





~~TOP SECRET//SI//NF~~ USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a ~~NOFORN~~

INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

December 13, 2019




(U) Audit of Combatant Commands Integration of Space Operations Into Military Deception Plans

Classified By: Richard B. Vasquez
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 13 December 2044

INTEGRITY * INDEPENDENCE * EXCELLENCE

~~TOP SECRET//SI//NF~~ USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a ~~NOFORN~~





(U) Results in Brief

(U) Audit of Combatant Command Integration of Space Operations into Military Deception Plans

(U) December 13, 2019

(U) Objective

(S) USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a
[Redacted]

(U) Background (cont'd)

(U) executed by, and in support of, combatant commanders, joint force commanders, and joint task force.

(S) USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a
[Redacted]

(U) Background

(U) MILDEC is an action executed deliberately to mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions that would contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. MILDEC activities are planned to support objectives detailed in concept plans, OPLANs, and operation orders associated with approved military operations or activities.¹

(U) Joint MILDEC is planned and conducted in a theater of operations to support military campaigns and major operations. Joint MILDEC activities are planned and

(U) Space is a physical domain like the air, land, and maritime domains, where military, civil, and commercial activities are conducted. DoD space forces are the systems, equipment, facilities, organizations, and personnel or combination thereof, necessary to conduct space operations. Joint Publication 3-14 states that deception in space operations is typically designed to confuse or mislead a threat with respect to the location, capability, operational status, mission type, or robustness of a national security system or payload.⁴ If deception measures are successful, an adversary will not attack a specific system or capability.

¹ (U) A concept plan may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into a complete and detailed OPLAN or operation order.
(U) An OPLAN is complete, detailed, and contains a full description of the concept of operations, all applicable annexes to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment list.
(U) An operation order is a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.

² (U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3211.01F, "Joint Policy for Military Deception," May 14, 2015.
(U) A Joint Strategic Campaign Plan provides military strategic and operational guidance to combatant commanders for preparation of plans based on current military capabilities.
³ (U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3130.03A, "Planning and Execution Planning Formats and Guidance," February 4, 2019.
⁴ (U) Joint Publication 3-14, "Space Operations," April 10, 2018.



(U) Results in Brief

(U) Audit of Combatant Commands Integration of Space Operations Into Military Deception Plans

(U) Finding

(S//ACGM//NF) USEUCOM, USINDOPACOM, and USSTRATCOM DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

[Redacted]

(S//ACGM) DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

[Redacted]

(S//ACGM//NF) DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

[Redacted]

(S//ACGM//NF) As a result, USEUCOM, USINDOPACOM, and USSTRATCOM DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

[Redacted]


(U) Finding (cont'd)

(S//ACGM//NF) DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

[Redacted]

(S//ACGM//NF) USEUCOM, USINDOPACOM, and USSTRATCOM DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

[Redacted]



(U) Results in Brief

(U) Audit of Combatant Commands Integration of Space Operations Into Military Deception Plans

(U) Recommendations

(S//ACGM) We recommend that the USEUCOM and USINDOPACOM Director of Information Operations [J39]

DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

[REDACTED]

(S//ACGM) We also recommend that the USSTRATCOM Commander

DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

[REDACTED]

(S) USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a, g

[REDACTED]

(U) Finally, we recommend that the Joint Staff Director of J39 document the relationship between MILDEC and space operations in joint doctrine to guide planners in understanding their roles and responsibilities for mutually supporting one another.

(U) Management Actions Taken

(S) USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a, g

[REDACTED]

(TS//ACGM) DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

[REDACTED]

The action taken is sufficient to resolve the recommendation. We will close the recommendation when we verify that USEUCOM

DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

[REDACTED]

(TS//ACGM//NF)

DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

[REDACTED]

The action taken is sufficient to resolve the recommendation. We will close the recommendation when we verify that USINDOPACOM

DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

[REDACTED]



(U) Results in Brief

(U) Audit of Combatant Commands Integration of Space Operations Into Military Deception Plans

(U) Management Actions Taken (cont'd)

(TS//ACGM) [REDACTED]
DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(TS//ACGM//NF) [REDACTED]
DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The actions
taken are sufficient to resolve the recommendation. We
will close the recommendation when we verify that
USSTRATCOM [REDACTED]
DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)
[REDACTED]

(TS//ACGM) Additionally, USEUCOM J39 and
USINDOPACOM J39 immediately initiated corrective
actions [REDACTED]
DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Management Actions Taken (cont'd)

(TS//ACGM) [REDACTED]
DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)
[REDACTED]. The actions taken are
sufficient to resolve the recommendations. We will close
the recommendations when USEUCOM and
USINDOPACOM [REDACTED]
DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)
[REDACTED]

(S//ACGM) [REDACTED]
DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The action taken is sufficient to resolve the
recommendation. We will close the recommendation
when we obtain guidance from [REDACTED]
DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page
for the status of the recommendations.

(U) Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Director, Information Operations, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command	None	2.a and 2.b	None
Director, Information Operations, U.S. European Command	None	1.a and 1.b	None
Director, Information Operations, U.S. Strategic Command	None	4	None
Director, Global Operations Special Activities Division, Joint Staff	None	3	None

(U) NOTE: The following categories are used to describe agency management's comments to individual recommendations:

- (U) **Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- (U) **Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- (U) **Closed** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.



INSPECTOR GENERAL
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
December 13, 2019

(U) MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE
COMMANDER, U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

(U) SUBJECT: Audit of Combatant Commands Integration of Space Operations Into
Military Deception Plans (Report No. DODIG-2020-039)

(U) We are providing this final report for your information and use. DoD officials took prompt action to resolve each concern identified; therefore, we will not make any additional recommendations in this report. We conducted this audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

(U) We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the audit. Please direct questions to me at DoD OIG (b)(6), DoD OIG (b)(6) (DSN DoD OIG (b)(6)).


Richard B. Vasquez
Assistant Inspector General for Audit
Readiness and Global Operations

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(U) Introduction

(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(S) USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a, g

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Background

(U) Military Deception

(U) MILDEC is an action executed deliberately to mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions that would contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. MILDEC activities are planned to support objectives detailed in concept plans, OPLANs, and operation orders associated with approved military operations or activities.¹ When properly integrated with operations security, other information-related capabilities, and the visible activities of the joint force and its components, MILDEC can be a decisive tool in altering the adversary's views, analysis, decisions, and actions.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Joint MILDEC is planned and conducted in theater operations to support military campaigns and major operations. Joint MILDEC activities are planned and executed by, and in support of, combatant commanders, joint force commanders, and joint task force. A combatant commander develops supporting Joint MILDEC plans for standing OPLANs directed by:

¹ (U) A concept plan may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into a complete and detailed OPLAN or operation order.

(U) An OPLAN is complete, detailed, and contains a full description of the concept of operations, all applicable annexes to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment list.

(U) An operation order is a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.

(U) Introduction

- (U//~~FOUO~~) the Guidance for Employment of the Force;²
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan tasked concept plans, OPLANS, theater campaign plans, and global campaign plans;³
- (U//~~FOUO~~) non-Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan combatant commanders-directed concept plans, and OPLANS; or in response to contingencies.

(S) USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a
 [Redacted text block]

(U) Space

(U) Space is a physical domain like the air, land, and maritime domains, where military, civil, and commercial activities are conducted. DoD space forces are the systems, equipment, facilities, organizations, and personnel or combination thereof, necessary to conduct space operations.

(U) Space systems consist of three related segments:

- (U) **Ground (Terrestrial) Segments.** Ground base facilities and equipment supporting command and control of space segment resources to include ground-based process equipment, earth terminals, space situational awareness sensors, and interconnectivity between the equipment facilities.
- (U) **Link Segments.** Signals that connect ground and space segments.
- (U) **Space Segments.** Operational spacecraft within the space joint-operating area.

² (S//NF) Secretary of Defense "Guidance for Employment of the Force," February 3, 2015.

³ (U) A Joint Strategic Campaign Plan provides military strategic and operational guidance to combatant commanders for preparation of plans based on current military capabilities.

⁴ (U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3211.01F, "Joint Policy for Military Deception," May 14, 2015.

⁵ (U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3130.03A, "Planning and Execution Planning Formats and Guidance," February 4, 2019.

(U) Introduction

(S) USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a

(S//NF) USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a

USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a

(U) Source: Defense Threat Reduction Agency.⁶

(U) Joint Publication 3-14 states that deception in space operations is typically designed to confuse or mislead a threat with respect to the location, capability, operational status, mission type, or robustness of a national security system or payload.⁷ If deception measures are successful, an adversary will not attack a specific system or capability. Given the nature of space operations, deception is a critical element of any space-system's ability to support functions necessary for mission success.

(U) Roles and Responsibilities

(U) Joint Staff

(U) The Joint Staff Operations Directorate [J3] supports the combatant commanders in development, assessment, coordination, and recommendation of Joint MILDEC options. The Joint Staff Global Operations Special Activities Division [Joint Staff J39] ensures CGMDs Joint MILDEC requirements do not conflict with Joint MILDEC operations occurring in other areas of responsibility. The Joint Staff J39 oversees the incorporation of Joint MILDEC into the information operation portion of operations estimates.

⁶ (U//FOUO) Defense Threat Reduction Agency, "2014 Balanced Survivability Assessment of Naval C4I and Support Activities, Naval Support Activities Naples," April 11 2014.

⁷ (U) Joint Publication 3-14, "Space Operations," April 10, 2018.

(U) Introduction

(U) Geographic Combatant Commands

(U) EUCOM (b)(3) 10 USC 130(e)

[REDACTED]

(U) U.S. European Command

(S//REL) USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a; EUCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a, g; INDOPACOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a, b, c

[REDACTED]

(U) U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

(S//REL) USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a; INDOPACOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a, b, c

[REDACTED]

(U) U.S. Space Command

(U) To further accelerate warfighting capability in space, the DoD created USSPACECOM which is responsible for preparing for and deterring conflict in space and leading U.S forces in that fight. USSPACECOM will develop space doctrine, concept of operations

¹ USSTRATCOM and EUCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a; INDOPACOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a, b, c

² USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a; INDOPACOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a, b, c

(U) Introduction

(U) and space tactics, techniques and procedures. To grow the needed joint warfighting expertise, the DoD is establishing a Space Operations Force to be overseen by USSPACECOM. The Space Operations Force will be responsible for providing personnel needed to develop, field, and integrate space capabilities into multi-domain warfighting. USSPACECOM will also be responsible for the deploying teams of space experts to USEUCOM and USINDOPACOM to assist USSPACECOM to meet its priorities, such as, integrating space planning and operations across military campaigns and contingency plans.

(U) U.S. Strategic Command

(S//ACGM) USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a; INDOPACOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a, b, c

[REDACTED]

(S//ACGM) DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

[REDACTED]

(U) Review of Internal Controls

(S//ACGM) DoD Instruction 5010.40, "Managers' Internal Control Program Procedures," May 30, 2013, requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls.¹⁰

DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)
[REDACTED]

¹⁰ (U) DoD Instruction 5010.40, "Managers' Internal Control Program Procedures," May 30, 2013.

(U) Introduction

(S//ACEM) **DODIG (b)(1)** We will provide a copy of the report to the senior official responsible for internal controls at USEUCOM, USINDOPACOM, and USSTRATCOM.

(U) Finding

(U) Finding

~~(S//ACGM//NF)~~ U.S. European Command, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, and U.S. Strategic Command ~~DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)~~

~~[REDACTED]~~

~~(S//ACGM//NF)~~ USEUCOM, USINDOPACOM, and USSTRATCOM ~~[REDACTED]~~

~~DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)~~

~~[REDACTED]~~

~~(S//ACGM)~~

~~DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)~~

~~[REDACTED]~~

~~(S//ACGM//NF)~~

~~DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)~~

~~[REDACTED]~~

~~(S//ACGM//NF)~~ As a result, USEUCOM, USINDOPACOM, and USSTRATCOM ~~[REDACTED]~~

~~DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)~~

~~[REDACTED]~~

(U) Finding

(S//ACGM//NF) USEUCOM, USINDOPACOM, and USSTRATCOM

DODIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

[REDACTED]

(U) Finding

~~(S//ACGM)~~ Combatant Commands [REDACTED]

DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g) [REDACTED]

~~(S//ACGM//NF)~~ USEUCOM, USINDOPACOM, and USSTRATCOM [REDACTED]

DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g) [REDACTED]

~~(S//ACGM)~~ Combatant Commands [REDACTED]

DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g) [REDACTED]

~~(TS//ACGM)~~ Although the 2018 National Defense Strategy [REDACTED]

DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g) [REDACTED]

~~(S//ACGM)~~ [REDACTED]

DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g) [REDACTED]

~~(TS//ACGM)~~ [REDACTED]

DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g) [REDACTED]

¹¹ (U) 2018 National Defense Strategy, "Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge," January 19, 2018.

¹² ~~(S)~~ USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a [REDACTED]

(U) Finding

(TS//ACGM) DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

(S//ACGM) Combatant Commands

DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

(S//ACGM) USEUCOM and USINDOPACOM

DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

[Redacted content]

³³ (U) Command MILDEC Officer – designated officer with overall oversight and management responsibility for each MILDEC program within the CCMDs, agencies, and service components which support joint military operations.

(U) Finding

(S) USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4g; EUCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4(a)

[Redacted]

(S//ACGM) [Redacted] USEUCOM and USINDOPACOM [Redacted]

DODIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)
[Redacted]

(S//ACGM) At USEUCOM and USINDOPACOM, [Redacted]

DODIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)
[Redacted]

(U) USSPACECOM Personnel Will Assist USEUCOM and USINDOPACOM With Integrating Space Operations Throughout the Command

(S) USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a; EUCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a, g; INDOPACOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a

[Redacted]

⁴⁴ (U) DoD Report to Congressional Defense Committees, "Final Report on Organizational and Management Structure for the National Security Space Components of the Department of Defense," August 9, 2018.

(U) Finding

(S) USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a
[Redacted]

(S) USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4g
[Redacted]

(U) USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.7e
[Redacted]. For instance, Joint Publication 3-13.4 discusses the relationship between MILDEC and cyberspace operations.¹⁵ Specifically, the publication identifies planning considerations for integrating cyberspace operations and MILDEC. Joint Publication 3 13.4, describes how MILDEC planners can help protect information systems by applying deceptive activities, such as false servers, replication of information systems traffic, and false data storage. USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.7e
[Redacted]

(S//ACGM) Joint Publication 3-14, discusses deception in a broad sense for space planners to consider, but does not use the term MILDEC. Joint Publication 3-14, states that deception is considered by commanders of space assets, in their planning for space operations, to ensure the survival and resilience of their space mission. [Redacted]
DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)
[Redacted]

(S//ACGM//NF) USSTRATCOM [Redacted]
DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)
(S//ACGM//NF) USSTRATCOM [Redacted]
DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)
[Redacted]

¹⁵ (U) Joint Publication 3-13.4, "Military Deception," February 14, 2017.

(U) Finding

(S//ACGM//NF)

[REDACTED]

DODIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Finding

(U) Recommendations

(U) Recommendation 1

(U) We recommend that the Director of Information Operations, U.S. European Command:

- a. **(S//ACGM)** [REDACTED]
 DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

- b. **(S)** USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4g; INDOPACOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a
 [REDACTED]

(U) Management Actions Taken

(TS//ACGM) During the audit, the USEUCOM Information Operations [J39] Deputy agreed with the recommendations and immediately initiated corrective actions. [REDACTED]

DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The action taken is sufficient to resolve Recommendation 1a. We will close the recommendation when we verify that USEUCOM [REDACTED] DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and [REDACTED]

(TS//ACGM) On October 9, 2019, the USEUCOM J39 Deputy stated that [REDACTED] DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

[REDACTED] The action taken will enable [REDACTED] and is sufficient to resolve Recommendation 1.b. We will close the recommendation when we [REDACTED]

(U) Finding

(U) Recommendation 2

(U) We recommend that the Director of Information Operations Division, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command:

- a. ~~(S//ACGM)~~ [REDACTED]
 DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

- b. ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] INDOPACOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a; USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4g
 [REDACTED]

(U) Management Actions Taken

~~(TS//ACGM//NF)~~ During the audit, the Director of Information Operations Division, USINDOPACOM agreed with the recommendations and immediately initiated corrective actions. DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The actions taken are sufficient to resolve Recommendation 2.a. We will close the recommendation when we verify that USINDOPACOM

DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

~~(S//ACGM)~~ On October 17, 2019, USINDOPACOM provided [REDACTED]
DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

The action taken will enable [REDACTED] and is sufficient to resolve Recommendation 2.b. We will close the recommendation when we verify [REDACTED] DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

[REDACTED]

(U) Finding

(U) Recommendation 3

(U) We recommend that the Director of Global Operations Special Activities Division, Joint Staff document the relationship between military deception and space operations in joint doctrine to guide planners in understanding their roles and responsibilities for mutually supporting one another.

(U) Management Actions Taken

(S//ACGM) During the audit, Joint Staff Global Operations Special Activities Division [Joint Staff J39] agreed with the recommendations and immediately initiated corrective actions. **DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)**

[REDACTED]

The action taken is sufficient to resolve Recommendation 3. We will close the recommendation when we obtain

DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)
[REDACTED]

(U) Recommendation 4

(S//ACGM) We recommend that the U.S. Strategic Command Commander

DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)
[REDACTED]

(U) Management Actions Taken

(TS//ACGM) During the audit, the Director of Information Operations, USSTRATCOM immediately initiated corrective actions to address the recommendation.

DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)
[REDACTED]

(U) Finding

(TS//ACGM//NF) [REDACTED] DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The actions taken are sufficient to resolve
Recommendation 4. We will close the recommendation when we verify that
USSTRATCOM [REDACTED] DODOIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (g)

(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this performance audit from January 2019 through November 2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective.

(U) We focused our audit on the USEUCOM, USINDOPACOM and USSTRATCOM use of Joint MILDEC to ~~EUCOM (b)(3) 10 USC 130(e)~~

~~_____~~ We met with Joint Staff, Office of Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Office of Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to gather background information on the integration of space operations into MILDEC plans. To obtain sufficient, evidence, we conducted site visits to USEUCOM, USINDOPACOM, and USSTRATCOM. During our site visits, we ~~EUCOM (b)(3) 10 USC 130(e)~~

~~_____~~

~~_____~~

~~_____~~

(U) We identified and reviewed the ~~EUCOM (b)(3) 10 USC 130(e)~~ and USINDOPACOM. From the listings, we non-statistically selected critical assets for additional audit procedures. We based the critical asset selection on each COCOM's prioritization, asset location, asset type, and if the asset supported an applicable OPLAN.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) No prior coverage has been conducted on integrating space operations into MILDEC plans during the last 5 years.

(U) List of Classified Sources

(U) List of Classified Sources

Source 1: (U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3211.01F, "Joint Policy for Military Deception," May 14, 2015 (Document Classified SECRET//NOFORN)
Declassify on: May 31, 2040
Date of Source: May 14, 2015

Source 2: (U) Secretary of Defense "Guidance For The Employment of the Force 2015-2017" (Document Classified SECRET//NOFORN)
Declassify on: February 3, 2040
Date of Source: February 3, 2015

Source 3: (U) 2018 National Defense Strategy (Document Classified SECRET)
Declassify on: January 19, 2043
Date of Source: January 19, 2018

Source 4: (S) USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a
[Redacted]

Source 5: (S) USSTRATCOM and EUCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a
[Redacted]

Source 6: (S) USSTRATCOM and INDOPACOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a
[Redacted]

Source 7: (S) USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a
[Redacted]

(U) List of Classified Sources

(U) List of Classified Sources (cont'd)

- Source 8: (U) Headquarters USINDOPACOM J39 Information Operations (Document Classified SECRET//NOFORN)
Declassify on: February 16, 2043
Date of Source: February 13, 2019
- Source 9: (U) Appendix 3 to Annex C to USPACOM OPLAN 5076-15 Change 1 (Document Classified TOP SECRET)
Declassify on: June 30, 2042
Date of Source: June 30, 2017
- Source 10: (U) USSTRATCOM Fiscal Year 2018 Joint MILDEC Annual Operations Report (Document Classified SECRET//NOFORN//ACCM USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a)
Declassify on: November 30, 2043
Date of Source: November 30, 2018
- Source 11: (U) USSTRATCOM Plans Overview (Document Classified TOP SECRET)
Declassify on: June 12, 2043
Date of Source: June 13, 2018
- Source 12: (U) USSTRATCOM MILDEC (Document Classified SECRET//NOFORN)
Declassify on: September 9, 2044
Date of Source: September 9, 2019
- Source 13: ~~(FOUO)~~ Balanced Survivability Assessment of Naval C4I and Support Activities, Naval Support Activity (NSA), Naples, Italy (Document Classified SECRET//NOFORN)
Declassify on: June 20, 2039
Date of Source: June 14, 2014
- Source 14: (U) USEUCOM Instruction 3206.02 MILDEC Program (Document Classified SECRET)
Declassify on: October 20, 2036
Date of Source: October 20, 2011

(U) List of Classified Sources

(U) List of Classified Sources (cont'd)

Source 15: (U) Captain Myers Building (C4I Building)/ Naval Computer,
Telecommunication Station (Document Classified SECRET)
Declassify on: October 26, 2039
Date of Source: October 26, 2014

Source 16: (U) Camp Smith Protected Military Satellite Communication Terminal
(Document Classified SECRET)
Declassify on: April 12, 2044
Date of Source: April 12, 2019

Source 17: (TS//ACGM) ~~DODIG (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (a) and (e)~~
~~(Document Classified TOP SECRET//ACGM)~~ (Document
Classified TOP SECRET//ACGM ~~USSTRATCOM (b)(1) EO 13526
Section 1.4a~~)
Declassify on: April 29, 2044
Date of Source: April 29, 2019

Source 18: (U) Annex N to USINDOPACOM ~~INDOPACOM (b)(1) EO 13526 Section 1.4a~~
(Document Classified TOP SECRET)
Declassify on: February 4, 2030
Date of Source: February 4, 2015

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

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- (U) CCMD Combatant Command
- (U) CMDO Command Military Deception Officer
- (U) MILDEC Military Deception
- (U) OPLAN Operation Plan
- (U) USEUCOM U.S. European Command
- (U) USINDOPACOM U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
- (U) USSTRATCOM U.S. Strategic Command
- (U) CCMD Combatant Command

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
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