Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons from Afghanistan
MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

SUBJECT: Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons from Afghanistan
(Report No. DODIG-2022-065)

This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General’s evaluation. We provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management's comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

This report contains one recommendation that is considered closed and one recommendation that is resolved, but open. The Department of Homeland Security and the National Ground Intelligence Center issued an updated sharing agreement on December 10, 2012, that extends the National Ground Intelligence Center's access to Customs and Border Protection data until June 27, 2022. This action taken meets the intent of Recommendation 1; therefore, we consider this recommendation closed. The United States Northern Command Chief of Staff, responding on behalf of the United States Northern Command Commander, non-concurred with Recommendation 2, stating that the United States Northern Command does not have the authority to address the recommendation. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security Director for Defense Intelligence (Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement), responding on behalf of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, agreed with Recommendation 2, but requested it be directed to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security for action. Therefore, we have redirected Recommendation 2 to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security and consider the recommendation resolved, but open. We will close the recommendation when we receive verification that procedures for sharing derogatory information on Afghan evacuees with DoD and interagency stakeholders are in place.
DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, please provide us within 30 days your response concerning specific actions in process or alternative corrective actions proposed on the recommendations. Send your response to Andre Brown

Andre Brown  
Acting Assistant Inspector General for  
Programs, Combatant Commands, and Overseas Contingency Operations Evaluations Directorate
Executive Summary

The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which the DoD managed and tracked displaced persons from Afghanistan through the biometric enrollment, screening, and vetting process. We determined that the DoD had a supporting role during the biometric enrollment of Afghan evacuees in staging locations outside the continental United States (OCONUS) and assisted in screening Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants. However, the DoD did not have a role in enrolling, screening, or overseeing the departure of Afghan parolees at temporary housing facilities (safe havens) within the continental United States (CONUS).

Additionally, we found that Afghan evacuees were not vetted by the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) using all DoD data prior to arriving in CONUS. This occurred because Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) enrollments were compared against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) data, which did not initially include all biometric data located in the DoD Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS) database and because the DoD’s National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) has agreements with foreign partners that prohibits the sharing of some ABIS data with U.S. agencies outside of the DoD. Subsequently, in August 2021, NGIC personnel expanded their normal analytic review of all biometric watchlist matches to also include non-watchlist matches of Afghan evacuees using all DoD data to close these gaps. Because NGIC personnel needed access to CBP records to complete this analysis, the NGIC entered into an agreement with the DHS to access the necessary CBP records. This agreement was set to expire December 27, 2021, prior to NGIC completing a full review of all Afghan evacuees.

Furthermore, during their analytic review, NGIC personnel identified Afghans with derogatory information in the DoD ABIS database who were believed to be in the United States. When NGIC personnel began their analytic review, they developed informal procedures to notify both the DoD and interagency stakeholders about these individuals. Subsequently, the NGIC relied on a broad dissemination list, with the expectation that the individual base commanders of CONUS safe havens would attempt to determine if the Afghan with derogatory information was located on their base.

We recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Director, Defense Forensics and Biometrics Agency; and the Commander, National Ground Intelligence Center, extend the data sharing agreement with the DHS. They completed the extension on December 10, 2021, extending the agreement until June 27, 2022. We also recommended that the Commander, U.S. Northern Command, develop procedures for sharing derogatory information on Afghan evacuees with the DoD and interagency stakeholders. Based on
comments received from the Chief of Staff, U.S. Northern Command, and the Director for Defense Intelligence (Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S)), we redirected the recommendation to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security.

**Objective**

The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which the DoD managed and tracked displaced persons from Afghanistan through the biometric enrollment, screening, and vetting process. Specifically, we evaluated the:

- screening of individuals biometrically, and whether the processes to screen these individuals was followed;
- identification, tracking, and management of the biometric enrollment of individuals who have never been enrolled in a DoD database;
- management of individuals identified as security risks through the screening process; and
- management and tracking of individuals’ ingress and egress to DoD-managed facilities.

We performed site visits or conducted interviews with personnel at five of the eight DoD installations that were providing temporary housing for Afghan evacuees: Fort Lee, Virginia; Fort Pickett, Virginia; Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia; Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico; and Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. Additionally, we conducted interviews with personnel from the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the OUSD(I&S), the U.S. Army G2, and the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC).

**Background**

On July 14, 2021, the President initiated an inter-agency effort to evacuate and relocate Afghans who had applied for a Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) along with other vulnerable Afghans to address the rapid takeover of Afghan cities by the Taliban. The evacuation and relocation effort included transporting evacuees out of Afghanistan to temporary locations in the United States to allow for the completion of the immigration process.

**Operation Allies Refuge**

On July 14, 2021, the President announced Operation Allies Refuge (OAR) to support the relocation of interested and eligible Afghan nationals, and their immediate families, who supported the U.S. Government and applied for a SIV.

1 On July 19, 2021, the Department of State (DOS), the lead Federal agency for OAR, activated the Afghanistan Coordination Task Force, which coordinated the U.S. Government’s efforts to bring qualified SIV applicants

---

1 SIV applicants worked directly with the U.S Armed Forces as translators or interpreters or were employed by or on behalf of the U.S. Government or the International Security Assistance Force for at least 2 years between 2001 and 2021 in the region.
to the United States once their security vetting was complete. However, in August 2021, the Taliban rapidly gained control of Afghanistan’s cities, culminating in the seizure of the country’s capital, Kabul, placing many Afghans who assisted the United States or its allies at increased risk of retaliation from the Taliban. As of August 2021, the United States had evacuated more than 120,000 people on U.S. military evacuation flights, including American citizens, lawful permanent residents of the U.S., Afghan SIV applicants, and vulnerable members of Afghan civil society.

**Operation Allies Welcome**

On August 29, 2021, the President directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to lead Operation Allies Welcome (OAW). OAW is a coordinated effort to implement ongoing initiatives across the Federal government to support displaced persons from Afghanistan, including those who are eligible for an SIV, through a broad range of services. Additionally, on August 29, 2021, the President directed the DHS to lead the coordination of ongoing efforts across the Federal government to resettle Afghan refugees by establishing and leading the Unified Coordination Group. Efforts under OAW included initial immigration processing, screening, and coronavirus disease–2019 (COVID-19) testing. Additionally, the Unified Coordination Group planned all operations related to OAW, including screening and vetting Afghan personnel prior to arrival in the United States and processing Afghan evacuees at U.S. military facilities. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy represents the DoD at the Unified Coordination Group meetings.

**Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations, Enrollment, and Screening**

On August 21, 2021, a Joint Staff Director of Operations (J3) general administration message directed DoD personnel to enroll Afghan evacuees in the Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) Tracking System (NTS), which assigns a unique number, printed on a wristband, to each evacuee.² DoD personnel were then tasked to support the enrollment of every Afghan evacuee assigned an NTS number in the Biometric Automated Toolset System or the CBP Automated Targeting System for biometric screening.³ On August 29, 2021, the President designated the DHS as lead for biometric screening of Afghan evacuees traveling to the United States and outside the continental United States (OCONUS) military installations. The DHS worked with DoD personnel to conduct OCONUS biometric enrolling, screening, and vetting activities.⁴

---

² General Administration messages provide general information, request information, or request support, but do not task commands or staff offices.

³ Enrollment in the Biometric Automated Targeting System or the CBP Automated Targeting System is limited to activities that include collecting biometrics and biographic data and does not entail any analysis. The enroller enters the evacuee’s information into the respective database and determines if there is any derogatory information on the evacuee.

⁴ Screening is the process of taking the enrollments and searching for other information available about the individual on the various databases to create a dossier. Vetting is a determination of suitability. The U.S. Government uses the enrollment and screening information to decide whether an evacuee is suitable for something, such as access to an installation.
On August 21, 2021, the Joint Staff J3 directed DoD combatant commanders supporting the biometric enrollments during the Afghan relocation mission to assist with screening enrolled individuals against the DoD and CBP identification databases. The DoD stored its collected enrollment data in the DoD ABIS. CBP conducted approximately half of the enrollments of Afghan evacuees at the OCONUS staging bases (also known as “lily pads”) and stored its collected information in the DHS IDENT. The DoD completed the remaining enrollments and screened its information against the DoD ABIS database. Both the DoD and the CBP enrollment information was then sent to the CBP National Targeting Center (NTC). The NTC then sent the combined DoD and CBP enrollment data to the NCTC to crosscheck the information with the FBI classified Terrorist Screening Database and Terrorist Identities DataMart databases to determine whether an individual was free of derogatory information and was cleared for travel or if the individual needed further adjudication. After these preliminary checks, the NCTC transmitted the results through the NTC to the NGIC and the CBP. The NGIC received the list of individuals approved to travel and notified OCONUS airports designated to coordinate departures, while the CBP notified the continental United States (CONUS) airports designated to receive cleared individuals. The DHS and the CBP then approved the manifest for flights and certified that all passengers were clear to fly to the United States.

**CONUS Placement of Afghan Evacuees**

The DoD transported Afghan evacuees and SIV applicants to intermediate staging bases located in several countries, including Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Spain, Italy, Bahrain, and Germany. These staging bases (lily pads) served as emergency processing centers. Afghan evacuees were screened at the lily pads before being transported to DoD-provided temporary housing facilities (also known as “safe havens”) for SIV applicants and other Afghan evacuees at eight DoD installations: Fort Bliss, Texas; Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey; Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; Camp Atterbury, Indiana; Fort Pickett, Virginia; Fort Lee, Virginia; Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia; and Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico.

Upon arrival in the United States, evacuees with green cards or U.S. citizenship were allowed to travel to their final destinations, while those who did not possess either a green card or proof of U.S. citizenship were sent to temporary safe havens for further processing. While at the safe havens, evacuees received medical services and a complete health screening, including COVID-19 testing. Furthermore, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) provided administrative support to evacuees to expedite the processing.

---

5. DoD’s ABIS supports storing, matching, and sharing of collected biometric data.

6. Derogatory information is information that potentially justifies an unfavorable fitness or access determination. Such information may prompt a request for additional investigation or clarification to resolve an issue.

7. A Green Card, officially known as a Permanent Resident Card, allows the bearer to live and work permanently in the U.S.
of applications for work authorization and immigration. The DOS and DHS also worked to provide initial relocation support to Afghan evacuees granted humanitarian parole, ensuring that those Afghans arriving in American communities have initial support, including short-term emergency health insurance.\(^8\)

**DoD Roles and Responsibilities**

Several DoD components were involved in developing policy and direction for the DoD in support of the inter-agency effort to relocate Afghan evacuees. DoD Directive 8521.01E identifies specific DoD roles and responsibilities in regards to biometric processes, and Joint Publication 3-68 defines the roles and responsibilities of DoD organizations during a NEO.\(^9\)

**Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security**

According to DoD Instruction O-3300.04, the OUSD(I&S) is the lead authority for DoD oversight of and guidance on DoD Biometric Enabled Intelligence programs, activities, and initiatives, which includes biometric enrolling, screening, and vetting.\(^10\) The OUSD(I&S) is responsible for directing the development and sustainment of Biometric Enabled Intelligence resources, capabilities, and capacity to meet validated requirements; providing support to irregular warfare; and countering human network operations.\(^11\) According to DoD Directive 8521.01E, the OUSD(I&S) serves as the primary DoD point of contact with other Government agencies and international entities for all DoD entities that conduct biometric enrollment intelligence activities.

**The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

According to Joint Publication 3-68, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff coordinates the deployment and employment of U.S. forces in support of NEOs approved by the Secretary of Defense and monitors U.S. force participation in the protection and evacuation of noncombatant evacuees. The Joint Staff issued OAW NEO-focused general administrative messages for all combatant commands detailing how DoD elements should enroll, track, and screen the Afghan evacuees. The Joint Staff also established a Crisis Management Team to coordinate operational activities between the DoD and other U.S. Government agencies involved in the Afghanistan NEO. In addition, the Joint Staff supports the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the Unified Coordination Group led by the DHS.

---

\(^8\) The DHS, through USCIS, is authorized to grant humanitarian parole to foreign nationals to temporarily enter the United States due to emergency or urgent humanitarian reasons.


Human network operations include counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, counter-proliferation, counter-narcotics, counterpiracy, and counter-smuggling.
U.S. Northern Command

The Secretary of Defense tasked USNORTHCOM as the lead combatant command for OAR, responsible for providing support to the DOS for SIV applicants brought into the United States. USNORTHCOM further delegated U.S. Army North as the lead operational command for the OAW mission. U.S. Army North provides medical screening, transportation, lodging, and general support to the DOS for Afghan evacuees on DoD installations.

National Ground Intelligence Center

The NGIC supports OAW and OAR screening and vetting efforts led by the DOS. On June 1, 2021, the DOS requested that the DoD support the DOS Afghan SIV applicant process. On June 2, 2021, the OUSD(I&S) informed the DOS that the Army tasked NGIC with screening Afghan SIV applicants for derogatory information that would make the applicant ineligible for the Afghan SIV program. On August 23, 2021, a collaborative general administration message from the Joint Staff J-3 requested that the NGIC post lists of the Afghan evacuees who were vetted and approved by the NCTC for onward travel to the United States on an unclassified, digital dropbox developed by the NGIC to ensure that all DoD personnel had access to the approved lists. Additionally, the NGIC notified personnel at OCONUS air points of departure when the lists were available so OCONUS DoD personnel could create flight manifests for Afghan evacuees.

Defense Forensic and Biometrics Agency

The Defense Forensic and Biometrics Agency (DFBA) is a component of the U.S. Army’s Office of the Provost Marshal General. In accordance with DoD Directive 8521.01E, the DFBA executes the responsibilities of the Executive Agent for DoD Forensics and Biometrics on behalf of the Secretary of the Army. As the Executive Agent, the DFBA leads, consolidates, and coordinates forensics and biometrics throughout the DoD across the range of military operations. The DFBA stores biometric data collected during military operations via direct enrollment or forensic analysis of material and shares the data with DoD partners. The DFBA, in coordination with the NGIC, is responsible for negotiating sharing agreements with the DHS for forensic and biometric data as it relates to Afghan evacuees.

DoD Roles and Responsibilities for Enrolling, Screening, and Vetting at Lily Pads and Safe Havens

On June 1, 2021, the DOS sent the DoD a memorandum requesting that the DoD support Afghan SIV applicant processing by verifying SIV applicants’ qualifying employment with the United States. On June 2, 2021, OUSD(I&S) replied to the DOS memorandum and stated that DoD personnel, including the NGIC, were tasked with verifying SIV applicants’ qualifying

employment with the United States, which included a review for derogatory information that would make the applicant ineligible for employment. This review was specific to Afghan SIV applicants and did not include other Afghan evacuees. Once OAR commenced and Afghan evacuees began arriving at the lily pads, the DHS did not request additional NGIC support for the screening of Afghan evacuees, beyond the NGIC’s continued support for screening Afghan SIV applicants. However, in August of 2021, to ensure U.S. agencies vetted Afghan evacuees against all biometric data, the NGIC expanded their normal analytic review of biometric watchlist matches to also include non-watchlist matches of all evacuees, in addition to SIV applicants. Additionally, the DoD assisted the DOS and the DHS in enrolling the evacuees into NTS at the lily pads and also provided biometric capable equipment that was interoperable with the DoD and DHS databases.

The DoD provided support for OAW, in conjunction with other organizations, within CONUS, including emergency housing and sustainment at DoD safe havens. Personnel at the five safe havens we visited or contacted confirmed that the DoD was not responsible for, or participating in, enrollment, screening, or vetting of evacuees at the safe havens. Instead, DoD efforts ensured that Afghan evacuees received basic life support and could continue moving forward with finalizing the immigration process.

Afghan Evacuee Immigration Categories

The DOS and USCIS identify Afghan evacuees in the OAW process as either SIV applicants or parolees. Under the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009, the DHS and DOS are authorized to issue an SIV to certain Afghan nationals who worked for or on behalf of the U.S. Government. The DHS, through the USCIS, is authorized to grant humanitarian parole to foreign nationals to temporarily enter the United States due to emergency or urgent humanitarian reasons.

Special Immigrant Visas

The DOS can issue an SIV under two separate programs. Under Section 602(b) of the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009, the DOS can issue an SIV to Afghan nationals who were employed in Afghanistan by or on behalf of the U.S. Government or by the International Security Assistance Force. The SIV applicant must have worked on a U.S. military base in Afghanistan, or the SIV applicant must have served as either an interpreter or translator off base. In addition, the applicant must have experienced an ongoing threat because of their employment and must have served for at least 1 year. Approximately 34,500 SIVs have been allocated under this program since December 19, 2014.

---

Under Section 1059 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, the DOS can issue up to 50 SIVs annually to Iraqi and Afghan translators and interpreters who worked directly with the U.S. Armed Forces or under the Chief of Mission authority at the U.S. Embassy Baghdad or U.S. Embassy Kabul. An amendment to Section 1059 expanded the total number of visas to 500 per year for FY 2007 and FY 2008 only. In FY 2009, the number of visas available for this category reverted to 50 annually.

The DOS and non-governmental organizations assist Afghans who have completed the SIV process and their dependents begin the resettlement process. The DHS grants humanitarian parole to those who have not finished the SIV application process while their SIV applications are adjudicated. SIV applicants can also apply for another immigration status through USCIS while awaiting their adjudication from the DHS.

**Immigration Parolees**

The United States Code permits the CBP, under the DHS, to process Afghan evacuees who are not enrolled in the SIV program and parole them into the United States for 2 years for urgent humanitarian reasons. An Afghan evacuee's immigration parole status is conditional upon their compliance with medical screening and vaccination requirements outlined in the USCIS Afghan Parole information document provided to evacuees upon arrival. To receive and maintain parolee status, evacuees are required to stay at the safe havens until all medical screening and vaccinations have been successfully completed.

Upon leaving the safe havens, the parolees must provide their address to USCIS and notify USCIS of every change of address. Additionally, parolees must comply with all public health directives, requests for additional information from the DHS and Federal law enforcement, and comply with local, state, and Federal laws and ordinances. Parolees may be subject to additional conditions of parole on a case-by-case basis. The U.S. Government arranges the parolee's travel to their final destination in the United States upon completion of the U.S. immigration process. U.S. Government agencies also help individuals connect with non-governmental organizations that may assist in their resettlement in the United States.

**Finding**

Afghan evacuees were not vetted by the NCTC using all DoD data prior to arriving in CONUS. Specifically, the NCTC did not have access to some DoD biometric and contextual data located in the ABIS database or to intelligence databases used by the DoD that are located on the Secret Internet Protocol network when they vetted Afghan evacuees. This occurred because CBP enrollments forwarded to the NCTC by the NTC for vetting purposes were compared against the CBP IDENT data, which did not initially include all biometric data located in the

---

ABIS database and because the NGIC has agreements with foreign partners that prohibits the sharing of some ABIS data with U.S. agencies outside of the DoD. Subsequently, in August 2021, NGIC personnel expanded their analytic review of all biometric watchlist matches to include non-watchlist matches of Afghan evacuees. NGIC personnel required access to the CBP electronic enrollment records to conduct the analytic review of Afghan evacuees and, on September 30, 2021, the NGIC entered into an agreement with the DHS to access CBP records to complete the review. However, this agreement was set to expire on December 27, 2021, and NGIC personnel estimated that they would not be able to screen all Afghan evacuees that are located in CONUS against the DoD’s ABIS database by this date.

Additionally, during their analytic review, NGIC personnel identified Afghans with derogatory information from the DoD ABIS database who were already in the United States. When NGIC personnel began their analytic review, they developed informal procedures to notify both the DoD and interagency stakeholders about these individuals. Subsequently, the NGIC relied on a broad dissemination list, with the expectation that individual base commanders would attempt to identify if the Afghan of concern was located on their base.

As a result of the NCTC not vetting Afghan evacuees against all available data, the United States faces potential security risks if individuals with derogatory information are allowed to stay in the country. In addition, the U.S. Government could mistakenly grant SIV or parolee status to ineligible Afghan evacuees with derogatory information gathered from the DoD ABIS database.¹⁷

**U.S. Agencies Did Not Vet Afghan Evacuees Using All Available DoD Data**

U.S. agencies did not use all available data when vetting Afghan evacuees. Specifically, the NCTC did not use all DoD tactical data located in the ABIS database when vetting Afghan evacuees entering the United States.¹⁸ The NCTC did not have access to all DoD tactical data located in ABIS because enrollments conducted by CBP forwarded to the NCTC by NTC for vetting purposes were compared against the CBP IDENT database, which did not include all biometric and contextual data located in the ABIS database. While the IDENT database includes some ABIS data, it does not include DoD tactical data. Additionally, agreements in place with foreign partners prohibited sharing some DoD ABIS information outside of the DoD.

---

¹⁷ The DHS, in accordance with 8 U.S.C. §1182, designates Afghan evacuees as parolees while in CONUS locations, and those evacuees receive all rights inherent to their immigration parole status. According to DoD and DHS personnel, parolees cannot be detained by the DoD or other Government agencies and are authorized to leave CONUS facilities once medical requirements are complete.

¹⁸ DoD tactical data is information and data that is collected that details tactical operations, typically on operations in deployed environments. Examples of tactical data are tactical patrol reports from ground units, tactical operation debriefings, after-action reports, detention operations, and fingerprints on improvised explosive devices. This information also includes the who, what, when, where, and why of enrollees.
Because Afghan evacuees were not screened against all data found in the DoD ABIS database, NGIC personnel expanded their analytic review of biometric watchlist matches to include non-watchlist matches of all Afghan evacuees located within the United States, in addition to the OUSD(I&S) task of screening Afghan SIV applicants. This analytic review began in August 2021, and consisted of reviewing DoD tactical data to determine if the Afghan evacuees located in the United States had derogatory information in DoD databases that would make them ineligible to be in the parolee program. Additionally, according to NGIC personnel, the NGIC included all evacuees, not just evacuees enrolled by the CBP, because, at the time, the NCTC did not use intelligence databases located on the Secret Internet Protocol Network when they vetted the Afghan evacuees. According to NGIC personnel, by not including intelligence databases located on the Secret Internet Protocol Network, the NCTC did not include multiple databases that contain DoD tactical data. As of November 2, 2021, NGIC personnel had identified 50 Afghan personnel in the United States with information in DoD records that would indicate potentially significant security concerns.19

NGIC personnel did not receive formal tasking to conduct an analytical review of Afghan evacuees who were not SIV applicants; however, DoD Instruction 3300.04 directs the NGIC to perform analytical work in support of DoD force protection.20 Specifically, as the Biometric Enabled Watchlist managers, the NGIC is tasked to develop and maintain procedures to nominate, de-nominate, validate, and share Biometric Enabled Watchlist entries in accordance with national, DoD, geographic combatant commands, and U.S. Special Operations Command requirements.21 Because of the responsibilities outlined in DoD Instruction 3300.04, the NGIC initiated the analytical review. OUSD(I&S) personnel stated that they were aware the NGIC was performing this analytical review.

According to NGIC personnel, when the NGIC began this self-initiated analytic review of non-SIV applicants, it did not have access to CBP enrollment electronic records created during the NEO evacuation operations because a data sharing agreement was not in place addressing the Afghan evacuee enrollment data. The NGIC cannot perform an analytic review of Afghan evacuees enrolled by CBP without the CBP enrollment data. This was approximately half of all evacuee enrollments. While it was not in the original policy to include the NGIC in the vetting process, the DHS’s Office of Biometric Identity Management and the NGIC developed a temporary sharing agreement where CBP enrollments are sent to the DoD ABIS for screening to ensure that the NGIC has access to all enrollment data for Afghan evacuees. However, this temporary agreement was set to expire on December 27, 2021. As of December 13, 2021,

19 Significant security concerns include individuals whose latent fingerprints have been found on improvised explosive devices and known or suspected terrorists and for which the NGIC sends derogatory information notifications to appropriate DoD personnel.
21 The Biometric Enabled Watch List is the NGIC-managed biometric database listing persons of interest, with individuals identified by biometric sample instead of by name, and the recommended action to be taken upon encountering each individual.
NGIC personnel have reviewed approximately 58,455 of the 80,404 Afghan evacuee identities received and have assessed that it will take until approximately March 2022 to finish this analytic review.

In addition, on December 27, 2021, the NGIC was initially required by the sharing agreement to purge all unmatched DHS Afghan enrollment information provided under this agreement, which would limit the NGIC’s ability to conduct an analytic review on any Afghan evacuees not yet reviewed. According to NGIC personnel, their ability to do an analytic review on any remaining identities, as well as on any Afghan evacuees enrolled after December 27, 2021, would be severely inhibited if they were required to purge all unmatched DHS Afghan enrollment information. We discussed the need to extend this agreement with DoD and DHS personnel. On December 13, 2021, NGIC personnel provided us with an updated data sharing agreement. This data sharing agreement between the DoD and DHS extended the expiration date for the temporary sharing agreement from December 27, 2021, to June 27, 2022.

**Some Afghan Evacuees With Derogatory Information Could Not Be Located**

DoD personnel could not locate some Afghan evacuees whom NGIC personnel identified as having derogatory information that would make them ineligible for the parolee program conducted at CONUS safe havens. Specifically, NGIC personnel stated that they could not locate some Afghan evacuees when attempting to report derogatory information to the DoD and U.S. Government agencies supporting CONUS safe havens. NGIC personnel stated that there was an issue with either field representatives or operators failing to upload data or maintain devices properly. For example, personnel conducting enrollments at Afghan enrollment locations may not have properly updated the location field in the electronic enrollment devices. If the location field was not updated, the location recorded during enrollments would have had the wrong location.

For example, as of September 17, 2021, the NGIC had identified 31 Afghans in CONUS who had derogatory information. Of those 31, only 3 could be located. To attempt to locate the 31 individuals, the NGIC developed an informal process of sending e-mails detailing the derogatory information to DoD and U.S. Government personnel that either were located at, or had oversight of, all CONUS safe havens. The distribution for these e-mails included DoD, FBI, and DHS personnel. Additionally, the NGIC maintains a consolidated database that includes all Afghan evacuees it identified as having derogatory information that DoD and U.S. Government personnel overseeing CONUS safe havens can request access to.
As a result of not knowing the location of all Afghan evacuees with derogatory information, the NGIC developed informal reporting procedures to inform the DoD and interagency stakeholders. However, using informal procedures does not ensure consistency and timeliness of notifying the appropriate personnel of a potential security risk. Not being able to locate Afghan evacuees with derogatory information quickly and accurately could pose a security risk to the United States. In addition, the U.S. Government could mistakenly grant ineligible Afghan evacuees with derogatory information from the DoD ABIS database SIV or parolee status.

**DoD Does Not Control Parolees Leaving Safe Havens Before Completing the Immigration Process**

We confirmed through discussions with DHS personnel and DoD personnel at Fort Lee, Fort Pickett, and Fort McCoy, Afghan parolees have the right to leave the safe havens at any time after receiving the required vaccinations and tuberculosis testing, which was also described in the DHS Afghan Parole Information document. As of September 29, 2021, USNORTHCOM reported that the safe havens had received 55,346 Afghan evacuees, with 1,236 of those evacuees having left the safe havens voluntarily without finishing processing, other than meeting medical requirements, and 1,358 evacuees having completed processing and moved out of the safe havens.

For example, DHS personnel at Fort McCoy stated that at their location, most of the approximately 255 voluntary departures were either American citizens or individuals who had family in the United States that the parolees could use for support. We also confirmed with DoD personnel at Fort Lee that when Afghan personnel requested to leave and re-enter the safe haven, DoD personnel used a Commander's Critical Information Requirement log to track the individual’s departure and return to the safe haven and reported that movement in a daily update brief to the commander.22

The management and tracking of parolees’ ingress and egress to the safe havens is coordinated between DoD, DHS, and DOS personnel. For example, DoD personnel from Fort Lee, Fort Pickett, and Fort McCoy described the departure process as staff at the departure desk notifying the appropriate DHS and DOS personnel of an evacuee choosing to leave the safe haven. DHS or DOS personnel conduct a meeting with the parolee to discuss the ramifications of leaving the immigration program early, arrange for the parolee’s exit from the facility, and record and track the parolee's removal from the installation’s lodging and other records.23

---

22 Commander’s Critical Information Requirements are elements of information required by commanders that directly affect decision making and dictate the successful execution of military operations.

23 According to the USCIS Afghan Parole Information Fact Sheet, the ramifications can lead to termination of parole, detention and removal from the United States, and could prevent the parolee from becoming a lawful permanent resident or obtaining other benefits and immigration relief for which they might otherwise be eligible.
Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response

OUSD(I&S) Comments
The OUSD(I&S) Director for Defense Intelligence (Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement), responding on behalf of the USD(I&S), provided comments disagreeing with one substantive item in the finding. The Director stated that his office disagrees with the assertion that Afghan evacuees were not vetted by the NCTC using all DoD data prior to arriving in CONUS because the NCTC did not have access to some DoD biometric data located in the ABIS database or to intelligence databases used by the DoD. The Director stated that during approximately the first 60 days, not all enrollments were verified with the DoD ABIS. The Director stated that after a DoD-DHS biometric agreement was reached, all enrollments were checked against DoD holdings and previous non-DoD evacuees that matched to the DoD Biometric Enabled Watchlist were automatically selected for additional screening by the DHS. Lastly, the Director stated that the NCTC does not typically use SIPR, which would limit the NCTC’s ability to access additional contextual information in real-time; however, he stated that this information is replicated to JWICS so that the NCTC would have access to it.

Our Response
We made minor changes based on comments provided by the OUSD(I&S) Director for Defense Intelligence (Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement) to ensure the accuracy of our finding. For example, we incorporated text in the finding stating that contextual data, in addition to some biometric data, was not included in the information provided to NCTC and stated that the NGIC closed the gap by conducting an analytic review of all biometric watchlist matches to also include non-watchlist matches of Afghan evacuees. Additionally, we incorporated text in the finding stating that enrollments did not initially include all biometric data, instead of stating that the DoD never addressed the issue. However, we did not change the statement that the NCTC may have incorporated the contextual information not included in the initial screening. We did not change the language because the OUSD(I&S) did not provide sufficient evidence to support a change. Additionally, we concluded that actions taken by the DHS to ensure that the NGIC continued its analytic review of all Afghan evacuees not on the watchlist, such as the extension of the data sharing agreement, indicate that NCTC did not have access to all available DoD data.
Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

Redirected Recommendation
The USNORTHCOM Chief of Staff, responding on behalf of the USNORTHCOM Commander, non-concurred with Recommendation 2, stating that USNORTHCOM does not have the authority to take action on the recommendation. The OUSD(I&S) Director for Defense Intelligence (Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement), responding on behalf of the USD(I&S), agreed with Recommendation 2, but requested it be directed to the OUSD(I&S) for action. Therefore, we have redirected Recommendation 2 to the USD(I&S).

Recommendation 1
We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Director, Defense Forensics and Biometrics Agency; and the Commander, National Ground Intelligence Center, negotiate an extension to the temporary sharing agreement of biometric information with the Department of Homeland Security beyond the expiration date of December 27, 2021, to allow National Ground Intelligence Center personnel to complete their analytic review of Afghan evacuees for derogatory information.

Management Actions Taken
During the evaluation, we met with DoD officials from the NGIC to discuss the recommendation. On December 13, 2021, NGIC personnel provided us with an updated data sharing agreement with DHS. The updated sharing agreement, issued on December 10, 2021, extends NGIC’s access to CBP data until July 27, 2022. By extending the agreement NGIC personnel will be able to complete their analytic review of Afghan evacuees for derogatory information. Therefore, management actions taken met the intent of this recommendation and no further comment is required. Therefore, the recommendation is closed.

Recommendation 2
We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security develop procedures for sharing derogatory information on Afghan evacuees with the Department of Defense and interagency stakeholders.

OUSD (I&S) Comments
The OUSD(I&S) Director for Defense Intelligence (Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement), responding on behalf of the USD(I&S), agreed with the recommendation but requested it be re-directed from USNORTHCOM to the USD(I&S) for action.
**U.S. Northern Command Comments**

The USNORTHCOM Chief of Staff, responding on behalf of the USNORTHCOM Commander, non-concurred with the recommendation, stating that USNORTHCOM is not tasked with, and does not have the appropriate authorities to engage in, the screening and vetting of Afghan evacuees or to respond to derogatory information.

**Our Response**

The USNORTHCOM Chief of Staff and the Director for Defense Intelligence’s comments were responsive. We have redirected the recommendation to the USD(I&S), and consider the recommendation resolved, but open because the OUSD(I&S) agreed with the recommendation. We will close the recommendation when we receive verification that the OUSD(I&S) implemented procedures for sharing derogatory information on Afghan evacuees with DoD and interagency stakeholders.

**Scope and Methodology**

We conducted this evaluation from September 2021 through November 2021 in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation,” published in January 2012 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

We identified and reviewed policies, directives, and orders related to biometric enrollment, screening, and vetting of Afghan evacuees to determine the DoD’s roles and responsibilities throughout the OAR and OAW missions. Specifically, we reviewed the following criteria:

- DoD Directive 8521.01E
- Joint Publication 3-68
- Joint Staff General Administration Message, August 21, 2021
- DoD Instruction 3300.04 (Incorporating Change 1, Effective May 28, 2021)
- Public Law 111-8
- Section 1182, title 8, United States Code (2012)

We submitted requests for information and conducted interviews to gather information to determine which DoD organizations were tasked to conduct the biometrics enrollment, screening, and vetting; how information was collected and shared with the DHS and DOS; and what actions occur when the DoD identified an evacuee as a potential threat to national security.
We conducted an entrance conference with personnel from USNORTHCOM, the Joint Staff J3, OUSD(I&S), NGIC, Army G2, and the Army Intelligence and Security Command to determine their respective roles in the biometric enrollment, screening, and vetting efforts in relation to the OAW and OAR missions and determine their roles at the safe havens housing Afghan evacuees in CONUS.

We conducted site visits at CONUS locations, including Marine Corps Base Quantico, Fort Pickett, and Fort Lee and met with personnel at Fort McCoy and Holloman Air Force Base to discuss their involvement with enrollment, screening, and vetting processes for Afghan evacuees. We focused these site visits and meetings to determine potential shortfalls, issues, and concerns related to the communication and sharing of screening information between the DoD, DOS, and DHS. We collected rosters of Afghan evacuees from the safe havens we visited and evaluated the data on each of the rosters to determine how each installation is maintaining accountability concerning the Afghan evacuees located at their site. Specifically, we used the rosters to review and evaluate how DoD personnel track the Afghan evacuee movements on and off the designated living area at the respective installations when the evacuees are not fully vetted and cleared.
January 20, 2022

MEMORANDUM FOR: Bryan T. Clark, Program Director for Overseas Contingency Operations Evaluation, Office of the Department of Defense Inspector General

FROM: Garry Reid, Director for Defense Intelligence (Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement, & Security)

SUBJECT: Response to Draft Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons From Afghanistan (Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000)

This memorandum provides responses to your request for OUSDI&S review of the subject draft report. The Department greatly appreciates the opportunity to participate in this important effort.

OUSDI&S conurs with Recommendation #1, noting the task has already been accomplished. We also concur with Recommendation #2, however we request you assign the responsibility for developing the data sharing agreement to USDI&S and not USNORTHCOM.

Additionally, we offer the attached recommended revisions to the report in order to more accurately capture the details of the vetting process.

Lastly, the attached also identifies the portions of the report that should be marked and handled as Controlled Unclassified Information.

Please feel free to reach out directly to my staff if you have any additional questions. The point of contact is 

Attachment:
DD form 818, Consolidated Comment Matrix
**UNCLASSIFIED**

**CONSOLIDATED DoD ISSUANCE COMMENT MATRIX**

U.S. DoD IG: “Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons from Afghanistan” Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
<th>PARA</th>
<th>COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>Coordinator Comment and Justification: Statement “CBP enrollments were compared against the CBP IDENT data, which does not include all biometric data located in the DoD Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS) database” is partially incorrect. Coordinator Recommended Change: “It took roughly 60 days after the beginning of the NEO for CBP enrollments to be check against the ABIS. A DHS-DoD sharing arrangement needed implementation before the data could flow real-time to support the effort more effectively. However, eventually all enrollments in support of OAW were checked against the DoD ABIS.” Originator Response: Choose an item. Originator Reasoning:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>Coordinator Comment and Justification: Statement “NGIC personnel were unable to notify specific base commanders and U.S. Government representatives at CONUS safe havens because the location of many of the Afghans that were identified as having derogatory information were unknown” is partially incorrect. Coordinator Recommended Change: NGIC personnel were able to send notifications to all eight (8) identified safe havens, Army Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (ACICA), and US Army North, however NGIC was unable to determine which personnel could action the information appropriately based on the information found. NGIC sent representatives to U.S. Army North to mitigate this issue. NGIC representatives worked with 902nd Army Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (ACICA) at U.S. Army North to reach counterintelligence screeners at each identified safe haven in an attempt to locate Afghans with derogatory information. The process of locating Afghans with derogatory information typically took three (3) to four (4) days, and occasionally the attempt was unsuccessful. It was determined that the Afghans who could not be located most likely had left (walked off) the safe haven sometime after arrival.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordinates</th>
<th>POC Name, Phone, and E-mail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OUSD(I&amp;S) Identity Intelligence Division</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUSD(I&amp;S) Identity Intelligence Division</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASS</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### U.S. DoD IG: "Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons from Afghanistan" Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
<th>PARA</th>
<th>BASIS FOR NON-CONCUR?</th>
<th>COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION</th>
<th>COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinator Comment and Justification: Statement “The DDI(CL&amp;S) coordinates the effort to support the DOS request for assistance in screening Afghan SIV applicants and tasked the NGIC to provide this support”, is incorrect. Coordinator Recommended Change: Department of State and Department of Homeland Security formally requested DoD Biometric Support. Secretary of Defense concurred via the Executive Secretary process, which tasked the U.S. Army, as the Executive Agent for DoD Biometrics. The U.S. Army then tasked NGIC to provide support. Originator Response: Choose an item. Originator Reasoning:</td>
<td>OUSD(I&amp;S) Identity Intelligence Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|       | 6 | 1    |      | ✓                      | Coordinator Comment and Justification: Statement “On June 2, 2021, the OUSD(I&S) informed the DOS that the NGIC was tasked with screening Afghan SIV applicants for derogatory information that would make the applicant ineligible for the Afghan SIV program.” Is incorrect Coordinator Recommended Change: Department of State requested DoD Biometric Support. Secretary of Defense concurred via the Executive Secretary |                                          |
| U     |   |      |      |                        |                                                                      |                                          |
### CONSOLIDATED DoD ISSUANCE COMMENT MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
<th>PARA</th>
<th>BASIS FOR NON-CONCUR?</th>
<th>COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinator Comment and Justification: Statement “Afghan evacuees were not vetted by the NCTC using all DoD data prior to arriving in CONUS. Specifically, the NCTC did not have access to some DoD biometric data located in the ABIS database or to intelligence databases used by the DoD that are located on the Secret Internet Protocol network when they vetted Afghan evacuees”, is incorrect. Coordinator Recommended Change: Biometric enrollments ingested into DoD ABIS are automatically ran against all DoD biometric holdings, including the entire DoD Biometrically Enabled Watchlist (BEWL). The first approx. 60 days, not all enrollments were conducted by or submitted to DoD ABIS. After DoD-DHS biometric sharing agreement was reached, all enrollments were ingested and checked against DoD holdings, and previously non-DoD submissions were retroactively checked against DoD ABIS. Subject’s that matched to the DoD BEWL were automatically selected for additional screening by DHS. NCTC, along with other IC components do not typically utilize SIPR which would limit NCTC’s ability to access additional contextual information located in the DoD’s Biometrics Identity Intelligence Resource (BI2R) in real-time, however information housed on SIPR BI2R is replicated to a JWICS instance which NCTC would have access to (replication typically takes 24-48 hours). Originator Response: Choose an item. Originator Reasoning:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OUSD(I&S) Identity Intelligence Division,
### UNCLASSIFIED

#### CONSOLIDATED DoD ISSUANCE COMMENT MATRIX

U.S. DoD IG: "Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons from Afghanistan" Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
<th>PARA</th>
<th>BASIS FOR NON-CONCUR?</th>
<th>COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION</th>
<th>COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinator Comment and Justification: Statement “However, when NGIC personnel attempted to notify the base commanders and U.S. Government representatives at CONUS safe havens, they found that the Afghans’ locations were unknown”, is partially incorrect. Coordinator Recommended Change: NGIC personnel notified base commanders through large email distribution lists and it was unclear if the information was received by the appropriate personnel on a case-by-case basis. NGIC sent representatives to U.S. Army North to mitigate this issue. NGIC representatives worked with 902nd Army Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (ACICA) at U.S. Army North to reach counterintelligence screeners at each identified safe haven in an attempt to locate Afghans with derogatory information. The process of locating Afghans with derogatory information typically took three (3) to four (4) days, and occasionally the attempt was unsuccessful. It was determined that the Afghans who could not be located most likely had left (walked off) the safe haven sometime after arrival. Originator Response: Choose an item. Originator Reasoning:</td>
<td>OUSD(I&amp;S) Identity Intelligence Division,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinator Comment and Justification: Statement “While the IDENT database includes some ABIS data, it does not include DoD tactical data.” is partially incorrect. Coordinator Recommended Change: DHS IDENT includes a portion of the DoD ABIS that is shared. Contextual information associated with the biometric information is available to all SIPR and JWICS users through BI2R. Originator Response: Choose an item. Originator Reasoning:</td>
<td>OUSD(I&amp;S) Identity Intelligence Division,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## UNCLASSIFIED
### CONSOLIDATED DoD ISSUANCE COMMENT MATRIX

**U.S. DoD IG: “Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons from Afghanistan” Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
<th>PARA</th>
<th>BASIS FOR NON-CONCUR?</th>
<th>COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION</th>
<th>COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>Coordinator Comment and Justification: Statement “This data sharing agreement between the DoD and DHS extended the expiration date for the temporary sharing agreement from December 27, 2021, to July 27, 2022”, is incorrect. Coordinator Recommended Change: This data sharing agreement between the DoD and DHS extended the expiration date for the temporary sharing agreement from December 27, 2021, to June 27, 2022. Originator Response: Choose an item. Originator Reasoning:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>Coordinator Comment and Justification: The statement “The updated sharing agreement, issued on December 10, 2012, extends NGIC’s access to CBP data until July 27, 2022.”, is incorrect. Coordinator Recommended Change: The updated sharing agreement, issued on December 10, 2012, extends NGIC’s access to CBP data until June 27, 2022. Originator Response: Choose an item. Originator Reasoning:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>Coordinator Comment and Justification: Recommendation “Commander of the United States Northern Command develop procedures for sharing derogatory information on Afghan evacuees with the Department of Defense and interagency stakeholders”, is is not an appropriate role for USNORTHCOM based on its tasking and authorities. USNORTHCOM’s role in Operation Allies Refuge (OAR) and Operation Allies Welcome (OAW) is limited to providing basic life support and transportation for Afghan Evacuees (AE) in support of the Lead Federal Agency (LFA). USNORTHCOM is not tasked with and does not have the appropriate authorities to engage in the screening/vetting of AEs or responding to derogatory information. DHS is responsible for those tasks as the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DD FORM 818-1, AUG 2016**

**UNCLASSIFIED**
LFA, and is the Federal department with the immigration and law enforcement authorities required. To the extent that DOD has provided any support to DHS for screening/vetting of AEs or responding to derogatory information, such support has been coordinated by USD(I&S), not USNORTHCOM. DHS is also responsible for the CONUS tracking of AEs from arrival through resettlement.

**Coordinator Recommended Change**: Recommend Commander NORTHCOM develop procedures in conjunction with DHS and DOS for ensuring shared awareness regarding location of Afghan evacuees located on U.S DoD facilities. Ensure information is disseminated throughout DoD and interagency stakeholder organizations. 

**OF NOTE**: USNORTHCOM CJ34 Rep Mr. Gosselin, recommended Critical non-Concur to USNORTHCOM CJ3 regarding Recommendation 2.

**Originator Response**: Choose an item.

**Originator Reasoning**: 
HOW TO FILL OUT THE DD 818-1 MATRIX

GENERAL GUIDANCE:
- To sort table by page/paragraph number, hover your mouse over the top of the first cell in the “page” column until a downward arrow appears; click and drag to the right to select both page and para columns. Under Paragraph on the Home ribbon, select A-Z button, set to sort by Column 3 and then Column 4, and select “OK.”
- To add new rows, copy and paste a blank row to keep consistent formatting. To add automatic numbering to column 2, select entire column and click on the Numbering button under Paragraph on the Home ribbon.

OSD COMPONENT (OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY):
- Do not use the DD Form 818.
- Consolidate comments from all coordinators and adjudicate them. When pasting coordinator’s comments from the coordinating Components’ DD Form 818s into your consolidated DD Form 818-1, use “Insert New Row” paste option. You do not need to include administrative comments (spelling, paragraph numbering, etc.), in the consolidated DD Form 818-1. Leave columns 3 and 4 blank for general comments that apply to the whole document.
- Sort comments by the pages/paragraphs to which they apply using the General Guidance sort feature (e.g., all comments from all coordinators that apply to Page 3, Paragraph 1.1.a., should be together; all comments that apply to Page 3, Paragraph 1.1.b., should be next). Set classification header, footer, Column 2, and complete the last two entries in Column 6:

| COLUMN 6 | If you rejected or partially accepted a comment, enter your rationale in the originator reasoning area. If any material is classified, follow DoDM 5200.01 guidance for marking the document. Leave originator reasoning area blank if you accepted it. Include any related communications with the coordinating Component. You must provide convincing support for rejecting nonconformance comments. |
MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD OIG), 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22350

SUBJECT: NORAD and USNORTHCOM (N&NC) Response to DoD OIG’s Recommendation in the draft Report Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons from Afghanistan (Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000)

This is the N&NC response to the recommendation in the subject draft report dated January 4, 2022. N&NC appreciates the DoD OIG’s work on this engagement, as well as the opportunity to review and comment on the draft report. We have reviewed your recommendation and our response is below.

Recommendation 2: We recommend that the Commander of the United States Northern Command develop procedures for sharing derogatory information on Afghan evacuees with the Department of Defense and interagency stakeholders.

USNORTHCOM’s response to Recommendation 2: Non-Concur

USNORTHCOM’s role in Operation Allies Refuge (OAR) and Operation Allies Welcome (OAW) is limited to providing basic life support and transportation for Afghan Evacuees (AE) in support of the Lead Federal Agency (LFA). USNORTHCOM is not tasked with and does not have the appropriate authorities to engage in the screening/vetting of AEs or responding to derogatory information. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for those tasks as the LFA, and is the Federal department with the immigration and law enforcement authorities required. DHS is also responsible for the CONUS tracking of AEs from arrival through resettlement. To the extent that DoD has provided any support to DHS for screening/vetting of AEs or responding to derogatory information, such support has been coordinated by USD(I&S), not USNORTHCOM.

Point of contact for this memorandum is...

Sincerely,

Michael Holland
RADM, USN
N&NC Chief of Staff
## Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABIS</td>
<td>Automated Biometric Identification System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBP</td>
<td>Customs and Border Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COVID-19</td>
<td>Coronavirus disease-2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFBA</td>
<td>Defense Forensic and Biometrics Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDENT</td>
<td>Automated Biometric Identification System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCTC</td>
<td>National Counter-Terrorism Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>Noncombatant Evacuation Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGIC</td>
<td>National Ground Intelligence Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Targeting Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTS</td>
<td>NEO Tracking System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAR</td>
<td>Operation Allies Refuge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAW</td>
<td>Operation Allies Welcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCONUS</td>
<td>Outside the Continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUSD(I&amp;S)</td>
<td>Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIV</td>
<td>Special Immigrant Visa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCIS</td>
<td>United States Citizenship and Immigration Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD[I&amp;S]</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Northern Command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Whistleblower Protection
U.S. Department of Defense

Whistleblower Protection safeguards DoD employees against retaliation for protected disclosures that expose possible fraud, waste, and abuse in Government programs. For more information, please visit the Whistleblower webpage at http://www.dodig.mil/Components/Administrative-Investigations/Whistleblower-Reprisal-Investigations/Whisteblower-Reprisal/ or contact the Whistleblower Protection Coordinator at Whistleblowerprotectioncoordinator@dodig.mil

For more information about DoD OIG reports or activities, please contact us:

Congressional Liaison
703.604.8324

Media Contact
public.affairs@dodig.mil; 703.604.8324

DoD OIG Mailing Lists
www.dodig.mil/Mailing-Lists/

Twitter
www.twitter.com/DoD_IG

DoD Hotline
www.dodig.mil/hotline