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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
950 JEFFERSON AVENUE
FORT EUSTIS, VIRGINIA 23604-5700

ATCG

29 November 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Executive Summary of Report of Independent Review of the USAFRICOM 15-6 Investigation re: Attack on CSL Manda Bay

1. **Task and Purpose.** In accordance with the direction from the Secretary of Defense, on 29 March 2021, the Acting Secretary of the Army appointed me to conduct an independent review of the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) Army Regulation 15-6 investigation (the "investigation") into the 5 January 2020, al Shabaab (AS) attack on Cooperative Security Location (CSL) Manda Bay, Kenya; to direct any further investigation that I deem appropriate; and to serve as the Consolidated Disposition Authority (CDA) for any appropriate disciplinary actions related to the attack. In addition, the Acting Secretary of the Army specifically directed that I consider 1) the pre-deployment training and personnel assignment processes of U.S. personnel who were attacked and who responded to the attack; (2) whether the actions and inactions of leaders and staff above the level of O-5 contributed to a poor understanding of the threat and an inadequate force protection posture; (3) whether the investigation's finding of no negligence or other misconduct by any U.S. personnel was consistent with the evidence related to the attack; and, finally, (4) whether further investigation is warranted regarding potential systemic or organizational issues related to the attack.

2. **Summary of Attack on CSL Manda Bay.**

a. CSL Manda Bay, located near the Kenyan coast, is comprised of three main parts: Kenyan Naval Base Manda Bay; Camp Simba, the U.S. "base within a base" where most U.S. forces are housed and work; and nearby Magagoni Airfield ("Airfield"), the Airfield where this attack occurred is a joint-use airfield approximately one mile south of Camp Simba from which U.S. and Kenyan air operations are conducted. USAFRICOM had designated Air Forces Africa (AFAF) with Base Operations Support Integrator (BOS-I) and force protection responsibilities.

b. On 5 January 2020 at 0520 hours (East African Time Zone), a massed enemy force of determined, disciplined, and well-resourced AS fighters attacked U.S. forces, aircraft, and assets located at CSL Manda Bay, Kenya. AS began the attack by fixing Camp Simba with indirect fire, while near simultaneously concentrating a ground attack on the Airfield. During the opening minutes of their attack, the AS fighters killed one

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Soldier and two DOD civilian contractors, and wounded one Soldier and one DOD civilian contractor. The AS fighters destroyed six U.S. aircraft, one Kenyan aircraft, and other equipment and assets located on the Airfield during the initial minutes of the attack.

c. The AS fighters attacked the Airfield until a small team of U.S. Marines maneuvered south from Camp Simba and made initial contact to assess the situation. Over the course of the ensuing several hours, a combined, ad hoc formation of U.S. Marines, U.S. Airmen, and Kenyan armed forces conducted a deliberate and sustained counterattack to repel the AS fighters. During the course of the fighting, one Marine and one Kenyan military member were wounded.

d. Upon establishing fire superiority, the combined force deliberately cleared the Airfield and multiple buildings over the course of the next nine hours, ultimately killing at least six attackers and driving the remaining attackers from the Airfield. The USAFRICOM East Africa Response Force (EARF) arrived later that evening to further reinforce the CSL Manda Bay defenders.

e. Despite the formality of the Report of Review, the ultimate sacrifice of three brave Americans who lost their lives in service to their country at CSL Manda Bay remained at the top of my mind during this Review. As the USAFRICOM Commander has already done, I too express my deepest condolences to each of their families.

3. Independent Review of USAFRICOM AR 15-6 Investigation.

a. I determined the investigation was thorough and accurately provides reasonable and appropriate findings and recommendations on virtually every significant issue. I particularly concur with the investigation's finding that the only proximate cause of the outcome of this event was the attack by a massed force of determined, well-resourced AS fighters. Furthermore, I concur that issues related to force protection, intelligence resourcing and structure, poor Security Forces preparation and training, and mission command all contributed to the outcome of the attack.

b. In addition to these broad areas of concurrence, with the benefit of additional information not available to the investigation, and reconsidering all of the information available, this Review diverges and expands upon a few of the investigation's findings. In those situations, the full Review provides the facts and evidence explaining the alternate and expanded findings. Most importantly, while concurring with all fifty recommendations from the investigation, this Review also makes additional findings and recommendations, particularly in areas where my appointment directed this Review to answer additional questions that were not part of the investigation.

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4. New and Expanded Findings related to USAFRICOM's Investigation

This Review concurs that issues related to the outcome of the attack are best analyzed using the four broad causal factors the investigation well identified. This Review concurs that matters related to force protection, intelligence resourcing and structure, poor Security Forces preparation and training, and mission command all contributed to the outcome of the attack. A summary of this Review's expanded analysis regarding the causes of the attack follows:

a. Force Protection Focus (New and Expanded Findings). Starting in 2016, CSL Manda Bay became a full-time operational Airfield. Despite this change, sufficient force protection measures were not made commensurate with the Airfield's myriad platforms or tempo of operations. The investigation found that every successive leader that visited CSL Manda Bay, or had responsibility for the force protection of it, contributed to the successful attack by tolerating complacency. Further, the investigation found that local commanders did not enforce a force protection mindset commensurate within an FPCON C country. Also evident was inadequate oversight of the tactical leaders to ensure they provided adequate force protection of the Airfield. The investigation also found that inadequate leadership focus on potential threats, lack of sufficient force protection measures, inadequate tactical command and control on CSL Manda Bay, and insufficient leadership at the operational level contributed to the force protection failures that existed at the Airfield prior to and at the time of the attack. This Review generally concurs with those findings. Expanding on those findings of the investigation, this Review further found that the lack of any type of perimeter security around the Airfield and the visible lack of any "field expedient" improvements, when coupled with an increase in the number of aircraft over the years, made the Airfield a more vulnerable target.

(1) The Fence Project. Significant unexplained delays in the timeline that extended from the initial identification of the necessity of a protective fence to the projected completion date demonstrate that leaders at echelon did not treat this as a priority project. While some evidence suggests these delays were reasonable based on a typical MILCON project timeline, it is apparent that leaders did not successfully expedite this specific project or utilize field expedient measures or local contracting options. While installations across Africa had to be considered concurrently when sourcing force protection projects, the Airfield fence project at CSL Manda Bay should have been designated a higher priority earlier on and, in the interim, expedient field measures and local contracting options should have been pursued and exhausted.

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(2) Leaders at CSL Manda Bay relied on the pending MILCON fence project as the solution to force protection concerns. No action was taken at the local level until the Wing Commander visited the Airfield in December 2019 and immediately directed a concertina wire fence to be placed around the perimeter. The delay in initiating an intermediate or interim solution to address the force protection gap associated with the open perimeter is unreasonable.

b. Intelligence Resourcing and Structure (New Findings). At all levels, this Review found no comprehensive analysis of the threat information, combined with inadequate sharing of intelligence with commanders responsible for force protection. Additionally, leaders at echelon seemed to lack proper architecture, battle rhythm, and decision making concerning intelligence reporting.

(1) Resourcing and staffing related to intelligence was marred by missteps and unfortunate events prior to the attack. Certain key personnel lacked requisite access to receive all relevant intelligence. CSL Manda Bay depended upon personnel off-station and outside their organizational chain of command to provide intelligence reporting. The security clearance of the sole individual at CSL Manda Bay with the appropriate clearance, and who would have been tracking outside threats to the base, had been suspended in the weeks prior to the attack. Meanwhile, a separate vacancy for a military intelligence officer billet remained unfilled.

(2) Lack of support and synchronization at echelon resulted in the failure to form a comprehensive threat picture. There were multiple intelligence reports that were shared only with a small number of recipients at USAFRICOM. Evidence reveals that intelligence personnel at CSL Manda Bay did consider and analyze certain relevant intelligence, but determined that certain reports, on their own, were not specific or credible.

c. Security Force Preparation and Training (Expanded Findings). The posture, capability, and performance weaknesses of the Air Force Security Forces did contribute to the vulnerabilities of the Airfield and made it more susceptible to enemy attack. Overall, I agree with the investigation's conclusion that the Security Forces were unprepared to respond to the attack.

(1) Leadership Oversight. The Air Force Security Forces were assigned to the Base Defense Force (BDF). The lack of effective oversight of the BDF is evidenced by: the list of equipment deficiencies uncovered in the investigation (e.g. Security Forces issues with communications, weapons, and vehicles); the suboptimal response by the Security Forces during the attack; and continued deficiencies identified in the

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weeks post-attack which make it clear there was an overall lack of oversight focused on training, rehearsals, and discipline.

(2) Training, Rehearsals, and Preparation. Air Force training of their Security Forces personnel prior to arriving at CSL Manda Bay was inadequate and Security Forces personnel readiness on CSL Manda Bay was insufficient based on a flawed pre-deployment training model. Collective training was not routinely conducted after the personnel at CSL Manda Bay at the time of the attack arrived there. Only one collective training exercise and one tabletop event were conducted in the three months prior to the attack. A reasonable commander would not find that was adequate to train for and offset the many assumed force protection risks in an FPCON C environment. Finally, there was no evidence to indicate the EABS or Security Forces addressed all force protection issues within their control, such as filling sandbags, developing HESCO barriers, laying concertina wire, or taking initiative to mow or clear the overgrown vegetation within the extent of existing permissions. There was no evidence in this Review that concerns were raised higher or assistance was requested. The Security Forces' consistent and predictable inactivity and non-involvement in "improving their foxhole" on a daily basis demonstrated complacency that may have portrayed the Airfield as a vulnerable target to AS fighters.

(3) Response. Security Forces personnel on duty at the time of the attack failed to respond appropriately. The noncommissioned officers responsible for supervising and directing the enlisted Security Forces personnel on shift left two tower guards at the airfield without NCO guidance or leadership. While engaging the enemy would have been difficult considering issues with communications systems, weapons, and vehicles, the evidence remains that several Security Forces personnel on duty at the time did not meaningfully engage AS fighters during the attack.

d. Mission Command (New Findings). Flawed operational level processes and inadequate command and control at the tactical level contributed to the outcome of the attack. Poor unity of command at the tactical level, however, did not contribute to the outcome of the attack due mainly to the heroic independent and immediate responsive actions of tenant unit personnel and others at CSL Manda Bay.

5. Overall Recommendations: The Review concurs with all of the recommendations identified by the investigation and made by the USAFRICOM Commander. Based on the additional investigation and materials, and after considering the specific directed questions from the Secretary of Defense and Acting Secretary of the Army, the Review made twenty (20) recommendations. Some of these recommendations are new, while others are simple expansions on recommendations from the USAFRICOM investigation with which the Report of Review concurs. Finally, some recommendations relate to the

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specifically directed questions for this Review (discussed in para. 7 below).
Recommendations are made for the U.S. Air Force, USAFRICOM, and AFAF.

6. Summary of Recommendations regarding issues that were investigated by USAFRICOM.

a. Force Protection (New and Expanded Findings). Recommend USAFRICOM and AFAF direct more frequent reviews and rehearsals of force protection measures and base defense plans, and provide more oversight at echelon, to ensure deficiencies are properly identified and quickly rectified.

b. Intelligence (New Findings). Recommend USAFRICOM conduct a holistic review of the intelligence architecture to ensure appropriate intelligence staffing, resourcing, and sharing of threat information across the AOR and at echelon.

c. Security Forces (Expanded Findings). Recommend the Air Force consider restructuring pre-deployment training and certification. Specifically, significant focus should be directed towards implementing collective training tailored to the environment where personnel would deploy. Further, extensive recommendations are made regarding rehearsals and in-theater training to be conducted within the first 45 days of arrival and periodically throughout the deployment.

d. Mission Command (New and Expanded Findings). Recommend USAFRICOM empower a single commander with authority over the Combined Joint Operations Area (CJOA), to include responsibility for force protection, intelligence, maneuver, training, and MEDEVAC/CASEVAC across the CJOA.

7. Independent Review Directed Questions – Findings and Recommendations:

This Review also was directed to answer certain questions that were not all specifically investigated during the investigation. The Review's findings and recommendations related to these **directed questions** are summarized below.

a. **Pre-Deployment Training**. I was specifically directed to consider the pre-deployment training of U.S. personnel who were attacked and who responded to the attack. I find the CSL Manda Bay Security Forces readiness on 5 January 2020 was insufficient for multiple reasons, to include insufficient pre-deployment training. USAF "Tier Training" that the Security Forces received prior to arriving in CSL Manda Bay was inadequate. Recommendations have been provided in the Report of Review to correct some of the noted pre-deployment training deficiencies.

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b. **Personnel Assignments.** I was specifically directed to consider personnel assignment processes related to the U.S. personnel who were attacked and who responded to the attack. All key leaders at CSL Manda Bay and at echelons above were assigned and qualified in accordance with established U.S. Air Force policies and the Request for Forces. Recommendations have been provided in the Report of Review to address personnel requirements and key leader training requirements for deploying command teams.

c. **Actions/Inactions of Leaders and Staff above the O5 level.** I was specifically directed to consider whether the actions and inactions of leaders and staff above the level of O-5 contributed to a poor understanding of the threat and an inadequate force protection posture. I concluded that certain senior officers above the O-5 level contributed to the inadequate force protection posture, and, to some extent, allowed a climate of complacency and a poor understanding of the threat. Their level of contribution and specific acts and omissions are fully analyzed in the Report of Review. I considered whether any other commander or senior officer not so identified in the Review, at all echelons to include USAFRICOM, contributed to a poor understanding of the threat and an inadequate force protection posture. In each such case, the flow of command and staff information that may have allowed other leaders to reasonably have been expected to take further appropriate actions to mitigate the risks at CSL Manda Bay stopped below their level.

d. **Negligence.** I was specifically directed to consider whether the investigation's "finding of no negligence or other misconduct by any U.S. personnel" was consistent with the evidence related to the attack. The investigation determined that neither misconduct nor criminal negligence was the *direct cause* of the loss of life or damage to property, but that failures and inactions for several years by leaders and staff at CSL Manda Bay and at echelon did contribute to the outcome of the attack. The investigation further found that no single point of failure resulted in the loss and damage. Reviewing more specifically this broader directed question now, I find that a number of personnel, both on the ground at CSL Manda Bay and certain leaders at echelon, despite significant mitigating circumstances, were negligent in the performance of their duties. I find that the collective negligence of the individuals identified in this Review contributed to the outcome of the attack in that the Airfield was made a more vulnerable target than it otherwise would have been with more aggressive force protection measures in place. The negligence of the individuals identified in this Review, however, was not the direct or proximate cause of the losses suffered in this attack.

8. **Further Investigation.** Finally, I was specifically directed to consider whether further investigation is warranted regarding potential systemic or organizational issues related to the attack. Based on the thoroughness of the investigation, having the benefit of and

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considering the substantial additional information collected during the suspended AFAF follow-on investigation, and with the benefit of the exceptional responsiveness of USAFRICOM to my multiple RFIs during the conduct of the Report of Review, no further investigation is required.

(b) (6)

PAUL E. FUNK II
General, U.S. Army
Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
950 JEFFERSON AVENUE
FORT EUSTIS, VIRGINIA 23604-5700

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29 November 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

(U) SUBJECT: Independent Review of the U.S. Africa Command Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation Manda Bay

1. Task and Purpose. In accordance with the direction from the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), on 29 March 2021, the Acting Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) appointed me to conduct an independent review of the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 investigation (the “initial investigation”) into the 5 January 2020, al-Shabaab (AS) attack on Cooperative Security Location (CSL) Manda Bay, Kenya, to direct any further investigation that I deem appropriate, and to serve as the Consolidated Disposition Authority (CDA) for any appropriate disciplinary actions related to the attack. In addition to conducting the overall review of the initial investigation, the Acting SECARMY specifically directed that I consider: (1) the pre-deployment training and personnel assignment processes of U.S. personnel who were attacked and who responded to the attack; (2) whether the actions and inactions of leaders and staff above the level of O-5 contributed to a poor understanding of the threat and an inadequate force protection posture; (3) whether the initial investigation’s finding of no negligence or other misconduct by any U.S. personnel was consistent with the evidence related to the attack; and, finally, (4) whether further investigation is warranted regarding potential systemic or organizational issues related to the attack.

2. Summary of Attack on CSL Manda Bay.

a. CSL Manda Bay, located near the Kenyan coast approximately 50 miles south of Somalia, is comprised of three main parts: Kenyan Naval Base Manda Bay; Camp Simba, the U.S. “base within a base” where most U.S. forces are housed and work; and nearby Magagoni Airfield (“Airfield”), a joint-use airfield approximately one mile south of Camp Simba from which U.S. and Kenyan air operations are conducted. USAFRICOM had designated Air Forces Africa (AFAF) with Base Operations Support Integrator (BOS-I) and force protection responsibilities.¹

¹ Joint Publication (JP) 4-0, Logistics, assigns the responsibilities of BOS-I to the designated service component or joint task force commander who is responsible to synchronize all sustainment functions for a contingency base. A November 2018 USAFRICOM Operations Order (OPORD) designated AFAF with BOS-I responsibilities for CSL Manda Bay and designated the installation commander as the responsible official for force protection of forces and assets on their installation. (Ex. 138).

(b) (1) (A)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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██████████ b. On 5 January 2020 at 0520 hours (East African Time Zone), an enemy force of approximately 30 - 40 AS fighters conducted an attack against U.S. forces, aircraft, and assets located at CSL Manda Bay, Kenya. The attack began with AS fixing Camp Simba with indirect fire, while near-simultaneously concentrating a ground attack against personnel and aviation assets on the Airfield. During the opening minutes of their attack, the AS fighters killed Specialist (SPC) Henry "Mitch" Mayfield, Jr., and wounded (b) (6) ██████████, both Soldiers in the U.S. Army assigned to 1-58th Aviation Battalion. Soon after, the AS fighters attacked and destroyed an aircraft that was taxiing on the Airfield prior to takeoff. That attack killed Mr. Dustin Harrison and Mr. Bruce Triplett and wounded (b) (6) ██████████; all three individuals were U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) contractors employed by L3 Technologies and stationed at CSL Manda Bay. The AS fighters destroyed a total of six U.S. aircraft, one Kenyan aircraft, and other equipment and assets located on the Airfield during the initial moments of the attack.

██████████ c. The AS fighters who attacked the Airfield were unopposed for nearly twenty minutes until a small team of U.S. Marines assigned (b) (1) (A) ██████████ maneuvered south from Camp Simba and made initial contact to assess the situation. Over the course of the ensuing several hours, a combined, ad hoc formation of U.S. Marines, U.S. Airmen, and Kenyan armed forces conducted a deliberate counterattack to repel the AS fighters. During the course of the fighting, one Marine, (b) (6) ██████████ and one Kenyan military member were wounded.

██████████ d. Upon establishing fire superiority, the combined force deliberately cleared the Airfield and multiple buildings over the course of the next nine hours, ultimately killing eight attackers and driving the remaining attackers from the Airfield. There were no additional U.S. casualties. The USAFRICOM East Africa Response Force (EARF) arrived later that evening, deploying from Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, to further reinforce the CSL Manda Bay defenders.

(U) 3. **Independent Review Methodology.** I directed the assembly of a Review Panel (the "Panel") to consider the questions laid out in the Acting SECARMY's appointment memorandum. The Panel was comprised of eleven senior officers and noncommissioned officers from across the DOD, with significant command, combat, and operational experience and subject matter expertise in force protection, contracting, training, aviation, personnel, and intelligence. They received a series of in-briefs and individually reviewed the initial investigation and supporting documents. The purpose of the Panel was to apply their knowledge, experience, and judgment to the circumstances surrounding this attack, to assist me in the identification of any issues leading up to it that may have contributed to the attack, and to contribute to my formulation of the recommendations contained in this Review. The Panel convened at the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Headquarters to review the initial investigation and relevant matters of evidence and to deliberate on the findings and recommendations of the initial investigation. The Panel also considered the additional questions directed by the Acting SECARMY as mentioned in Paragraph 1, above. Having witnessed the thoroughness and professionalism of the Panel members throughout this process, and inspired by their competence and thoughtfulness, I have fully considered their analysis and the informed professional opinions they shared with me during discussions as I completed this Review. While this independent Review has been supported by the Panel members and informed by their collective efforts, the findings and recommendations in this Report are my own.

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(U) **4. Informing Documents.** I reviewed the initial investigation, including the USAFRICOM Commander's Executive Summary and Action on Findings (dated 31 December 2020), as well as three additional suspended or partial investigations, numerous materials from USAFRICOM in response to this Review's Requests for Information (RFIs), and additional products prepared for this Review by a designated Intelligence Review Team. As a result, I was able to consider extensive materials and exhibits beyond the initial investigation. To gain a comprehensive understanding of the attack, in addition to the initial investigation, I specifically considered the following materials:

(U) a. Documents collected by the U.S. Air Force personnel in conjunction with the AFAF investigation into the 5 January 2020 attack that was directed by Commander, AFAF (AFAF Materials). This investigation was ordered suspended by the SECDEF to first allow for completion of this Review.

(U) b. Documents and statements collected by the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) (OSI Materials).

(U) c. Statements collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (FBI Inquiry).

(U) d. Consolidated intelligence information, graphs, charts, and maps prepared for this Review by my Intelligence Review Team (Intel Materials). These products are attached as enclosures and cited in discussion below.

(U) e. Significant additional information provided by USAFRICOM in response to RFIs submitted as part of this Review.

5. Summary:

a. Findings of Independent Review of Initial Investigation. Informed by the deliberations of the Panel, and my independent assessment of the full collection of exhibits, evidence, and enclosures, I determined that the initial investigation was thorough and provides reasonable and appropriate findings and recommendations on virtually every relevant issue. I particularly concur with the initial investigation's findings that the only proximate cause of the outcome of this event was the attack by a massed force of determined, well-resourced AS fighters, but issues related to force protection, intelligence resourcing and structure, poor Security Forces preparation and training, and flawed operational processes (mission command) all contributed to the outcome of the attack.

b. As accurately discussed in the initial investigation, the fundamental issues in the outcome of the attack were complacency, poor decision-making, and lack of oversight which contributed to insufficient force protection at Magagoni Airfield. This made the Airfield a vulnerable target. In addition to these broad areas of concurrence, now having the benefit of additional information, and reconsidering all of the information available, there are a few findings in the initial investigation and subsequent modifications by the USAFRICOM Commander where I diverge. In those situations, this Review provides the facts and evidence explaining the alternate finding. More significantly, while concurring with all of the fifty recommendations from the initial investigation, this Review also expands on some of the findings of the initial investigation and makes additional findings and recommendations - particularly in areas where

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directed to do so by my appointment order. My findings and recommendations are detailed in the paragraphs below, organized sequentially first by the specific questions from the initial investigation and then the additional questions in my appointment order. To assist the reader, I use **bold** font where I make **additional or expanded findings and recommendations**. I use ***bold, italicized*** font in the few instances where I believe my findings diverge from the initial investigation's findings.

(U) c. **Relevant Factors Overview.** In addition to the Panel of subject matter experts discussed above, I used an Operations Research/Systems Analysis (ORSA) team to capture relevant factors that led to the attack at CSL Manda Bay. Based on the Panel discussions and analysis, I determined that Complacency/Discipline/Lack of Standards, Leadership Decision Making, and a Lack of Rehearsals were the most significant contributing factors to the results of this attack. Other important contributing factors that led to the outcome of the attack included the intelligence information analysis and command and control issues at echelon. The impact of these factors is not specific to any one portion of the investigation, rather, they imply a relationship to a systemic failure. A comprehensive explanation of the methodology used in this process is detailed in Enclosure 1, "Relevant Factors Analysis."

(b) (1) (A)

² USAFRICOM's mission is to, "with partners, counter transnational threats and malign actors, strengthen security forces, and respond to crises in order to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability and prosperity. Among the ways USAFRICOM executes its mission is to, along with regional partners, "conduct military operations to disrupt, degrade and neutralize violent extremist organizations that present a transnational threat." From 1 October 2019 - 31 January 2021, USAFRICOM was responsible for security at 27 designated locations, including 15 enduring locations across Africa, of which 13 of those enduring locations were Cooperative Security Locations. USAFRICOM's mission is largely executed through its dual-hatted Service Component Commands, to include U.S. Air Forces in Europe – Air Forces Africa (USAFE-AFAF). Many of the AFAF staff were concurrently responsible for USAFE missions. Among the responsibilities of AFAF during the period of this report was to execute BOS-I, including force protection, seven total posture locations including six Cooperative Security Locations in Africa, to include CSL Manda Bay. (Ex. 330)

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(b) (1) (A) e. Given the assigned mission, this Review is necessarily somewhat mechanical in approach. Despite its formality, the enormous sacrifice that SPC Mitch Mayfield, Jr., Mr. Dustin Harrison, and Mr. Bruce Triplett made in service to their country remained at the top of my mind throughout this Review. As the USAFRICOM Commander has already done, I too express my deepest condolences to each of their families.

6. **Specific Findings.** Two preliminary matters must be stated before making my specific findings and recommendations. First, given that the nature of this mission is to review the initial USAFRICOM investigation, this Review must be read in conjunction with that Report of investigation (dated 29 December 2020) and the USAFRICOM Commander's Executive Summary and Actions on Findings (dated 31 December 2020) ("CDR EXSUM"). While this Review includes some of the baseline facts and issues where necessary to assist the reader in understanding my findings and recommendations, the presumption is that the reader will have read and absorbed the original documents which this Review was directed to consider. Therefore, many of the facts contained in the initial investigation are not repeated in this Review. Second, I found that the initial investigation was thorough on all relevant issues to appropriately inform reasonable findings and recommendations on the directed questions. With the benefit of time, additional resources, and the significant additional materials provided and reviewed as discussed in paragraph 4 above (Informing Documents), further investigation is not required to complete this Review.

(U) a. **USAFRICOM 15-6 Question 1.** *Gather all known facts and information to develop a comprehensive timeline of events.*

(U) (1) Evidence and Findings. The initial investigation accurately described and depicted the organizational structure of the relevant commands immediately prior to and at the time of the attack. In addition, the initial investigation sufficiently provides a comprehensive timeline of events following the attack. The summary of the attack in paragraph 2, above, provides the salient facts and findings. All findings pertaining to the command structures and timeline of the attack are reasonable and appropriate. While the evidence relied on in the initial investigation was sufficient to reach its findings, my Review developed supplemental material discussed below.

(a) Command Structure. I reviewed additional materials that assisted in clarifying the complicated command and control (C2) relationships. I considered, particularly, the Commander, USAFRICOM, Theater Command and Control chart (Ex. 167) within the AFAF Materials. This chart shows a thorough and detailed Operational Control (OPCON) and Tactical Control (TACON) relationship up from the 435th Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) to USAFRICOM. To better understand the command and control relationships on CSL Manda Bay at the time of the attack, a C2 diagram and Command Structure Overview is attached as Enclosure 2.

(b) Phases of the Attack. The phases of the attack described in the initial investigation were accurate and sufficiently detailed to create a comprehensive picture of the attack. However, after reviewing additional exhibits, my intelligence analysts created a more detailed timeline, attached hereto as Enclosure 3, "Timeline of Events: Manda Bay Attack – 05 JAN 2020." This updated timeline provides Phase 0 operations that explains pre-attack events such as the last shift change and the roving patrols conducted prior to the attack. (Ex. 39). The updated timeline also incorporates several events that occurred hours after the start of the

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attack, including: details about how kinetic activity continued slightly later than indicated in the initial investigation; the positioning of and response by Kenyan units; and partner intelligence coordination (b) (1) (A) (Ex. 8, 39, 90). This expanded timeline provides greater background and serves to bolster the original findings regarding the phases of the attack.

(U) (2) Recommendations. There were no recommendations associated with this question. No recommendations are necessary or appropriate.

(U) b. **USAFRICOM 15-6 Question 2.** *Who was killed and injured during the attack by AS and how, if known – both friendly and enemy personnel?*

(U) (1) Evidence and Findings. Overall, the initial investigation appropriately concluded that three American citizens were killed in action at CSL Manda Bay (one Army Soldier and two DOD contractors), three American citizens sustained injuries (one contractor, one Marine, and one Soldier), and eight AS fighters were assessed to have been killed. Statements collected pursuant to the FBI Inquiry further substantiated these findings through first-hand accounts of the attack from two Airmen on the ground and one Airman manning the Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC). All findings were reasonable and appropriate based on the evidence.

(U) (2) Recommendations. There is one recommendation in the initial investigation to find the deaths of the three American citizens and the injuries to three other American citizens in the line of duty. I concur with the USAFRICOM Commander's approval of this recommendation. No additional recommendations are necessary.

(U) c. **USAFRICOM 15-6 Question 3.** *What was the extent of the damage done to friendly facilities and aircraft at Manda Bay?*

(U) (1) Evidence and Findings.

(a) The assessed damage amounts at the time of the initial investigation of over \$94 million, including the loss of six aircraft owned or under contract to DOD, and the destruction or damage to U.S. equipment including vehicles, supplies, and infrastructure was an estimate. The USAFRICOM J4 has since conducted a more accurate assessment of damage costs and USAFRICOM provided that information for consideration. An updated Damage Determination, dated 10 May 2021, is included as Enclosure 4 to this report.

(b) The new total damage assessment to friendly facilities and aircraft at CSL Manda Bay as a result of the 5 January 2020 attack is \$71,570,242 (Encl. 4).

(b) (1) (A)

(2) Recommendations. There were no recommendations associated with this question. No additional recommendations are necessary.

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(U) d. **USAFRICOM 15-6 Question 4.** *Assess the defensive plan and force protection measures at the base in place at the time of the attack and determine if they were reasonable and appropriate based on the threat information available to leaders at echelon prior to the attack.*

(U) (1) Evidence. The initial investigation was thorough and collected sufficient evidence to appropriately inform reasonable findings and recommendations. However, additional information provided in the AFAF Materials and from USAFRICOM RFIs helped contextualize and create increased understanding of the defensive plan and force protection measures at CSL Manda Bay at the time of the attack.

(a) FPCON Status. The initial investigation accurately identified that given its location in Kenya, CSL Manda Bay was under Force Protection Condition – Charlie (FPCON C)⁴ on the date of the attack. A 2019 USAFRICOM message specifically designating Kenya as an FPCON C country was included in this Review. (Ex. 100). (b) (1) (A)

This background is important to any determination regarding whether the units and leaders responsible for force protection on the date of the attack had ample time and opportunity to appropriately posture CSL Manda Bay to FPCON C requirements. As discussed in the initial investigation, the fact that the country had been at FPCON C since 2017 and CSL Manda Bay had not been attacked in 16 years also informs judgement on the reasonableness of the operations at Manda Bay.

(b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

(U) ⁴ FPCON C: This condition applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating some form of terrorist action or targeting against personnel or facilities is likely. Prolonged implementation of measures in this FPCON may create hardships and affect the activities of the unit and its personnel. (Joint Pub 3-07.2)

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(b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

(CUI) (2) Findings. I concur with the initial investigation's finding that while Camp Simba was reasonably well defended, the protection measures at Magagoni Airfield were neither reasonable nor appropriate based on the FPCON level and threat information available to leaders at echelon prior to the attack, nor were they appropriate based on the air assets on the Airfield at the time of the attack. Given the additional information available to me during this Review, additional discussion is warranted concerning the threat picture and how that impacted force protection measures.

(CUI) (a) Threat Information Available Prior to the Attack. A full analysis of threat reporting pursuant to this Review identified five (b) (1) (A) reports - three published prior to the attack, and two published the day of the attack - and five (b) (1) (A) threat reports published prior to the attack (Encl. 5). Even allowing for the fact that the two (b) (1) (A) reports published on the day of the attack would not reasonably have reached CSL Manda Bay in time, the body of the remaining reports indicates a growing and developing threat reflecting AS's intent, preparation, and target preference.

(b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

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(b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

(CUI) (c) I find that all relevant threat information was not provided to the leaders responsible for force protection on CSL Manda Bay. This reflects a flaw in the intelligence architecture which was in place at CSL Manda Bay. The result of this flaw was that relevant threat information was not provided to the Commander, 475th Expeditionary Air Base Squadron (EABS), to allow her the opportunity for consideration of the sufficiency of the force protection plan in place. (b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

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(b) (1) (A)

(d) The initial investigation determined that “threat information was overlooked due to an overall sense of complacency at CSL Manda Bay.” CSL Manda Bay had not been attacked in its 16 years of existence, and its personnel were generally authorized passes into the village and a nearby beach. (Ex. 13, 14, 15, 28⁶, 35, 53, 54, 56, 57). While I concur that complacency was one factor, it was not the sole factor, nor the most material factor in considering the threat picture. The most material factor that impacted the threat picture was that intelligence reporting was not adequately analyzed. Inadequate analysis resulted from multiple sub-factors to include: eligibility and access constraints; inadequate staffing; and failure to disseminate.⁷

(b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

(iii) Dissemination. Relevant threat information was not disseminated to concerned individuals; specifically, all available and relevant threat intelligence was not shared with leaders responsible for force protection of CSL Manda Bay.

(e) The inadequate threat picture described above impacted the force protection posture at CSL Manda Bay. The initial investigation determined that force protection measures were neither reasonable nor appropriate. In addition, the investigation found that, “Security Forces organization, preparation, training, and defensive plans were inadequate to counter the threat,” which contributed to the outcome of the attack. I concur with the initial

(b) (1) (A)

⁷ (U) A more complete analysis of these factors can be found in this Report’s response to Question 11 below.

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investigation concerning the Security Forces response to the threat, and I expand upon it by finding that when taken collectively, the posture, capability and performance weaknesses of the Air Force Security Forces did contribute to the vulnerabilities of the Airfield and made it more susceptible to an enemy decision to attack the Airfield. While the initial investigation focused on the reactive response of the Security Forces to the attack, this Review expands upon that, considering how the lack of observable proactive actions by the Security Forces (lack of training, rehearsals, and outward appearance of a force protection mindset) ultimately contributed to making the Airfield a more attractive target of attack. Inadequate preparation, leadership, and readiness of Security Forces personnel allowed for the continued exposure of the Airfield's vulnerability.

(U) (i) Leadership at CSL Manda Bay. The Air Force Security Forces were assigned to the Base Defense Force (BDF), which was part of the 475th EABS. The lack of effective oversight by the 475th EABS leadership of the BDF is evident based on the deficiencies within the Security Forces and the lack of involvement on a day-to-day basis. In addition, while complacency was certainly a factor in the attitude leaders at CSL Manda Bay exhibited, the 30 September 2019 deliberate and coordinated attack on Baledogle Military Airfield (BMA) by AS fighters should have triggered an immediate change in perspective and refocus on force protection. (Ex. 318).⁸ While the BMA attack had that very effect on the AEW Commander, as he directed immediate actions to ensure appropriate force protection measures were in place following the BMA attack (Ex. 336), there was no corresponding energized action by leaders at CSL Manda Bay. While the 475th EABS Commander stated that the Security Forces were insufficiently manned to accomplish security at both Camp Simba and Magagoni Airfield (Ex. 43), this Review found no evidence that the 475 EABS leadership team ever made requests to higher commands for additional Security Forces personnel to mitigate risk.⁹

(CUI) (b) (6) the 475 EABS Defense Force Commander (DFC)¹⁰, and (b) (6) the BDF NCOIC (b) (6) were responsible for training and leading the Security Forces tasked with base defense. However, based on the list of equipment deficiencies uncovered in the initial investigation (b) (1) (A) the failed response by the Security Forces both during the attack (detailed in the paragraph titled, "Response," below) and in the weeks post-attack (b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

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(b) (1) (A) it is clear there was an overall lack of oversight focused on training, rehearsals, and discipline that almost certainly existed prior to the attack. (Ex. 31, 32, 40).

(CUI) (b) The 475th EABS (b) (6)

was responsible for force protection and base defense, including ensuring Security Forces had appropriate training, equipment, and manning (Ex. 27, 43, 110, and 138). (b) (6)

in the three months she was on the ground prior to the attack, there is only evidence of one (b) (1) (A) exercise (vehicle crash) and one table top exercise (b) (1) (A). It is clear that (b) (6) delegated all base defense and Security Forces responsibilities to (b) (6) without providing sufficient oversight or guidance.¹¹

(ii) Training. I concur with the initial investigation's conclusion that the Air Force training of their Security Forces personnel prior to arriving at CSL Manda Bay was inadequate and Security Forces personnel readiness on CSL Manda Bay was insufficient based on a flawed pre-deployment training model. Significant analysis on this issue is included in paragraph 8 below. (b) (1) (A)

(iii) Rehearsals. (b) (6)

evidence indicates that only one rehearsal was conducted in the four months prior to the attack by the personnel present on the date of the attack. (b) (1) (A)

the rehearsal appears at least topically relevant (b) (1) (A) a reasonable commander would not find that one rehearsal, using one scenario, is adequate to train for and offset the many assumed force protection risks in an FPCON C environment – particularly one lacking a perimeter fence. When asked what rehearsals were

(b) (1) (A)

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done with the IDP, (b) (6) the senior NCO responsible for base defense on the date of the attack, responded, "Never exercised it. Talked about it." (Ex. 61). IDP rehearsals would have tested the plan's effectiveness based on available Security Forces personnel and equipment capabilities against reasonably foreseeable enemy threats.

(iv) Preparation. Besides expensive force protection project requests that were working their way through the lengthy Military Construction (MILCON) process for approval, there is no evidence to suggest Security Forces personnel or leaders, responsible for base defense, were making any local efforts to mitigate known and identified risks resulting from inadequate base defense measures (b) (1) (A)

(v) Response. Security Forces personnel on duty at the time of the attack failed to respond appropriately. (b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

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(U) (b) **Security Forces NCOs at the bottom of Tower 10.** During the attack, (b) (6) and (b) (6) were responsible for supervising and directing the enlisted Security Forces personnel on shift. At the time the attack on the Airfield began, the NCOs were conducting post checks with the two personnel at Tower 10. (Ex. 40, 146). These NCOs had a duty to command the members of their flight to respond to the attack; instead, one of the NCOs, (b) (6), drove back to Camp Simba to give a situation report to the BDOC instead of sending the junior enlisted on that mission or using the radio or cell phone to call the BDOC. (Ex. 146). The other NCO, (b) (6), left Tower 10 to go back to the ECP to take cover, leaving the two tower guards to fend for themselves. (Ex. 40, 147).

(b) (1) (A)

(3) Recommendations. There were no recommendations in the initial investigation. I concur with the corrective actions directed by the USAFRICOM Commander in the CDR EXSUM that centers on increasing Security Forces size, focus, and capability, increasing force protection measures specific to CSL Manda Bay, incorporating Kenyan participation in all security operations, improving communications at the BDOC, and establishing one single commander for force protection and base defense at every base. Further, I strongly concur with the USAFRICOM Commander's recommendations addressing threat information and intelligence.

(U) (a) The USAFRICOM Commander echoed similar sentiments regarding the deficient flow of threat information provided to commanders responsible for base defense. In his Directed Action, the USAFRICOM Commander emphasized the "Duty to Warn," with which I fully concur. All tenant intelligence elements that receive reports or gather information related to threats or protection of the base must directly share that information with the commander and intelligence element charged with force protection—even if they operate in different reporting or command channels.

(b) (1) (A)

(U) (c) Additional recommendations concerning intelligence threat picture and force protection are included in the overall review of Question 11 below.

(U) ¹³ I acknowledge there is already progress to this effect, reflected in a change to the required security clearance level for the 475th EABS Commander to TS/SCI. (Ex. 178).

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(U) e. **USAFRICOM 15-6 Question 5.** *Assess whether there were any delays to any planned force protection improvements and, if so, did those delays contribute to the conditions leading to the attack and its effects.*

(U) (1) Evidence. The initial investigation on this question was unable to collect sufficient evidence to appropriately inform all of its findings and recommendations. However, the AFAF Materials and subsequent USAFRICOM responses to RFIs adequately supplement the initial investigation, enabling me to conduct a thorough review of the reasonableness of the findings and recommendations.

(U) (a) The initial investigation collected and cited to Exhibits 1, 8, 12, 34, and 35 to justify the findings and recommendations. The majority of that evidence consists of statements by individuals recounting the force protection improvement process.

(U) (b) Multiple exhibits collected by the AFAF investigation team provided further insight into force protection projects at CSL Manda Bay (Ex. 103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 114, 122, 203, 204, 205). Further, in response to RFIs, USAFRICOM provided seventeen additional relevant documents and presentations (Ex. 325-328). The additional AFAF and USAFRICOM responsive materials specifically address the timing of the Airfield perimeter fence project, which are compiled and summarized in Enclosure 6, "Perimeter Fence Project."

(2) Findings. The initial investigation found that delays to force protection improvements did not significantly contribute to the conditions leading to the attack and its effects. Existing force protection projects for the Airfield would not have been completed in time to effect the outcome, and even if projects and vegetation removal had been performed prior to the attack, the AS fighters would still have been successful.

(a) While I concur that delays in force protection improvement did not *significantly* contribute to the conditions leading to the attack, I do recognize that they were a contributing factor. In addition, I concur with the USAFRICOM Commander's assessment that "the planning, approval and execution timelines for requested projects were unacceptably long – and still are – especially for essential force protection builds." Three years passed from identification of the force protection gap to the attack on 5 January 2020. The impact of that timeline contributed to the outcome of the attack. More specifically, this failure contributed to the situation where [REDACTED] aircraft were placed on the Airfield with no fence or barrier around the perimeter.

(b) (1) (A)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(b) (1) (A)

[REDACTED]

(b) (1) (A)

[REDACTED]

(b) (1) (A)

[REDACTED]

(b) (1) (A)

[REDACTED]

(b) (1) (A)

[REDACTED]

(b) (1) (A)

[REDACTED]

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(b) (1) (A)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b) (1) (A)

[REDACTED]

(CUI) (vi) One month prior to the attack, (b) (6) the 435th AEW commander, directed (b) (6) Commander, 449th Air Expeditionary Group (AEG) (Djibouti) (b) (6) to erect a triple-strand concertina wire fence around the Airfield no later than 31 January 2020 due to the length of time still needed for completion of the MILCON fence project. However, both the MILCON FY19 fence project and the more field expedient

(b) (1) (A)

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[REDACTED] conducted approximately 4 to 13 December 2019.

(b) (1) (A)

(b) (6) While installations across Africa had to be considered when sourcing force protection projects, the Airfield fence project at CSL Manda Bay should have been designated a higher priority earlier on, and, in the interim, expedient field measures and local contracting options should have been pursued and exhausted.

_____, it took over two years, until December 2019, before leadership submitted a request for an interim expedient fencing project (b) (6)

[REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

reliance on future projects, and [REDACTED] failure to conduct an internal assessment of resources

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immediately available for increased force protection, demonstrates a departure from [REDACTED] inherent command responsibility to “promote and safeguard the morale, physical well-being, and the general welfare of persons under (b) (6) command.” (Ex. 95).

(b) (1) (A)

[REDACTED] (b) The initial investigation details the timing and process by which the Airfield fencing project progressed through the 475th EABS, 449th AEG, 435th AEW, and up to AFAF. While the initial investigation’s findings concerning the Airfield fence project, the expedient Airfield perimeter project, and the vegetation clearance project are reasonable and appropriate based on the evidence available at the time, this Review makes an **additional finding that delay in initiating an intermediate or interim solution to address the force protection gap associated with the open perimeter was unreasonable and unacceptable.** An earlier start on the 11,000 foot concertina wire fence may have been important in deterring an attack.

(b) (1) (A)

[REDACTED] (3) Recommendations. There were no recommendations for this question in the initial investigation. I concur with the USAFRICOM Commander’s Directed Action and reemphasize that USAFRICOM staff and AFAF leaders must work diligently to increase the speed of processing and executing future force protection enhancements – even when locally contracted – and to use tactical/expedient measures as an interim solution. In addition, particularly in light of AFAF Materials I reviewed, it bears repeating that USAFRICOM component commanders must instruct their subordinate leaders to use the tactical/expedient resources readily available to improve force protection (FORCEPRO) quickly while waiting for more exquisite or permanent solutions. **Finally, if not already existing, I recommend USAFRICOM create a venue for components to consolidate contingency FORCEPRO**

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requirements in order to appropriately allocate resources from across the geographic combatant command to support BOS-I tasked agencies to meet mission requirements. It was not apparent in this Review whether a system currently exists to provide resources allowing base commanders to take immediate action to improve force protection.

(U) f. **USAFRICOM 15-6 Question 6.** What medical care was available to the injured personnel in the wake of the attack, to include medical evacuations?

(b) (1) Evidence. The initial investigation was thorough and collected sufficient evidence to appropriately inform reasonable findings and recommendations. While further information regarding the theater-wide medical treatment common operating picture (MEDCOP), Medical Evacuation/Casualty Evacuation (MEDEVAC/CASEVAC) plan, and structure of responsibility for deploying MEDEVAC/CASEVAC assets would assist in providing a more robust depiction of available medical care within the Combined Joint Operations Area (CJOA), this information would not materially impact the response to this question and would not change either the findings or the recommendations.

(b) (2) Findings. The initial investigation found that Camp Simba had a Role 1 Medical Treatment Facility, (b) (1) (A). In addition, Camp Simba had the benefit of medical personnel assigned to tenant units on the CSL, which proved critical to the treatment and casualty evacuation of the wounded during the attack. Importantly, the investigation found that if the Airfield becomes inoperable, contingency plans for CASEVAC are insufficient. All of the findings are reasonable and appropriate. However, this Review makes several additional findings, as it specifically pertains to medical assets and CASEVAC on CSL Manda Bay.

(U) (a) I find that as CSL Manda Bay experienced over 50% growth in population since 2016, 475th EABS medical resources failed to keep pace with the growth and theater posturing of CSL Manda Bay.

(b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

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(i) CSL Manda Bay depended on support from medical personnel belonging to tenant units on the day of the attack. (b) (1) (A)

The number of injuries overwhelmed the capabilities of the (b) (1) (A) resident medical personnel. (Ex. 36). In order to provide sufficient care, several medical personnel belonging to tenant units were activated to assist. (b) (1) (A)

Had the not been fortuitously present at the time of the attack, it is likely that the injuries sustained during the attack and resulting from the response to the attack could have caused the organic medical capacity of Camp Simba to be overwhelmed.

(b) (1) (A)

(iii) There was no CASEVAC/MEDEVAC annex in the IDP, as required for the Air Force assumption of BOS-I duties. (Ex. 123). (b) (1) (A)

(3) Recommendations. There were no recommendations to this question in the initial investigation. However, the USAFRICOM Commander directed specific action to establish Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency (PACE) plans, review current medical support and contingency plans at Manda Bay and other bases in Africa, and coordinate CASEVAC branch plans across AFAF, USAFRICOM J3, J4, and the Surgeon. In addition, he directed component commanders and USAFRICOM staff to review all IDPs to ensure PACE plans are in place for medical treatment, CASEVAC, and receipt of reinforcing forces and supplies when primary methods are denied.

(CUI) (a) I concur with these actions and make the following additional recommendation:

(b) I recommend USAFRICOM provide a single operational authority responsible for CJOA-wide CASEVAC resources, designating a single point of responsibility for the Medical Common Operating Picture. (b) (1) (A)

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(b) (1) (A)

(U) g. **USAFRICOM 15-6 Question 7.** Document the procedural measures in place at the time of the attack, to include who responded to the attack, the reporting to higher headquarters that an attack occurred, and the measures taken as consequence management after the attack.

(U) (1) Evidence. The initial investigation was thorough and collected sufficient evidence to appropriately inform reasonable findings and recommendations.

(2) Findings. The initial investigation found (b) (1) (A)

For the most part, this Review confirmed that the findings of the initial investigation were reasonable and appropriate, though they warrant further discussion below. ***I do not concur with the finding that the IDP and AFD 31-1 were followed at the time of the attack.***

(U) (a) The IDP (Ex. 28) and AFD 31-1 (Ex. 26) were not followed at the time of the attack.

(b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

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(b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

(U) (iv) Annex P of the IDP requires completion of the following assessments on *at least an annual basis*: Asset Criticality; Threat; Vulnerability; and Risk. These assessments are critical components of the Integrated Defense Risk Management Process (IDRMP). The IDRMP is the Installation Commander's tool and standardized method for identifying and mitigating risk impacting operations, personnel, and resources and informs their decisions concerning the defensive posture of their installation; it essentially forms the core of a location's base defense plan. However, evidence from December 2019 reveals these assessments had not been completed since 2017. (Ex. 164). While annual assessments were the minimum, Air Force Instruction (AFI) 31-101 states, "Changes in mission and assets, evolving threats, implementation of mitigation measures and even change in leadership can precipitate the need to reassess the security environment. Without continuous assessment, security becomes reactive, responding to the latest crisis or security failure." Between 2017 and 2019, aircraft assets and threat reporting only increased. (Encl. 5, 7), and there were multiple changes in leadership, all which should have triggered more frequent assessments. Additionally, despite Annex P indicating that the IDRMP and the assessments could be located within the 475th EABS/BDF S5 office, neither the AFAF investigative team nor this Review were able to obtain any documentation of the IDRMP. USAFRICOM confirmed in response to a specific RFI that the IDRMP did not exist at the time of the attack. (Ex. 320).

(b) (1) (A)

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(b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

(U) (3) Recommendations. The initial investigation made no recommendations with this finding. The USAFRICOM Commander approved the findings with no additional comment. The following new recommendations based on my Review are reasonable and appropriate given the evidence and findings.

(U) (a) **I recommend AFAF direct quarterly review and update of IDPs across all bases theater-wide. IDPs must include a workable command and control SOP. The IDPs need to be coordinated and disseminated to tenant units on bases that have multiple separate entities. At a minimum, quarterly rehearsals of the IDP must occur with appropriate oversight by the BOS-I commander.**

(U) (b) **I recommend USAFRICOM review FPCON standards and establish a yearly reporting requirement to certify FPCON measures are in place to keep commanders at echelon accountable for their oversight of FPCON-related activities, to include site visits and force protection inspections.**

(U) h. **USAFRICOM 15-6 Question 8. Document the mission command structure; that is, the command and control in place at the time of the attack at Manda Bay and assess whether that structure caused undue friction or confusion in either defensive preparations or response.**

(U) (1) Evidence. The initial investigation was thorough and collected sufficient evidence to appropriately inform reasonable findings and recommendations.

(b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

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(b) (1) (A)

(U) (b) I considered whether it was necessary to collect additional evidence regarding CJTF-HOA's mission directives, chain of command, and supported/supporting relationships relative to CSL Manda Bay. However, given the USAFRICOM Commander's directive in the CDR EXSUM to establish unity of command between tenant units for force protection and crisis response, I determined this additional evidence would be unnecessary for the purpose of this Review. Obtaining this evidence would not alter my support for the recommendation that USAFRICOM needs to revisit and address unity of command at all U.S. military locations across the continent.

(U) (2) Findings. The initial investigation found that there was no overarching friction within the mission command structure and command and control in place at CSL Manda Bay, and the CJOA was sufficient for steady state operations, but the size and complexity of the 5 January 2020 attack significantly stressed elements of the mission command and command and control structures. The investigation determined that the 475th EABS was overwhelmed because the attack response required participation from nearly all tenant units, which were not directly tied to the command and control structures. While the findings are reasonable and appropriate, they warrant further discussion due to the complicated nature of command and control chains at the time of the attack.

(b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

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(b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

(U) (d) ***While I concur with the initial investigation's finding that there was a lack of a single air authority over all the aircraft, I do not agree that this caused delays in EARF deployment, ISR coordination, and CASEVAC.*** The evidence supports the finding that the common air picture was unclear and there was no single authority over the aircraft operating in the CJOA. (Ex. 49, Encl. 8). While *technically* USAFRICOM was a single air authority, delegation of authorities in a disparate manner resulted in no single air authority capable of directing crisis response *in practice* since there was no single air authority with a comprehensive operating picture of the Airfield. This, however, did not cause delays in EARF deployment, ISR coordination, or CASEVAC. ISR was coordinated effectively through tenant personnel on the ground at CSL Manda Bay. (Ex. 8). The evidence demonstrates that any delays in EARF deployment and CASEVAC were not the result of a lack of single air authority, but rather the

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result of the Airfield being unsecured and air assets destroyed. (Ex. 8, 36). Therefore, even if a single air authority with a comprehensive operating picture over the Airfield had existed at a lower level at the time, it would not have resulted in more expedient CASEVAC, ISR, or EARF deployment.

(U) (3) Recommendations. The initial investigation made no recommendations with this finding. I support and re-emphasize the USAFRICOM Commander's Directive that USAFRICOM revisit and address unity of command at all U.S. military locations across the continent, with the goal to integrate and synchronize warfighting functions and establish authority over a multitude of units conducting diverse missions.

(U) i. **USAFRICOM 15-6 Question 9.** Assess if any misconduct or negligence contributed to the loss of life or damage to property.

(U) (1) Evidence. The initial investigation was thorough and collected sufficient evidence to appropriately inform reasonable findings and recommendations. Statements from personnel on the ground at CSL Manda Bay, commanders and staff at higher echelons in the various chains of command for those personnel, and various orders, taskings, and regulations were sufficient to establish the duties that existed, whether those duties were known, or should have been known, to those responsible for execution of such duties, and whether personnel reasonably performed those duties.

(a) Additional information within the AFAF Materials and RFI responses provided by USAFRICOM provided clarification and a comprehensive understanding of the background, experience, and training of relevant individuals considered within this Review.

(b) (1) (A)

(U) (2) Findings. The initial investigation found that the loss of life and damage to property at CSL Manda Bay was not the direct result of misconduct or criminal negligence and that no single point of failure resulted in the loss of life and damage. The initial investigation also found that the losses were attributable to a force protection approach at CSL Manda Bay best

(b) (1) (A)

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characterized as a culture of complacency permeating every echelon for several years. The initial investigation further found that certain leaders were inept¹⁹ and other senior leaders at multiple echelons failed to provide sufficient leadership and oversight over a period of years. While these conclusions perhaps did not directly answer the question asked, the initial investigation did determine that those *failings* contributed to the loss of life and property, but that they were not the *direct* cause of the loss of life or property. Those findings are all reasonable and appropriate.²⁰ I concur that neither criminal negligence nor misconduct by any U.S. personnel was the direct cause, nor proximate cause, of the loss of life or property at CSL Manda Bay.²¹ **I further find that although misconduct or criminal negligence was not the direct or proximate cause²² of the attack or the losses suffered, the negligent²³ actions or inactions of certain leaders, staff, and Security Forces personnel did contribute to the outcome of the attack.** It not productive to speculate as to whether the enemy would have elected to attack against a more well-secure Airfield and, if so, whether such attack might have had a similar outcome.

However, it is not speculative to conclude that inactions of several personnel made the Airfield insufficiently secure and a more vulnerable target than it would otherwise have been had a more aggressive force protection posture been taken to mitigate known weaknesses as the USAFRICOM Commander expected.²⁴ An analysis of all personnel whom I determined were negligent in the performance of their duties on the day of and, more importantly, in the several months leading up to this incident are provided below.²⁵

(b) (1) (A)

(U) ¹⁹ "Ineptitude" is generally defined as "generally incompetent or lacking in fitness or aptitude for function." In accordance with the Manual for Court-Martial (2020), "a person is not derelict in the performance of duties if the failure to perform those duties is caused by ineptitude rather than by willfulness, negligence, or culpable inefficiency."

(b) (1) (A)

(U) ²¹ I note that this additional finding was *not* a finding required by Question 9 as set forth in the original appointment memo. However, based on the additional Questions in the Acting SECARMY Appointment Memo, I find it necessary to reach a finding on this point to execute my responsibilities in this Review and it seems appropriate to address these issues within the context of reviewing this question in the original investigation.

(U) ²² "Proximate Cause" is defined as the natural and probable result of one's conduct, act, omission, or negligence. A proximate cause does not have to be the only cause, nor must it be the immediate cause. However, it must be a direct or contributing cause that plays a material role, meaning an important one, in bringing about the injury or result.

(U) ²³ Simple negligence is an act or omission of a person who is under a duty to use due care which exhibits a lack of degree of care which a reasonably prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances." U.C.M.J., Art. 92.

(U) ²⁴ USAFRICOM Commander's stated intent was that Commanders at all levels would maintain an aggressive force protection posture. (Ex. 193 - Mod 1 to Annex M to USAFRICOM OPRORD 14-10, Implementation guidance for DODI 2000.16 Vol. 2) 22 June 2017.

(U) ²⁵ I concur with the initial investigation findings that there was no intentional misconduct for the reasons and justification laid out in the original investigation.

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(U) ²⁶ Extract from the 2020 USAFE Colonel Grade Review Position Description.

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(U) ²⁷ This does not include the significant number of locations across the European theater for which Commander, USAFE-AFAF also had BOS-I responsibilities due to his dual-hatted status as the air component for both USAFRICOM and United States European Command.

(U) ²⁸ A similar visit by the USAFRICOM/J4 in November 2019 identified deficiencies that would reasonably be expected to be identified by the A4S visit, since the A4S is at a lower echelon relative to CSL Manda Bay. (Ex. 89).

(b) (1) (A)

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(b) (1) (A)

(k) Other Individuals Reviewed:

(U) (1) I also considered whether other individuals assigned to CSL Manda Bay, and at echelon, to include tenant unit personnel and horizontal units, committed misconduct or were negligent in performance of duties related to CSL Manda Bay that contributed to the loss of life or damage to property. This Review included staff officers and commanders up to, and including, component and Combatant Command levels. Based on the evidence collected in the initial investigation, and having the benefit of considering the substantial additional information collected during this Review, I do not find any other individual was negligent in the performance of their duties other than those personnel identified above.

(b) (1) (A)

(3) Recommendations. There were no recommendations in the initial investigation regarding this finding. While the USAFRICOM Commander referred the initial investigation to his component commanders to take appropriate action on the results of the initial investigation, particularly with regard to certain Security Forces personnel (b) (1) (A) on CSL Manda Bay at the time of the attack, the ability of that component commander was later withheld by the

(b) (1) (A)

(U) ³² These comments do not constitute a substantiated adverse finding against this agent.

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Secretary of Defense pending completion of this Review. (b) (1) (A)

(U) j. **USAFRICOM 15-6 Question 10.** Were there measures that could have been taken to prevent or mitigate this attack by AS?

(U) (1) Evidence. The initial investigation was thorough and collected sufficient evidence to appropriately inform reasonable findings and recommendations.

(U) (2) Findings. The initial investigation found that there were several measures that could have prevented the attack by the AS element. The measures are related to leadership, Security Forces readiness and force protection plans, intelligence sharing, and structured processes to evaluate and control adjustments to posture locations, as well as assets placed in those locations. The finding is reasonable and appropriate but I would not assert that any of these measures could have *prevented the attack*. Rather, such measures executed individually, or more likely, in combination, could potentially have deterred or mitigated the attack. The enemy has a vote. It is possible, even likely, that the enemy viewed CSL Manda Bay as a lucrative target based on the lack of significant, observable force protection measures in place and multiple exposed aircraft. (Encl. 8). It is equally likely that the decision to attack the Airfield was based on other unknown factors, such as location, manpower available, access to resources, and escape/evasion routes. Regardless, this Review determined the finding was reasonable and appropriate based on the evidence.

(U) (3) Recommendations. There were no recommendations included with this finding and this Review makes none.

k. (U) **USAFRICOM 15-6 Question 11.** Provide recommendations for any procedural and/or mission command changes to prevent or mitigate the recurrence of this type of loss.

(U) (1) Evidence. The initial investigation was thorough and collected sufficient evidence to appropriately inform reasonable findings and recommendations.

(U) (2) Findings and Recommendations. Findings and recommendations within this portion of the initial investigation are focused on the four key factors of force protection, understanding the threat, Security Forces preparation, and mission command.

(U) (a) **Force Protection Focus.**

(i) Findings. Contrary to Joint Publication (JP) 1-02's definition of a CSL including an element that "there is little to no U.S. presence,"³³ the initial investigation found that

(U) ³³ Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms and Associated Terms, defines a Cooperative Security Location as: "a facility located outside the United States and U.S. territories with little or no U.S. presence, maintained with periodic Service, contractor or host-nation support. Cooperative Security Locations provide

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starting in 2016, CSL Manda Bay became a full-time operational Airfield (b) (1) (A)

These findings are reasonable. This Review analyzes such performance weaknesses against a standard of negligence in the discussion related to Question 9 above.³⁴

(U) (ii) *Recommendations*. The recommendations related to force protection are reasonable and appropriately based on available evidence and the findings.

(U) (a) I concur with the USAFRICOM Commander's directives to: 1) Commander, AFAF, to continue to improve the organization, equipping, preparation, focus, resourcing, and supervision of base defense units and plans; 2) all other USAFRICOM components with force protection and BOS-I responsibilities, to review this investigation and adjust pre-deployment preparation, and training, force posture and operations accordingly, and 3) Senior/Base commanders responsible for each contingency location, to conduct quarterly reviews of force protection posture that will be briefed to the USAFRICOM Commander or Deputy Commander. These new initiatives, new focus, and new requirements will ensure force protection across the continent is re-assessed appropriately and regularly to prevent an attack like this from occurring again.

(U) (b) In consideration of all the materials contained in this Review, I make the following additional recommendation: **I recommend USAFRICOM reissue FORCEPRO posture TASKORD/OPORD guidance no less than annually to ensure that commanders can reference recently reviewed guidance for responsibilities for FORCEPRO.** This guidance should, at a minimum, address: responsibilities of tenant units for FORCEPRO under the TACON of installation commanders; responsibilities of USAFRICOM J2 for intelligence analysis/dissemination; responsibilities of all USAFRICOM components and units operating in the USAFRICOM AOR for duty to warn; and responsibilities of all tenant units to validate readiness training and confirm the identified training deficiencies have been submitted for corrective action by Service/Components. The frequency of publication (annually) accounts for the high turnover rate of personnel and the ever-changing threat environment.

contingency access, logistical support, and rotational use by operating forces that are a focal point for security cooperation activities."

(U) ³⁴ A deeper analysis of the force protection gaps have been provided in conjunction with this Review of Question 4 and 5, above. Actions and inactions of commanders and leaders is fully assessed in Question 9 of this Review, above.

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(U) (b) **Understanding the Threat.**

(i) **Findings.** The USAFRICOM Commander found that leaders responsible for CSL Manda Bay, at all levels, had an inadequate and flawed threat picture that directly contributed to the outcome of the attack and that these leaders were lulled by the benign threat history of CSL Manda Bay. However, the USAFRICOM Commander also found that, while ineffective intelligence resourcing, analysis, dissemination, and sharing were present, these elements did not contribute to the outcome of the attack. For the most part, this Review confirmed these findings are reasonable and appropriate. However, contrary to the finding noted above, ***I find that ineffective intelligence resourcing, analysis, dissemination, and sharing, taken together, did contribute to the outcome of the attack by AS on CSL Manda Bay.*** Threat information was available that, even if not enough to change the force protection condition level, could have prompted the EABS personnel to adjust their force protection posture to mitigate the attack.

(b) (1) (A)

(b) **Insufficient Staffing.** The sole individual at CSL Manda Bay with the appropriate clearance who would have been tracking outside threats to the base was the

(b) (6), (b) (1) (A)

(b) (6)

removed from (b) (6)

position (b) (6) ten days prior to the attack. (b) (6) As discussed in Question 4 above, this NCO was not immediately replaced and the 475th EABS MI Officer billet was never filled (b) (1) (A)

Access to tools and information is not useful if the organization is insufficiently staffed.

(c) **Lack of Analysis, Dissemination, and Intelligence Sharing.**

There was additional (b) (1) (A) reporting available that was only shared with a small number of recipients at USAFRICOM (b) (1) (A) Similarly at

(b) (1) (A)

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CSL Manda Bay, (b) (1) (A) members did not share with the 475th EABS Commander the report from the one (b) (1) (A) message that they had received, based on their determination it was not a credible report. Access to relevant threat information and reporting is essential in order to understand the threat and take actions to mitigate it. (b) (1) (A)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) (ii) *Recommendations.* The recommendations in the initial investigation are reasonable and appropriately based on available evidence and the findings. Based on the USAFRICOM Commander's assessment in the CDR EXSUM, many corrective actions have already been taken to improve intelligence sharing and dissemination, to include: increased integration among tenant units at CSL Manda Bay, USAFRICOM J2 pushing new graphic threat reports to components, and intelligence warnings disseminated in a "push" style to units in and near potentially affected areas.

(U) (a) I concur with the recommendations of the USAFRICOM Commander, especially his "Duty to Warn" directive requiring all tenant intelligence elements that receive a report related to threats or protection of a base to share that information with the commander charged with force protection. This is a significant action which will enhance the ability of base defense commanders to assess the threat based on timely intelligence reports.

(b) Based on the findings within the initial investigation, and pursuant to this Review, **I recommend USAFRICOM conduct an in-depth review of the intelligence architecture, analytic support, and battle rhythm events supporting force protection,**

(b) (1) (A)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) (c) **Security Forces Preparation.**

(U) (i) *Findings.* The initial investigation found that Security Force training and readiness were grossly deficient and significantly contributed to the attack. The Security Forces pre-deployment training did not include collective training or a mission rehearsal exercise to ensure the force was adequately prepared. In addition, the initial investigation found that Security Forces' organization, preparation, training, and defensive plans were inadequate to counter the threat. The findings are reasonable and appropriate. I agree that sufficient evidence demonstrates the Security Forces were inadequately prepared to assume the mission of force protection and base security in a combat zone, and therefore unprepared to respond to the attack. The performance of Security Forces members in contact certainly provide sufficient anecdotal evidence to confirm the failure of their preparation for this overall deployment and this crucible moment. In addition, evidence of poorly maintained weapons, a lack of defense force level rehearsals, poor maintenance of communications equipment, a lack of understanding or training in proper use of night vision goggles, and a general lack of discipline are in line with the false perception that "no enemy threat" existed at CSL Manda Bay.³⁶

(U) ³⁶ A deeper analysis of the deficiencies within the Security Forces at CSL Manda Bay is provided in this Review of Question 4. Specifically, I made the additional finding above that the Security Forces' poor training, lack of

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(U) (ii) *Recommendations*. The recommendations related to Security Forces preparation are reasonable and appropriately based on the findings. In line with the recommendation that AFAF change the Security Forces pre-deployment training, the USAFRICOM Commander notes in the CDR EXSUM that specific improvements to Security Forces pre-deployment training are already in place and subject to further improvements. Based on information received during the course of this Review, it is apparent that the Air Force is actively constructing improvements to the training program to ensure their forces are provided the base defense capabilities and unit cohesion essential to building a team that can appropriately respond in the future.

(U) (a) As the Air Force continues to improve their pre-deployment training, and in concurrence with the USAFRICOM Commander's recommendation, it is important to emphasize that the Air Force should consider collective training of deploying teams at regional training centers. The training should include basic tactical maneuvers for defensive and offensive operations. Additionally, the Air Force should consider conducting a case study involving Air Force Security Forces performance under similar circumstances and utilize this event as a training scenario for base defense forces. This would serve as a starting point in accurately building best practices for pre-deployment preparation and training.

(b) (1) (A)

(U) (d) **Mission Command.**

(U) (1) *Findings*. The initial investigation found that flawed operational level processes failed to account for the growth of CSL Manda Bay and the corresponding change in mission, ultimately contributing to the outcome of the attack. In addition, the USAFRICOM Commander found that while inadequate command and control at the tactical level did contribute to the attack, poor unity of command at the tactical level, while existing at CSL Manda Bay, did not contribute to the success of the attack.³⁷ These findings are reasonable and appropriate.

(U) (a) **Inadequate Command and Control.** Command and control encompasses the exercise of authority, responsibility, and direction by a commander over assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission (JP-1). Given this definition, I concur

rehearsals, inadequate preparation, lack of oversight by leaders collectively provided a missed opportunity to potentially deter or mitigate the AS attack.

(U) ³⁷ While the initial investigation determined that poor tactical level unity of command contributed to the attack, the USAFRICOM Commander did not approve that finding. Rather, he determined that while poor unity of command did exist, it was a non-contributing factor.

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with the initial investigation's finding that inadequate command and control at the tactical level was a contributing factor to the attack.

(b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

(U) (b) **Poor Tactical Unity of Command.** Unity of command is the operation of all forces under a single responsible commander who has the authority to direct and employ those forces in pursuit of a common purpose (JP 3-0). I concur with the finding that while poor unity of command at the tactical level was present but despite this command weakness, given the timely ad hoc actions of tenant units responding to the threat, it was not a contributing factor to the outcome of the attack.

(b) (1) (A)

(ii) However, based solely on the independent and immediate actions of (b) (1) (A) tenant units, the poor unity of command at the tactical level did not contribute to the outcome of the attack. First, the majority of the damage occurred within the first ten minutes of the attack, so even a well-coordinated response would likely have been unable to prevent that immediate death and destruction. Second, (b) (6) the (b) (1) (A) Commander took charge and had personnel responding to the Airfield within nineteen minutes. (b) (1) (A)

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(b) (1) (A)

It is clear that the independent actions of tenant units, coordinating through their technical chains rather than through the (b) (6) EABS BDOC, resulted in limiting further losses. Therefore, while I agree that poor tactical unity of command was present at CSL Manda Bay, it did not contribute to the outcome of the attack.

(U) (2) *Recommendations.* The USAFRICOM Commander has already directed corrective actions to remedy unity of command issues across the African continent. Additionally, while the initial investigation recommended AFAF designate CSL Manda Bay a Protection Level 3 posture, in accordance with AFI 31-101, the USAFRICOM Commander modified that recommendation and directed AFAF to determine the appropriate Protection Level posture at Manda Bay in accordance with regulations, instructions and orders, and ensure proper resourcing. I concur with these and the other recommendations in the CDR EXSUM. In addition, I make the following recommendations:

(a) I recommend that USAFRICOM empower a single commander with authority over the CJOA, to include responsibility for force protection, intelligence, maneuver, training, and MEDEVAC/CASEVAC across the CJOA. (b) (1) (A)

(b) (1) (A)

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(U) I. **USAFRICOM 15-6 Question 12.** *Include thorough analysis of whether the circumstances alleged are accurate and merit correction. You should also report whether any personnel should be recognized for their meritorious conduct, as well as held accountable for any shortcomings or failures.*

(U) (1) Evidence and Findings. The initial investigation was thorough and collected sufficient evidence to appropriately inform reasonable findings and recommendations. The initial investigation finds that recognition of meritorious service is appropriate and provides the names and information on those who should be recognized. In addition, the initial investigation focuses on personnel who may warrant administrative or disciplinary action and finds that while the loss of life and damage to property were not the direct result of misconduct or criminal negligence by any single U.S. person, CSL Manda Bay was characterized by a general culture of complacency which permeated every echelon and existed for several years. The findings are reasonable and appropriate.

(U) (a) In the CDR EXSUM, the USAFRICOM Commander directed the Commander, AFAF to “determine and take or recommend any administrative, disciplinary, or commendatory actions required.” AFAF was in the process of executing that directive when their investigation was suspended. This Review picks up where the AFAF investigation was paused. As discussed throughout this Review and particularly in response to Questions 4, 9, and 11 above, I have determined where individual negligence lies. Although such actions and inactions were not the direct or proximate cause of the losses suffered in the attack, I find that certain leaders and Airmen were negligent in performance of their duties.

(b) (1) (A)

The personnel in place at CSL Manda Bay on 5 January 2020 each had the independent responsibility to assess the situation and take appropriate action. Recognizing the force protection deficiencies, they were expected to then either take measures to mitigate the risks at the Airfield or to accept those risks, regardless of the decisions of leaders before them who were operating under different, variable conditions. Therefore, given that all personnel at the time of the attack had sufficient time to take appropriate action, this Review focused on the commanders, leaders, and staff in position at the time of the attack and made individual determinations as to whether their specific lack of oversight or failure to effectively accomplish their duties reached the level of negligence. My conclusions are discussed in Question 4, 9, and 11.

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(U) (c) While the nature of this Review required extensive focus on the shortcomings, missteps, and negligence that directly and indirectly contributed to the outcome of the attack, it by no means should be interpreted as, nor does it intend to, diminish the need to recognize the heroic acts, meritorious conduct, and courageous performance by numerous individuals who responded to the attack. As such, I strongly concur with the USAFRICOM Commander's Directed Action to ensure commendatory actions receive proper recognition.

(U) 8. **Directed Review CDA Question: Pre-Deployment Training**. In accordance with the SECARMY memo, this Review considered pre-deployment training of the U.S. personnel who were attacked and responded to the attack.

(U) a. Findings.

(U) (1) I concur with the initial investigation on finding the USAF Tier Training that the Security Forces received prior to arriving in CSL Manda Bay was inadequate.

(U) (a) The CSL Manda Bay Security Forces readiness on 5 January 2020 was insufficient for multiple reasons, to include insufficient pre-deployment training. Although there were additional training modules that deploying Security Forces personnel could have been run through prior to deployment, for unknown reasons, they were not required for deployments to CSL Manda Bay. Accordingly, Air Base Defense and more robust training that was already available inside the Air Force training model was not utilized. Instead, Security Forces members deployed with their basic Tiered Training.

(U) (b) The Tiered Training model employed by the Air Force did not ensure that deployed commanders had a ready, fully trained, and integrated force. Instead, Tiered Training allowed home station commanders to certify that individuals, or groups of up to 13 personnel, had basic individual skills that were neither practiced as a larger deployed unit nor validated by their deployed commanders. Even the other Air Base Defense and more robust training modules the deploying Security Forces members could have received still does not require that any of them be accomplished collectively, where deploying members go through as one unit. While the Air Force must choose a pre-deployment training model that fits their needs, the lack of collective training for Airmen deploying outside of the continental United States (OCONUS) for force protection proved to be a significant inadequacy in this instance.

(U) (2) Security Forces training was inadequate to prepare personnel to respond to a major threat on a CSL in an FPCON C country. Security Forces organization, preparation, training, and defensive plans were more or less in line with a flawed common understanding of the real enemy threat at CSL Manda Bay, and therefore contributed to the successful attack.

(U) b. Discussion.

(U) (1) There is no pre-deployment requirement for the Air Force to collectively train Security Forces to conduct security operations, and as a result, personnel were inadequately prepared to function in combat operations. (Ex. 15, 24, 35, 40, 42). Collective training is required to achieve higher echelon proficiency, unit cohesion, and assure the force is prepared to execute their deployment mission. The USAFRICOM Commander has recognized this deficiency and specifically noted that improvements to Security Forces pre-deployment training

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are in execution, which include: deployment of trained, confident, and cohesive teams; time and focused training to build unit cohesion; improvements to individual training to increase troop confidence, collective training against the toughest threat; and culmination of collective training with a "mission rehearsal" exercise against a challenging opposing force.

(U) (2) At the time of this attack, the Air Force did not have collective training and certification at the command level. Therefore, Command Team training requirements were inadequate, relying on past experience as an indication of future success, and there was no validation of the necessary skills needed for deployment to geographically isolated locations. The 475th EABS senior leaders (Commander, Senior NCOs, key staff) lacked the ability to form a cohesive and effective team prior to assuming the mission. The 475th EABS leadership was not collectively certified to conduct command and control of critical tasks. (Ex. 35, 43).

(U) c. Recommendations. Additional measures are necessary to ensure U.S. personnel deploying to a combat zone are prepared, trained, and ready to assume the mission. In addition to the directives issued by the USAFRICOM Commander, I make the following recommendations:

(1) I recommend the implementation of pre-deployment collective validation exercises, (b) (1) (A)

based on case studies of events in the AOR, to include this attack. (b) (1) (A)

(U) (2) I recommend the establishment of a formal relief-in-place process, validated and briefed at least two echelons higher.

(U) (3) I recommend elevating the certification authority for pre-deployment training to the General Officer level.

(U) (4) I recommend the Air Force consider the following actions:

(U) (a) Restructure pre-command/pre-deployment training for key deployed leaders to include collective Incident Management and Emergency Operations training, particularly for geographically isolated, medium- to high-threat locations. Such training should include exposure to functional specialties for which they are responsible, the Request for Forces (RFF) process, ground threat assessment briefings specific to their site, and training to meet USAFRICOM's directed Site Mission Commander Responsibilities. (Exhibit 132).

(U) (b) Restructure pre-deployment training for Security Forces to be collective in nature, site-specific, and focus on successful integrated defense (to include offensive and defensive maneuver) in a high threat area. This training should be reviewed annually by the applicable COCOM J34 for sufficiency. This will help produce a force capable of deterring and defeating threats to a base in a combat-deployed zone.

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(U) (c) Reevaluate line remarks for sufficiency. At a minimum, all deploying members will receive the Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) Course and weapons proficiency to support Security Forces augmentations as required for contingency plans. This training can be accomplished prior to deployment or employment with an adequate handover/changeover period. Security Forces training will be collective in nature and site specific in order to produce the desired end-state of a force capable of deterring and defeating threats to the base. Implement training plans via battle drills and rehearsals for all personnel to ensure skill fade is mitigated and impress a collective focus on readiness.

(U) d. Further Investigation. While this Review identifies weaknesses, and makes recommendations for the Air Force to consider with regard to training its deploying forces, based on the thoroughness of the initial investigation, and having the benefit of considering the substantial additional information collected during this Review, no further investigation is required for this Review to address systemic organizational and institutional issues related to the attack regarding the Air Force Security Forces training and integration prior to deployment.

(U) 9. **Directed Review CDA Question. Personnel Assignment Process.** In accordance with the SECARMY memo, this Review considered the personnel assignment process of U.S. personnel who were attacked and who responded to the attack, and whether further investigation is warranted concerning defects in the Air Force assignment process.

(U) a. Findings. Based on this Review, I make the following findings:

(U) (1). **All key leaders at the 475th EABS, 449th AEG, and 435th AEW echelons were assigned and qualified in accordance with established U.S. Air Force policies.**

(b) (6), (b) (1) (A) (a) (b) (6) Commander, 435th AMOW and 435th AEW,³⁸ (b) (6)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] background and experience were appropriate for the assignment, (b) (6) met the requirements, was qualified for [REDACTED] position, and was properly assigned by the Air Force.

(b) (1) (A) (b) (6) Commander, 449th AEG, (b) (6)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
background and experiences were appropriate for the assignment, (b) (6) met the requirements, was qualified for [REDACTED] position, and was properly assigned by the Air Force.

(b) (1) (A) (c) (b) (6) A4S, USAFE-AFAF, (b) (6)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] met the requirements, was qualified for [REDACTED] position, and was properly assigned by the Air Force.

[REDACTED] (b) (1) (A), (b) (6)
[REDACTED]

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(b) (1) (A) (d) (b) (6) Commander, 475th [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
met all the requirements, and was qualified for the position.

(b) (1) (A) (e) (b) (6) Flight Commander, 475th EABS BDF (b) (6)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
met the requirements, was well qualified for (b) (6) position, and was properly assigned by the Air Force.

(b) (1) (A) (f) (b) (6) SEL, 475th EABS, (b) (6)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] did meet the requirements from USAFE-AFAF, was qualified for the position, and was properly assigned by the Air Force.

(b) (1) (A) (g) (b) (6) First Sergeant, 475th EABS, (b) (6)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] met the requirements from USAFE-AFAF, was qualified for the position, and was properly assigned by the Air Force.

(b) (1) (A) (h) (b) (6) NCOIC, 475th EABS BDF (b) (6)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] met the requirements from USAFE-AFAF, was well qualified for the position, and was properly assigned by the Air Force.

(U) (2) The Air Force personnel system delivered personnel who were qualified in accordance with the requirements levied by USAFE-AFAF on behalf of USAFRICOM. Fundamental issues with the level or quality of personnel provided should result in AFAF considering a change or addition to the established requirements for the position. For example, subsequent to the attack, USAFE-AFAF amended the requirements of the commander billet at 475th EABS to require a TS/SCI clearance. A scrub of the position requirements for all relevant positions discussed above should be conducted.

(U) b. Discussion. During the course of this Review, I considered RFFs and Line Remarks for CSL Manda Bay personnel billets in effect at the time the personnel present on the date of

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the attack were selected. (Ex. 172, 173, 174, 178, 182). Additionally, this Review compiled the personnel reports for all relevant U.S. personnel who were either selected for the CSL Manda Bay billets or directly or indirectly played a role during the attack. These additional personnel reports are included as Enclosure 9. Finally, Air Force personnel experts provided a thorough briefing regarding: (i) the Air Force pre-assignment process used in order to fill RFFs requirements for the 475th EABS, 449th AEG, and 435th AEW; and (ii) the background, experience, and qualifications for all commanders and senior NCOs who had leadership roles at or over CSL Manda Bay at the time of the attack.

(U) c. Recommendations. Based on this Review and my findings above, I make the following recommendations:

(U) (1) In conjunction with the quarterly force protection reviews briefed to commanders for each posture location, which was directed by the USAFRICOM Commander in his Comments and Directed Action, **I recommend a review and validation of RFFs and personnel assignments based on threat level assessments and force protection mission requirements.**

(U) (2) **I recommend requiring Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection Level III for all field grade and above commanders exercising installation-commander level responsibilities in FPCON Charlie or Delta countries / areas of operation.**

(U) (3) **I recommend AFAF establish a process to ensure command teams are appropriately selected, taking into consideration the operational requirements of the location of assignment.**

(U) d. Further Investigation. No further investigation is required concerning potential systemic organizational and institutional issues related to the attack regarding the Air Force assignment process.

(U) 10. **Directed Review CDA Question. Actions/Inactions of Leaders and Staff**. In accordance with the SECARMY memo, this Review considered whether the actions and inactions of leaders and staff above the O-5 level contributed to a poor understanding of the threat and an inadequate force protection posture.

(U) a. Findings. I find that (b) (6) and (b) (6) contributed to the inadequate force protection posture, and, to some extent - by allowing for a climate of complacency - a poor understanding of the threat. Their level of contribution and specific acts and omissions are fully analyzed in this Review of Question 4, 9 and 11 above. In contrast, as discussed in Questions 5 and 9 above, the 435th AEW Commander immediately took action following the BMA attack to re-focus subordinate commanders on force protection. (b) (6) directed all IDPs be updated within 15 days and a minimum of monthly rehearsals. Specific to CSL Manda Bay, upon visiting CSL Manda Bay on 6 December 2019, (b) (6) identified risks and directed the erection of a concertina wire fence while waiting for the more substantial fence project to be completed. The 435th AEW Commander also moved the CSL Manda Bay fence project up to number one priority. These actions were appropriate for a leader at level.

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(U) b. A full analysis of the factors and individuals who contributed to a poor understanding of the threat are more fully discussed in this Review's analysis of AFRICOM 15-6 Questions 4, 9, and 11, above. Considering the totality of the 435th AEW Commander's efforts, I do not find negligence in [REDACTED] performance of duty. I do find that additional attention to the intelligence warfighting function by (b) (6) and other leaders, may have provided an improved intelligence site picture for the Commander at CSL Manda Bay.

(U) c. During the course of this Review, I considered whether any other commander or senior officer, at all echelons to include USAFRICOM, contributed to a poor understanding of the threat and inadequate force protection posture. In each such case, the flow of command and staff information that may have allowed other leaders to take more appropriately aggressive actions to mitigate the risks at CSL Manda Bay stopped at one or more echelons below the other individual leaders identified in this Report of Review.

(U) d. Recommendations. No additional recommendations beyond the significant recommendations already included in Questions 4, 9, and 11 above.

(U) e. Further Investigation. Based on the thoroughness of the initial investigation, and having the benefit of considering the substantial additional information collected during this Review, no further investigation is required concerning potential systemic organizational and institutional issues related to the attack regarding leadership shortcomings.

(U) 11. **Directed Review CDA Question.** IO Finding of No Negligence. In accordance with the SECARMY memo, this Review considered whether the initial investigation's finding of "no negligence or other misconduct by any U.S. personnel" is consistent with the evidence contained in the report's enclosures.

(U) a. Findings. As an initial matter, I do not read the initial investigation to have made a specific finding that "there was no negligence or other misconduct by any U.S. personnel." The directed question in the investigation was whether or not negligence or misconduct contributed to the loss of life and damage to property. That directed question did not require such a broad finding as is asked of this Review and, therefore, no such broad finding was made. Rather, in a more nuanced collection of relevant findings which perhaps did not answer that question directly, the initial investigation found that:

(U) (1) Neither misconduct nor criminal negligence was the direct cause of loss of life or damage to property;

(U) (2) There were failures and inactions for several years by leaders at CSL Manda Bay and multiple leaders and staff officers at all echelons up to USAFRICOM who were not providing proper oversight;

(U) (3) These failures and inactions did contribute to the outcome of the attack; but that
...

(V) (4) No single point of failure resulted in the loss of life and damage to property at CSL Manda Bay.

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(U) b. Reviewing more specifically this broader directed question now, I do find that a number of personnel, both on the ground at CSL Manda Bay and certain leaders at echelon were negligent in the performance of their duties. Looping back to the question asked in the initial investigation, I specifically find that the collective negligence of the individuals identified in this Review contributed to the outcome of the attack in that it made the Airfield a more vulnerable target than it otherwise would have been with more aggressive force protection measures. While the negligence identified in this Review contributed to the attack in this way, such negligence was not the direct or proximate cause of the losses suffered in this attack. Additional factual findings as to this question are addressed in the Review of Questions 4, 9, and 11 above.

(U) c. Recommendations.

(U) (1) **Considering that all personnel against whom I have made findings of negligence are members of the United States Air Force, and currently scattered across the world in follow on assignments, I recommend the Secretary of Defense refer the findings of this investigation to the Secretary of the Air Force to take appropriate action regarding such personnel.**

(U) (2) **As noted in the review of Question 9, above, I further recommend, the Secretary of the Air Force/Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, review all personnel actions related to these individuals during the performance period encompassing 5 January 2020, including, but not limited to, evaluation performance reports, awards, decorations and modify, as appropriate, upon review of this report.**

(U) d. Further Investigation. No further investigation is warranted concerning potential systemic organizational and institutional issues related to the attack regarding leadership shortcomings.

(U) 12. **Directed Review CDA Question.** Further Investigation.

(U) a. In accordance with the SECARMY memo, this Review considered whether further investigation is warranted concerning potential systemic organizational and institutional issues related to the attack, e.g., Air Force Security Forces' training and integration prior to deployment, leadership shortcomings, and defects in the Air Force assignment process.

(U) b. Based on the thoroughness of the initial investigation, and having the benefit of considering the substantial additional information collected during the suspended AFAF follow-on investigation, and with the benefit of the exceptional responsiveness of USAFRICOM to my multiple RFIs during the conduct of this Review, no further investigation is required.

(U) 13. This Review reconfirmed the bravery and heroism of dozens of outstanding Servicemembers and Civilians across our joint force who were all working for our nation's good as so many thousands are around the world every day. Even for those individuals against whom

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I made adverse findings of negligence in some aspects of their performance, it is apparent that they, too, were committed to both their personnel and their mission. Overall, however, the outcome of this attack resulted in tragic losses. It will never be known for certain whether such losses may have been avoided or mitigated had improvements been made in the areas identified herein - that is, more aggressive force protection measures driven at all echelons, improved intelligence architecture, improved command and control structure, improved Security Forces training and readiness, and improved operational processes to ensure that the growth at the CSL was better managed. What is certain is that we can, and must, do better. Quite obviously USAFRICOM and AFAF have moved swiftly to improve virtually all areas of weakness identified in the initial investigation. It is my fervent hope that the additional findings and recommendations made in this Review will provide further opportunity for our joint team to continue improving in order to prevent the reoccurrence of attacks like this one in the future.

(U) 14. The point of contact for this memorandum is (b) (6), (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Encls
as

PAUL E. PUNK II
General, U.S. Army
Commanding