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RESILIENCE AND RESOLVE: ENHANCING ABSTRACT ELEMENTS OF HOMELAND DEFENSE

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ABSTRACT

History shows homeland defense as an interrelated package of defensive and offensive measures, intelligence, resilience and resolve. History also shows civilian leadership's inability to enhance abstract components of resilience as proactive measures.

The pursuit of resilience has pivoted to military leadership; resilience is part of USNORTHCOM/NORAD strategy.¹ While an all-encompassing civil defense solution is unlikely - despite potential enhancements - USNORTHCOM/NORAD's military role provides an opportunity to de-politicize national resolve, draw on the public's strong history of resilience, and better involve people in all components of homeland defense.

Resolve contributes to deterrence and national service, while the material and abstract elements of resilience foster restraint required for sound judgment and shape post-crisis recovery. Canada's resolve led to its early military participation in World War II and to citizens volunteering for homeland aerial surveillance. U.S. civilians responded with poise to Cuban Missile Crisis alerts and the 9/11 and Pearl Harbor attacks, even at target sites.

But, today's threats require fresh outlooks. A rogue or accidental nation-state attack or international or home-grown terrorists employing weapons of mass destruction could produce unforeseen public reactions. The emergence of social media channels and outlets producing inaccurate reports must be taken into account for how the public perceives events.

Enhanced homeland defense and homeland security programs are required. Progress also will necessitate addressing the issues of factual information and the public's notion of teamwork.

INTRODUCTION

Resilience and resolve have played longstanding roles in the North American homeland defense equation. Despite U.S. politics fractured by isolationism, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, on a visit to Kingston, Ont., in 1938 said the United States would not stand idly by if an enemy threatened Canada. In 1940, amid concerns Hitler might sweep Europe and threaten the security of North America following the fall of France to Germany, Roosevelt and Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King met in the President's rail car on a siding near Ogdensburg, N.Y. They created the Ogdensburg Agreement for mutual defense and the U.S.-Canadian Joint Board on Defense (PJBD) with military and civilian representatives who within two months developed the first of many homeland defense recommendations.

A strong culture of resolve supported calls for national service in Canada, which chose to declare war on Germany in September 1939, more than two years before the United States

¹ From NORAD and USNORTHCOM Strategy. (March 2021) Section on "Enduring Conditions, Enhance National Resiliency." Northcom.mil

entered World War II. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor mobilized U.S. civilian wartime support, overcoming longstanding U.S. isolationist political pressure.

Civilian and military resilience was tested on Dec. 7, 1941, when Hawaii faced a devastating surprise attack. “Only the individual courage and sacrifice of personnel acting in fear and desperation prevented the Japanese from completely destroying the Army Air Forces on Oahu,” a 1991 U.S. Air Force report by the Pacific Air Forces Department of History² said. ... “All of the anti-saboteur attacks, mock battles and practice deployments proved to be of no avail during the actual attack.”

Civilians in Canada and the United States filled gaps in air defense programs in World War II and beyond.³ Volunteers joined the Royal Canadian Air Forces’ Aircraft Detection Corps established in May 1940 before radar sites became operational. During training exercises in 1940, the U.S. Army Air Corps’ Air Defense Command initially sought volunteers through the American Legion for ground observer posts. A broad collection of unpaid civilians worked at observer posts and filter centers during World War II.

While effectiveness was questionable - a U.S. Ground Observer Corps (GOC) station described a blimp as “one submarine flying high” and a P-38 as “something that looks like two plane with their arms around each other” - the GOC concept grew into one with 9,000 posts and 300,000 observers along the Eastern seaboard and 2,400 posts with 150,000 observers along the Pacific Coast shortly after the war began.⁴ A year later, 3,800 posts with 51,000 volunteers operated along the Gulf Coast, bringing total, albeit unreliable estimates to between 500,000 to 1.5 million volunteers overall.⁵

“Civilian participation in the defense of the United States against air attack during World War II was the first serious attempt in the nation’s history to enlist the home-front actively in preparation for its own defense,” a 1952 Air Defense Command (ADC) historical report said.⁶ Despite doubts among civilian and military experts about the effectiveness of ground observers, networks in Canada and the United States were re-established during the early Cold War.

The most dramatic Continental U.S. air defense event of World War II lit the early morning skies of Los Angeles with searchlights and anti-aircraft artillery fire less than three months after the attack on Pearl Harbor.⁷ Southern California residents on Feb. 25, 1942, shunned shelter and watched from their rooftops and nearby hills for hours until the shooting ended at dawn. The

² Leatrice R. Arakaki and John R. Kuborn. (1991) “7 December 1941 The Air Force Story.” Pacific Air Forces Office of History Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii. 59

³ Denys Volan (1968) “The History of the Ground Observer Corps.” Aerospace Defense Command National Division Command Directorate of Information and Bruce Forsyth, RCAF Naval Reserve. (2007) “Watching the Skies - The RCAF Ground Observer Corps” Essa Times.

⁴ Ibid. Volan. 47, 53

⁵ Ibid. Volan. 53

⁶ The Directorate of Historical Service Air Defense Command. (1952) “The Air Defense of The United States, A study of the work of the Air Defense Command and its predecessors through June 1951.” 251

⁷ From the Los Angeles Times, (Feb. 26, 1942) 1, 4, 33, 35 and (Feb. 27, 1942) Los Angeles Times 1, 5)

Army cited one civilian death from a heart attack and injuries from traffic accidents on blacked out streets as shell fragments fell to earth.

The public did not not panic, with the exception of a few hysteric accounts of the attacks some believed was happening amid sirens and flashes from AAA gunfire. One local man told police he threw a garbage can through a window of a jewelry store to turn the lights out. Police suspected he had other motives and took him to jail.⁸

This spectacular World War II incident led to a 2011 military science fiction movie “World Invasion: Battle Los Angeles” that grossed \$212 million worldwide.⁹ The film was not the first fictional account of what began to transpire the night of Feb. 24, 1942, and continued into the following morning. In what became an overnight embarrassment to the nation’s top officials, initial reports of the air battle - like the science fiction movie based on the event - were largely fantasy: There was no enemy attack.

“Attempts to arrive at an explanation of the incident quickly became as involved and mysterious as the ‘battle’ itself,” a report the Office of Air Force History reprinted in 1983 stated.¹⁰ “The Army had a hard time making up its mind on the cause of the alert. The Army would modify its account to say the “battle” began with a four-hour air defense alert after some sort of lights or flares were reported near Los Angeles defense plants.” After the War, the Japanese said they had not sent planes over Los Angeles.

Following World War II, the United States and Canada contended with Cold War tension that heightened with the Russian launch of Sputnik in October 1957 and reached a peak during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. Reports of U.S. strategic warfare deficiencies with false bomber gap and missile bomber claims by Democratic politicians challenging the Eisenhower Administration added to Russian propagandea that overstated its military prowess.

“The success of Sputnik seemed to herald a technological Pearl Harbor,” David Halberstam wrote in “The Fifties.”¹¹ “No one in the Eisenhower Administration, despite all the warnings, was prepared...none of the senior men even saw at first what a psychological victory it was for the Soviets.”

The Cuban Missile Crisis evolved overnight following weeks of political discord between the Kennedy Administration and Republicans over reports of Russian military activity in Cuba. President John F. Kennedy’s Oct. 22, 1962, televised speech outlined prospects for world war if the United States were attacked by forces from Cuba.

Accounts during the Missile Crisis differ from narratives generated years later that claim the nation was overwhelmed by tension. The classic image of the Missile Crisis in south Florida in late October 1962 was a Key West newspaper photograph circulated worldwide through news wire services.¹² Three women, one with a baby tucked in her arms, nonchalantly strolled past a trio of U.S. Army HAWK missiles set up on a launcher on Smathers Beach. Other photographs

⁸ Los Angeles Times (Feb. 26,1942) “Jewelry Store Window Bashed” 35

⁹ From: The Numbers (2011) the-numbers.com

¹⁰ William A. Goss (1983) in “The Army Air Forces in World War II” Volume I 284 Office of Air Force history reprint

¹¹ David Halberstam. (1993) “The Fifties” 624,625 Fawcett Columbine New York

¹² Photograph by Don Pinder. (Oct. 1962) Key West Citizen

showed motorists alongside their parked cars taking pictures of Army troops setting up missile launchers on the narrow strip of sand and digging gun emplacements and stringing concertina wire to protect the site.¹³

Residents nationwide saw wartime preparations first hand from ADC F-101B, F-102 and F-106 interceptors and SAC B-47 bombers dispersed to 28 civilian/joint use airports - five accommodating both dispersed fighters and bombers.¹⁴ Despite from four to 12 B-47s clearly visible on distant tarmacs at major airports in Boston, Philadelphia, Detroit, St. Louis, Milwaukee, Minneapolis- St.Paul and Memphis and elsewhere, business and travel continued as usual.

While the Kennedy Administration, its Executive Committee (Ex-Comm) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff contemplated strategy in secrecy, the NORAD commander attended to civilian concerns. USAF Gen. John K. Gerhart sent a classified message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Army Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor saying there should be some method for news media to keep the population informed to the extent security would permit.¹⁵

“The population of the southeast U.S. and particularly Florida should have the benefit of a public announcement from you, the Secretary of Defense or the President, generally to the effect the the military build-up in their area is a defense precautionary measure, that by virtue of this build-up the probability of an attack from Cuba is lessened and the public be urged to continue their normal pursuits.”

“I do not feel the the situation requires such drastic actions as blackout, CONELRAD, or evacuation, and that no control of influx or regress of civilian surface traffic is warranted at this time,” Gerhart said. “Taking any of these actions would probably be met with violent protests from civic and business interests and would contribute greatly to the overall defense mission.”

Nearly four decades later, the 9/11 terrorist attacks with hijacked airliners on New York City and the Pentagon created events in which the general public again responded with poise.¹⁶ A National Security Agency employee at an Internet sources conference at the Hyatt Regency Reston, Va., told the author, whose wife was attending the sessions, “People are calm but are in shock. There will be repercussions in our office. Our director has been trying to be more

¹³UPI telephoto (Oct. 1962) On file with U.S. Library of Congress. loc.gov/item/2001696199/

¹⁴ Information compiled from Michael S. Binder (March 2012) “Megatons For Moscow, Coming To an Airport Near You: Dispersal of the B-47 Medium bomber Force During the Cuban Missile Crisis and Richard F. McMullen (Nov. 1964) “The Fighter Interceptor Force 1962-1964” ADC Historical Study No. 27

¹⁵ USAF Gen. John K. Gerhart (Oct. 24, 1962) “Personal For Taylor From Gerhart” Declassified Secret memo to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Army Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor

¹⁶ Greg Edwards (Sept. 12, 2001) “Courtesy and Calm Prevail in Arlington” Richmond Times-Dispatch. A3

open about the risks.” A hotel guest from Toronto said, “Our countries are in this together.”¹⁷ Commercial aviation resumed service two days after the attacks and travel returned with stricter flight inspections.

But the responses of elected officials following catastrophes can rise and fall over time as conditions and a sense of urgency evolve. President Roosevelt on Dec. 9, 1941, warned the Pearl Harbor attack could be repeated “at any one of many points in both oceans and along our coastlines.”¹⁸ Schools closed in Oakland, Calif., following rumors of an enemy aircraft carrier off the coast.

After Japanese submarines shelled a Standard Oil refinery building in Aruba on Feb. 16, 1942, the first enemy attack of the war on the Americas, Roosevelt warned the nation the enemy could shell New York City or drop bombs on Detroit. Roosevelt followed his public warning within a week with his ill-advised measure to relocate and incarcerate 120,000 Japanese-Americans on the West Coast.

Differences emerged in wartime outlooks between civilians and the military. Military planners after Pearl Harbor were apt to think in terms of offensive forces to take the fight to the enemy more so than defensive forces protecting the United States, the U.S. Army history titled “Guarding the United States and Its Outposts” said.¹⁹ The public was more likely to see threats in terms of personal situations, in particular West Coast residents’ concern about exposure to attack by Japanese carriers following the loss of the U.S. naval buffer in Hawaii. The emotional element in the situation, that it took only one bomb to wipe out a home, meant that political factors were no less important than strictly military considerations in continental defense, the Army review said.

Throughout North American history, the public has responded to emergencies from Pearl Harbor to the Cuban Missile Crisis to 9/11, with more resilience than some elected officials who seize on crises to pursue political agendas.²⁰

¹⁷ Ted Jackovics (Sept. 11, 2001) Notes from unpublished Tampa Tribune article. A Web Search University conference attendee, with a name tag identifying her as a National Security Agency employee and by her initials, provided a quote for me, asking her name not be used in my news article. Pam Casey, a visitor from Toronto, also provided a comment for the one-page report I faxed to Tampa. The short story got lost in the newsroom turmoil at the Tribune, understandable because staff was putting out a special edition on Tuesday in addition to the Wednesday newspaper. I later wrote a 9/11 article, “Shield Down,” for the Tribune’s Sept. 23, 2001, Commentary section.

¹⁸ President Franklin D. Roosevelt (Dec. 9, 1941) Radio address transcript found at www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/WorldWar2/radio.htm

¹⁹ Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, Byron Fairchild (2000) “Guarding the United States and Its Outposts” U.S. Army in World War II. Center of Military History, U.S. Army

²⁰ Two examples are the measured responses by Canada’s public and armed forces, including Canadian NORAD personnel (and Canadian Minister of National Defence Douglas Harkness) during the Cuban Missile Crisis when Prime Minister John Diefenbaker initially failed to follow through with an enhanced air defence alert, and the post 9/11 pursuit by the Bush Administration to use the attacks as a “good vs. evil” rationalization to invade Iraq in 2003.

RESILIENCE DEFINED

Resilience is generally understood to be the ability of individuals and a nation to contend with challenges and recover from crises. Material components such as enhanced infrastructure and abstract, value-influenced political perceptions shape resilience.

USNORTHCOM/NORAD Commander USAF Gen. Glen D. VanHerck and other top military leaders regard national resilience as a key component of homeland defense strategy. “Equally as important as defeating threats is the hardening of critical infrastructure and promoting resilience in order to mitigate the consequences of attacks, both kinetic and non-kinetic,” the March 2021 USNORTHCOM/NORAD Strategy states.²¹ “Our demonstrated ability to respond to diverse attacks with a whole-of-government response is a strong deterrent to our adversaries. Protecting our nations is a prerequisite to projecting power abroad.”

Representatives from more than half-dozen government bodies discussed resilience at an October 2021 Association of the U.S. Army meeting in Washington, D.C. ²² “Our resiliency can either motivate conflict or it can deter it,” U.S. Army Reserve Lt. Gen. A.C. Roper, deputy commanding general of USNORTHCOM, said. “A resilient nation helps de-escalate in crisis, just as an ill-prepared nation emboldens attack.”²³

It is easier to acknowledge the importance of national resolve and resilience in homeland defense than to strengthen the concepts, let alone create them. Resolve and resilience can be traced to a nation’s culture, reinforced over time by overcoming adversities. Charismatic leaders, like Winston Churchill in Great Britain and Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Ukraine, can enhance resilience. Elected officials can take stands with political underpinnings more so than heads of civilian agencies and, in most cases, military leadership.

A 2014 essay by Daphna Canetti and Israel Waismel-Manor of the University of Haifa, Naor Cohen of the University of Calgary, and Carmit Rapaport of the Israel Institute of Technology compared national resilience definitions and threat assessments by citizens of the United States and Israel.²⁴ Their research reported in the *Armed Forces & Society* journal found “perceived threats, optimism and political-psychological features such as patriotism, trust in government and other public institutions” form the basis for citizens’ definitions of national resilience.

“We... suggest that national resilience is actually an overlooked element of a society’s ability to enhance national security, and cannot be limited to military, economic, or clinical-psychological

²¹ NORAD and USNORTHCOM Strategy (March 2021)

²² Charlotte Reavis. (Oct. 15, 2021) “AUSA emphasizes importance of national resilience” U.S. Army North News Feed. Attendees included the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Integration and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), the director for the Office of National Assessment and Integration from FEMA, the director of the U.S. Army National Guard and Air Force and Army representatives from USNORTHCOM.

²³ Ibid. Reavis

²⁴ Daphna Canetti, Israel Waismel-Manor, Naor Cohen, Carmit Rapaport (2013) “What Does National Resilience Mean In a Democracy? Evidence From the United States and Israel” Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society.

assets; rather the concept would be expanded to include political-psychological components as well.”

Data for the study was collected in 2004, a period when Israelis were exposed to ongoing acts of terrorism resulting in about 1,100 fatalities, while Americans experienced the onetime attack on 9/11 with nearly 3,000 single-day fatalities in New York, Pennsylvania and at the Pentagon. Americans felt twice as threatened by terrorism as Israelis, indicating that threats and the abilities to overcome them are the consequences of individual perceptions. Israelis were more accustomed to recurring threats than Americans, who three years after 9/11 remained haunted by the attacks on New York and the Pentagon.

The authors said the 9/11 events, a chronic threat of terrorism, and the expansion of the threat of war involving nation-states challenged Americans’ sense of national resilience, which American research respondents defined as their nation’s ability to overcome its problems and threats, and remain united while facing those threats. Israeli respondents had a slightly different and more detailed composite definition of resilience as their nation’s ability to overcome its external and internal threats and problems, be they political, social or economic, while society remains united, patriotic and imbued with a volunteering spirit.

“Terrorism” was the most frequently occurring word respondents cited as a threat facing their country. But a poor economy was considered second only to terrorism as a threat, followed by poor governmental performance and corruption. The research indicated that gaining citizens’ support and trust in government policy, a key element in obtaining national resilience, has a “vital and even critical effect on the ability of the state to endure non routine situations.”

The authors found national resilience is a dynamic rather than static concept. By measuring threats and public attitudes such as patriotism, trust and optimism, it is possible to evaluate societies’ abilities to endure crises and recover from them. They conclude that for both Israelis and Americans the presence of major threats and the stability of a society’s political institutions are important components of national resilience.

In recent years, the concept of resilience has become a key topic of homeland security for North American government agencies. Examples include the Canadian government’s counter-terrorism strategy titled “Building Resilience Against Terrorism.”²⁵ The December 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy report outlines a risk-informed approach to build resilience, including improving risk management, building a culture of preparedness, improving planning, and incentivizing information sharing.²⁶ The U.S. Department of Homeland Security recognized resilience in the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review that established goals for critical infrastructure, global movement and supply chains, and cyberspace.²⁷

The Department of Homeland Security in its 2020-2024 Strategic Plan said, “In the many years since the September 11th attacks, the Department has marshaled this collective vision to face

²⁵ Public Safety Canada (2011, plus subsequent updates) “Building Resilience Against Terrorism, Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy”

²⁶ White House (2017) “National Security Strategy of the United States of America”

²⁷ U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2014) “2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review” 1, 45

new and emerging threats against the Homeland. To do so, we are instilling a ‘culture of relentless resilience.’ ”²⁸

Under the heading “Strengthen Preparedness and Resilience” the Department said in February 2022, “The United States will never be completely impervious to present and emerging threats and hazards across the homeland security mission space.”²⁹ The Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the Nation’s Capitol exposed the vulnerability that an adversary need not use sophisticated tactics or weapons to successfully attack a major target.

CIVILIAN, MILITARY RESPONSE TO ATTACKS

While the North American public generally has responded well to crises, threats evolve. North America has never faced a major attack with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Rogue or accidental attacks by nation-states are ever-present possibilities.

Military and civilian planners in the 1950s considered threats to North America ranging from enemy troops landing in remote areas of Canada to attack radar sites to a campaign with an aerial assault preceded by nuclear detonations set off on the ground in Washington, D.C., and New York City from devices built with components smuggled in the United States.³⁰ Military planners in the early 1950s referenced concerns about possible sabotage against infrastructure and military bases by U.S. citizens who were sympathizers or members of the Communist Party.³¹

The U.S. Army enhanced security in Chicago in 1968 during the anti-Vietnam War demonstrations surrounding the Democratic National Convention in part to help protect atomic warheads at Nike Hercules surface-to-air missile sites along the lakefront and the suburbs. “I do not know if the Army thought the SDS (Students for a Democratic Society) could launch a Nike Hercules (or seize a nuclear warhead), but some intelligence agency did,” former U.S. Army Command Sgt. Gary Huber, who was assigned as a sniper during the Convention, told the author for a 2012 Tampa Tribune article about Operation Garden Plot, the Defense Department’s civil disturbance plan.³²

It is difficult to predict how the public would respond to an attack with a Weapon of Mass Destruction in an international or home-grown terrorists attack on a scale broader than those in Washington, D.C., on Jan. 6, 2021, or the recent mass shootings at a music festival in Las Vegas, a nightclub in Orlando and schools in Florida, Connecticut, Colorado and elsewhere. The emergence of social media as a primary communications channel and the nation’s acceptance of factually inaccurate reports by major news media outlets can distort individuals’ perceptions and judgments of events.

²⁸ U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2019) “The DHS Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2020-2024”

²⁹ U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Updated 2022) “Strengthen Preparedness and Resilience”

³⁰ Central Intelligence Agency (1953) “Soviet Capabilities For Attack On the U.S. Through Mid-1955”

³¹ U.S. Army 209th AAA Group (1951) “Operation Plan For The Antiaircraft Defense of Pittsburgh”

³² Ted Jackovics (July 23, 2012) “Military Is On Call for RNC” The Tampa Tribune A1

Increasingly partisan political rancor in the United States, and on occasion in Canada, affects mindsets in ways that are not easily predictable. Who, for example, would have anticipated a public and political response to nearly 1 million U.S. lives lost within two years of the outbreak of Covid-19 with more than 35 percent of the U.S. population as of Jan. 30, 2022, eschewing full doses of effective vaccines? Who would have predicted that one day after the Feb. 24, 2022, Russian invasion of Ukraine that attendees at a political gathering in Florida would cheer Russian President Vladimir Putin?

Crises generally prompt short-term news media and public attention. Following the 9/11 attacks, elected officials were quick to proclaim the nation's defense as their top priority. "The U.S. government has no more important mission than protecting the homeland from future terrorist attacks," President George W. Bush said.³³ U.S. Northern Command was established Oct. 1, 2002, to provide command and control of military resources supporting homeland defense.

Some improvements in security and defense were provided post 9/11. Airline passenger security was enhanced, though protections for air and shipborne cargo lagged. The Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration worked together to provide radar coverage and communications throughout the nation and aerial tankers were positioned on alert to support fighter operations. Continental U.S. fighter-interceptor alert sites increased from seven on 9/11 to a steady state of about 26 nationwide, a number that was reduced to 16 and eventually 14 in 2012.

Media reports provided a false sense of security to Americans through reports of Combat Air Patrols over major metropolitan areas and at special events, while inevitable gaps persisted following risk assessments addressing military budgets. A teenager hijacked a general aviation aircraft at St. Petersburg-Clearwater International Airport in 2002 and flew it into the side of a downtown Tampa office tower before either a U.S. Coast Guard helicopter that happened to be in the area and the nearest interceptors from Homestead Air Reserve Base could intervene.³⁴

Texas Air National Guard Lt. Col. Gordon Niebergall said in a 2009 U.S. Army War College report: "No one is willing to publicly announce that the fighter assets needed to protect the homeland are not necessary. However actions speak louder than words when one looks into funding this mission."³⁵

In 2011, in another event beyond the immediate response range of interceptors on alert, an FAA controller requested a Southwest Airlines pilot intercept a general aviation aircraft headed toward Orlando that had not responded to FAA communications.³⁶ The airliner intercepted the general aviation aircraft without a problem, but the FAA and Southwest Airlines subsequently created policies to avoid events that could endanger airliners.³⁷

³³ President George W. Bush (2002) Quote in "Defending the Northwest-Point Paper" Oregon National Guard Association

³⁴ Ted Jackovics and eight contributors (Jan. 6, 2002) "Skyscraper Hit" The Tampa Tribune A1

³⁵ Texas ANG Lt. Col Gordon Niebergall (2009) "Air Sovereignty Alert: America's Security Blanket" U.S. Army War College

³⁶ Ted Jackovics (Oct. 6, 2011) "Airliner, plane close enough to 'see heads' " The Tampa Tribune A1

³⁷ Ted Jackovics (Oct. 7, 2011) "Southwest Airlines creates 'fly-by' policy" The Tampa Tribune B4

It is unlikely the public has much knowledge of and understands their homeland's vulnerability, the reality elected officials generally are reluctant to acknowledge. The drawdown of North American aircraft defenses once Soviet missiles became the primary strategic threat during the middle of the Cold War escaped the attention of civilians and military and elected officials, beyond a few involved in air defense roles.

"The general public likely thinks we have planes ready to take off from many of our bases on defense missions," an Air National Guard planner assigned to the Pentagon, Lt. Col. Carl Nuzzo, said for a Tampa Tribune article in 1995. "They would be surprised to find out how little we have."³⁸

U.S. Sen. John McCain, R-Az., was a staunch advocate of military security with access to the nation's best information on homeland defense. Five years before the 9/11 attacks, during a March 1996 Senate subcommittee meeting, McCain asked what airborne threats remained after the Cold War.³⁹

"Any threat which may come into our airspace," responded Deborah Lee James, Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs who later became Secretary of the Air Force.

"Name me an enemy that that could be," McCain responded. "Canada? Mexico? Venezuela?"

Most mainstream media coverage of air defense, as well as other homeland defense issues, has been limited to problematic events, with few stories covering the issues beforehand. U.S. Rep. Frank LoBiondo, R-NJ, told the author for a Tampa Tribune article on air defense in 2010, "Public knowledge: It's zero. People don't know anything about the (air defense) shortfall and the consequences are not talked about."⁴⁰

"The Pentagon has to fully explain with specifics how they intend to deal with the air sovereignty alert mission. It is why we have pressed so hard for Congress to pay more attention. More members understand and are very frustrated the Air Force just ignores us."

WHAT HOMELAND DEFENSE SHOULD DEFEND

Along with concerns over post-9/11 violent international extremists, USNORTHCOM/NORAD expanded its focus in recent years to contend with peer adversaries Russia and China seeking to leverage weakness in North American defenses and space based programs. Long-range cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles could strike select North American command centers and international deployment forces, using conventional warheads to lower the likelihood of a U.S. nuclear retaliatory response.

Adversaries could seek to wage war with the United States after slowing or preventing deployment of U.S. military capabilities abroad and using asymmetric attacks on political institutions, creating a domestic political climate amenable to agreeing to adversaries' terms,

³⁸ ANG Lt. Col. Carl Nuzzo, interviewed by Ted Jackovics for (1995) "Sentries of the Skies" The Tampa Tribune. Commentary 1

³⁹ U.S. Sen John McCain (March 21, 1996) Comments in Readiness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee hearings found in Federal News Service transcript

⁴⁰ U.S. Rep. Frank LoBiondo interviewed by Ted Jackovics for (April 18, 2010) "Web of defense has gaps" The Tampa Tribune A1

H. Quenton Lucie wrote in the May 2019 edition of Homeland Security Affairs. The article titled “How FEMA Could Lose America’s Next Great War,” focused on improving civil defense.⁴¹

Lucie suggested a scenario a nation-state could use to achieve a political objective through military means: Initiate a war such as Russia seizing the Baltic States or China invading Taiwan; interfere with deployment of U.S. military forces from the Continental United States; upset U.S. mobilization and industrial and manpower base to a wartime footing; directly attack American electrical and financial sectors, the Internet and other infrastructure that impacts citizens’ day-to-day lives and the economy; and directly target voting infrastructure, attempting to sway the executive and legislative branches of the federal government to end the war on favorable terms for the adversary.

“Attacks upon critical transportation and power infrastructure, shutting down large portions of the national power grid for a sustained period, the use of social media to influence elections indirectly, and the hacking of electronic ballots to affect them directly, might, in combination, defeat the United States in a future conflict,” Lucie wrote.

In the not too distant past, the points Lucie outlined as context for the need for a new approach to civil defense might have drawn skeptical responses and claims of over-reaction from non-experts and experts alike. But since the article was written, domestic and International current events have proven major elements of his thesis prophetic.

North American air defense planners during the early Cold War gave top priority to defending the strategic retaliatory force and U.S. and Canadian command and decision making centers within a primary strategy of area defense. That was supported by point defense of Strategic Air Command and Atomic Energy Commission installations and major metropolitan areas.

By the time the Cold War concluded, air defense became oriented to point defense of a few main population centers with ballistic missile defense focused on a small attack, possibly by North Korea. Post 9/11, the United States and Canada were forced to more aggressively contend with the potential for terrorist attacks against omnipresent targets.

As with air defense, the question of overall homeland defense historically comes down to the question of “How much is enough?” Clearly, defensive measures cannot be the only element to support homeland defense. Offensive measures are required in the homeland defense equation to provide deterrence and prevent adversaries from making a repeat attack. Strategic and tactical Intelligence measures are necessary to provide warning to alert defenses. Resilience can provide deterrence and help restore everyday life to normal.

While it is likely any defense can be penetrated or circumvented, defensive measures are required for deterrence and to deny adversaries an unopposed path to their targets. Such was the case on 9/11 once terrorists breached the cockpits of four commercial airliners and the nation’s depleted air defense force could not do as might have been ordered to “take lives in the air to save lives on the ground.”⁴²

Defensive measures can be provided for only a few targets that nation-states or international or home-grown terrorists might attack. “...You don’t have to put Patriot or THAAD on every corner

⁴¹ H. Quenton Lucie (May 2019) “How FEMA Could Lose America’s Next Great War” Homeland Security Affairs

⁴² Maj.Gen. Larry Arnold (Sept. 11, 2001) Quoted in “Air War Over America” Headquarters 1st Air Force (2003) 68

and have batteries all over the place,” Gen. VanHerck said at the February 2022 Air Force Association conference in Orlando. “It’s figuring out what we must defend that could bring us to our knees in a crisis or conflict. And that’s not my decision. That’s a policy decision that we’ve been working on for a while to get.”⁴³

Clearly, homeland defense gaps will persist. Beyond the reality that myriad targets exist, elected officials have not been aggressive to fund improvements beyond some measure of response post-catastrophe. Decision makers rely on quantitative risk assessment models, processes the news media and public seldom challenge, to assist or confirm recommendations on defense expenditures such as the Government Accountability Office’s 2013 report on interceptor alert site reductions.⁴⁴

One example of the need to determine priorities during crises took place on 9/11 with the uncertainty after the attacks on New York and the Pentagon that other targets might be struck. Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold, commander of the 1st Air Force in charge of Continental U.S. air defense, on 9/11 drew circles around major metropolitan areas to enhance defense with combat air patrols, along with contacting fighter units without 1st Air Force missions for alert duty.⁴⁵

“Eventually, probably a month after this thing began, everybody in the world, of course, is putting in, ‘You got to come defend me, and - we were just told, ‘no, no, no,’ “ Arnold said. “Everybody has to send their request through their service up to the JCS, JCS will make a determination.

Arnold received a National Security Council list of cities and other sites that mostly resembled the 1st Air Force list of cities, minus a few including Seattle and Dallas/Fort Worth. Some places were listed that 1st Air Force had not considered: Las Vegas, Orlando, popular vacation places with a lot of people.

“And, we had to adapt a little bit and we’re still in the planning stages of adapting to that, because we weren’t directed to do anything specifically,” Arnold said. “The other thing they directed us to do was to develop a plan to protect nuclear power plants and some nuclear labs around the country. And we did that.

“And while we were doing that, I can tell you we were not positioned to be able to defend all the cities. There are chemical sites, you know, where the Army has stored the chemical weapons they’re trying to destroy and those things are very, you know, it could be high profile targets. NASA is interested in the space shuttle, as they should. Civilian populations are concerned about the civilian population. Department of Energy is concerned about nuclear power plants and labs.”

Ultimately, the decision on what targets to defend should be determined by the combination of risk assessment techniques contributing to - not determining - informed, experienced judgments by top military and civilian leadership. Decisions on what targets to defend should

⁴³ USAF Gen. Glen D. VanHerck (March 3, 2022) “Leaders of US Space Command, US Northern Command Discuss Threats to Homeland” airforcemag.com March 10, 2022

⁴⁴ U.S. Government Accountability Office (Feb. 28, 2013) “Homeland Defense: DOD’s Aerospace Control Alert Basing Decision Was Informed By Various Analyses”

⁴⁵ USAF Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold (Nov. 19, 2001) “Interview of Larry K. Arnold, National Guard Bureau Air Guard History 27, 28

encompass the full equation of homeland defense - defensive measures, offensive measures for deterrence, intelligence, and resilience, not simply defensive resources alone.⁴⁶

21st CENTURY CIVIL DEFENSE

At some point, a nation's populace must depend on government plans and preparations to contend with a catastrophe or a lesser crisis that interferes with their everyday lives. That is the role that civil defense can help fill. Civil defense programs in the United States have evolved with elected official and public perceptions of threats from the World War I era into the 21st Century. The civil defense concept has addressed both natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes and preparedness for attacks by an ever-changing cast of adversaries.

A succession of Presidential Administrations has advanced changes in civil defense focus, depending on a combination of the mindsets of decision makers in power and the mindsets of the general public, both of whose interest and attention appear and disappear with the latest crisis. Since 9/11, for example, civil defense was resurrected as homeland security, Northwestern University professor Tracy C. Davis said in her 2007 book "Stages of Emergency."⁴⁷

Similar to the United States, civil defense efforts in Canada since World War II have evolved with changing perceptions of threats and subsequent government priorities. Canada Command, which focuses on domestic operations, in 2015 agreed to a Civil Assistance Plan with USNORTHCOM that allows each nation's military to support the other's armed forces during a civil emergency.

Other nations have invested in civil defense programs that change over time. After the Cold War, Sweden slashed funding for its armed forces and dismantled an exceptional civil defense before announcing in 2020 a 40 percent increase in its defense budget over five years and doubling funding for civil defense.⁴⁸

The Washington, D.C., think tank said the new investments followed aggressive Russian tactics in Swedish airspace and territorial waters. Funding was announced the same week NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg pivoted the alliance towards resilience, saying in speech NATO's militaries can't be strong if the societies are weak, so the first line of defense must be strong societies.

⁴⁶ Cold War ADC histories showed air defenses could be penetrated or circumvented, but commanders placed limited resources to complicate an enemy's path to a target, unlike air defenses remaining on 9/11, when interceptors were based on Cape Cod, Mass., and Hampton, Va. to defend New York and Washington, D.C, respectively. In 1964, the Office of the Secretary of Defense the inactivation of the interceptor squadron at Goose AB, Labrador, in FY 1967. NORAD and ADC recommended a creating a detachment of interceptors at Goose Bay to "complicate Soviet targeting, restrict route options, as well as performing identification and sovereignty functions and radar site training for radar site personnel," the January-December NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary reported (103-106) The ADC Commander, USAF Lt. Gen. Herbert B. Thatcher, said the detachment would provide "pre-war battle effect" and "strengthen our position politically by providing additional assurance to our Canadian friends." Various detachment plans subsequently became operational at Goose Bay.

⁴⁷ Tracy C. Davis (2007) "Stages of Emergency"

⁴⁸ Elisabeth Braw (Oct. 19, 2020) "Sweden's Wide Investment in Civil Defense" American Enterprise Institute blog post found at aei.org

Most civil defense programs face some degree of criticism, an inevitable consequence from civil defense primarily being a response to an unpredictable crisis. A December 2019 paper in a Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies journal said Israeli civil defense was a critical tactic that reduces civilian casualties during wartime, but is insufficient as a strategy to defeat an enemy.⁴⁹ At issue, author Elliot Chodoff, wrote, was a shift in Israeli civil defense from a protective tactic up to the point Israel could achieve a battlefield victory to a strategic strategy of minimizing civilian casualties through sirens, shelters and anti-rocket defenses like Iron Dome. The new paradigm of civil defense, Chodoff contended, allowed the enemy to launch attacks that cause few casualties but mitigated the prospects for a devastating Israeli response.

“If Israeli strategy is based on deterrence, a civil defense strategy is counterproductive,” Chodoff wrote. “Non-response to attacks emboldens the attacker and erodes deterrence... When attacks eventually escalate beyond the ‘tolerable’ and Israeli reacts militarily, that response is likely to elicit severe international criticism, as the foreign perception is likely to be that the incremental escalation did not justify the response.”

Disparate views of U.S. civil defense have prevailed since the early Cold War when the program was known throughout the civilian community for protection against a possible Russian bombing attack, along with providing responses to floods and other natural disasters.⁵⁰

The Eisenhower Administration was mindful of budgets, but backed a plan to develop the Interstate Highway program in part as a network for evacuation of heavily populated areas. The Kennedy Administration increased the priority for civil defense and stressed its role in deterrence, but the Johnson Administration marked the beginning of a major decline in civil defense funding, a 2006 Homeland Security report said, and the focus turned toward preparedness for natural disasters. The Carter Administration created FEMA in 1979 as the lead agency for Federal disaster relief and goals and budgets continued to evolve as the nation responded to various crises from oil spills to hurricanes.

“The United States has not had a comprehensive strategy to protect its civilian population and defense industrial base, or to mobilize and sustain the nation during time of war, in almost 25 years,” Quinton Lucie said in his 2019 Homeland Security Affairs essay.⁵¹ Lucie suggested a combined mobilization, civil defense, and continuity of government and operations plans approach for a 21st Century civil defense that would revitalize FEMA’s original goals that the FEMA director in 1993 reshaped following the agency’s poor response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and its heavily Cold War-focused mission.

“Unfortunately, efforts so far may not have reflected the fact that it is the morale and purpose of the American people that will be the crucial factor to prosecuting any future war,” Lucie wrote. “It is the American public, and their supporting political system and critical infrastructure that could quite possibly be the focus of our enemy’s attacks if it decides to bypass the American military juggernaut and go directly after the citizens it serves to protect.”

⁴⁹ Elliot Chodoff (Dec. 16, 2019) “Israel Civil Defense: A Critical Tactic, But a Poor Strategy” The Begin-Sadat Center For Strategic Studies perspective paper No. 1,373

⁵⁰ U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Sept. 2006) “Civil Defense and Homeland Security: A Short History of National Preparedness Efforts”

⁵¹ H. Quinton Lucie (May 2019) “How FEMA Could Lose America’s Next Great War” Homeland Security Affairs

Clearly, civil defense can accomplish certain necessary functions to support homeland defense and there is no shortage of recommendations on how to improve the programs. But well-informed ideas will be at odds with one another, judgments on anticipated effectiveness will differ, and reasonable proposals will compete for limited resources.

A new approach to civil defense could maintain its missions under FEMA or another federal agency, Lucie wrote. Moving civil defense responsibilities to DOD is unlikely, he said, adding that DOD historically has divested or downgraded civil defense responsibilities it assumed. FEMA's effectiveness to address civil defense with concrete, measurable activities can be easier to evaluate than efforts to enhance the fluid, abstract elements of resilience dependent on psychological components and political factors.

FEMA's support for Covid-19 vaccination distribution efforts in the United States generally have succeeded. But the government's efforts to enhance national resilience through a high percentage of vaccinations among the population have fallen short, in part because of psychological and political factors, including politically partisan efforts focused on challenging the President and his chief medical adviser.

The Department of Homeland Security went all in with endorsing and highlighting the notion it calls "Relentless Resilience" in its Fiscal 2020-2024 strategic plan. DHS said it was instilling a culture of relentless resilience across the United States "striving to prevent future attacks against the United States and our allies, responding decisively to natural and manmade disasters and advancing American prosperity and economic security long into the future."⁵²

Strengthening preparedness and resilience is a DHS goal cited in a report updated in February 2022.⁵³ DHS cited an emphasis on material components of resilience with pre-disaster mitigation efforts that strengthen infrastructure and reinforce existing structure to build resilience. But the report provided no specifics for the abstract, psychological and political elements of resilience.

"The United States will never be completely impervious to present and emerging threats and hazards across the homeland security mission space," the narrative explaining the goal states. That reality was tested and the agency's "Relentless Resilience" concept from 2019 was strained from 2020 into 2022. The U.S. record of Covid-19 cases and deaths became among the world's worst. And on Jan, 6, 2021, the United States suffered the most significant terrorist attack since 9/11 when home-grown civilian insurgents took over the U.S. Capitol, showing that an attack on the United States does not require sophisticated weapons or tactics to achieve success.

The 2022 war in Ukraine with Russian President Vladimir Putin's threats drew news media attention to prospects for a wider conflict with an impact on North America. The Seattle Times on April 3, 2022, carried a front-page story headlined "Is it time for state to restart prepping for nuclear war?" that focused on civil defense in the metropolitan area.⁵⁴ The 88-inch long newsprint article did not address abstract, psychological elements of resilience. But the key takeaway from the article might be that 46 of the first 56 comments to the on-line edition

⁵² U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2019) The DHS Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2020-2024, 1

⁵³ U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2022) Found on www.dhs.gov/strengthen-preparedness-and-resilience

⁵⁴ Rebecca Moss (April 3, 2022) "Is it time for state to restart prepping for nuclear war?' The Seattle Times A1

involved political issues, rather than the civil defense elements in the story. Clearly, governments will have an increasingly difficult time to get messages across on civil defense given the partisan political and ideological divides.

Sweden, with a stronger civil defense culture than the United States in the post Cold War era, in 2018 mailed a 20-page illustrated leaflet titled “If Crisis Or War Comes” to all of its households.⁵⁵ It contains sections on emergency preparedness, warning systems and “total defense,” with descriptions of homeland defense military missions and resources. Some viewed the project as alarmist until Covid-19 arrived, which showed that preparing the public for a crisis is not a bad idea, Elisabeth Braw wrote in her October 2020 AEI blog post.⁵⁶

While responsibility for the Covid-19 response and the Jan. 6 attacks will continue to be researched and debated for months, clearly confidence the general public has in government protection from natural and man-made assaults has been shaken in recent years. Whether a civilian government office can enhance resilience sufficiently through material measures is questionable. Enhancing resilience involves psychological and political factors that likely require charismatic leadership or the public’s understanding and regard for the military mission of homeland defense, which includes resilience as a major component.

HOW USNORTHCOM/NORAD CAN SUPPORT RESILIENCE

By virtue of its military mission, USNORTHCOM/NORAD is well positioned to de-politicize resolve and take a leadership role in promoting resilience as a major component of homeland defense. By aggressively endorsing the resilience civilians historically have contributed to North American military security, USNORTHCOM/NORAD can draw the public into better understanding and supporting all elements of their missions.

North America has faced multiple major crises in a little more than two decades, from 9/11 attacks to the Covid-19 pandemic to the Jan, 6, 2021, assault on the U.S. Capitol, to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Elected officials and the public must become better informed to support their interests and the best interests of the nation to better contend with inevitable crises that will follow.

USNORTHCOM/NORAD could pursue the following to create a better understanding of and support for the homeland defense mission:

1. Interest the public in a national discourse on homeland defense, detailing and emphasizing the interdependent roles of defensive and offensive measures, intelligence, resilience and resolve.
2. Aggressively promote the public’s historical achievements in resilience and resolve to draw their attention to the overall homeland defense mission.
3. Consider multiple approaches to generate more attention to homeland defense through on-line and other communication outlets, including a (necessarily) more limited-circulation print pamphlet similar to Sweden’s initiative. USNORTHCOM and NORAD generally operate beneath political⁵⁷ and news media radar (more so in the United States than with Canada/

⁵⁵ Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2018) “If Crisis Or War Comes’ English version at www.msb.se

⁵⁶ Ibid. Braw

⁵⁷Andrea Charron, Jim Fergusson with Joseph Jockel, Chris Sands, Joel Sokolsky (Jan. 31, 2019) “NORAD: Beyond Modernization” Centre for Defense and Security Studies 53-59

NORAD) - perhaps to some operational benefit. But the two nations might derive a good deal of benefit if the public were more aware of homeland defense roles.

4. Engage publicly with FEMA on that agency's pursuit of civil defense improvements and evaluate proactive measures to better protect infrastructure per USNORTHCOM/NORAD strategy.
5. The U.S. Defense Department and Canadian officials should more publicly address the extent to which North America is well prepared and stockpiled to counter a Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear weapons attack (CBRN) to a reasonable degree that might promote resilience and deterrence. Similarly, governments should aggressively publicize efforts to contend with cyber attacks, a key element of adversaries' asymmetrical arsenals. Cybersecurity seemingly remains a reactive rather than proactive mission in public perceptions.

There is little likelihood of developing some all-encompassing strategy for homeland defense. History shows that well-informed leaders disagree among themselves about strategies.⁵⁸ Advancing national resolve and resilience among civilian leaders and the public likely will depend upon a campaign with small steps. USNORTHCOM/NORAD can be the organization to meaningfully increase national resilience, but it should do so by considering resilience in context with defensive and offensive measures and intelligence components of the homeland defense equation.

Improvements to homeland defense and homeland security will require leadership to prepare for and respond to fresh challenges rationally and aggressively, rather than muddle through or rely on political ideology or previous government practices. That in turn requires a well-informed public to oversee leadership decisions, a task complicated by false information disseminated by foreign adversaries and domestic political rivals.

“Currently the United States has no integrated approach to combating foreign-backed disinformation occurring within the Homeland, former DHS Acting Under Secretary for Intelligence Brian Murphy said in a March 2022 Defense One article.⁵⁹ Murphy has argued for the need for a “Center to Counter Foreign Malign Influence” that can “anticipate, identify and defuse foreign-backed disinformation... to keep it from undermining the foundations of our democracy. To date, Beltway turf wars and political hesitancy have prevented efforts to create such a Center.”

A similar argument has been raised with regard to deliberate inaccurate information politicians and U.S. and Canadian media outlets and on-line sources spread. But any quest for government regulators to separate fact from falsehood is fraught with legal and political complications. U.S. Sen Daniel Moynihan in 1983 said in a point others made throughout previous decades but fails to gain meaningful traction: “Everyone is entitled to his own opinion but not his own facts.”⁶⁰

The quest to improve homeland defense and homeland security is likely to rest on two issues beyond government programs:

⁵⁸ An example of disagreements among well-informed experts can be found in a dive into U.S. air defense history. Many are the occasions when USAF personnel in NORAD disagreed with USAF officers in ADC who disagreed with USAF leadership in air defense divisions.

⁵⁹ Brian Murphy (March 20, 2022) “The US Needs a Center to Counter Foreign Malign Influence at Home” Defense One

⁶⁰ Daniel Moynihan (1983) Found in “An American Original” (Oct. 2010) Vanity Fair

Will social media and professional news outlets - new and old - communicate factual reports with sufficient context and perspective to enable the public to understand national security and advance electoral responsibility?

And will people acknowledge that life is a team game, beyond competitive elements built into everyday activities, as they pursue their personal interests and the well being of their countries?

No one should expect that diverse nations will produce a consensus of national or individual goals. No one is compelled to buy into a team concept and the compromises that might entail. What is essential, though, is that individuals acknowledge their lives are interdependent. People's well-being depends on one another - for better or worse.

The quest to ensure good information will require small, innovative and forceful steps through political and legal landmines. Judgments that people reach to serve their interests begin with sound information and an understanding of mutual dependence, both of which USNORTHCOM/NORAD can exemplify.

Some might contend a more enlightened citizenry (and news media) is too simplistic or too improbable a goal to pursue. But events in the 21st Century reveal the urgent need for people to "wise up."