



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER  
UNIT 29951  
APO AE 09751-9951



31 December 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND  
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES AIR FORCES AFRICA  
COMMANDER, SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AFRICA  
COMMANDER, COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE-HORN OF AFRICA  
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES AFRICA  
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES AFRICA  
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS FORCES AFRICA

SUBJECT: Executive Summary and Action on Findings, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation into the Attack on Cooperative Security Location (CSL) Manda Bay, Kenya on 5 January 2020

1. References.

- a. AR 15-6 Investigation into the Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the Attack on CSL Manda Bay, Kenya on 5 January 2020, dated 29 December 2020 (S//NF)
- b. Legal Review – AR 15-6 Investigation into the Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the Attack on CSL Manda Bay, Kenya on 5 January 2020, dated 30 December 2020 (S//NF)

2. The findings and recommendations contained in reference (a) are approved as indicated in the enclosure and forwarded for action as appropriate.

3. Summary of Events. On 5 January 2020 at 0520 hours (East African Time Zone), a ruthless and determined enemy force of approximately 30-40 Al Shabaab fighters conducted a complex attack against U.S. forces and assets located at Cooperative Security Location (CSL) Manda Bay, Kenya. CSL Manda Bay is comprised of three main parts: Kenyan Naval Base Manda Bay which encompasses Camp Simba, the U.S. "base within a base" where U.S. forces are housed and most work, as well as the nearby Magagoni airfield, a joint-use airfield about (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b)(1) 1.7e from which U.S. air operations are conducted. Fixing Camp Simba with indirect fires and exploiting the inadequate defenses and U.S. force protection posture at Magagoni airfield, the Al Shabaab fighters concentrated their attack there and, in short order, killed a U.S. service member and two U.S. DoD contractors, wounded another U.S. service member and DoD contractor, destroyed six U.S. and one Kenyan aircraft and other property before they were effectively engaged and forced to withdraw. The Al Shabaab fighters who attacked Magagoni airfield were (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b)(1) 1.7e until a small team of U.S. Marines moved aggressively from Camp Simba to gain initial contact to assess and develop the situation. Later, a combined, ad hoc formation of U.S. Marines, U.S. Airmen, and Kenyan armed forces, conducted a deliberate and sustained counterattack to repel the attacking enemy force. Upon establishing fire superiority, the combined force deliberately cleared the airfield and multiple buildings over the course of the next (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.7e ultimately killing at least six attackers and driving the remaining enemy from the airfield. U.S. Africa Command's (USAFRICOM) East Africa Response Force, ordered to rapidly deploy from Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, reinforced the CSL's defenders later that same evening.



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4. I convey my deepest condolences to the families of U.S. Army Specialist Henry “Mitch” Mayfield, Jr. and U.S. DoD contractors Mr. Dustin Harrison and Mr. Bruce Triplett—three brave Americans who died while serving to advance U.S. national security objectives in Africa.

5. The investigating officer, a combat experienced (b)(3)(b)(6) led a diverse, joint-service team of subject matter experts from across the USAFRICOM Headquarters and Service components to gather evidence, conduct interviews, and evaluate the circumstances surrounding the attack. The enclosed findings and recommendations reflect USAFRICOM’s assessment of the causal and contributing factors of this incident, which include organizational, intelligence, operational and command and control issues, and how USAFRICOM will address them so that USAFRICOM and its component commands can better operate to accomplish our mission while protecting our force anywhere in Africa.

6. Causal Factors: The Investigating Officer identifies the proximate cause of the death of three U.S. citizens, injuries to three other U.S. citizens, and the loss of U.S. aircraft and property as the attack by a massed force of determined, disciplined and well-resourced Al Shabaab fighters. After thoroughly reviewing the report and collected evidence, I also concur with (b)(3)(b)(6) assessment that four broad factors contributed to the outcome of the attack and resultant loss of lives, aircraft, equipment, and injuries.

a. Force protection focus: inadequate leadership focus on potential threats and force protection (**contributing**), inadequate tactical level command and control (base defense flight and squadron) (**contributing**), and insufficient operational level leader oversight (group, wing, component level and combatant command level staff officers) (**contributing**).

b. Understanding the threat: inadequate threat picture at all levels (**contributing**) and ineffective intelligence resourcing, analysis, dissemination, and sharing (**non-contributing**).

c. Security force preparation: Security Forces organization, preparation, training, and defensive plans were inadequate to counter the threat (**contributing**).

d. Mission command: poor unity of command at the tactical level (base defense flight and squadron) (**non-contributing**). Flawed operational processes (group, wing, component, and combatant command staff officers) failed to account for the growth of CSL Manda Bay and its change in mission (**contributing**).

7. The investigation also documents how decisive actions by U.S. forces and Kenyan forces drove Al Shabaab from the CSL and enabled the arrival of the East Africa Response Force later that evening.

8. USAFRICOM Chief of Staff and Directorates: Take appropriate action on the approved AR 15-6 recommendations pertaining to Headquarters, USAFRICOM with specific focus on the intelligence resourcing and sharing issues, C2 issues, oversight process and preparation of security forces for deployment to the USAFRICOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). In conjunction with United States Air Forces Africa and United States Special Operations Command Africa, supervise the development of training vignettes, based on these findings, for staff and leader development so we take positive action to avoid a similar incident in the future. Engagement with Services is required in order to make lasting changes to training and pre-deployment preparations for security forces from all Services defending austere, expeditionary locations on the continent.

9. Commander, U.S. Air Forces Africa. Take appropriate action on the approved AR 15-6 recommendations pertaining to your component with specific focus on the intelligence resourcing and sharing issues, leadership

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and C2, operational oversight process and preparation of security forces for deployments in the USAFRICOM AOR. Based on these findings, develop training vignettes for unit and leader development so we take positive action to avoid a similar incident in the future. Determine and take or recommend any administrative, disciplinary or commendatory actions required.

10. Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command Africa. Take appropriate action on the approved AR 15-6 recommendations pertaining to your component with specific focus on the intelligence resourcing and sharing issues, tactical leadership and C2 and operational oversight process. Based on these findings, develop training vignettes for unit and leader development so we take positive action to avoid a similar incident in the future. Determine and take or recommend any administrative, disciplinary or commendatory actions required.

11. Commanders of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, U.S. Naval Forces Africa, U.S. Army Forces Africa, and U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa. Take appropriate action on the approved AR 15-6 recommendations pertaining to your respective headquarters and apply them AOR wide. Apply the vignettes we will develop from these findings to unit and leader development so we take positive action to avoid a similar incident in the future.


12. Provide complete copies of the investigation, exhibits, and this endorsement to the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, the Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force and Army, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command for any actions that they deem appropriate.

13. Within 60 days, Chief of Staff, USAFRICOM will schedule a review for commanders to provide me an update on the actions they have taken to date and the date they will complete all directed actions.

14. Chief of Staff, USAFRICOM will work with the investigating officer and the components to conduct necessary follow-on actions, to include briefs to Congress, as required.

15. I direct this investigation's documentary evidence, findings, and recommendations be appropriately classified or declassified and coordinated for Freedom of Information Act processing. Within 60 days, the Chief of Staff, USAFRICOM, will update me on the completion of these actions and the progress made.

16. The point of contact for this memorandum is the Legal Counsel, USAFRICOM.



STEPHEN J. TOWNSEND  
General, U.S. Army

Enclosure:

(U) Consolidated Summary of Approved Findings, Recommendations and Action (U//FOUO)

CC:

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps

Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command



Enclosure: Consolidated Summary of Approved Findings, Recommendations and Action, 31 December 2020

(U) This enclosure consolidates the investigation findings and recommendations, followed immediately by the Appointing Authority's action and comments on each respective finding.

**GENERAL COMMENTS APPLICABLE TO ALL FINDINGS**

(U) This investigative report is a thorough and comprehensive review of all relevant factors, beginning with unit pre-deployment training, through the attack on Camp Simba and Magagoni Airfield (herein, airfield) and the aftermath. The investigation uncovered institutional, organizational, and individual shortcomings that must be addressed by the appropriate commanders.

(U) Causal Factors: The Investigating Officer identifies the ***proximate cause*** of the death of three U.S. citizens, injuries to three other U.S. citizens, and the loss of U.S. aircraft and property as the attack by a massed force of determined, disciplined and well-resourced Al Shabaab (AS) fighters. After thoroughly reviewing the report and collected evidence, I concur with (b)(3) (b)(6) assessment that four broad factors ***contributed*** to the outcome of the attack and resultant loss of lives, aircraft, equipment, and injuries.

a. Force protection focus: inadequate leadership focus on potential threats and force protection (***contributing***), inadequate tactical level command and control (base defense flight and squadron) (***contributing***), and insufficient operational level leader oversight (group, wing, component level and combatant command level staff officers) (***contributing***).

b. Understanding the threat: inadequate threat picture at all levels (***contributing***) and ineffective intelligence resourcing, analysis, dissemination, and sharing (***non-contributing***).

c. Security force preparation: Security Forces organization, preparation, training, and defensive plans were inadequate to counter the threat (***contributing***).

d. Mission command: poor unity of command at the tactical level (base defense flight and squadron) (***non-contributing***). Flawed operational processes (group, wing, component, and combatant command staff officers) failed to account for the growth of CSL Manda Bay and its change in mission (***contributing***).

(U) The U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) J3 will direct J34 Force Protection Division to review and revise the force protection inspection checklist to incorporate the lessons learned and recommendations in this investigation.

**INVESTIGATION QUESTION #1 (TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS)**

**DISCUSSION.** (U) The investigation records a clear timeline and a comprehensive sequence of events.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (U) None.

**APPOINTING AUTHORITY COMMENTS & DIRECTED ACTION.** (U) The Findings to Question #1 are approved as written.



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**INVESTIGATION QUESTION #2 (PERSONNEL LOSSES AND LINE OF DUTY DETERMINATION)**

(U) Three U.S. citizens killed in action at CSL Manda Bay died in the line of duty and not due to misconduct.

(U) Three U.S. citizens at CSL Manda Bay sustained wounds in the line of duty and not due to misconduct.

**DISCUSSION.**

a. (U) Specialist Henry "Mitch" Mayfield, Jr., U.S. Army, was killed in action performing his duties as a Landing Zone Safety Officer (LZSO). He was a 91C (Utilities Equipment Repairer) assigned to the 1-58th Aviation Battalion based out of Fort Rucker, Alabama.

b. (U) Mr. Dustin Harrison was a Department of Defense (DoD) contractor pilot killed in action while in support of DoD operations in East Africa.

c. (U) Mr. Bruce Triplett was a DOD contractor pilot killed in action while in support of DoD operations in East Africa.

d. (U) (b)(3)(b)(6) was wounded in action performing (b)(3)(b)(6) duties as a LZSO along with Specialist Mayfield. (b)(3)(b)(6) is a 15Q (Air Traffic Controller) assigned to the 1-58th Aviation Battalion based out of Fort Rucker, Alabama.

e. (U) (b)(3)(b)(6) is a DoD contractor and (b)(3)(b)(6) wounded in action while in support of DoD operations in East Africa.

f. (U) (b)(3)(b)(6) is a U.S. Marine wounded in action while engaging AS forces during search and clearance of the airfield.

**RECOMMENDATIONS.** (U) That the Appointing Authority find that the deaths of three U.S. citizens and the wounds to three other U.S. citizens, occurred in the line of duty and not due to misconduct.

**APPOINTING AUTHORITY COMMENTS & DIRECTED ACTION.**

(U) The Findings to Question #2 are approved with comment. I specifically find that Specialist Henry "Mitch" Mayfield, Jr., Mr. Dustin Harrison, and Mr. Bruce Triplett died in the line of duty and not due to misconduct.

(U) I also specifically find that the wounds to (b)(3)(b)(6) (b)(3)(b)(6) occurred in the line of duty and not due to misconduct.

(U) The Investigating Officer and (b)(3)(b)(6) team conducted an exhaustive and thorough review of all the facts surrounding the deaths and injuries of these (b)(3)(b)(6). I am confident that these findings are the most accurate reflection of the facts and circumstances surrounding the final moments of these three brave men, as well as the wounds sustained by the three others during initial attack and subsequent clearance operations.

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**INVESTIGATION QUESTION #3 (DETERMINE EXTENT OF DAMAGE AT MANDA BAY)**

(U//FOUO) Damages from the 5 January 2020 attack on CSL Manda Bay are estimated to be over \$94 million including the loss of six U.S. aircraft, approximately \$84 million, as well as destruction or damage to other U.S. equipment including vehicles, supplies and infrastructure amounting to approximately \$10 million. These costs reflect the latest estimates provided by the various contractors operating out of CSL Manda Bay.

**DISCUSSION.** (U) None.

**RECOMMENDATIONS.** (U) None.

**APPOINTING AUTHORITY COMMENTS & DIRECTED ACTION.** (U) **The Findings to Question #3 are approved with comment.** USAFRICOM J4 will coordinate with U.S. Air Forces Africa (AFAF), Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF), and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to fully account for all damaged and destroyed property, to include contractor owned, contractor operated, as well as Government owned, contractor operated aircraft and equipment to ensure services or components direct and complete proper disposition as appropriate.

**INVESTIGATION QUESTION #4 (ASSESS BASE DEFENSE PLANNING & EXECUTION)**

(U) Force protection measures at CSL Manda Bay were neither reasonable nor appropriate based on the threat information available to leaders at echelon, prior to the attack, nor were they appropriate based on the air assets on the airfield at the time of the attack. Camp Simba, with its manned Entry Control Point (ECP), barriers, lights, and manned towers, was reasonably well defended, but force protection at Magagoni airfield was deficient.

**DISCUSSION.** (U) General base defense procedural measures in place on 5 January 2020 are annotated in the unit's Integrated Defense Plan (IDP) and service policies and appear to have been followed. However, the unit's IDP was inadequate to their basing posture, their mission and threat. The IDP did not sufficiently address protection of aviation assets and infrastructure against an enemy ground attack on the airfield.

**RECOMMENDATIONS.** (U) Addressed in answer to Question #11, pages 8-13.

**APPOINTING AUTHORITY COMMENTS & DIRECTED ACTION.**

(U) **The Findings to Question #4 are approved with comment.**

(U) In the immediate aftermath of the attack, and before the investigation was even started, USAFRICOM, AFAF, and CJTF-HOA leaders initiated many corrective actions including:

- Security Forces (SECFOR) increased in size, focus, and capability (leaders, crew served weapons, etc.)
- Cleared jungle around Magagoni airfield to improve fields of observation and fire and sustained it
- Established 360-degree defense at airfield (perimeter fence, HESCO wall, fighting positions, towers)
- Improved defenses, fighting positions and indirect fire protection at Camp Simba
- Increased Kenyan participation in all security operations



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- Increased frequency and range of patrols
- Improved communications, functioning and capability of base defense operations center
- Established one supported commander for force protection and base defense at every base

(U) I direct all commanders to review this finding and:

- Adjust troop preparation and training, force posture, equipment, and security operations, as required
- Emplace appropriate measures to improve base defense plans and Standard Operating Procedures

(SOPs) to counter potential threats

- Incorporate regular rehearsals so leaders and troops know the plan and improve execution
- Incorporate alternate plans for the introduction of reinforcements or relief forces if the primary method

is denied.

(U) Numerous acts of valor by Marines, Airmen, and Kenyan partner forces took place on and around the airfield, warranting review for appropriate recognition. USAFRICOM J1 will assist with the recognition process by providing additional information, guidance, and support to the appropriate approval authority, as required.

(U) The USAFRICOM J3 will coordinate with the staff and components to track and ensure the force protection deficiencies highlighted by this finding are corrected.

**INVESTIGATION QUESTION #5 (ASSESS DELAYS TO FORCE PROTECTION IMPROVEMENTS AND IMPACTS)**

(U) Delays to planned force protection improvements did not significantly contribute to the conditions leading to the attack and its effects. Existing force protection projects for the airfield would not have been completed in time to effect the outcome of the attack. Evidence suggests that even if all of the projects and vegetation removal had been performed before 5 January, the AS element would still have been successful.

**DISCUSSION**

(U) In November 2017 the base leadership identified, programmed, and submitted an airfield fence project. In March 2018, the project was identified as critical and was elevated to the AFAF top priority. In April 2018, the project was funded and the design was projected to be completed January 2020 with a construction contract award date estimated in June 2020. The estimated build time was 1.5 years once work began.

(U) The Manda Bay Expedient Airfield Perimeter project (which included the installation of an 11,000ft concertina wire airfield fence) was conceived as an intermediate perimeter solution while the formal fence project was being contracted and built. This project initiated prior to December 2019, but was not projected to begin construction until January 2020. In December 2019, 35 thousand feet of concertina wire had been purchased for the project. As of 8 January 2020, engineers were assessing the airfield for the fence installation.

(U) A vegetation clearance project was completed in early fall of 2019. Unfortunately, the contract did not cover routine maintenance and much of the vegetation regrew over the next few months leading up to the attack. The evidence demonstrates that the thick vegetation surrounding the airfield made it impossible for CSL Manda Bay personnel to see the attackers.

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**RECOMMENDATION.** (U) None.

**APPOINTING AUTHORITY COMMENTS & DIRECTED ACTION.**

(U) **The Findings to Question #5 are approved with comment. Bottom Line Up Front:** We teach our leaders to have a plan to “improve your foxhole every day”—even if just a little bit. We should never be satisfied with the status quo when it comes to protecting our troops. Though it may be true there were no “major delays” to planned force protection improvements, I find the planning, approval and execution timelines for requested projects were unacceptably long—and still are—especially for essential force protection builds. Even accounting for a poorly understood threat, responsible leaders did not make full use of tactical resources readily available (e.g. sandbags, concertina wire, engineer pickets, HESCO bastions, concrete barriers and walls, etc.) to improve force protection quickly while waiting for more exquisite or permanent solutions.

(U) Since the attack, a triple-strand, concertina wire, anti-personnel barrier (combat fence) and a HESCO bastion wall have been completed around the airfield perimeter with construction continuing.

(U) The USAFRICOM J3, USAFRICOM J4, and Commander, AFAF thoroughly reviewed current manning and equipment levels in light of the requirement to defend the entire CSL, not just Camp Simba. AFAF has also submitted requests to deploy additional U.S. personnel via the USAFRICOM J3.

(U) AFAF and CJTF-HOA coordinated with the USAFRICOM J5 and the Senior Defense Official / Defense Attaché in Kenya for Kenyan armed forces to augment security for the entire CSL, including the airfield.

(U) The USAFRICOM J3, USAFRICOM J4, and Commander, AFAF will work to increase the speed of processing and execution of future force protection enhancements—even when locally contracted—and use tactical/expedient measures as an interim solution.

(U) USAFRICOM component commanders will instruct their subordinate leaders to use the tactical/expedient resources readily available (e.g., sandbags, concertina wire, HESCO bastions, concrete barriers and walls, etc.) to improve force protection quickly while waiting for more exquisite or permanent solutions.

**INVESTIGATION QUESTION #6 (ASSESS MEDICAL CARE, EVACUATION, CONTINGENCIES)**

(U) Camp Simba has a Role 1 Medical Treatment Facility. Camp Simba also benefits from additional medical personnel who belong to tenant units living on Camp Simba. These additional assets were critical to the treatment and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) of the wounded during the attack. Contingency plans for CASEVAC are insufficient if Magagoni airfield is not available.

**APPOINTING AUTHORITY COMMENTS & DIRECTED ACTION.** (U) **The Findings to Question #6 are approved with comment.**

(U) Primary, alternate, contingency, emergency or “PACE” plans are essential in geographically isolated bases. Though medical treatment was sufficient during and after the attack, the findings prompted USAFRICOM to review medical support and contingency CASEVAC plans for CSL Manda Bay and other bases in Africa.



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(U) AFAF, in coordination with the USAFRICOM J3, J4, and Surgeon will develop CASEVAC branch plans.

(U) Component Commanders and USAFRICOM staff will review all IDPs to ensure they have "PACE" plans (primary, alternate, contingency, emergency) in place for medical treatment, CASEVAC, and receipt of reinforcing forces and supplies if the primary method is denied or out of service.

**INVESTIGATION QUESTION #7 (ASSESS PROCEDURES FOR RESPONSE, REPORTING, CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT)**

(U//FOUO) General base defense procedural measures in place during 5 January 2020 are annotated in the 475th Expeditionary Air Base Squadron (EABS) Integrated Defense Plan (IDP) and Air Force Policy Directive 31-1 and appear to have been followed. However, the 475th EABS IDP was inadequate. The IDP did not sufficiently address protection of air assets against an enemy ground force at the airfield. The closest contingency that was addressed in the IDP was the manning guidance during a FPCON Delta event and the "Ground Attack/Indirect Fire/Small Arms" Quick Reaction Checklist.

**DISCUSSION.** (U) The findings of question #7 explored the initial defensive response, the follow-up counteractions, reporting at multiple levels and consequence management actions such as casualty treatment and evacuation, re-establishment of airfield operations and reception of reinforcements.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (U) Addressed in answer to Question #11, pages 8-13.

**APPOINTING AUTHORITY COMMENTS & DIRECTED ACTION.** (U) The Findings to Question #7 are approved without comment.

**INVESTIGATION QUESTION #8 (DOCUMENT AND ASSESS THE MISSION COMMAND STRUCTURE)**

(U//FOUO) There was no overarching friction with the mission command structure and command and control in place at CSL Manda Bay and the CJOA is sufficient for steady state operations, but the size and complexity of the 5 January 2020 attack significantly stressed elements of those mission command and command and control structures. The 475th EABS was overwhelmed because the attack response required participation from nearly all its tenant organizations, which were not directly tied to their command and control structure. The mission command structure at CJTF-HOA was not overwhelmed because it consolidated reporting and asset support from Special Operations Task Force-East Africa (SOTF-EA) and Joint Special Operations Air Component-Africa (JSOAC-A) and it was able to leverage additional organic assets to help respond to the attack (i.e. East Africa Response Force (EARF), CASEVAC assets). However, CJTF-HOA's ability to quickly ascertain the air picture at CSL Manda Bay and coordinate for additional CASEVAC assets was slightly complicated by the mission command structures in place that controlled air assets. The friction was based on the CJTF-HOA air operations not having complete awareness of other airframes in the vicinity. The CJTF-HOA J32 <sup>(b)(3)/(b)(6)</sup> stated that "there was no single air picture; they had no idea what aircraft at CSL Manda Bay were on the airfield or what was (flying) in the air." The J32 only knew about CJTF-HOA aircraft, and had no situational awareness of the JSOAC-A or <sup>(b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(1) 1.4.a</sup> aircraft.

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**DISCUSSION.** (U) The findings of question #8 thoroughly reviewed the mission command structure at Manda Bay and found it to be adequate for day to day operations of the base but insufficiently clear for the demands of a major emergency. The findings identified points of friction that should be addressed.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (U) Addressed in answer to Question #11, pages 8-13.

**APPOINTING AUTHORITY COMMENTS & DIRECTED ACTION.** (U) The Findings to Question #8 are approved without comment.

**INVESTIGATION QUESTION #9 (ASSESS IMPACT OF ANY MISCONDUCT OR NEGLIGENCE)**

(U//FOUO) Loss of life or damage to property were not the direct result of misconduct or criminal negligence by any U.S. personnel. No single point of failure resulted in the loss of life and damage to property at CSL Manda Bay. Loss of life and damage to property were not the result of criminal negligence by leaders. However, failures and inactions by leaders at the 475th EABS and lack of oversight by commanders and staff officers at CJTF-HOA, 449th Air Expeditionary Group (AEG), the 435th Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW), AFAF, and USAFRICOM did contribute to the loss of three lives and damage to property in excess of \$90 million dollars. In fact, the approach to force protection at CSL Manda Bay was characterized by a general culture of complacency which permeated every echelon and existed for several years. (Exhibit 1: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 2: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 13: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) Exhibit 15: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)).

**DISCUSSION.** (U) None.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (U) Addressed in Questions #11 and #12, pages 8-15.

**APPOINTING AUTHORITY COMMENTS & DIRECTED ACTION.** (U) The Findings to Question #9 are approved. See comments and directed actions at Questions #11 and #12.

**INVESTIGATION QUESTION #10 (IDENTIFY MEASURES TO PREVENT OR MITIGATE THE ATTACK)**

(U) There were several measures that could have prevented this attack by AS. The measures are related to leadership, security force readiness and force protection plans, intelligence sharing, and structured processes to evaluate and control adjustments to posture locations, as well as assets that are placed at those locations.

**DISCUSSION.** (U) Addressed in answer to Question #11, pages 8-13.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (U) Addressed in answer to Question #11, pages 8-13.

**APPOINTING AUTHORITY COMMENTS & DIRECTED ACTION.** (U) The Findings to Question #10 are approved without comment. See comments and directed actions at Question #11.



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**INVESTIGATION QUESTION #11 (RECOMMEND PROCEDURAL AND MISSION COMMAND CHANGES)**

**MAJOR FINDING 1 – FORCE PROTECTION FOCUS**

(U//FOUO) From 2004 until 2016, CSL Manda Bay’s airfield was not a full-time operational airfield. In 2016, CSL Manda Bay became a full-time operational airfield with up to 11 aircraft operating there; yet for the next four years the force protection measures never adjusted to the air operation’s new tempo. Since then, every successive leader that visited CSL Manda Bay, or who had responsibility for the force protection of it, contributed to the successful 5 January terrorist attack by tolerating an overall sense of complacency. This negatively impacted force protection and allowed an acceptance of the status quo.

(U//FOUO) On 5 January 2020, the Commander of the 475th EABS and the 475th BDF did not enforce a force protection (FP) mindset commensurate with a Force Protection Condition-Charlie (FPCON-C) country.

(U//FOUO) Commanders of the 435th AEW and the 449th AEG did not provide the adequate oversight of the tactical leaders to ensure there was an adequate force protection of the airfield. Although the 435th AEW Commander ordered the 475th EABS and 449th AEG to have concertina wire around the airfield no later than 31 January 2020, the wire had not been purchased when the attack occurred on 5 January.

**DISCUSSION.** (U) None.

**RECOMMENDATION #1** (U) Leaders at all levels must ensure there is an adequate Integrated Defense Plan (IDP) for all posture locations, a designated base defense commander with tactical control (TACON) of all tenant units, an effective Base Cluster Operations Center, and sufficient protective/fighting positions.

**APPOINTING AUTHORITY COMMENTS & DIRECTED ACTION.**

(U) **Major Finding 1 and recommendation are approved with comment.** I specifically find that three factors contributed to the successful Al Shabaab attack on CSL Manda Bay: inadequate leadership focus on potential threats and force protection by the leaders responsible for CSL Manda Bay – especially for Magagoni airfield; inadequate tactical level command and control; and insufficient operational level leader oversight. In addition to the corrective actions already documented in my comments and actions directed at Question #4, and Major Finding 4 below regarding tactical level command and control and operational level leaders oversight, I further direct:

(U) Commander, AFAF will review this finding and continue to emplace appropriate measures to improve the organization, equipping, preparation, focus, resourcing, and supervision of future Expeditionary Air Base Defenders, base defense units, and their base defense plans.

(U) As other USAFRICOM components also have force protection and base operating support-integrator (BOS-I) responsibilities for other locations in Africa, the Commanders of U.S. Naval Forces Africa (NAVAF), U.S. Army Forces Africa, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa (MARFORAF), AFAF, SOCAF, and CJTF-HOA will also review the investigation for applicable lessons and adjust their pre-deployment preparation and training, force posture and operations accordingly.

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(U) I direct quarterly reviews of force protection posture at each contingency location by the appropriate base/senior commander responsible for those locations. Selected quarterly reviews will be briefed to myself or the USAFRICOM Deputy Commander as part of Campaign Synchronization Boards or a similar venue.

**MAJOR FINDING 2 – UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT**

(U//FOUO) It is discernible in hindsight that improved intelligence sharing of the enemy's intentions and greater scrutiny of the December 2019 (b)(1) 1.4c, (b)(1) 1.7e report may have inspired increased force protection measures at the CSL (Manda Bay). There was a (b)(1) 1.4c, (b)(1) 1.7e (b)(1) 1.4c, (b)(1) 1.7e Yet) (t)he base had never been attacked in any manner in its sixteen years of existence. Personnel stationed at CSL Manda Bay frequented the off-post village, the pier, and the beach repeatedly for years without incident. There was nothing in the (b)(1) 1.4c, (b)(1) 1.7e that changed this reality. Yet, intelligence sharing was hindered by the absence of the Intelligence (or Antiterrorism Analyst) Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) from the EABS staff (Exhibit 43). After 25 December 2019, no one internal to the EABS was analyzing intelligence focused on CSL Manda Bay's force protection and the 475th EABS Commander did not request a replacement. So, although a factor (intel sharing) that needs improvement, the (b)(1) 1.4c, (b)(1) 1.7e threat information available to leaders (at CSL Manda Bay) was not compelling enough to overcome the false sense of security and complacency at CSL Manda Bay.

**RECOMMENDATIONS #2-5.**

(U) (2) That the AFAF EABS always has both an Intel Officer and Intelligence NCO with proper access to systems to enable intelligence awareness and fusion at the lowest level. These Intelligence Points of Contact (POCs) should hold a weekly Threat Working Group and report the status to the Contingency Location (CL)/CSL commander and collaborate with the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT) monthly.

(U) (3) Improve CL/CSL vetting for local employees; USAFRICOM standardize vetting for all CL/CSL locations.

(U) (4) USAFRICOM J2 and CJTF-HOA J2 create and share a long-term intelligence picture that educates all new organizations at CL/CSLs; this mitigates intelligence gaps that result from six month or year-long deployment in the CJOA.

(U) (5) Recommend (USAFRICOM or Component) Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Division (J2X) representative perform bi-annual mandatory site visits for all CL/CSLs.

**APPOINTING AUTHORITY COMMENTS & DIRECTED ACTION.**

(U) **Major Finding 2 and recommendations are approved *with modification*.** I specifically find that the leaders responsible for CSL Manda Bay, at all levels, had an inadequate and flawed threat picture that directly contributed to the successful Al Shabaab attack on 5 January 2020. These leaders, and their predecessors, were clearly lulled by the benign threat history and assessments of Manda Bay.

Enclosure: Consolidated Summary of Approved Findings, Recommendations and Action, 31 December 2020

(U) I also find that while ineffective intelligence resourcing, analysis, dissemination, and sharing were present, these elements did not contribute to the successful attack. Nevertheless, I have directed corrective actions to remedy these flaws.

(U) In the immediate aftermath of the attack, and before the investigation was even started, leaders responsible for CSL Manda Bay initiated many corrective actions including:

- Increased integration and information sharing between the various units at CSL Manda Bay.
- USAFRICOM J2 produces and pushes new, improved graphic threat reports to components.
- Intel warnings disseminated in “push” style to units in and near the potentially affected area.

(U) Where commanders or units lack organic or adequate intelligence support, intelligence personnel at higher headquarters must fill that role for them. Even with adequate support, in the end, every commander is their own intelligence officer—commanders must apply their own judgment when weighing intelligence reports.

(U) Duty to Warn. All tenant intelligence elements that receive reports or gather information related to threats or protection of the base will directly share that information with the commander and intelligence element charged with force protection—even if they operate in different reporting or command channels.

(U) Ensure the AFAF EABS always has appropriate Intel staffing and leaders with proper access to systems to enable intelligence awareness and fusion at the lowest level. These Intel leaders should hold a recurring Threat Working Group, including tenant units, providing an update to local commanders, and collaborate with the SDO/DATT on a regular basis.

(U) Commander, AFAF, supported by USAFRICOM J2, will ensure these recommendations are fully implemented at CSL Manda Bay.

(U) USAFRICOM and Component Antiterrorism/Force Protection and intelligence/counter-intel staffs will:

- Improve access vetting for local employees; USAFRICOM will improve standardization of vetting procedures for all CL/CSL locations.
- Perform more frequent site visits for all CL/CSLs, produce detailed assessments and add to USAFRICOM J2’s longitudinal understanding of threats in the area.

(U) All USAFRICOM component commanders will ensure these recommendations are actioned across the Area of Responsibility (AOR).

### **MAJOR FINDING 3 – SECURITY FORCE PREPARATION**

(U//FOUO) Security Force training and the readiness at CSL Manda Bay was grossly deficient and significantly contributed to the successful AS attack. Although the Security Forces possessed the proper equipment to perform their mission, the pre-deployment training for USAF Security Force personnel did not include collective level training or a mission rehearsal exercise to ensure the force was adequately prepared to provide FP of the CSL. The Security Forces also lacked offensive maneuver training and weapons qualifications at night. Overall, the Security Forces lacked basic tactical fundamentals for defending the terrain surrounding CSL Manda Bay.

Enclosure: Consolidated Summary of Approved Findings, Recommendations and Action, 31 December 2020

**RECOMMENDATIONS #6-7.**

(U//FOUO) (6) Recommend that USAFRICOM require the Service Component Commands to perform pre-deployment training that includes a full mission profile training event against an opposing force in both day and night conditions. Training should be tailored to the future environment, to include weapon qualifications in day and night conditions.

(U//FOUO) (7) Recommend AFAF change the Security Forces pre-deployment training, currently called "Tier Training." This new training concept should include this attack as a vignette for all future Security Force pre-deployment training.

**APPOINTING AUTHORITY COMMENTS & DIRECTED ACTION.**

(U) **Major Finding 3 and recommendations are approved with modification.** I do not find that security force (SECFOR) training was "grossly deficient" though it was clearly inadequate to the actual threat. Instead, I find the SECFOR organization, preparation, training, and defensive plans was more or less in line with the flawed common understanding of the real enemy threat at Manda Bay highlighted above, and therefore contributed to the successful attack.

(U) I concur that SECFOR organization and training for Manda Bay, prior to 5 January, did not provide the preparation that U.S. service members should be given to conduct confident and dominant security operations against Al Shabaab or other African terrorist groups. Specific improvements to SECFOR pre-deployment preparation already in place or under review for possible adoption include:

- Task organize for the mission and threat. Ensure key base defense capabilities (i.e., optics, crew-served weapons, communications) match the potential threat and are provided regardless of deploying unit's Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE).

- Deploy trained, confident and cohesive teams.

- If deploying ad hoc units, provide time and focused training to build unit cohesion.

- Improve individual training to increase troop confidence in own combat skills and in teammates.

- Provide collective training against the toughest threat (defend/attack vs. guard/law enforcement).

- Culminate collective training with a "mission rehearsal exercise" against a challenging Opposition

Force (OPFOR).

- Ensure unit/base commanders and key leaders have requisite qualifications and experience.

(U) USAFRICOM J3 will ensure that theater entry requirements for installation/base security forces defer to the services, components or other force providers to determine pre-deployment preparation and readiness but will also articulate the potential threat to guide their SECFOR preparation (i.e., combined arms, complex attacks by X-sized units including indirect fire, Improvised Explosive Devices and/or Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices under conditions of limited visibility).

(U) USAFRICOM Service Component Commands will ensure these lessons learned are applied at all forward operating locations in Africa, regardless of the Service responsible for force protection and BOS-I and use this event as a training vignette to orient/develop future SECFOR leaders.



Enclosure: Consolidated Summary of Approved Findings, Recommendations and Action, 31 December 2020

(U) Recommend the U.S. Air Force evaluate institutional preparation of deploying security forces. Previous model featured collective training of deploying expeditionary units at regional training centers.

**MAJOR FINDING 4 – MISSION COMMAND**

(U//FOUO) The purpose of CSL Manda Bay was not clearly understood. The fact that CSL Manda Bay was both a full-time airfield and a Life Support Area (LSA) was not apparent to all. The 475th EABS Commander was unclear as to why (b)(3)/(b)(6) unit was not protecting the aircraft on the airfield. Nor did the next echelon of commanders (435th AEW and 449th AEG) make it clear that the 475th EABS should be protecting (both) the airfield and the LSA. Force protection experts from AFAF did not know who was responsible for protecting critical assets at the airfield and incorrectly believed it was the host nation's responsibility to protect the airfield.

(U//FOUO) USAFRICOM lacked a process to control the placement of critical assets into a location before FP measures were in place. This allowed a diverse group of units (CJTF-HOA, JSOAC-A as part of SOCAF, and (b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(1) 1.4.a as part of USSOCOM) to place critical assets in locations that did not have sufficient FP measures. The Commanders of those three organizations failed to ensure there was proper security for their respective air assets on the airfield.

**DISCUSSION.** (U) None.

**RECOMMENDATIONS #8-12.**

(U) (8) Recommend that USAFRICOM improve its process to control mission creep and asset introduction, provide and communicate the clear purpose of all posture locations, and ensure proper force protection measures at all posture locations.

(U) (9) Recommend USAFRICOM require that the Service Component Commands improve their contract oversight (to include USSOCOM). Security requirements with contract operated assets should not be difficult to discern, but openly defined in an order.

(U) (10) Recommend USAFRICOM and CJTF-HOA ensure there is a single air common operating picture in the CJOA, which would include that a "Rated Officer" is assigned to any airfield operating full-time.

(U) (11) Recommend AFAF designate CSL Manda Bay as a Protection Level 3 posture location (in accordance with AFI 31-101 dated 6 July 2017, page one). This would validate proper resources like fences, sensors, cameras, lights, towers, and adequate vegetation removal when applicable.

(U//FOUO) (12) Recommend USAFRICOM enforce the use of the Expeditionary Risk Management Tool. All CL/CSLs should be required to evaluate airfield and aircraft as critical assets to determine appropriate security in accordance with the Mission Assurance process. This would ensure active airfields get added to the Task Critical Asset List in the AOR.

Enclosure: Consolidated Summary of Approved Findings, Recommendations and Action, 31 December 2020

**APPOINTING AUTHORITY COMMENTS & DIRECTED ACTION.**

(U) **Major Finding 4 and recommendations are approved *with modification*.** I specifically find that flawed operational level processes failed to account for the growth of CSL Manda Bay and the corresponding change in mission, ultimately contributing to the successful Al Shabaab attack. Accordingly, I direct the following:

(U) USAFRICOM Chief of Staff and J3 will codify in staff procedures the process by which the command ensures ALL pre-conditions, not just appropriate force protection, are met before deploying troops or key capabilities to any location on the continent. Exceptions to accepted pre-conditions will be approved by commanders.

(U) All commands operating in Africa will improve their contract oversight. Security requirements with contract solutions must follow the approval procedures in U.S. Africa Command Instructions 3203.02 and 3203.13.

(U) USAFRICOM, AFAF, SOCAF and CJTF-HOA will work together to develop an improved common air operating picture in Africa—at least regionally. Commanders responsible for providing Senior Airfield Authority responsibilities will assign or coordinate for a leader with the appropriate qualifications.

(U) AFAF will determine the appropriate Protection Level posture at Manda Bay in accordance with applicable service, USAFRICOM and AFAF regulations, instructions and orders, and ensure proper resourcing.

(U) Chief of Staff, USAFRICOM will direct the USAFRICOM staff to implement the applicable recommendations, as modified.

(U) USAFRICOM J3 will direct J34 Force Protection Division to review and revise the force protection inspection checklist to incorporate the lessons learned in this investigation.

(U) Furthermore, while I also find that poor tactical level unit of command was present, I determined it did not contribute to the successful attack. Nevertheless, I have directed corrective actions for the entire AOR.

(U) Unity of Command is timeless principle of war but was not institutionalized at Manda Bay on 5 January. In modern military operations, it is common for units with varied missions and command structures to live together on expeditionary bases. However, what should not be overlooked, or left to chance, is the unity of command necessary to respond effectively during a threat to the base or other crisis involving multiple tenant units. This command structure should not be “ad hoc,” developed “on the fly,” or agreed to once in contact with the enemy. This dilemma is effectively addressed with command arrangements that establish unity of command for force protection and crisis response. One way to do this is with an order that establishes a single “senior commander” with tactical control (TACON) of tenant units for base force protection and crisis response. This may be the installation/base commander or some other suitable, designated commander. Thus, for day to day operations, the various tenant units execute their missions under their various chains of command. But for force protection or crisis response on the base at which they reside, they report to and take direction from the designated commander. **USAFRICOM has directed this unity of command provision across all U.S. military locations across the African continent.**

Enclosure: Consolidated Summary of Approved Findings, Recommendations and Action, 31 December 2020

(U) For all USAFRICOM components. For each installation/base where they have BOS-I responsibility, component commanders will appoint or ensure a single "senior commander" with TACON for force protection and crisis response and all tenant units will comply. At a minimum, tenant units must understand who they respond to when the base is under attack or the senior commander declares a crisis. This C2 structure should be exercised regularly and especially as units rotate in and out of the base. Further, all intelligence entities who receive reports or gather information related to threats to or protection of the base will share that information with the senior commander and intelligence leaders.

**INVESTIGATION QUESTION #12 (RECOGNITION AND ACCOUNTABILITY)**

(U) Loss of life and damage to property were not the direct result of misconduct or criminal negligence by any single U.S. person. No single point of failure resulted in the loss of life and damage to property at CSL Manda Bay. Loss of life and damage to property were not the result of criminal negligence by leaders. In fact, the approach to force protection at CSL Manda Bay was characterized by a general culture of complacency which permeated every echelon and existed for several years. (Exhibit 1: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 2: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 13: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 15: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)).

**DISCUSSION.** (U//FOUO) The investigation documents evidence of some valorous conduct, as well as potential performance failures during the 5 January 2020 attack. These failures did not directly result in loss of life or loss of property, but indicate indiscipline and may warrant correction.

**RECOMMENDATIONS: #1-3.**

(U//FOUO) (1) Recommend AFAP take appropriate action with the A4 and commanders of the 435th AEW and the 449th AEG for providing insufficient leader oversight of subordinate units to ensure adequate force protection of the airfield. The insufficient leader oversight contributed to the US loss of life and loss of over \$90M in US government property at CSL Manda Bay.

(U//FOUO) (2) Recommend AFAP take appropriate action for the inept leadership of the commander of the 475th EABS and the commander of the 475th BDF for their inability to properly secure the Airfield with the same vigor as Camp Simba. The ineptitude of these leaders contributed to the U.S. loss of life and loss of over \$90M in U.S. government property at CSL Manda Bay.

(U//FOUO) (3) In addition to the leadership and oversight shortfalls outlined above, the investigation produced evidence of some potential performance failures at the tactical level during the 5 January 2020 attack. These failures did not directly result in loss of life or loss of property, but indicate indiscipline and may warrant correction. Recommend AFAP conduct further inquiry into the actions of the airmen at Tower #10 and why they failed to engage the enemy with a crew served weapon; and inquire into the actions of the TSgt who was the Assistant Flight Chief (equivalent to the Guard Shift Assistant NCOIC), at the base of the tower when the attack commenced and whether (b)(3) abandoned (b)(3) Airmen at their post. (Exhibit 40: 475th EABS BDF After Action Review and Exhibit 39: 475th EABS BDF Blotter from 5 JAN 20).

Enclosure: Consolidated Summary of Approved Findings, Recommendations and Action, 31 December 2020

**APPOINTING AUTHORITY COMMENTS & DIRECTED ACTION.**

(U) **The Findings to Question #12 are approved with comment/modification.**

(U) I agree that the loss of life and damage to property does not hinge on any single person or point of failure. That said, a determined and ruthless enemy observed, discerned and attacked our insufficient security posture at Manda Bay. This posture developed and existed over time due to complacency combined with the systemic and prolonged failure to see the threat for what it really was and to holistically assess the force protection requirements for the entire CSL as its mission evolved. **We must not allow this to happen again.**

I concur that the investigation documents individual conduct that may warrant recognition as well as individual conduct that may warrant accountability actions. Commanders, AFAF and SOCAF will review to determine recognition and accountability they deem appropriate.

(U) Since the attack, USAFRICOM and AFAF have already implemented a pre-conditions review process which was used to ensure proper conditions were set for the return of high value assets to CSL Manda Bay. USAFRICOM Chief of Staff will ensure this process has been institutionalized in our routine staff functions to ensure that force protection and all other pre-conditions are appropriate and in place.

(U) In concert with USSOCOM, USAFRICOM will ensure subordinate units / agencies also implement a pre-conditions review process to ensure all proper conditions (including force protection) are established prior to positioning high value assets and personnel in the future.

(U) Commander, U.S. Air Forces Africa. Based on these findings, develop training vignettes for unit and leader development so we take positive action to avoid a similar incident in the future.

(U) Commanders of Special Operations Command Africa, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, U.S. Naval Forces Africa, U.S. Army Forces Africa, and U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa. Take appropriate action on the approved recommendations pertaining to your respective headquarters and apply them AOR wide. Apply the vignettes we will develop from these findings to unit and leader development so we take positive action to avoid a similar incident in the future.

(U) A complete copy of the investigation report and all exhibits and enclosures shall be provided to the Commanders of AFAF, SOCAF, and USSOCOM for their review and appropriate action. Copies will also be provided to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps for any actions they deem appropriate.



20 January 2022

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Addendum to Executive Summary and Action on Findings, Army Regulation (15-6) Investigation into the Attack on Cooperative Security Location (CSL) Manda Bay, Kenya on 5 January 2020

## 1. References:

a. AR 15-6 Investigation into the Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the Attack on CSL Manda Bay, Kenya on 5 January 2020, dated 29 December 2020 (S//NF)

b. Executive Summary and Action on Findings, Army Regulation (15-6) Investigation into the Attack on Cooperative Security Location (CSL) Manda Bay, Kenya on 5 January 2020 (CUI)


2. In preparation for this briefing, I conducted another review of the investigation I approved on 31 December 2020. This memorandum serves to clarify an issue that I discovered in the course of that review.

3. The AR 15-6 findings state in paragraph 12.c. that concertina wire had been purchased in December 2019 as an intermediate solution pending the completion of the formal fence project. This finding is consistent with (b)(3) (b)(6) witness statement. Later in the report at paragraph 18.a.(2) there is a contradictory finding which states, "the wire had not been purchased when the attack occurred on 5 January." This finding is consistent with (b)(3) (b)(6) witness statement.

4. I approved both of these findings without accounting for the inconsistency. The inconsistency of this fact, or any fact, should not have occurred. We have a thorough review process in place, yet these two contradictory statements made it into the final report. What remains clear is that the concertina wire fence was not installed prior to the attack on 5 January 2020. Additionally, the investigating officer's conclusion that the fence project would have only been useful in keeping wildlife off of the Airfield and would not have prevented the attack remains valid.

5. Therefore, I change my findings in the third paragraph under Question #5 on page 4 and the third paragraph under Question #11 on page 8 to read: The 435th AEW Commander ordered the 475th EABS and 449th AEG to have concertina wire around the airfield no later than 31 January 2020. The concertina wire had been purchased or was in the process of being purchased shortly before the attack but it had not been installed prior to 5 January 2020.

6. The point of contact for this memorandum is the Legal Counsel, USAFRICOM.



STEPHEN J. TOWNSEND  
General, U.S. Army  
Commander, U.S. Africa Command

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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER  
UNIT 29951  
APO AE 09751-9951

13 January 2021

MEMORANDUM THRU THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: (U) Letter of Transmittal for Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation: 5 January 2020  
Complex Attack on Cooperative Security Location Manda Bay, Kenya

1. (U) Attached is U.S. Africa Command's (USAFRICOM) completed investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the complex attack on Cooperative Security Location (CSL) Manda Bay, Kenya on 5 January 2020. I request you forward this report to the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and to U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) for consideration and action as deemed appropriate.
2. (U) We convey our deepest condolences to the families of Specialist Henry Mayfield, Jr., Mr. Dustin Harrison, and Mr. Bruce Triplett, as well as our wishes for the full recovery of (b)(3)/(b)(6) and (b)(3)/(b)(6). Additionally, I want to recognize the individual valor and bravery displayed by the U.S. Marines, U.S. Airmen, and their partners in the Kenyan Defense Forces during the events of 5 January 2020.
3. (U) The attached report is a comprehensive review of Al Shabaab's complex attack on CSL Manda Bay. The investigating officer, a combat experienced (b)(3)/(b)(6) led a diverse, joint-service team of subject matter experts from across the USAFRICOM Headquarters and Service components to gather evidence, conduct interviews, and evaluate the circumstances surrounding the attack. The enclosed findings and recommendations reflect USAFRICOM's assessment of the causal and contributing factors of this incident, which include organizational, intelligence, operational, and command and control issues, and how USAFRICOM will address them so that USAFRICOM and its component commands can better operate to accomplish our mission while protecting our force anywhere in Africa.
4. (U) The proximate cause of the death of three U.S. citizens, injuries to three other U.S. citizens, and the loss of over \$90 million worth of U.S. aircraft and property was the attack by a massed force of 30 to 40 determined, disciplined, and well-resourced Al Shabaab fighters. No single point of failure resulted in the loss of life and damage to property at CSL Manda Bay. No one act, or omission, would have avoided the attack. Rather, the following four broad factors contributed to the success of the 5 January 2020 attack:
  - a. (U) Force protection focus. Inadequate leadership focus on potential threats and force protection, inadequate command and control (C2) at the tactical level (base defense flight and squadron) and insufficient oversight from operational leaders (group, wing, as well as component and combatant command staff levels).
  - b. (U) Understanding the threat. Inadequate threat picture at all levels based on ineffective intelligence resourcing, analysis, dissemination and sharing.

Classified by: General Stephen J. Townsend, Commander, U.S. Africa Command  
Derived from: Multiple Sources  
Declassify on: 20460113

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**UNCLASSIFIED IF SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS**

SUBJECT: (U) Letter of Transmittal for Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation: 5 January 2020 Complex Attack on Cooperative Security Location Manda Bay, Kenya

c. (U) Security force preparation. Security Force organization, preparation, training and defensive plans were inadequate to counter the threat.

d. (U) Mission command. Poor unity of command at the tactical level (base defense flight and squadron). At the operational level (group, wing, as well as component and combatant command staff levels) flawed oversight processes failed to account for the growth of CSL Manda Bay from a small Special Operations Forces training base to a forward counter-terrorism support base hosting multiple aircraft.

5. (U) The investigation also documents how decisive actions by U.S. forces and Kenyan Defense Forces drove Al Shabaab from the CSL and enabled the arrival of the East Africa Response Force (EARF) later that evening.

6. (U) After the events of 5 January 2020, we immediately addressed the force protection deficiencies by first deploying the EARF to reinforce the CSL against further attacks. We then subsequently increased physical security through a series of upgrades that included the installation of fencing, barriers, barricades, and bunkers, vegetation clearance to improve fields of observation and fire, as well as upgraded technology such as cameras, sensors, biometrics, and voice system. We also addressed several organizational deficiencies by improving command and control by designating a single commander for force protection and crisis response at each CSL or contingency location in Africa. In addition, we have taken steps to streamline the intelligence architecture and information sharing procedures to ensure that commanders have the necessary threat information to adjust force protection posture as needed. Furthermore, we have implemented a pre-conditions review process which was used to ensure proper conditions were set for the return of high value assets to CSL Manda Bay. Despite this progress, many of the shortcomings require further action that USAFRICOM, USSOCOM, U.S. Air Forces Africa (AFAFRICA) and Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA), and other service components are already addressing.

7. (U) Moreover, the investigation highlighted training deficiencies that will require examination by the USAF, and that may be applicable to the other services preparing forces to deploy to and operate in other austere locations globally. Specifically, I recommend that the USAF examine the current training model that was used to prepare the USAF Base Defenders deploying to Manda Bay in 2019, and compare it to their previous model that featured collective training of cohesive expeditionary units at regional training centers.

8. (U) Regarding the chain of command, the loss of life and damage to property were not the direct result of misconduct or criminal negligence by any U.S. personnel. With that said, a determined and cunning enemy observed, discerned, and attacked our insufficient security posture at Manda Bay. This posture developed and existed over an extended time due to complacency, the systemic and prolonged failure to see the threat for what it really was, and to holistically assess the force protection requirements for the entire CSL as its mission involved. Accordingly, I directed AFAFRICA and SOCAFRICA to review the investigation and exhibits to determine the recognition and accountability actions they deem appropriate. I recommend and request that you direct the USAF, Department of the Navy, and USSOCOM to do the same.

Classified by: General Stephen J. Townsend, Commander, U.S. Africa Command  
Derived from: Multiple Sources  
Declassify on: 20460113


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**UNCLASSIFIED IF SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS**

SUBJECT: (U) Letter of Transmittal for Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation: 5 January 2020 Complex Attack on Cooperative Security Location Manda Bay, Kenya

9. (U) In the enclosed approval memorandum, you will find the investigating officer's findings and recommendations. I have approved or modified these findings, and provided specific and detailed comments on many of the findings and recommendations warranting your review. The findings and recommendations, as modified and approved, address the critical questions and issues the investigation set out to resolve.

10. (U) While many positive corrective actions have already been completed, I intend to continue to take action on the findings within USAFRICOM's purview and request you forward this report, along with the approved findings and recommendations, to the USAF, USSOCOM, and the U.S. Marine Corps for their consideration and action as deemed appropriate.

11. (U) Although the entire report of investigation was intentionally written for public release, this report still contains material that is both unclassified and classified as Secret//No Foreign. USAFRICOM will continue to coordinate for necessary declassification and process the investigation for Freedom of Information Act and internal accessibility purposes. The point of contact for this memorandum is the Chief of Staff, U.S. Africa Command.



Stephen J. Townsend  
General, U.S. Army  
Commander

Enclosures:

1. (U) Approving Official's Endorsement
2. (U) Consolidated Summary of Approved Findings, Recommendations, & Action
3. (~~S//NOFORN~~) Findings and Recommendations for Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation
4. (U) Briefing Slides
5. (U) Draft Remedial Action Matrix

Classified by: General Stephen J. Townsend, Commander, U.S. Africa Command  
Derived from: Multiple Sources  
Declassify on: 20460113





**HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND  
UNIT 29951  
APO AE 09751-9951**

29 December 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR GEN STEPHEN J. TOWNSEND, U.S. ARMY, United States Africa Command,  
Commander, Kelley Barracks, Armed Forces, Europe, 09751

SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations for Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation

**1. (U) References.**

- a. (U) Memorandum of Appointment, dated 6 January 2020
- b. (U) Appointment of Assistant Investigating Officers, dated 15 January 2020
- c. (U) AR 15-6, Procedures for Administrative Investigations and Boards of Officers

**2. (U) Background.**

a. (U) On 6 January 2020 I was appointed as an investigating officer pursuant to AR 15-6. The purpose of the investigation is to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the 5 January 2020 attack on Cooperative Security Location (CSL) Manda Bay in Lamu County, Kenya.

b. (U) On 22 June 2020 I signed an initial version of this report. This updated version reflects changes to classification markings, the correction of the date of the NCIS-Kenya assessment listed in Table 2 on page 30, and the addition of several exhibits. This report also includes responses to additional questions I received on 5 October 2020. Some findings and recommendations have been revised to incorporate additional justification and provide greater clarity.

3. (U//~~FOUO~~) **Summary.** On 5 January 2020 at 0520 hours (East African Time Zone), an Al Shabaab (AS) element consisting of 30-40 personnel conducted a complex attack against U.S. forces located at CSL Manda Bay, Kenya. The attack resulted in three U.S. citizens killed in action (KIA), three U.S.



citizens wounded in action (WIA), and the destruction of U.S. government resources in value of over \$90 million. In its sixteen years of existence CSL Manda Bay has never been attacked. CSL Manda Bay encompasses both Camp Simba and Magagoni Airfield (herein after, the Airfield), which are two different geographic locations. Camp Simba is the fortified camp that houses all U.S. forces operating out of CSL Manda Bay. The Airfield is approximately one mile to the south and is where all U.S. air assets reside and operate. There were approximately 11 persistent aircraft operating from the Airfield since 2016.

a. (U) **Summary of the findings.** The proximate cause of the death of three U.S. citizens, injuries to three other U.S. citizens, and the loss of U.S. aircraft and property was the attack by a massed force of determined, disciplined, and well-resourced Al Shabaab fighters. No single point of failure resulted in the loss of life and damage to property at CSL Manda Bay. No one act, or omission, would have avoided the attack. Rather, the following four key factors contributed to the success of the 5 January 2020 attack:

i. (U) Force protection focus. Inadequate leadership focus on potential threats and force protection, inadequate command and control (C2) at the tactical level and insufficient oversight from operational leaders.

ii. (U) Understanding of threat. Inadequate threat picture at all levels based on ineffective intelligence resourcing, analysis, dissemination and sharing.

iii. (U) Security force preparation. Security Force organization, preparation, training and defensive plans were inadequate to counter the threat.

iv. (U) Mission command. Poor unity of command at the tactical level. At the operational level, flawed oversight processes failed to account for the growth of CSL Manda Bay from a small Special Operations Forces training base to a forward counter-terrorism support base hosting multiple aircraft.

#### 4. (U) **Personnel Losses.**

a. (U) **Specialist Henry “Mitch” Mayfield, Jr.** was 23 years old when he was killed in action performing his duties as a Landing Zone Safety Officer (LZSO). He was assigned to the 1-58<sup>th</sup> Aviation Battalion based out of Fort Rucker, Alabama and he was a 91C (Utilities Equipment Repairer).

b. (U) **Mr. Dustin Harrison** was a pilot killed in action while in support of Department of Defense (DoD) operations in East Africa.

c. (U) **Mr. Bruce Triplett** was killed in action while in support of DoD operations in east Africa.

5. (U) **Overview.** I commenced the investigation on 7 January 2020 in accordance with the Memorandum of Appointment. A small team was immediately assembled to assist in preparing for the investigation, made up of subject matter experts from the United States Air Force, Special Operations Command-Africa, United States Army Africa, and United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM). These individuals were officially appointed as assistant investigating officers on 15 January 20. This investigative report and all evidence were submitted for initial legal review on 9 March 2020. On 5 October 2020 I received additional questions and submitted a completed report for final legal review on 29 December 2020.

#### 6. (U) **Approach.**

a. (U) **Investigative Approach.** I traveled to Africa between 7-8 January 2020 to observe the Airfield and meet the personnel involved in the attack response. I did not gather evidence during that visit, but used it as a site survey. The investigating team utilized a five phase approach to conduct the investigation.

In Phase 1, the team gathered documents relevant to the incident, including emails, Operating Instructions, Standard Operating Procedures, contracts, and other authoritative documents. In Phase 2, the team analyzed the documents, established knowledge gaps, and determined key individuals involved in the events leading up to and during the incident that should be interviewed. In Phase 3, the team traveled to Djibouti and Manda Bay to conduct interviews with these key individuals and observe the damage done to CSL Manda Bay. In Phase 4, the team sought additional information as required to close any knowledge gaps. In Phase 5, the team formulated findings and recommended actions.

b. (U) **Scope of the Investigation.** I was instructed to answer the following twelve questions:

- (1) Gather all known facts and information to develop a comprehensive timeline of events.
- (2) Who was killed and injured during the attack by AS and how, if known – both friendly and enemy personnel?
- (3) What was the extent of the damage done to friendly facilities and aircraft at Manda Bay?
- (4) Assess the defensive plan and force protection measures at the base in place at the time of the attack and determine if they were reasonable and appropriate based on the threat information available to leaders at echelon prior to the attack.
- (5) Assess whether there were delays to any planned force protection improvements and, if so, did those delays contribute to the conditions leading to the attack and its effects.
- (6) What medical care was available to the injured personnel in the wake of the attack, to include medical evacuations?
- (7) Document the procedural measures in place at the time of the attack, to include who responded to the attack, the reporting to higher headquarters that an attack occurred, and the measures taken as consequence management after the attack.
- (8) Document the mission command structure; that is, the command and control in place at the time of the attack at Manda Bay and assess whether that structure caused undue friction or confusion in either defensive preparations or response.
- (9) Assess if any misconduct or negligence contributed to the loss of life or damage to property.
- (10) Were there measures that could have been taken to prevent or mitigate this attack by AS?
- (11) Provide recommendations for any procedural and / or mission command changes to prevent or mitigate the recurrence of this type of loss.
- (12) Include thorough analysis of whether the circumstances alleged are accurate and merit correction. You should also report whether any personnel should be recognized for their meritorious conduct, as well as held accountable for any shortcomings or failures.

The additional questions I received on 5 October 2020 are not listed here but are within the scope of the twelve questions above and are included as an enclosure to this investigation.

7. (U) **Key Terms.** The following terms are relevant to the investigation.

a. (U) Base Operations Support Integrator (BOS-I). The designated service component or joint task force (JTF) commander assigned to synchronize all support functions for a contingency base (Joint Publication (JP) 4-0). The responsibilities of the designated BOS-I commander include ensuring force protection.



b. (U) Cooperative Security Location (CSL). A facility located outside the United States and its territories with little or no permanent United States presence that is maintained by periodic Service, contractor, or host nation support. Cooperative security locations provide contingency access, logistics support, and rotational use by operating forces and are a focal point for security cooperation activities (Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (DoD Dictionary), JP 4-04).

c. (U) Command and Control (C2) and Mission Command (MC). JP 3-0 defines C2 as encompassing “the exercise of authority and direction by a commander over assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission”, and JP 3-31 defines MC as “the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders.” (JP 3-0, JP 3-31).

d. (U) Force Protection Responsibility and Force Protection Level- Charlie (FPCON-C). The Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishes the missions, responsibilities, and areas of responsibility (AOR) for Combatant Commanders. Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) are responsible for missions in their assigned AOR, to include maintaining the security of and carrying out the force protection responsibilities for the command and all US forces within the AOR. (Unified Command Plan of November 3, 2017, with Change-1 dated May 24, 2019). Pursuant to the UCP, USAFRICOM establishes the baseline FPCON for all countries in Africa based on threat assessments and input from each of the Component Commands. A country is declared FPCON-C when intelligence indicates direct or indirect terrorist attacks or hostile acts directed against DoD elements and personnel are occurring or are likely to occur within the commander’s area of interest, requiring additional FPCON measures. FPCON-C is the second highest level of protective posture.

e. (U) Posture Location (PL). A geographic locality identified by the geographic combatant commander (GCC), consisting of one or more sites, and utilized by USAFRICOM to enable strategic access, support security interests, and/or sustain operations and activities. Posture locations are categorized as enduring locations (defined by DoDI 3000.12, “Management of U.S. Global Defense Posture”), or as contingency locations (defined by Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.10, “Contingency Basing Outside the United States”).

f. (U) Senior Airfield Authority (SAA). An individual designated by the joint force commander to be responsible for the control, operation, and maintenance of an airfield to include the runways, associated taxiways, parking ramps, land, and facilities whose proximity directly affects airfield operations (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-17).

g. (U) Command Responsibility. The U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army both maintain policies that govern the responsibilities of the commander. Air Force Instruction 1-2 (AFI 1-2) and Army Regulation 600-20 (AR 600-20) both require commanders to take all necessary measures to safeguard the well-being of their subordinates at all times. (Exhibit 94: AR 600-20; Exhibit 95: AFI 1-2).

h. ~~(S)~~ Key organizations and staff related to CSL Manda Bay.

- (1) 475th Base Defense Flight (BDF)
- (2) 475th Expeditionary Air Base Squadron (EABS)
- (3) (b)(1) 1.4.a [REDACTED]
- (4) (b)(1) 1.4.a [REDACTED]
- (5) East Africa Response Force (EARF)
- (6) (b)(1) 1.4.a [REDACTED]
- (7) [REDACTED]
- (8) [REDACTED] - Africa)
- (9) 449th Air Expeditionary Group (AEG)
- (10) 435th Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW)



- (11) Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)
- (12) U.S. Air Forces Africa A4
- (13) United States Air Force Africa (AFAFRICA)
- (14) United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) (the staff process)
- (15) Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF)

8. (U) **Scope of the Investigation Question #1 (Gather all known facts and information to develop a comprehensive timeline of events).**

a. ~~(S)~~ On 5 January 2020, the following organizations were responsible for the missions being performed at CSL Manda Bay:



(1) USAFRICOM is responsible for all DOD missions on the African continent.


(2) CJTF-HOA was under the Operational Control (OPCON) of USAFRICOM and its Combined Joint Area of Operations (CJOA) included Kenya. At the time of the attack, CSL Manda Bay was in the CJTF-HOA AOR. On 5 January 2020, CJTF-HOA had OPCON of the East Africa Response Force (EARF) and air assets that performed Casualty Evacuation and Personnel Recovery (CPR). CJTF-HOA lost two Bell 412 helicopters and one PC-12 fixed wing aircraft in the attack. The estimated value of the CJTF-HOA assets destroyed in the attack is \$15 million.

(3) AFAF maintains OPCON of the 435th AEW, the 449th AEG, and the 475th EABS. Per USAFRICOM policy, AFAF is responsible for designating a General Officer responsible for Force Protection of posture locations on the continent secured by USAF personnel. (Exhibit 92: SRO MFR.)

i. The Senior Responsible Officer for Force Protection of CSL Manda Bay on 5 January 2020 was the AFAF A4, (b)(3)/(b)(6) (Exhibit 92: SRO Memorandum). In that capacity (b)(3)/(b)(6) was responsible for certifying that minimum force protection condition requirements were met at seven posture locations in Africa, including CSL Manda Bay. (b)(3)/(b)(6) delegated force protection issues to the A4S (Security Forces Division Chief), (b)(3)/(b)(6) and (b)(3)/(b)(6) the 435th AEW leadership team. (Exhibit 63: (b)(3)/(b)(6) Statement). (b)(3)/(b)(6) never visited CSL Manda Bay. (Exhibit 63: (b)(3)/(b)(6) Statement).

ii. At the time of the attack, the A4S was (b)(3)/(b)(6). Like (b)(3)/(b)(6) staff responsibilities were focused on several airfields throughout Europe and Africa. (b)(3)/(b)(6) never visited CSL Manda Bay in over two and a half years in (b)(3)/(b)(6) role as the A4S (Exhibit 80: (b)(3)/(b)(6) Statement).

★ Organization Structure of the 435<sup>th</sup> AEW (and 449<sup>th</sup> AEG and 475<sup>th</sup> EABS)



(4) At the time of the attack, the 435<sup>th</sup> AEW was commanded by (b)(3)/(b)(6). It was under the OPCON of AFAF and was responsible for oversight of the 475<sup>th</sup> EABS which provides BOS-I for CSL Manda Bay. (b)(3)/(b)(6) visited CSL Manda Bay on 30 August 2019.


(5) 449<sup>th</sup> AEG was commanded by a (b)(3)/(b)(6). The 449<sup>th</sup> AEG was under the OPCON of the 435<sup>th</sup> AEW and was responsible for the direct oversight of the 475<sup>th</sup> EABS. The 449<sup>th</sup> AEG commander was acting as the Senior Airfield Authority for CSL Manda Bay since there was not a rated officer (pilot) at CSL Manda Bay. (b)(3)/(b)(6) was responsible for the oversight of three squadrons commanded by O-5s in Africa. The 475<sup>th</sup> EABS was one of the three squadrons. (b)(3)/(b)(6) visited CSL Manda Bay frequently.

(6) At the time of the attack, the 475<sup>th</sup> EABS was commanded by (b)(3)/(b)(6). (b)(3)/(b)(6) The unit is under the OPCON of the 449<sup>th</sup> AEG and is assigned the BOS-I role for CSL Manda Bay. The 475<sup>th</sup> EABS Commander was responsible for the synchronization of all support functions, to include force protection, for the CSL.

i. The 475<sup>th</sup> EABS Senior Enlisted Leader was (b)(3)/(b)(6) and the First Sergeant was (b)(3)/(b)(6). Neither of them were involved in the oversight of the tactical employment of the security forces and they did not positively contribute to improving the CSL's force protection.

(7) At the time of the attack, the 475<sup>th</sup> EABS BDF was commanded by (b)(3)/(b)(6). The 475<sup>th</sup> EABS BDF was responsible for all tactical matters related to the base defense of CSL Manda Bay and was under the OPCON of the 475<sup>th</sup> EABS.





(8) Special Operations Task Force- East Africa (SOTF-EA) executes operations in Eastern Africa and has Tactical Control (TACON) of the Marine Special Operations Team (MSOT) at CSL Manda Bay. SOTF-EA is under the TACON of Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF).

i. The MSOT, also known as “Raiders”, is a tenant unit on CSL Manda Bay and has no direct responsibility for force protection of the CSL. On the day of the attack, the MSOT was commanded by (b)(3)/(b)(6).

(9) JSOAC-A provides oversight for (b)(1) 1.4.a on CSL Manda Bay. JSOAC-A is under the OPCON of SOCAF. On 5 January 2020 JSOAC-A was commanded by (b)(3)/(b)(6). (b)(3)/(b)(6) had responsibility for the protection of the organization’s assets. JSOAC-A had one CASA 212 destroyed in the attack, valued at \$3.5 million.

i. The Expeditionary Special Tactics Squadron (ESTS) is under the OPCON of the JSOAC-A and is a tenant unit on CSL Manda Bay. The ESTS had no direct responsibility for force protection of the CSL.

ii. The (b)(1) 1.4.a is under the OPCON of the JSOAC-A and is a tenant unit on CSL Manda Bay.

(10) (b)(1) 1.4.a are tenants on CSL Manda Bay. The (b)(1) 1.4.a Commander on 5 January was (b)(3)/(b)(6) who was responsible for ensuring the protection of the organization’s assets. (b)(1) 1.4.a had two aircraft destroyed in the attack, a B350 and a DHC-8 (De Havilland Canada, also known as a DASH-8). The aircraft and its equipment were valued at over \$60 million.

(11) Contractors from various companies provided services for CJTF-HOA, (b)(1) 1.4.a, and JSOAC-A on the Airfield at CSL Manda Bay.

(12) Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) had an adjacent compound to the Airfield at CSL Manda Bay and assisted in providing personnel to man the Entry Control Points at Camp Simba and the Airfield. The KDF also used the Airfield but did not have a formal force protection responsibility for the Airfield. (Exhibit 28: CSL Manda Bay Integrated Defense Plan).

b. (U) The 5 January 2020 attack took place in six phases:


(1) Phase I - Initial engagement by AS



- (2) Phase II – Marine Special Operations Team arrival and initial Kenyan and U.S. actions
- (3) Phase III - Consolidation and AS re-attack
- (4) Phase IV - Kenyan helicopter engagement and final airfield clearance
- (5) Phase V - Movement off the Airfield
- (6) Phase VI - Arrival of the EARF

c. (U) Phase I - Initial engagement by AS

(1) (U) At 0520 hours on 5 January 2020, members of AS conducted a complex attack on friendly forces at CSL Manda Bay, Kenya.<sup>1</sup> The attack commenced near simultaneously at Camp Simba the Airfield which is located (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b)(1) 1.7e of Camp Simba (see Figure 1 below).




**(U//FOUO) Figure 1 (Overhead view of CSL Manda Bay showing relation of the Airfield to Camp Simba; and the relation of the CSL to the water access.) Photo is unclassified when sanitized of any additional graphics/overlays.**

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<sup>1</sup> (U) The evidence indicates that approximately 30-40 enemy personnel were involved in the attack. There were 20-30 attackers on the airfield and approximately 10 individuals with an indirect fire element to the north of Camp Simba.

(2) (U) The attack consisted of a ground assault on the Airfield and resulted in three fatalities. At approximately 0521 hours, an indirect fire attack against Camp Simba took place. It was determined that ten rounds from an 82mm mortar impacted on Camp Simba causing no casualties. (See Figure 2). It is believed that the mortar attack was executed to inflict casualties on the occupants, and delay any U.S. forces reaction to the Airfield.



(U//FOUO) Figure 2 (Ten indirect fire points of impact and suspected point of origin on Camp Simba) Photo is unclassified when sanitized of any additional graphics/overlays.

(3) (U//FOUO) On the Airfield, approximately 20-30 AS personnel initiated their attack. It took (b)(3) 10 USC 130 total for AS to destroy seven aircraft<sup>2</sup>, five non-tactical vehicles, wound one U.S. contractor, and kill three U.S. personnel. At 0520 hours, SPC Henry Mayfield and (b)(3)(b)(6) were in a Toyota Hilux truck clearing the runway of animals and other hazards in preparation for the B350 aircraft to take off. Both individuals were wearing civilian clothes while they were performing their LZSO duties in accordance with the established standard for Sunday operations (Exhibit 2: Statement (b)(3)(b)(6)). While performing their sweep of the runway, (b)(3)(b)(6) identified some images in the vegetation on the east side of the runway using a handheld thermal scope. SPC Mayfield drove the truck to within 10-20 meters of the images. (b)(3)(b)(6) initially believed that the images (b)(3)(b)(6) saw were hyenas. When the LZSO vehicle turned to face the grass, (b)(3)(b)(6) leaned outside the left-side passenger window of the vehicle and looked through his handheld thermal scope to try and confirm the identity of the images. (b)(3)(b)(6) then realized (b)(3)(b)(6) was looking at three men kneeling with rifles pointed at the aircraft and the runway. The

<sup>2</sup> (U) Six of the seven aircraft were U.S. assets. The seventh aircraft was a Kenyan Cessna.



men immediately launched two RPGs at the LZSO vehicle from a range of 10-20 meters. The first RPG penetrated the front windshield, missing (b)(3)/(b)(6) by inches, and did not explode. The second RPG penetrated the driver's side door and detonated, instantly killing SPC Mayfield. (b)(3)/(b)(6) escaped from the vehicle before the second RPG hit, and was able to move away by foot to the other side of the Airfield near the hangars. (See Figures 3 & 4, Exhibit 1: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6))



(U//FOUO) Figure 3 (Drone imagery of SPC Mayfield and (b)(3)/(b)(6) destroyed vehicle on the runway.) Photo is unclassified when sanitized of any additional graphics/overlays.



(U//FOUO) Figure 4 (LZSO vehicle after it was turned on its side later in the day in an attempt to search for (b)(3)/(b)(6).) Photo is unclassified when sanitized of any additional graphics/overlays.



(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) At approximately 0522 hours, pilots Dustin Harrison and Bruce Triplett were killed while performing preflight checks inside their B350 aircraft. Both men were contracted pilots for the airplane. The AS element engaged the B350 aircraft with RPG and small arms fire while it was still on the runway. The plane caught fire and both pilots died. After the aircraft was severely damaged and caught fire, it eventually came to a halt on the western side of the runway. As best as can be determined, it is believed that the pilots purposely steered the aircraft off the runway to keep it free for further operations. The fact that the aircraft was off of the runway was beneficial for the eventual arrival of the East African Response Force (EARF) over (b)(3) 10 USC 130 . (See Figures 5 & 6). (b)(3)/(b)(6) also a contractor, was the (b)(3)/(b)(6) for the B350 and was located in the back of the plane with the equipment at the time of the attack. (b)(3)/(b)(6) was able to escape from the burning aircraft. He sustained (b)(6) . (See Figure 7, Exhibits 3-6: Statements (b)(3)/(b)(6)



(U//~~FOUO~~) Figure 5 (Initial flames of B350 on the far left and burning vehicles on the right) Photo is unclassified when sanitized of any additional graphics/overlays.



(U//FOUO) Figure 6 (Destroyed B350 on the north end and western side of the runway; this photo is used from later imagery in the daylight in order to provide a better perspective.) Photo is unclassified when sanitized of any additional graphics/overlays.


(5) (U//FOUO) After (b)(3)/(b)(6) escaped from the burning aircraft, (b)(3)/(b)(6) ran to the three U.S. maintenance contractors (b)(3)/(b)(6) who were located in a nearby hangar after they perform support for the B-350 crew. At 0529 hours, the U.S. maintenance contractors transported (b)(3)/(b)(6) to Camp Simba for treatment. The U.S. contractors departed the Airfield with (b)(3)/(b)(6) moments before the AS assault element crossed the Airfield from east to west. (Exhibits 3-6: (b)(3)/(b)(6) Statements (b)(3)/(b)(6)).



(U//FOUO) Figure 7 (Closed circuit video footage of a wounded (b)(3)/(b)(6) moving to the hangar after the B350 airplane he was in was hit by an RPG. In vicinity of the hangar are three U.S. contract maintenance personnel (b)(3)/(b)(6) who immediately extract him for treatment.) Photo is unclassified when sanitized of any additional graphics/overlays.



(6) (U//~~FOUO~~) Next, the AS element quickly walked across the Airfield shooting small arms fire into the aircraft. (See Figure 8). It is unclear for certain how the AS element maneuvered across the Airfield. As best as can be determined they walked across the Airfield in small tactical formations.



(U//~~FOUO~~) Figure 8 (Closed circuit video of AS fighters moving across the Airfield and the B350 on fire) Photo is unclassified when sanitized of any additional graphics/overlays.

7. (U//~~FOUO~~) After destroying all seven aircraft and four vehicles on the Airfield with small arms fire and RPG rockets, the AS element moved up to the northwest edge of the Airfield near Tower 10. (Exhibits 81-87: Closed Circuit Video Footage).





(U//FOUO) Figure 9 (Overall battle damage assessment on the Airfield and location of AS) Photo is unclassified when sanitized of any additional graphics/overlays.

8. (U//FOUO) During the initial attack, there were two USAF Security Force personnel inside Tower #10 and one USAF NCO at the base. Once it was determined that enemy fire was occurring on the Airfield, the NCO returned to Camp Simba in his vehicle alone. The AS element did not engage the two remaining USAF Security Force personnel (b)(3)/(b)(6) located in Tower # 10. The tower was equipped with a M240B machine gun, oriented away from the Airfield. Neither (b)(3)/(b)(6) made any attempt to fire the M240B at the attackers. It is suspected that the AS element did not know personnel were still in the tower because the USAF Security Forces personnel did not engage AS when they approached. (b)(3)/(b)(6) did fire (b)(3)/(b)(6) individual weapon while on the ground in the tower. Yet (b)(3)/(b)(6) two shots were not directed at a known enemy target. It is believed that the AS never heard (b)(3)/(b)(6) shots, or that the sound was masked by another explosion from the Airfield. It is believed that if the AS element would have known there were US personnel in the tower, they would have attempted to kill them. Once arriving near the tower, the AS element took water bottles that were located at the base of the tower, and then departed the area. (Exhibit 40: 475th Manda Bay Attack After Action Report).




(U//FOUO) Figure 10 (Drone overhead view after AS destroyed aircraft and moved off the runway; photo used to provide better perspective of where Tower # 10 was located.) Photo is unclassified when sanitized of any additional graphics/overlays.

9. (U//FOUO) From that location it is not exactly known where the AS element moved to consolidate, but the evidence indicates that they moved into the western wood line and began to move southward to the vicinity of what was locally known as the Department of State (DoS) hangar. At this time, the AS element had been on the Airfield for (b)(3) 10 USC 130 without facing any resistance. (See Figure 11)<sup>3</sup> (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)).

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<sup>3</sup> (U) This is suspected because when the (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e first arrived at the airfield and did an initial clearance they did not detect the presence of any remaining AS elements.






(U//FOUO) Figure 11 (Schematic of AS initial assault location and suspected follow on movement) Photo is unclassified when sanitized of any additional graphics/overlays.

10. (U//FOUO) At approximately (b)(3) 10 USC 130, after gathering situational awareness of the ongoing attack at Camp Simba, the (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e responded to the attack on the Airfield with (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b)(1) 1.7e each containing five personnel. (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)).



d. (U) Phase II - MSOT arrival and initial Kenyan and U.S. actions

(1) (U//FOUO) (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.7e the MSOT arrived at the Airfield with (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.7e element immediately maneuvered down the Airfield from north to south and were not engaged by the AS element. The MSOT did a hasty battle damage assessment on the Airfield, and identified four vehicles destroyed. The MSOT completed a mounted clearance of the Airfield and did not identify any enemy personnel. (See Figure 12) (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)).



(U//FOUO) Figure 12 (Schematic of MSOT's arrival at the Airfield and initial clearance of the Airfield) Photo is unclassified when sanitized of any additional graphics/overlays.

(2) (U//FOUO) The MSOT commander returned to Camp Simba (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.7e to gain situational awareness and gather additional maneuver forces from the United States Air Force Expeditionary Special Tactics Squadron (ESTS). While the MSOT commander was at Camp Simba, the MSOT noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) remained at the Airfield and conducted a mounted and dismounted clearance of the hangars. (See Figure 13). During this clearance, one set of human remains was discovered in the B350 that was destroyed on the runway. Also, during this timeframe, the fuel farm ignited. Sometime between 0600 and 0730 hours, AS re-occupied the structures that were just cleared by the MSOT. (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)). After 0600 hours, USAF Security

Forces retrieved the two Airmen in Tower #10 and consolidated at Entry Control Point (ECP) #3. (Exhibit 40: 475th Manda Bay Attack After Action Report).



(U//FOUO) Figure 13 (Schematic MSOT initial clearance of hangars (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.7e) Photo is unclassified when sanitized of any additional graphics/overlays.




(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) When the MSOT commander returned to the Airfield, there were three U.S. vehicles, (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.7e, and (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) personnel on the Airfield. (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)(b)(6)). Drone imagery taken of the Airfield that morning confirmed seven destroyed aircraft and four destroyed non-tactical vehicles. (See Figure 14).



(U//~~FOUO~~) Figure 14 (Daylight drone footage of six aircraft in flames, one destroyed but not burning, and LZSO vehicle location; fuel farm has not caught fire yet from AS small arms fire.) Photo is unclassified when sanitized of any additional graphics/overlays.




(4) (U//FOUO) At (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e moved south to the destroyed LZSO vehicle and discovered human remains of one Friendly Killed in Action (FKIA), later confirmed to be SPC Mayfield. The U.S. personnel then began searching the vegetation east of the destroyed vehicle for (b)(3)/(b)(6) the other U.S. Soldier who would have been in the LZSO vehicle, but could not find (b)(3)/(b)(6) (See Figure 15, Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)).



(U//FOUO) Figure 15 (Schematic of MSOT (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e for unaccounted for U.S. personnel near the LZSO vehicle. Photo demonstrates locations of the MSOT (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e and ESTS non-tactical vehicle.) Photo is unclassified when graphics/overlays.

e. (U) Phase III – Consolidation and AS re-attack

(1) (U//FOUO) At approximately (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.7e the dismounted service members and vehicles received a large volume of effective small arms fire. (See Figure 16). During this engagement, (b)(3)/(b)(6) a member of the MSOT, sustained a laceration above (b)(3)/(b)(6) left eye. (Exhibit 7: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)



(U//FOUO) Figure 16 (Schematic of MSOT/ESTS when AS engage with high volume of fire and FWIA) Photo is unclassified when sanitized of any additional graphics/overlays.



(2) (U//FOUO) During this time, USAF Security Forces arrived with additional KDF members. It was determined that the original four KDF personnel had remained on the Airfield and had not broken contact with the enemy. The MSOT returned back to the engagement area in order to extract the KDF who were still in contact. Before the MSOT joined with the KDF again, four KDF personnel, on their own accord, attempted to clear the DoS hangar of AS but were repulsed. A (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e all U.S. and KDF forces then moved back to the northern edge of the Airfield to consolidate and re-organize. (See Figure 17, Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)(b)(6) .



(U//FOUO) Figure 17 (Schematic of KDF assault of AS positions before pulling back and MSOT (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.7e positions) Photo is unclassified when sanitized of any additional graphics/overl




(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) During consolidation and re-organization, more KDF arrived, giving friendly forces parity in numbers. Both U.S. forces and KDF returned to the AS strongpoint near the DoS hangar, using the U.S. vehicles as a Support by Fire (SBF) while KDF personnel successfully cleared the hangar. (See Figure 18, Exhibit 8: Statemen (b)(3)/(b)(6) .



(U//~~FOUO~~) Figure 18 (Schematic (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e displacement to the north (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e final blocking position) Photo is unclassified when erlays.

f. (U) Phase IV - Kenyan helicopter gun run and final Airfield clearance


(1) (U//FOUO) At <sup>(b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e</sup> once the hangar was cleared of AS threat, friendly forces pushed to the north in order to conduct a deliberate clearance of the wood line west of the Airfield and other structures. At this time <sup>(b)(3)/(b)(6)</sup> a KDF leader, took the initiative to coordinate close air support with Kenyan MD500 helicopter gunship. The Kenyan MD500 conducted three “gun runs” using 7.62mm mini-guns to suppress the AS position. The KDF was in the lead during this clearance. (See Figure 19, Exhibit 8: Statement <sup>(b)(3)/(b)(6)</sup> .



(U//FOUO) Figure 19 (Schematic of MSOT disposition in the north and KDF MD500 mini-gun runs and KDF Armor Personnel Carrier) Photo is unclassified when sanitized of any additional graphics/overlays.



(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) Upon reaching the DoS hangar, the MSOT and ESTS re-cleared all buildings in order to ensure security. The clearance was performed south to north with dismounts and a Kenyan Armored Personnel Carrier. (See Figure 20). At this point, a second set of human remains were discovered in the B350, confirming both the pilot and co-pilot were killed in the aircraft. (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6))



(U//~~FOUO~~) Figure 20 (Schematic of final Airfield clearance with KDF and MSOT elements from south to north) Photo is unclassified when sanitized of any additional graphics/overlays.


(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) At (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e a Kenyan UH-1H helicopter transported (b)(3)/(b)(6) to Lamu Airport, a few kilometers away, for further evacuation via fixed wing aircraft. The MSOT Commander then pushed out the security perimeter through (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e. At approximately 1700 hours, the last friendly MIA (b)(3)/(b)(6) who survived the initial RPG attack on the LZSO vehicle and successfully evaded the enemy for nearly 12 hours, approached a USAF Security Force vehicle, and was moved to Camp Simba for medical treatment. (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6))



g. (U) Phase V - Movement off the Airfield

(1) (U) Indications and Warnings (I&W) of potential enemy activity at the local Kenyan Navy personnel (KNAV) base housing, the coastal pier, and small arms range triggered a combined clearance of these areas and buildings by the MSOT, Air Force Security Forces, and KNAV forces from

(b)(1) 1.4.a,  
(b)(1) 1.7e



(U//FOUO) Figure 21 (Schematic of KDF and MSOT clearance of local village based on I&W) Photo is unclassified when sanitized of any additional graphics/overlays.

(2) (U//FOUO) This clearance was largely KNAV led. Once cleared, the MSOT Commander authorized the East Africa Response Force (EARF) to land at the Airfield. (Exhibit 8: Statement

(b)(3)/(b)(6)

(b)(3)/(b)(6)

h. (U) Phase VI – Arrival of the East African Response Force (EARF)

(1) (U//FOUO) At (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e the ESTS marked the runway for the EARF and at (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e the EARF landed on the Airfield. At 0001 hours, the EARF assumed responsibility of security on the Airfield. (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) .



(S) Figure 22 (Schematic of final MSOT, ESTS, and Security Force disposition before EARF arrives) Photo is unclassified when sanitized of any additional graphics/overlays.

9. (U) **Scope of the Investigation Question #2 (Who was killed and injured during the attack by AS and how, if known – both friendly and enemy personnel?)**

a. (U) **Findings.** Friendly Killed in Action (FKIA): On the morning of 5 January 2020, three Americans were killed by AS at the CSL Manda Bay Airfield. All three were killed in the opening minutes of the attack. One was a U.S. service member performing LZSO duties, the other two were contract pilots preparing to takeoff from the Airfield in a B350 aircraft.

(1) (U//FOUO) At approximately 0520 hours, SPC Henry Mayfield, Jr., was killed while performing his LZSO duties. He and (b)(3)/(b)(6) were in a Toyota Hilux truck clearing the runway of animals and other hazards in preparation for aircraft take off. While performing their sweep of the runway, (b)(3)/(b)(6) identified some images in the vegetation on the east side of the runway using a handheld thermal imager. (b)(3)/(b)(6) SPC Mayfield drove the truck to within 10-20 meters of the images. (b)(3)/(b)(6) initially believed that the images (b)(3)/(b)(6) saw were hyenas. When the LZSO vehicle turned to face the grass (b)(3)/(b)(6) leaned outside of the passenger side window and looked through (b)(3)/(b)(6) handheld thermal scopes to see through the dense vegetation. (b)(3)/(b)(6) saw three men kneeling with weapons pointed at



the aircraft and the runway. The men launched two RPGs at the LZSO vehicle from a range of 10-20 meters. The first penetrated the front windshield, missing (b)(3)/(b)(6) by inches, and did not explode. The second RPG penetrated the driver's side door and detonated, instantly killing SPC Mayfield (Exhibit 1: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 2: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)).

(2) (U//FOUO) Mr. Dustin Harrison was a contract pilot for L3 Technologies (L3) who flew the B350 airplane. He perished in the B350 aircraft, while still on the Airfield, after the AS element engaged the aircraft with RPG and small arms fire. After the aircraft was severely damaged and caught fire, it eventually came to a halt on the western side of the runway. As best as can be determined, it is believed that Mr. Harrison purposely steered the aircraft off the runway to keep it free for further operations. The fact that the aircraft was off of the runway was beneficial for future use for the critically important EARF. (Exhibit 3: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 4: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 5: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)).

(3) (U//FOUO) Mr. Bruce Triplett was also a contract pilot for L3 who flew the B350 airplane. He perished in the B350 aircraft, while still on the Airfield, after the AS element engaged the aircraft with RPG and small arms fire. After the aircraft was severely damaged and caught fire, it eventually came to a halt on the western side of the runway. As best as can be determined, it is believed that Mr. Triplett assisted in purposely steering the aircraft off the runway to keep it free for further operations. The fact that the aircraft was off of the runway was beneficial for future use for the critically important EARF. (Exhibit 4: Statements (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 5: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)).

b. (U//FOUO) Friendly Wounded in Action (FWIA): A total of three U.S. personnel and one Kenyan soldier were wounded during the CSL Manda Bay attack. The first two (b)(3)/(b)(6) were injured during the initial AS ambush on the Airfield. The other U.S. person (b)(3)/(b)(6) was wounded while clearing AS from the Airfield. One Kenyan Army Special Team soldier was wounded clearing AS from the Airfield. (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)).

(1) (U//FOUO) (b)(3)/(b)(6) was wounded while performing LZSO duties with (b)(3)/(b)(6). While (b)(3)/(b)(6) and SPC Mayfield were clearing the Airfield, (b)(3)/(b)(6) identified what appeared to be hyenas through the handheld thermal scope (b)(3)/(b)(6) was using. (b)(3)/(b)(6) and SPC Mayfield drove up to within 10-20 meters of the "hyenas." (b)(3)/(b)(6) leaned out of the passenger side window, looked through (b)(3)/(b)(6) handheld thermal scope to see through the vegetation, and observed three men kneeling with weapons pointed at the aircraft and the runway. At 0520 hours, the men engaged (b)(3)/(b)(6) Toyota Hilux truck with an RPG. The RPG did not detonate and narrowly missed (b)(3)/(b)(6). (b)(3)/(b)(6) quickly exited the vehicle and ran across the Airfield. (b)(3)/(b)(6) ran in a "zig zag" method to avoid being hit by the small arms fire. Near simultaneously to (b)(3)/(b)(6) exiting the vehicle, the second RPG hit the LZSO truck, instantly killing SPC Mayfield. At some point during that attack, the explosions (b)(3)/(b)(6). (b)(3)/(b)(6) When (b)(3)/(b)(6) got to the west side of the Airfield, (b)(3)/(b)(6) found some thick vegetation and concealed (b)(3)/(b)(6). From that position (b)(3)/(b)(6) could hear the attack take place on the Airfield and occasionally see the feet of AS fighters as they maneuvered near (b)(3)/(b)(6) position. (b)(3)/(b)(6) was unable to engage the enemy at that time because (b)(3)/(b)(6) did not have a weapon. (b)(3)/(b)(6) eventually repositioned to a safer concealed position approximately 25 meters further to the west in order to safely evade the enemy (b)(3)/(b)(6) remained there until approximately 1700 hours. When (b)(3)/(b)(6) finally heard American voices and recognized specific personnel from the USAF Security Forces, (b)(3)/(b)(6) came out of (b)(3)/(b)(6) concealed position with (b)(3)/(b)(6) arms raised to avoid being accidentally shot, and linked up with friendly forces (b)(3)/(b)(6) was then immediately moved to Camp Simba for medical evaluation. (b)(3)/(b)(6) was evacuated on a C130 aircraft later that night. (b)(3)/(b)(6) caused by (b)(3)/(b)(6) hours of being in a cramped, concealed position. It is miraculous that (b)(3)/(b)(6) was not killed, or severely wounded, by the enemy. Throughout the day, (b)(3)/(b)(6) was able to successfully evade the enemy for approximately twelve



hours after the initial RPG contact and small arms fire that was directed solely at [REDACTED]. (Exhibit 1: Statement [REDACTED], Exhibit 2: Statement [REDACTED]).

(2) (U//FOUO) [REDACTED] was an L3 contractor who [REDACTED] on aircraft. [REDACTED] was wounded at approximately 0522 hours when [REDACTED] aircraft was engaged by RPG and small arms fire while [REDACTED] was in the B350 performing preflight checks on the north end of the runway. [REDACTED] When the attack occurred [REDACTED] was by the door of the aircraft. When the airplane was hit by the RPG [REDACTED] was able to extract [REDACTED] from the plane and run to the maintenance building where U.S. contract maintenance personnel were located. When the maintenance personnel saw [REDACTED], they called [REDACTED] over to their location. The three U.S. contract maintainers, [REDACTED], assisted [REDACTED] into their non-tactical truck and drove to Camp Simba to seek medical treatment. Once at Camp Simba, they delivered [REDACTED] to the 475th EABS medical building. [REDACTED] received immediate care for [REDACTED] wounds and was later evacuated by Kenyan rotary wing to Lamu Airport, where [REDACTED] was transferred to a U.S. non-standard CASEVAC airplane and flown to Camp Lemmonier, Djibouti (CLDJ) for further treatment. [REDACTED] actions during the attack most likely saved [REDACTED] life. (Exhibit 5: Statement [REDACTED], Exhibit 6: Statement [REDACTED]).

(3) (U//FOUO) [REDACTED] is an [REDACTED] When the Airfield was attacked, [REDACTED] was a member of the [REDACTED]. At 0540 hours, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] team arrived on the Airfield. Initially they were not in contact with AS and began searching the Airfield for unaccounted personnel. Between [REDACTED] participated in the systematic search and clearance of the Airfield. At [REDACTED] one of the search elements near the DoS aircraft hangar was engaged by the 20-30 man AS element that had initially attacked the Airfield, and were now on the western side of the Airfield near the DoS hangar. While engaging the enemy, [REDACTED] received a [REDACTED]. Although the [REDACTED], the Corpsman, [REDACTED], assessed that the wound was non-life-threatening and [REDACTED] continued to fight. [REDACTED] received medical treatment once the team was out of enemy contact. (Exhibit 7: Statement [REDACTED]).

(4) (S) [REDACTED] was a member of the Army Special Teams, Kenyan Ranger Regiment. [REDACTED] arrived at the Airfield with a mixed force of approximately [REDACTED] members of the Kenyan Defense Force, Kenyan Navy, and Kenyan Ranger Regiment. They heard the attack and moved to the Airfield on their own accord, under the leadership of [REDACTED]. During the attack [REDACTED] conducted an assault against the enemy positions and was [REDACTED]. Despite [REDACTED] request to stay in the fight, [REDACTED] was immediately evacuated to the north end of the Airfield to be evaluated. (Exhibit 5: Statement [REDACTED], Exhibit 8: Statement [REDACTED]).

c. (U//FOUO) Enemy Killed in Action (EKIA): A total of eight assessed AS were killed in the attack. They were killed by U.S. and Kenyan forces sometime between 0730 and 1430 hours. It is uncertain who was directly responsible for killing the AS fighters, and when precisely they were killed. The AS fighters were most likely all killed by small arms fire. (Exhibit 8: Statement [REDACTED]).

(1) (U//FOUO) Six AS fighters were killed on the Airfield by the combined fires of U.S. and Kenyan forces. These six individuals were located at a strong point just northwest of the DoS hangar, where a drainage ditch and some large container units provided them some partial cover and concealment. From that position, they engaged U.S. elements as they attempted to clear the Airfield. The AS element

was heavily armed with AK-47 assault rifles, Type 80 machine guns, RPGs, and F1 hand grenades. (Exhibit 9: Team Manda Bay Complex Attack Story Board).

(2) (S//NF) (b)(1) 1.4c  
 (b)(1) 1.4c  
 (b)(1) 1.4c (Exhibit 10) (b)(1) 1.4.a Manda Bay Attack Narrative).

d. (U) **Recommendation:** That the Appointing Authority find that the deaths of three U.S citizens and the wounds to three other U.S. citizens, occurred in the line of duty and not due to misconduct.

**10. (U) Scope of the Investigation Question #3 (What was the extent of the damage done to friendly facilities and aircraft at Manda Bay)?**

a. (U//FOUO) **Finding.** Damages from the 5 January 2020 attack on CSL Manda Bay are estimated to be over \$90 million. The financial losses consist of six U.S.<sup>4</sup> aircraft that were destroyed in the opening minutes of the attack. Additional damage to U.S. equipment, vehicles, and infrastructure amount to approximately another \$10 million. These costs are initial rough estimates provided by the various contractors operating out of CSL Manda Bay. Of note, the cost of the Kenyan aircraft is not listed in Table 1.

Owner	Equipment	Ownership Status	QTY	Cost Per Unit	Arrival Date	SubTotals
L3	B350 (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.7e	GOCO	1	\$ 20,000,000	2016	\$ 20,000,000
STAMP	DASH-8 (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.7e	GOCO	1	\$ 46,000,000.00	Sep-19	\$ 46,000,000
SNC	PC-12 (C)	COCO	1	\$ 5,000,000.00	Oct-18	\$ 5,000,000
SNC	Bell 412 (CJTF HOA)	COCO	2	\$ 5,000,000.00	Oct-18	\$ 10,000,000
CHI	CASA 212 (JSOAC)	COCO	1	\$ 3,500,000.00	Feb-18	\$ 3,500,000.00
KBR	Camp Simba (Electric cables, Gator, Containers)		1	\$ 52,737.00		\$ 52,737.00
L3	Airfield Equipment (Landcruiser, Pumping Assembly, fuel bladders, etc.		1	\$ 188,131.00		\$ 188,131.00
SNC	Equipment (Tools, spare parts, CONNEX, Medical Supplies)		1	\$ 9,800,000.00		\$ 9,800,000.00
Govt	Fuel (JetA)		1	\$ 132,863.00		\$ 132,863.00
Govt	Base Infrastructure (CCTV, Cameras, Wiring)		1	\$ 317,835.00		\$ 317,835.00
U//FOUO	<b>Total Cost</b>					<b>\$ 94,991,566</b>

(U//FOUO) Table 1 (Estimated Costs of Damages)

**11. (U) Scope of the Investigation Question #4 (Assess the defensive plan and force protection measures at the base in place at the time of the attack and determine if they were reasonable and appropriate based on the threat information available to leaders at echelon prior to the attack).**

a. (U) **Finding:** Force protection measures at CSL Manda Bay were neither reasonable nor appropriate based on the threat information available to leaders at echelon, prior to the attack, nor were they appropriate based on the air assets on the Airfield at the time of the attack. Camp Simba, with its

<sup>4</sup> (U) Seven total aircraft (six U.S. and one Kenyan).



manned ECP, barriers, lights, and manned towers, was reasonably well defended, but force protection at the Airfield was deficient.

b. (S) The threat information available to leaders prior to 5 January 2020 was not adequately analyzed. Relevant threat information was overlooked due to an overall sense of complacency at CSL Manda Bay. (Exhibit 11: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 12: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) Exhibit 13: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 14: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), (b)(1) 1.4c (Exhibit 13: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) Exhibit 15: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)).

c. (S//NF) (b)(1) 1.4.a at CSL Manda Bay was complicated by the multitude of units operating from the base, each with a different mission and different requirements and tools available for (b)(1) 1.4 a. (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 15 (b)(3)/(b)(6) had (b)(1) 1.4c assigned to CSL Manda Bay dedicated to (b)(1) 1.4c (Exhibit 14: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) The 475th Expeditionary Air Base Squadron had (b)(1) 1.4c for based defenders. (Exhibit 16: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) The (b)(1) 1.4.a who arrived in October 2019 and focused primarily on (b)(1) 1.4c with Kenyan partners. (Exhibit 15: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)). The (b)(1) 1.4.c, (b)(1) 1.4.c on CSL Manda Bay: (b)(1) 1.4c support. In addition, the (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4c (Exhibit 14: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 15: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 16: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)).

d. (S//NF) Despite these disparate (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4c representatives from all units met on a weekly basis to discuss any relevant reporting. (Exhibit 24: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), (b)(1) 1.4c (b)(1) 1.4c. Although beneficial, the Squadron Weekly Intelligence Meetings (SWIMs) did not solve the EABS' access issues. For example, neither the (b)(1) 1.4.c (Exhibit 24: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)

e. (S//NF) Threat Information Available prior to 5 January 2020. There were multiple threat assessments from various organizations between 2017 and December 2019. The majority of the assessments concluded that the terrorism threat was (b)(1) 1.4c. The (b)(1) 1.4c determinations were the most recent ones and solely based on the (b)(1) 1.4c. It is important to note that the (b)(1) 1.4c assessments were conducted by organizations with more of a (b)(1) 1.4c. The organizations that assessed the terror threat to be (b)(1) 1.4c were influenced by local factors surrounding CSL Manda Bay and the fact that this location had never been attacked in its 16 years of existence. (Exhibit 18 and 19: (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4c see chart in table 2 below). The following threat information was available to leaders prior to 5 January 2020:

(1) (S//NF) (b)(1) 1.4c

(2) (S//RELID) (b)(1) 1.4c

(b)(1) 1.4c



(b)(1) 1.4c  
(b)(1) 1.4c (Exhibit 17: DIA CTDB Record August 2019).

(b)(1) 1.4c

e. (~~S//NF~~) Threat reporting and vulnerability assessments were conducted by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4c (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4c Air Mobility Command (AMC), Force Protection Detachment Kenya (FPD-Kenya) and Naval Criminal Investigations Service (NCIS). All products were produced within the past 12 months with the exception of the NCIS products which are included for historical reference (Exhibit 17, Exhibit 18: MSOT TVA DEC19, Exhibit 19: AFOSI Manda Bay (b)(1) 1.4c APR19, Exhibit 20: AMC Kenya (b)(1) 1.4c JUL19, Exhibit 21: FPD-Kenya TA, Exhibit 22: NCIS Manda Bay Assessment FEB17, Exhibit 23: NCIS Kenya Assessment FEB19).

f. (~~S//NF~~) (b)(1) 1.4c (b)(1) 1.4c

(1) (~~S//NF~~) (b)(1) 1.4c (b)(1) 1.4c

(2) (~~S//NF~~) (b)(1) 1.4c (b)(1) 1.4c

(b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4c  
(b)(1) 1.4c (Exhibit 15: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6))

g. (~~S~~) Threat information available at echelon. Prior to 5 January 2020, the USAFRICOM J2 had access to all assessments in Table 1, (b)(1) 1.4c reflected in the

tearline above, and additional (b)(1) 1.4c  
(b)(1) 1.4c  
(b)(1) 1.4c The information was passed in (b)(1) 1.4c to the attention of a small group of individuals at other Agencies and SSO USAFRICOM. The 3 January distro of this (b)(1) 1.4c report did not include other USAFRICOM or Component personnel, or personnel from other agencies embedded within USAFRICOM. On 7 January, after the attack, the (b)(1) 1.4c report was forwarded to the USAFRICOM Command Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority. (Exhibit 24: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)  
(b)(3)/(b)(6)

h. (S) The CJTF-HOA J2 had access to all assessments recorded in Table 1, (b)(1) 1.4c  
(b)(1) 1.4c the report with CJTF-HOA J2 until after the attack (Exhibit 11: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)). In addition, on 1 November 2019 CJTF-HOA (b)(1) 1.4c to HOA J2. Those (b)(1) 1.4c  
(b)(1) 1.4c  
(b)(1) 1.4c (Exhibit 13: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)

i. (S) Prior to 5 January 2020, the 475th EABS, (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4c had access to the assessments discussed at Table 1. However, only (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4c  
(b)(1) 1.4c After analyzing the 19 December 2019 (b)(1) 1.4c reporting, (b)(1) 1.4c on CSL Manda Bay was unlikely because U.S. forces had never been attacked in Kenya. (Exhibit 14: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)). This determination seemed logical and it was reinforced by recent (b)(1) 1.4 a describing CSL Manda Bay. The December 2019 MSOT  
(b)(1) 1.4c  
(b)(1) 1.4 a

j. (U//FOUO) The evidence supports the conclusion (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.7e was speaking about Camp Simba in the December 2019 threat assessment. (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b)(1) 1.7e  
(b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b)(1) 1.7e

(b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b)(1) 1.7e Based on USAFRICOM's command focus on higher threat posts that had recently been attacked, few USAFRICOM force protection representatives visited CSL Manda Bay to see the reality on the ground. The last visit from a USAFRICOM senior representative was by the J4 as recently as 19 November 2019. Therefore, the evolution of the threat environment and the Airfield operations at CSL Manda Bay were not well known.

k. (S) The threat information available to leaders up and down the chain of command, including the (b)(1) 1.4c tearline information shared with very few, was not sufficient to overcome the false sense of security and complacency at CSL Manda Bay. Attacks on citizens of the United States were unprecedented in Kenya. The base had never been attacked, in any manner, in its 16 years of existence. Personnel stationed at CSL Manda Bay frequented the off-post village, the pier, and the beach repeatedly for years without incident. The force protection measures at CSL Manda Bay on 5 January 2020 reflected this reality.



1. ~~(S)~~ **CSL Force Protection Requirements.** CSL Manda Bay encompasses both Camp Simba and the Airfield, which are two different geographic locations. (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g  
 (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4g The Airfield is (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g  
 (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4g and is where (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4g . There were approximately (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g  
 (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4g These aircraft were a mix of government owned, contractor operated (GOCO) and contractor owned, contract operated (COCO) air assets. The CASEVAC air assets contractually required the U.S. Government to provide force protection. (Exhibit 73: Big Safari CASEVAC Performance Work Statement). (b)(1) 1.4 a  
 (b)(1) 1.4 a

The BOS-I responsibility applies to CSL Manda Bay as a whole, which means that the integrated defense plan must protect the base perimeter, base boundary and the base security zone of both locations. (Exhibit 25: USAFRICOM BOS-I TASKORD, Exhibit 26: AFPD 31-1). Air Force Protection Level 3 should have been applied to the Airfield because of the (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e nature of the aircraft, but at the time of the attack there was no documented protection level. (Exhibit 66: MFR (b)(3)/(b)(6)). Protection Level 3 dictates that the security measures around CSL Manda Bay should “Anticipate, Deter, Detect, Assess and Delay” enemy forces (Exhibit 27: AFI 31-101, p. 83), meaning that force protection measures should have included a perimeter fence with corresponding barriers, sensors, vegetation control and fields of fire that could deter, detect, delay/fix, and destroy an enemy with direct fires (Exhibit 27: AFI 31-101, p. 90). Additionally, under Air Force protection Level 3, active security measures (i.e. security patrols) should be frequently employed in both the base boundary (i.e. tactical or jurisdictional limit) and the base security zone (i.e. range of enemy capabilities) to detect and deter possible enemies (Exhibit 26: AFPD 31-1, p. 3).

m. ~~(S)~~ **Force protection measures in place on 5 January 2020 at CSL Manda Bay.** There was a noticeable disparity in the force protection levels between Camp Simba and the Airfield. Camp Simba had more robust force protection infrastructure and manning than the Airfield. This is mainly because (b)(1) 1.4.a  
 (b)(1) 1.4 a since 2004. Over the years, steady force protection measure improvements had been built over time. At the time of the attack Camp Simba (b)(1) 1.4.a

(see Figure 23). Out of a total (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g security personnel, there were approximately (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g Security Forces personnel on duty, manning p (b)(1) 1.4.a s 24 hours a day. (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g sections, each consisting of (b)(1) 1.4.a and (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g were always on standby and conducted random security patrols generally (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g per shift for a total of (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g. (Exhibit 28: 475th EABS Integrated Defense/Antiterrorism Plan (IDP), Ex (b)(3)/(b)(6)). The force protection measures at Camp Simba and the corresponding IDP were reasonable given the threat picture and relevant AF force protection regulations.

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5 ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g  
 (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4g






(S) Figure 23 (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g  
 (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4g  
 (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g  
 photo is unclassified when sanitized of

n. (S) The CSL Manda Bay Airfield by contrast had far fewer force protection measures in place at the time of the attack. (Exhibit 8: (b)(3)/(b)(6) ; Exhibit 14: (b)(3)/(b)(6) ; Exhibit 35: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) . It was determined that the (b)(1) 1.4g, (b)(1) 1.4d . They used it only episodically and only manned the Kenyan ECP (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g in an attempt to control access to the Airfield. (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4g (Exhibit 35: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) . Security Force manning consisted of a total (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g personnel at all times. The Airfield had (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4g

(b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4g (see Figure 23).<sup>6</sup> The Airfield also had (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4g, some HESCO barriers along the ECP and western edge of the Airfield, and some vegetation clearance.<sup>7</sup> Unfortunately, the Airfield did not have any form of perimeter barrier capable of delaying or deterring enemy elements. It did not have any sensor assets to detect intrusion, and the existing towers could not provide 360 degree security. (Exhibit 80 (b)(3)/(b)(6)). These gaps at the Airfield were unreasonable given the threat picture and applicable USAF force protection regulations.



<sup>6</sup> (S) (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4g (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4g

(b)(1) 1.4 a, (b) but during the attack it was not available until after the aircraft had been destroyed.

<sup>7</sup> (U) Vegetation clearance had been conducted in the early fall of 2019. Since that date much of the vegetation had regrown and seriously degraded fields of fire. This was true also of the perimeter around Camp Simba.





(S) Figure 24a and 24b (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4g  
 (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4g  
 (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g  
 Photo is unclassified when sanitized  
 of any additional graphics/overlays.

o. (U//FOUO) **Analysis of reasonability and appropriateness of CSL Manda Bay force protection measures and defensive plan.** Objectively, Camp Simba was well defended and had reasonable and appropriate force protection measures, but force protection for CSL Manda Bay as a whole was neither reasonable nor appropriate based on the level of protection warranted by critical assets located on the Airfield. In addition, it was not properly postured based on its location in an FPCON Charlie country. (Exhibit 30: USAFRICOM Protection OPOD 14-10, Standard 5, Criticality Assessment, and Standard 19, AT Measures for Critical Asset Security).

p. (S) As outlined in the 475th EABS IDP, posted Security Forces must be capable of (b)(1) 1.4g (Exhibit 28: 475th EABS Integrated Defense Plan (IDP), para 2.2.2., 3.4.1. and 3.4.3). Additionally, IDP paragraph 3.1.3. states (b)(1) 1.4g (Exhibit 28: 475th EABS IDP, para 3.1.3.). Both of these capabilities require (b)(1) 1.4g security, with the ability to (b)(1) 1.4g (b)(1) 1.4g This was not possible because the security positions and available personnel on the Airfield were unable to secure it. They could not provide interlocking fields of fire and much of the Airfield was unobservable. (b)(1) 1.4g (b)(1) 1.4g



(b)(1) 1.4g

(b)(1) 1.4g ] These shortfalls were compounded by the fact that there were no clear fields of fire due to overgrown vegetation and there was no perimeter fence, protective barriers, or sensors. The lack of these measures meant that the entire Airfield could be approached and penetrated without being detected. (Exhibit 35: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)).

q. (S) In addition to a lack of physical barriers, CSL Manda Bay's force protection posture was also negatively impacted by not having a sufficient maneuver force to be able to respond to and deter an enemy attack from (b)(1) 1.4g ] USAF Security Forces responsible for defending the base and the Airfield were focused almost entirely on Camp Simba and not on the Airfield. There was no feasible plan in the IDP to be able to effectively defend against (b)(1) 1.4g ] (Exhibit 15: (b)(3)/(b)(6)), Exhibit 29 (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 40: 475th Manda Bay Attack AAR, Exhibit 70: 475th IDF Full Dress AAR). Force protection experts from the investigation team concluded that the USAF Tier training that the Security Forces received prior to arriving to CSL Manda Bay was inadequate. In addition to Tier training of the Base Defense Flight having negative impacts, a lack of effective leader involvement (at all levels) led to a lack of discipline. The effects of this were visible in their capabilities and performance (Exhibit 31: MFR (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 32: MFR (b)(3)/(b)(6)). Below are some examples of the investigation team's observations:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Not all Airmen were qualified on weapons during hours of limited visibility, nor were they capable of properly using night optics and lasers.

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) USAF security personnel were not adequately trained to perform offensive maneuvers using multiple sections of gun trucks or dismounts.

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) USAF NCOs would not always conduct inspections of personnel and equipment prior to guard shift.

(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) More than one of the crew-served machinegun's 7.62mm ammunition in the towers was rusted, which could prevent effective operation of the weapon.

(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) Lack of uniform standards resulted in some Airmen manning positions without full combat uniform and equipment.

(6) (U//~~FOUO~~) Airmen did not know how to develop and utilize a range card in their towers.

(7) (U//~~FOUO~~) Quick Reaction Force elements generally performed minimal numbers of active security patrols around CSL Manda Bay (i.e. one per 12 hour shift).

(8) (U//~~FOUO~~) Personal electronic devices, like cell phones, were frequently used while on force protection duty.

r. (U) Although USAF Security Forces had some capability and performance weaknesses in their organization, those weaknesses did not cause the loss of life or damages on 5 January 2020. However, some of these weaknesses, combined with the lack of force protection personnel and infrastructure at the Airfield, made CSL Manda Bay an easy target for AS. (See intelligence reporting in paragraph 11f above).



s. (U//FOUO) Camp Simba has always been the primary focus for force protection since it was first built by U.S. forces in 2004. (Exhibit 71: USAFRICOM History). Between 2004 and 2016 the primary mission of CSL Manda Bay was to provide a base camp for units training or supporting Kenyan forces combating Somali pirates or AS. (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 71: USAFRICOM History). As a result, Camp Simba, not the Airfield, was the security focus for CSL Manda Bay. Over time the CSL steadily grew in size, manning and force protection infrastructure.

t. (S) Starting in 2016, the mission and purpose of CSL Manda Bay changed as (b)(1) 1.4 a unit in Africa. (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4g (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4g (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4g Exhibit 35: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) Exhibit 62: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)). As the number of airframes operating out of CSL Manda Bay grew, the corresponding force protection measures necessary to secure the Airfield did not grow at the same rate. (Exhibit 35: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) Exhibit 79 (b)(3)/(b)(6) Part of the reason for this was that leaders at all levels did not adequately reevaluate the force protection requirements at CSL Manda Bay to match the level of protection needed for the critical assets on the Airfield. (Exhibit 66: MFR (b)(3)/(b)(6) Also, many leaders did not understand what (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4g at CSL Manda Bay (GOCO vs. COCO), what protection guarantees were in the contract language for those aircraft or who had responsibility for protecting them (Exhibit 52: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) Exhibit 78: Statemen (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 80: Statemen (b)(3)/(b)(6)). As late as 27 October 2019, the AFAF A4S, the component office directly responsible for force protection at CSL Manda Bay, conducted a manpower study of CSL Manda Bay and determined that the existing 475th EABS base defense force needed 10 fewer security personnel because the aircraft were contractor aircraft and did not warrant additional security. (Exhibit 33: Camp Simba Manpower Study, Exhibit 63: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) In fact, the U.S. government was contractually obligated to provide force protection. (Exhibit 73: Big Safari CASEVAC PWS (excerpt)).

u. (U//FOUO) USAF's objective criteria baseline for pre-deployment training for the CSL Manda Bay BDF's Mission Essential Task List was as follows:

- (1) Deliver Integrated Defense
- (2) Conduct Law and Order Operations
- (3) Provide Training and Maintenance of Small Arms and Crew-served Weapons
- (4) Provide Military Working Dog Support

v. (U//FOUO) The USAF's current model for pre-deployment training (also known as Sustainment training), the model used to prepare the CSL Manda Bay BDF, is for Airmen in the Security Forces career field to attend Tier 1-5 training (Exhibit 93: Tier 1 Training Table of Contents and some samples of the training plans from Tier 1 training). Tier training and Evasion and Conduct After Capture (ECAC) course was the only pre-deployment training that was provided the CSL Manda Bay BDF. Tier training is by rank and skill level (3,5,7,9). Tier 1 is for Airmen (E1-4), Tier 2 is for Staff Sergeants (SSgts) (E-5s), Tier 3 is for Technical Sergeants (TSgt)s (E-6s), Tier 4 is for Staff Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCOs)/Company Grade Officers (CGOs), and Tier 5 is for Chiefs (E-9s)/Field Grade Officers. Because tiered training occurs within the specified groups, there is no opportunity for deploying personnel to conduct collective training. (Exhibit 93: (b)(3)/(b)(6) Email.)

w. (U//FOUO) The individual responsible to ensure training standards are met prior to deployment is the home-station security forces commander. The USAF will pull security forces from multiple squadrons to meet deployment requirements. This will result in multiple home-station squadron commanders. CSL Manda Bay security forces came from eight different security forces home station units. (Exhibit 93 (b)(3)/(b)(6) Email.) The Unit Deployments Managers (UDMs) track the training on behalf of

the commander. There are both a home-station and deployed UDM which complicates training tracking and readiness.

x. (U//FOUO) The CSL Manda Bay Security Forces readiness on 5 January 2020 was insufficient because of a flawed pre-deployment training model. The tiered training model prevented them from having the basic tactical fundamentals for defending the terrain surrounding CSL Manda Bay, and contributed to a successful AS attack. The USAF pre-deployment training methodology for expeditionary base defense units is insufficient and requires major changes.

**12. (U) Scope of the Investigation Question #5 (Assess whether there were delays to any planned force protection improvements and, if so, did those delays contribute to the conditions leading to the attack and its effects).**

a. (U) **Findings.** There were several force protection improvements that were pending before the 5 January attack. Most notably, the contract to remove the vegetation around the Airfield needed to be executed every 90 days and it had been approximately 90 days since the last clearance. All Manda Bay infrastructure projects are routed through 475th EABS, to 449th AEG, to 435th AEW to AFAF. There had been several force protection improvements over time, from 2017 to 2019. Some of the improvements included, hardened guard shacks, PRC-152 radio upgrade, vegetation clearance, HESCO towers at the Airfield, programmed for Military Working Dogs, repurposed Unmanned Aerial Systems, (b)(3) 10 USC 130 for the BDOC, repurposed drop arm barriers, and repurposed additional ammunition. (Exhibit 12: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)). There was also a fence project pending, but was not planned to be completed before 5 January. Delays in force protection improvement projects were not a major contributing factor to the success of the attack. Existing force protection projects for the Airfield would not have been completed in time to effect the outcome of the attack. Evidence suggests that even if all of the projects and vegetation removal had been performed before 5 January, the AS element would still have been successful.

b. (U//FOUO) In November 2017 the 475th EABS identified, programmed, and submitted an airfield fence project to 435th AEW. (Exhibit 34: 449th Manda Bay Fence Project). In March 2018, the project was identified by the 435th AEW Commander as critical and was elevated to the AFAF top priority. In April 18, the project was funded and the design was projected to be completed January 2020 with a construction contract award date estimated in June 2020. The estimated build time was 1.5 years once work began. (Exhibit 34: 449th Manda Bay Fence Project, Exhibit 12: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)).

c. (U//FOUO) The Manda Bay Expedient Airfield Perimeter project (which included the installation of an 11,000ft concertina wire airfield fence) was conceived as an intermediate perimeter solution while the formal fence project was being contracted and built. This project was initiated prior to December 2019, but was not projected to begin construction until January 2020. In December 2019, 35 thousand feet of concertina wire had been purchased for the project. As of 8 January 2020, engineers were assessing the Airfield for the fence installation. (Exhibit 34: 449th Manda Bay Fence Project, Exhibit 35: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)). The fence project would have only been useful keeping the wildlife off of the Airfield. It would not have prevented the AS element from attacking the Airfield.

d. (U//FOUO) A vegetation clearance project was completed in early fall of 2019. Unfortunately, the contract did not cover routine maintenance and much of the vegetation regrew over the next few months leading up to the attack. (Exhibit 34: 449th Manda Bay Fence Project). The evidence demonstrates that the thick vegetation surrounding the Airfield made it impossible for CSL Manda Bay personnel to see the attackers. (Exhibit 1: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)).



13. (U) Scope of the Investigation Question #6 (What medical care was available to the injured personnel in the wake of the attack, to include medical evacuations)?

a. (U//FOUO) Findings. Camp Simba has a Role 1 Facility, operated by one Physician's Assistant (PA) and one Medical Technician. (Exhibit 36: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)). However, there are additional medical personnel who belonged to tenant units living on Camp Simba. These additional assets were critical to the treatment and CASEVAC of the wounded during the attack. If these assets were not available due to other mission requirements, the 475th EABS medical staff may have been overwhelmed on the day of the attack. (Exhibit 5: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 36: (b)(3)/(b)(6) Exhibit 70: IDF Full Dress AAR). Additionally, we identified that CSL Manda Bay needs alternate CASEVAC plans that do not include the Airfield. During the attack the Airfield was not secure, which greatly impeded CASEVAC options. (Exhibit 49: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)).

b. (U//FOUO) Camp Simba has a Role 1 Facility, operated by one PA and one Medical Technician. This is the primary medical staff responsible for the day-to-day care of the (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b)(1) 1.7e of Camp Simba. (Exhibit 36: (b)(3)/(b)(6)).

(1) (U//FOUO) (b)(3)/(b)(6) and medical technician (b)(3)/(b)(6) provided treatment to (b)(3)/(b)(6) and helped coordinate with the Personnel Recovery Control Center (PRCC) to evacuate wounded personnel. (Exhibit 36: (b)(3)/(b)(6))

(2) (U//FOUO) (b)(3)/(b)(6) and (b)(3)/(b)(6) team treated numerous acute stress injuries of light-headedness, nausea/vomiting, and heat exhaustion during the course of the day (Exhibit 36: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)).

c. (U) Additional medically trained personnel are available from some of the units that operate out of Camp Simba and can be employed during an emergency. These elements are not always available due to their primary mission requirements, but on 5 January 2020 they were present on Camp Simba and provided critical medical support to the Camp Simba Role 1 facility. The following were the additional medical personnel:

(1) (U//FOUO) (b)(3)/(b)(6), (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.7e helped treat (b)(3)/(b)(6) before (b)(3)/(b)(6) was CASEVAC'ed. (Exhibit 5: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6))

(2) (U//FOUO) Four medical personnel from Contracted Personnel Recovery (CPR). These contracted medical personnel perform the regional CPR mission for CJTF HOA. They accompanied and provided continued treatment and monitoring to (b)(3)/(b)(6) and (b)(3)/(b)(6) during their separate air CASEVAC. (Exhibit 36: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6))

(3) (U//FOUO) (b)(3)/(b)(6), (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.7e These personnel accompany (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e their directed missions. During the attack they provided treatment to (b)(3)/(b)(6). (Exhibit 7: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6))

d. (U//FOUO) CASEVAC operations at CSL Manda Bay are almost solely reliant on CPR air assets and personnel operating out of the Manda Bay airfield. Routine and non-routine personnel requiring CASEVAC have historically been flown out of the Airfield utilizing CPR. (Exhibit 43: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6))

(1) (U//FOUO) On 5 January 2020 all CPR air assets were destroyed on the Airfield in the opening nine minutes of the attack. The Airfield was not fully secured and ready for CASEVAC operations for over 16 hours.

(2) (U//FOUO) There was no viable plan to CASEVAC (b)(3)/(b)(6) because the Airfield was unsecure and the CPR assets were destroyed. Initially, PRCC and CTJF HOA considered evacuating (b)(3)/(b)(6) by contracted water taxi to Lamu Airport where (b)(3)/(b)(6) would be flown to follow on care. This course of action was rejected by the CJTF-HOA Deputy Commanding General as too risky. (Exhibit 36: (b)(3)/(b)(6) (b)(3)/(b)(6)). A Kenyan UH-1H rotary wing CASEVAC plan was coordinated by the (b)(1) 1.4.a (b)(3)/(b)(6) and the KDF. At approximately (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(3)/(b)(6) was evacuated to Lamu County Airport by KDF rotary wing and accompanied by CPR medical personnel. (b)(3)/(b)(6) was then transferred to U.S. nonstandard CASEVAC fixed wing asset and flown to CLDJ. (Exhibit 36: (b)(3)/(b)(6)).

(3) (U//FOUO) After (b)(3)/(b)(6) was recovered by US Forces at approximately (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(3)/(b)(6) was immediately treated at Camp Simba and later evacuated with CPR medical personnel a (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e on the C130 aircraft that brought in the EARF to CSL Manda Bay. (Exhibit 36: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) (b)(3)/(b)(6)).

14. (U) Scope of the Investigation Question #7 (Document the procedural measures in place at the time of the attack, to include who responded to the attack, the reporting to higher headquarters that an attack occurred, and the measures taken as consequence management after the attack).

a. (U//FOUO) Finding. Procedural Measures in place on 5 January 2020 at CSL Manda Bay. General base defense procedural measures in place during 5 January 2020 are annotated in the 475th EABS IDP and Air Force Policy Directive 31-1 and appear to have been followed. However, the 475th EABS IDP was inadequate. The IDP did not sufficiently address protection of air assets against an enemy ground force at the Airfield. The closest contingency that was addressed in the IDP was the manning guidance during a FPCON Delta event and the "Ground Attack/IDF/Small Arms" Quick Reaction Checklist. (Exhibit 28: 475th EABS IDP, Annex C Appendix 1 and Annex J Appendix 2 and Exhibit 37: 475th EABS QRC Ground Attack).

b. (U) Discussion.

(1) (S) According to the 475th EABS SOPs, CSL Manda Bay was in a FPCON-C posture. Under this FPCON-C posture status, (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g

(Exhibit 28: 475th EABS IDP, Annex C, Appendix 1).

(2) (S) The IDP states that in a contingency scenario (i.e. IDF ground attack, etc.) (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g

(Exhibit 28: 475th EABS IDP).

(3) (S) In the event of a complex attack, the SOP is unclear whether the (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g



(b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g

(b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g

(Exhibit 28: 475th EABS IDP).

c. ~~(S)~~ **Findings. Actual response on 5 January 2020.** On the morning of the attack at CSL Manda Bay, FPCON-C was in effect. When the IDF first landed on Camp Simba, there was confusion. Some personnel believed it was an exercise, but within minutes many personnel knew it was some sort of attack. (Exhibit 38: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)). There was also confusion at the Airfield. The personnel at Tower #10 first thought the tracers were flares and possibly an exercise. At approximately 0530 hours, reports of contact with IDF and SAF were sent to the BDOC. At approximately 0536 hours the (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g (Exhibit 39: 475th EABS Blotter (b)(3)/(b)(6)). Additionally, the 475th EABS Commander, (b)(3)/(b)(6) notified the 449th AEG Commander, (b)(3)/(b)(6) of the attack through the 449th TOC at Chebelley Airfield. (Exhibit 29: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) (b)(3)/(b)(6)) then moved to the CJTF-HOA Joint Operation Center (JOC). (Exhibit 35: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)).

d. (U) Discussion:

(1) ~~(S)~~ No later than (b)(1) 1.4.a (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g Security Forces personnel began to show up to the (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g The 475th EABS and the Base Defense Commanders (b)(3)/(b)(6) and (b)(3)/(b)(6) met with (b)(1) 1.4.a Commander (b)(3)/(b)(6) at the BDOC. (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) Exhibit 29: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) Exhibit 43: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) (b)(3)/(b)(6), the Base Defense Commander, was not sure if there would be a follow on attack on Camp Simba, but (b)(1) 1.4.a did know that the Airfield was under attack based on audio/visual contact and closed circuit video footage. (Exhibit 29: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)). All leadership present agreed that (b)(1) 1.4.a would send their (b)(1) 1.4.a (b)(1) 1.4.a to assess the conditions at the Airfield, which would allow the 475th EABS to maintain its QRF at Camp Simba. (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) Exhibit 29: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) Exhibit 43: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)). Security Forces also sent a response force of (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g as was typically used for transportation, to the Airfield (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g it their personnel at the Airfield. (Exhibit 39: 475th EABS Blotter, Exhibit 40: 475th EABS Manda Bay Attack AAR, p.21). This force essentially filled the role of the response force that the (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g

(2) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g

(b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 29: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)). This decision was made because during the initial phases of the attack it was still feasible that Camp Simba would be directly attacked by some size of enemy ground force, and it was reasonable to (b)(1) 1.4.a to assess the Airfield while Security Forces prepared for a possible attack at Camp Simba. (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) Exhibit 29: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)). (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g



(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) After having increased the FPCON level to Delta and sending QRF elements to the location of the enemy force, the next step in the SOP was to neutralize the enemy and get 100% accountability. (Exhibit 28: 475th EABS IDP). These two conditions took (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.7e and required the combined forces of MSOT, ESTS, KDF, KNAV, 475th EABS Security Forces and the (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.7e (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 10 (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e Manda Bay Attack Narrative, Exhibit 29: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6). The AS attack was not defeated until after multiple clearing attempts were executed by the combined forces. It took time and significant coordination to build sufficient combat power to force the AS element off of the Airfield. The importance of the Kenyan Forces cannot be overstated. The KDF/KNAV assets changed the tide of the combat action. (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 10: (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e Manda Bay Attack Narrative, Exhibit 29: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)

e. (U) Findings. Key Responders:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) The MSOT commander was the Acting Ground Force Commander and responsible for leading the systematic clearance of the Airfield against a force of 20-30 AS fighters. The MSOT coordinated with Kenyan forces to assist with the clearance of the Airfield and then conducted the follow on clearance of the KNAV housing areas after receiving reports of AS in that area. The MSOT was also critical in the CASEVAC of (b)(3)/(b)(6) on Kenyan rotary wing to the Lamu Airport (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e personnel element from the ESTS assisted with the clearance of the Airfield and the search for miss (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e S. personnel. In addition, the ESTS was responsible for marking the runway for the C130 carrying the EARF. (Exhibit 41: ESTS Story Board, Exhibit 42: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)

(3) (U) Th (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e as responsible for requesting and controlling ISR assets during the attack and clearance.

(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) Kenyan forces were on the Airfield before 0700. Kenyan forces participated in all phases of the Airfield clearance. Kenyan Ranger Regiment personnel were responsible for clearing the DoS hangar. The KDF leadership was responsible for employing KDF rotary wing in three separate gun runs on AS, which likely was the trigger for AS to begin to retrograde from the Airfield. The KNAV forces provided Airfield security and a fire truck on the Airfield. After the Airfield was secured, Kenyan forces led the clearance of the KNAV housing area and provided APC support. Ultimately KDF was responsible for the CASEVAC of (b)(3)/(b)(6) (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)

(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) 475th EABS Security Forces were responsible for the perimeter security of Camp Simba. Security Forces initially reinforced existing positions on the Airfield and provided additional security on the north end of the Airfield during clearance operations. They conducted 100% accountability of all organic personnel and their tenants. At approximately 1430 hours the Security Forces assumed control of the Airfield allowing MSOT to clear the KNAV housing area to the north. The 475th EABS Base Defense Commander was responsible for the orderly battle handoff of airfield security to the EARF (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 29: Statemen (b)(3)/(b)(6) Exhibit 43: (b)(3)/(b)(6)

f. (U//~~FOUO~~) Findings. Reporting Channels. There were several echelons of reporting. The first was the tactical reporting at CSL Manda Bay between units in contact and the BDOC. Secondly, there were individual units reporting to their respective higher level headquarters. In addition, CJTF-HOA collected reporting and created a central common operating picture (COP) in order to coordinate support

assets. (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 29: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 43: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) The 475th EABS' COP at CSL Manda Bay not clear or well-established. This was caused by friction from each participating unit reporting to their external higher headquarters instead of going through the BDOC. This friction was compounded by inconsistent FM network communications throughout the day. The MSOT, FAD, ESTS, 475th EABS Command Cell, and 475th BDOC all had independent C2 cells that were located in different buildings. Information during the attack was shared through cell phone contact or in-person communication with members of the USAF Security Forces and the other partners. (Exhibit 29: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)). Early on the command cell moved to the BDOC in order to consolidate information and make reporting easier. However, sharing information with the other participating units (i.e. MSOT, FAD, ESTS, and contractors) was slow and cumbersome. Each element had a narrow view of what was going on. (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 29: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 43: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)).

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) The COP in Djibouti was better because reporting at the CJTF-HOA JOC was being informed by Secure Voice Over Internet Protocol (SVOIP) and Multi-user Internet Relay Chat (MIRC) chat rooms that included all involved organizations. (Exhibit 13: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)). The 475th EABS sent reports to the 449th AEG Commander who moved to the CJTF-HOA JOC (Exhibit 35: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)). The MSOT sent reports to SOTF-EA which consolidated and disseminated them by MIRC chat to the CJTF-HOA JOC and other participating joint staff sections. (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)). The FAD on CSL Manda Bay was able to view ISR footage and coordinate and report with JSOAC-A through MIRC chat through an ISR chatroom with various ISR assets, JSOAC-A (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e and the CJTF-HOA JOC. The 475th EABS medical team was able to report to HOA PRCC, who communicated medical/CASEVAC requirements via MIRC chat with (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e the CJTF-HOA JOC, (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e and various air CASEVAC assets (Exhibit 44: MIRC chat Logs). The collective information sharing and consolidation at CJTF HOA allowed the HOA Deputy Commanding General and staff to clearly understand the situation at CSL Manda Bay and deliver the required support assets (Exhibit 45: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)).

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) Reporting at the tactical level and building a COP with the units on CSL Manda Bay was challenging. Part of the challenge was simply that the scale and complexity of the attack created chaos. The sheer number of different organizations trying to operate at CSL Manda Bay made tactical coordination and synchronization difficult. (Exhibit 42: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)). The geographic separation of C2 nodes and the reliance on cell phone and person-person communications meant that no one element had an adequate picture of events as they unfolded. Reporting to the joint level (CJTF-HOA) seemed to better achieve a COP that could enable informed decisions. Although, multiple elements were reporting to different organizations (i.e. SOTF-EA, JSOAC-A, 449th AEG, HOA PRCC), all information was consolidated at the CJTF-HOA JOC due to established reporting TTPs that ultimately created a reasonably accurate COP. The CJTF-HOA seemed to have a good handle on the situation and was well positioned to influence the fight.

g. (U//~~FOUO~~) **Findings: Consequence Management.** Consequence management included medical treatment/CASEVAC, fire control, and airfield operations post attack and security reinforcement by the EARF. (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 29: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 43: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)).

(1) (U) Medical treatment and CASEVAC operations are covered in the medical discussion in paragraph 13.



(2) (U) One Kenyan fire truck responded to the Airfield. The Kenyan truck has 2.5 thousand gallon capacity. The U.S. fire truck with 1 thousand gallon capacity remained on-call at Camp Simba.

(3) (U) The ESTS provided night airfield markings and airspace control which allowed the EARF to land in a C130 and later to evacuate wounded and non-essential personnel.

(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) The EARF served as the final consequence management mechanism that allowed U.S. forces who had been in action throughout the day to refit after the attack. The employment of the EARF was a deliberate decision by the CJFT-HOA DCG that provided the necessary manpower to secure the Airfield and improve force protection infrastructure. (Exhibit 45: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) Exhibit 46: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)).

h. (U//~~FOUO~~) Many different assets, belonging to many different organizations were employed to manage the consequences of the attack against CSL Manda Bay. It is important to note that the 475th EABS did not have the necessary assets to deal with the attack or its aftermath. It took units tasked with separate missions to use their expertise to bring the Airfield back on line and bring the EARF to CSL Manda Bay. It is also important to note that U.S. reinforcements and to a large extent CASEVAC were contingent on an operational airfield. The attack made clear that, without a functional airfield, U.S. personnel at CSL Manda Bay are isolated.

**15. (U) Scope of the Investigation Question #8 (Document the mission command structure; that is, the command and control in place at the time of the attack at Manda Bay and assess whether that structure caused undue friction or confusion in either defensive preparations or response).**

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) **Findings.** There was no overarching friction with the mission command structure and command and control in place at CSL Manda Bay and the CJOA is sufficient for steady state operations, but the size and complexity of the 5 January 2020 attack significantly stressed elements of those mission command and command and control structures. The 475th EABS was overwhelmed because the attack response required participation from nearly all its tenant organizations, which were not directly tied to their command and control structure. (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) Exhibit 29: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 43: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)). The mission command structure at CJTF-HOA was not overwhelmed because it consolidated reporting and asset support from SOTF-EA and JSOAC-A and it was able to leverage additional organic assets to help respond to the attack (i.e. EARF, CASEVAC assets). However, CJTF-HOA's ability to quickly ascertain the air picture at CSL Manda Bay and coordinate for additional CASEVAC assets was slightly complicated by the mission command structures in place that controlled air assets. The friction was based on the CJTF-HOA air operations not having complete awareness of other airframes in the vicinity. The CJTF-HOA J32 (b)(3)/(b)(6) stated that "there was no single air picture; they had no idea what aircraft at CSL Manda Bay were on the Airfield or what was (flying) in the air." The J32 only knew about CJTF-HOA aircraft, and had no situational awareness of the JSOAC-A (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e aircraft. (Exhibit 49: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 50: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)).

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Prior to 5 January 2020, the mission command structure and command and control in place at CSL Manda Bay and the CJOA did not cause undue friction to day-to-day operations. (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 29: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 43: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)). The 475th EABS had a clear command and control structure designed for local events and day-to-day security. (Exhibit 43: (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 47: 475th EABS Structure). The tenant units that resided on CSL Manda Bay had separate headquarters (i.e. JSOAC-A, (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e ESTS, and MSOT) and were performing independent missions that were unrelated to the daily operations of the 475th EABS. (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 29: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) Exhibit 43: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)). On the

day of the attack, the size and complexity of the events critically tested the existing mission command and C2 structures.

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) The MSOT is TACON to SOTF-EA and (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4.d, (b)(1) 1.7e (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4d, (b)(1) 1.7e . (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) , Exhibit 29: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) Exhibit 43: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) ). (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e and their reporting remains to their parent organization. They are a tenant of CSL Manda Bay, but do not have any formal support role in any of the 475th EABS defense plans. (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) ). During the 5 January 2020 attack, however, the MSOT Commander became the ground force commander. The MSOT was instrumental in the response to the attack that day. The MSOT Commander maintained command and control of 475th EABS base Security Forces while simultaneously reporting to SOTF-EA. All reports and requests for support were communicated and consolidated through SOTF-EA and relayed to CJTF-HOA. This did not appear to create undue friction for SOTF-EA or CJTF-HOA, but coordinating with the 475th EABS was sometimes problematic because MSOT's C2 node was separated from the 475th EABS BDOC which meant that reporting had to be done through a combination of a runner, cell phone and SVOIP. (Exhibit 8: (b)(3)/(b)(6) ).

(2) (S//~~NF~~) (b)(1) 1.4 a (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4c (b)(1) 1.4 a (Exhibit 48: JSOAC-A Newcomers Brief). During the attack, ESTS and FAD MB became decisively engaged with both airfield security and the coordination of ISR assets. (Exhibit 10: ESTS Manda Bay Attack Narrative). The two units were able to effectively coordinate and control ISR assets through JSOAC-A. The intelligence captured during ISR operations was easily tracked by CJTF-HOA through MIRC Chat and ISR feeds. (Exhibit 44: MIRC Chat Logs). A member of the ESTS (b)(1) 1.4 a while (b)(3)/(b)(6) was securing the Airfield. However, the 475th EABS had to send runners to the FAD command and control node to get ISR updates. (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) , Exhibit 29: (b)(3)/(b)(6) , Exhibit 42: (b)(3)/(b)(6) ).

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) The 475th EABS is OPCON to 449th AEG, which is OPCON to 435th AEW, which is OPCON to AFAF. AFAF has BOS-I for Manda Bay (Exhibit 25: USAFRICOM BOS-I TASKORD). The 449th AEG is the Senior Airfield Authority (SAA) (Exhibit 35: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) ). The 475th EABS is responsible for providing the necessary life support and base security for the tenants residing on Camp Simba as well as the operations being conducted on the Airfield (i.e. airfield security, LZSO activities, airfield support). All force protection improvements, request for forces, etc. are routed through this chain. (Exhibit 35: (b)(3)/(b)(6) ). During the attack, the C2 structure of the 475th EABS was initially overwhelmed by the size and complexity of the attack because the response required actions from many of its tenants. The 475th EABS, as discussed in paragraph 14.f (1), did not have the ability to communicate easily with all their tenants during a contingency operation at CSL Manda Bay. Additionally, MSOT became the ground force commander, which put the 475th EABS in a support role for the duration of the attack. At the next echelon, the 449th AEG was able to consolidate the reporting from the 475th EABS and effectively consolidate it for CJTF-HOA. Although the 475th EABS command and control structure was initially overwhelmed, this was greatly mitigated when the MSOT Commander became the ground force commander. This effectively allowed them to operate the base defense of Camp Simba under their existing command and control architecture, while the MSOT focused on the attack at the Airfield. (Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) Exhibit 29: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) , Exhibit 43: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) ).

(4) (S//~~S~~) There were approximately four separate companies running contracted air assets out of CSL Manda Bay at the time of the attack. (Contractors known as L3, Stamp, Sierra Nevada

Corporation, and Construction Helicopters, Inc). Each company had separate, independent missions and received their tasks from (b)(1) 1.4 a JSOAC-A, or CJTF-HOA PRC. The contractor pilots and respective air support crews were residents on Camp Simba and commuted to the Airfield to conduct operations. (See Table 1, Exhibit 38: Statemen (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 64: MFR Contractors). Yet, on the day of the attack, it was not possible to assess whether or not the command structure caused undue friction or confusion because (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g were destroyed so quickly. However, CPR was able to effectively work under the 475th EABS command and control architecture to assist with CASEVAC and brought in an external asset to assist with (b)(3)/(b)(6) CASEVAC. (See paragraph 13).

(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) CJTF-HOA is OPCON to USAFRICOM and supports operations in the CJOA, which includes the following countries: Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. Only the CPR assets in CSL Manda Bay directly work for CJTF-HOA. (Exhibit 57 (b)(3)/(b)(6) During an emergency crisis event such as the attack on CSL Manda Bay, CJTF-HOA becomes the primary command and control node that coordinates a response. During the attack, CJTF-HOA was able get a clear COP from multiple reporting channels and effectively respond with the assets at their disposal (i.e. EARF deployment, (b)(1) 1.4c CASEVAC). However, there was some friction reported by the staff due to unclear air mission command structures. (Exhibit 49: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) and Exhibit 50: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) ).

(6) (U//~~FOUO~~) Immediately after the attack, CJTF-HOA could not determine how many aircraft should have been on the Airfield and which aircraft were actually airborne. Additionally, when CJTF-HOA staff began coordinating ways to evacuate casualties, it required many phone calls to determine what aircraft were in the area and available. As a plan formulated to evacuate the first casualties (using Kenyan rotary wing, SOCAF, and HOA aircraft) many phone calls were required to get permission to execute the plan. There was no single authority over all the aircraft used. (Exhibit 49: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) and Exhibit 50: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) ). Ultimately, these friction points did not halt operations, but they did cause some unnecessary delays.

**16. (U) Scope of the Investigation Question #9 (Assess if any misconduct or negligence contributed to the loss of life or damage to property).**

(U//~~FOUO~~) **Findings.** Loss of life or damage to property were not the direct result of misconduct or criminal negligence by U.S. personnel. No single point of failure resulted in the loss of life and damage to property at CSL Manda Bay. Loss of life and damage to property were not the result of criminal negligence by leaders. However, failures and inactions by leaders at the 475th BDF and 475th EABS, as well as the lack of oversight by commanders and staff officers at CJTF-HOA, 449th AEG, the 435th AEW, AFAFRICA, and USAFRICOM did contribute to the loss of three lives and damage to property in excess of \$90 million dollars. In fact, the approach to force protection at CSL Manda Bay was characterized by a general culture of complacency which permeated every echelon of leadership and existed for several years. (Exhibit 1: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 2: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 13: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) Exhibit 15: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) See 18(g) for additional analysis.

**17. (U) Scope of the Investigation Question #10 (Were there measures that could have been taken to prevent or mitigate this attack by AS)?**

(U) Yes, there were several measures that could have prevented this attack by AS. The measures are related to leadership, Security Force readiness and force protection plans, intelligence sharing, structured processes to evaluate and control adjustments to posture locations, as well as the assets that are placed at those locations. See paragraph 18 for further discussion.



**18. (U) Scope of the Investigation Question #11 (Provide recommendations for any procedural and / or mission command changes to prevent or mitigate the recurrence of this type of loss).**

**a. (U) Finding Relating to Force Protection Focus.**

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) From 2004 until 2016, CSL Manda Bay's airfield was not a full-time operational airfield. When an aircraft arrived, forces from Camp Simba would temporarily come down to secure the Airfield and return when the aircraft departed. In 2016, CSL Manda Bay became a full-time operational airfield with up to 11 aircraft operating full-time; yet for the next four years the force protection measures never adjusted to air operations new tempo (Exhibit 79: Statement <sup>(b)(3)/(b)(6)</sup> and Exhibit 35: Statement <sup>(b)(3)/(b)(6)</sup>). Since then, every leader that ever visited CSL Manda Bay, or who had responsibility for the force protection of it, contributed to the successful 5 January terrorist attack by tolerating an overall sense of complacency. This negatively impacted force protection and allowed an acceptance of the status quo. All levels of leadership, who had responsibility and oversight of CSL Manda Bay failed to enforce random antiterrorism measures on the Airfield and did not mandate a 360 degree defense of the Airfield from 2016 to 2020.

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) On 5 January 2020 the Commander of the 475th EABS and the 475th BDF (tactical leadership) did not enforce a force protection (FP) mindset commensurate with a FPCON-C country. A 2019 USAFRICOM message established Kenya as an FPCON-C country (Exhibit 91: ACM 3204.07A AT Force Protection Measures). Kenya's FPCON-C status was based on previous terror attacks that had occurred at other locations inside Kenyan borders. The mindset of the 475th EABS commander (tactical leadership) <sup>(b)(3)/(b)(6)</sup> senior NCOs was more focused on individual morale and welfare than the force protection requirements of the CSL. (Exhibit 43: <sup>(b)(3)/(b)(6)</sup> statement). Commanders of the 435th AEW and the 449th AEG (operational leadership) did not provide adequate oversight of tactical leaders to ensure there was adequate force protection of the Airfield. Although the 435th AEW Commander ordered the 475th EABS and 449th AEG to have concertina wire around the Airfield no later than 31 January 2020; the wire had not been purchased when the attack occurred on 5 January. These conditions were not adequately addressed due to an overall lack of force protection measures and oversight at the Airfield at CSL Manda Bay.

(3) (U) **Recommendation:** Leaders at all levels must ensure there is an adequate Integrated Defense Plan (IDP) for all posture locations with a sufficient amount of forces, a designated base defense commander with tactical control (TACON) of all tenant units, a Base Cluster Operations Center, and a sufficient amount of bunkers.

**b. (U) Finding Relating to Understanding of the Threat.**

(1) (~~S~~) It is discernible in hindsight that improved intelligence sharing of the enemy's intentions and greater scrutiny of the December 2019 <sup>(b)(1) 1.4c</sup> report may have inspired increased force protection measures at the CSL. There was a <sup>(b)(1) 1.4c</sup> report that mentioned a possible attack of a <sup>(b)(1) 1.4c</sup>. Although not a major contributing factor to a successful terrorist attack, intelligence sharing is an issue that needs improvement. Attacks on citizens of the United States were unprecedented in Kenya. The base had never been attacked, in any manner, in its sixteen years of existence. Personnel stationed at CSL Manda Bay frequented the off-post village, the pier, and the beach repeatedly for years without incident. There was nothing in the threat information that changed this reality. Yet, intelligence sharing was hindered by the absence of the Expeditionary Air Base Squadron (EABS) Intelligence (or Antiterrorism Analyst) Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) who had been

relieved of duties for misconduct approximately 10 days before the attack. (Exhibit 43: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)). After 25 December 2019, no one internal to the EABS was analyzing intelligence focused on CSL Manda Bay's force protection and the 475th EABS Commander did not request a replacement. Yet, AFOSI, MSOT, and ESTS representatives had the ability to share intelligence with the 475th EABS Commander if they determined it was relevant to increase their force protection posture. (b)(1) 1.4c report was not deemed worthy of mention based on their assessment that it was unlikely AS would attack US forces in Kenya. EABS Intelligence personnel were also unable to gain access to critical intelligence reports. This may have resulted in the 475th EABS Commander not having the awareness of (b)(1) 1.4c. However, all tenant units worked very well together and communicated regularly at the Squadron Weekly Intelligence Meeting. The OSI agent at CSL Manda Bay was very competent and communicated very frequently with the 475th EABS Commander. So although a factor that needs improvement, the (b)(1) 1.4c available to leaders at echelon was not compelling enough to overcome the false sense of security and complacency at CSL Manda Bay. The insufficient force protection measures at CSL Manda Bay on 5 January 2020 reflected this reality.

**(2) (U) Recommendations:**

(a) (U) Recommend that the AFAF EABS always has both an Intelligence Officer and Intelligence NCO with proper access to systems to enable intelligence awareness and intelligence fusion at the lowest level. These Intelligence POCs should also hold a Weekly Threat Working Group and report status to CL/CSL commander and collaborate with the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT) monthly.

(b) (U) Recommend the improvement of CL/CSL vetting for Locally Employed Personnel; USAFRICOM must standardize vetting for all CL/CSL locations.

(c) (U) Recommend that ACJ2 and Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) J2 create and share a long-term intelligence picture that educates all new organizations at CL/CSLs; this mitigates intelligence gaps that result from six month or year-long deployment in the Combined Joint Operations Area (CJOA).

(d) (U) Recommend Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Division (J2X) representative perform bi-annual mandatory site visit for all CL/CSLs.

**c. (U) Finding Relating to Security Force Preparation.**

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Security Force training and the readiness at CSL Manda Bay was grossly deficient and significantly contributed to the successful AS attack. Although the Security Forces possessed the proper equipment to perform their mission, the pre-deployment training for USAF Security Force personnel did not include collective level training or a mission rehearsal exercise to ensure the force was adequately prepared to provide FP of the CSL. The Security Forces also lacked offensive maneuver training and weapons qualifications at night. Overall, the Security Forces lacked basic tactical fundamentals for defending the terrain surrounding CSL Manda Bay.

**(2) (U) Recommendations:**

(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) Recommend that USAFRICOM require the Service Component Commands to perform pre-deployment training that includes a full mission profile training event against a live opposing

force in both day and night conditions. Training should be tailored to the future environment, to include weapon qualifications in day and night conditions.

(b) (U//~~FOUO~~) Recommend AFAF change the Security Forces pre-deployment training, currently called "Tier Training." This new training concept should include this attack as a vignette for all future Security Force pre-deployment training.

**d. (U) Finding Relating to Mission Command.**

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) The purpose of CSL Manda Bay was not clearly understood. The fact that CSL Manda Bay was both a full-time airfield and a Life Support Area (LSA) was not apparent to all. The 475th EABS Commander was unclear as well. (b)(3)/(b)(6) stated that "the purpose of Camp Simba was all about the Airfield," yet "it did not make any sense to (b)(3)/(b)(6) why (b)(3)/(b)(6) unit was not protecting the aircraft on the Airfield. (Exhibit 43). Nor did the next echelon commanders (435th AEW and 449th AEG) make it clear that the 475th EABS should be protecting the Airfield and the LSA. Force protection experts (the AFAF A4S) from AFAF did not know who was responsible for protecting critical assets at the Airfield and incorrectly believed it was the host nation's responsibility to protect the Airfield (Exhibit 67).

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) USAFRICOM lacked an effective process to control the placement of critical assets into a location before FP measures were in place. This allowed a diverse group of units (CJTF-HOA, JSOAC-A as part of SOCAF (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e as part of USSOCOM) to place critical assets in locations that did not have sufficient FP measures. None of the Commanders of those three organizations ensured there was proper security for their respective air assets on the Airfield. Successive CJTF-HOA Commanders did not ensure there was proper force protection for that organization's PC-12 and two Bell 412 aircraft. The JSOAC-A Commander did not ensure there was proper force protection for that organization's CASA 212 aircraft. The (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e Commander did not ensure there was proper force protection of that organization's DHC-8 (or DASH-8) and B-350 aircraft.

**(3) (U) Recommendations:**

(a) (U) Recommend that USAFRICOM improve its process to control mission creep and asset introduction, provide and communicate the clear purpose of all posture locations, and ensure proper force protection measures at all posture locations.

(b) (U) Recommend USAFRICOM require that the Service Component Commands improve their contract oversight (to include USSOCOM). Security requirements with contract operated assets should not be difficult to discern, but openly defined in an order.

(c) (U) Recommend USAFRICOM and CJTF-HOA ensure there is a single air common operating picture in the CJOA. Also recommend that a "Rated Officer" is assigned to any airfield operating full-time.

(d) (U) Recommend AFAF designate CSL Manda Bay as a Protection Level 3 posture location (in accordance with AFI 31-101 dated 6 July 2017, page one). This would validate proper resources like fences, sensors, cameras, lights, towers, and adequate vegetation removal when applicable.

(e) (U//~~FOUO~~) Recommend USAFRICOM enforce the use of the Expeditionary Risk Management Tool. All CL/CSLs should be required to evaluate airfield and aircraft as critical assets to determine appropriate security in accordance with the Mission Assurance process. This would ensure active airfields get added to the Task Critical Asset List in the AOR.



**19. (U) Scope of the Investigation Question #12 (Include thorough analysis of whether the circumstances alleged are accurate and merit correction. You should also report whether any personnel should be recognized for their meritorious conduct, as well as held accountable for any shortcomings or failures).**

a. (U) The preceding discussion outlines the circumstances of what occurred on 5 January 2020, as well as recommended corrective actions.

b. (U) **Finding:** There are US personnel and Kenyan Defense Forces that merit recognition. Recognition for meritorious conduct and gallantry in action for the following MSOT personnel:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6) demonstrated gallantry in action throughout the day. personal actions and leadership saved lives and was the decisive factor in re-taking the Airfield. should be recognized for leadership and heroic achievements under enemy fire against a larger enemy force.

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6) demonstrated gallantry in action throughout the day. should be recognized for heroic achievements under enemy fire against a larger enemy force.

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6) should be recognized for being wounded in action and recognized for heroic achievements under enemy fire against a larger enemy force.

(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6) should be recognized for efforts treating fellow MSOT member under fire and for heroic achievements under enemy fire against a larger enemy force.

(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6) should be recognized for heroic achievements under enemy fire against a larger enemy force.

(6) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6) should be recognized for heroic achievements under fire against a larger enemy force.

(7) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6) should be recognized for heroic achievements under enemy fire against a larger enemy force.

(8) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6) should be recognized for heroic achievements under enemy fire against a larger enemy force.

(9) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6) should be recognized for heroic achievements under enemy fire against a larger enemy force.

(10) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6) should be recognized for heroic achievement in support of combat action.

(11) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6) should be recognized for meritorious achievement in support of combat action.

(12) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6) should be recognized for meritorious achievement in support of combat action.

c. (U) Recognition for meritorious conduct of ESTS-A personnel as follows:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6) should be recognized for heroic achievement under enemy fire in support of combat action.

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6) should be recognized for heroic achievement under enemy fire in support of combat action.

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6) should be recognized for medical treatment of (b)(3)/(b)(6) and for heroic achievement under enemy fire against a larger enemy force.

(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6) should be recognized for heroic achievements under enemy fire against a larger enemy force.

(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6) should be recognized for heroic achievements under enemy fire against a larger enemy force.

(6) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6) should be recognized for heroic achievements under enemy fire against a larger enemy force.

(7) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6) should be recognized for heroic achievements under enemy fire against a larger enemy force.

(8) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6) should be recognized for meritorious achievement in support of combat action regarding the key role played in acquiring ISR support.

c. (U) Recognition for meritorious conduct by DoD contractors as follows:

(1) (b)(3)/(b)(6) who was critical to the BDOC operations throughout the day. provided expert advice and assistance related to communications, CASEVAC, and general situation awareness for the BDOC. personal actions should be formally recognized through the appropriate contracting officer.

(2) (b)(3)/(b)(6) actions on the Airfield during the attack most likely saved the life of (b)(3)/(b)(6). They should be recognized for extracting (b)(3)/(b)(6). If they stayed at the Airfield, they all most likely would have been killed by the AS element.

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) Recognition for meritorious conduct of 475th EABS personnel as follows:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6) should be recognized for meritorious achievement in support of combat action for personal efforts on 5 January 2020 treating wounded personnel and for efforts in retrieving the remains of our friendly KIA.

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6), USAF, should be recognized for part in responding to the Airfield to retrieve (b)(3)/(b)(6) in Tower #10.

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6), USAF, should be recognized for part in responding to the Airfield to retrieve (b)(3)/(b)(6) in Tower #10.

e. (U//~~FOUO~~) Recognition for meritorious conduct of the leadership and Soldiers of the EARF (elements of 3/101 Infantry Brigade Combat Team) for their actions on the evening of 5 January 2020 and their relief of the MSOT and ESTS element. The EARF's ability to rapidly respond with no notice and successfully deploy from another country was impressive. Their actions improving the defensive posture, in the weeks after 5 January, were critical to enabling continued air operations from CSL Manda Bay.

f. (U) Recognition for meritorious conduct by Kenyan military personnel:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6) should be recognized for meritorious efforts coordinating air to ground support during the lethal engagement with the AS assault force consisting of up to 30 personnel. was personally responsible for the MD500 rotary wing mini-gun engagements which changed the tide of the firefight between U.S. and Kenyan forces against the Al Shabaab threat.

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6) should be recognized for gallant actions against a larger enemy force. (b)(3)/(b)(6) took charge of an ad hoc Kenyan Ranger and Army Special Teams element and assaulted the AS element without concern for personal welfare. heroic leadership helped neutralize the overwhelming enemy element. Without personal initiative, the outcome would have been very different. actions are a great demonstration of the Kenyan resolve to defeat terrorist elements in Kenya and in eastern Africa.

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)/(b)(6) should be recognized for heroic actions in the face of a larger enemy element. was wounded by grenade shrapnel while assaulting an AS force. (b)(3)/(b)(6) displayed incredible initiative during the firefight and showed complete disregard for own personal well-being in order to accomplish the mission.

**g. (U) Based on the preceding discussion and analysis, there are personnel that may warrant administrative or disciplinary action.**

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) **Findings.** As stated in paragraph 16, loss of life and damage to property were not the direct result of misconduct or criminal negligence by any single person. No single point of failure resulted in the loss of life and damage to property at CSL Manda Bay. The evidence does not show that individuals willfully failed to perform their duty. Nor was there willful intent by the leaders to have people harmed. Loss of life and damage to property were not the result of criminal negligence by leaders. It was apparent that every leader involved in this incident had genuine concern for the well-being of their subordinates, their equipment, and the mission. However, the evidence suggests that certain leaders may have been culpable.

(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) The overall sense of complacency and an acceptance of the status quo displayed by the 475th EABS and the 475th BDF leadership resulted in the Airfield being highly vulnerable to an AS attack. The commanders of the 475th EABS and the 475th BDF failed to implement an adequate IDP. An adequate IDP would have included a sufficient amount of bunkers at Camp Simba, a sufficient amount of active patrols at the Airfield, and other airfield defensive measures such as, additional towers, obstacles, cameras, sensors, lights, clearance of surrounding vegetation, and a sufficient organic QRF. These commanders should also have ensured nighttime weapon qualification and proper maintenance of ammunition for the M240B machineguns in the towers.

(b) (U//~~FOUO~~) Ineptitude<sup>8</sup> by the commanders of the 475th EABS and the 475th BDF did contribute to the loss of three lives and damage to property in excess of \$90 million dollars.

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<sup>8</sup> (U) Article 92, Uniform Code of Military Justice contrasts ineptitude with dereliction of duty as follows: “a person is not derelict in the performance of duties if the failure to perform those duties is caused by ineptitude rather than by willfulness, negligence, or culpable inefficiency, and may not be charged under this article, or otherwise punished. For example, a recruit who has tried earnestly during rifle training and throughout record firing is not derelict in the performance of duties if the recruit fails to qualify with the weapon.”



(c) (U//~~FOUO~~) The AFAFRICA A4, the 435th AEW Commander, and the 449th AEG Commander were inadequate in their leader oversight.

(d) (U//~~FOUO~~) The lack of oversight by successive A4s (and designated SROs), and the commanders of the 435th AEW and the 449th AEG contributed to the 5 January 2020 attack. In fact, the approach to force protection at CSL Manda Bay was characterized by a general culture of complacency which permeated every echelon of leadership for several years. (Exhibit 1: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 2: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 13: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6), Exhibit 15: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)).

(e) (U) The USAFRICOM process did not ensure proper oversight of force protection at CSL Manda Bay. Moreover, USAFRICOM and the designated service SRO did not ensure the proper requirements were in place to protect a full-time airfield. The flawed process allowed commanders of the JSOAC-A (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.7e and CJTF-HOA to place their valuable air assets on the Airfield without first ensuring there was adequate force protection.

(f) (U//~~FOUO~~) USAFRICOM does not have an effective process for controlling the introduction of new assets to existing posture locations. This allowed CSL Manda Bay to transition from an episodic airfield to a full-time operating airfield without effective control measures to ensure proper force protection. In this case, it enabled CSL Manda Bay to grow from supporting episodic C-130 aircraft operations, to permanently supporting up to 11 GOCO and COCO aircraft operating full-time. The flawed process allowed mission creep (or asset creep) to occur over time without ensuring proper force protection.

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) **Mitigation.** There are several mitigating factors to consider when determining the degree of culpability of the leaders listed above. Each leader had a sizable scope of duties that spanned a broad area and each leader had many other subordinate units to oversee. The commanders of the 435th AEW and the 449th AEG acknowledged the tactical inexperience of the 475th EABS leadership at CSL Manda Bay and both worked diligently to improve the physical security at the airfield. They were both very aware of the physical force protection shortfalls like the lack of fence and the need to clear the vegetation. In addition, CSL Manda Bay was commonly believed to be the least likely location that a terrorist group would attack in comparison to all of the other CSLs on the continent. This reality informed leadership decisions and resource allocation at CSL Manda Bay.

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) **Recommendations.**

(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) Recommend AFAFRICA take appropriate action with the A4 and the commanders of the 435th AEW and the 449th AEG for providing insufficient leader oversight of subordinate units to ensure adequate force protection of the airfield. The insufficient leader oversight contributed to the U.S. loss of life and loss of over \$90M in U.S. government property at CSL Manda Bay.

(b) (U//~~FOUO~~) Recommend AFAFRICA take appropriate action for the inept leadership of the commander of the 475th EABS and the commander of the 475th BDF for their inability to properly secure the Airfield with the same vigor as Camp Simba. The ineptitude of these leaders contributed to the U.S. loss of life and loss of over \$90M in U.S. government property at CSL Manda Bay.

(c) (U//~~FOUO~~) In addition to the leadership and oversight shortfalls outlined above, the investigation produced evidence of some potential performance failures at the tactical level during the 5 January 2020 attack. These failures did not directly result in loss of life or loss of property, but indicate indiscipline and may warrant correction. Recommend AFAFRICA conduct further inquiry into the actions of the airmen at Tower #10 and why they failed to engage the enemy with a crew served weapon;

and inquire into the actions of the (b)(3)/(b)(6)  
(b)(3)/(b)(6)  
(b)(3)/(b)(6) (Exhibit 40: 475th EABS BDF After Action Review and Exhibit 39: 475th EABS BDF Blotter from 5 JAN 20).

20. (U//~~FOUO~~) Point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned investigating officer (b)(6)  
(b)(3)/(b)(6)

(b)(3)/(b)(6)



Investigating Officer

21. List of Exhibits.

<b>Exhibit</b>	<b>Classification</b>
Exhibit 1: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(S)
Exhibit 2: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(S)
Exhibit 3: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 4: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 5: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 6: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 7: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 8: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) (MSOT)	(S)
Exhibit 9: TM MB Complex Attack Story Board	(S)
Exhibit 10: ESTS Manday Bay Attack Narrative	(S)
Exhibit 11: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(S//NF)
Exhibit 12: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) (435 AEW)	(S)
Exhibit 13: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(S)
Exhibit 14: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(S//NF)
Exhibit 15: Statement (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(S)
Exhibit 16: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 17: DIA CTDB Record AUG19	(S//NF/FISA)
Exhibit 18: MSOT TVA DEC19	(S//NF)
Exhibit 19: AFOSI Manda Bay Threat Assessment JUL19	(S//NF)
Exhibit 20: AMC Kenya Risk Assessment JUL19	(S//NF)
Exhibit 21: FPD-Kenya Threat Assessment SEP19	(S//NF)
Exhibit 22: NCIS Manda Bay Assessment FEB17	(S//NF)
Exhibit 23: NCIS Kenya Assessment FEB19	(S//NF)
Exhibit 24: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(S//NF)
Exhibit 25: USAFRICOM BOS-I TASKORD	(S)
Exhibit 26: AFD 31-1	(U)
Exhibit 27: AFI 31-101 (excerpt)	(FOUO)
Exhibit 28: 475th EABS IDP	(S//NF)
Exhibit 29: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(S)
Exhibit 30: USAFRICOM Protection OPORD 14-10	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 31: MFR (b)(3)/(b)(6) (15-6 team)	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 32: MFR (b)(3)/(b)(6) (15-6 team)	(S)
Exhibit 33: Camp Simba Manpower Study (A4S)	(U)
Exhibit 34: 449th Manda Bay Fence Project	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 35: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) (449th AEG)	(S)
Exhibit 36: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(S)
Exhibit 37: 475th EABS QRC Ground Attack	(U)
Exhibit 38: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 39: 475th EABS Blotter	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 40: 475th Manda Bay Attack AAR	(U//FOUO)



Exhibit 41: ESTS Story Board	(S//NF)
Exhibit 42: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(S)
Exhibit 43: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) (475 <sup>th</sup> EABS)	(S)
Exhibit 44: MIRC chat Logs	(S)
Exhibit 45: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(S)
Exhibit 46: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(S)
Exhibit 47: 475th EABS Structure	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 48: JSOAC-A Newcomers Brief	(U)
Exhibit 49: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(S)
Exhibit 50: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(S//NF)
Exhibit 51: ACI 3203.11	(U)
Exhibit 52: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(S)
Exhibit 53: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(S)
Exhibit 54: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 55: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 56: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(S//NF)
Exhibit 57: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(S//NF)
Exhibit 58: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(S)
Exhibit 59: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(S//NF)
Exhibit 60: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) ¶	(S//NF)
Exhibit 61: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 62: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(S)
Exhibit 63: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6) (A4)	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 64: MFR Contractors Discussion	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 65: MFR Kenyan Base Dep Commander	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 66: MFR #2 (b)(3)/(b)(6) (435 AEW, AFI 31-101)	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 67: A4S AFAF Visit 23OCT-14NOV	(S)
Exhibit 68: USAFRICOM COMREL	(S)
Exhibit 69: ACM 3204.02 Physical Security for CL/CSL	(U)
Exhibit 70: 475th IDF Full Dress AAR	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 71: USAFRICOM History (excerpt)	(S//NF)
Exhibit 72: 435 AEW Org Structure	(U)
Exhibit 73: Big Safari CASEVAC PWS (excerpt)	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 74: KBR Equipment Losses	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 75: STAMP Equipment Losses	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 76: (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b) Contract Equipment Losses	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 77: (b)(3)/(b)(6) Equipment Loss Summary	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 78: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(S)
Exhibit 79: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(S//NF)
Exhibit 80: Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 81: Big Safari Equipment Loss	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 82: CCTV CSL Manda Bay Airfield (1)	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 83: CCTV CSL Manda Bay Airfield (2)	(U//FOUO)

Exhibit 84	(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g	CSL Manda Bay Airfield (3)	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 85		CSL Manda Bay Airfield (4)	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 86		CSL Manda Bay Airfield (5)	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 87		CSL Manda Bay Airfield (6)	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 88:		Autopsy SPC Mayfield	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 89:		USAFRICOM J4 Trip Report 27NOV19	(U)
Exhibit 90:		MFR OSI Perspective 14MAY20	(S//NF)
Exhibit 91:		ACM 3204.07A (AT Force Pro Measures)	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 92:		GO/FO SRO Force Pro Memorandum	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 93:	(b)(3)/(b)(6)	and Tier Training Documents	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 94:		Army Regulation 600-20 (Excerpt)	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 95:		Air Force Regulation 1-2	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 96:		Unified Campaign Plan	(U//FOUO)
Exhibit 97:		Second Statement and Attachments (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(S//NF)
Exhibit 98:		Second Statement (b)(3)/(b)(6)	(U//FOUO)

22. (U) GLOSSARY OF TERMS

<b>ACRONYM</b>	<b>MEANING</b>
AEG	Air Expeditionary Group
AEW	Air Expeditionary Wing
AFAF	Air Force Africa
AFOSI	Air Force Office of Special Investigations
AMC	Air Mobility Command
AS	Al-Shabaab
BCOC	Base Cluster Operations Center
BDOC	Base Defense Operations Center
BMA	Baladogle Military Airfield
BOS-I	Base Operating Systems Integrator
CASEVAC	Casualty Evacuation
CCTV	Close Circuit Television
CJOA	Combined Joint Operations Area
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa
CLDJ	Contingency Location Djibouti
COA	Course of Action
COCO	Contractor Owned Contractor Operated
CONNEX	Container Exportable
COP	Common Operating Picture
CPR	Contracted Personnel Recovery
CSL	Cooperation Security Location
DCG	Deputy Commanding General
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DoS	Department of State
EABS	Expeditionary Air Base Squadron
EARF	East African Response Force
ECP	Entry Control Point
EKIA	Enemy Killed in Action
ESTS	Expeditionary Special Tactics Squadron
FAD	Forward Aircraft Detachment
FKIA	Friendly Killed in Action
FP	Force Protection
FPCON	Force Protection Condition
FWIA	Friendly Wounded in Action
GOCO	Government Owned Contractor Operated
IDF	Indirect Fire
IDP	Integrated Defense Plan
IOT	In Order To
ISR	Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance
JIPOE	Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
JOC	Joint Operations Center



JSOAC-A Joint Special Operations Air Component Africa  
(b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.7e

KDF	Kenyan Defense Force
KIA	Killed in Action
KNAV	Kenyan Navy
LZSO	Landing Zone Safety Officer
MATV	Mine Resistant Ambush Protective All-Terrain Vehicle
MB	Manda Bay
MIA	Missing in Action
MIRC	Multi-user Internet Relay Chat
MSOT	Marine Special Operations Team
NAVAF	United States Navy Africa
NCIS	Naval Criminal Investigation Service
NCOIC	Non Commissioned Officer In Charge
OPCON	Operational Control
PJ	Para rescue
PR	Personnel Recovery
PRCC	Personnel Recovery Control Center
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade
SA	Situational Awareness
SAA	Senior Airfield Authority
SAF	Small Arms Fire
SBF	Support by Fire
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SOTF-EA	Special Operations Task Force East Africa
SVOIP	Secure Voice Over Internet Protocol
TACON	Tactical Control
TM MB	Team Manda Bay
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFRICOM	United States Africa Command
WIA	Wounded in Action



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND  
UNIT 29951  
APO AE 09751

J0

06 January 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR (b)(3)/(b)(6), United States Army, Africa

SUBJECT: Appointment of Investigating Officer

1. References.

a. Army Regulation 15-6, Procedures for Investigation Officers and Boards of Officers, 1 May 2016

b. ACI 5800.03B, Administration of Military Justice, 12 August 2013

2. Appointment. You are hereby appointed as an investigating officer (IO) pursuant to AR 15-6, to conduct an investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack by al-Shabab (AS) of the airfield at Manda Bay near Camp Simba, Kenya on 5 January 2020. This attack resulted in the loss of life, injury to personnel, and damage to both facilities and aircraft. Your responsibilities as an IO take precedence over all other military duties. You will complete your investigation and provide me with a written report with a summary of findings and recommendations not later than 7 February 2020. Coordinate any requests for an extension through your legal advisor.

3. Scope of Investigation. You are hereby directed to conduct an investigation into the facts and circumstances leading up to and resulting in the loss of life and damage to property at Manda Bay, Kenya on 5 January 2020. At a minimum, you shall:

a. Gather all known facts and information to develop a comprehensive timeline of events;

b. Who was killed and injured during the attack by AS and how, if known – both friendly and enemy personnel?

c. What was the extent of damage done to friendly facilities and aircraft at Manda Bay?

d. Assess the defensive plan and force protection measures at the base in place at the time of the attack and determine if they were reasonable and appropriate based on the threat information available to leaders at echelon prior to the attack.

e. Assess whether there were delays to any planned force protection improvements and, if so, did those delays contribute to the conditions leading to the attack and its effects.

SUBJECT: Appointment of Investigating Officer

f. What medical care was available to the injured personnel in the wake of the attack, to include medical evacuations?

g. Document the procedural measures in place at the time of the attack, to include who responded to the attack, the reporting to higher headquarters that an attack occurred, and the measures taken as consequence management after the attack;

h. Document the mission command structure; that is, the command and control in place at the time of the attack at Manda Bay and assess whether that structure caused undue friction or confusion in either defensive preparations or response;

i. Assess if any misconduct or negligence contributed to the loss of life or damage to property;

j. Were there measures that could have been taken to prevent or mitigate this attack by AS; and

k. Provide recommendations for any procedural and / or mission command changes to prevent or mitigate the recurrence of this type of loss.

l. Include thorough analysis of whether the circumstances alleged are accurate and merit correction. You should also report whether any personnel should be recognized for their meritorious conduct, as well as held accountable for any shortcomings or failures.

4. Conduct of the Investigation

a. (b)(3)/(b)(6), USAFRICOM Office of Legal Counsel, will serve as your legal advisor. You will consult with your legal advisor before making substantive efforts regarding your investigation. You may reach (b)(3)/(b)(6) at DSN (b)(6).

b. If at any time in the conduct of your investigation, something happens that could cause me to consider enlarging, restricting, or terminating the investigation, or otherwise modifying any instruction in this memorandum of appointment, immediately report this situation to me, together with your recommendations as to the action I should take in response.

c. Schedule a briefing to me or the Combatant Commander to present your preliminary findings and recommendations prior to finalizing your report.

d. If, during the conduct of your investigation you find significant deficiencies in current force protection conditions, coordination, or capabilities, immediately raise those to the appropriate Component Commander and the AFRICOM HQ (J3 and J34).



SUBJECT: Appointment of Investigating Officer

c. Evidence Collection and Preservation

1. To the extent possible, witness statements will be written and sworn. You should record witness statements on a DA Form 2823 (*Sworn Statement*). If it is impracticable to obtain a written sworn statement from a particular witness, you will attest to the accuracy of any summary of the witness's testimony. You will provide a Privacy Act statement to a witness if you do not use a DA Form 2823 to record the statement of that witness.

2. No military or civilian witness can be ordered to provide information that may incriminate him or herself. You may order a military or civilian witness to provide information if you believe that the witness has non-incriminating relevant information to the investigation. If, in the course of your investigation you come to suspect a person may have engaged in criminal conduct, you will consult with your legal advisor and inform me. Under no circumstances should you attempt to elicit any information from a suspect without first advising that person of his/her rights under Article 31 UCMJ, or the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Document your rights advisement and witness waivers of their Article 31 or Fifth Amendment rights on a DA Form 3881.

3. Preserve all evidence gathered. As you gather evidence apply appropriate classification controls and retention to ensure its accessibility as needed within classification controls. Pay particular attention to any evidence that exceeds SECRET NOFORN or is Focal Point / code word protected.

4. Subject Matter Experts: You are authorized to interview and consult technical experts assigned to duties to protect and safeguard classified information at any echelon within USAFRICOM.

5. Should you determine in the context of your investigation that a service member's status has changed from favorable to unfavorable, as defined in a relevant service regulations, e.g., AR 600-8-2, *Suspension of Favorable Actions*, you must notify me immediately and consult with your legal advisor, to ensure that a flag is initiated against that service member.

5. Report of Investigation

a. General. Your report of investigation will be written.

b. Memorandum with your findings and recommendations.

1. Findings. You will reach your findings by a preponderance of the evidence that you gather. A finding is a clear and concise statement of facts that can be readily deduced from the evidence in the record. In your report develop specific findings and cite the evidence that supports your findings. If the evidence conflicts, you will make a finding as to which evidence is more credible and why you believe it to be more credible.

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2. Recommendations. Based on your findings, make recommendations as to what changes, if any, are needed in terms of policy, procedures, resources, doctrine, training, and leadership to avoid incidents of this nature in the future, as well as recommendations consistent with your findings concerning other items your investigation revealed. Each recommendation will cite to the finding and exhibit(s) that supports it, and should comport with the guidance in AR 15-6. Attach and index all enclosures and exhibits to your report.

3. Submission. Submit your findings and recommendations to me after you have obtained a legal review.

MCCAFFREY.TODD.B. Digitally signed by  
MCCAFFREY.TODD.BULLARD. (b)(6)  
ULLARD. (b)(6) Date: 2020.01.06 18:17:25 +01'00'

Todd B. McCaffrey  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Chief of Staff, U.S. Africa Command