview Reports of Investigation on Army MAVNI Personnel (Army Concur with Comment).

(U) The DoD IG report identifies instances where the Office of Personnel Management, Federal Investigative Service (now known as NBIB), identified derogatory information. The DoD CAF has acknowledged that it considers all information discovered through the NBIB investigative process in making its recommendation and/or determination. We believe that given this acknowledgement by the DoD CAF, that there is no reason to assume DoD is incurring risk. We believe that this section could be edited to create a separate DoD observation as NBIB will identify the same types of information regardless of the Service.

Recommendations:

A. ~~(S//NF)~~ DoDIG Recommendation: OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

[Redacted]

(U) Army concurs with this recommendation.

B. ~~(S//NF)~~ DoDIG Recommendation: OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

[Redacted]

(U) Army non-concurs with this recommendation.

(U) The Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) currently provides assets to the Army Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (ACICA) to perform the function recommended by DoDIG.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, M&RA



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
(MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS)
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20350-1000

5 May 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INTELLIGENCE
AND SPECIAL PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS - EVALUATIONS

Subj: DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL (DODIG) EVALUATION OF MILITARY SERVICES'
COMPLIANCE WITH MILITARY ACCESSIONS VITAL TO THE NATIONAL
INTEREST (MAVNI) PROGRAM SECURITY REVIEWS AND MONITORING
PROGRAMS

Ref: (a) DoDIG Project No. D2016-DISPA-0162.000 dated April 10, 2017

1. In response to reference (a) report titled Evaluation of Military Services' Compliance With
Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) Program Security Reviews and
Monitoring Programs, the Department of the Navy (DoN) comments are submitted.

NAVY: (b) (5)
[Redacted]

NAVY: (b) (5)
[Redacted]

2. Additional comments in response to the report are provided. Bold text indicates comments taken
directly from the report.

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)
[Redacted]

OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)
[Redacted]

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)
[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Navy (cont'd)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Subj: DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL (DODIG) EVALUATION OF MILITARY SERVICES' COMPLIANCE WITH MILITARY ACCESSIONS VITAL TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST (MAVNI) PROGRAM SECURITY REVIEWS AND MONITORING PROGRAMS

OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

NAVY: (b) (5)

c. (U) DoD Manual 4240.01, "Procedures Governing the Conduct of DoD Intelligence Activities" (page 16)

Reference should read: "DoD Manual 5240.01, "Procedures Governing the Conduct of DoD Intelligence Activities."



Juliet M. Beyer
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Military Manpower and Personnel)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, M&RA



CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO NOFORN~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC



MAY 08 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INTELLIGENCE
AND SPECIAL PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS-EVALUATIONS

FROM: SAF/MR

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Military Services Compliance with Military Accessions Vital to the
National Interest Program Security Reviews and Monitoring Programs (Project Number D2016-
DISPA-0162.000)

1. (U) The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
(SAF/MR) would like to thank the Department of Defense Inspector General team for their efforts
in the evaluation of the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program.

2. ~~(S)~~ OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)
[Redacted]

3. (U) If you have any questions, please contact [Redacted] DoD OIG: (b) (6) via email at
DoD OIG: (b) (6)

DANIEL R. SITTERLY
Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)


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AFOSI (5) (7)(E)
[Redacted]

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO NOFORN~~

BREAKING BARRIERS...SINCE 1947


(U) Air Force (Cont'd)

OSD/JS, (b) (1), 1.4(c), 1.4(g), (b) (7)(E); AFOSI, (b) (7)(E)



(U) Air Force (Cont'd)

OSD/JS: (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F), AFOSI: (b) (7)(E)



(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACES	Army Continuous Evaluation System
ACICA	Army Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority
AFOSI	Air Force Office of Special Investigations
AFSOC	Air Force Special Operations Command
ASA M&RA	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
CI	Counterintelligence
DCII	Defense Central Index of Investigations
DCIS	Defense Criminal Investigative Service
DMDC	Defense Manpower Data Center
DoD CAF	Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigations
FTTTF	Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force
FY	Fiscal Year
HSI	Homeland Security Investigations
INSCOM	Intelligence and Security Command
MAVNI	Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest
NCIS	Naval Criminal Investigative Service
NIAC	National Intelligence Agency Check
NSW	Naval Special Warfare
OSD(I)	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
OSD(P&R)	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
ROI	Report of Investigation
SRMP	Security and Risk Mitigation Program
SSBI	Single Scope Background Investigation
SVO	Security Vetting Office
USCIS	United States Customs and Immigration Service

Whistleblower Protection

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman's role is to educate agency employees about prohibitions on retaliation and employees' rights and remedies available for reprisal. The DoD Hotline Director is the designated ombudsman. For more information, please visit the Whistleblower webpage at www.dodig.mil/programs/whistleblower.

For more information about DoD OIG reports or activities, please contact us:

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congressional@dodig.mil; 703.604.8324

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

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