OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

OCTOBER 1, 2021–DECEMBER 31, 2021

ABOUT THIS REPORT

A 2013 amendment to the Inspector General Act established the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations and requires that the Lead IG submit quarterly reports to Congress on each active operation. The Chair of the Council of Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency designated the DoD Inspector General (IG) as the Lead IG for Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). The DoS IG is the Associate IG for the operation. The USAID IG participates in oversight of the operation.

The Offices of Inspector General (OIG) of the DoD, the DoS, and USAID are referred to in this report as the Lead IG agencies. Other partner agencies also contribute to oversight of OIR.

The Lead IG agencies collectively carry out the Lead IG statutory responsibilities to:

- Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight of the operation.
- Ensure independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the U.S. Government in support of the operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, investigations, or evaluations.
- Report quarterly to Congress and the public on the operation and on activities of the Lead IG agencies.

METHODOLOGY

To produce this quarterly report, the Lead IG agencies submit requests for information to the DoD, the DoS, USAID, and other Federal agencies about OIR and related programs. The Lead IG agencies also gather data and information from other sources, including official documents, congressional testimony, policy research organizations, press conferences, think tanks, and media reports.

The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of audits, inspections, investigations, or evaluations referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not audited the data and information cited in this report. The DoD, the DoS, and USAID review the reports for accuracy prior to publication. For further details on the methodology for this report, see Appendix B.

CLASSIFIED APPENDIX

This report normally includes an appendix containing classified information about the U.S. mission to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria. However, due to constraints resulting from the coronavirus disease–2019 pandemic, the Lead IG agencies did not prepare a classified appendix this quarter.

FOREWORD

We are pleased to submit this Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) quarterly report on OIR to the U.S. Congress. This report discharges our individual and collective agency oversight responsibilities pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978.

The United States launched OIR in 2014 to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), while setting the conditions for follow-on activities to increase regional stability. The U.S. Government strategy to defeat ISIS includes military operations, as well as support for local security forces, diplomacy, governance, humanitarian assistance, and stabilization programs.

This quarterly report describes the activities of the U.S. Government in support of OIR, as well as the work of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development to promote the U.S. Government's policy goals in Iraq and Syria, during the period October 1, 2021, through December 31, 2021.

This report also discusses the planned, ongoing, and completed oversight work conducted by the Lead IG agencies and our partner oversight agencies during the quarter. During the quarter, the Lead IG agencies and our oversight partners issued 10 audit, evaluation, and inspection reports related to OIR.

Working in close collaboration, we remain committed to providing comprehensive oversight and timely reporting on Operation Inherent Resolve.

Sean W. O'Donnell
Acting Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense

Diana Shaw
Senior Official Performing the
Duties of the Inspector General
U.S. Department of State

Thomas J. Ullom
Acting Inspector General
U.S. Agency for International
Development

On the Cover
(Top row): A U.S. Soldier conducts registration and calibration for an M777 A2 Howitzer weapon system in Syria (U.S. Army photo); a newly recruited trainee in the Kurdish Security Forces participates in an obstacle course at the Zeravani Tigers Training Center Erbil, Iraq (U.S. Army photo); a live fire exercise is held at Mosul Dam, Iraq (U.S. Army Photo); an advisor with the Military Advisory Group–North accompanies an Iraqi forces delegation visiting Erbil Air Base, Iraq. (Bottom row): a helicopter strikes a targeted area during a live fire exercise held at Mosul Dam, Iraq (U.S. Army photo).

MESSAGE FROM THE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL

Sean W. O'Donnell

I am pleased to present this Lead IG quarterly report on Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). Its mission is to advise, assist, and enable local partner forces until they can independently defeat ISIS in designated areas of Iraq and Syria, thereby setting conditions for the implementation of long-term security cooperation frameworks.

During the quarter, U.S. forces in Iraq completed their transition to an advise, assist, and enable role. The transition stemmed from agreements associated with the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Dialogue and occurred gradually over multiple preceding quarters.

ISIS remained entrenched in Iraq and Syria during the quarter. Although the United States' partner forces in Iraq and Syria were able to conduct successful operations against ISIS without Coalition involvement during the quarter, they also continued to rely on Coalition support. Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) reported that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continued to experience organizational shortcomings—ranging from inefficient command and control systems to ineffective maintenance and logistical processes—that hindered its ability to operate independently. The Syrian Democratic Forces, while able to gather intelligence through their human intelligence networks, remained fully dependent on the Coalition's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, according to CJTF-OIR.

The Iraqi government successfully held parliamentary elections on October 10. Members of the international community (including the DoS and its partners) had worked with the Iraqi government over the past year as it prepared to hold the elections. The DoS reported that the elections were "technically sound," yet uncertainty remained as the Iraqi parliament endeavored to form a new Iraqi government. CJTF-OIR said that the ISF's performance while securing the elections serves as a "strong example" of its growing capabilities.

The U.S. Government continued stabilization activities that support people and institutions in parts of Iraq and Syria affected by conflict. Although it is difficult to assess the long-term effects of these activities—which range from support for civil society groups and independent media to fostering economic growth—the incremental progress made on repatriation of displaced persons is notable. The DoS reported that 128 Iraqi families returned to Iraq from the al-Hol camp in Syria during the quarter. However, according to the DoS, tens of thousands of Syrians, Iraqis, and other foreign nationals continue to live in formal displaced persons camps and informal sites, with many facing extremely difficult living conditions.

We will continue to report on the status of OIR, including the counter-ISIS mission, the effects of malign actors on the mission, and U.S. Government efforts to address the underlying factors that influence stability in Iraq and Syria. I look forward to working with my Lead IG colleagues to continue to provide oversight of and report on OIR, as required by the IG Act.

Sean W. O'Donnell
Acting Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense

A British Royal Air Force FGR4 Eurofighter Typhoon receives fuel from a U.S. Air Force KC-10 Extender above Kuwait. (U.S. Air Force photo)

CONTENTS

October 1, 2021–December 31, 2021

CJTF-OIR personnel attend a ceremony to divest vehicles to the KSF Regional Guard Brigade in Erbil, Iraq. (U.S. Army photo)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) mission is to advise, assist, and enable partner forces until they can independently defeat ISIS in designated areas of Iraq and Syria in order to set conditions for long-term security cooperation.[1] This effort includes supporting the Iraqi government and vetted Syrian partners with civilian-led stabilization and humanitarian activities.[2]

STATUS OF OIR

U.S. forces with a combat role departed Iraq, ahead of schedule.[3] Adjustments to the OIR mission related to this transition included the movement of select combat equipment from Iraq; the rotation of new Coalition units to advise, assist, and enable the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF); the transfer of military vehicles to the ISF; and the repositioning of Combined Joint Task Force–OIR (CJTF-OIR) support and special operations units outside of Iraq.[4] Accordingly, CJTF-OIR said that OIR has "shifted from a mission of combat to one of support for our partner forces through advising, assisting, and enabling at the operational and strategic levels."[5]

Personnel shortages due to staff ceilings at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad continued to limit operations. The embassy and the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center have been on ordered departure status since March 2020.[6] The DoS reported that due to the security situation and staffing constraints, end-use monitoring activities during the quarter in Iraq were limited.[7] The impact of the coronavirus–2019 (COVID-19) pandemic on embassy operations during the quarter was minimal. Nearly all—99 percent—of diplomatic employees were vaccinated as of the end of the quarter.[8]

STATUS OF ISIS

ISIS remained entrenched in Iraq and Syria.[9] ISIS claimed responsibility for fewer attacks in both countries compared with the previous quarter.[10] The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) said the group retained freedom of movement in remote areas, where it exploited security gaps.[11] While ISIS senior leadership likely remained based in Syria, the group maintained a larger presence and greater capability in Iraq, the DIA said.[12] The U.S. Government continued to view ISIS as a threat to U.S. interests in both countries.[13]

ISIS continued efforts to undermine governing authorities and provoke sectarian, ethnic, and tribal divisions in both Iraq and Syria.[14] The DIA said that in Iraq, ISIS promoted attacks on Shia civilians in Diyala province, provoking retaliatory violence and likely seeking to increase recruitment among Sunnis.[15] The group also increased activity in geographic gaps between the ISF and Kurdish Security Forces (KSF), particularly in disputed areas of northern Iraq.[16] In Syria, ISIS conducted attacks against Syrian regime forces and allies in the southwest and throughout the Syrian Desert, and against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the northeast.[17] In November, the SDF foiled a planned ISIS attack to free thousands of ISIS detainees from an SDF-run detention facility.[18]

ISIS continued to conduct attacks, radicalize to violence, and recruit from inside the al-Hol camp for displaced persons.[19] CJTF-OIR said that the group utilized the camp as a hub for smuggling and human trafficking, and to plan attacks.[20] The DoS reported that there were 12 killings in the camp during the quarter, a decrease from the previous quarter, when there were 19 killings. Although most of the killings appeared to target camp residents with perceived ties to the security services, the motive for some remained unclear, but probably attributable to neighbor/tribal disputes, or other issues unrelated to ISIS.[21] CJTF-OIR said that ISIS activity in al-Hol "poses a threat to the OIR mission to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS."[22]

IRAQ

Iraq held parliamentary elections on October 10. Candidates associated with nationalist Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr gained seats, and the Iran-aligned Fatah Alliance lost seats, in what many considered a surprising outcome.[23] Iraq's High Electoral Commission reviewed more than a thousand appeals but ultimately did not make significant changes to the results.[24] The DoS said that the elections, which received extensive support from the international community, were technically sound.[25] Iraq had not announced a new government as of the end of the quarter.

CJTF-OIR helped the ISF plan security during and after the October 10 parliamentary elections. However, CJTF-OIR did not participate in security operations on the day of the elections due to political sensitivities.[26] CJTF-OIR remained focused on defeating ISIS, which allowed the ISF to funnel resources toward post-election security.[27] The ISF secured polling sites and ballots on election day and safeguarded ballots following the elections.[28] The ISF also provided security during post-election demonstrations, with Coalition support that included intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) collection.[29]

The ISF conducted operations against ISIS during the quarter but continued to rely on Coalition support. ISF ground forces conducted most of their patrols and clearance operations without Coalition support, including ISR collection.[30] However, CJTF-OIR advisors noted that the ISF needs to improve its ability to operate at night.[31] The ISF also continued to lack key sustainment capabilities and rely on Coalition forces for logistical support.[32] In addition, command-and-control issues within the ISF often slowed the transmission of key information and decision-making.[33]

Additional Iraqi aircraft became operational, but ISF targeting processes still fell short. The ISF conducted airstrikes without significant Coalition assistance aside from ISR collection during the quarter.[34] However, CJTF-OIR stated that the ISF's lack of discipline and coordination in the planning, target development process, and execution of counter-ISIS operations prevented the Coalition from assessing that the ISF is fully capable of conducting unilateral operations efficiently.[35]

The Iraqi Prime Minister survived an assassination attempt on November 7.[36] No group claimed responsibility for the attempted assassination, which included the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to attack the Prime Minister's residence. The attack followed days of protests over the October election results, led by Iran-aligned militias.[37] Meanwhile, the militias paused attacks on U.S. and Coalition forces during the quarter.[38]

CJTF-OIR said that ISIS activity in al-Hol "poses a threat to the OIR mission to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS."

The Iraqi government repatriated 128 families from the al-Hol displaced persons camp in Syria to the Jeddah 1 camp in Ninewa province.[39] The situation for displaced persons in Iraq remained precarious. During the quarter, the Iraqi government reclassified one of two remaining internally displaced persons (IDP) camps outside the Iraqi Kurdistan Region as an informal site and announced plans to close the other.[40] Thousands of people remained at the sites, some without security clearances to leave.[41] USAID continued to support health, protection, food assistance, shelter, and other assistance to displaced persons in both the formal and informal IDP sites.[42]

In December, the United States renewed the complex emergency disaster declaration for Iraq.[43] In addition to challenges facing displaced persons, record low rainfalls resulted in dry wells, limited water supply, diminished river levels, and sediment blockages in water treatment plants in some areas of Iraq.[44] USAID reported that although a recently streamlined access letter process made it easier for humanitarian organizations to deliver aid in Iraq, new Iraqi government rules about conducting assessments and surveys could delay humanitarian assistance.[45]

SYRIA

CJTF-OIR reported that SDF operations continued to limit ISIS's ability to reconstitute, move, and stage high profile attacks in northeastern Syria.[46] Coalition forces continued to provide training, instruction, and advising for the SDF to advance soldiering skills and to help the SDF operate independently.[47] The SDF remained reliant on the Coalition to collect and share ISR on ISIS activities, while the SDF remained capable of independently gathering information on ISIS through its human intelligence networks.[48]

CJTF-OIR continued to train and support SDF personnel guarding detention facilities that cumulatively held at least 10,000 ISIS detainees.[49] CJTF-OIR reported that the SDF made "great strides" in training its personnel on non-lethal measures to control unrest at detention facilities. No riots or escapes occurred during the quarter.[50] While the Coalition continued to provide equipment, training, and funds to improve physical security and improve living conditions at the facilities, gaps in the equipment capabilities remained.[51]

Lead IG Oversight Activities

The Lead IG agencies completed 10 reports related to OIR during the quarter. These reports examined various activities that support OIR, including the extent to which the DoD monitored and provided care for Service members suspected of sustaining a traumatic brain injury; whether the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) took adequate steps to reduce potential law of war violations when conducting operations; guidance on cost differences identified in U.S. Army management of government property in Kuwait; and whether the DoS and USAID effectively managed contracts and humanitarian assistance programs in Iraq. As of December 31, 2021, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies had 11 projects ongoing and 14 projects planned.

During the quarter, the investigative branches of the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies closed 7 investigations, initiated 5 investigations, and coordinated on 72 open investigations. The investigations involve grant and procurement fraud, corruption, theft, program irregularities, computer intrusions, and human trafficking.

Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints specific to its agency. The hotlines provide a confidential and reliable means for individuals to report violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; and abuse of authority. A DoD OIG investigator coordinates the hotline contacts among Lead IG agencies and others, as appropriate. During the quarter, the investigator referred 40 cases to Lead IG agencies or other investigative organizations.

Multiple parties operating in Syria posed a threat to Coalition forces and local partners during the quarter.[52] CJTF-OIR reported that the threat Iranian forces and Iran-aligned militias pose to U.S. military personnel and local partners operating in Syria increased during the quarter. In October, multiple unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) targeted U.S. forces in the vicinity of the At-Tanf Garrison.[53] Meanwhile, Russian forces increased their violations of protocols meant to deconflict ground movements with Coalition forces increased.[54] Tensions between the SDF and Turkish or Turkish-backed forces in northern Syria also remained high.[55] During the quarter, the SDF remained concerned about a potential Turkish offensive across the Turkey-Syria border due to Turkish threats of military action.[56] The DoD Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy–International Security Affairs (OUSD(P) ISA) and the DIA reported that there were no indications that Turkey was preparing to renew major offensive operations in northeast Syria as of the end of the quarter.[57]

The U.S. Government continued efforts to repatriate and reintegrate displaced persons in Syria. The Self-Administration of North and East Syria (SANES) continued to facilitate the safe and voluntary return and reintegration of Syrians from displaced persons camps who wished to depart, including to their home communities.[58] The DoS and USAID continued to fund humanitarian organizations working in al-Hol and other displaced persons camps, and provide assistance, including food, water and sanitation, shelter, protection, winterization supplies, health, education, and camp management.[59] The DoS continued to advocate with countries of origin to repatriate their nationals from displaced persons camps in northeast Syria.[60]

CJTF-OIR reported that the threat Iranian forces and Iran-aligned militias pose to U.S. military personnel and local partners operating in Syria increased during the quarter.

Rounds from a Dillon Aero M134D minigun mounted on a helicopter strike a targeted area during a live fire exercise held at Mosul Dam, Iraq. (U.S. Army photo)

STATUS OF OIR

STATUS OF OIR

MISSION

U.S. Forces Complete Transition to Advise, Assist, and Enable Role

On December 9, Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) announced that it had completed the transition of U.S. forces to an advise, assist, and enable role. As of the end of the quarter, there were no longer any U.S. or Coalition forces with a combat role in Iraq.[61] The transition meets the goal set forth in the July 2021 announcement at the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Dialogue that the United States would transition to an advise, assist, and enable role by December 31.[62] Accordingly, CJTF-OIR reported that the mission of OIR has "shifted from a mission of combat to one of support for our partner forces through advising, assisting, and enabling at the operational and strategic levels."[63]

In the months preceding the December announcement, CJTF-OIR gradually moved personnel, equipment, and other military support activities to support the transition. During the quarter, CJTF-OIR redeployed combat equipment from Iraq; rotated in advise, assist, and enable units; and transferred military vehicles to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). CJTF-OIR also moved its Support Command and Special Operations Command out of Iraq.[64]

The DoD Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy–International Security Affairs (OUSD(P) ISA) said that following the transition, CJTF-OIR maintained many of the same capabilities to advise, assist, and enable the ISF and Kurdish Security Forces (KSF, also known as the Peshmerga), as well as maintain defensive capabilities.[65]

Syria Policy Review Complete

In December, the Biden Administration completed an extensive "roots-up" Syria policy review which began in January 2021.[66] The DoS said that the goal of the review was to assess the situation on the ground in Syria and identify options for the United States to increase stability, improve access to humanitarian assistance, and establish the conditions for a broader political resolution to the conflict.[67]

About Operation Inherent Resolve

Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) began in 2014, after the United States and its partners in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS initiated military activity to support local partners combatting ISIS in Iraq and Syria.[68] Comprising former al-Qaeda fighters and new recruits, ISIS exploited instability in Iraq and Syria and rapidly seized major cities in the two countries.[69]

Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) executes its mission to achieve the enduring defeat of ISIS according to a four-phase operational campaign plan.[70] (See Figure 1.) During the first three phases of the campaign, Coalition forces conducted air strikes and targeted raids against ISIS. U.S. and Coalition forces also trained and advised Iraqi and Syrian partner forces and provided them with equipment and other forms of assistance. By March 2019, ISIS no longer held territory in Iraq and Syria.[71]

In July 2020, CJTF-OIR transitioned to Phase IV ("Normalize") of the campaign plan.[72] Consistent with Phase IV objectives, CJTF-OIR shifted from tactical-level training to a focus on building the capacity of partner forces in Iraq and Syria to advising them and enabling their operations.[73]

USAID, the U.S. Government lead for implementing stabilization activities in Iraq, focuses on restoring essential infrastructure and services by working with local partners to identify priorities for recovery; improve social cohesion; and help marginalized and displaced populations return to and rebuild their places of origin.[74] The DoS seeks to help Iraq chart an independent security and foreign policy path separate from that of Iran or other powers, enable political and economic reform, support vulnerable minority populations, and achieve reconciliation among communities.[75] In Syria, the U.S. Government, through USAID and the DoS, continues to work through all possible channels to deliver aid to those in need in Syria, including through the United Nations, international and non-governmental organizations, and local Syrian organizations.[76]

Figure 1.

The OIR Campaign Plan

PHASE I	PHASE II	PHASE III	PHASE IV
Degrade	**Counterattack**	**Defeat**	**Normalize**
2014–2015	2015–2016	2017–2020	2020–Present

Source: CJTF-OIR, "History of CJTF-OIR," 9/2020.

According to the DoS, the review found that although levels of violence in Syria are the lowest since the conflict began, the economic situation is at its worst.[77] Years of violence—compounded by the coronavirus disease–2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, a historic drought that has decimated food crops, and the collapse of the Lebanese financial sector—has caused a humanitarian catastrophe.[78] Based on the policy review, the United States will continue to focus on core policy priorities in Syria: sustaining the U.S. Government and Coalition campaign against ISIS; supporting local ceasefires in place across the country; supporting the expansion of humanitarian access throughout Syria; pressing for accountability and respect for international law while promoting human rights and nonproliferation, including through the imposition of targeted sanctions; and supporting a political process led by the Syrian people, as envisioned in UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254.[79]

OUSD(P) ISA and CJTF-OIR said that there was no significant change to U.S. Syria policy or the U.S. military campaign in Syria during the quarter, or to Coalition unity, resources, disposition of personnel, or rules of engagement. There were no changes to logistical, supply, or support locations for counter-ISIS operations in Syria.[80]

USAID reported that it is working closely with the DoS to facilitate a Syria stabilization strategy review to underscore "the role that stabilization assistance can and should play in facilitating the U.S. Government's foreign policy priorities for Syria." [81]

Years of violence—compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic, a historic drought that has decimated food crops, and the collapse of the Lebanese financial sector—has caused a humanitarian catastrophe.

D-ISIS Coalition Political Directors Meet

On December 2, the United States and Belgium cochaired a meeting in Brussels of Political Director-level representatives from the Small Group of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Acting Special Envoy for the Global Coalition John Godfrey led the U.S. delegation and highlighted the Coalition's focus on completing the U.S. and Coalition forces' transition to an advise, assist, and enable role in Iraq and preventing an ISIS resurgence in Syria.[82]

According to cable reporting, Coalition members praised the transition of U.S. forces in Iraq to enabling and advising, discussed efforts to enhance monitoring and disruption of ISIS finances, and acknowledged the need to "emphasize strategic communications to counter ISIS's propaganda and ideology" in multiple areas.[83]

FUNDING

MILITARY OPERATIONS AND PARTNER SUPPORT

Congress has not yet approved a full year FY 2022 appropriation for OIR and the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF). Under the initial continuing resolution (October 1 to December 3), CTEF received an allotment of $52.6 million. On December 3, Congress approved a second continuing resolution that allotted an additional $31.8 million, which brought total CTEF funding to $84.4 million. The continuing resolution expires on February 18, 2022.[84]

CJTF-OIR reported that by the end of the quarter, it provided approximately $192.1 million in assistance to Iraqi partner forces through CTEF, including material support and stipends.[85]

CTEF-funded Support to Iraq and Syria, October–December 2021

Ministry of Interior $24.8 Million

Counterterrorism Service $0.0

Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs- Material Support $39.0 Million

Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs- Class I/III Support $3.3 Million

IRAQ $192.1 Million

Ministry of Defense $69.8 Million

Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs- Stipends $55.3 Million

SDF Provincial Security Forces (PrSF) $1.2 Million

Hezen Anti-Terror Units (HaT) $1.7 Million

Commandos $2.5 Million

SDF Internal Security Forces (InSF) $4.6 Million

Roj Mine Clearance Organization $.004 Million

SYRIA $26.7 Million

SDF $8.8 Million

Mughawir al-Thawra (MaT) $7.9 Million

Notes: Numbers may not add to total due to rounding. Syria CTEF chart displays divestment of equipment only.

Source: CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL014, 1/18/2022; CJTF-OIR, vetting comment, 1/25/2022.

CJTF-OIR provided approximately $26.7 million in equipment (including ammunition, uniforms, and vehicles) to vetted partner forces in Syria during the quarter.[86] (See Figure 2.) The full 2-year CTEF appropriation for Syria also provides support for additional non-equipment items, such as stipends and construction of detention facilities.[87]

For FY 2021, Congress appropriated $12.7 billion for OIR, including $710 million for CTEF.[88] For FY 2022, the DoD requested $522 million for CTEF, of which $345 million would support train and equip requirements in Iraq, and $177 million would support requirements in Syria.[89]

STABILIZATION AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

The DoS and USAID work with the United Nations, NGOs, and other implementing partners to fund a variety of programs and services in Iraq and Syria, including food assistance, cash assistance, shelter, health, and education in Iraq, Syria, and neighboring countries.[90] (See Table 1.)

Globally, the United States remains the largest single donor to the humanitarian response in Iraq and Syria. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that, as of the end of the quarter, the U.S. Government had committed approximately $178.3 million in humanitarian assistance toward the needs identified in the 2021 UN Humanitarian Response Plan for Iraq, and $785.9 million in humanitarian assistance for the 2021 response plan for Syria.[91] The DoS noted that these UN totals do not fully incorporate all forms of support for the Syria response, as there are frequently delays in funding being reported by the UN's Financial Tracking System.[92]

Table 1.

U.S. Government Funding Available for the Iraq and Syria Humanitarian Response

IRAQ HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE FY 2021-22			
	USAID BHA	**DoS PRM**	**TOTAL**
Humanitarian Funding for Complex Emergency	$97,658,686	$392,579,278	**$490,237,964**
COVID-19 Response		$29,005,000	**$29,005,000**
TOTAL	**$97,658,686**	**$197,129,144**	**$519,242,964**

SYRIA REGIONAL RESPONSE FY 2021			
	USAID BHA	**DoS PRM**	**TOTAL**
Crisis Response	$744,931,793	$212,003,000	**$956,934,793**
Humanitarian Funding for Countries that Host Syrian Refugees			
Egypt	$20,280,000	$20,167,523	**$40,447,523**
Iraq	N/A	$48,664,523	**$48,664,523**
Jordan	$72,800,000	$181,346,860	**$254,146,860**
Lebanon	$105,592,000	$285,534,628	**$391,126,628**
Turkey	$10,760,000	$152,319,877	**$163,079,877**
Regional	N/A	$7,600,000	**$7,600,000**
TOTAL	**$745,141,225**	**$907,636,411**	**$1,662,000,204**

Sources: USAID, "Iraq-Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #1," 12/22/2021; USAID, "Syria-Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #2," 1/7/2022; DoS, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.

PERSONNEL

MILITARY PERSONNEL

The number of U.S. military personnel in Iraq and Syria remained unchanged during the quarter, according to OUSD(P) ISA.[93] (See Table 2.)

Table 2.

U.S. Military Personnel in Iraq and Syria

	Iraq	**Syria**
U.S. Military (as of June 2021)	Approximately 2,500	Approximately 900
DoD Contractor	5,802	

Sources: OUSD(P) ISA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 21.3 OIR 001, 6/23/2021; DoD OSD(AS), "Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility," 1/2022.

CJTF-OIR: Vaccination Rates Near 100 Percent

CJTF-OIR reported at the end of the quarter that nearly all of its uniformed, civilian, and contractor personnel had received the COVID-19 vaccine. Vaccination rates among Coalition military and foreign contractor staff were also near or at 100 percent.[94]

CJTF-OIR reported that there were 754 cases of COVID-19 among CJTF-OIR personnel in Iraq, Syria, and Kuwait between November 15 and January 15, compared to 207 during the previous quarter.[95]

During the quarter, CJTF-OIR continued multiple COVID-19 mitigation measures, including mask wearing, screening, limits on community spaces (such as gyms and dining halls), and travel restrictions. Since December 15, only vaccinated personnel have been allowed to enter Kuwait.[96] CJTF-OIR reported that these mitigation strategies "continue to maintain the prevalence of COVID-19 at a low prevalence threshold risk to mission." [97]

DIPLOMATIC AND AID PERSONNEL

Staff Ceiling Places Burdens on Diplomatic Activities

Mission Iraq, which includes the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center (BDSC), and the Consulate General in Erbil, continued to operate during the quarter subject to the DoS's 300-person cap for U.S. direct-hire, personal service contractors, and third country national staff in-country. The staff ceiling was imposed in 2019 after a Zero-Based Staffing Review.[98] In November 2021, the cap was adjusted by four to 304.[99] In addition, the embassy and the BDSC have been on ordered departure status—a procedure by which the number of government employees at the post is temporarily reduced—since March 2020 in response to health and safety concerns.[100]

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken emphasized that the safety and security of DoS personnel is his highest priority. The DoS said that it regularly assesses the security and health environments in Iraq. In order to terminate ordered departure status for the embassy and the BDSC, the Under Secretary for Management must determine that those conditions support a return to normal operations.[101] In January, the DoS extended the ordered departure through February 12, 2022.[102]

The DoS said that during the quarter, Mission Iraq operated with the full in-country staffing allowed by the Zero-Based Staffing Review while remaining in ordered departure status. The staff ceiling has strained Mission Iraq, necessitating staff to carry a heavier workload to support the Mission's objectives. The DoS said that the primary impact of the ordered departure status has been the administrative burden of weekly permission-to-travel requests. This process requires constant monitoring from all sections of the mission and significant coordination by the Management section. As of the end of the quarter, the Under Secretary of State for Management had not denied any requests. The extended ordered departure status has also significantly delayed multiple needed infrastructure projects at the embassy compound and the BDSC.[103]

CJTF-OIR reported that there were 754 cases of COVID-19 among CJTF-OIR personnel in Iraq, Syria, and Kuwait between November 15 and January 15, compared to 207 during the previous quarter.

Reduced COVID-19 Impact on Embassy Operations

The impact of COVID-19 on Embassy operations during the quarter was minimal. Nearly all—99 percent—of Mission Iraq employees were vaccinated as of the end of the quarter. The DoS reported that Mission Iraq has been able to relax masking and social distancing requirements, allowing the Mission to return for the most part to pre-COVID-19 operations.[104]

The DoS requirement to test all travelers to the United States 1 day prior to travel has put a strain on the Mission Health Unit, but the workload has been manageable. In keeping with the Mission Local Employed Staff Reintegration Plan, more locally employed staff returned to the workplace during the quarter. All locally employed staff who have returned have been fully vaccinated. Approximately 35 locally employed staff have not returned, many of them unvaccinated. The Mission is currently finalizing a vaccination mandate policy for locally employed staff.[105]

End-Use Monitoring Restricted

The DoS reported that due to the security situation and lack of a dedicated end-use monitoring linguist, end-use monitoring activities during the quarter in Iraq were limited to electronic mail for submission of regular reports and input from routine observations into end-use monitoring systems.[106] No physical checks of security standards occurred, other than observations made by advisors and contractors operating on or near Iraqi installations. No end-use monitoring activities took place in Syria.[107]

The DoS also reported that no ISF units that had committed human rights violations received U.S. equipment and training, as prohibited by the Leahy law or the Foreign Assistance Act.[108]

FACILITIES

No Attacks on Facilities, but Security Remains a Concern

The DoS reported that there were no indirect fire attacks on Mission Iraq facilities during the quarter by Iran-aligned militias and other malign actors. However, on December 19, an indirect fire attack targeted Union III, a Coalition facility in Baghdad located near the embassy.[109] The DoS said that the threat of rocket, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and mortar attacks did not necessitate changing its intelligence assessment of embassy operations during the quarter.[110]

The threat of future attacks drove priorities at the BDSC during the quarter. The DoS reported that there were plans to protect critical infrastructure from indirect fire attacks by building hard covers for the Diplomatic Support Hospital, a new dining facility, and a secure fuel facility. While there were no rocket, UAV, or mortar attacks directed at the BDSC during the quarter, the persistent threat of attack drove the heightened security readiness posture and focused a considerable number of resources on the counter-UAV and counter-rocket, -artillery, and -mortar systems.[111]

The DoS reported that Mission Iraq has been able to relax masking and social distancing requirements, allowing the Mission to return for the most part to pre-COVID-19 operations.

An M249 Squad automatic weapon is fired during a live fire exercise held at Mosul Dam, Iraq. (U.S. Army photo)

STATUS OF ISIS

STATUS OF ISIS

ISIS remained entrenched in Iraq and Syria during the quarter, operating a low-level insurgency across sparsely populated, rugged areas while seeking opportunities to infiltrate urban centers in both countries.[112] The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reported that ISIS was able to move more freely in remote areas where it exploits security gaps and sectarian and other demographic tensions.[113] In both countries, ISIS continued to take advantage of restrictive terrain and gaps in coordination among forces to maintain safe havens for its fighters.[114]

Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) said that it continued to advise, assist, and enable local partners to defeat ISIS in these safe havens and to restrict ISIS's ability to reconstitute its forces by supporting enhanced security around displaced persons camps and in detention centers.[115]

In Iraq and Syria, ISIS continued to take advantage of restrictive terrain and gaps in coordination among forces to maintain safe havens for its fighters.

REGIONAL TRENDS

ISIS-Claimed Attacks Decrease but Group Remains a Threat

CJTF-OIR reported that ISIS claimed responsibility for far fewer attacks in Iraq and Syria between October 1 and December 31 than during the same period in 2020.[116] In Iraq, ISIS claimed 128 attacks during the quarter, compared with 175 claimed attacks in the same period the previous year.[117] In Syria, ISIS claimed 34 attacks, compared with 101 claimed attacks during the same 2020 period.[118] (See page 21.)

Whether the drop in ISIS-claimed attacks marked a shift in operational tempo or a slowdown in ISIS propaganda and communications infrastructure is unclear.[119] The DIA noted that ISIS does not always claim attacks it perpetrates, possibly as part of a "tactical effort to hide its operations."[120] The U.S. military uses claimed attacks as a metric to assess ISIS operational activity because these data are more consistent over time.[121]

The DIA said that ISIS maintains a smaller presence in Syria than in Iraq, even though most of its senior leadership reside in Syria.[122] The ISIS branch in Syria tends to be less capable than the branch in Iraq, according to the DIA.[123]

Despite the decrease in ISIS-claimed attacks during the quarter, CJTF-OIR and the U.S. Government continued to view ISIS as a threat to stability in Iraq and Syria, and to U.S. interests in the Middle East.[124] In its updated 2022 mission statement, CJTF-OIR noted that despite ISIS's degradation, remnants of the group remain active and fund themselves through criminal activity, and ISIS retains supporters in Iraq and Syria "who endorse the spread of violence across the globe."[125] In reports published during the quarter, independent analysts described how ISIS exploited a worsening economic crisis and continued to conduct operations, raise revenue, and rebuild its networks in Iraq and Syria.[126]

CJTF-OIR said that there were isolated indications that ISIS was attempting to reorganize during the quarter, likely in response to what it called the group's "inability to create resonating effects in the theater."[127]

ISIS ACTIVITY IN IRAQ AND SYRIA

October 1, 2021–December 31, 2021

IRAQ ISIS insurgents continued to concentrate hit-and-run style attacks on security forces in rural Kirkuk, Diyala, Salah ad Din, Anbar, northern Baghdad, and Erbil provinces. ISIS shifted its focus of attacks away from energy infrastructure and towards KSF outposts and rural communities along the KCL.

SYRIA Little changed in Syria, where ISIS continued to focus small scale attacks on SDF checkpoints and patrols within the MERV. ISIS continued to conduct larger, more lethal attacks on pro-regime forces in the sparsely populated deserts and mountains of Homs, Dayr az Zawr, Raqqah, and Hamah governorates.

ISIS Attacks by Month, January 2020–December 2021

Target of Attacks, October–December 2021

Note: Some attacks had more than one target. Numbers displayed above may exceed total number of attacks during the quarter.

Sources: CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL015, 1/18/2022; Janes Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, data for non-state armed group attacks, statements, and actions by Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, 10/1/2021–12/31/2021; Enabling Peace in Iraq Center, "Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitor," 9/30/2021–1/6/2022.

ISIS Struggles Against Losses, but Maintains Capabilities and Cohesion

The DIA said that ISIS has never fully regained the capabilities it had prior to the group's territorial defeat in early 2019.[128] However, ISIS continued to operate in Syria and demonstrated some renewal of its capabilities in Iraq.[129]

STRATEGY: The DIA reported that ISIS's overall strategic objective in Iraq and Syria remained unchanged during the quarter: ISIS sought to reestablish itself as a viable insurgency capable of seizing and controlling territory in Iraq and Syria.[130] ISIS worked to resist and undermine Iraqi government and Syrian regime authority, and exploit and provoke sectarian, ethnic, and tribal divisions.[131] In particular, the group sought to maximize support from and influence over Sunni Arab populations in Iraq and Syria, the DIA said.[132]

The DIA said that in pursuit of these aims, ISIS continued to use improvised explosive devices (IED) and small arms to attack security forces.[133] ISIS also targeted opposing community and tribal leaders with assassinations and other coercive measures.[134] CJTF-OIR reported that in Iraq, ISIS continued to focus its attacks on civil and military targets in order to generate revenue and discredit the Iraqi government.[135]

INTERNAL COHESION: The DIA reported that the effects of leadership losses that accrued over the previous year tested ISIS's internal cohesion in Iraq and Syria during the quarter.[136] In October, the Iraqi National Intelligence Service arrested senior ISIS deputy and key financial facilitator Sami Jasim Muhammad al-Jaburi, also known as Hajji Hamid.[137] Jasim supervised illicit sales of gas, oil, antiquities, and minerals to generate revenue for ISIS.[138] Prior to his arrest, the DoS described Jasim as a "key ISIS leader" and offered a reward of up to $5 million for information leading to his capture.[139]

The DIA said that despite these leadership losses, ISIS showed "few signs of major fracturing or disaggregation" during the quarter.[140] ISIS leadership continued to exercise effective command and control over the group's branches in Iraq and Syria.[141] The DIA noted that it did not observe major difference in levels of cohesiveness between the ISIS networks in the two countries.[142]

CROSS-BORDER ACTIVITIES: The DIA reported that ISIS continued to exploit security gaps along international and regional borders, particularly the border between Iraq and Syria.[143] ISIS remained reliant on its ability to move personnel, materiel, and resources between Iraq and Syria to support its operations in both countries.[144] According to the DIA, the group's clandestine presence, ability to blend into local populations, and well-established smuggling networks and routes were critical to ISIS sustainment.[145]

In its annual Country Reports on Terrorism 2020, the DoS said that although the Turkish government continued to prioritize reduction of ISIS-related activity in Turkey, it remained a "source and transit country" for foreign ISIS fighters and other terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria, as well as for foreign fighters seeking to travel from Syria to Iraq.[146]

In October, the Iraqi National Intelligence Service arrested senior ISIS deputy and key financial facilitator Sami Jasim Muhammad al-Jaburi, also known as Hajji Hamid.

RECRUITMENT AND SUSTAINMENT: ISIS continued to prioritize freeing its members detained in Iraq and Syria, according to the DIA.[147] The group continued to smuggle supporters and prospective adolescent recruits out of displaced persons camps, and to recruit fighters outside the camps by exploiting local tribal, sectarian, and economic tensions.[148]

The DIA said that ISIS likely sought to support its recruitment efforts by attacking Shia communities in Iraq's Diyala province; these events sparked a series of sectarian attacks between Shias and Sunnis in the region.[149] The DIA said that by provoking sectarian violence, ISIS probably sought, in part, to instill fear of further Shia attacks among the Sunni population and generate greater Sunni support for ISIS.[150]

In November, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) foiled an ISIS attempt to free its fighters from a detention facility in Hasakah governorate. The complex is the largest SDF detention facility holding ISIS detainees in northeastern Syria.[151] The DIA reported that if ISIS were to free even a small percentage of the more than 10,000 ISIS-affiliated detainees in SDF detention facilities, the group would significantly augment its forces.[152] The DIA reported that the attempt to free its fighters suggests that force regeneration was likely an "operational priority" for ISIS.[153]

FINANCES: ISIS's financial situation remained largely unchanged from the previous quarter. According to the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), ISIS probably had tens of millions of U.S. dollars available in cash reserves dispersed across the region.[154] The group continued to raise funds via various means, including oil smuggling (especially in eastern Syria), kidnapping for ransom, extortion, looting, and the possible operation of front companies.[155]

ISIS continued to rely on money services businesses—including hawalas (part of a money transfer system based on trust)—throughout Iraq, Syria, and Turkey to move funds.[156] ISIS also maintained a network of couriers to smuggle cash between Iraq and Syria, as well as facilitators in Turkey and other financial centers.[157] For example, ISIS supporters in Iraq collected and sent funds to intermediaries in Turkey, who then smuggled cash into Syria or sent funds to hawalas operating in the al-Hol displaced persons camp.[158] Treasury reported that ISIS also transferred funds to displaced persons camps such as al-Hol using virtual currencies and online platforms.[159]

ISIS-Core Leads a Global Organization

The DIA reported ISIS-Core leaders in Iraq and Syria continued to manage the group as a global caliphate, maintaining an element in Iraq and Syria dedicated to overseeing the group's branches around the world.[160] Since 2014, ISIS has incorporated existing jihadist groups or upstart elements into its global organization, expanding into the Arabian Peninsula, South and Southeast Asia, Eurasia, Turkey, and Africa.[161]

The DIA said that ISIS leaders provided the group's branches with guidance, media support, and funding.[162] For example, ISIS-Somalia and ISIS-West Africa received resources and financial support from ISIS-Core leadership in Iraq and Syria.[163] Since late 2019, the removal of ISIS senior leaders in Iraq and Syria prompted ISIS-Core to give regional affiliates greater operational autonomy while retaining strategic oversight of the global organization.[164]

The DIA assessed that the threat ISIS posed globally increased due to strategic expansion and entrenchment in conflict zones and areas lacking counterterrorism pressure.[165] The DIA said that there were no indications that any of the group's external branches considered abandoning ISIS during the quarter.[166] In particular, the DIA did not observe any changes in the relationship between ISIS-Core and ISIS-Khorasan since withdrawal of U.S. and Coalition forces from Afghanistan in August.[167]

THREAT TO WESTERN COUNTRIES: ISIS did not claim responsibility for any attacks in the United States or Europe in 2021.[168] However, the DIA reported that ISIS "Core" remained committed to directing and supporting attacks in Western countries, and publicly encouraged its branches and supporters to conduct such attacks.[169] An October disruption of an ISIS cell in Kosovo suggested these global efforts continued, the DIA said.[170] However, ISIS-Core probably remained unable to direct external operations in the United States and the majority of its branches probably lacked both the intent and capability to direct attacks against the U.S. homeland or Europe.[171]

According to the DIA, the greatest transnational terrorist threat to Western countries likely came from lone actors, many inspired by ISIS propaganda to conduct attacks using simple weapons, often with little or no warning.[172]

PROSECUTING ISIS FIGHTERS AND FINANCIERS: During the quarter, a prominent ISIS fighter captured in Syria pleaded guilty in a U.S. court to "conspiring to provide material support to ISIS, resulting in death."[173] Mohammed Khalifa, a Canadian citizen, was captured by the SDF in January 2019.[174] The Department of Justice (DoJ) reported that Khalifa fought for ISIS.[175] He was also a leading figure in ISIS' English Media Section and narrated multiple ISIS recruitment videos including those depicting the violent execution of unarmed captives.[176] As part of his plea, Khalifa admitted that he executed two Syrian soldiers on behalf of ISIS.[177] (See page 111.)

IRAQ

ISIS Exploits Security Gaps and Inflames Sectarian Tensions

ISIS launched attacks throughout Iraq during the quarter. The group continued to rely on restrictive terrain such as deserts, riverbeds, and mountains to provide safe haven for its fighters.[178] When feasible, ISIS occasionally conducted high-profile attacks in urban centers to undermine faith in security forces and cultivate sectarian tension.[179]

ISIS claimed an October 27 attack in Diyala province that killed at least 11 members of a Shia tribe in the village of al-Rashad, according to media reports.[180] Men from the tribe retaliated by attacking predominantly Sunni village located nearby. The Shia men killed residents of the village and burned homes and farms, blaming the villagers for cooperating with ISIS.[181] Media reports said the retaliatory attacks prompted an exodus of Sunni villagers.[182] The DIA reported that the attack was an example of the group's strategy of provoking violence and inflaming sectarian tensions.[183]

ISIS continued to target ISF and Kurdish Security Forces (KSF, also known as the Peshmerga) checkpoints and ambush security patrols in order to maintain its freedom of

The DIA reported that ISIS "Core" remained committed to directing and supporting attacks in Western countries, and publicly encouraged its branches and supporters to conduct such attacks.

Ministry of Peshmerga soldiers attend a meeting with CJTF-OIR Coalition forces in Erbil, Iraq. (U.S. Army photo)

movement in Iraq, the DIA said.[184] In particular, ISIS exploited poor coordination between security forces in various provinces, the DIA said.[185] For example, there was a spate of attacks on KSF personnel in areas disputed by the Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), which prompted greater cooperation between the ISF and KSF.[186] (See page 47.)

The DIA said that ISIS attacks on infrastructure decreased during the quarter, compared with the previous two quarters, likely due to a concerted increase in security efforts by the ISF and KSF.[187] The DIA said that security forces, including the Iraqi military, the KSF, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and the federal and local police forces, were specifically tasked with protecting Iraq's electric, oil, and water infrastructure with increased patrols, checkpoints, aerial reconnaissance, and surveillance operations.[188] Senior Iraqi officials formed coordination centers throughout Iraq to synchronize these efforts and encouraged local tribal groups and citizens to form community watch groups to deter ISIS attacks.[189]

SYRIA

ISIS Struggles to Rebuild and Replenish, Using Desert Sanctuary, Training, and Rebuilding

The DIA reported that ISIS remained active in Syria but struggled to replenish personnel and rebuild its organizational capacity. ISIS also faced challenges acquiring the necessary funding, materiel, and logistical support necessary to fully rebuild its attack capabilities.[190]

During the quarter, ISIS attacks in Syria increased slightly compared to the previous quarter.[191] The DIA said that although the number of ISIS-claimed attacks in Syria remained low during the quarter, there was a slight increase in November that suggested the group might increase activity over the next quarter.[192] The president of the SDF-aligned Syrian Democratic Council expressed concern to reporters in October that ISIS retained "intellectual and ideological influence" over civilians in northeastern Syria.[193]

OPERATIONAL LOCATIONS: ISIS continued to focus most of its activities in southwestern Syria, the central Syrian Desert, and across northern and eastern Syria.[194] The DIA said that ISIS attacks were perpetrated primarily against Syrian regime forces and regime allies in the southwest and throughout the Syrian Desert, and against the SDF in the eastern governorates of Hasakah and Dayr az Zawr.[195]

The DIA said that ISIS had the greatest ability to move in the desert due to its sparsely populated, rugged terrain and the lack of a permanent or robust security presence.[196] ISIS continued to rely on this remote desert region for sanctuary and used the area for training, sustainment, and as a base of operations.[197] The DIA said that ISIS also continued to use the mountainous areas of the central desert to rebuild organizational capacity and replenish personnel.[198]

The DIA said that ISIS conducted few attacks in the Syrian regime-controlled, highly populated western regions of Syria.[199] The DIA noted that ISIS's movement remained restricted in the country's northwest, where rival extremist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—the dominant Sunni Islamist group—continued to target ISIS and detain individuals suspected of having ties to the group.[200] In addition to HTS, ISIS faced a wide range of state, state-supported, and nonstate rivals in Syria, including the Syrian regime, the SDF, Turkish-supported opposition groups (TSO), Iran-aligned militants, and others.[201] The DIA said that ISIS adjusts its operational priorities in different regions to adapt to the local conditions.[202]

TARGETS AND TACTICS: Observers attributed several attacks on Syrian regime-aligned forces to ISIS. During an ambush in western Dayr az Zawr governorate in mid-November, ISIS killed 13 pro-regime forces members, according to a war monitoring organization.[203] In early December, a blast killed 10 oil workers when it struck a bus carrying them back from an oil field in Dayr az Zawr governorate.[204]

The DIA said that ISIS also used small-arms fire to target static locations, such as checkpoints, and IEDs and ambushes against targets of opportunity, such as Syrian regime and SDF convoys, and occasionally civilian targets.[205] The group continued to operate in small, clandestine cells to avoid security forces to the greatest extent possible.[206]

ISIS Activity at al-Hol Camp Remains a Threat

The DIA reported that during the quarter, ISIS continued to conduct attacks, radicalize to violence, and recruit from inside the al-Hol displaced persons camp in northeastern Syria.[207] According to CJTF-OIR, ISIS activity in al-Hol "poses a threat to the OIR mission to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS."[208] CJTF-OIR added that ISIS activity in the camp could serve as a "significant source" of ISIS recruitment and radicalization, and therefore has a "negative, long-term effect" on the mission.[209]

CJTF-OIR reported that al-Hol is a displaced persons camp home to more than 57,000 residents, mostly displaced Iraqis and Syrians, as well as some nationals of other countries.[210] According to the DoS, although most residents of al-Hol have no connection to former ISIS fighters or the group, some women and children with familial ties to ISIS fighters live among the population.[211] The number of those who might maintain some degree of ideological affiliation with ISIS is unknown, the DoS said.[212]

> **ISIS continued to focus most of its activities in southwestern Syria, the Syrian Desert (Badiyah), and across northern and eastern Syria.**

CJTF-OIR reported that the overall security situation in the camp remained "largely the same" as the previous quarter.[213] Killings in the camp have declined since April, when the SDF completed a security sweep targeting ISIS activists in the camp.[214] The DoS reported that there were 12 killings at al-Hol during the quarter.[215] (See Table 3.) According to media reports and human rights observers, many—but not all—of the killings have been attributed to ISIS.[216] The DIA reported that on November 12, ISIS attacked the reception center in al-Hol, killing two Iraqis, including the head of the Iraqi Council for Refugees.[217]

CJTF-OIR reported that the SDF performed multiple security sweeps and raids in al-Hol during the quarter, but there were no Coalition-advised operations targeting specific ISIS members in the camp.[218] On November 22, security forces in al-Hol arrested more than a dozen Iraqis in the camp for committing killings, raiding reception centers, and targeting SDF personnel according to media reports.[219]

ISIS very likely also continued to focus efforts during the quarter on smuggling supporters and male children out of displaced persons camps, the DIA said.[220] In previous quarters, the DIA reported that ISIS smuggled males out of the camp to train them in the Syrian Desert.[221] CJTF-OIR reported that ISIS takes advantage of insufficient perimeter security at al-Hol, which is located in the Hasakah governorate, as a hub for smuggling and human trafficking, and to plan its operations in the nearby governorate of Dayr az Zawr.[222]

During the quarter, Amnesty International raised concerns that security forces arbitrarily separated boys—some as young as 12—from their mothers and caregivers and transferred them to detention facilities or youth rehabilitation centers because of potential radicalization in the future.[223]

(For more on efforts to improve security and humanitarian conditions in Syrian displaced persons camps, see pages 85-87.)

Table 3.

Decline in Killings at al-Hol Camp, October 2020–December 2021

Quarter	Number of Killings
October–December 2020	13
January–March 2021	45
April–June 2021	16
July–September 2021	19
October–December 2021	12

Note: Not all killings have been attributed to ISIS.

Sources: DoS, responses to DoS OIG requests for information, 6/18/2021, 9/18/2021, 10/8/2021, 12/16/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 2/1/2022.

A newly recruited trainee in the Kurdish Security Forces participates in an obstacle course at the Zeravani Tigers Training Center Erbil, Iraq. (U.S. Army photo)

IRAQ

*In 2016, the Iraqi parliament passed a law incorporating the PMC into the Iraqi armed forces, however PMF units have continued to operate outside of official government channels.

Note: This chart is not intended to depict command and control structures.

Sources: Jessa Rose Dury-Agri, Omer Kassim, and Patrick Martin, "Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle," Institute for the Study of War, December 2017; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 21.4 OIR 036, 9/22/2021 and 21.4 OIR CLAR036, 10/12/2021; Lead IG analysis.

IRAQ

According to the Integrated Country Strategy for Iraq, U.S. strategic priorities in the country include reforming and strengthening the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), supporting the development of a capable and responsive Iraqi government, building a strong Iraqi Kurdistan Region, encouraging economic reform, and supporting vulnerable communities as they transition from stabilization to recovery.[224] The Integrated Country Strategy for Iraq was issued in August 2018 and is currently being updated.[225]

SECURITY

In December, U.S. forces in Iraq completed their transition to an advise, assist, and enable role.[226] U.S. and Coalition forces remained in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government to support and advise the ISF, including the Kurdish Security Forces (KSF, also known as the Peshmerga) at the operational and strategic levels.[227] Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) reported no significant change to Coalition unity, resources, disposition of forces, or rules of engagement during the quarter.[228]

The Coalition continued to advise ISF leaders at the Joint Operations Command-Iraq (JOC-I) in Baghdad and the Kurdish Coordination Center in Erbil, as well as al-Asad Air Base in Anbar province.[229] CJTF-OIR supported ISF units in the Iraqi Ministry of Interior

Figure 3.

Iraqi Security Institutions

Figure 4.

Joint Operations Command-Iraq (JOC-I) and provincial Operations Commands (OCs)

(MoI) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) during the quarter. The Coalition does not partner with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) or the Tribal Mobilization Forces (TMF).[230] (See Figures 3 and 4.)

COALITION ACTIVITY

Coalition Advises the ISF on Election Security

CJTF-OIR reported that it helped the ISF plan its efforts to secure the Iraqi parliamentary elections, held on October 10, but Coalition forces did not participate in security operations

Figure 5.

Coalition Airstrikes in Iraq, January 2020–December 2021

Sources: CJTF-OIR, press releases, "CJTF-OIR Strike Summary Report," 2/13/2020, 3/24/2020, 4/10/2021, 4/30/2020, 6/24/2020, 9/8/2020, 10/29/2020, 12/14/2020, 1/6/2021, 2/4/2021, 7/6/2021, 7/7/2021, 7/9/2021, 8/4/2021, and 9/20/2021.

on the day of the elections due to political sensitivities.[231] ISF security operations on election day included securing polling sites and safeguarding collected ballots.[232] The Coalition provided intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) collection support to the ISF as it responded to post-election demonstrations, CJTF-OIR said.[233]

CJTF-OIR reported that it no longer publishes information on airstrikes in Iraq due to "competing priorities and staffing."[234] CJTF-OIR data on airstrikes through August 2021 indicates that CJTF-OIR conducted many fewer airstrikes in Iraq in 2021 compared to the previous year.[235] (See Figure 5.)

SELECTED KEY EVENTS, OCTOBER 1, 2021–DECEMBER 31, 2021

OCTOBER 10
Iraq holds parliamentary elections, producing a victory for the political bloc led by Muqtada al-Sadr.

OCTOBER 31
Three rockets land in Baghdad neighborhoods in an attack that Iraqi officials say targeted the U.S. Embassy.

OCT   **NOV**

OCTOBER 27
ISIS attacks a Shia village in Diyala province, killing at least 11 civilians. The incident provoked a 4-day spate of sectarian violence in which at least 6 additional civilians are killed.

NOVEMBER 1
Iraqi airstrikes kill five ISIS fighters in Salah ad Din province.

IRAQI GROUND FORCES

Iraqi Ground Forces Conduct Counter-ISIS Clearance Operations

The ISF carried out two major operations against ISIS during the quarter: Operation Lightning Sky and Operations Lightning Sky II. CJTF-OIR reported that during these operations, executed in late November and early December, the ISF repositioned some of its reconnaissance units from urban checkpoints to counter-ISIS operations.[236]

According to CJTF-OIR, the operations were successful and allowed the ISF to conduct reconnaissance in areas where the ISF had not maintained a presence in some time.[237] CJTF-OIR characterized this development as a step toward denying ISIS freedom of movement in challenging terrain that runs along Iraq's provincial boundaries.[238] The repositioning of Iraqi ground forces from checkpoint operations to counter-ISIS operations, CJTF-OIR noted, better aligns with the ground forces' training.[239] However, CJTF-OIR said that reported results from these operations were "modest when accounting for material removed from the battlespace."[240]

CJTF-OIR said that while the ISF still needs to improve in some areas, it has demonstrated basic capabilities.[241] After the Lightning Sky and Lightning Sky II operations, CJTF-OIR advisors and ISF leaders reviewed what had occurred and identified areas where Coalition forces could provide additional support to the ISF.[242]

In total, Iraqi ground forces conducted at least 1,036 counter-ISIS patrols and clearance operations during the quarter.[243] The majority of the operations were conducted by provincial Operations Commands in Baghdad, Anbar, Karbala, Diyala, Ninewa, and Kirkuk provinces.[244] As of December 31, these operations resulted in at least 46 ISIS fighters killed and 199 ISIS fighters captured, in addition to the discovery and clearance of 269 ISIS bed-down locations and 2,684 IEDs, according to CJTF-OIR.[245]

CJTF-OIR said that the ISF conducted most of these operations without Coalition support, including without ISR support. CJTF-OIR also noted that the ISF conducted these operations while providing election and post-election security—which it said highlights the ISF's ability to execute multiple operations simultaneously.[246]

NOVEMBER 7
Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi survives a UAV attack on his residence in Baghdad. No group claims responsibility.

DECEMBER 4–6
ISIS briefly captures small village of Luheiban in Kirkuk province. In a joint operation, the ISF and KSF later recapture Luheiban.

DEC

NOVEMBER 27
ISIS claims responsibility for an attack on the KSF in Diyala province, killing five soldiers, the first of a sharp uptick in attacks against Kurdish troops and civilians in areas along the Kurdistan Coordination Line.

DECEMBER 7
A motorcycle bomb explodes near a hospital in Basrah, killing 4 people. No group claims responsibility.

Operational and Organizational Shortcomings Undermine ISF Independence

CJTF-OIR reported that the ISF showed greater ability to cooperate and coordinate among units while planning and executing joint operations during the quarter. In particular, additional ISF personnel from more varied units were involved in joint operational activities and the ISF was able to cooperate and coordinate effectively on particularly complex operations despite compressed planning timelines. The ISF's performance in securing the October elections was a "strong example" of the ISF's growing capabilities, CJTF-OIR said.[247]

CJTF-OIR also identified several ongoing operational and organizational shortcomings that challenge the ISF's ability to operate independently. However, CJTF-OIR noted that it is unable to fully assess some of these capabilities because CJTF-OIR advisors no longer advise the ISF at the tactical level.[248]

ENEMY ENGAGEMENT: CJTF-OIR said that ISF units conducting search and clearance operations were rarely in contact with ISIS fighters even though the ISF personnel significantly outnumbered the ISIS fighters.[249] CJTF-OIR noted that the JOC-I appears to assess the ISF's ability to conduct counter-ISIS operations based on the number of operations completed rather than whether the operations succeeded in killing or capturing ISIS fighters.[250]

NIGHT OPERATIONS: CJTF-OIR said that most ISF night operations were not producing results because they were not conducted in areas where ISIS was operating.[251] CJTF-OIR said that it provided night vision devices to the ISF in July 2021 through the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF).[252] CJTF-OIR said that it is up to Iraqi ground forces to identify and train operators to employ these systems effectively.[253]

LOGISTICS: Iraqi ground forces typically do not conduct logistical planning and often rely on Coalition forces for logistical support.[254] They lack the equipment necessary to develop and execute a logistical plan, such as computers and software.[255] Instead, ground force logistics officers maintain information of critical material via manual bookkeeping.[256]

CJTF-OIR advisors have been working with ISF logistics officers to form a proper Iraqi logistics office to support the JOC-I leadership staff on planning of operations and maintaining logistical situational awareness.[257] CJTF-OIR reported that one of the ISF logistics officers' main tasks is to coordinate requests for equipment through CJTF-OIR.[258] CJTF-OIR advisors also worked with NATO Mission–Iraq (NMI) to coordinate support for ISF sustainment and maintenance planning, as well as logistical tracking.[259] CJTF-OIR said that coordination with NMI was important because NMI's Ministerial Advisory Division advises the Iraqi ground forces command at the ministerial level.[260]

COMMAND AND CONTROL: CJTF-OIR reported that "a significant portion" of Iraqi officers at the JOC-I "do not appear to understand the overall sequence of the operations at the 4-star headquarters level." [261] Communications sent by ISF tactical units to the JOC-I headquarters experienced inefficiencies because the information passed through multiple layers of command at the provincial level.[262] Subordinate commanders were often unwilling

> The ISF's performance in securing the October elections was a "strong example" of the ISF's growing capabilities, CJTF-OIR said.

to make difficult decisions, leaving senior ISF leaders—not commanders on the ground—to make tactical decisions. Their unwillingness to make decisions delayed subsequent decision-making and decreased the tempo of ISF operations, according to CJTF-OIR.[263]

In particular, weak command and control limited the ISF's ability to coordinate airstrikes in support of ground operations. CJTF-OIR said that senior ISF leadership noted challenges to "battle tracking" ground units with any level of fidelity—identifying where friendly ground units are located—prior to employing airstrikes.[264]

Specifically, CJTF-OIR reported that the JOC-I lacks an ability to locate, monitor, and direct all ISF field units concurrently. The JOC-I's operations floor does not have a means to visually display the current disposition of ISF field units, which rely mostly on telephonic messaging to provide updates on their status. CJTF-OIR said advisors were taking steps to demonstrate to ISF leaders how publicly available tools, including Google Earth Pro, could help them track ISF field units more effectively and efficiently.[265] The demonstration, planned for December, was postponed due to lack of access to Google Earth Pro and was being rescheduled possibly for early 2022, CJTF-OIR said.[266]

INFORMATION SECURITY: CJTF-OIR reported that the ISF's communication platforms and methods—such as personal cell phones—continued to hinder its operations, pose information security challenges, and require improvements. CJTF-OIR said that the ISF does not appear apprehensive about using these potentially unsecure means of communication.[267]

MAINTENANCE: CJTF-OIR said that the ISF has its own facilities to maintain ground equipment, but lacks spare parts, funds to procure spare parts, and skilled mechanics to do some types of maintenance.[268] The ISF often requests spare parts for their vehicles from the Coalition.[269] CJTF-OIR said that they have communicated to the ISF that CTEF funds are decreasing, and that it is the ISF's responsibility to identify shortfalls and develop solutions to maintain its equipment.[270]

In particular, CJTF-OIR said that its advisors had observed ISF efforts to maintain surveillance towers, which were funded by CTEF through September 2022, and through the Foreign Military Sales program after that date.[271] According to a Defense Security Cooperation Agency press release, the towers increase the ISF's ability to "provide protection of national-level command and control sites, military installations, and other critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks."[272]

Iraqi Border Guards Replace Iraqi Army Units along the Iraq-Syria Border

CJTF-OIR reported that Iraqi Border Guards replaced Iraqi Army units along a stretch of the Iraq-Syria border that extends from the Yarubiyah-Rabiah crossing, located northwest of Mosul, to a point on the border approximately 35 miles south.[273] According to CJTF-OIR, the move away from the border will allow the Iraqi Army units to conduct their primary mission against ISIS.[274]

> CJTF-OIR reported that Iraqi Border Guards replaced Iraqi Army units along a stretch of the Iraq-Syria border that extends from the Yarubiyah-Rabiah crossing, located northwest of Mosul, to a point on the border approximately 35 miles south.

CJTF-OIR said that the JOC-I did not report any notable operations along the border during the quarter. The ISF's border operations typically include creating obstacles such as trenches, elevated barriers, and concertina wire to prevent ISIS fighters and others from crossing the border.[275] According to CJTF-OIR, a trench that the ISF is building along the border was 90 percent complete and installation of the concertina wire fence was approximately 20 percent complete.[276]

CJTF-OIR reported that it was unable to assess the ISF's border security capabilities because CJTF-OIR advisors no longer accompany Iraqi ground forces.[277] However, CJTF-OIR noted that concertina wire, funded through the CTEF, previously given to the ISF was deemed "substandard" and this had delayed the placement of obstacles along the Iraq-Syria border.[278] CJTF-OIR said that it used the CTEF to procure replacement concertina wire, which was delivered to the ISF during the quarter. CJTF-OIR said it expected to deliver additional concertina wire to the ISF in January 2022.[279]

OSC-I Continues Efforts to Reduce Corruption within the ISF

The Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq (OSC-I) at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad is not part of OIR but supports the development of Iraq security institutions. OSC-I noted that it had renamed its Security Sector Reform Group the Educate, Reform, and Train Team during the quarter to "more accurately reflect its focus," which is primarily to educate the MoD and MoI on security sector reform.[280] The team also focused on English language training for ISF personnel, OSC-I said.[281]

OSC-I reported that although it did not directly observe incidents of corruption within the ISF during this quarter, the ISF continued to face what USCENTCOM characterized as "daunting challenges from rampant corruption at every level."[282] Examples of this corruption include "pay-to-play" schemes, nepotism, bribery, pursuing personal vendettas, and in-fighting within and among services and ministries.[283] To mitigate corruption associated with padding ISF payrolls, including through payments to ghost soldiers, OSC-I continued implementing the Human Resources Management System for the MoD, the MoI, and the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MoPA).[284] OSC-I said that the intent of payroll system reform was to enable the ISF to employ more efficient methods of managing human capital while combating corruption through digital, traceable, and accountable processes.[285]

OSC-I continued to support multilateral efforts to train Iraqi Border Guards by coordinating tri-national training events involving the United States, Iraq, and Jordan.[286] OSC-I said there were five remaining training events scheduled to occur in Jordan that will focus on border security, interdiction, and developing training capabilities.[287]

OSC-I continued to support the MoD, MoI, MoPA, and the CTS, but remained understaffed during the quarter. OSC-I said that understaffing limited its ability to carry out its mission in Iraq.[288] OSC-I reported that it coordinated with international partners, including United Nations Development Program, NMI, and the European Union Advisory Mission to better shape and synchronize security sector reform efforts.[289]

OSC-I reported that although it did not directly observe incidents of corruption within the ISF during the quarter, the ISF continued to face "daunting challenges from rampant corruption at every level."

COUNTER TERRORISM SERVICE

CTS Operations Decreased Compared to Last Quarter

CJTF-OIR reported that Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) operations during the quarter ranged from simple reconnaissance patrols to targeted detention operations by small units. Additionally, the CTS conducted large-scale clearance operations with other ISF elements to destroy enemy bed-down locations or supply caches. CJTF-OIR said that the CTS increased its engagement with other ISF elements and its integration within the JOC-I.[290] However, operations conducted by the CTS during the quarter decreased compared to the previous quarter, from 426 to 298.[291]

According to CJTF-OIR, the CTS conducted 298 operations during the quarter, 11 of which were accompanied by Coalition advisors.[292] (See Table 4.) CJTF-OIR explained that the primary reason for conducting these partnered operations was to enable Coalition advisors to accompany CTS operators and accurately assess their capabilities at the tactical level while under the stress of operational conditions, rather than just observing CTS operations from an operations center. The partnered operations included deliberate detention operations, clearance operations, and reconnaissance missions. CJTF-OIR added that the CTS recognizes the need to conduct independent operations based on operational and strategic priorities but the CTS increasingly acknowledged that ISF joint operations are beneficial in terms of enhancing relationships.[293]

CJTF-OIR reported that cooperation and integration between CTS operations and those conducted by other ISF units continues to improve. While there are still hurdles to overcome in order to build trust and allow the CTS to fully integrate with the JOC-I, the sharing of intelligence between organizations has proven useful in multiple large operations during the quarter.[294]

Table 4.

Counter Terrorism Service Operations by Type, October 1–December 31, 2021

Operation Type	October	November	December	TOTAL
Partnered	4	4	3	**11**
Direct Detention Operations	13	16	12	**41**
Warranted Individuals Detained	16	17	11	**44**
Reconnaissance	54	69	30	**153**
Cache/Clearance	2	0	5	**7**
Force Protection	34	2	0	**36**
Other	0	5	1	**6**
TOTAL	**123**	**113**	**62**	**298**

Source: CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL033, 12/22/2021.

The main focus of CJTF-OIR development of the CTS during the quarter was refining the CTS's approach to the targeting cycle. CJTF-OIR stated that under Coalition advisement, the CTS has further developed its capability to identify and track ISIS members. Other key areas of development include employment of air-to-ground assets and employment of specific weapons systems. Additionally, CJTF-OIR reported that the CTS Special Forensics Investigation Lab continues to develop its capability and breadth of knowledge regarding exploitation of captured enemy material, but that the CTS is still monitored closely by the Coalition's Exploitation and Analysis Center.[295]

CJTF-OIR evaluates CTS capabilities using the Combat Readiness and Preparedness Inspection, a self-evaluation assessment that indicates the war-fighting ability of an inspected battalion. CJTF-OIR noted that the CTS is very critical of itself and is using this assessment as a tool to improve its counter-ISIS capabilities.[296] However, CJTF-OIR did not provide any publicly releasable assessment results.

The CTS continued to receive funding from the United States and the Coalition, both through CJTF-OIR utilizing CTEF as well as OSC-I funding through the DoS Foreign Military Financing program.[297] (See Table 5.)

Coalition Special Operations Forces Continue to Advise CTS

During the quarter, the Special Operations Advisory Group (SOAG) under CJTF-OIR continued to advise and train CTS personnel from the ministerial level down to the tactical units. Under the SOAG, there are three Special Operations Advisement Teams from the Coalition.[298] CJTF-OIR reported that the SOAG's advisory capacity increased during the quarter, with additional Coalition advisors at the CTS tactical level to provide a holistic assessment of CTS capabilities to build unit readiness and operational execution.[299]

> **The main focus of CJTF-OIR development of the CTS during the quarter was refining the CTS's approach to the targeting cycle.**

U.S. personnel load approximately 250 pallets of artillery and ammunition on Iraqi transportation vehicles at al-Asad Air Base, Iraq. (U.S. Army photo)

Table 5.

CTEF-funded Equipment Provided to the CTS, October–December 2021

Description	Cost
Replacement Tires	$144,000.00
CTS Armored Security Vehicle Reallocation	$6,000,690.00
Warehouse Forklifts	$105,600.00
PSYOPS MacBook	$102,340.14
2 Desktop Computers	$2,338.00
20 Laptops	$22,981.00
Tetra Tactical Trunked Mesh Radio Network	$27,719,102.00
Smart Targets	$2,788,021.00
CTS Ambulances	$18,190,000.00
CTS M1151 Humvees	$15,454,584.00
Mortars and Ammo for 2nd ISDF	$5,007,488.00

Note: Equipment shown in table was funded using 2021 CTEF funds.

Source: CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 036, 12/22/2021.

CJTF-OIR explained that at the institutional level, SOAG advising focused on targeting and intelligence processes and improving legal representation within the CTS's operational decision-making process. Coalition advisors also focused on the CTS's weapons proficiency, planning and resourcing, English language training, and wider officer development. The CTS also received training in media skills and crisis communication drills as well as efforts to synchronize messaging outputs across the CTS departments.[300]

At the operational level, SOAG advisors are paired with the Counter Terrorism Command, to help establish the operational headquarters for the CTS. CJTF-OIR reported that advisors from the SOJTF-L Mobile Training Teams trained CTS personnel in videography, photography, planning multimedia support, messaging, and social media techniques during the quarter.[301]

Additionally, CJTF-OIR said that SOAG advisors' efforts utilized train-the-trainer instruction that focused on streamlining training efforts at the CTS training center, better known as Academia. SOAG advisors assisted the CTS in identifying tactical readiness gaps through the continued use of Combat Readiness and Preparedness Inspections. Coalition advisors also worked with the CTS Academia to develop organic solutions within the CTS with an emphasis on retraining the basics in addition to sustainment systems and processes development.[302]

CJTF-OIR said that the primary enablement the CTS received from the Coalition during the quarter was in support of their target discovery and target refinement capabilities. CTS targeting capabilities were still significantly limited, requiring the Coalition to continue assisting the CTS in their targeting efforts through technical means, to include ISR support.[303]

IRAQI AIR ENTERPRISE

Additional ISF Aircraft Become Operational

CJTF-OIR reported that the Iraqi Air Force resumed tasking its Czech-made L-159 and Russian-made Su-25 strike aircraft again for operations during the quarter.[304] CJTF-OIR explained that the L-159's combat tasking is notable since it had not been used for operations in nearly 5 years.[305] CJTF-OIR said that the L-159 conducted operations during the quarter with unguided bombs (Mk-82s) because its laser designation pods have not been delivered to the squadron.[306] Meanwhile, CJTF-OIR reported last quarter that Iraq's Su-25s only conducted one airstrike and were largely relegated to conducting training missions due to a lack of confidence in air-to-ground weapons accuracy given the aircraft can only use unguided rockets and bombs.[307]

CJTF-OIR said that the Iraqi L-159 and Su-25 aircraft still suffer from low fully mission capability rates, while Iraq's F-16 and AC-208 aircraft remain the main strike platforms with use and mission capable rates similar to those in the previous quarter.[308] CJTF-OIR reported last quarter that Iraq's F-16s conducted eight strikes and its AC-208s conducted five.[309]

Table 6.

Airstrikes by Iraqi Aircraft, October 1–December 31, 2021

Date	Aircraft	Location	Target	Munition
Oct. 1	2 x F-16	Kirkuk	1 x BDL	2 x GBU-10
Oct. 3	1 x AC-208	Diyala	1 x BDL	1 x AGM-114
Oct. 9	2 x AC-208	Diyala	3 x BDL + 1 x vehicle	4 x AGM-114
Oct. 18	2 x F-16 + 2 x Su-25	Kirkuk	1 x BDL	2 x Mk-84 + 4 x ZAB
Oct. 19	1 x Bell-407 + 2 x EC-635	Kirkuk	2 x BDL	12.7mm gun + 70mm rockets
Oct. 24	1 x Bell-407 + 1 x Mi-17	Ninewa	1 x BDL	12.7mm gun
Oct. 24	1 x Bell-407 + 1 x Mi-35	Salah ad Din	1 x BDL	N/A
Oct. 27	2 x Bell-407	Baghdad	Personnel	12.7mm gun + 70mm rockets
Nov. 1	2 x F-16	Salah ad Din	1 x BDL	1 x GBU-12
Nov. 3	2 x Su-25	Diyala	1 x BDL	2 x OFAB-500 + 2 x FAB-500
Nov. 12	4 x L-159	Diyala	8 x BDL	16 x Mk-82
Nov. 14	2 x F-16 + 1 x Mi-35 + 1 x Bell-407	Salah ad Din	3 x BDL	3 x GBU-12
Nov. 17	2 x Su-25 + 2 x L-159	Salah ad Din	6 x BDL	4 x Mk-82 + 7 x FAB-500
Nov. 17	1 x Bell-407 + 2 x EC-635	Diyala	Personnel	N/A
Nov. 22	2 x L-159	Diyala	1 x BDL + 2 x vehicles	8 x Mk-82
Nov. 24	2 x F-16	Diyala	1 x BDL	4 x GBU-12
Nov. 27	1 x EC-635	Kirkuk	1 x BDL + 1 x vehicle	12.7mm gun + 70mm rockets
Dec. 5	2 x F-16	Anbar	1 x BDL	1 x GBU-12

According to CJTF-OIR, the objectives of Iraq's F-16 sorties included defensive counter air operations, airborne interdiction, deliberate airstrikes, dynamic targeting, ISR collection, and a training program to ensure combat readiness in the mission sets required. From October 1 to December 31, the two Iraqi Air Force squadrons that operate F-16s (the 9th and 11th Fighter Squadrons), flew 215 sorties, averaging 2 to 6 training missions per day. CJTF-OIR reported that Iraqi F-16 aircrews released at least one weapon on 10 of the 215 sorties and that all F-16 operational sorties are flown separately from training sorties.[310]

ISF Focused Airstrikes on ISIS Hideouts

CJTF-OIR reported that the JOC-I leadership ordered a deliberate increase in ISF counter-ISIS operations at the end of 2021, resulting in more targets engaged and an increase in ordnance used during aerial strikes.[311] In total, ISF aircraft performed 30 aerial strikes against ISIS targets during the quarter, compared to 26 strikes during the previous quarter.[312] (See Table 6.) The Iraqi Air Force conducted 20 of these airstrikes using fixed-wing aircraft (F-16, Su-25, L-159, and AC-208), while the Iraqi Army Aviation Command conducted 11 airstrikes using helicopters (Bell-407, EC-635, Mi-17, and Mi-35). One airstrike was conducted using assets from both services.[313]

Date	Aircraft	Location	Target	Munition
Dec. 6	2 x F-16	Anbar	Personnel	3 x GBU-12
Dec. 7	4 x L-159	Diyala	6 x BDL + 1 tunnel	8 x Mk-82
Dec. 9	2 x F-16	Kirkuk	N/A	4 x Mk-82
Dec. 11	2 x F-16	Salah ad Din	5 x BDL	8 x GBU-12
Dec. 11	4 x L-159	Diyala	4 x BDL	4 x Mk-82
Dec. 12	1 x Bell-407 + 1 x EC-635	Kirkuk	1 x BDL	12.7mm gun
Dec. 12	1 x Bell-407 + 1 x EC-635	Kirkuk	2 x BDL + 1 vehicle	12.7mm gun + 70mm rockets
Dec. 12	1 x Bell 407 + 1 x EC-635	Diyala	Tunnel	12.7mm gun
Dec. 19	2 x F-16	Diyala	Personnel	1 x GBU-12
Dec. 25	1 x EC-635 + 1 x UH-1	Salah ad Din	1 x BDL	12.7mm gun
Dec. 26	2 x F-16	Diyala	2 x BDL	4 x GBU-12
Dec. 26	2 x F-16 + 2 x L-159	Diyala	Training Camp	10 x Mk-82
Munitions Key				
GBU-10 – 2,000 pound guided bomb			GBU-12 – 500 pound guided bomb	
Mk-84 – 2,000 pound unguided bomb			Mk-82 – 500 pound unguided bomb	
AGM-114 – Hellfire guided missile			ZAB – Unguided incendiary bomb	
OFAB-500 – 1,100 pound unguided bomb			FAB-500 – 1,100 pound unguided bomb	

Source: CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL038, 12/22/2021.

CJTF-OIR reported that ISF operations remained focused on the same provinces as last quarter, namely Diyala, Kirkuk, and Salah ad Din. Diyala province became the prevalent area of operations during the quarter in place of Kirkuk province, which was the focus of operations last quarter. CJTF-OIR assessed that ISF operations conducted in Kirkuk last quarter caused ISIS to move south and become more active in Diyala.[314]

CJTF-OIR explained that precision airstrikes remain one of the most effective means of hitting ISIS targets in remote regions of Iraq where the group can still move freely. Airstrikes also remain one of the most effective ways of striking ISIS bed-down locations (BDL) without ISF ground forces incurring unnecessary risks.[315]

CJTF-OIR said that Iraqi air assets often strike BDLs when ISIS fighters are present, per the JOC-I Deputy Commander's intent. But Iraqi aircraft still targeted some sites without any evidence of an ISIS presence at the time they were struck in order to prohibit ISIS from using the site for support activity.[316] CJTF-OIR said that when feasible, following an airstrike on a BDL, an Iraqi ground force is used to clear the area. The BDLs, or what is left of them, are systematically destroyed with controlled detonations by the ground forces after the sweeps are over.[317] CJTF-OIR said that subsequent sweeps of the target areas confirmed the destruction of significant ISIS logistic support points during the quarter.[318]

On several occasions during the quarter, Iraqi aircraft were directed to strike ISIS sites prior to the start of a ground clearance operation. CJTF-OIR reported these strikes did not attack entities that would meet a Coalition definition of a target, but were instead struck to boost the morale of ISF ground troops. CJTF-OIR added that boosting morale of ground troops could likely have also been achieved with artillery.[319]

Based on Coalition advice, artillery fire support was used once during the quarter in combination with air assets, but CJTF-OIR said that the ISF generally lack confidence in using their artillery battalions. During the quarter, Coalition advisors at the JOC-I worked on a plan to reenergize the artillery directorate in order to advance artillery battalions' training, deployment, and combat employment.[320]

CJTF-OIR reported that ISF artillery units do not appear capable of destroying ISIS BDLs given the artillery units current level of accuracy. However, CJTF-OIR noted that during an operation on October 18 in Wadi Ashai in southern Kirkuk, Iraqi artillery demonstrated that it could provide suppressive fire long enough to pin down the enemy in an unpopulated area, allowing ground forces to approach for a subsequent ground sweep. As a result, Coalition personnel focused their advising activities on Iraqi artillery and air assets providing complementarity effects, rather than replacing one asset with another.[321]

CJTF-OIR explained that as a rule, Iraqi Air Force aircraft are mostly used to target ISIS BDLs, while Iraqi Army Aviation Command aircraft, which are largely helicopters, are mostly used as air weapon teams in support of planned ground operations. Iraqi Army Aviation helicopters were also sometimes used to defend ISF ground unit garrisons or checkpoints that come under attack.[322]

CJTF-OIR explained that precision airstrikes remain one of the most effective means of hitting ISIS targets in remote regions of Iraq where the group can still move freely.

Shortcomings in Target Development Persist

According to CJTF-OIR, the ISF conducted airstrikes without significant Coalition assistance, except for ISR collection before conducting airstrikes and ISR monitoring during the actual strike execution[323] During the quarter, Coalition forces provided approximately 2,700 hours of ISR support to ISF target development.[324] CJTF-OIR reported that although Coalition personnel also advised the ISF during some of its airstrikes, the ISF made advisors aware of other airstrikes after they occurred. In total this quarter, four ISF airstrikes were planned with the assistance of Coalition advisors (which occurred on October 18, November 1, November 14, and December 26).[325] Additionally, on two occasions (December 6 and 19), Coalition MQ-1 unmanned ISR aircraft provided laser designation support to Iraqi F-16s to dynamically target high value individuals. CJTF-OIR said the process went flawlessly for both events and demonstrated tactical interoperability between Iraqi F-16s and Coalition ISR.[326]

CJTF-OIR said that the ISF continued to conduct counter-ISIS missions in Iraq with relative autonomy. However, the lack of discipline and coordination in the planning and execution of these operations did not allow the Coalition to assess that the ISF is capable of fully efficient autonomous operations to date.[327]

CJTF-OIR reported that the ISF successfully executed a few deliberate, pre-planned strikes in October. However, CJTF-OIR assessed that the Iraqi Target Development Cell is not robust enough yet—due to a lack of personnel—to allow the JOC-I to conduct a permanent deliberate targeting cycle.[328] While the ISF remains relatively effective at accomplishing the deliberate targeting process from beginning to end, ad-hoc dynamic targeting attempts interrupt the deliberate cycle.[329] As a result, some targets that ISF personnel have been developing—sometimes over a period of several days—are abandoned.[330]

The use of ad hoc, dynamic targeting increased in October to support the parliamentary elections, but JOC-I leadership continued to push for use of dynamic targeting in November as well.[331] The Coalition continued to support the development of the ISF's dynamic targeting capability during the quarter. However, CJTF-OIR said the ISF's use of dynamic airstrikes is rarely aimed at sensitive targets, but instead driven by ISF leadership's desire to strike immediately, as soon as a target is found. According to CJTF-OIR, the desire to strike targets quickly, rather than using ISF ground forces to clear an area can result in the loss of ISIS material that could be exploited for intelligence.[332]

CJTF-OIR added that during the quarter the number of dynamic targets that the ISF planned with minimal information increased. According to CJTF-OIR, it was not uncommon for the direction to strike a target to come from the JOC-I Deputy Commander to ISF planners with little more than a grid point, lacking intelligence collection, or a desired effect other than to strike a target. CJTF-OIR explained that this created issues because the Target Development Cell staff is good at the deliberate development of a target, but becomes challenged with providing good effects on a target without the ability to analyze and develop the intelligence.[333] CJTF-OIR said that continued Coalition advice against disrupting the deliberate target development process appears to be influencing the ISF, as the recent trend indicates a return to a more deliberate and efficient targeting cycle.[334]

ISF Lacks Necessary ISR Capability

CJTF-OIR reported that with Iraq's fleet of 12 Chinese-made CH-4 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) not capable of performing missions since September 2019, the ISF lacks a medium altitude, long endurance ISR capability.[335] Other Iraqi assets, such as the A/RC-208 and KA-350 manned ISR aircraft, either lack the necessary endurance and discretion or, in the case of the ScanEagle UAVs, the range to provide the level of intelligence required by an efficient and deliberate joint targeting cycle.[336] As a result, the ISF still requires Coalition ISR support to develop ISIS targets, including the prosecution of ISIS BDLs.[337]

Despite the aforementioned capability shortfalls, the Iraqi Air Force continued to show increased willingness to use its ISR assets rather than rely strictly on Coalition support. CJTF-OIR said that although the Iraqi KA-350 and A/RC-208 aircraft maintain acceptable full mission capable rates, the ISF's ISR capabilities are substantially reduced by an inability to disseminate information collected by the aircraft to decision makers on the ground in a consistent, timely manner. The KA-350 and the RC-208 are capable of providing a live full-motion-video feed to personnel on the ground, but the Iraqi Air Force currently lacks the infrastructure necessary to utilize this capability. CJTF-OIR added that the Iraqi Air Force, aided by Coalition advisors, continues to pursue options to exploit this capability, such as handheld ROVER systems capable of viewing real-time full-motion-video from nearby aircraft, but these efforts are not widespread.[338]

CJTF-OIR reported that dynamic targeting also remains a critical shortcoming for the Iraqi Air Force and the Army Aviation Command.[339] CJTF-OIR reported that due to Coalition ISR's persistent presence over the areas of Iraq where counter-ISIS operations occur, the ISF continued to rely heavily on Coalition ISR when a dynamic situation unfolds, such as ISF ground forces coming under attack or when ISIS targets of opportunity emerge. CJTF-OIR explained that in these situations, the JOC-I leadership requested Coalition ISR to be dynamically retasked in support of the new situation, often disrupting ISF requested deliberate target development efforts. Coalition forces do not engage dynamic targets of opportunity but are required to handover targets to the ISF's AC-208 armed ISR aircraft.[340] However, CJTF-OIR said these situations are rarely effective due to the fleeting nature of some targets, such as individuals or vehicles.[341]

Dynamic targeting is further degraded by the slow speed in which reporting is sent up the ISF command and control structure. ISF troops are typically in contact with ISIS for an estimated 15 minutes before ISIS disengages and leaves the general area.[342] Currently, the only individuals with authority to grant strike approval for Iraqi aircraft in the JOC-I chain of command are the deputy commander or the chief of staff in his absence. CJTF-OIR reported that the ISF has not notified Coalition personnel of any plans to delegate this authority to lower levels within the chain of command.[343]

CJTF-OIR reported that it witnessed no Iraqi close air support missions during the quarter. Regardless, CJTF-OIR said that conventional ISF ground units do not have the ability to coordinate close air support with Iraqi aircraft due to lack of training, experience, and equipment. Only the Iraqi Terminal Attack Controllers (ITAC) have trained to this capability, but the program is limited in scope with only 32 ITACs operating in the entire Iraqi military. These ITACs work exclusively with CTS units at this time.[344]

CJTF-OIR reported that with Iraq's fleet of 12 Chinese-made CH-4 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) not capable of performing missions since September 2019, the ISF lacks a medium altitude, long endurance ISR capability.

CJTF-OIR said that ITAC development continued this quarter to improve the quality of ITACs capable of safely routing multiple aircraft for strikes that achieve the ground force commander's intent and deconflict from friendly forces.[345] Coalition advisors assisted during training events to sharpen ITAC skills and work directly with the CTS unit commanders and ITACs to provide operational mentorship. CJTF-OIR added that Coalition advisors continue to support ongoing efforts to integrate air and ground operations.[346]

CJTF-OIR reported that ITAC integration has been completed with multiple Iraqi strike and ISR aircraft, to include the L-159s, C-208s and Su-25s, in addition to the F-16s. Recently, several operations have integrated ITACs and seen successful contributions to ISF battle tracking, building confidence for subsequent development and use in future operations.[347]

High Aircraft Alert Status Strains Iraqi Personnel and Logistics

Iraqi Terminal Attack Controllers (ITAC) identify a target location during a live fire exercise held at Mosul Dam, Iraq. (U.S. Army photo)

CJTF-OIR reported that given the slow tempo of operations, aircraft operational readiness rates did not seem to affect the Iraqi Air Force and the Army Aviation Command's short-term ability to respond to dynamic situations, with tasked units typically responding in a timely manner. However, CJTF-OIR said that an unnecessarily high and lasting readiness

alert status put Iraqi front line air units in a permanent state of surge. Human and logistic costs do not appear to be factored into JOC-I leaderships' operational decisions.[348]

CJTF-OIR reported that the Iraqi Air Force and Army Aviation Command continue to suffer critical shortcomings related to obtaining and distributing spare parts. CJTF-OIR noted that Iraqi aircraft supported by Foreign Military Sales cases through the U.S. Government are notably more effective at producing combat air power than those without.[349]

Specifically, the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) reported that the current footprint of U.S. contract support to the Iraqi Air Force's F-16 program consists of a base support contract at Balad Air Base and a contractor logistics support program for maintenance. U.S. contractors have transitioned to a hybrid model to provide logistics support from Erbil Air Base, in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, which includes technicians remotely supporting ISF maintainers through video teleconference and technician day trips to Balad for direct hands-on support. Although this model of support began in August 2021, USCENTCOM assessed that the hybrid support method has demonstrated the potential to meet all contractor logistics support requirements and will enable the Iraqi Air Force to take on more responsibilities. USCENTCOM said that the Iraqi Air Force has proven proficient in some tasks with minimal contractor support.[350]

According to USCENTCOM, contractor logistics support is funded by the Iraqi government, while base support is transitioning to become Iraqi government-funded. The United States has reduced funding for the base support contract in each of the past 3 years. Although there was a short-term decrease in contactor support effectiveness immediately after U.S. contractors withdrew from Balad Air Base, OSC-I predicts the overall long-term effects will be positive. USCENTCOM said that it expects the hybrid model to result in a lower cost contractor maintenance support program while continuing to shift more maintenance responsibility to the Iraqi Air Force. Iraq requested to extend the base support and logistics support contracts for an additional year. OSC-I is supporting the Iraqi Air Force as they prepare to start the process of recompeting the base support contract with better defined requirements in next quarter. USCENTCOM expects this trend to continue as the Iraqi Air Force becomes more proficient and less reliant on civilian contractor support.[351]

KURDISH SECURITY FORCES

ISF and KSF Sign Agreement on Joint Force Brigade

CJTF-OIR reported that the ISF and the KSF signed an agreement during the quarter to establish a Joint Force Brigade that will provide security in a disputed area known as the Kurdish Coordination Line (KCL).[352] The agreement codified a verbal agreement achieved last quarter after months of negotiations between Iraqi and Kurdish officials.[353]

To establish the joint brigade, MoPA designated a new Regional Guard Brigade (RGB) as the KSF contribution to the Joint Force Brigade. The unit participated in 3 weeks of initial training in advance of the unit's move to the Iraqi Army. Pending some administrative processes, the RGB should participate in joint training next quarter with the Iraqi Army unit

CJTF-OIR reported that the Iraqi Air Force and Army Aviation Command continue to suffer critical shortcomings related to obtaining and distributing spare parts.

ISIS VIOLENCE SPURS ISF-KSF COORDINATION ALONG THE KCL

During the quarter, ISIS increased activity in a disputed area known as the Kurdistan Coordination Line (KCL). The DIA reported that ISIS demonstrated a growing ability to coordinate operations along in the KCL, exploiting poor coordination between the ISF and KSF in this area to attack and kill Kurdish soldiers and civilians.

LIMITED COORDINATION SO FAR

The increase in ISIS activity prompted Kurdish officials to press for greater security cooperation between the ISF and the KSF in areas along the KCL. In December, Iraqi and Kurdish forces conducted a joint operation to expel ISIS from the village of Luheiban in Kirkuk province.

The joint ISF-KSF operation was only the second of its kind. It occurred amid ongoing efforts, supported by CJTF-OIR, to improve coordination between federal and regional forces in Iraq to address the common threat of ISIS.

The ISF and KSF have coordinated their operations through Joint Coordination Centers, but have not regularly conducted joint operations.

CHALLENGES TO COORDINATION

The KSF is not unified under one command. KSF forces known as the Regional Guard Brigades operate under the command of the MoPA. Thousands of other KSF personnel are split between the commands of two vying Kurdish political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which operate separately as the 70s and 80s Units.

Tension between the KSF and Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) units that operate along the Iraqi side of the KCL stymies security cooperation between the KSF and the ISF. Kurdish officials say that they do not want security cooperation with the ISF to include the PMF.

NOVEMBER 27
Kolajo, Diyala
ISIS killed five KSF soldiers in an IED attack.

NOVEMBER 28–30
Kifri, Diyala
ISIS launched multiple attacks on the KSF.

DECEMBER 4–5
Luheiban, Kirkuk
ISIS briefly captured Luheiban and killed four KSF soldiers and a civilian in the nearby village of Qara Salem.

DECEMBER 12
Makhmur, Erbil
ISIS attacked two villages near Makhmur, killing as many as ten KSF soldiers and three civilians.

Sources: See endnotes on page 134.

assigned to the Joint Force Brigade.[354] CJTF-OIR said that the new MoPA unit was formed from new recruits and existing units formerly belonging to the politically aligned 70s and 80s Units.[355]

Security along the KCL is a "chief concern" for CJTF-OIR because ISIS has long exploited the lack of the security in disputed territories to provide safe haven for its fighters and stage attacks along the KCL and adjacent areas.[356] The joint ISF-KSF operations will "ensure a clear command responsibility for operating in the disputed areas and minimize opportunities for ISIS to operate with impunity," CJTF-OIR said.[357]

Coinciding with the formation of the joint brigade, the ISF and KSF have conducted joint operations against ISIS, including one on December 8 that was conducted in response to an uptick in ISIS activity and ISIS's capture of a small village in Kirkuk province.[358] (See page 49.) CJTF-OIR reported that the December 8 joint operation included clearance of an area of the disputed territories where key terrain was delineated between RGB and Iraqi Army units, which allowed "simultaneous movement and achievement of objectives."[359] CJTF-OIR reported that another joint operation planned for December 18 was postponed due to weather.[360]

However, the four Joint Coordination Centers intended to facilitate ISF-KSF cooperation continued to appear to be underused, and no operations were conducted from them during the quarter, CJTF-OIR said. A fifth Joint Coordination Center in Erbil, manned by ISF and KSF personnel, also appeared to be underutilized.[361]

Capabilities of KSF Units Vary

CJTF-OIR said that the KSF conducted 1,650 independent operations against ISIS between October 1 and November 30, including presence patrols, clearance patrols, observation posts, temporary checkpoints, and reconnaissance missions.[362] In addition, from October through December, the KSF conducted 29 partnered operations with Coalition forces, the ISF, or other partner forces.[363]

CJTF-OIR said that KSF units' basic capability was "adequate in the deterrence of concerted ISIS infiltration," but acknowledged that ISIS conducted successful attacks along the KCL, particularly toward the end of the quarter.[364]

However, CJTF-OIR noted that it observed "markedly different levels of competency and success" across different KSF units.[365] The RGBs, units that operate under the MoPA and are meant to be apolitical, operated predominantly as static ground holding forces and conducted larger basic area clearance operations, although infrequently and with no resistance from ISIS fighters.[366] The 70s and 80s Units, which function under the command of the two largest Kurdish political parties, also operated predominantly as static ground holding forces.[367]

The "wide variance in effectiveness" between the individual RGB, 70s Unit and 80s Unit brigades rendered blanket assessments of their performance unreliable. CJTF-OIR attributed the variations to the quality of leadership and training at echelon levels.[368]

Security along the KCL is a "chief concern" for CJTF-OIR because ISIS has long exploited the lack of the security in disputed territories to provide safe haven for its fighters and stage attacks along the KCL and adjacent areas.

Role of Third Parties

IRAN-ALIGNED MILITIAS PAUSE MOST ATTACKS ON U.S. PERSONNEL, BUT WARN OF POTENTIAL CONFRONTATION IN 2022

The DIA reported that Iran-aligned militias continued to pose a threat to U.S. personnel in Iraq during the quarter.[369] In late December, militants conducted a rocket attack against the U.S. Embassy that a Counter-Rocket, Artillery, Mortar system (C-RAM), successfully defeated.[370] The DIA explained that the militias still maintained the ability to conduct UAV and IED attacks against U.S. interests, but have mostly paused attacks during the quarter due to several factors, including a desire to manage escalation and evaluate U.S. intentions following the announcement that no U.S. forces with a combat role would be in Iraq after December 31.[371]

The DIA and CJTF-OIR noted that as December 31 drew near, the militias continued to demand that all U.S military forces withdraw from Iraq and publicly stated their resolve to resume attacks if a full withdrawal did not occur.[372] CJTF-OIR pointed to multiple social media posts from the leader of Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, a prominent Iran-aligned militia, which escalated threats this quarter, promising a decisive and historic confrontation with U.S. forces after midnight on December 31. The threats included calls for volunteers and statements to evict the entire U.S. presence from Iraq.[373]

The DIA also reported that the militias threatened to target U.S. and Coalition aircraft. The groups have access to man-portable air defense systems, commonly known as MANPADS, and other anti-aircraft systems. For example, the DIA noted that a hybrid surface-to-air missile/UAV system, referred to as a 358, and which is capable of engaging U.S. aircraft was recovered near Tuz Khurmatu Airfield in Salah ad Din province this quarter. The 358 is designed to avoid air defense systems when targeting aerial assets. The DIA said that militia-affiliated media insinuated that the system's discovery was a warning for U.S. forces.[374] The 358 is an Iranian-made system.[375]

The DIA reported that, while avoiding attacks on U.S. and Coalition forces, Iran-aligned militias probably conducted two attacks against Turkish forces in Iraq this quarter. The DIA said that these attacks came after Turkey and Azerbaijan conducted joint military exercises near the Iranian border in early October. In mid-November, Turkey's Foreign Minister visited Iran likely in an attempt to reduce tensions after the attacks. The DIA added that the last time a probable Iran-aligned militia conducted an attack against Turkish forces in Iraq was September 2021.[376]

IRAQ'S PRIME MINISTER SURVIVES ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AS POST-ELECTION DEMONSTRATIONS TURN VIOLENT

The militia-affiliated Fatah Alliance political bloc performed poorly during this quarter's elections, dropping from 48 seats in Iraq's Council of Representatives to 17.[377] The DIA reported that this electoral result could jeopardize the militias' ability to control and influence government ministries, which they leverage to safeguard their interests.[378] As a result of reduced election success, militia members protested the election results at the entrance to Baghdad's International Zone, which escalated on November 5, leading to the deaths of two militia-affiliated demonstrators.[379]

Role of Third Parties *(continued from previous page)*

On November 7, Prime Minister al-Kadhimi survived an assassination attempt after two quadcopter UAVs attacked his residence in Baghdad, injuring several guards.[380] The DIA said no group has claimed responsibility for the attack, but noted the attack followed days of militia-led protests. The DIA also noted that at the November 6 funeral held for the protesters, Qays al-Khazali, the Secretary General of the Iran-aligned militia Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, warned the prime minister would be held accountable for their deaths, suggesting that his group possibly conducted the attack. Other Iran-aligned militias also blamed al-Kadhimi for the violence and demonstrator deaths.[381] The DIA reported that the Iranian government condemned and denied any role in the assassination attempt.[382]

The DIA reported that following the incident, the prime minister pledged to pursue those responsible, while calling for calm and restraint. The prime minister also labeled the attack an act of terrorism, a characterization repeated by Iraqi President Barham Salih. The DIA said the attack underscores the risk of further violence as the Iraqi government formation process moves forward.[383]

According to the DIA, immediately after the failed assassination attempt, the Iraqi government heightened security and deployed special forces around the International Zone and adjacent neighborhoods. The security forces remained in the International Zone to deter any additional assassination attempts and respond to any future protests, redeploying after the threat subsided.[384] The DIA assessed that the Iraqi government almost certainly did not pursue accountability for the assassination attempt to avoid disrupting the government formation process.[385]

IRAQI GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER THE MILITIAS REMAINED TENUOUS

According to the DIA, the Iraqi government's ability to assert control over the Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC) or hold its affiliated militias accountable remained tenuous, with no noticeable change during the quarter. The Iraqi government did not issue orders for the ISF to directly challenge or confront Iran-aligned militias this quarter.[386] The DIA said the PMC continued to demonstrate its ability to exert influence in Iraq's judicial process through the use of intimidation tactics to stymie investigations and rely on sympathetic judges to have cases dismissed.[387]

Iran and Iran-aligned militias continue to have strong ties to some elements of Iraq's traditional security forces, the DIA said. In 2005, many former Badr Corps military officers affiliated with the Badr Organization were integrated primarily into the MoI, and some into the MoD, retaining their ranks and often experiencing rapid promotions due to their political ties. The DIA said that while the MoI's Federal Police and Emergency Response Division, and the Iraqi Army's 5th and 8th Divisions are the units thought to have the greatest Iranian influence, officers sympathetic to Iranian or militia interests are scattered throughout the security services.[388]

The DIA assessed that most ISF units remained committed to the Iraqi government and continued to follow orders from the prime minister in his role as commander-in-chief. The DIA said this probably leaves Iran-aligned militias with limited ability to shape ISF decision-making. Rather, Iran-aligned militias attempt to intimidate ISF units through information campaigns used to threaten security forces to stay away from Coalition forces, offset real world weaknesses, and create false narratives in the case of defeats.[389]

POLITICS AND ECONOMY

The DoS said that its principal objective is to support a sovereign, stable, united, and democratic Iraq that is a partner of the United States and able to fend off internal and external threats. The DoS coordinates traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy programs to ensure stability and enable reconstruction. The DoS said that such strong U.S. Government engagement is necessary to combat malign foreign influence, particularly from Iran. The DoS supports Iraqi efforts to ensure a more responsive government and to reduce corruption. The United States also seeks to support private sector-led economic growth and job creation to address the region's persistent high unemployment, including among young people, and seeks to support civil society groups so that they can operate freely.[390]

GOVERNANCE

Sadrists Gain in Parliamentary Election

Figure 6.

2021 Parliamentary Election Results by Party

On October 10, Iraqis went to the polls to elect all 329 members of the Iraqi parliament. The elections were held months ahead of schedule in response to protestor demands. The DoS reported that Iraq's Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) executed technically sound elections with extensive support from the international community, including substantial USAID support through the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, a

Sources: DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) monitoring mission, and significant UN technical electoral assistance.[391]

Muqtada al-Sadr's Sadrist Bloc won more than one-fifth (73) of the seats in parliament, an increase from 54 seats won in the 2018 election.[392] (See Figure 6.) The election results shocked many in Iraq's Shia political establishment. While former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law coalition strengthened its political base, increasing its seats by one-third, the National State Forces bloc, led by Hikma Movement leader Ammar al-Hakim and former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, lost nearly all of the seats that it won in 2018. The Iran-aligned Fatah Alliance also suffered significant losses, losing two-thirds (31) of its seats. The Sunni parties, led by Speaker al-Halbousi's Taqaddum Party, and the Kurdish parties, led by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), increased their shares of seats in the new parliament.[393]

Parties Challenge Election Results

After the IHEC announced preliminary election results on October 12, demonstrators affiliated with Iran-aligned parties that lost seats filled the streets of Baghdad that lead to the International Zone where Iraqi government buildings, the U.S. Embassy, and other foreign embassies are located. The demonstrators claimed the government had rigged the elections. At times, the demonstrations turned violent. On November 5, the demonstrators attempted to enter the International Zone, leading to a confrontation during which two militia-affiliated demonstrators were killed.[394]

The "Coordination Framework," consisting of Shia political parties that lost seats, contested the election results. The framework consisted of Fatah Alliance, the Hikma Movement, State of Law Coalition, and political wings of armed militias.[395] The framework accused UNAMI of rigging the election results. In response, UNAMI Special Representative Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert assured Iraqi voters and the international community that the parliamentary elections were conducted in a fair and free manner.[396] According to media reports, Special Representative Hennis-Plasschaert met with the Coordination Framework leaders in mid-November.[397] On November 26, Special Representative Hennis-Plasschaert briefed the UN Security Council on the success of the elections.[398]

The IHEC spent nearly 2 months reviewing the election results, including 1,436 appeals.[399] The DoS said that the appeals resulted in recounts at 870 individual polling stations.[400] The final election results, announced on November 30, did not produce significant changes, despite pressure from Iran-aligned militias to change the results in their favor. The review resulted in changes to only 5 parliamentary seats in Ninewa, Erbil, Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Basrah provinces.[401]

On December 27, Iraq's Federal Supreme Court ratified the final election results. The ratification had been delayed while the court considered a lawsuit from Fatah Alliance leader Hadi al-Amiri, whose party lost nearly two-thirds of their seats, to invalidate the election results. The lawsuit claimed that the elections were rife with irregularities and fraud. After the court rejected Fatah's challenge, Hadi al-Amiri stated their commitment to the court's decision despite the "deep and firm belief" that the election "had been tainted by fraud and manipulation."[402] Hezbollah Brigades, a pro-Iran militia, announced it would boycott efforts to form a new government.[403]

Muqtada al-Sadr's Sadrist Bloc won more than one-fifth (73) of the seats in parliament, an increase from 54 seats won in the 2018 election.

The Process of Government Formation

Ratification of the election results on December 27 was just the beginning of the task of forming a new government. Iraq's 2005 Constitution requires the new parliament to meet within 15 days from the date the Federal Supreme Court ratifies the election results to elect a new speaker.[404] The new Iraqi Parliament held its first session on January 9 and reelected Mohamed al-Halbousi speaker for a second term.[405] While the constitution sets specific deadlines to establish a new government, it was not possible, at the end of the quarter, to predict when the new government would be formed. Following the 2010 elections, it took 8 months for a new government to be formed. After the 2018 elections, it took 5 months.[406]

After the speaker is elected, the parliament elects a president, who will serve as head of state. The winning candidate must receive at least two-thirds of the members' votes. If no candidate receives this super majority, then the two candidates with the highest number of votes will compete, and the winner with a simple majority will become president.[407] The constitution requires the new president, within 15 days of election, to name as Prime Minister-designate the nominee of the largest political bloc in the parliament. The Prime Minister-designate has 30 days to name the members of his Council of Ministers, who are then approved by the parliament to form the new government. If the Prime Minister-designate fails to meet this deadline, the president is tasked with naming a new Prime Minister-designate.[408]

Iraqi Government, DoS Continue Anticorruption Efforts

Iraq ranked 157 out of 180 countries on Transparency International's 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index.[409] During the quarter, polling by the International Republican Institute indicated that corruption was among the highest concerns of Iraqis, attributed in part to their perceived lack of governmental control and oversight.[410] Corruption is deeply systemic and politically sanctioned. According to the DoS, many political party leaders have a vested interest maintaining the status quo to keep corruption flourishing.[411]

The DoS reported extensively during the quarter on reinvigorated efforts by the Iraqi government to counter corruption in the previous year. Finance Minister Ali Allawi has attempted to address Iraq's pervasive corruption through his white paper, adopted by the Iraqi parliament in October 2020, calling for banking and financial management reforms to reduce corruption. On November 20, Minister Allawi singled out border customs as "riddled with corruption;" local customs clerks are often bought off with bribes and very little revenue reaches the Ministry of Finance.[412] Some laws to combat corruption were already in place, such as an anti-money laundering law and a law governing the Integrity Commission.[413]

While participating in the virtual Summit for Democracy, hosted by the U.S. Government on December 9 and 10, counter-corruption reform was the central pillar of Iraq's presentation.[414] The embassy's current engagement with the Iraqi government on corruption reform stemmed from conversations initiated by Prime Minister al-Kadhimi with Ambassador Tueller on the margins of the 2020 Strategic Dialogue.[415] The DoS said that Mission Iraq has engaged the Iraqi government, civil society, and others, providing $57 million annually to support anticorruption efforts. During the quarter, Mission Iraq continued these efforts, providing

guidance on legal reforms, standardizing contracting and business processes, strengthening citizen oversight, and providing training across a spectrum of Iraqi institutions to provide transparency and accountability.[416]

Mission Iraq also continued initiatives to improve transparency in Iraqi institutions. For example, the embassy's Economic Section supported legislative reform in areas such as customs, renewable energy, and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region's investment law and company law. In addition, the DoS funded an online single-window system that enabled the Global Entrepreneurship Network to launch an online business registration system to ease new business registration while cutting out corruption opportunities. The DoS funded the Fiscal Transparency Funds to provide training on budget administration and best practices with the Ministry of Finance. The embassy also supported a program focused on training for corruption prosecutions, working with ministries to improve the technical capacity of the Commission of Integrity, the Federal Board of Supreme Audit, key law enforcement entities, MoI, and the Office of the Prosecutor General.[417]

The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad said that it plans to encourage incremental steps to modernize procurement, financial and payroll systems, and adhering to international accounting standards. It also plans to step up efforts to engage the Iraqi parliament on legislation to support implementation of measures to counter corruption. The DoS plans to expand U.S.-funded technical capacity efforts tied to Iraq's courts and their investigative counterparts in both the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and the rest of federal Iraq.[418] A cultural shift, accompanied by significant policy reforms, is needed in Iraq to better combat corruption. The embassy said this will take significant time, effort, and political will, and it will press the Iraqi government on ways the U.S. Government can support these efforts.[419]

BUDGET AND ECONOMY

Economic Outlook Brightens but with Risks

During 2021, Iraq's economic outlook improved as world oil markets recovered. Iraqi gross domestic product (GDP) grew 2.6 percent in 2021, according to the World Bank.[420] Iraq's government is dependent on oil sales to fund the state-run economy. Over the past decade, oil has accounted for 85 percent of the Iraqi government's budget and 42 percent of Iraq's GDP.[421] In 2021, oil continued to be the main driver of GDP growth. The World Bank expects that to continue as OPEC+ phases out its production quotas. The World Bank projected that Iraq's GDP would grow more than 6 percent in 2022 and 2023.[422] Higher oil prices throughout 2021 boosted Iraq's central bank reserves to $64 billion in mid-December, according to Iraqi Central Bank Governor Mustafa Ghalib.[423]

During the quarter, government revenues from oil exports were robust, although December's monthly revenues decreased 7.5 percent compared to November after the price per barrel of oil dropped below $70 for the first time since August. Average daily revenues during the quarter were $242.7 million per day compared to the 2021 budget projection of $146.25 million per day.[424] (See Figure 7.)

Over the past decade, oil has accounted for 85 percent of the Iraqi government's budget and 42 percent of Iraq's GDP.

Figure 7.

Actual vs. Projected Daily Oil Revenue, Monthly Average, 2021, in $ Millions

Sources: Iraq Ministry of Oil, website, "Historical Summary," 1/6/2022; John Lee, "Iraq Oil Exports Flat for December," Iraq Oil and Gas News, 1/3/2022.

Severe water shortages and widespread electricity outages that affected the agriculture and industrial sectors slowed growth in 2021. The World Bank said it is critically important that Iraq deal with its serious water scarcity and water quality issues, as a further drop in water supply and consequential crop yields could produce a dramatic decline in real GDP.[425]

Iraqi Government Transfers Funds to KRG

The DoS reported that on December 12, the Iraqi government transferred $138 million to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Ministry of Finance. This is the fifth payment since KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani struck a pre-election agreement with Prime Minister al-Kadhimi in June 2021 to transfer funds from the Iraqi government to the KRG. According to the DoS, the budget transfers help pay public sector employees and workers in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. The payments fall outside the 2021 budget law, which requires the KRG to transfer to the central government 250,000 barrels per day in exchange for a fixed share of 12.6 percent of the federal budget. These terms were not adhered to in 2021, and it is not clear if the ad hoc budget transfers will continue in 2022.[426]

In the absence of a sitting parliament and with government formation at the beginning stage, the 2022 national budget negotiations were on hold during the quarter. In the meantime, Iraq's ministries continued to operate with funds set at the levels of the 2021 budget.[427]

IRAQI DIPLOMACY

Iraqi Government Engages Regional Neighbors

The October 10 election and its aftermath consumed much of the Iraqi government's attention during the quarter, as matters of state and governance unrelated to the election mostly ground to a halt. However, the Iraqi government was able to focus some attention on regional diplomatic issues.[428]

Media reported that Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi was in direct contact with the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud to facilitate the diplomatic repatriation of Iran's ambassador to Yemen. According to a media report, the ambassador's flight from Yemen would not have happened without a rare exemption from the air blockade enforced by a Saudi-led coalition. Media sources also reported the evacuation flight was agreed to after discussions between Saudi authorities and authorities from Iraq and Oman.[429]

According to media sources, Hassan Irloo, the Iranian ambassador to Yemen, who is alleged to be an officer in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, was evacuated to Tehran on December 18. There were conflicting reports claiming the evacuation was for humanitarian reasons because he was suffering from coronavirus disease–2019 (COVID-19). It was reported that Saudi Arabia agreed that Ambassador Irloo could be evacuated only to Iraq or Oman as a transition location before proceeding to Iran. The evacuation took place on an Iraqi airplane with Iraq acting as an intermediary.[430]

The media also reported that a fifth round of talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Baghdad was temporarily postponed pending formation of the new Iraqi government. The fourth round of talks was held in Baghdad in late September when the parties discussed a roadmap going forward addressing bilateral and regional issues.[431]

During the quarter, the Iraqi government began diplomatic efforts to facilitate the voluntary return of Iraqi migrants seeking to migrate to the European Union who had been drawn to Europe by trafficking organizations and were trapped at the border between Belarus and Poland. The KRG estimated that about half the people—between 7,500 and 8,000— who had amassed on the border were from the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. Iraqi Kurds told reporters that they left their homes due to deteriorating economic conditions exacerbated by corruption, nepotism, and the influx of refugees from Syria, which have led to higher unemployment rates.[432]

STABILIZATION

Since the 2017 territorial defeat of ISIS in Iraq, the U.S. Government has sought to accelerate restoration of essential services in liberated areas of Iraq that suffered devastation during ISIS occupation and the conflict that followed. In addition, the DoS said the United States assists ethnic and religious minority communities and supports programs that help internally displaced persons (IDP) return safely and voluntarily to their homes of origin or settle in other destinations of their choosing. The U.S. Government seeks to establish stability in Iraq so that the Iraqi government can suppress future insurgencies and violent extremist organizations at the local government and law enforcement levels.[433]

During the quarter, the Iraqi government began diplomatic efforts to facilitate the voluntary return of Iraqi migrants seeking to migrate to the European Union who had been drawn to Europe by trafficking organizations and were trapped at the border between Belarus and Poland.

USAID predicted that the transition of U.S. troops to an advise, assist, and enable role would have minimal impact on the profile and standing of its programs and that logistical support would continue. USAID said that it will work with its implementers to monitor whether additional security concerns arise due to implementers' association with the U.S. Government.[434]

ESSENTIAL SERVICES

U.S. Government Supports Ibn al-Khatib Hospital Renovations

On December 19, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the USAID Iraq Mission Director participated in a ribbon-cutting ceremony for the reopening of a ward, funded by USAID, at the Ibn al-Khatib hospital.[435] The ceremony included a brief memorial ceremony for the victims of a fire at the hospital in April that killed more than 80 people. In July, another fire broke out in the COVID-19 isolation ward of the al-Hussein hospital in Nasiriyah.[436] USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) provided a grant of $560,000 to the American Medical Student Association–Iraq Chapter following the Ibn al-Khatib hospital fire to support hospital reopening efforts, create a memorial for the victims, and improve the safety and medical services in COVID-19 facilities.[437]

In media reports, Iraqi officials stated that corruption is endemic in the health system, and Iraq's anticorruption commission routinely reports allegations of malfeasance in medical equipment procurement. During the quarter, according to media reports, officials in multiple provinces were under investigation for improper procurement of scanning devices.[438] According to one report, public contract profits are inflated by under delivering on the service or product, overcharging, or both.[439]

A December report from a German think tank argued that political control of the healthcare system compromises safety at hospitals in Iraq due to corruption in procurement, evasion of quality control, and maximization of profits.[440] According to the report, government officials blamed the fires on patients' families for overcrowding the hospital wards, smoking, and bringing in privately purchased oxygen tanks.[441] In interviews, some COVID-19 patients and families described the extent to which they avoided hospitals due to lack of trust and perceptions of poor quality.[442] However, government officials also admitted that the two hospitals which experienced fires were not constructed or maintained safely. For example, months before the fire in the al-Hussein Hospital, a routine engineering report identified a leak in the oxygen supply as well as other structural vulnerabilities, but no action was taken.[443]

DISPLACED PERSONS

Iraqi Government Reclassifies One of Two Remaining Formal IDP Camps in Federal Iraq

From mid-October 2020 through October 2021, the Iraqi government closed 47 internally displaced person (IDP) camps leaving open only 2 camps in federal Iraq outside the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. The closures were made without advance notice to, or prior coordination

From mid-October 2020 through October 2021, the Iraqi government closed 47 internally displaced person (IDP) camps leaving open only 2 camps in federal Iraq outside the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.

with, the humanitarian community, resulting in protection concerns for the more than 45,000 individuals affected by the closures. On November 10, the Amriyat al-Fallujah camp in Anbar province was declared "closed" and reclassified by the government of Iraq from a formal IDP camp to an informal site.[444] USAID reported that a September analysis found that camp reclassifications continue to place many IDPs at risk of forced or premature departure and secondary displacement.[445]

Approximately 1,270 individuals resided in the Amriyat al-Fallujah camp at the end of the quarter. The DoS reported that many lack the security clearances issued by Iraqi government that are needed to leave.[446] According to USAID, options available to IDPs sheltering in the camp following the reclassification depended on whether their households had a security clearance issued by the Iraqi government. Households with a security clearance could either return to their areas of origin or locally integrate in an area other than where they originated. Households that lack security clearances or are unable to return to areas of origin can remain in the now informal camp settlement. According to USAID, households in the latter category without security clearances face additional vulnerabilities compared to other groups of IDPs.[447]

On December 15 the Iraqi Minister of Migration and Displacement announced the intention to close the Jeddah 5 camp—the last remaining camp in federal Iraq—in coordination with the KRG.[448] USAID reported that, as of the end of the quarter, the closure process had not yet begun.[449] Approximately 4,900 people lived in the Jeddah 5 camp at the end of the quarter.[450] USAID and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that an additional 25 IDP camps hosting 180,000 individuals remained open in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region as of November.[451] Media reporting indicated that while the Iraqi government asked the KRG to close IDP camps under its control, KRG officials stated they will not force IDPs to return home.[452] According to another media report, the Minister of Migration stated that the implementation of the Sinjar Normalization Agreement was necessary as a prerequisite to closing the IDP camps in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.[453]

USAID is aware that the Iraqi government—particularly through the Sunni Endowment—has expanded incentives for IDPs to leave both the Amriyat al-Fallujah and Jeddah 5 camps. This has focused the attention of the humanitarian community on the conditions of informal sites where residents face living conditions of varying levels of quality and access to services.[454] The Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster—the UN-led coordination mechanism that ensures IDPs living in displacement sites have equitable access to assistance and services—found that approximately 103,000 individuals were sheltering in nearly 480 informal sites in Iraq as of September, which does not include Amriyat al-Fallujah camp populations.[455] USAID reported that in both the Amriyat al-Fallujah and Jeddah 5 camps, implementers and relief agencies continued to coordinate and advocate for the Iraqi government to maintain minimum standards and ensure voluntary, safe, family-unit, informed, nondiscriminatory, durable, and dignified IDP returns.[456]

USAID reported that its implementers reported no significant impact on continued programming, despite the Amriyat al-Fallujah camp reclassification.[457] Implementers' programs and services in the Amriyat al-Fallujah and Jeddah 5 camps during the quarter included health, water, sanitation, and hygiene services; protection services; food assistance; and shelter activities.[458] During the reporting period, USAID reported that its implementers

USAID reported that a September analysis found that camp reclassifications continue to place many IDPs at risk of forced or premature departure and secondary displacement.

supported basic primary healthcare in the camps, including outpatient curative consultations, treatment of communicable and noncommunicable diseases, reproductive health consultations, provision of essential medicines, emergency services, and referrals for vaccination, nutrition and secondary specialized services, and training of medical staff and equipment to prepare and respond to COVID-19 in Iraq.[459]

USAID also supported winterization activities in the camps, including installing roofs over exterior baking sites, stabilizing tents, and placing sandbags. These activities were implemented to prepare for the winter season and to mitigate risks related to floods.[460]

Jeddah 1 Camp Continues to Receive Iraqi Repatriations from al-Hol

The Iraqi government has continued to repatriate Iraqi families from the al-Hol displaced persons camp in Syria to the Jeddah 1 camp in Ninewa province. On December 8, it repatriated an additional 128 families (507 individuals).[461] The December returns follow the repatriation of 117 Iraqi households in late September and 93 households in May from al-Hol. With the early December repatriations, 338 of the initial 500 "pre-Baghuz" households cleared by the Iraqi government have returned to Iraq from al-Hol.[462] As of December 10, approximately 70 families had departed the Jeddah 1 camp in Iraq for their home communities.[463]

During the quarter, the Iraqi government took over the lead in camp management for Jeddah 1 camp.[464] A USAID-funded implementer provided mental health and psychosocial support to returned individuals upon their arrival to Jeddah 1, while other teams delivered key messages, conducted protection monitoring, and worked to identify the most vulnerable IDPs and link them to available services.[465]

Throughout the summer and early fall, USAID reported that heightened security restrictions were put in place. In response, UN and NGO representatives urged the Iraqi government to ensure that all camps remain humanitarian in nature. According to USAID, this concerted engagement has led to reduced restrictions and lowered tensions.[466]

While no consolidated rehabilitation program has been disclosed by the Iraqi government, USAID reported that the humanitarian community has expressed some concerns about Iraqi government proposals to conduct rehabilitation programming for non-ISIS-affiliated returnees from al-Hol.[467] The Iraqi government, through its Office of National Security Advisor, established an "experts committee" tasked with assessing the radicalization risk of the Jeddah 1 camp returnees and designing a deradicalization and rehabilitation program; however, the committee did not design or complete any such program in 2021. According to USAID, the international humanitarian community does not endorse this approach; the humanitarian community and USAID will track the findings and recommendations of this committee.[468]

The DoS said that though many Iraqi communities reacted negatively to the initial rumors about the repatriations from al-Hol, the Iraqi government proceeded with repatriations discreetly during the quarter, and there have been no visible adverse reactions. Since the initial repatriations, several high-level Iraqi government officials publicly stated that the

With the early December repatriations, 338 of the initial 500 "pre-Baghuz" households cleared by the Iraqi government have returned to Iraq from al-Hol.

people in Syria currently designated for repatriation have security clearances. However, there has been no widespread public information campaign in support of these people. For their part, families of the returned individuals have been visiting the newly open visitor's center in the Jeddah 1 camp and have indicated that they would like their family members to return home.[469]

DoS PRM Provides Support to Returnees

During the quarter, the DoS Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) supported NGO and international organization programs that work to assist returnees, displaced persons, and broader communities with humanitarian and protection assistance, durable solutions, and the reintegration process. Notably, DoS PRM supported IOM's Community Revitalization Program, which works to improve the conditions for dignified and voluntary durable solutions through returns, local integration, and settlement in new locations, while also supporting efforts to prevent additional climate-induced displacement in Iraq. In locations of displacement, both in camp or out-of-camp locations, IOM worked to assess the intention of IDPs to return, provide information on conditions in areas of return or relocation, identify main barriers to return, and to provide targeted services, which may include civil documentation and legal assistance, social cohesion support, financial assistance, health consultations, and protection monitoring to assess safety, freedom of movement, and other protection concerns. In communities of return, integration, or relocation, and in communities where returnees are living in severe conditions, IOM also provided multi-sectoral assistance and services—such as shelter, rehabilitation of homes, and cash-for-work assistance—through an area-based approach aimed at reducing identified barriers to returns and at increasing the likelihood of successful reintegration of IDPs.[470]

> **The DoS said that the chief concerns among IDPs, refugees, returnees, and persons at risk of statelessness across Iraq continued to be the lack of security, lack of social cohesion, unavailable or uninhabitable shelter, and the absence of basic services.**

The DoS said that the chief concerns among IDPs, refugees, returnees, and persons at risk of statelessness across Iraq continued to be the lack of security, lack of social cohesion, unavailable or uninhabitable shelter, and the absence of basic services. Most individuals affected by displacement were living on daily wages, and the movement restrictions have significantly affected their ability to make ends meet.[471]

Lack of civil documentation, ongoing IDP camp closures, and the shortage of adequate assistance to camps are all major barriers to meeting the needs of IDPs. A lack of civil documentation for IDPs and returnees from Syria, particularly for children of women forcibly married to ISIS fighters, is a critical barrier that prevents access to services and leads to individuals potentially being considered "stateless." The IDP camp closures and reclassification of camps to "informal settlements" have led to further protection concerns for IDPs from residual ISIS influence in Iraq, including risk of secondary displacement and potential barriers to accessing services or assistance.[472]

USAID OTI Initiates Second Phase of the Iraq Regional Program

During the quarter, USAID OTI initiated the second phase of the Iraq Regional Program.[473] The first phase of the program, launched in September 2018, aimed to increase stability in Iraq by improving conditions that allowed for durable returns—returns that are safe,

dignified, and voluntary and that allow displaced populations to reintegrate or resettle—in areas liberated from ISIS and by mitigating discrete challenges that threatened overall stability in Iraq.[474] The primary objectives in the first phase of the program were to improve the delivery of public services prioritized by communities, to expand livelihoods, and to improve social conditions.[475] As of December 2021, the first phase of the Iraq Regional Program is formally closed and all activities completed. Since its inception, USAID OTI implemented 358 activities, partnering with 159 local organizations. The majority of activities were implemented in Western Anbar, Mosul, the Ninewa Plain, and Sinjar.[476]

The second phase of the Iraq Regional Program will focus on improving stability in Iraq by increasing perceptions of equity and inclusion and by reducing polarization and division in strategic, marginalized communities. USAID OTI reported that the activities, which are expected to begin in January 2022, will occur primarily in Dhi Qar, Western Anbar, Mosul, and Sinjar as a continuation of some phase one program activities. In the second phase, USAID OTI will continue to partner with faith-based groups, civil society organizations, and local governments to provide equitable, responsive public services, expand livelihoods, increase opportunities for civic engagement, and counter disinformation and divisive rhetoric. It will also expand activities into Dhi Qar, Baghdad, Basrah, and other areas as security and needs allow.[477]

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

According to the United Nations, 2.5 million people in Iraq are in acute need of humanitarian assistance. USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) provides assistance to Iraqis affected by conflict, including those displaced by violence, by providing life-saving aid, including food assistance, water, sanitation and hygiene, shelter, and emergency healthcare services.[478] DoS PRM provides assistance to vulnerable refugees and displaced persons. (See Table 7.)

Embassy Renews Complex Emergency Declaration

In early December, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq renewed the complex emergency disaster declaration in Iraq, citing continued complex humanitarian conditions, insufficient response capacity in Iraq, the Iraqi government's willingness to accept U.S. Government assistance, and the United States' ongoing interest in providing humanitarian assistance.[479]

The United Nations estimated that approximately 2.5 million Iraqis will remain in need in FY 2022, including 960,000 people in acute need.[480] In addition, the DoS reported that nearly 1.2 million people remained displaced during the quarter. Returns to areas of origin were hindered by the continued lack of security, damaged homes and infrastructure, and a lack of social cohesion.[481] Additional challenges include the movement of refugees from Syria's al-Hol camp to Iraq's Jeddah 1 camp, increasing drought conditions, and water scarcity throughout Iraq.[482]

The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad reported that in FY 2022 USAID BHA will provide more targeted life-saving and life-sustaining humanitarian assistance to vulnerable Iraqi IDPs and Syrian refugees in camps and informal settlements based on independent needs

The United Nations estimated that approximately 2.5 million Iraqis will remain in need in FY 2022, including 960,000 people in acute need.

Table 7.

DoS- and USAID-funded Humanitarian Assistance Activities During the Quarter

DoS PRM	
Implementer	**Activity**
UNHCR, the UN refugee agency	Promoted and protected the rights of refugees, provided material assistance, and sought durable solutions for refugees and coordinates the humanitarian response for IDPs.
IOM	Collected data on displacement, conditions in areas of return, needs, and vulnerabilities to support a data-driven policy and operational response.
Various NGOs and international organizations	Increased access to education for displaced school-aged children, a key need for refugee, returnee, and IDP families.
	Programs to reduce risk for refugees and IDPs, including gender-based violence prevention and response activities and legal assistance and awareness-raising to remove legal barriers to durable solutions for displacement-affected individuals.
	For the restoration of income-generating and livelihoods opportunities, provided services in the agricultural sector, training to develop key business knowledge and skills, cash grants for enterprise start-ups, and legal assistance services.
USAID	
Implementer	**Activity**
Various NGOs and international organizations, including UN agencies	Provided protection services to women and girls, including through three Women and Girls Community Centers in Ninewa and one in Kirkuk.
	Provided legal services in the form of legal and administrative counseling and representation before courts and administrative bodies in multiple districts of the Ninewa and Salah ad Din provinces.
	Provided both water trucking services and solid waste management services, benefiting 3,050 and 22,297 individuals, respectively, in October.
	Conducted hygiene promotion activities that reached a total of 16,026 individuals and distributed multi-purpose cash assistance to a total of 1,237 households.
	Provided winterization activities to prepare for the winter season and flooding risk, including installation of roofs over exterior baking sites and tent stabilization and sandbagging.
	Provided cash-based food assistance to IDPs in various locations.

Sources: DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

assessments, and it will also advocate for programs and approaches that emphasize the relief-to-development transition in coordination with interagency partners, UN agencies, and NGOs. In line with decreasing humanitarian needs, the programs will prioritize the transition to local authorities and stabilization and development organizations.[483] In addition, USAID BHA will continue to provide critical humanitarian assistance to IDPs and; emergency food assistance to food insecure IDPs and Syrian refugees, and support the Iraqi government's Public Distribution System for food rations. USAID BHA will continue to prioritize health, protection, water, sanitation, hygiene, food assistance, humanitarian coordination, information management, and assessments, and shelter and settlement sectors.[484]

Bureaucratic Challenges Remain Despite Improvements in Access Letter Process

USAID reported that several implementers paused humanitarian operations near Baghdad in early October in anticipation of election-related movement restrictions and security concerns. While the elections did not result in major security or humanitarian incidents, implementers experienced security-related delays in the post-election period due to protests and isolated security incidents.[485]

USAID reported that the streamlining of the Iraqi government's approval letter process, resulted in improved access for its implementing partners compared to earlier in the year.[486] As of November, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) reported that approximately two-thirds of the districts in Iraq's central and northern provinces were considered accessible with adequate resources and clearances for humanitarian organizations to reach populations in need.[487] However, USAID also reported that the humanitarian community is closely tracking other developments that occurred during the quarter which may indicate there are additional bureaucratic hurdles relating to access for implementing activities.[488]

On November 24, the Iraqi government published a circular that requires NGOs to validate any assessments or surveys with the Iraqi government before conducting them. The Iraqi government did not announce when this process of submitting surveys for approval is expected to start. DoS PRM expressed concern that with more than 300 NGOs registered in Iraq, the requirement could result in significant programmatic delays and limit the quality and quantity of assessments on which a successful humanitarian response must be based.[489] USAID reported that the NGO community is concerned that this requirement may undermine their independence and create practical impediments to timely program implementation. USAID stated that it is monitoring the situation and engaging implementers on any potential impact of this new requirement.[490]

WATER, SANITATION, AND HEALTH

Concerns About Water Shortages

Iraq's 2020–2021 rainy season produced one of the lowest rainfall totals in 40 years. A new report published by several international organizations expressed concern that water scarcity will have an impact on food security.[491] On October 16, the Iraqi government announced it would reduce its winter crop plan by 50 percent because of water scarcity and low water revenues.[492] According to a media report, the Ministry of Agriculture predicted the available water in dams and reservoirs could only irrigate approximately 250,000 hectares of land.[493]

Iraq's 2020–2021 rainy season produced one of the lowest rainfall totals in 40 years.

USAID reported dry private wells, limited water supply, diminished river levels, and sediment blockages in water treatment plants in some areas of Diyala, Dohuk, Ninewa, and Sulaymaniyah provinces.[494] On December 9, the IOM published new data that showed that more than 18,000 individuals (3,031 households) were experiencing displacement due to drought conditions across five provinces. More than 7 in 10 of these individuals had relocated to urban areas due to water scarcity and increased water salinity, jeopardizing sufficient and sustainable livelihoods.[495] According to USAID, the 2021 needs assessment

IRAQ: U.S. ASSISTANCE SNAPSHOT

October 1, 2021–December 31, 2021

Water scarcity in Iraq during the quarter exacerbated humanitarian concerns, including increased incidence of water-borne illnesses, food insecurity, and displacement among populations affected by ongoing drought conditions. Households often minimized hygiene practices and reduced water consumption as coping mechanisms. Iraq is ranked fifth most vulnerable globally to the effects of water scarcity and extreme temperatures.

IRAQ

During the quarter, one in two families in Anbar, Basrah, Dahuk, Kirkuk, Ninewa, Salah ad Din, and Dhi Qar provinces required food assistance because of drought conditions. More than 30 percent of wheat and barley farmers suffered crop failure and 37 percent of households lost livestock due to insufficient water, inadequate feed, or disease. As a result, monthly household income dropped below the survival threshold in six of the seven provinces.

ERBIL PROVINCE

Heavy rainfall in December produced flash floods that killed at least 11 people and caused extensive damage to buildings and infrastructure, especially in Qosh Tapa and Darto districts. 3,276 households filed damage claims, including 2,717 that reported losing all their possessions.

DHI QAR PROVINCE

International Organization for Migration (IOM)reported that 3,031 households in southern Iraq were displaced as of mid-November due to drought conditions, water scarcity, and increased salinity of agricultural water. Families from Dhi Qar province were most affected (1,374 households), followed by Maysan (728 households), Qadisiya (245 households), and Basrah (230 households).

DIYALA PROVINCE

More than 500 households in Diyala province were displaced in October due to water scarcity. Scarce water, sanitation, and hygiene services generated social tension between the displaced families and host communities.

2.5 million People in Need of Humanitarian Assistance OCHA–January 2022	**960,000** People in Acute Need OCHA–January 2022	**1.2 million** IDPs IOM–September 2021	**252,591** Syrian Refugees Sheltering in Iraq UNHCR–November 2021	**4.9 million** IDP Returns Since 2014 IOM–September 2021

COVID-19 VACCINE ROLLOUT

As of December 27, more than **14.1 million** COVID-19 vaccine doses had been administered. More than **14 percent** of the population was fully vaccinated.

Allocated (COVAX)

13,260,660

Doses Delivered

- COVAX/Global–AstraZeneca: **835,200**
- COVAX/Italy–AstraZeneca: **201,600**
- COVAX/USA–Pfizer/BioNTech: **503,100**
- COVAX/Global–Pfizer/BioNTech: **1,660,000**
- COVAX/Global–Other: **5,349,620**
- China–Sinopharm: **799,000**
- Pfizer/BioNTech (Procured): **100,000**
- Sinopharm (Procured): **1,000,000**
- Other (Procured) & Unknown: **5,074,810**

Sources: UN OCHA, "Iraq: Humanitarian Bulletin, October 2021," 11/29/2021; Embassy Baghdad, cable, "Iraq: Water Woes, Dependency on Fickle Neighbors Continue," 21 BAGHDAD 1872, 10/3/2021; Norwegian Refugee Council, "One in Two Families in Drought-affected Iraq Need Food Assistance," 12/16/2021; EPIC, "Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitor: December 9–16, 2021," 12/16/2021; EPIC, "Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitor: December 16–30, 2021," 12/30/2021; IOM, "DTM Emergency Tracking Climate-Induced Displacement—Southern Iraq," 12/9/2021; USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021; USAID, "Iraq—Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #1," 12/22/2021; UN OCHA, website, "Iraq Global Humanitarian Overview 2022," undated; WHO, "Iraq: WHO Coronavirus Disease Dashboard," 12/21/2021; UNICEF, "COVID-19 Vaccine Market Dashboard," 1/2/2022; UN OCHA, "COVID-19 Vaccine Doses in HRP Countries," 1/2/2022.

conducted by REACH, an NGO, found that the number of people in need of water, sanitation, and hygiene assistance tripled in Basrah province, doubled in Sulaymaniyah province, and increased by 20 percent in Diyala compared to the population in need of water, sanitation, and hygiene services in 2020.[496]

During the quarter, USAID supported improved water access and efficiency through several activities, including the provision of technical assistance to improve water management systems and the Water and Energy for Food grand challenge.[497] Announced in the fourth quarter of FY 2021, the $1.5 million program will support Iraq-based companies working to provide more sustainable water or energy solutions for agriculture.[498] In the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, USAID co-funded an activity to increase water efficiency in select district-metered areas. The activity engages communities and the corresponding KRG water directorate to identify and repair faults, damages, leaks, and illegal connections.[499]

The DoS reported that, during the U.S.–Iraq Strategic Dialogue talks in July, Iraqi government officials asked for U.S. assistance to rebuild and expand Iraq's water treatment infrastructure and mitigate rising salinity in the Shatt al-Arab River. However, the programs remain stalled because of pandemic-related travel restrictions.[500]

USAID reported that its implementers have not been directly affected by the water shortages, but they are conducting assessments and tracking the situation closely to ensure programming takes the evolving situation into account and does not exacerbate the crisis. USAID stated that many implementers, are drawing on in-house expertise to conduct assessments to evaluate the impact of the drought conditions on programming.[501]

COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Mass Vaccination Campaign Begins

The number of active COVID-19 cases in Iraq has declined according to World Health Organization (WHO) data provided to the embassy by the Iraqi Ministry of Health (MoH).[502] (See Figure 8.) On January 6, the MoH announced it had identified the first five cases of the Omicron variant in Iraq.[503]

As of December 27, more than 14.1 million vaccine doses had been administered and more than 14 percent of the population was fully vaccinated.

During the quarter the MoH, in collaboration with WHO, began a nationwide vaccination campaign, starting in Erbil and Baghdad and targeting over 12 million people aged 12 years and older.[504] As of December 27, more than 14.1 million vaccine doses had been administered and more than 14 percent of the population was fully vaccinated.[505] Although a majority of the population has not yet received a vaccination, Iraq approved booster doses of COVID-19 vaccines in early December.[506] The MoH stated that the number of vaccinated teens has reached 170,000, and it reaffirmed its hopes to vaccinate between 9 and 10 million people by the end of 2021.[507]

In November, Iraq received 2.9 million doses of the Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine through COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX), the global initiative to provide equitable access to vaccines.[508] Through December, COVAX delivered more than 8.5 million vaccine doses to Iraq.[509] A media source reported that Iraq also received 1 million vaccine doses from China during the quarter.[510]

Figure 8.

Total Confirmed COVID-19 Cases in Iraq, March 2020– December 2021, in Thousands

While confirmed cases during the quarter fell from the July 2021 peak, the DoS reported that the high level of COVID-19 transmission in Iraq continues to exacerbate vulnerabilities, strain an under-resourced health system, and impact livelihoods and food consumption.[511] COVID-19 continued to limit USAID activities, but implementers used flexible techniques, such as reaching the same number of beneficiaries through smaller workshops to limit attendance. However, staff infections delayed some activities.[512]

USAID Grants Seek to Counter COVID-19 Misinformation

During the quarter USAID provided $3 million in grants to WHO and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) to support the MoH's efforts to reduce COVID-19 morbidity and mortality, reduce transmission, and strengthen health systems, including preventing, detecting, and responding to pandemic threats.[513] WHO distributed brochures and posters on COVID-19 prevention to individuals at health facilities in displacement camps and plan to distribute to out-of-camp populations through mobile clinics and other supported health facilities.[514] WHO also launched awareness campaigns, including community and peer group discussions and community leader engagement to increase vaccine uptake.[515] WHO also directly provided primary health services, emergency medicine, chronic disease management, and mobile medical services.[516]

In addition, USAID BHA implementers began a program to counter the spread of misinformation and rumors about COVID-19. In Iraq, the program tracked rumors in camps and informal settlements, coordinated with organizations serving IDPs, and engaged with media organizations.[517] In addition, USAID BHA implementers combined

During the quarter, COVID-19 restrictions continued to significantly hamper the DoS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs law enforcement programming in Iraq.

multipurpose cash assistance with 15-minute messaging sessions related to COVID-19 prevention.[518] The implementers also helped health facilities deliver primary healthcare in the Jeddah 5 and the Amriyat al-Fallujah camp. Activities included reproductive health, emergency medicine, and training medical staff to respond to COVID-19.[519] The implementers also provided infection prevention and control, case management, and vaccine promotion in IDP camps and informal settlements.[520]

USAID BHA also supported WHO's External Quality Assessment Project which expands laboratory capacity by training laboratory technicians and supporting quality assurance testing.[521] By the end of summer 2021, nearly 50 laboratories were conducting COVID-19 tests with more than 200 PCR machines, whereas at the start of the epidemic only the central public health lab had the capacity to test for COVID-19.[522] With USAID BHA support, WHO also provided in-service training and mentoring among laboratory technicians working in health facilities that serve IDPs and hosting communities to strengthen diagnostic capacity.[523]

COVID-19 Affects U.S. Programs

The DoS said the effects of COVID-19 varied across and within its program areas. In some cases during the quarter, implementers held virtual events to mitigate COVID-19 concerns. In other cases, they postponed or delayed events or training until travel and gatherings were more feasible. Consequently, program offices maintained sliding schedules. Implementers also reported some delays in delivery of equipment which may have been caused by pandemic-related supply chain problems.[524]

During the quarter, COVID-19 restrictions continued to significantly hamper the DoS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) law enforcement programming in Iraq. Training sessions for one INL-funded project implemented by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), had to be rescheduled to take place in Turkey rather than Tunisia due to the countries' varying vaccine requirements for visitors. This change caused UNODC to regroup participants based on their vaccination status rather than the most effective configuration. Additionally, an INL-funded project being implemented by the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) continued to be paused as INL determines how to move forward strategically in the face of COVID-19-related obstacles. ICITAP had to relocate management of this project, as well as training, to the United States, resulting in only moderate success and added lengthy implementation delays.[525]

The DoS reported that the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor's (DRL) implementing partners successfully moved many in-person trainings and activities to virtual platforms. When deemed appropriate and safe, DRL was able to hold in-person activities. In addition, DRL has a team of in-country local staff monitors who have participated in those in-person activities, and Washington-based DRL staff has joined virtual activities whenever possible. As the pandemic continued, DRL and its implementing partners have designed hybrid programs that are able to adjust based on lockdown requirements.[526]

The DoS said that COVID-19 largely did not affect DoS Counterterrorism programs in Iraq during the quarter. Slight supply chain issues, largely caused by the pandemic, delayed the delivery of equipment for one DRL implementer working on a border security project.[527]

A U.S. Soldier conducts registration and calibration for an M777 A2 Howitzer weapon system in Syria. (U.S. Army photo)

SYRIA

SYRIA

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy–International Security Affairs
(OUSD(P) ISA) reported that the U.S. Government is focused on "practical and achievable
goals" in Syria.[528] These goals include preventing an ISIS resurgence, providing life-saving
humanitarian assistance, sustaining existing ceasefires, and supporting human rights and
accountability in order to create conditions for a comprehensive political resolution to the
Syrian conflict as outlined in UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254.[529]

SECURITY

Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) continued to work by,
with, and through vetted local partners in Syria to help them prevent an ISIS resurgence
during the quarter.[530] OUSD(P) ISA said that the presence of Coalition forces in Syria
enabled civilian-led humanitarian and stabilization efforts to address the underlying
grievances that facilitated ISIS's rapid expansion in the country.[531]

CJTF-OIR noted that it continued to operate in a very complex security environment in
Syria. (See page 71.) Coalition forces supported the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the
Eastern Syria Security Area (ESSA)—which includes parts of Hasakah and Dayr az Zawr
governorates east of the Euphrates River—and the Mughawir al-Thawra (MaT) forces in
the vicinity of the At Tanf Garrison near the convergence of the Syrian, Iraqi, and Jordanian
borders.[532]

CJTF-OIR said that Iran-aligned militia groups posed an increased security threat to U.S.
and Coalition forces and the OIR mission during the quarter. These actors continued to
harass Coalition forces by conducting unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and rocket attacks
against Coalition bases.[533] (See page 78.)

THE COMPLEX OPERATING ENVIRONMENT IN SYRIA

Multiple parties—including Coalition, SDF, Syrian regime, Russian, Turkish, and Iran-aligned forces—operate across central and eastern Syria, with rival forces sometimes operating in close proximity. While these forces conduct some counter-ISIS operations, their presence restricts SDF and Coalition movements and puts civilians at greater risk.


BASES
- Iran-aligned
- Russia
- Turkey
- United States

AREAS OF INFLUENCE
- ISIS Support Zones
- Pro-Regime
- SDF
- Turkish-supported Opposition
- United States and Coalition

BORDER PRESENCE
- Russia
- Syrian Army
- SDF
- Iran-aligned Militia
- Turkey and Turkish-supported Opposition
- United States and Coalition

Note: This map does not depict precisely or comprehensively bases or operation locations in Syria.

Sources: Institute for the Study of War, "Syria Situation Report: March 22–April 19, 2021," 4/22/2021; Fabrice Balanche, "The Assad Regime has Failed to Restore Full Sovereignty Over Syria," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2/10/2021; CJTF-OIR, vetting comment #Q12, 1/24/2022; NGA.

Sources: CJTF-OIR, press releases, "CJTF-OIR Strike Summary Report," 2/13/2020, 3/24/2020, 4/10/2021, 4/30/2020, 6/24/2020, 9/8/2020, 10/29/2020, 12/14/2020, 1/6/2021, 2/4/2021, 7/6/2021, 7/7/2021, 7/9/2021, 8/4/2021, and 9/20/2021.

COALITION ACTIVITY

Coalition Forces Continue to Conduct Operations with Local Partners

Coalition forces continued to advise, assist, and enable their local partners—the SDF and the MaT—in Syria during the quarter.[534] CJTF-OIR reported that Coalition forces, namely the Special Operations Joint Task Force-Levant (SOJTF-L), conducted only partnered counter-ISIS operations (no unilateral operations) in Syria during the quarter.[535]

CJTF-OIR reported that it continued to employ Bradley Fighting Vehicles in the ESSA to support stability operations, enhance force protection for Coalition forces, and maintain Coalition freedom of maneuver in the region.[536] CJTF-OIR said that the presence of these Bradley Fighting Vehicles in key population centers also inspires support for Coalition forces and deter ISIS activity in these areas.[537]

Figure 9.

Coalition Airstrikes in Syria, January 2020– December 2021

SELECTED KEY EVENTS, OCTOBER 1, 2021–DECEMBER 31, 2021

OCTOBER 18
In a major operation supported by the Coalition, the SDF arrests 22 ISIS suspects in Dayr az Zawr governorate.

NOVEMBER 8
The SDF disrupts a planned ISIS operation to break thousands of ISIS fighters out of an SDF detention facility, destroying a car bomb and capturing fighters.

OCT

NOV

OCTOBER 20
Five drones laden with explosives target U.S. forces in the vicinity of At Tanf Garrison in a suspected Iran-aligned militia attack.

NOVEMBER 13
ISIS claims responsibility for an ambush that kills 13 pro-government fighters in Dayr az Zawr governorate.

During the quarter, the SDF conducted 19 counter-ISIS operations, all of them Coalition-enabled.

CJTF-OIR did not provide information on airstrikes that it conducted in Syria during the quarter due to "competing priorities and staffing."[538] CJTF-OIR conducted many fewer airstrikes through August 2021—the last month for which data are available—compared to 2020.[539] (See Figure 9.)

During the quarter, news reporting about civilian casualties resulting from a March 2019 airstrike in Baghuz, Syria prompted the DoD to launch an investigation in to the strike.[540] The DoD said its investigation would include a review of 60 civilian casualties that resulted from the airstrike; compliance with the law of armed conflict; record-keeping and reporting procedures; previous investigations into the incident; whether mitigation measures were implemented effectively; and the appropriateness of accountability measures.[541]

SYRIAN DEMOCRATIC FORCES

SDF Sustains Counter-ISIS Operations, Demonstrates Increased Capability

During the quarter, the SDF conducted 19 counter-ISIS operations, all of them Coalition-enabled.[542] (See Figure 10.) CJTF-OIR said all of the operations required Coalition ISR before action on the target.[543] The SDF's operational tempo remained relatively steady compared to the previous quarter.[544] CJTF-OIR reported that these operations continued to limit ISIS's ability to reconstitute, move, and stage high-profile attacks in northeastern Syria.[545]

According to CJTF-OIR, the majority of SDF operations consisted of time sensitive raids on known ISIS attack cell personnel; raids to capture enemy weapons (including a vehicle-borne IED, suicide vests, and other material to be used against Coalition forces); and operations to disrupt illicit finance operations that further enable ISIS to sustain its operations.[546] SDF counter-ISIS operations also included disruption of smuggling networks, clearance operations, wide area security operations, and route clearance.[547] SDF operations during the quarter resulted in 2 ISIS members killed and 12 captured, CJTF-OIR said.[548]

In addition, the SDF continued to improve the staffing levels across its network of checkpoints.[549] The SDF conducted one wide area clearance operation during the quarter in

DECEMBER 8
Iraq repatriates 125 families—approximately 507 people—from the al-Hol displaced persons camp in Syria. Iraq also repatriates 100 suspected ISIS fighters held in SDF detention.

DECEMBER 13
Coalition aircraft shoots down drone "demonstrating hostile intent" as it was about to enter airspace around the Tanf garrison; a second drone turned around.

DEC

OCTOBER 1–DECEMBER 10
A total of 330 Syrians depart the al-Hol camp for Hasakah and Dayr az Zawr governorates.

DECEMBER 14
Russian aircraft launch a new series of airstrikes targeting ISIS caves and hideouts in Syrian desert.

Figure 10.

Number of SDF Operations by Quarter, October 2020–December 2021

Source: CJTF-OIR, vetting comment #Q16, 1/26/2021; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 21.2 OIR CLAR090, 4/14/2021; CJTF-OIR, vetting comment #C15, 10/20/2021; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 077 and 22.1 OIR 082, 12/22/2021.

the town of Zir, which CJTF-OIR said was a known ISIS safe haven.[550] While the operation resulted in questioning several individuals, it did not ultimately result in any captures of intended ISIS members.[551]

CJTF-OIR reported that the SDF's ability to plan and conduct unilateral counter-ISIS operations continued to improve during the quarter.[552] CJTF-OIR said the SDF "showed improved efficiency" in operations against ISIS in the Middle Euphrates River Valley outside the ESSA.[553] The SDF "successfully, and independently" accomplished capture/kill raids on IED cells and clearance operations in this area, CJTF-OIR said.[554] The SDF also demonstrated improvements in its ability to plan, contain objectives during operations, cordon explosives during site clearance for disposal by Coalition forces, and coordinate in order to follow individuals who flee.[555]

SDF partners also continued to receive training on how to prevent targets from fleeing, and how to secure detainees with minimal impact to the surrounding community. CJTF-OIR said that by working with organizations like the Roj Mine Control Organization, the SDF is able to dispose of explosive remnants of war safely following operations, which it said builds credibility among the population throughout the Middle Euphrates River Valley.[556]

SDF Continues to Rely on Coalition Intelligence

CJTF-OIR said that although the SDF remains capable of conducting targeted raids against ISIS, it continues to seek advanced capabilities. According to CJTF-OIR, the Hezen Anti-Terror (HAT) units—the primary strike force for the SDF's Internal Security Forces (InSF)—are capable of conducting targeted raids against mid-level ISIS fighters even when these operations are constrained by time.[557] CJTF-OIR said that the HAT is capable of

unilateral operations when Coalition forces provide intelligence support, and HAT personnel are eager to receive advanced training and equipment from Coalition forces.[558]

CJTF-OIR reported that the SDF Commandos—the SDF's premier counterterrorism strike force—are highly capable but exhibit some shortcomings.[559] CJTF-OIR did not specify the shortcomings. SDF Commando units can effectively conduct detention operations, maneuvers, patrols, and large-scale clearance operations.[560] According to CJTF-OIR, the SDF Commando units are eager and willing to learn from Coalition advisors.[561] CJTF-OIR noted that the SDF "finish forces" have improved overall capability but have limited opportunities to train consistently.[562]

The SDF continued to rely heavily on their human intelligence networks to independently gather information about ISIS because it lacks ISR collection capabilities.[563] CJTF-OIR noted that the SDF is likely incapable of operating and maintaining ISR systems; therefore, the SDF will likely continue to rely on partners for ISR collection in the future.[564] CJTF-OIR noted that once SDF personnel receive targeting information, they are able to interpret and act on the intelligence and coordinate further with Coalition forces.[565]

CJTF-OIR reported that although trust deficits among different SDF units are a persistent challenge, the SDF demonstrated an increased willingness to share information during the quarter.[566] CJTF-OIR noted that the SDF still does not have policies in place for safeguarding information outside of its own internal vetting of new recruits and current personnel.[567] However, CJTF-OIR said it appeared that the SDF's ability to safeguard information had improved.[568]

Coalition Forces Train the SDF to Operate Independently

CJTF-OIR reported that Coalition forces continued to emphasize to SDF leaders the value of mentoring, training, and educating their subordinates, as well as enabling them to accomplish basic tasks with little guidance.[569] Coalition advisors encouraged SDF trainers to use tools from basic soldier skills training to help trainees develop advanced soldiering skills.[570] CJTF-OIR said this training approach helps the SDF increase its independent training capabilities.[571]

CJTF-OIR noted that Coalition forces continued to train the SDF on marksmanship, use of heavy weapons, mounted maneuver, medical assistance, communications, and explosives ordnance disposal.[572] Coalition forces instructed the SDF through structured training activities as well as by advising them during operations.[573]

SDF Improves Training to Control Unrest at Detention Facilities

The SDF continued to maintain at least 14 detention facilities in the ESSA holding more than 10,000 ISIS detainees, including at least 2,000 foreign terrorist fighters and the rest Iraqis and Syrians.[574]

CJTF-OIR reported that the SDF made "great strides" in training to use nonlethal measures to control unrest at detention facilities this quarter.[575] CJTF-OIR said no ISIS detainee uprisings, riots, or escapes occurred at SDF detention facilities in northeastern Syria this

The SDF continued to maintain at least 14 detention facilities in the ESSA holding more than 10,000 ISIS detainees, including at least 2,000 foreign terrorist fighters and the rest Iraqis and Syrians.

quarter.[576] In November, the SDF foiled an ISIS plan to break its fighters out of the al-Sina'a detention facility in Hasakah governorate that is managed by the Provincial Internal Security Forces (PrISF).[577]

CJTF-OIR reported that the SDF's ability to manage detention facilities improved "moderately" during the quarter, partly because of additional equipment and training Coalition forces provided the SDF.[578] The SDF continued to mitigate the risk of detainee breakouts, thereby helping to prevent an ISIS resurgence.[579] The SDF's efforts to detain ISIS fighters also afforded the international community the "time and space" to develop appropriate diplomatic and humanitarian mechanisms to deal with ISIS detainees, CJTF-OIR said.[580]

CJTF-OIR continued to support the SDF with equipment transfers and resources aimed at improving the physical security of detention facilities, reducing overcrowding, enabling more humane conditions for detainees through the improvement of living conditions, and professionalizing the SDF guard force.[581] CJTF-OIR said that it continued to identify gaps in equipment that could be addressed through Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) assistance.[582]

CJTF-OIR reported that during the quarter, it continued training PrISF guards at both the Hasakah and Shaddadi detention centers, where more than half of ISIS fighters are held.[583] Coalition forces trained 200 PrISF guards in the ESSA during the quarter.[584] CJTF-OIR said that training in the use of pepper spray, riot shields, and batons has better prepared the SDF to quell riots and ensure the secure detention of ISIS detainees.[585]

The PrISF remain the primary internal security force providing security at SDF detention facilities.[586] Other SDF elements, including the InSF and the SDF Military Intelligence, support other detention centers.[587]

CJTF-OIR reported that Coalition partners continued construction and refurbishment efforts at the Hasakah facility during the quarter, although "local factors"—including relations between local authorities and international Coalition forces or non-governmental agencies, and security, logistics or weather issues—have caused a delay in completion until early 2022.[588]

CJTF-OIR also identified projects that require further investment, particularly the al-Houri Youth Detention Center and buildings at the Hasakah facility which detain youth.[589] CJTF-OIR said that projects at these locations would make conditions more humane and "as such, increase the safety and security" of their inhabitants.[590] Amnesty International reported during the quarter that the youth "rehabilitation centers" lack adequate access to food, water, or healthcare and diseases are "rampant."[591] CJTF-OIR said that funding to improve the youth facilities has yet to be apportioned through CTEF and contracted work has not yet begun.[592]

Critical Petroleum Infrastructure Guard Force Grows, Demonstrates Effectiveness

The DIA reported that critical fuel infrastructure and supply routes remained vulnerable to ISIS attacks during the quarter. ISIS claimed responsibility for setting an oil well on fire in November in southern Syria, conducted an IED strike on an oil tanker in Hasakah

In November, the SDF foiled an ISIS plan to break its fighters out of the al-Sina'a detention facility in Hasakah governorate that is managed by the Provincial Internal Security Forces (PrISF).

governorate during the same month, and in December, attacked a bus of oil workers in a Syrian regime-controlled portion of Dayr az Zawr governorate, killing 10 people.[593]

CJTF-OIR reported that SDF Critical Petroleum Infrastructure Guard (CPIG) forces continued to conduct patrols unilaterally during the quarter—without U.S. or Coalition forces—and they had no combat engagements.[594] CJTF-OIR said that the CPIG patrols successfully met two of its objectives: preventing sabotage and damage to critical petroleum infrastructure sites and collecting intelligence on surrounding areas. However, the CPIG continued to struggle with a third objective: preventing theft from the sites. CJTF-OIR said theft remained "a recurring issue" that the CPIG is attempting to address.[595]

CJTF-OIR reported that the CPIG added approximately 300 personnel during the quarter. Ninety new recruits—between 30 and 40 each month—were in training during the quarter.[596] CJTF-OIR did not provide the total number of CPIG personnel during the quarter. In July, CJTF-OIR reported that approximately 2,500 trained CPIG forces continued to be deployed to protect 64 oil infrastructure sites across the ESSA. Of those, 500 were posted in the northern ESSA, 500 in the central ESSA and 1,500 operated in the Dayr az Zawr area.[597]

CJTF-OIR reported that the CPIG force has the equipment required to arm, transport, and train the current force. CJTF-OIR identified shortcomings in fortification materials to build and reinforce defensive positions in and around CPI sites, including materials that had been requested for HESCO-type barriers—collapsible sand-filled wire mesh containers lined with heavy duty fabric—to reinforce infrastructure. CJTF-OIR said the CPIG is creating an inventory list of equipment needs and requests for Coalition forces.[598]

MUGHAWIR AL-THAWRA

MaT Forces Increase Capabilities, Continue Training and Patrols with Coalition Forces

CJTF-OIR reported that MaT forces continued to demonstrate increased capabilities to plan and conduct unilateral counter-ISIS operations in the vicinity of the At Tanf Garrison.[599]

CJTF-OIR reported that it conducted numerous joint operations and patrols with the MaT during the quarter in the vicinity of the At Tanf Garrison, including combined arms exercises.[600] The operations included capture/kill raids, route clearance, and wide area security.[601] CJTF-OIR said that during the quarter, there were no MaT operations involving exchanges of weapons fire.[602] However, MaT forces captured ISIS sympathizers, interdicted the smuggling of a drug cache of the amphetamine Captagon, and conducted three wide area security missions.[603]

As with the SDF, Coalition forces emphasized mentoring the MaT leadership to train and educate their subordinates to enable the accomplishment of basic tasks.[604] CJTF-OIR said that U.S. forces also continued training with the MaT, conducting drills, rehearsals, weapons firing, and maneuvering to improve MaT lethality.[605]

Role of Third Parties

Multiple actors continued to vie for influence in northeastern Syria during the quarter.[606] While the SDF conducted its counter-ISIS operations with Coalition support, Syrian regime, Russian, and Turkish forces, as well as Iranian forces other groups supported by Iran, all continued their own operations across the country, often operating in close proximity in northeastern Syria.[607] The DoS said that third-party forces, including Iranian forces, Iran-aligned militia groups, and Iran, its proxies, and other groups it supports threaten regional stability and the "security of our allies and partners."[608]

OUSD(P) ISA said that despite continued political pressure from Russia and military tensions with Turkey and Turkish-backed forces, the SDF maintained its focus on counter-ISIS operations during the quarter.[609]

THE SYRIAN REGIME, ITS RUSSIAN AND IRANIAN ALLIES, AND TURKISH FORCES FIGHT ISIS

The DIA reported that the Syrian regime continued to rely on allies in Syria, particularly Russia, to conduct counter-ISIS operations.[610] In the Syrian Desert, Russia continued to conduct airstrikes and coordinated with pro-regime ground operations against ISIS targets.[611] The DIA reported that despite its efforts, Russia failed to dislodge ISIS from the region or prevent attacks against pro-regime forces.[612]

The DIA said that while Iran-aligned forces operate across Syria to expand influence and safeguard their interests, they also continued to support counter-ISIS operations in the Dayr az Zawr governorate in northeastern Syria, in southwestern Syria near Damascus, and in strategic towns and villages along the Lebanese border.[613]

Turkey and Turkish-supported opposition groups also conducted operations against ISIS during the quarter in areas they control, according to media reports.[614] The DIA reported that according to Turkish media, Turkish intelligence assisted Iraq in the capture of senior ISIS leader Sami Jasim in northwestern Syria.[615]

THREAT TO U.S. AND PARTNER FORCES IN SYRIA FROM IRAN-ALIGNED GROUPS INCREASES

CJTF-OIR reported that Iranian forces and Iran-aligned militias posed an increased threat to Coalition personnel and local partners operating in Syria during the quarter. An October 20 attack on Coalition forces operating in the vicinity of the At Tanf Garrison illustrated this threat. The attack was "complex, coordinated, and deliberate," according to a USCENTCOM spokesperson. CJTF-OIR assessed that although the attack—which included the use of five Iranian UAVs—was similar to those carried out by Iran-aligned militias elsewhere in the region, it was the most sophisticated strike against Coalition forces in Syria to date.[616] According to the DIA, Iran-aligned militias conducted at least two other attacks against Coalition forces in Syria in 2021, but they resulted in no casualties.[617]

The DIA reported that Iran-aligned forces continued to support Syrian regime operations across Syria and continued to expand their freedom of movement, particularly in eastern Syria, under the pretext of conducting operations against ISIS. For example, Iran-aligned forces operated in Dayr az Zawr, which is critical to sustaining Iran's lines of communication from Iraq to its forces and partners in Syria and Lebanon. The DIA said that Iran maintains a military presence in Idlib and Aleppo governorates to ensure the Syrian regime maintains influence and safeguards Shia municipalities in northern Syria.[618]

To secure its transportation links from Iraq to Lebanon and expand its influence in the region, Iran and groups it supports continued to build relationships with Arab tribal communities in eastern Syria this quarter. The DIA said that Iran funds and trains local militias, including a newly formed tribal group

in eastern Syria called the Hashemiyoon Brigade. Tensions between Arab tribes and the SDF in the northeastern Syria provided Iran, its proxies, and other groups it supports opportunities to make further inroads into tribal areas. The DIA assessed that Iranian tribal recruitment and militia activity likely continue to pose an additional obstacle for the SDF by drawing SDF attention away from the counter-ISIS mission.[619]

RUSSIA INCREASES DECONFLICTION VIOLATIONS, AS SDF FORMS JOINT OPERATIONS ROOM WITH RUSSIA AND REGIME

CJTF-OIR reported that during the quarter, the Russian military committed an increased number of violations of the deconfliction protocols it has with Coalition forces to coordinate air and ground movements in Syria, compared with previous quarters.[620] CJTF-OIR said that the majority were ground violations, and that air violations dropped considerably compared to the previous quarter.[621]

CJTF-OIR noted that the majority of the Russian military ground violations posed no threat to Coalition forces, and Coalition forces continued to demonstrate "the willingness and ability" to project force by conducting mounted presence patrols.[622] In addition, CJTF-OIR said that Coalition forces conducted live fire exercises with artillery and close air support assets as well as daily engagement with the Russian military through the deconfliction channel, where Coalition forces are able to raise concerns and urge Russian forces to adhere to the mutual deconfliction processes.[623]

According to CJTF-OIR, Russian forces continued to focus military efforts on supporting pro-regime forces and creating an environment that puts pressure on the Coalition in Syria. The Russian military dedicates considerable energy to strategic messaging and information operations aimed at discrediting the Coalition and creating and validating its own image as a credible partner in the region, CJTF-OIR said.[624]

The DIA reported that Russia's disposition in northeastern Syria remained largely unchanged during the quarter. Russia bolstered its military presence in northeastern Syria following the 2019 Turkish incursion and the reduction of U.S. troops in Syria.[625] Since then, Russia has maintained multiple military police posts along the M4 highway that traverses northern Syria, including several near Ayn Issa. Qamishli airport continued to serve as Russia's primary logistics hub in northeast Syria.[626]

The DIA reported that in late October, the SDF announced the formation of a joint operations room with the Syrian regime and Russia because of concerns of a possible Turkish offensive, and said the forces conducted joint training operations.[627] The DIA said that coinciding with the announcement, Russia for the first time temporarily deployed advanced fighter jets—Su-35S Flankers—to the Qamishli airport, which typically hosts transport freighters as well as Russian military helicopters.[628]

TENSIONS ESCALATE BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE SDF

Tensions between the SDF and Turkish- and Turkish-backed forces remained high during the quarter with attacks on Turkish forces in Syria, Turkish airstrikes, and sporadic shelling between Turkish forces and the SDF.[629]

OUSD(P) ISA reported that the SDF remained concerned about a potential Turkish offensive into northeastern Syria during the quarter.[630] In October, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatened a new military offensive against the SDF following reports of cross-border exchanges between the SDF and Turkish forces and the reported killing of two Turkish soldiers.[631] Despite the rhetoric, OUSD(P) ISA

Role of Third Parties *(continued from previous page)*

and the DIA reported that there are no indications that Turkey was preparing a renewed offensive operations in northeast Syria at the end of the quarter.[632]

Turkey views the SDF as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a U.S-designated terrorist organization that has long waged a deadly insurgency against Turkey. In particular, Turkey claims that the People's Protection Units militia, which make up a significant portion of the SDF, are directly linked to the Syrian branch of the PKK.[633] Turkey launched an incursion into northern Syria in October 2019 to push back the SDF from its border, and Turkish forces remain in the area of the incursion.[634]

The DIA, citing Turkish press reports, said that during the quarter, Turkish soldiers and Turkish-supported opposition forces dug a 143-mile trench along the M-4 highway between Ras al-Ayn and Tal Abyad—the area of the 2019 Turkish incursion—in an attempt to prevent YPG attacks in Turkish operating areas.[635]

In November, the SDF commander, General Mazloum Kobani claimed that Turkey would not conduct an offensive against the SDF without consent from Russia and the United States. He expressed his discontent with the U.S. and Russian silence regarding Turkish strikes on Kurdish forces.[636] OUSD(P) ISA said that the DoD, along with the DoS, communicated to Turkish and SDF counterparts the importance of deescalation in order to focus on the shared goal of defeating ISIS.[637]

The DIA, citing media reports, said that Turkey accused Russia of escalating tensions by conducting strikes on Turkish-supported forces in northern Syria and civilians in Idlib.[638] In addition, according to a news report, Turkey also reinforced its troops in Idlib because of concerns about a Syrian regime offensive.[639]

As of early October, media reports said that Turkish and Russian forces were still conducting joint patrols in Idlib. The DIA did not observe increased clashes between Turkish military or Turkish-supported opposition forces and the Syrian regime during this quarter.[640]

STABILIZATION

The DoS reported that all its stabilization programs with local governance actors, civil society, and Syrian communities in northeastern Syria continued during the quarter. These programs support education, community security, independent media, civil society, social cohesion, transitional justice, accountability, restoration of essential services, and a political resolution to the conflict in line with UNSCR 2254.[641]

USAID stabilization programming in agriculture, livelihoods, and vocational training also continued during the quarter, with the exception of a project on 'restoring livelihoods through agriculture,' which closed in January 2022 due to a lack of funding.[642] USAID stabilization assistance focuses on restoring essential services and infrastructure, economic recovery, and governance. USAID also works with the Syria Recovery Trust Fund to bolster Syria's private sector.[643]

The DoS said that stabilization assistance plays a "critical role" in this stage of the OIR mission by addressing the economic and social divides previously exploited by ISIS, and also closing gaps in local authority capacity and supporting civil society to advocate for citizen needs.[644]

The DoS reported that although ISIS's activities threatened stability in northeastern Syria, ISIS attacks did not directly affect U.S. stabilization activities during the quarter.

The DoS reported that although ISIS's activities threatened stability in northeastern Syria, ISIS attacks did not directly affect U.S. stabilization activities during the quarter. Attacks continued to target individuals affiliated with the Self Administration of Northeast Syria (SANES) and the SDF, threatening immediate and longer-term stability in the area, the DoS said.[645] The Coalition's 2021 pledge drive raised $296.5 million for Syria stabilization, almost double the $149 million raised in calendar year 2020.[646]

GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Sixth Round of Constitutional Committee Talks a "Disappointment"

According to the DoS, the United States and the majority of the international community continues to support UNSCR 2254 as the "best roadmap for the way forward in Syria."[647] However, the Syrian Constitutional Committee made little progress during the quarter largely due to the continued "stalling tactics" of the Syrian regime, the DoS reported.[648]

In October, the Syrian Constitutional Committee met for a sixth round of talks in Geneva. UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen had expressed hope that the committee was ready to begin drafting a constitution.[649] However, in an address to the UN Security Council on December 20, Special Envoy Pedersen said that 6 years from its adoption, "we are regrettably a long way from implementing" UNSCR 2254 in a way that would ease the suffering of the Syrian people, meet their legitimate hopes, and "fully restore Syria's sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity."[650] Special Envoy Pedersen described his efforts to reconvene the Syrian-led, Syrian-owned, UN-facilitated Constitutional Committee in Geneva for a seventh session, and warned against accepting the many dangers of the status quo: "It would be folly only to manage an unacceptable and deteriorating stalemate."[651]

"We share [Special Envoy Pedersen's] disappointment" in the outcome of the sixth round of Constitutional Committee meetings which concluded in October, the DoS reported.[652] The DoS said it is "particularly disappointed" with the Assad regime participants' unwillingness to make progress toward the committee's goal of drafting a new constitution. The regime continues to be the "biggest obstacle to progress" toward a political resolution to the conflict that represents the will of all Syrians, the DoS said.[653] A negotiated political solution is the "only way forward" and the regime's delays only prolong the suffering and deaths among the Syrian people, according to cable reporting.[654] A date for a seventh round of talks had not yet been determined as of the end of the quarter.[655]

DoS Supports Constitutional Committee Participants

During the quarter, a DoS Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Syria Transition Assistance Response Team's (START/NEA) project continued to support the Syrian political process, and worked with political process stakeholders to strengthen their participation with Constitutional Committee and other UN-convened negotiations to support UNSCR 2254. The project also fostered engagement with Syrian civil society organizations, local governance structures, and Syrian citizens, including members of the Syrian diaspora. The purpose of these workshops and dialogue sessions is to ensure the Constitutional Committee

bridges the gap between local community-based organizations and their local constituents, by supporting political inclusivity, knowledge-sharing, and outreach.[656]

During the quarter, a START/NEA project continued to support civil society organizations in northeast Syria, helped partners establish the "Northeast Syria Civil Society Coalition." The coalition's aim is to strengthen the ability of these organizations to advocate with international actors, engage with SANES and other local authorities in a constructive way, and better foster the growth and development of civil society organizations across the region.[657]

The START/NEA civil society project launched three activities in northeastern Syria during the quarter to address community reintegration challenges identified through focus group discussions conducted in July and August 2021 and continued youth activities with civil society organizations in Hasakah, Raqqah, and Dayr az Zawr governorates with two civil society partners.[658] The goal of the program is to support Syrian civil society organizations in restoring essential services and livelihoods in areas liberated from ISIS, enhance social cohesion in those communities, including members of religious and ethnic minority groups, and strengthening the capacity of all civil society partners to serve and represent Syrians.[659]

During the quarter, USAID START approved the first workplan and started activities for the Syria Electoral and Political Processes project, which aims to support efforts by local authorities in northeastern Syria and Syrian civil society to enhance efficient, inclusive, and accountable governance, including through holding local elections. The first phase of the project is focused on analysis of the context, and beginning work with civil society groups to participate in and hold local authorities accountable in electoral processes.[660]

START is an interagency stabilization platform with programming operating from the U.S. Consulate General in Istanbul, where stabilization teams from both DoS NEA and USAID manage different programs inside Syria.[661]

SDF Continues Demobilization of Child Soldiers Amid Charges of Ongoing Recruitments

According to the DoS, the SDF has continued to make progress since the December 2020 implementation of a UN-sponsored action plan to end the use of child soldiers. The SDF has removed 150 children from SDF ranks and screened out 908 children.[662] The SDF established an age assessment committee, a child protection committee, and a "child protection office" to resolve complaints regarding incidents of recruitment. In June 2021, the SDF continued to further standardize its processes for demobilization of individuals identified as underage in its ranks, the DoS reported.[663]

Despite these efforts to stop recruitment and demobilize children already in the ranks, some Kurdish parents and activists continued to accuse the SDF of ongoing recruitment and even kidnapping, according to media reports.[664] In late November, the co-chair of the child protection unit for the SANES confirmed that his office received five complaints from parents who blamed units within the SDF for the disappearance of their children.[665] Some of these parents accused the Revolutionary Youth Movement, a group associated with the Democratic Union Party, of recruiting their missing daughters, while others blamed the

According to the DoS, the SDF has continued to make progress since the December 2020 implementation of a UN-sponsored action plan to end the use of child soldiers.

People's Protection Units and the Women's Protection Units for either enticing children away or abducting them.[666]

DoS Al Rashad Project Supports Community Security

During the quarter, START/NEA's project supporting community security in northeastern Syria, Al Rashad+, continued building the capacity of PrISF in Hasakah, Raqqah, and Dayr az Zawr governorates. During the quarter, Al Rashad+ continued delivering training on community policing principles and integrating community policing best practices into every aspect of the PrISF's work, supported the rehabilitation of a number of buildings for use by the PrISF and the local governance bodies that oversee them, brought together PrISF officers and community members to discuss security issues and build mutual trust, and supported work on a number of public safety projects, including street light and traffic infrastructure rehabilitation.[667]

DoS Media Program Provides On-Demand Stabilization Content

During the quarter, START/NEA's Support to Independent Media in Syria II project extended support to three additional Syrian media platforms as part of new activities to produce on-demand content on key stabilization and counter violent extremist related themes. The project partners with radio, online, and television media platforms in northeastern and northwestern Syria to empower citizens, promote accountability, provide information about COVID-19, and counter violent extremism and disinformation perpetuated by Iran-backed militias, Russia, the Syrian regime, designated terrorist organizations, and other malign actors.[668]

ECONOMIC RECOVERY

USAID Supports Skills Development Programs

During the quarter, USAID began its second year of activities for a $1.2 million program benefitting 350 people. The program provides skills training to conflict-affected vulnerable communities in Syria. These activities included the startup of basic vocational training courses in six topics: sewing, female and male hairdressing, beauty and cosmetics, IT networking, photography, and confectionary and food processing.[669]

During the quarter, the USAID Syria Livelihoods Project awarded grants to block press workshops in Raqqah, Dayr az Zawr, and Hasakah governorates. USAID said that the grants will enable the workshops to buy additional block presses, hire additional employees, and increase the supply of locally made blocks for construction projects in northeast Syria. In addition, the project also launched the Construction Community of Practice in Raqqah, which provides a space for contractors to share their expertise, collaborate, and propose solutions to common issues.[670]

USAID Programs Support Small Business and Agriculture

USAID START also continued activities of the Economic Management for Stability Program to support growth and investment of medium-sized enterprises in northeastern Syria. The

During the quarter, USAID began its second year of activities for a $1.2 million program benefitting 350 people.

program identified key constraints to the growth of five additional companies, addressing them with targeted and tailored technical assistance and business development support. The goal of the program is for companies to grow and create new jobs.[671]

In December 2021, USAID START completed activities under the Restoring Livelihoods through Revitalizing Agriculture project, which will close in January 2022 due to lack of funding. During the quarter the program completed the final distribution of agriculture kits (drip-irrigation systems, seeds, fertilizers, and equipment) and livestock vouchers (sheep and fodder) to vulnerable households.[672] During the quarter, the project distributed nearly twice as many sheep and twice as much fodder as planned, as a result of low prices for sheep in the market due to the drought. The project remains roughly $1.6 million under its envisioned total estimated cost, and will not reach its life of project goals. According to USAID Mideast Bureau, cancelled activities mean that 800 households will receive agricultural inputs for just one season instead of for two seasons as planned.[673] The project will not rehabilitate one irrigation system as planned and reduced the number of households receiving livestock kits by more than 500. Activities finished in December 2021.[674]

USAID START's Supporting Livelihoods in Syria program seeks to build resilience at the household and community levels in Syria through strengthened food security and livelihood opportunities, focusing on the wheat and fodder value chains.[675] The program seeks to increase agricultural production, through protecting, and building productive assets, and restoring or creating income-generating opportunities.[676] During the quarter, the program completed the rehabilitation of 10 bakeries and procured and distributed high-quality wheat seeds to farmers in northeastern Syria in response to the drought during in the 2020-2021 season.[677]

ESSENTIAL SERVICES

DoS Program Supports First Responders and Infrastructure

During the quarter, START/NEA's program that supports local governance partnered with local governance actors in Raqqah, Hasakah, and Dayr az Zawr to provide operational support to first responders, rehabilitate essential water infrastructure, and build partner capacity to manage essential services more effectively. In addition to extending existing firefighting operational support, START/NEA's governance program facilitated internationally certified advanced training for firefighting teams operated by civic councils in Hasakah, Raqqah, and Dayr az Zawr. It also expanded its firefighting programming to Tabqa. The program facilitated financial management, project management, and computer skills training for civic council personnel at two Dayr az Zawr capacity building centers it finished during the reporting period.[678]

The DoS said that the governance program also began electrical and pipeline repairs, cleaned canals, and rehabilitated water stations in Hasakah and Dayr az Zawr to facilitate the reliable flow of drinking water from the Euphrates to 300,000 beneficiaries in Hasakah City while discouraging siphoning. The DoS said that together, these activities denied ISIS space to operate by strengthening the relationship between local governance organizations and nearby communities.[679]

During the quarter, START/ NEA's program that supports local governance partnered with local governance actors in Raqqah, Hasakah, and Dayr az Zawr to provide operational support to first responders, rehabilitate essential water infrastructure, and build partner capacity to manage essential services more effectively.

Wheat, Water, and Electricity Shortages Exacerbate Need

Beyond the chronic shortages of essential services, USAID reported that it was addressing the acute need for stable electricity transmission to the Alouk Water Station, which provides drinking water to a large portion of northeast Syria's Jazeera region.[680] During the quarter. USAID supported repairs to the Darbasiyah Power Station, the transmission station supplying power to Alouk, which was damaged by a fire. USAID reported that repairs were nearing completion at the end of the quarter.[681]

Due to the drought, there is a shortage of wheat in all of Syria, including a shortage of wheat seeds for the wheat planting season, which occurs from early November to late December. USAID START provided 2,880 metric tons of improved wheat seed, imported from Iraq.[682] The same project distributed seed directly to farmers in Hasakah and to farmer cooperatives in Dayr az Zawr.[683] USAID said that the bakery rehabilitations it completed during the quarter in Hasakah and Dayr az Zawr are intended to ease bread production constraints and expand access to affordable bread.[684]

REINTEGRATION AND REPATRIATION

The DoS continues to advocate for the repatriation and reintegration of displaced persons to their areas and countries of origin as the most effective way to manage security and improve overall conditions at the al-Hol displaced persons camp. The United States also urges countries of origin to repatriate, rehabilitate, reintegrate, and, where appropriate, prosecute their nationals in northeast Syria. The DoS said that the repatriation of all foreign nationals from northeast Syria is a critical component of ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS and preventing an ISIS resurgence, as well as holding ISIS accountable.[685]

The DoS added that the successful reintegration of internally displaced persons into their home communities is critical to the counter-ISIS mission's broader stabilization efforts. The smooth reintegration of these displaced persons, including from camps such as al-Hol and Roj, is essential to eliminate the social isolation and economic dislocation that ISIS exploits to regain a foothold in northeast Syria, the DoS reported.[686] As in previous quarters, significant stabilization needs for essential service provision, education, and livelihoods persisted in liberated areas.[687]

The DoS reported that some countries of origin requested U.S. Government assistance to repatriate their nationals from northeast Syria, while others organized repatriations directly with local authorities in northeast Syria.[688] Countries of origin have shown varying willingness to repatriate their nationals. Some proactively repatriate their citizens, while others remain reluctant to do so. The DoS said it prioritizes repatriation to countries of origin and advises allies and local partners on options to return their nationals.[689]

Reintegration, Repatriation of Returnees Continued

On December 8, 128 "pre-Baghuz" Iraqi families (507 individuals) were repatriated from the al-Hol camp to the Jeddah 1 camp in Iraq, the DoS said.[690] This was the third group of returns from the camp arranged bilaterally between the northeastern Syrian authorities and the Iraqi government in 2021, the DoS said. The Iraqi government continued to "prepare

Due to the drought, there is a shortage of wheat in all of Syria, including a shortage of wheat seeds for the wheat planting season, which occurs from early November to late December.

communities and advance reintegration" of the approximately 200 "pre-Baghuz" Iraqi families who were repatriated from al-Hol to the Jeddah 1 camp in two previous tranches in May and September 2021.[691] (See page 59.)

According to the DoS, from October 1 through December 10, 330 Syrian displaced persons left al-Hol camp and moved to Hasakah and Dayr az Zawr governorates.[692] The DoS reported that the SANES continued to facilitate the safe and voluntary return and reintegration of Syrians from displaced persons camps who wished to depart to their home communities.[693] U.S.-funded-programs that support essential services, community security, civil society and governance, education, removal of explosive remnants of war, accountability for atrocities committed by the regime and by ISIS, reconciliation, and livelihoods and economic growth have helped communities in northeast Syria to reintegrate returning populations.[694]

Acceptance from their home communities for those returning from displaced persons camps varies by location, the DoS reported, with urban environments like Raqqah less welcoming for returnees than more rural areas in Dayr az Zawr, where returnees receive additional tribal support and tend to be viewed with less suspicion.[695] The U.S. Government is assessing current capabilities, modifying existing projects, and designing new efforts to facilitate the reintegration of displaced persons, the DoS reported.[696]

The DoS reported that on October 5 and 6, the U.S. Government assisted in the repatriation of 48 Danish and German women and children to Denmark and Germany.[697]

Challenges Remain Despite Substantial Decline in Violence at al-Hol and Roj Camps

The security situation in al-Hol, a civilian, humanitarian camp for displaced persons, remained a challenge for local security and humanitarian partners.[698] During the quarter, there were 12 killings in al-Hol camp, a decline from previous quarters. The DoS noted that this decline may have been attributable to increased patrols by security partners.[699]

The Internal Security Forces (InSF) are responsible for the security within al-Hol, while the SDF provides outside security around the camp.[700] CJTF-OIR said that the SDF requested security television equipment in order to provide better external security.[701] The SDF also expressed concerns for the safety of its guard force as a result of insufficient lighting and monitoring equipment.[702] CJTF-OIR said the SDF has reported multiple attacks against its guards from inside displaced persons camps by military age males using small arms.[703]

CJTF-OIR reported that the SDF also required additional support to segregate women in the camp who are suspected of crimes.[704] Media outlets reported earlier in 2021 that radicalized women in the camp formed units of religious or moral police that spread ISIS ideology and enforce its version of Islamic law, often violently.[705]

The DoS said it "strongly supports" efforts to remove violent actors, ISIS operatives, and weapons from al-Hol camp, as high levels of violence impede the ability of humanitarian organizations to safely provide assistance at the camp, and "further traumatize an already vulnerable population."[706]

According to the DoS, from October 1 through December 10, 330 Syrian displaced persons left al-Hol camp and moved to Hasakah and Dayr az Zawr governorates.

The Self-Administration of North and East Syria (SANES) continued to explore ways to improve external and internal security without compromising humanitarian services at al-Hol camp. The DoS said that short-term security improvements are urgently needed to minimize threats to camp residents, and longer-term solutions are needed to properly train and equip external and internal security actors.[707]

According to the DoS, Roj displaced persons camp, also in the Hasakah governorate, is "substantially more secure and stable" than the al-Hol camp and security measures are adequate. On two occasions during the quarter a large number of residents protested, citing the uncertainty of their futures and repatriations as the reasons for their protests.[708] The DIA reported that during one such protest in mid-October, women staged a violent demonstration in Roj camp, throwing stones at security forces and setting several tents on fire.[709] A camp official told Voice of America that dozens of women linked to ISIS were involved in the protest.[710]

According to the DoS, the Roj displaced persons camp, also in the Hasakah governorate, is "substantially more secure and stable" than the al-Hol camp and security measures are adequate.

The United States frequently emphasizes to its partners that while security partners are working to improve conditions in al-Hol, the "only practical long-term solution" is the safe and voluntary return and repatriation of camp residents to their home areas in Syria or countries of origin, which many states remain unwilling to facilitate.[711]

In December, Fabrizio Carboni, the regional director for the Near and Middle East for the International Committee of the Red Cross, described harsh conditions for children and adults in Syria's displaced persons camps. He warned that displaced persons are at particular risk during winter when temperatures can drop to freezing, adding to their already "vulnerable conditions" in the camps.[712] He cited the breakup of families, with members separated during transfers to other civilian, humanitarian camps or "places of detention," as particularly worrisome and advised that children in detention should be reunited with their families in civilian camps, "repatriated alongside them, or have alternative care arrangements made for them."[713]

DoS Launches Media Project Focused on al-Hol Camp

In November, START/NEA's Support to Independent Media in Syria II project launched a pilot initiative that produces special content concerning the al-Hol camp. The project includes daily radio programs and hundreds of online media products across three different online properties, covering local and regional news, life in the camp, women's and gender issues, topics related to reintegration and social and cultural stories intended to spotlight Syria's cultural diversity and tradition of cultural exchange and tolerance.[714] With these new activities, the program supported 10 Syrian media partners as of the end of the quarter.[715]

Humanitarian Assistance Activities for Displaced Persons Continued

The DoS and USAID fund humanitarian organizations working in the camps and receive updates from these organizations about conditions in the camps. Through partnerships with humanitarian organizations, the U.S. Government provides significant life-saving assistance for the camps, including food, water and sanitation, shelter, protection, winterization supplies, health, education, and camp management.[716]

SYRIA: U.S. ASSISTANCE SNAPSHOT

October 1, 2021–December 31, 2021

DAR'A
Ongoing fighting and associated movement and security restrictions continued to disrupt several USAID activities—particularly those that require direct participant engagement.

NORTHWEST SYRIA
Over the previous 6 months, the price for diesel in northwest Syria increased by 19 percent and the price of petrol by 36 percent. In response, Syrians resorted to burning any material that they can find for heating, including unsafe material producing toxic fumes upon burning, such as plastic bags.

IDLIB AND ALEPPO
On November 11, airstrikes in Idlib killed five people, including three children. On November 19 rockets struck Afrin, killing three civilians. These attacks followed the largest escalation of hostilities in northwest Syria since the 2020 ceasefire.

13.4 million	**12.4 million**	**6.8 million**	**4.8 million**	**2.1 million**
In Need of Humanitarian Assistance	People Food Insecure	Estimated Number of IDPs	People Reached by USAID BHA per Month	People Reached by DoS PRM per Month
UN-March 2021	WFP-December 2021	UNHCR-June 2021	USAID-December 2021	USAID-December 2021

STABILIZATION

- **The DoS** facilitated internationally certified, advanced training for firefighting teams operated by civic councils in Hasakah, Raqqah, and Dayr az Zawr governorates and expanded its firefighting programs to Tabqa.
- **The DoS Support to Independent Media program** launched new daily radio programs and hundreds of online media products dealing with the al-Hol camp. The programs covered local and regional news, life in the camp, women's and gender issues, topics related to reintegration, and social and cultural stories.

COVID-19 VACCINE ROLLOUT

More than **3.96 million** COVID vaccine doses have been delivered, enough to cover **10.2 percent** of the population.

Allocated (COVAX)

7,470,500

Doses Delivered
- COVAX–AstraZeneca: **309,600**
- COVAX Bilateral Donations–AstraZeneca: **591,840**
- COVAX–Sinovac: **1,714,800**
- Bilateral–China: **800,000**
- Bilateral–Russia: **250,000**
- Unknown: **293,760**

Sources: USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021; USAID, "Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #1 FY22," 12/3/2021; WHO, "Update on COVID-19 Vaccination in Syria, 12 November 2021," 11/12/2021; UNHCR, "Syria: UNHCR Operational Update, June 2021," 7/18/2021; Al Mayadeen, "China Donates 500,000 COVID-19 Vaccines to Syria," 11/14/2021; Reuters, "Syria Gets Donation of 150,000 COVID shots from China," 4/24/2021; Xinhua, "Syria Receives 150,000 Doses of Chinese COVID-19 Vaccines," 7/30/2021; DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

During the quarter, the DoS provided more than $605 million in humanitarian assistance for Syrian refugees across the region as well as displaced populations inside Syria, and coordinated with humanitarian organizations working in displaced persons camps and host communities.

During the quarter, the DoS provided more than $605 million in humanitarian assistance for Syrian refugees across the region as well as displaced populations inside Syria, and coordinated with humanitarian organizations working in displaced persons camps and host communities.[717] With U.S. Government support, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees facilitated the distribution of hygiene kits, relief commodities, and tents to displaced persons and host community members in Syria.[718]

The DoS reported that it continued to support three international organizations for multi-sector humanitarian responses throughout Syria.[719] The DoS also funded two NGO partners that implement displaced persons camp coordination and management in northeastern Syria and provide assistance to out-of-camp Iraqi refugees living throughout Syria.[720]

USAID's Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) reported that it funds an international NGO for protection activities in al-Hol camp that are intended to provide support to children who have been exposed to extremist ideology.[721] The funds supported child and youth clubs, child protection committees where children discuss the importance of peaceful actions, and child and youth resilience programming that includes sessions on team building, trust and respect, and decision-making processes.[722]

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

USAID reported that similar to the previous reporting quarter, increased, price fluctuations—particularly fuel prices—and accelerating rates of COVID-19 were reported countrywide.[723] In northeast Syria, the COVID-19 situation remained concerning as case numbers continued to rise while testing capacity remained limited.[724] Humanitarian assistance remains a top U.S. government priority in Syria. As of the end of the quarter, the DoS and USAID had contributed over $14 billion in responding to humanitarian needs in Syria since the crisis began.[725]

Years of violence—compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic, a historic drought that has decimated food crops, and the collapse of the Lebanese financial sector—have caused a humanitarian catastrophe in Syria.[726] More than 90 percent of all Syrians live in extreme poverty.[727] The World Food Programme estimated that 12.4 million Syrians were food insecure, an increase of more than 4.5 million during the previous year; 1.3 million of those are severely food insecure. In addition, 6.8 million Syrians were internally displaced.[728] Tens of thousands of displaced people in the northeastern are living in destitute conditions in overcrowded camps.[729]

ACCESS AND OPERATIONS

NGOs Challenged by Turkish Lira Depreciation

During this reporting period, northwest Syria was particularly affected by the depreciation of the Turkish lira. Since early 2021, the value of the Turkish lira has declined significantly, resulting in the loss of approximately 50 percent of its value against the U.S. dollar.[730] USAID reported that this resulted in a significant loss in purchasing power for residents of northwest Syria where the use of the Turkish lira is common. For example, the price of 1 liter of gasoline has increased from 5-6 Turkish lira to 11 Turkish lira in the last 3 months.[731]

Given the critical nature of fuel in the economy, the impacts of this price rise were seen across sectors. NGOs operating in northwest Syria also reported issues with their cash-based programs, including substantial financial loss due to the long wait times of transfer and the rapid nature of depreciations.[732]

October Hostilities in Idlib Increase Risk for Civilians, Including Aid Workers

Increased hostilities in Idlib governorate in late October resulted in several casualties and threatened civilian safety, including in areas of northern Idlib with a high concentration of IDP camps.[733] According to NGO reporting, on October 20, artillery attacks by Syrian regime and Russian forces struck a marketplace in Idlib's Ariha subdistrict, killing at least 13 civilians and injuring 40 others, as well as damaging nearby schools and shops.[734] On October 27, airstrikes and artillery attacks struck multiple locations in Idlib, including in Dana subdistrict's Qah village and an IDP camp on the outskirts of Termanin village, resulting in the death of one child and injuries to seven women and children at the IDP site, as well as damage to several shelters.[735] The October 27 attacks prompted humanitarian organizations to temporarily close certain offices in Qah and restrict staff movements as a safety precaution.[736]

FOOD AND WATER

Syria's Water Crisis Continues to Affect Human Health and Agriculture

USAID continued to report that water insecurity has become a central concern for humanitarian actors working in all areas of Syria as the country is facing the worst drought in over 70 years.[737] According to the UN, the water crisis was spurred by the combination of climate change and hydro-political factors. The water crisis has disrupted access to clean drinking water for more than 5 million people reliant on the Euphrates River, as well as electricity for a further 3 million. The water crisis also threatens access to other essential services such as the provisions of healthcare and could cause a rise in waterborne diseases.[738]

USAID reported that farmers in northeast Syria have reported profound impacts on the agricultural output of the region.[739] Scarce rainfall combined with the periodic disruptions to water from Alouk water station have made it nearly impossible for farmers to irrigate their fields. During the reporting period, there was a concerning decrease in water levels in Nabaa Lake, which is the only alternative source to water trucking for al-Hol camp. This crisis, along with the impacts of COVID-19 and Syria's economic stagnation, have resulted in a sharp increase in the number of people in need of food assistance.[740]

Drought-Induced Crop Losses in Northeast Drive Food Insecurity

According to USAID, drought conditions continue to result in significantly reduce northeast Syria's wheat crop yields, threatening the availability and affordability of staple grains in the region, humanitarian actors reported.[741] As of December, reports indicate a more than 70 percent decrease in the region's 2021 wheat crop yields compared to the 2020 harvest.

Increased hostilities in Idlib governorate in late October resulted in several casualties and threatened civilian safety, including in areas of northern Idlib with a high concentration of IDP camps.

Hasakah was the worst affected governorate, with harvested crop area losses of 75 percent or more recorded in 13 subdistricts, including seven subdistricts that experienced losses of 90 percent or more.[742]

Humanitarian actors warned that the 2021 harvest's alarmingly low crop yields in northeast Syria will adversely affect food security and diminish supply chains for staple commodities such as flour.[743] As a result, NGOs anticipate that bread prices in the region will increase through the 2022 cropping season and into 2023, as depleted harvest stocks and supply constraints drive prices upward.[744]

COVID-19 PANDEMIC

COVID-19 Vaccine Hesitancy Remains High as Rollout Continues

At the beginning of the quarter, confirmed cases of COVID-19 reached the highest rate since the beginning of the pandemic, peaking at 2,517 confirmed cases reported by the World Health Organization (WHO) during the week of October 18, 2021, according WHO.[745] According to the Syrian American Medical Society Foundation, intensive care units at COVID-19 hospitals in northwest Syria were at 93 percent capacity, and ventilators were at 98 percent utilization in mid-October.[746] SAMS also reported that the increase in cases during the quarter was due to the Delta variant, which was detected in 98 percent of new cases in northwest Syria.[747]

Despite high rates of COVID-19, laboratory testing supply shortages constrained the ability to accurately monitor and detect positive cases through testing during the quarter. According to the World Food Programme by November 10, northeast Syria lacked testing materials and the central laboratory was out of service.[748] BHA stated that in early December, an NGO donated 4,100 PCR testing kits to the central laboratory in northeast Syria, but the lab is running a minimal level of tests to maintain supplies and estimates that this supply will run out early in the second quarter.[749]

As of mid-November, WHO announced that Syria had received over 2.6 million doses through COVAX and an additional 1.3 million through bilateral agreements, which covers 10 percent of the population.[750]

With vaccines arriving in country, in November the Syrian regime Ministry of Health initiated a COVID-19 vaccination campaign with 1,500 vaccination teams deployed across 14 governorates to vaccinate individuals ages 18 and older, according to USAID BHA.[751] The WHO reported that at the end of the quarter, over 2.9 million vaccine doses had been administered, with 883,478 people fully vaccinated.[752]

Of the delivered doses, an estimated 87,732 doses were delivered to northeast Syria, according to the WHO.[753] Moreover, in northeast Syria, healthcare staff noted high rates of vaccine hesitancy due to mistrust of the regime and the delivery of vaccines from WHO to the Syrian government before being transported to northeast Syria.[754] Vaccine hesitancy also remains a concern among UN staff. During the quarter, UN Relief and Works Agency provided their staff and dependents with vaccines, but acceptance remains low among staff.[755]

As of mid-November, WHO announced that Syria had received over 2.6 million doses through COVAX and an additional 1.3 million through bilateral agreements, which covers 10 percent of the population.

USAID reported that vaccine hesitancy, little or no supply of vaccines and PCR testing agents, and a weak health system have impeded COVID-19 programming in northeast Syria.[756] Global supply chain disruptions also caused delays. USAID BHA extended an award through an unfunded modification due to delayed delivery of nutrition commodities and the pandemic's effects on price and exchange rates.[757]

USAID Awards $54 Million for COVID-19 Response

Despite these challenges, USAID continued to issue new awards. In late September, USAID announced $108 million in additional funding to bolster COVID-19 response activities in Syria, including procuring essential medical equipment for intensive care, reinforcing COVID-19 case management and surveillance, and combatting misinformation.[758] USAID BHA awarded $54 million through eight awards to UN agencies and NGOs during the quarter to address the three pillars of the COVID-19 response strategy: support for public health, protection assistance through safe spaces and gender-based violence programming, and strengthening humanitarian operations and coordination.[759] USAID BHA continued to fund 13 partners to provide health assistance to 480 facilities; supported activities include direct health service delivery through mobile medical units, provision of equipment for health facilities, and training for Syrian medical workers.[760] In the previous year, USAID BHA health assistance reached 5 million people.[761]

The USAID Middle East Bureau also supported the COVID-19 response through stabilization activities during the quarter. USAID reported that the USAID Essential Services project supported the Jazeera Health Commission and Raqqah Health Committee on infrastructure projects that support the COVID-19 response, including establishing an oxygen bottling plant and solar powered cold storage for vaccines, rehabilitating the Hasakah National Hospital to have a COVID-19 isolation ward, and building a training center for medical staff.[762]

Health Services Strained by Conflict

USAID did not report any attacks on healthcare workers during the quarter.[763] However, the effects of conflict continued to strain the health system in Syria. Humanitarian actors continued to respond to conflict-related medical emergencies in Idlib governorate—including mass casualty incidents—despite a 2020 ceasefire agreement between the governments of Turkey and Russia. In mid-December an airstrike sent 15 people, including 11 children, to a hospital co-managed by Doctors Without Borders, according to the NGO.[764]

Across northern Syria, the number of health facilities and health workers are insufficient to support the surrounding population.[765] For example Physicians for Human Rights reported that the last functional health facility in Jabal al-Zawiya region of Idlib was destroyed in September, leaving patients to seek care in other towns.[766] Of the 553 nonfunctioning health facilities in Syria, 73 percent are in the northern governorates.[767] Patients also face cost barriers and security risks when traveling to seek healthcare; the estimated cost for a one-way trip to a surgical hospital in al-Atareb in northern Aleppo was $25, or 17 times the daily income.[768] In early December, representatives from nine countries and territories, including focal points from Syria and Northwest Syria, met for a 2-day workshop to

USAID did not report any attacks on healthcare workers during the quarter.

advance WHO response to attacks on health care in complex humanitarian emergencies, including discussing best practices to protect health services, health workers, and patients from attacks, according to WHO.[769]

Supply Challenges Including Cross-Line and Cross-Border Access Impact COVID-19 Response

Reliance on cross-border and cross-line deliveries also hampered access to critical health commodities, including vaccines.

Reliance on cross-border and cross-line deliveries also hampered access to critical health commodities, including vaccines. As of early November, the Turkish government-administered Peace Spring territory had not received any vaccines due to lack of cross-border access from Turkey or cross-line delivery from regime-held areas.[770] Meanwhile in northwest Syria, a December cross-line convoy of 14 trucks carried humanitarian aid, including food; health; nutrition; and water, sanitation, and hygiene assistance to UN World Food Programme warehouses in Idlib governorate, the first delivery since a previous cross-line mission in late August.[771]

COVID-19 continued to impact implementation. At the beginning of the quarter, a surge in COVID-19 cases caused a humanitarian organization to suspend activities across multiple IDP camps in Idlib governorate.[772] Implementer staff noted an increased in trauma-related behavioral, cognitive, or impairments due to the pandemic and other causes.[773]

A U.S. Air Force material management journeyman places an M4 Carbine on to a rack at Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait. (U.S. Air Force photo)

OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

This section of the report provides information on Lead IG and partner agencies' strategic planning efforts; completed, ongoing, and planned Lead IG and partner agencies' oversight work related to audits, inspections, and evaluations; Lead IG investigations; and hotline activities from October 1 through December 31, 2021.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

Pursuant to Section 8L of the Inspector General Act, the Lead IG develops and implements a joint strategic plan to guide comprehensive oversight of programs and operations for each overseas contingency operation. This effort includes reviewing and analyzing completed oversight, management, and other relevant reports to identify systemic problems, trends, lessons learned, and best practices to inform future oversight projects. The Lead IG agencies issue an annual joint strategic oversight plan for each operation.

FY 2021 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan Activities

In 2014, upon designation of the DoD IG as the Lead IG for Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), the three Lead IG agencies developed and implemented a joint strategic oversight plan for comprehensive oversight of OIR. The three Lead IG agencies update the oversight plan annually.

The *FY 2022 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for OIR* was published on November 8, 2021, as part of the *FY 2022 Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Overseas Contingency Operations*. The *FY 2022 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for OIR* is organized by three strategic oversight areas: 1) Military Operations and Security Cooperation; 2) Governance, Humanitarian Assistance, and Development; and 3) Support to Mission.

The Overseas Contingency Operations Joint Planning Group serves as a primary venue to coordinate audits, inspections, and evaluations of U.S. Government-funded activities supporting overseas contingency operations, including those relating to the Middle East.

The Overseas Contingency Operations Joint Planning Group meets quarterly to provide a forum for coordination of the broader Federal oversight community, including the military service IGs and audit agencies, the Government Accountability Office, and the OIGs of the Departments of Justice, Treasury, Energy, and Homeland Security.

In November 2021, the Joint Planning Group held its 56th meeting, carried out virtually to accommodate participants because of coronavirus disease–2019 (COVID-19) precautions. Karen Decker, Director of Afghanistan Operations in the DoS Afghan relocation effort, spoke about challenges during and after the August 2021 non-combatant evacuation from Afghanistan.

FY 2022 Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Overseas Contingency Operations

Lead IG Strategic Oversight Areas

MILITARY OPERATIONS AND SECURITY COOPERATION

Military Operations and Security Cooperation focuses on determining the degree to which the contingency operation is accomplishing its security mission. Activities that fall under this strategic oversight area include:

- Conducting unilateral and partnered counterterrorism operations
- Providing security assistance
- Training and equipping partner security forces
- Advising, assisting, and enabling partner security forces
- Advising and assisting ministry-level security officials

GOVERNANCE, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT

Governance, Humanitarian Assistance, and Development focuses on some of the root causes of violent extremism. Activities that fall under this strategic oversight area include:

- Countering and reducing corruption, social inequality, and extremism
- Promoting inclusive and effective democracy, civil participation, and empowerment of women
- Promoting reconciliation, peaceful conflict resolution, demobilization and reintegration of armed forces, and other rule of law efforts
- Providing food, water, medical care, emergency relief, and shelter to people affected by crisis
- Assisting and protecting internally displaced persons and refugees
- Building or enhancing host-nation governance capacity
- Supporting sustainable and appropriate recovery and reconstruction activities, repairing infrastructure, removing explosive remnants of war, and reestablishing utilities and other public services
- Countering trafficking in persons and preventing sexual exploitation and abuse

SUPPORT TO MISSION

Support to Mission focuses on U.S. administrative, logistical, and management efforts that enable military operations and non-military programs. Activities that fall under this strategic oversight area include:

- Ensuring the security of U.S. Government personnel and property
- Providing for the occupational health and safety of personnel
- Administering U.S. Government programs
- Managing U.S. Government grants and contracts
- Inventorying and accounting for equipment

AUDIT, INSPECTION, AND EVALUATION ACTIVITY

The Lead IG agencies use dedicated, rotational, and temporary employees, as well as contractors, to conduct oversight projects, investigate fraud and corruption, and provide consolidated planning and reporting on the status of overseas contingency operations.

The COVID-19 global pandemic continued to affect the Lead IG agencies' ability to conduct oversight of projects related to overseas contingency operations. In response to travel restrictions, the Lead IG agencies either delayed or deferred some oversight projects or revised or narrowed the scope of ongoing work. The Lead IG agencies continued to conduct oversight work while teleworking and practicing social distancing.

Prior to the pandemic, oversight staff from the Lead IG agencies stationed in field offices in Qatar, Iraq, Kuwait, Egypt, and Germany, as well as from the United States, would travel to locations in the region to conduct fieldwork for their projects.

DoD OIG oversight and investigative staff maintained their presence in Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain during the quarter. While the ordered departure that has been in place since March 2020 continued during the quarter, each of the DoS OIG staff assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad have returned to Iraq. DoS OIG staff members stationed in Frankfurt, Germany, primarily worked from home rather than their offices in the consulate.

The Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies completed 10 reports related to OIR during the quarter. These reports examined various activities that support OIR, including the extent to which the DoD monitored and provided care for Service members suspected of sustaining a traumatic brain injury; whether the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) took adequate steps to reduce potential law of war violations when conducting operations; guidance on cost differences identified in Army management of government property in Kuwait; and whether DoS and USAID effectively managed contracts and humanitarian assistance programs in Iraq.

As of December 31, 2021, 11 projects related to OIR were ongoing and 14 projects related to OIR were planned.

Final Reports by Lead IG Agencies

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Evaluation of U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command Implementation of the Administrative Requirements Related to the Department of Defense's Law of War Policies
DODIG-2022-038; November 16, 2021

The DoD OIG conducted this evaluation to determine the extent to which USCENTCOM and USSOCOM developed and implemented programs in accordance with DoD law of war requirements in order to reduce potential law of war violations when conducting operations.

Specifically, the DoD OIG reviewed USCENTCOM and USSOCOM processes for training, exercising, reporting, investigating, and maintaining records of the receipt and disposition

of allegations of law of war violations for compliance with DoD policy. The DoD OIG did not review specific incidents or allegations to determine if law of war violations or war crimes occurred or whether specific incidents or allegations should have been determined to be law of war violations or war crimes. According to the DoD, laws of war regulate the conditions for war and the conduct of warring parties, to include U.S. personnel engaged in contingency operations such as OIR.

The DoD published overall guidance on the DoD Law of War program for all subordinate organizations within the DoD. USCENTCOM and USSOCOM published their own policies that implement guidance based on DoD directives and the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions on law of war programs.

The DoD OIG determined that USCENTCOM and USSOCOM developed law of war policies, procedures, and orders that implemented most DoD requirements. In addition, the commands included law of war principles in training and exercises. However, USCENTCOM and USSOCOM policies need to be updated to reflect current DoD policy on law of war. Both commands' subordinate components' or joint commands' training, and USCENTCOM exercises and reporting processes can be improved.

The DoD OIG made several recommendations to the Commander of USCENTCOM, the Commander of USSOCOM, and the Director of the Joint Staff. Recommendations included revising internal procedures, directives, and instructions to make them consistent with current requirements of DoD Law of War Program directives. Management did not agree with all of the recommendations. Reasons for disagreement are controlled unclassified information. At the time the report was issued, the DoD OIG considered the recommendations unimplemented.

Evaluation of Traumatic Brain Injuries in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility

DODIG-2022-006; November 1, 2021

The DoD OIG conducted this evaluation to determine whether USCENTCOM tracked and reported potentially concussive events and those DoD Service members involved in potentially concussive events within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility to provide the Joint Trauma Analysis and Prevention of Injury in Combat Program Office with data for actionable analysis to prevent or mitigate traumatic brain injuries (TBI).

The DoD defines a TBI as a disruption of brain function, sustained as a result of a potentially concussive event, such as a blast event, vehicle collision, or direct blow to the head, that may impair thinking, memory, movement, vision, hearing, or emotional functioning. A potentially concussive event can, but does not always, result in a TBI. According to the DoD, TBIs are common injuries among troops wounded in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since 2000, more than 413,858 Service members have been diagnosed with a TBI.

The DoD OIG determined that USCENTCOM and its Service Component Commands did not track or report potentially concussive events or those DoD Service members involved in potentially concussive events, as required by DoD instructions. This occurred because the Service Component personnel thought the requirements in USCENTCOM Regulations were

unclear and because USCENTCOM relied on electronic health records to identify and track DoD Service members involved in potentially concussive events. Additionally, the Joint Staff did not monitor USCENTCOM compliance with the requirements in DoD instructions, as required. This occurred because the Joint Staff did not designate an Office of Primary Responsibility to monitor compliance with DoD Instructions.

As a result, the DoD cannot ensure actionable TBI analysis is conducted because the JTAPIC Program Office lacks potentially concussive event and TBI data to inform the DoD's efforts to develop solutions to prevent or mitigate TBIs in the deployed environment. Additionally, according to Joint Trauma Analysis and Prevention of Injury in Combat Program, the DoD cannot determine whether all Service members are being properly diagnosed and treated for TBIs in deployed settings, due to the lack of potentially concussive event reporting. Furthermore, the program office may be unable to verify whether Service members were involved in a potentially concussive event. Therefore, the DoD may not know the actual number of Service members involved in potentially concussive events in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. Finally, without consistent and adequate information on potentially concussive events, Service members may not be eligible to receive disability benefits or care associated with a potentially concussive event from the Department of Veterans Affairs after separating from the military.

The DoD OIG recommended that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff appoint an Office of Primary Responsibility to monitor compliance with the requirements. Additionally, the DoD OIG recommended that the USCENTCOM Commander revise USCENTCOM Regulations to: designate an Office of Primary Responsibility to receive, review, and monitor USCENTCOM Service Components personnel reporting of potentially concussive events; include requirements for USCENTCOM to submit monthly potentially concussive event tracking reports and monitor Service Component personnel compliance with the monthly reporting requirements; and include specific details on the minimum required field for the monthly reporting.

Management agreed to implement the recommendations.

Management Advisory: Internal Control Weaknesses in the Global Combat Support System-Army and the Army Enterprise System Integration Program
DODIG-2022-003; October 15, 2021

The DoD OIG prepared this memorandum to advise Army officials responsible for the accountability and reporting of government-furnished property of the internal control weaknesses identified during fieldwork conducted in Kuwait for the Audit of U.S. Army Base Operations and Security Support Services Contract Government-Furnished Property in Kuwait.

In several instances, cost information within the Global Combat Support System–Army significantly differed from the Army Enterprise System Integration Program, the contractor's government-furnished property list, and DoD records such as requisition, invoice and shipping documents. Additionally, the Army Enterprise System Integration Program had the incorrect cost for several items that it fed into the Global Combat Support System–

Army. Furthermore, when cost information were corrected in the Army Enterprise System Integration Program, the updates were not always uploaded into the Army's Global Combat Support System.

In other examples, DoD OIG auditors found incorrect cost information on printers and other equipment resulting in a roughly $104 million overstatement. Additionally, Kuwait accountable property records showed one simulator used by the base fire department listed for $36.3 million, when their actual value was listed in other records as $499,950. Incorrect costs in the Army Enterprise System Integration Program could potentially affect the Army's financial statements, therefore internal controls need to be in place to prevent incorrect costs from being manually entered in the system.

While this management advisory contained no recommendations, the DoD OIG did provide examples of inaccurate costs to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), representatives from Global Combat Support System-Army and Army Enterprise System Integration Program to research and identify the causes and impacts of incorrect costs within these systems.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of Noncompetitive Contracts in Support of Overseas Contingency Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
AUD-MERO-22-03; October 18, 2021

The DoS OIG conducted this audit to determine whether the DoS 1) followed acquisition policy in awarding noncompetitive contracts in support of overseas contingency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq; and 2) performed the required steps to ensure that the DoS paid fair and reasonable prices for noncompetitively awarded contracts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Competition in Contracting Act requires full and open competition in awarding contracts, but there are certain exceptions under which an agency can award contracts using noncompetitive procedures. The Federal Acquisition Regulation and DoS procedures require Contracting Officers to justify, in writing, the reason for awarding noncompetitive contracts.

The DoS OIG determined that the DoS did not fully follow acquisition policy when awarding noncompetitive contracts in support of contingency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. DoS contracting officers did not document sole source award decisions for 2 of 22 of the noncompetitive contracts reviewed during the audit and did not publicly disclose those sole source determinations for any of the 11 noncompetitive contracts reviewed that required such a notice. Moreover, the DoS OIG found that the DoS did not fully adhere to required steps intended to ensure that fair and reasonable prices were paid on noncompetitive contract awards. The records for 2 of 22 contract files reviewed during the audit did not contain statements to demonstrate that DoS contracting personnel sufficiently considered price factors before making awarding the contract, and for 10 of the 11 contracts reviewed that required such documentation, DoS contracting officer did not adequately document the principal elements of the price negotiation.

The DoS OIG made eight recommendations in this report, which DoS management agreed to implement.

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Independent Audit Report on Chemonics International Inc.'s Direct Costs Incurred and Billed Under USAID/Iraq Contract AID-267-11-00006, July 1, 2015, to December 31, 2016

8-267-22-001-D; December 27, 2021

USAID Iraq contracted with the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) to express an opinion on whether the costs incurred and billed complied, in all material respects, with applicable contract terms from July 1, 2015, through December 31, 2016. Auditors reviewed $14,182,598 in expenditures incurred from July 1, 2015, through December 31, 2016. DCAA did not identify any questioned costs and determined the amounts audited represent allowable direct costs billed to USAID by Chemonics for the period July 1, 2015, through December 31, 2016. USAID OIG did not make any recommendations.

Independent Audit Report on Chemonics International Inc.'s Direct Costs Incurred and Billed Under USAID/Iraq Contract AID-267-11-00006, January 1 to September 29, 2017

8-267-22-002-D; December 27, 2021

USAID Iraq contracted with DCAA to express an opinion on whether the costs incurred and billed comply, in all material respects, with applicable contract terms from January 1, 2017, through September 29, 2017. Auditors reviewed $7,751,820 in expenditures from January 1 through September 29, 2017. DCAA did not identify any questioned costs and determined that the amounts audited represent allowable direct costs billed to USAID by Chemonics for the period January 1 through September 29, 2017. USAID OIG did not make any recommendations.

Examination of Incurred Costs Claimed on Flexibly Priced Contracts by The QED Group, LLC for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2018

3-000-22-009-I; December 21, 2021

USAID contracted with the independent certified public accounting firm of Booth Management Consulting, LLC to express an opinion on whether the costs claimed by The QED Group, LLC on in-scope contracts and subcontracts for the period ending December 31, 2018 were allowable, allocable, reasonable, and in accordance with contract terms and applicable laws and regulations. Auditors reviewed $23,230,113 for the contract period ending December 31, 2018. QED Group, LLC expenditures of U.S. Government financial assistance included awards in Iraq and Afghanistan. Booth Management Consulting, LLC identified indirect questioned costs of $112,398 composed of $105,775 in fringe pool costs and $6,623 in general and administrative pool cost. The accounting firm's examination did not disclose any findings that are required to be reported under government auditing standards. There were no direct questioned costs and USAID OIG did not make any recommendations.

Significant Events Surrounding USAID's Iraq Religious and Ethnic Minority Portfolio and Award Management Challenges

E-000-22-001-M; November 1, 2021

USAID OIG conducted an evaluation to objectively report on significant events surrounding the development of USAID's Iraq religious and ethnic minority portfolio from 2017 to 2019 and key challenges that related to the management of awards providing assistance to religious and ethnic minority groups.

USAID OIG determined that USAID sought to revise its strategy in Iraq by providing more assistance to religious and ethnic minority groups through local organizations and various implementing mechanisms. However, the initial mechanism, a Broad Agency Announcement, resulted in awards still going to large international organizations. By October 2019, USAID was able to increase the award mix of the religious and ethnic minority portfolio and engage directly with local Iraqi organizations through a new implementing mechanism, the New Partnerships Initiative.

As the religious and ethnic minority portfolio developed, USAID staff faced challenges executing and managing awards while handling significant media attention and increased involvement of senior leadership. In addition, USAID Iraq staffing levels were reduced as monitoring requirements increased. These staffing limitations negatively impacted the mission's ability to manage New Partnerships Initiative awards, resulting in awards being managed from USAID headquarters.

USAID OIG did not make any recommendations in this report; it was designed to inform USAID leadership and stakeholders who may be able to determine whether mitigation measures were effective and further actions are needed to help USAID better prepare for future policy shifts and resulting challenges in award management.

Financial Audit of Tearfund under Multiple USAID Awards, for the Year Ended March 31, 2019

8-000-22-001-R; October 25, 2021

USAID implementing partner Tearfund contracted with the independent certified public accounting firm Gelman, Rosenberg & Freedman, CPAs & Advisors to review Tearfund's expenditures of $13,192,706 in U.S. Government financial assistance including awards in Iraq from April 1, 2018, through March 30, 2019.

The accounting firm concluded that the fund accountability statement presented fairly, in all material respects, program revenues and costs incurred under the awards for the period audited and questioned ineligible costs of $9,284 ($7,829 ineligible and $1,455 related indirect costs). The accounting firm did not identify any material weaknesses in internal control or any material instances of noncompliance. Since the questioned costs did not meet USAID OIG's established threshold of $25,000 for making a recommendation, USAID OIG did not make any formal recommendations regarding this audit, but USAID OIG did suggest that USAID determine the allowability of the $9,284 in questioned costs and recover any amount determined to be unallowable.

ONGOING OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

As of December 31, 2021, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies had 11 ongoing projects related to OIR. Figure 11 describes the ongoing projects by strategic oversight area.

Tables 8 and 9, contained in Appendix E, lists the title and objective for each of these projects. Appendix E also identifies ongoing projects that the DoD OIG suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Those projects will restart when the DoD OIG resumes normal operations.

The following sections highlight some of these ongoing projects by strategic oversight area.

### MILITARY OPERATIONS AND SECURITY COOPERATION

- The **DoD OIG** is conducting an audit to determine whether the Military Services effectively conducted pre-deployment training to counter an adversary's use of unmanned aircraft systems.

- The **DoD OIG** is conducting an audit to determine whether vetted Syrian opposition groups met DoD requirements prior to receiving DoD funds.

SUPPORT TO MISSION

- The **DoD OIG** is conducting an audit to determine whether DoD officials effectively distributed and administered coronavirus disease–2019 vaccines to the DoD, including personnel serving in the OIR area of operations.

- The **DoD OIG** is conducting a follow up evaluation to determine whether corrective actions were taken as identified in the 2019 "Evaluation of DoD Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Persons in Kuwait," related to contractors at facilities supporting OIR.

- The **DoS OIG** is conducting an audit to determine whether the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad implemented internal controls to account for and manage personal property in accordance with Federal requirements and DoS regulations.

Figure 11.

Ongoing Projects by Strategic Oversight Area

SOA 1
Military Operations and Security Cooperation
4

SOA 3
Support to Mission
7

PLANNED OVERSIGHT PROJECTS

As of December 31, 2021, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies had 14 planned projects related to OIR. Figure 12 describes the planned projects by strategic oversight area.

Table 10, contained in Appendix E, list the titles and objectives for each of these projects. The following sections highlight some of these planned projects by strategic oversight area.

MILITARY OPERATIONS AND SECURITY COOPERATION

- The **DoD OIG** intends to conduct an audit to determine whether the DoD is implementing effective oversight, controls, and processes to mitigate cybersecurity risks to unmanned systems, including those in the OIR area of responsibility.

Figure 12.

Planned Projects by Strategic Oversight Area

SOA 2
Governance, Humanitarian
Assistance, and Development
1

SOA 3
Support
to Mission
4

SOA 1
Military
Operations
and Security
Cooperation
9

- The **DoD OIG** intends to conduct an evaluation to determine whether the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is collecting, analyzing, and distributing geospatial intelligence in support of Combatant Commands' intelligence requirements in accordance with law and DoD policy and guidance, including those in the OIR area of responsibility.

GOVERNANCE, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT

- **USAID OIG** intends to conduct an evaluation to determine the extent to which USAID has policies and procedures for obtaining Office of Foreign Assets Control licenses and adhering to U.S. Government sanctions in humanitarian settings.

SUPPORT TO MISSION

- The **DoD OIG** intends to conduct an audit to determine whether the Army is meeting mission goals associated with implementing a program to modernize equipment sets in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, to include Kuwait in support of OIR.

- The **DoS OIG** intends to conduct an audit to determine whether the DoS considered existing and future electrical power needs and infrastructure of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad when designing the new power plant, conducted oversight of the construction and commissioning of the new power plant, and took measures to mitigate design or construction deficiencies, if any.

INVESTIGATIONS AND HOTLINE ACTIVITY

Investigations

The investigative components of the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies continued to conduct investigative activity related to OIR during the quarter. However, COVID-19 limitations have led to a decrease in the overall number of open investigations. The DoD OIG's criminal investigative component, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), temporarily closed its office in Iraq, but maintained investigative personnel in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar, where they are working on cases related to OIR. DCIS agents also worked on OIR-related cases from offices in the United States. DoS OIG and USAID OIG investigators are working on cases related to OIR in Washington, D.C.

INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY RELATED TO OIR

During the quarter, the investigative branches of the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies closed 7 investigations, initiated 5 new investigations, and coordinated on 72 open investigations. The open investigations involve grant and procurement fraud, corruption, theft, program irregularities, computer intrusions, and human trafficking allegations.

Figure 13.

Primary Offense Locations and Types of Allegations, October 1, 2021–December 31, 2021.

As noted in Figure 13, the majority of primary offense locations and allegations related to OIR originated in Iraq and Kuwait.

The Lead IG agencies and partners continue to coordinate their investigative efforts through the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group, which consists of representatives from DCIS, the DoS OIG, USAID OIG, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations.

Figure 14.

Open Investigations and Sources of Allegations, October 1, 2021–December 31, 2021.

Note: * The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division has formally changed its name to USACID, from U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command.

Some investigations are joint with more than one agency and some not joint with any other agency. Therefore, the total number of Joint Open Cases may not equal the total number of Open Cases. Open Cases as of 12/31/2021.

Figure 14 describes open investigations related to OIR and sources of allegations.

During the quarter the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group conducted 63 fraud awareness briefings for 289 participants.

INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY RELATED TO LEGACY CASES

The Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies have six ongoing "legacy" investigations related to crimes in OIR area of operations that occurred prior to the designation of OIR.

Hotline

Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints specific to its agency. The hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; or abuse of authority. A DoD OIG Hotline investigator coordinates among the Lead IG agencies and others, as appropriate.

During the quarter, the DoD OIG hotline investigator received 333 allegations and referred 40 cases to Lead IG agencies and other investigative organizations. In some instances, it is possible for a case to contain multiple subjects and allegations.

As noted in Figure 15, the majority of the allegations during the reporting period were related to personal misconduct, criminal allegations, and reprisal.

Figure 15.

Hotline Activities

A pilot conducts preflight checks of a U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar. (U.S. Air Force photo)

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
Classified Appendix to this Report

This report normally includes an appendix containing classified information about the U.S. mission to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria. However, due to constraints resulting from the coronavirus disease–2019 pandemic, the Lead IG agencies did not prepare a classified appendix this quarter.

APPENDIX B
Methodology for Preparing this Lead IG Quarterly Report

This report complies with section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, which requires that the designated Lead IG provide a quarterly report, available to the public, on each overseas contingency operation, and is consistent with the requirement that a biannual report be published by the Lead IG on the activities of the Inspectors General with respect to that overseas contingency operation. The Chair of the Council of Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency designated the DoD IG as the Lead IG for Operation Inherent Resolve. The DoS IG is the Associate IG for the operation.

This report covers the period from October 1, 2021, through December 31, 2021. The three Lead IG agencies—DoD OIG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG—and partner oversight agencies contributed the content of this report.

To fulfill the congressional mandate to report on OIR, the Lead IG agencies gather data and information from Federal agencies and open sources. The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited the information collected through open-source research or from Federal agencies, and the information provided represents the view of the source cited in each instance.

INFORMATION COLLECTION FROM AGENCIES AND OPEN SOURCES

Each quarter, the Lead IG agencies gather information from the DoD, DoS, USAID, and other Federal agencies about their programs and operations related to OIR. The Lead IG agencies use the information provided by their respective agencies for quarterly reporting and oversight planning.

This report also draws on current, publicly available information from reputable sources. Sources used in this report may include the following:

- U.S. Government statements, press conferences, and reports
- Reports issued by international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and think tanks
- Media reports

The Lead IG agencies use open-source information to assess information obtained through their agency information collection process and provide additional detail about the operation.

REPORT PRODUCTION

The DoD IG, as the Lead IG for this operation, is responsible for assembling and producing this report. The DoD OIG, the DoS OIG, and USAID OIG draft the sections of the report related to the activities of their agencies and then participate in editing the entire report. Once the report is assembled, each OIG coordinates a two-phase review process within its own agency. During the first review, the Lead IG agencies ask relevant offices within their agencies to comment, correct inaccuracies, and provide additional documentation. The Lead IG agencies incorporate agency comments, where appropriate, and send the report back to the agencies for a second review prior to publication. The final report reflects the editorial view of the DoD OIG, the DoS OIG, and USAID OIG as independent oversight agencies.

APPENDIX C
Department of Justice Prosecutions and Activities Against Terrorism

Since 2014, the Department of Justice (DoJ) has charged more than 210 individuals with international terrorism-related conduct relating to ISIS. Since 2014, the DoJ has obtained more than 165 convictions; the remaining cases remain open. A portion of the aforementioned cases involve individuals who could be described as foreign terrorist fighters or homegrown violent extremists linked to ISIS, as well as those who may have assisted their conduct, obstructed investigations, or otherwise involved an identified link to ISIS.

The following examples include details on indictments, convictions, or sentences related to foreign terrorist fighters and homegrown violent extremists related to ISIS activity from October 1 through December 31, 2021:

- **On December 10, 2021, in the Eastern District of Virginia, Mohammed Khalifa** pleaded guilty to conspiring to provide material support to ISIS, resulting in death. On October 2, 2021, a complaint was unsealed charging Khalifa, a leading figure in ISIS's English Media Section who also served as an ISIS fighter, with conspiring to provide material support to ISIS, a foreign terrorist organization, resulting in death. The defendant was captured overseas by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in January 2019. He was transferred into the custody of the FBI, at which point he was first brought to Virginia. According to court documents, the defendant served as a lead translator in ISIS's propaganda production and the English-speaking narrator on multiple violent ISIS recruitment videos, including the two "Flames of War" videos released by ISIS. As part of his plea, Khalifa admitted that he executed two Syrian soldiers on behalf of ISIS.

- **On October 29, 2021, in the Southern District of Ohio, Naser Almadaoji** pleaded guilty to one count of attempting to provide material support—himself, as personnel—to ISIS and ISIS Wilayat Khorasan (ISIS-K). Almadaoji, an Iraqi-born U.S. citizen, purchased a plane ticket for travel on October 24, 2018, and was arrested at the airport after checking in and obtaining his boarding pass. The defendant intended to travel to Astana, Kazakhstan, where he planned to be smuggled into Afghanistan so that he could join and receive military training from ISIS-K in support of both that terrorist group and ISIS. Almadaoji explained to an individual whom he believed to be an ISIS supporter that he wanted "weapons experts training, planning and executing, hit and run, capturing high value targets, ways to break into homes and avoid security guards." He began making travel plans in September 2018. Prior to that, between February 16 and 24, 2018, Almadaoji traveled to Egypt and Jordan for the purpose of joining ISIS's affiliate in the Sinai Peninsula, ISIS Wilayat Sinai, another designated foreign terrorist organization, but he ultimately was unsuccessful. Almadaoji told an individual posing as an ISIS supporter online about his proposed plot to start a conflict in the United States between the federal government and anti-government militias. He

asked the purported ISIS supporter for a guide on how to make a car bomb. In August 2018, Almadaoji also told the purported ISIS supporter that he was "always willing" to assist with "projects" in the United States. Almadaoji recorded and sent a video of himself wearing a headscarf and pledging allegiance to the leader of ISIS. In addition, Almadaoji translated a purported ISIS document from Arabic to English, and he told his contact, whom Almadaoji believed to be part of ISIS, "Don't thank me . . . it's my duty."

- **On October 22, 2021, in the Southern District of Florida, Samuel Baptiste** pleaded guilty to attempting to materially support terrorism. According to court documents, Baptiste attempted to provide material support to a terrorist act through the use of an explosive device by providing information pertaining to the construction of explosive devices by posting internet links and portions of a manual containing specific instructions on the construction of explosives, to persons whom he believed were acting on behalf of ISIS.

- **On October 18, 2021, in the Northern District of Illinois, a jury found Thomas Osadzinski** guilty after a two-week trial of attempting to provide material support to ISIS. Osadzinski designed a process using a computer script to make ISIS propaganda more conveniently disseminated online. The process would automatically copy and preserve ISIS media postings in an organized format, allowing social media users to continue to conveniently access and share the content. Osadzinski in 2019 shared his script—and instructions for how to use it—with individuals whom he believed to be ISIS supporters and members of pro-ISIS media organizations. Unbeknownst to Osadzinski, the individuals were actually covert FBI employees and a person confidentially working with law enforcement.

- In addition, 13 people have been transferred to the United States from Iraq and Syria to face federal criminal charges related to terrorism since 2014.

During the quarter, some DoJ programs designed to train Coalition partners in Iraq and Syria on law enforcement and domestic intelligence as part of counter-ISIS operations, remained limited due to the unexpected early departure of its Justice Attaché. The DoJ's Rule of Law Office continued following counterterrorism matters through the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and the FBI Attaché's Office. DoJ planned to deploy a new Justice Attaché to Baghdad in January 2022 on a 2-year assignment. Training and capacity building efforts are anticipated to be reinstated during that timeframe. Additionally, the DoJ's National Security Division planned to deploy a new attaché to Iraq in January or February 2022. The National Security Division Attaché will help facilitate civilian prosecutorial dispositions for foreign terrorist fighters and other terrorists, including efforts to counter the financing of terrorism. This includes:

- Reviewing intelligence and available information to determine if criminal prosecutions can be brought against suspected foreign terrorist fighters and other terrorists, including those being detained in Syria by partner forces, in either U.S. or foreign courts;

- Navigating the complexities of foreign legal systems and assisting in assembling available information for use by international partners in foreign investigations and prosecutions; and

- Assisting both interagency and international partners at the platform in navigating complex legal issues associated with the use of intelligence in criminal investigations and court proceedings, and issues related to the admissibility of evidence (converting intelligence into evidence).

Other DoJ programs continued, including through the DoJ's Office of International Affairs, which assists partner nations in developing institutions needed for effective mutual legal assistance and extradition cooperation. In coordination with the DoS, experts from the DoJ Office of International Affairs work with international counterparts, particularly throughout Asia, Africa and the Middle East, to help partner countries build effective central authorities. These institutions support effective international cooperation in criminal matters and enable the legal processes necessary to bring terrorists and other criminals to justice under the rule of law. Personnel from the Federal Bureau

of Investigation (FBI) are not involved in training or capacity-building programs with coalition partners in Iraq, outside of routine interactions with host nation partners on a variety of criminal and national security matters. The FBI does not have a presence in Syria for capacity-building activities. However, the FBI does have personnel providing support to interagency and foreign partners through international intelligence sharing efforts.

APPENDIX D
Department of the Treasury and Department of State Actions Against Terrorist Financing

Executive Order 13224, as amended, provides the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State global terrorism authorities that authorize the Department to target activities of extremist groups, including ISIS. The Department of the Treasury's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence and its Office of Foreign Assets Control work to disrupt the ability of terrorist organizations to fund their operations. The DoS's Bureau of Counterterrorism leads DoS activities to counter terrorist finance and to designate Specially Designated Global Terrorists and Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY DESIGNATIONS AND ACTIVITIES

Since 2014, the Secretary of the Treasury has designated 100 individuals and entities providing support to ISIS pursuant to Executive Order 13224. No individuals or organizations sanctioned for providing support to ISIS were removed from the sanctions list during this reporting period.

The Department of the Treasury (Treasury) leverages its participation and influence to develop a shared understanding of the threat posed by ISIS, as well as to encourage countries to take action within their jurisdictions and in coordination with others to disrupt ISIS financing and facilitation.

Treasury continued to work with interagency and Coalition partners, including the Iraqi government, to prioritize identifying ISIS's financial reserves and financial leaders, disrupting its financial facilitation networks in Iraq, and designating ISIS facilitators, front companies, and fundraisers in Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and elsewhere. Treasury also takes a leadership role in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, serving as a co-lead of the Counter ISIS Finance Group along with its counterparts from Italy and Saudi Arabia.

Treasury reported that ISIS's financial situation remains largely unchanged since last quarter. ISIS continued to raise funds through extortion of oil smuggling networks in eastern Syria, kidnapping for ransom targeting civilian businesses and populations, extortion, looting, and the possible operation of front companies. The group relied on money services businesses, including hawalas (informal money transfer networks), throughout Iraq, Syria, and Turkey to transfer funds internationally. ISIS probably has tens of millions of U.S. dollars available in cash reserves dispersed across the region, but Treasury was not aware of the amount of money ISIS distributed during this quarter.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DESIGNATIONS

This quarter, the Secretary of State did not make any Specially Designated Global Terrorist designations that were relevant to OIR.

APPENDIX E
Ongoing Oversight Projects

Tables 8 and 9 list the title and objective for Lead IG and partner agencies' ongoing oversight projects related to OIR.

Table 8.

Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OIR by Lead IG Agency, as of December 31, 2021

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of Pre-Deployment Training on Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems
To determine whether the Military Services conducted pre-deployment training to counter an adversary's use of Unmanned Aerial Systems in accordance with the operational requirements of the geographic combatant commands, including those in the OIR area of responsibility.
*Suspended due to COVID-19. The project will restart when force health protection conditions permit.

Audit of the DoD Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund Stipends to the Vetted Syrian Opposition
To determine if the DoD assessed whether Vetted Syrian Opposition groups met DoD requirements prior to the DoD providing stipends from the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund for Syria to the Vetted Syrian Opposition.

Follow-Up Evaluation of Report No. DoDIG-2019-088, "Evaluation of DoD Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Persons in Kuwait," June 11, 2019
To determine whether the DoD implemented corrective actions for the recommendations in report DODIG-2019-088, "Evaluation of DoD Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Persons in Kuwait," June 11, 2019, which is related to contractors at facilities supporting OIR.

Audit of DoD Implementation of the DoD Coronavirus Disease–2019 Vaccine Distribution Plan
To determine whether DoD officials effectively distributed and administered coronavirus disease–2019 vaccines to DoD's workforce, including those serving in the OIR area of operations, in accordance with DoD guidance.

Audit of Army Accountability of Government-Furnished Property Under Base Operations Contracts in Kuwait
To determine whether the Army effectively accounted for Government-Furnished Property provided to the base operations and security support services contractor in Kuwait at facilities that support OIR.

Audit of Tracking, Recovery, and Reuse of Department of Defense-Owned Shipping Containers
To determine to what extent the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps complied with DoD requirements to track, recover, and reuse shipping containers at facilities that support OIR, and included those containers in an accountable property system of record.

Audit of Training Ranges Supporting Units in the U.S. European Command
To determine whether training ranges have the capability and capacity to support combat readiness for units assigned to the U.S. European Command, including facilities that support OIR.

Evaluation of the DoD's Management of Traumatic Brain Injury
To determine the extent to which the Defense Health Agency and Military Service medical departments implemented policies and procedures, and provided oversight, to ensure that Service members who sustained traumatic brain injuries—including those who served in Iraq and Syria—were identified and screened to determine their appropriate level of care.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of Nonexpendable Personal Property at U.S. Embassy Baghdad, Iraq
To determine whether the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad has implemented internal controls to account for and manage the life cycle of nonexpendable personal property in accordance with Federal requirements and DoS regulations.

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of USAID's New Partnerships Initiative
To determine the extent to which USAID has established a framework for effectively implementing the New Partnerships Initiative as well as processes for measuring the initiative's performance and results, which has included support for religious and ethnic minorities in Iraq that were victimized by ISIS.

Table 9.

Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OIR by Lead IG Partner Agencies, as of December 31, 2021

AIR FORCE AUDIT AGENCY

Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreement Accountability
To determine whether the Army had processes in place to accurately record acquisition and cross-servicing agreement orders in Kuwait, including those that support OIR.

APPENDIX F
Planned Oversight Projects

Table 10 lists the titles and objectives for Lead IG planned oversight projects.

Table 10.

Planned Oversight Projects Related to OIR by Lead IG Agencies, as of December 31, 2021

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of Unmanned Systems Cybersecurity Controls
To determine whether the DoD is implementing effective oversight, controls, and processes to mitigate cybersecurity risks to unmanned systems, including those in the OIR area of responsibility.

Audit of U.S. Army Central's Modernized Enduring Equipment Set in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility
To determine whether the Army's implementation of the modernized enduring equipment sets in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility is meeting mission goals.

Follow up Audit of Management of Army Prepositioned Equipment
To determine whether the Army implemented the recommendations identified in DODIG-2018-132, "Management of Army Equipment in Kuwait and Qatar," June 29, 2018, to improve Army Prepositioned Stock–Southwest Asia inventory accountability and maintenance for equipment that supports the OIR mission.

Audit of Oversight of the Department of Defense Language Interpretation and Translation Enterprise II Contract
To determine the extent to which the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency supports U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Southern Command operations, by collecting, analyzing, and distributing geospatial intelligence information to include support to OIR.

Evaluation of the Use of Compartmented Geospatial Intelligence Collection for Operation Inherent Resolve
To evaluate National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and U.S. Central Command intelligence collection in support of OIR.

Evaluation of the U.S. Central Command's Defense of Critical Assets Within its Area of Responsibility Against Missiles and Unmanned Aircraft Systems
To determine the extent to which the U.S. Central Command can defend critical assets within its area of responsibility against missile and unmanned aircraft system threats.

Evaluation of the Military Sealift Command's Surge Sealift Readiness in a Global Crisis
To determine the Military Sealift Command's readiness to deploy, operate, and sustain operations to meet critical supply and equipment requirements through contracts with vendors during a global crisis, and for overseas contingency operations such as OIR.

Evaluation of Service Capabilities to Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems
To determine the extent to which the Military Services have implemented intelligence support and techniques, tactics and procedures necessary to employ counter-unmanned aircraft systems.

Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the Security Force Assistance Brigades
To determine the extent to which the Security Force Assistance Brigades are meeting the Geographic Combatant Commands' security force assistance requirements and contributing to improving U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team readiness, including for those deployed or deployable to the OIR area of responsibility.

Evaluation of the U.S. Special Operations Command Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center
To determine whether the U.S. Special Operations Command's Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center meets the combatant commander's requirements to counter adversary messaging and influence in the information environment, including in support of OIR.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of the U.S. Embassy Baghdad, Iraq Power Plant Performance
To determine whether the DoS assessed the existing and future electrical power needs and infrastructure of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad when designing the new power plant; conducted oversight of the construction and commissioning of the new power plant; and took measures to mitigate design or construction deficiencies, if any.

Audit of the PAE Operations and Maintenance Contract at Embassy Baghdad, Iraq
To determine whether the DoS is administering the PAE operations and maintenance contract for the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq in accordance with Federal and DoS requirements and whether PAE is operating in accordance with the contract terms and conditions.

Audit of Physical Security Standards for Temporary Facilities at High Threat Posts
To determine whether the DoS has instituted internal control procedures and standardized designs to meet applicable physical security standards for temporary structures used at high-threat, high-risk posts, including posts in Iraq.

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Evaluation of USAID's Sanctions Policies and Procedures
To assess USAID policies and procedures for obtaining OFAC licenses and adhering to U.S. Government sanctions in humanitarian settings and evaluate how USAID identifies, analyzes, and responds to implementer risks and challenges related to sanctions in Syria.

ACRONYMS

Acronym	
BDL	bed-down location
BDSC	Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center
BHA	USAID Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance
CJTF-OIR	Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve
COVAX	Coronavirus–2019 Vaccines Global Access
COVID–19	coronavirus disease–2019
CPIG	Critical Petroleum Infrastructure Guard
C-RAM	Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar system
CTEF	Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund
CTS	Counter Terrorism Service
DCAA	Defense Contract Audit Agency
DCIS	Defense Criminal Investigative Service
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
DoJ	Department of Justice
DoS	Department of State
DRL	DoS Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
ESSA	Eastern Syria Security Area
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GDP	gross domestic product
HAT	Hezen Anti-Terror units
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
IDP	internally displaced person
IED	improvised explosive device
IHEC	Independent High Electoral Commission
InSF	Internal Security Forces
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces

Acronym	
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
ITAC	Iraqi Terminal Air Controller
JOC-I	Joint Operations Command–Iraq
KCL	Kurdish Coordination Line
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
KSF	Kurdish Security Forces
Lead IG agencies	The DoD, DoS, and USAID OIGs
MANPADS	man-portable air defense systems
MaT	Mughawir al-Thawra
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoI	Iraqi Ministry of Interior
MoPA	Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OIR	Operation Inherent Resolve
OSC-I	Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq
OTI	USAID Office of Transition Initiatives
OUSD(P) ISA	DoD Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
PMF	Popular Mobilization Forces
PrISF	Provincial Internal Security Forces
PRM	DoS Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
RGB	Regional Guard Brigades
SANES	Self-Administration of North and East Syria
SDF	Syrian Democratic Forces
SOAG	Special Operations Advisory Group

Acronym	
SOJTF-L	Special Operations Joint Task Force-Levant
START/NEA	DoS Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Syria Transition Assistance Response Team
TBI	traumatic brain injury
TMF	Tribal Mobilization Forces
TSO	Turkish-supported opposition
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
UN	United Nations
UNAMI	UN Assistance Mission in Iraq

Acronym	
UNHCR	The UN Refugee Agency
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNODC	UN Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSCR	UN Security Council Resolution
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	The U.S. Central Command
USSCOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
WHO	World Health Organization

A Belgian Air Component pilot flies an F-16 Fighting Falcon during a mission in support of CJTF-OIR. (U.S. Air Force photo)

ENDNOTES

1. CJTF-OIR, website, "About CJTF-OIR," undated; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 002, 12/22/2021.
2. CJTF-OIR, fact sheet, "Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve Fact Sheet," undated.
3. OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 1/24/2022.
4. OUSD(P) ISA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 006, 12/16/2021.
5. CJTF-OIR, fact sheet, "Operation Inherent Resolve," 1/2022.
6. Lead IG, "Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the U.S. Congress, July 1, 2018-September 30, 2018," 11/3/2018; DoS, cable, "Extension of Ordered Departure for Embassy Baghdad and the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center (BDSC)," 22 STATE 3524, 1/12/2022.
7. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
8. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
9. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 016, 12/22/2021.
10. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOLO15, 1/18/2022.
11. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 016, 12/22/2021.
12. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 016, 12/22/2021.
13. DoS, transcript, "Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism John T. Godfrey on the 2020 Country Report on Terrorism," 12/16/2021; CJTF-OIR, fact sheet, "Operation Inherent Resolve," 1/2022.
14. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 018, 12/22/2021.
15. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 026, 12/22/2021.
16. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL062, 1/18/2022.
17. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 023, 12/22/2021.
18. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 026, 12/22/2021.
19. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 027, 12/22/2021.
20. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 028, 12/22/2021.
21. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
22. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 028, 12/22/2021.
23. Embassy Baghdad, cable, "Iraq: Federal Supreme Court Certifies Election Results," 21 BAGHDAD 2280, 12/28/2021; DoS, vetting comments, 1/26/2022.
24. Embassy Baghdad, cable, "Mission Iraq Official Informal: Wednesday, November 24," 21 MDA 52112, 11/24/2021; Hassan Ali Ahmed, "Iraqi Election Results Sent to Federal Supreme Court for Approval," Al-Monitor, 12/1/2021; DoS, vetting comments, 1/26/2022.
25. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
26. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 032 and 052, 12/22/2021.
27. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 032, 12/22/2021.
28. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 032, 12/22/2021.
29. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 032, 12/22/2021.
30. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 050, 12/22/2021.
31. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 047, 12/22/2021.
32. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 048, 12/22/2021.
33. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 052, 12/22/2021.
34. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 038, 12/22/2021.
35. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 038, 12/22/2021.
36. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 075, 12/22/2021.
37. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 075, 12/22/2021.
38. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 067, 12/22/2021.
39. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.
40. EPIC, "Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitor: December 9–December 16, 2021," 12/16/2021; Khazan Jangiz, "Iraq to Close Last IDP Camp in Mosul: Ministry," Rudaw, 12/15/2021.
41. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; WHO, "Iraq: Health Cluster Bulletin No. 11 - (November 2021), 12/22/2021; USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 11/23/2021.
42. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.
43. Embassy Baghdad, cable, "Iraq FY2022 Redeclaration of Complex Emergency," 21 BAGHDAD 2164, 12/6/2021.
44. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.
45. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.
46. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 004, 12/22/2021.
47. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 089 and 22.1 OIR 091, 12/22/2021.
48. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 083 and 22.1 OIR 091, 12/22/2021.
49. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 091, 22.1 OIR 093 and 22.1 OIR 094 12/22/2021.
50. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 091 and 22.1 OIR 096, 12/22/2021.
51. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 097, 12/22/2021.
52. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 102, 22.1 OIR 103, 22.1 OIR 104, 22.1 OIR 106, 12/22/2021; DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
53. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 112, 12/22/2021.

54. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR CLAR104, 1/18/2022.

55. OUSD(P) ISA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 105, 12/16/2021.

56. OUSD(P) ISA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 109, 12/16/2021; DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 110, 12/22/2021; Daily Sabah, "Syrian Opposition Forces Prepare for Possible Turkish Op in Syria," 10/31/2021.

57. OUSD(P) ISA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 109, 12/16/2021; DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 110, 12/22/2021.

58. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

59. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 1/11/2022.

60. DoS, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.

61. CJTF-OIR, press release, "Combat Role in Iraq Complete; Invitation from Iraq Reaffirmed to Advise, Assist, Enable," 12/9/2021; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 004, 12/22/2021; OUSD(P) ISA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 006, 12/16/2021.

62. DoS, press release, "Joint Statement on the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Dialogue," 7/26/2021.

63. CJTF-OIR, fact sheet, "Operation Inherent Resolve," 1/2022.

64. OUSD(P) ISA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 006, 12/16/2021.

65. OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 1/24/2022.

66. OUSD(P) ISA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 005, 12/16/2021; DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/15/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.

67. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

68. CJTF-OIR, website, "About CJTF-OIR," undated.

69. Naval History and Heritage Command, website, "Operation Inherent Resolve," 8/6/2020; The Wilson Center, "Timeline: The Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State," 10/28/2019.

70. CJTF-OIR, website, "CJTF Campaign Design," undated; OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 1/24/2022.

71. CJTF-OIR, "History of CJTF-OIR," 9/2020; CJTF-OIR, vetting comment #C1, 4/20/2021; OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 4/20/2021.

72. CJTF-OIR, "History of CJTF-OIR," 9/2020; CJTF-OIR, vetting comment #C1, 4/20/2021; OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 4/20/2021.

73. OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 4/20/2021.

74. USAID, fact sheet, "Iraq Country Profile," 1/27/2021.

75. DoS, "Integrated Country Strategy–Iraq," 8/13/2018.

76. USAID, website, "About Syria," 1/12/2022; DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 6/18/2021; USAID, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.

77. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

78. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

79. DoS, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.

80. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 003 and 22.1 OIR 005, 12/22/2021.

81. USAID ME Bureau, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.

82. DoS, cable, "USUN: Talking Points for the November 15 UN Security Council Consultation on Syria, 21 STATE 113228, 11/9/2021.

83. DoS, cable, "Readout: D-ISIS Political Directors Meeting Highlights Iraq Transition, Foreign Fighter Repatriation and DISIS Efforts in Africa and Afghanistan," 21 STATE 127522, 12/22/2021.

84. DoD Comptroller, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL013, 1/14/2022; OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 1/24/2022.

85. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL014, 1/18/2022; CJTF-OIR, vetting comment, 1/25/2022.

86. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL014, 1/18/2022; CJTF-OIR, vetting comment, 1/25/2022.

87. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 014, 12/22/2021.

88. DoD Comptroller, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL013, 1/14/2022.

89. DoD Comptroller, "FY 2022 Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) Request," 5/2021.

90. USAID, "Iraq-Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #2," 3/11/2021; USAID, "Syria-Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #8," 6/28/2021; DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 9/18/2021.

91. UN OCHA, Financial Tracking Service for FY2021, as of 12/2021.

92. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 6/18/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 7/20/2021.

93. OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 1/24/2022.

94. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 012, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL012, 1/18/2022.

95. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 012, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL012, 1/18/2022; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 21.4 OIR FOL002, 10/13/2021.

96. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 012, 12/22/2021.

97. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 012, 12/22/2021.

98. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

99. DoS, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.

100. Lead IG, "Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the U.S. Congress, January 1, 2020–March 31, 2020," 5/4/2020.

101. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

102. DoS, cable, "Extension of Ordered Departure for Embassy Baghdad and the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center (BDSC)," 22 STATE 3524, 1/12/2022.

103. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

104. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

105. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

106. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

107. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

108. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

109. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.

110. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

111. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

112. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 016, 12/22/2021.

113. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 016, 12/22/2021.

114. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 022 and 22.1 OIR 023, 12/22/2021; DIA, vetting comment, 1/25/2022.
115. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 004, 12/22/2021; OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 1/25/2022.
116. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOLO015, 1/18/2022.
117. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOLO015, 1/18/2022.
118. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOLO015, 1/18/2022.
119. Flashpoint, "ISIS Attacks, November 2021: Key Trends, Statistics and Geographic Analysis," 12/7/2021.
120. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 016, 12/22/2021.
121. CJTF-OIR, vetting comment #Q1, 1/22/2021.
122. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 016, 12/22/2021.
123. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 016, 12/22/2021.
124. CJTF-OIR, fact sheet, 1/7/2022; DoS, transcript, "Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism John T. Godfrey on the 2020 Country Report on Terrorism," 12/16/2021.
125. CJTF-OIR, fact sheet, "Operation Inherent Resolve," 1/7/2022.
126. Soufan Center, "IntelBrief: The Islamic State is Not Finished in Iraq and Syria," 11/1/2021; Soufan Center, "IntelBrief: The Islamic State Continues to Mutate, Defying Efforts to Stamp it Out," 12/16/2021; Gregory Waters, "Smuggling Away the Future in Syria's Northeast," Counter Extremism Project, 10/26/2021.
127. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 004, 12/22/2021.
128. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 016, 12/22/2021.
129. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 016, 12/22/2021.
130. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 018, 12/22/2021; OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 1/24/2022.
131. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 018, 12/22/2021.
132. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 018, 12/22/2021.
133. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 016, 12/22/2021.
134. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 016, 12/22/2021.
135. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 004, 12/22/2021.
136. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 019, 12/22/2021.
137. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 004, 12/22/2021; BBC, "Iraq Claims Capture of IS Financial Chief in Operation Abroad," 10/11/2021; Treasury, "Treasury Sanctions Major Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Leaders, Financial Figures, Facilitators, and Supporters," 9/29/2015.
138. BBC, "Iraq Claims Capture of IS Financial Chief in Operation Abroad," 10/11/2021; Louisa Loveluck and Mustafa Salim, "Iraq Says it has Arrested ISIS Leader who was Deputy to Baghdadi," Washington Post, 10/11/2021; Martin Chulov, "Iraq Captures Alleged Islamic State Finance Chief in Operation Abroad," The Guardian, 10/11/2021.
139. DoS Diplomatic Security Service, Facebook post, "Up to $5 Million Reward for Information," 8/22/2019; DoS, press release, "Rewards for Justice: Reward Offer for Information Leading to Identification or Location of ISIS Deputies," 8/21/2019.
140. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 019, 12/22/2021.
141. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 019, 12/22/2021.
142. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 019, 12/22/2021.
143. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 025, 12/22/2021.
144. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 025, 12/22/2021.
145. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 025, 12/22/2021.
146. DoS, "Country Reports on Terrorism 2020," 12/16/2021.
147. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 026, 12/22/2021.
148. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 026, 12/22/2021.
149. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 026, 12/22/2021.
150. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 026, 12/22/2021.
151. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 018 and 22.1 OIR 026, 12/22/2021; Shelly Kittleson, "Attack on Syrian Prison Holding Iraqi Islamic State Captives Raises Concerns," Al-Monitor, 11/16/2021; OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 1/24/2022.
152. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 026, 12/22/2021.
153. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 023, 12/22/2021.
154. Treasury OIG, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 WOG TREAS 003, 1/6/2022.
155. Treasury OIG, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 WOG TREAS 003, 1/6/2022.
156. Treasury OIG, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 WOG TREAS 003, 1/6/2022.
157. Treasury OIG, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 WOG TREAS 004, 1/6/2022.
158. Treasury OIG, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 WOG TREAS 004, 1/6/2022.
159. Treasury OIG, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 WOG TREAS 004, 1/6/2022.
160. DIA, vetting comment, 2/3/2022.
161. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 021, 12/22/2021.
162. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 021, 12/22/2021.
163. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 021, 12/22/2021.
164. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 021, 12/22/2021.
165. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 021, 12/22/2021.
166. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 021, 12/22/2021.

167. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 021, 12/22/2021.
168. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 020, 12/22/2021.
169. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 020, 12/22/2021.
170. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 020, 12/22/2021.
171. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 020, 12/22/2021.
172. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 020, 12/22/2021; DIA, vetting comment, 1/25/2022.
173. DoJ OIG, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 WOG DOJ 001B, 1/6/2022.
174. DoJ OIG, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 WOG DOJ 001B, 1/6/2022; DoJ, news release, "Leading ISIS Media Figure and Foreign Fighter Pleads Guilty to Conspiring to Provide Material Support to a Terrorist Organization, Resulting in Death," 12/10/2021.
175. DoJ OIG, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 WOG DOJ 001B, 1/6/2022; DoJ, news release, "Leading ISIS Media Figure and Foreign Fighter Pleads Guilty to Conspiring to Provide Material Support to a Terrorist Organization, Resulting in Death," 12/10/2021.
176. DoJ OIG, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 WOG DOJ 001B, 1/6/2022; DoJ, news release, "Leading ISIS Media Figure and Foreign Fighter Pleads Guilty to Conspiring to Provide Material Support to a Terrorist Organization, Resulting in Death," 12/10/2021.
177. DoJ OIG, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 WOG DOJ 001B, 1/6/2022.
178. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 022, 12/22/2021.
179. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 016, 12/22/2021.
180. Louisa Loveluck and Mustafa Salim, "In Iraq, Islamic State Killing of Shiites Provokes Reprisal Against Sunnis," Washington Post, 11/12/2021; Hiwa Hassam, "Diyala Residents Recount Fatal Attack," Rudaw, 10/28/2021; Shelly Kittleson, "Islamic State Attack Sparks Sectarian Bloodletting in Iraq's Diyala," Al-Monitor, 11/4/2021.
181. Louisa Loveluck and Mustafa Salim, "In Iraq, Islamic State Killing of Shiites Provokes Reprisal Against Sunnis," Washington Post, 11/12/2021; Hiwa Hassam, "Diyala Residents Recount Fatal Attack," Rudaw, 10/28/2021; Shelly Kittleson, "Islamic State Attack Sparks Sectarian Bloodletting in Iraq's Diyala," Al-Monitor, 11/4/2021.
182. Louisa Loveluck and Mustafa Salim, "In Iraq, Islamic State Killing of Shiites Provokes Reprisal Against Sunnis," Washington Post, 11/12/2021; Hiwa Hassam, "Diyala Residents Recount Fatal Attack," Rudaw, 10/28/2021; Shelly Kittleson, "Islamic State Attack Sparks Sectarian Bloodletting in Iraq's Diyala," Al-Monitor, 11/4/2021.
183. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 018, 12/22/2021.
184. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 018, 12/22/2021.
185. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 022, 12/22/2021.
186. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 022, 12/22/2021.
187. Shafaq News, "IED Explosion Targets a Convoy of the Global Coalition Heading to Kuwait," 12/27/2021.
188. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 017, 12/22/2021.
189. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 017, 12/22/2021.
190. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 016, 12/22/2021.
191. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 023, 12/22/2021.
192. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 023, 12/22/2021; DIA, vetting comment, 1/25/2022.
193. Jeff Seldin, "IS Shows Signs of Strengthening in Syria, Iraq," Voice of America, 11/5/2021.
194. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 023, 12/22/2021.
195. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 023, 12/22/2021.
196. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 018 and 22.1 OIR 023, 12/22/2021.
197. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 023, 12/22/2021.
198. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 018, 12/22/2021; DIA, vetting comment, 1/25/2022.
199. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 016, 12/22/2021.
200. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 018 and 22.1 OIR 023, 12/22/2021.
201. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 018, 12/22/2021.
202. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 018, 12/22/2021.
203. Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, "SOHR: 13 Tribal Pro-Government Fighters Ambushed, Killed by ISIS Terrorists in Syria's Deir Ezzor," 11/14/2021.
204. Associated Press, "Report: 10 Oil Workers Killed in Attack on Bus in Syria," 12/2/2021; Al-Monitor, "Oil Workers Killed in Islamic State Attack in Syria," 12/3/2021.
205. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 023, 12/22/2021.
206. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 023, 12/22/2021.
207. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 027, 12/22/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.
208. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 028, 12/22/2021.
209. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 028, 12/22/2021.
210. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 028, 12/22/2021.
211. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 028, 12/22/2021.
212. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
213. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 030, 12/22/2021.

214. Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, "SOHR Booklet, 2021 Developments," 1/2/2022; Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, "Al-Hawl Mini-state in 2021 | 89 Persons Killed by ISIS and Proxies, and Harsh Living Conditions Claim the Lives of 74 Children, While 780 Families Leave the Camp Under SDC Initiative," 12/31/2021.

215. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

216. Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, "'Al-Hawl Mini-state' in 2021 | 89 Persons Killed by ISIS and Proxies, and Harsh Living Conditions Claim the Lives of 74 Children, While 780 Families Leave the Camp Under SDC Initiative," 12/31/2021; DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 1/11/2022; Heather Murdock, "Reporter's Notebook: Islamic State Murders in Syria's al-Hol Camp," Voice of America, 11/25/2021; Shafaq News, "Report: Murders Surge in al-Hol Camp Stalked by Isis," 11/12/2021.

217. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 027, 12/22/2021.

218. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 030, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, vetting comment #Q2, 1/24/2022.

219. Syrian Observatory for Human Rights , "SOHR: Security forces Arrest 14 Iraqis at Al-Hol," 11/22/2021; Layal Shakir, "Security Forces Arrest 14 Iraqis at al-Hol: Conflict Monitor," Rudaw, 11/22/2021.

220. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 026, 12/22/2021.

221. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 21.4 OIR 027, 9/22/2021.

222. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 028, 12/22/2021.

223. Amnesty International, "Syria: Repatriate at Least 27,000 Children Held in Dire Conditions in North-east Syria,"11/30/2021.

224. DoS, "Integrated Country Strategy: Iraq," 8/13/2018.

225. DoS, "Integrated Country Strategy: Iraq," 8/13/2018; DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

226. OUSD(P) ISA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 006, 12/16/2021; OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 1/24/2022.

227. OUSD(P) ISA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 004 and 22.1 OIR 006, 12/16/2021; OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 1/24/2022.

228. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 002, 12/22/2021.

229. CJTF-OIR, responses to DoD OIG request for information, 21.3 OIR 003, 6/24/2021 and 21.4 CLAR036, 10/12/2021.

230. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 21.4 CLAR036, 10/12/2021.

231. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 032 and 052, 12/22/2021.

232. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 032, 12/22/2021.

233. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 032, 12/22/2021.

234. CJTF-OIR, vetting comment #Q3, 1/24/2022.

235. CJTF-OIR, press releases, "CJTF-OIR Strike Summary Report," 2/13/2020, 3/24/2020, 4/10/2021, 4/30/2020, 6/24/2020, 9/8/2020, 10/29/2020, 12/14/2020, 1/6/2021, 2/4/2021, 7/6/2021, 7/7/2021, 7/9/2021, 8/4/2021, and 9/20/2021.

236. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 032, 12/22/2021.

237. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 032, 12/22/2021.

238. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 032, 12/22/2021.

239. CJTF-OIR, vetting comment, 1/24/2022.

240. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 047, 12/22/2021.

241. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 032, 12/22/2021.

242. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 032, 12/22/2021.

243. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 050, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL050, 1/18/2022.

244. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 050, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL050, 1/18/2022.

245. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 050, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL050, 1/18/2022.

246. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 050, 12/22/2021.

247. CJTF-OIR, vetting comment, 1/25/2022.

248. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 046, 22.1 OIR 047, and 22.1 OIR 052, 12/22/2021.

249. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 046, 12/22/2021.

250. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 046, 12/22/2021.

251. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL050, 1/18/2022.

252. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 047, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, vetting comment #Q28, 1/24/2022; DoD OUSD(P), vetting comment, 2/1/2022.

253. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 047, 12/22/2021.

254. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 048, 12/22/2021.

255. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 048, 12/22/2021.

256. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 048, 12/22/2021.

257. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 048, 12/22/2021.

258. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 048, 12/22/2021.

259. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 048, 12/22/2021.

260. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 048, 12/22/2021; OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 1/24/2022.

261. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL050, 1/18/2022.

262. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 052, 12/22/2021; OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 1/24/2022.

263. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 052, 12/22/2021.

264. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 052, 12/22/2021.

265. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR CLAR052, 1/18/2022.

266. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 052, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR CLAR052, 1/18/2022; CJTF-OIR, vetting comment, 1/24/2022.

267. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 052, 12/22/2021.

268. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 048 and 22.1 OIR 054, 12/22/2021.

269. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 054, 12/22/2021.

270. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 054, 12/22/2021.

271. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 054, 12/22/2021.

272. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, press release, "Iraq–Aerostats and Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment Tower Systems," 5/13/2014.

273. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 053, 12/22/2021; OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 1/24/2022.

274. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 053, 12/22/2021.

275. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 053, 12/22/2021.

276. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 053, 12/22/2021.

277. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 053, 12/22/2021.

278. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 053, 12/22/2021.

279. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 053, 12/22/2021.

280. USCENTCOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 065, 12/22/2021.

281. USCENTCOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 065, 12/22/2021.

282. USCENTCOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 066, 12/22/2021.

283. USCENTCOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 066, 12/22/2021.

284. USCENTCOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 066, 12/22/2021.

285. USCENTCOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 065, 12/22/2021.

286. USCENTCOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 065, 12/22/2021.

287. USCENTCOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 065, 12/22/2021.

288. USCENTCOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 065, 12/22/2021.

289. USCENTCOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 065, 12/22/2021.

290. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 033, 12/22/2021.

291. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL033, 1/18/2022; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 21.4 OIR FOLA061, 10/12/2021.

292. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 033, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL033, 1/18/2022.

293. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 033, 12/22/2021.

294. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR CLAR034, 1/18/2022.

295. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR CLAR034, 1/18/2022.

296. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 034, 12/22/2021.

297. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 036, 12/22/2021.

298. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 036, 12/22/2021.

299. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 036, 12/22/2021.

300. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 036, 12/22/2021.

301. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 036, 12/22/2021.

302. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 036, 12/22/2021.

303. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 036, 12/22/2021.

304. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 038, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 037, 12/22/2021.

305. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 037, 12/22/2021.

306. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 038, 12/22/2021.

307. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 21.4 OIR 049, 9/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 21.4 OIR FOL050, 10/12/2021.

308. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 037, 12/22/2021.

309. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 21.4 OIR FOL050, 10/12/2021.

310. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 041, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL041, 1/18/2022.

311. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL038, 1/18/2022.

312. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 038, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 21.4 OIR FOL050, 10/12/2021.

313. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 038, 12/22/2021.

314. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 038, 12/22/2021.

315. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 039, 12/22/2021.

316. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 038, 12/22/2021.
317. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 039, 12/22/2021.
318. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 038, 12/22/2021.
319. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 039, 12/22/2021.
320. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 039, 12/22/2021.
321. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 039, 12/22/2021.
322. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 038, 12/22/2021.
323. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 038, 12/22/2021.
324. CCJTF-OIR, vetting comment #9, 1/24/2022.
325. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 038, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL038, 1/18/2022.
326. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL038, 1/18/2022.
327. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 038, 12/22/2021.
328. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 043, 12/22/2021.
329. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 043, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 056, 12/22/2021.
330. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 043, 12/22/2021.
331. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 043, 12/22/2021.
332. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 043, 12/22/2021.
333. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 056, 12/22/2021.
334. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 043, 12/22/2021.
335. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 039, 12/22/2021.
336. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 043, 12/22/2021.
337. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 039, 12/22/2021.
338. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 045, 12/22/2021.
339. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 037, 12/22/2021.
340. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 040, 12/22/2021.
341. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 043, 12/22/2021.
342. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 040, 12/22/2021.
343. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 043, 12/22/2021.
344. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 040, 12/22/2021.
345. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 044, 12/22/2021.
346. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 044, 12/22/2021.
347. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 044, 12/22/2021.
348. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 040, 12/22/2021.
349. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 037, 12/22/2021.
350. USCENTCOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 042, 12/22/2021.
351. USCENTCOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 042, 12/22/2021.
352. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 062, 12/22/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 1/27/2022.
353. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 21.4 OIR 033 and 066, 9/22/2021.
354. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 062, 12/22/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 1/27/2022.
355. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 062, 12/22/2021.
356. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 21.4 OIR 066, 9/22/2021.
357. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 21.4 OIR 066, 9/22/2021.
358. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 062, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL062, 1/18/2022.
359. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 062, 12/22/2021.
360. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL032, 1/18/2022.
361. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 063, 12/22/2021.
362. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 061, 12/22/2021.
363. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL061, 1/18/2022.
364. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 058, 12/22/2021.
365. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 058, 12/22/2021.
366. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 058, 12/22/2021.
367. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 058, 12/22/2021.
368. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 058, 12/22/2021.
369. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 067, 12/22/2021.
370. Associated Press, "Iraq Military: 2 Rockets Strike Inside Green Zone," 12/19/2021.
371. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 067, 12/22/2021.
372. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 067, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 071, 12/22/2021.

373. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 071, 12/22/2021.

374. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 067, 12/22/2021.

375. DIA, vetting comment, 1/25/2022.

376. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 070, 12/22/2021.

377. Enabling Peace in Iraq Center, "Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitor, November 18–December 2, 2021," 12/2/2021; Renad Mansour and Victoria Stewart-Jolley, "Explaining Iraq's Election Results," Chatham House, 10/22/2021.

378. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 073, 12/22/2021.

379. DIA, vetting comment, 1/25/2022.

380. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 075, 12/22/2021.

381. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 075, 12/22/2021.

382. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 075, 12/22/2021.

383. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 075, 12/22/2021.

384. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 075, 12/22/2021; DIA, vetting comment, 1/25/2022.

385. DIA, vetting comment, 1/25/2022.

386. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 073, 12/22/2021.

387. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 073, 12/22/2021.

388. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 074, 12/22/2021.

389. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 074, 12/22/2021.

390. DoS, "Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 1, Department of State Diplomatic Engagement, Fiscal Year 2022," 5/28/2021.

391. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; USAID ME Bureau, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.

392. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

393. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; Akeel Abbas, "Iraqi Election Shakes Up Shiite Political Old Guard," Al-Monitor, 10/19/2021; Agence France-Presse, "Iraq: Key Forces Emerge After Latest Election," 11/30/2021; Kamaran Palani, "The Kurds Could Be Kingmakers in Iraq's New Government," Al Jazeera, 12/15/2021.

394. Hassan Ali Ahmed, "Investigations Finds Militias Involved in Iraqi Post-election Violence," Al-Monitor, 11/5/2021.

395. Hassan Ali Ahmed, "Head of UN Iraq Mission Tells Security Council No Evidence of Election Fraud," Al-Monitor, 11/26/2021.

396. Hassan Ali Ahmed, "Head of UN Iraq Mission Tells Security Council No Evidence of Election Fraud," Al-Monitor, 11/26/2021.

397. Omar Sattar, "UN Official Speaks with Iraqi Leader to Break Post-election Deadlock," Al-Monitor, 11/19/2021.

398. UNAMI, "Briefing to the Security Council by SRSG Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, 23 November 2021," 11/23/2021; Hassan Ali Ahmed, "Head of UN Iraq Mission Tells Security Council No Evidence of Election Fraud," Al-Monitor, 11/26/2021; DoS, cable, "USUN: Talking Points to the November 23 Security Council Briefing and Consultations on UNAMI," 21 STATE 116314, 11/19/2021.

399. Hassan Ali Ahmed, "Iraqi Election Results Sent to Federal Supreme Court for Approval," Al-Monitor, 12/1/2021; Embassy Baghdad, cable, "Mission Iraq Official Informal: Wednesday, November 24," 21 MDA 52112, 11/24/2021.

400. Embassy Baghdad, cable, "Mission Iraq Official Informal: Wednesday, November 24," 21 MDA 52112, 11/24/2021.

401. Hassan Ali Ahmed, "Iraqi Election Results Sent to Federal Supreme Court for Approval," Al-Monitor, 12/1/2021.

402. Middle East Monitor, "Iraq's Al-Fatah Alliance Accepts Court's Decision on Election Results," 12/28/2021.

403. Middle East Monitor, "Iraq: Shia Militia Boycotts Efforts to Form Government," 12/28/2021.

404. Iraq 2005 Constitution, Article 54.

405. Qassim Abdul-Zahra, "Iraq's New Parliament Holds 1st Session Marked by Disarray," Associated Press, 1/9/2022.

406. Andrew Parasiliti, Elizabeth Hagedorn, and Joe Snell, "The Takeaway: Iraq's Elections: What Comes Next?" Al-Monitor, 1/5/2022.

407. Iraq 2005 Constitution, Article 70.

408. Iraq 2005 Constitution, Article 76.

409. Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2020, 1/2021.

410. Embassy Baghdad, cable, "Iraq: Mission Engagement to Support National Security Study Memorandum 1 to Prioritize the Fight Against Corruption," 21 BAGHDAD 2120, 11/24/2021; International Republican Institute, "IRI Iraq Poll Shows Concerns over Corruption, Deep Distrust of Political Establishment, Openness to New and Independent Candidates," 12/16/2021.

411. Embassy Baghdad, cable, "Iraq: Mission Engagement to Support National Security Study Memorandum 1 to Prioritize the Fight Against Corruption," 21 BAGHDAD 2120, 11/24/2021.

412. Embassy Baghdad, cable, "Iraq: Mission Engagement to Support National Security Study Memorandum 1 to Prioritize the Fight Against Corruption," 21 BAGHDAD 2120, 11/24/2021.

413. Embassy Baghdad, cable, "Iraq: Mission Engagement to Support National Security Study Memorandum 1 to Prioritize the Fight Against Corruption," 21 BAGHDAD 2120, 11/24/2021.

414. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for Information, 12/16/2021; Embassy Baghdad, cable, "Iraq: Mission Engagement to Support National Security Study Memorandum 1 to Prioritize the Fight Against Corruption," 21 BAGHDAD 2120, 11/24/2021.

415. Embassy Baghdad, cable, "Iraq: Mission Engagement to Support National Security Study Memorandum 1 to Prioritize the Fight Against Corruption," 21 BAGHDAD 2120, 11/24/2021.

416. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for Information, 12/16/2021.

417. Embassy Baghdad, cable, "Iraq: Mission Engagement to Support National Security Study Memorandum 1 to Prioritize the Fight Against Corruption," 21 BAGHDAD 2120, 11/24/2021.

418. Embassy Baghdad, cable, "Iraq: Mission Engagement to Support National Security Study Memorandum 1 to Prioritize the Fight Against Corruption," 21 BAGHDAD 2120, 11/24/2021.

419. Embassy Baghdad, cable, "Iraq: Mission Engagement to Support National Security Study Memorandum 1 to Prioritize the Fight Against Corruption," 21 BAGHDAD 2120, 11/24/2021.

420. World Bank, "The Slippery Road to Economic Recovery," Iraq Economic Monitor, Fall 2021.

421. World Bank, "Republic of Iraq," Macro Poverty Outlook, 10/2021.

422. World Bank, "The Slippery Road to Economic Recovery," Iraq Economic Monitor, Fall 2021.

423. John Davidson, Ahmed Rasheed, "Iraq Foreign Reserves Rise on Currency Devaluation, Oil Prices-Cbank Governor," Reuters, 12/14/2021; Nayera Abdallah, "Iraqi Central Bank Reserves Rise to $64 Billion," Reuters, 12/13/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.

424. John Lee, "Iraq Oil Exports Flat for December," Iraq Oil and Gas News, 1/3/2022; Iraq Ministry of Oil, website, "Historical Summary," 1/6/2022.

425. World Bank, "Iraq Economic Monitor: The Slippery Road to Economic Recovery: Fall 2021," 11/24/2021.

426. Embassy Baghdad, cable, "Mission Iraq Official Informal: Monday, December 13," 21 MDA 54742, 12/13/2021; Ben Van Heuvelen, Rawaz Tahir, Lizzie Porter, "Despite One Payment, Baghdad-Erbil Budget Stalement Continues," Iraq Oil Report, 7/30/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.

427. Lead IG, "Operation Inherent Resolve: Quarterly Report to the U.S. Congress, January 1, 2021–March 31, 2021," 4/2021; DoS, cable, "Mission Iraq Official Informal: Tuesday, January 12," 21 MDA 1126, 1/12/2021.

428. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

429. Mohammad Ali Shabania, "Exclusive: Kadhimi, MbS Engage to Repatriate Iran's Yemen Envoy," Amwaj.media, 12/19/2021; Agence France-Presse, "Saudi Allows Medical Evacuation of Iran Yemen Envoy," 12/18/2021.

430. Mohammad Ali Shabania, "Exclusive: Kadhimi, MbS Engage to Repatriate Iran's Yemen Envoy," Amwaj.media, 12/19/2021; Agence France-Presse, "Saudi Allows Medical Evacuation of Iran Yemen Envoy," 12/18/2021.

431. Amwaj.media, "Exclusive: Iran-Saudi Arabia Dialogue in Iraq Paused 'Until New Iraqi Government Formed,'" 11/2/2021.

432. Bekir Aydogan, "Why Iraqi Kurds Are Seeking Refuge in Europe," Amwaj.media, 11/23/2021.

433. DoS, "U.S. Embassy Iraq Integrated Country Strategy Stabilization Annex November 2019–November 2020," 12/2/2019.

434. USAID ME Bureau, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

435. USAID ME Bureau, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

436. USAID, "Iraq - Complex Emergency Humanitarian Update #315," 7/15/2021.

437. USAID ME Bureau, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021; Lead IG, "Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 1–June 30, 2021," 7/30/2021.

438. Louisa Loveluck and Mustafa Salim, "The US Built a Hospital for Iraqi Children with Cancer. Corruption Ravaged It," Washington Post, 12/16/2021.

439. Mac Skelton and Abdulameer Mohsin Hussein, "Medicine Under Fire: How Corruption Erodes Healthcare in Iraq," Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 12/2021.

440. Mac Skelton and Abdulameer Mohsin Hussein, "Medicine Under Fire: How Corruption Erodes Healthcare in Iraq," Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 12/2021.

441. Mac Skelton and Abdulameer Mohsin Hussein, "Medicine Under Fire: How Corruption Erodes Healthcare in Iraq," Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 12/2021.

442. Mac Skelton and Abdulameer Mohsin Hussein, "Medicine Under Fire: How Corruption Erodes Healthcare in Iraq," Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 12/2021.

443. Mac Skelton and Abdulameer Mohsin Hussein, "Medicine Under Fire: How Corruption Erodes Healthcare in Iraq," Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 12/2021.

444. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; WHO, "Iraq: Health Cluster Bulletin No. 11–(November 2021)," 12/22/2021; USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 11/23/2021.

445. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

446. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

447. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

448. EPIC, "Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitor: December 9–December 16, 2021," 12/16/2021; Khazan Jangiz, "Iraq to Close Last IDP Camp in Mosul: Ministry," Rudaw, 12/15/2021.

449. USAID BHA, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.

450. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.

451. USAID, Iraq–Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #1, 12/22/2021.

452. Khazan Jangiz, "Iraq to Close Last IDP Camp in Mosul: Ministry," Rudaw, 12/15/2021.

453. EPIC, "Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitor: December 9–December 16, 2021," 12/16/2021.

454. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021; USAID ME Bureau, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.

455. CCCM Cluster, "Iraq Informal Sites Overview September 2021, 11/30/2021; CCCM Cluster, website, "About CCCM Cluster," undated; USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

456. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

457. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

458. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

459. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

460. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

461. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; DoS, vetting comments, 1/26/2022.

462. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

463. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

464. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

465. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

466. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 1/28/2022.

467. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

468. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 11/20/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 1/28/2022.

469. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

470. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

471. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

472. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; DoS, vetting comments, 1/26/2022.

473. USAID OTI, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021; USAID, "USAID/OTI Iraq Regional Program Semi-Annual Report: October 1, 2020–March 31, 2021," 4/30/2021.

474. USAID, "USAID/OTI Iraq Regional Program Semi-Annual Report: October 1, 2020–March 31, 2021," 4/30/2021; DoS, website, "Durable Solutions," undated.

475. USAID, "USAID/OTI Iraq Regional Program Semi-Annual Report: October 1, 2020–March 31, 2021," 4/30/2021.

476. USAID OTI, vetting comment, 1/26/2022; USAID ME Bureau, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.

477. USAID OTI, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021; USAID ME Bureau, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.

478. USAID, website, "Our Work," undated; USAID BHA, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.

479. Embassy Baghdad, cable, "Iraq FY2022 Redeclaration of Complex Emergency," 21 BAGHDAD 2164, 12/6/2021; USAID BHA, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.

480. UN OCHA, website, "Iraq Global Humanitarian Overview 2022," undated; DoS, vetting comments, 1/26/2022.

481. Embassy Baghdad, cable, "Iraq FY2022 Redeclaration of Complex Emergency," 21 BAGHDAD 2164, 12/6/2021.

482. Embassy Baghdad, cable, "Iraq FY2022 Redeclaration of Complex Emergency," 21 BAGHDAD 2164, 12/6/2021.

483. Embassy Baghdad, cable, "Iraq FY2022 Redeclaration of Complex Emergency," 21 BAGHDAD 2164, 12/6/2021.

484. Embassy Baghdad, cable, "Iraq FY2022 Redeclaration of Complex Emergency," 21 BAGHDAD 2164, 12/6/2021.

485. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

486. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021; USAID BHA, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.

487. UN OCHA, "Iraq Humanitarian Access Severity Overview (November 2021)," 12/20/2021.

488. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

489. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

490. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

491. UN OCHA, "OCHA Iraq Humanitarian Bulletin October 2021," 11/29/2021.

492. Layal Shakir, "Iraq to Reduce Winter Crops Area by Half: Ministry," Rudaw, 10/18/2021; Moayed Kenany, "Iraq to Reduce Winter Crop Area by 50% Due to Water Shortage–Ministry Statement," Reuters, 10/17/2021.

493. Moayed Kenany, "Iraq to Reduce Winter Crop Area by 50% Due to Water Shortage–Ministry Statement," Reuters, 10/17/2021.

494. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

495. EPIC, "Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitor, December 9–December 16, 2021," 12/16/2021.

496. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

497. Embassy Baghdad, cable, "Iraq: Water Woes, Dependency on Fickle Neighbors Continue," 21 BAGHDAD 1872, 10/3/2021.

498. USAID, press release, "USAID Commits $1.5 million to Support Green Iraqi Innovation," 9/9/2021.

499. Embassy Baghdad, cable, "Iraq: Water Woes, Dependency on Fickle Neighbors Continue," 21 BAGHDAD 1872, 10/3/2021.

500. Embassy Baghdad, cable, "Iraq: Water Woes, Dependency on Fickle Neighbors Continue," 21 BAGHDAD 1872, 10/3/2021.

501. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

502. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

503. Ahmed Rasheed, "Iraq Reports First Cases of Omicron Variant," Reuters, 1/6/2022.

504. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021; WHO, "Iraq Launches Nationwide Vaccination Campaign to Scale up Immunity Against COVID-19," 11/8/2021.

505. WHO, "Iraq: WHO Coronavirus Disease Dashboard," 12/21/2021.

506. Reuters, website, "Reuters COVID-19 Tracker: Iraq," undated; Al-Monitor, "Iraq Approves Booster Dose of COVID-19 Vaccines," 12/1/2021.

507. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

508. UNICEF, "Iraq Receives Almost 3 Million Doses of the COVID-19 Vaccine Through COVAX," 12/1/2021.

509. UNICEF, "COVID-19 Vaccine Market Dashboard," 1/2/2022.

510. NRT, "Iraq Receives 1m Doses of Sinopharm COVID-19 Vaccine," 10/15/2021.

511. Embassy Baghdad, cable, "IRAQ FY2022 Redeclaration of Complex Emergency," 21 BAGHDAD 2164, 12/6/2021; WHO, "Iraq: WHO Coronavirus Disease Dashboard," 12/21/2021.

512. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

513. USAID ME Bureau, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

514. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

515. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

516. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

517. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

518. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

519. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

520. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

521. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

522. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

523. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2021.

524. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

525. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

526. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

527. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

528. OUSD(P) ISA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 005, 12/16/2021.

529. OUSD(P) ISA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 005, 12/16/2021; DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

530. OUSD(P) ISA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 005, 12/16/2021.

531. OUSD(P) ISA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 005, 12/16/2021.

532. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 21.3 OIR 086, 7/13/2021; USCENTCOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 21.3 OIR 089, 6/24/2021; CJTF-OIR, vetting comment #Q11, 1/24/2022.

533. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 112, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, vetting comment #Q11, 1/24/2022.

534. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 003, 22.1 OIR 077, 22.1 OIR 078, 22.1 OIR 086, 12/22/2021.

535. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 077, 12/22/2021.

536. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 092, 12/22/2021.

537. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 092, 12/22/2021.

538. CJTF-OIR, vetting comment #Q3, 1/24/2022,

539. CJTF-OIR, vetting comment #Q3, 1/24/2022,

540. DoD, transcript, "Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby and Dr. Mara Karlin, Performing the Duties of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Hold a Press Briefing," 11/29/2021; Eric Schmitt and Dave Philipps, "Pentagon Chief Orders New Inquiry Into U.S. Airstrike That Killed Dozens in Syria," New York Times, 11/29/2021.

541. DoD, news release, "Austin Orders Review of 2019 Baghuz Airstrikes That Killed Syrian Civilians," 11/29/2021.

542. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL082, 1/18/2022.

543. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL082, 1/18/2022.

544. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 077, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD request for information, 22.1 OIR FOLO077, 1/18/2022.

545. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 004, 12/22/2021.

546. CJTF-OIR, press releases, "CJTF-OIR Strike Summary Report," 2/13/2020, 3/24/2020, 4/10/2021, 4/30/2020, 6/24/2020, 9/8/2020, 10/29/2020, 12/14/2020, 1/6/2021, 2/4/2021, 7/6/2021, 7/7/2021, 7/9/2021, 8/4/2021, and 9/20/2021.

547. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 078, 12/22/2021.

548. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOLO077, 1/18/2022.

549. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL079, 1/18/2022.

550. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL079, 1/18/2022.

551. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL079, 1/18/2022.

552. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 078, 12/22/2021.

553. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR CLAR078, 1/18/2022; CJTF-OIR, vetting comment #Q15, 1/24/2022; OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 1/24/2022.

554. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR CLAR078, 1/18/2022.

555. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR CLAR078, 1/18/2022.

556. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR CLAR078, 1/18/2022; OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 1/24/2022.

557. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 081, 12/22/2021.

558. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 081, 12/22/2021.

559. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 081, 12/22/2021.

560. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 081, 12/22/2021.

561. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 081, 12/22/2021.

562. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL082, 1/18/2022.

563. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 083 and 22.1 OIR 091, 12/22/2021; OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 1/24/2022.

564. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 091, 12/22/2021.

565. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 083, 12/22/2021.

566. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 083, 12/22/2021.

567. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 084, 12/22/2021.

568. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 084, 12/22/2021.

569. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 078, 12/22/2021.

570. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 091, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, vetting comment #Q16, 1/24/2022.

571. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 091, 12/22/2021.

572. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 088, 12/22/2021.

573. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 089, 12/22/2021.

574. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 093 and 22.1 OIR 094, 12/22/2021; OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 1/24/2022.

575. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 091, 12/22/2021; OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 1/24/2022.

576. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 096, 12/22/2021.

577. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 018 and 22.1 OIR 026, 12/22/2021; OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 1/24/2022.

578. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 095, 12/22/2021.

579. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 097, 12/22/2021.

580. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 097, 12/22/2021.

581. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 093 and 22.1 OIR 097, 12/22/2021.

582. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 097, 12/22/2021.

583. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 093 and 22.1 OIR 097, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, vetting comment #Q17, 1/24/2022.

584. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 091, 12/22/2021; OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 1/24/2022.

585. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 091, 12/22/2021; OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 1/24/2022.

586. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 093, 12/22/2021.

587. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 093, 12/22/2021.

588. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 097, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, vetting comment #Q18, 1/24/2022; OUSD(P) ISA, vetting comment, 1/24/2022.

589. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 097, 12/22/2021.

590. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 097, 12/22/2021.

591. Amnesty International, "Syria: Repatriate at Least 27,000 Children Held in Dire Conditions in North-east Syria,"11/30/2021.

592. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 097, 12/22/2021.

593. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 101, 12/22/2021; Reuters, "Ten Oil Workers Killed in Attack in Syria's Deir al Zor–State News Agency," 12/2/2021; Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, "Spotlight on Global Jihad (November 25–December 1, 2021)," 12/2/2021.

594. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 100, 12/22/2021.

595. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 100, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, vetting comment #Q19, 1/24/2022.

596. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 098, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, vetting comment #Q20, 1/24/2022.

597. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 21.3 OIR CLAR105, 7/13/2021.

598. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 099, 12/22/2021.

599. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 086, 12/22/2021.

600. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 090 and 22.1 OIR 087, 12/22/2021.

601. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 086, 12/22/2021.

602. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL087, 1/18/2022.

603. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 087, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR FOL087, 1/18/2022.

604. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 086, 12/22/2021.

605. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 087 and 22.1 OIR 090, 12/22/2021.

606. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 102, 22.1 OIR 103, 22.1 OIR 104, and 22.1 OIR 106, 12/22/2021.

607. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 102, 12/22/2021; DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 107, 12/22/2021.

608. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

609. OUSD(P) ISA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 105, 12/16/2021.

610. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 102, 12/22/2021.

611. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 102, 12/22/2021.

612. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 102, 12/22/2021.

613. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 102, 12/22/2021.

614. Saeed Abdulrazek, "Turkey Arrests Dozens of ISIS Members, Supporters," Asharq al-Aawsat, 11/3/2021; Saeed Abdulrazek, "Turkey Apprehends 30 Suspected ISIS Terrorists," Asharq al-Awsat, 12/31/2021.

615. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 102, 12/22/2021.

616. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 112, 12/22/2021.

617. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 21.4 OIR 122, 9/22/2021.

618. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 102, 12/22/2021.

619. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 103, 12/22/2021.

620. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 104, 12/22/2021.

621. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR CLAR104, 1/18/2022.

622. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR CLAR104, 1/18/2022.

623. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR CLAR104, 1/18/2022.

624. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR CLAR104, 1/18/2022.

625. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 106, 12/22/2021.

626. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 106, 12/22/2021.

627. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 106, 12/22/2021.

628. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 106, 12/22/2021.

629. OUSD(P) ISA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 105, 12/16/2021.

630. OUSD(P) ISA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 109, 12/16/2021.

631. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 110, 12/22/2021; Daily Sabah, "Syrian Opposition Forces Prepare for Possible Turkish Op in Syria," 10/31/2021.

632. OUSD(P) ISA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 109, 12/16/2021.
633. BBC, "Turkey v Syria's Kurds: The Short, Medium and Long Story," 10/23/2019.
634. Al Jazeera, "Turkey's Operation Peace Spring in Northern Syria: One Month On," 11/8/2019.
635. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 110, 12/22/2021.
636. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 110, 12/22/2021.
637. OUSD(P) ISA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 108, 12/16/2021.
638. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 110, 12/22/2021.
639. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 111, 12/22/2021.
640. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 111, 12/22/2021.
641. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
642. USAID ME Bureau, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.
643. USAID ME Bureau, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.
644. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
645. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
646. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
647. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
648. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
649. European Union External Action, "Syria: Statement by the Spokesperson on the Start of the Sixth Round of Talks of the Syria Constitutional Committee in Geneva," 10/18/2021.
650. UN Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, "United Nations Special Envoy for Syria Geir O. Pedersen Briefing to the Security Council on Syria," 12/20/2021.
651. UN Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, "United Nations Special Envoy for Syria Geir O. Pedersen Briefing to the Security Council on Syria," 12/20/2021.
652. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/15/2021.
653. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/15/2021.
654. DoS, cable, "USUN: Talking Points for the November 15 UN Security Council Consultation on Syria (Political/Humanitarian)," 21 STATE 113228, 11/9/2021.
655. UN Special Envoy for Syria, transcript, "Transcript of Press Stakeout by United Nations Special Envoy for Syria Mr. Geir O. Pedersen, Following Conclusion of Constitutional Committee's Sixth Session," 10/22/2021.
656. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
657. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
658. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
659. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
660. USAID ME Bureau, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.
661. DoS, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.
662. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
663. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
664. Sirwan Kajjo, "Syrian Kurds Demand End to Child Recruitment," Voice of America, 11/29/2021; Agence France-Presse, "Syria Kurds Protest Recruitment of Teenage Girls for Combat," 11/28/2021.
665. Sirwan Kajjo, "Syrian Kurds Demand End to Child Recruitment," Voice of America, 11/29/2021.
666. Sirwan Kajjo, "Syrian Kurds Demand End to Child Recruitment," Voice of Americas, 11/29/2021; Agence France-Presse, "Syria Kurds Protest Recruitment of Teenage Girls for Combat, 11/28/2021.
667. DoS, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.
668. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.
669. USAID ME Bureau, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.
670. USAID ME Bureau, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.
671. USAID ME Bureau, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.
672. USAID ME Bureau, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.
673. USAID ME Bureau, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.
674. USAID ME Bureau, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.
675. USAID ME Bureau, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.
676. USAID ME Bureau, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.
677. USAID ME Bureau, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.
678. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.
679. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.
680. USAID ME Bureau, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.
681. USAID ME Bureau, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.
682. USAID, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.
683. USAID ME Bureau, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.
684. USAID ME Bureau, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.
685. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.
686. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
687. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
688. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
689. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; DoD, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.
690. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 1/14/2022; DoS, vetting comment, 1/26/2022.
691. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
692. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
693. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
694. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
695. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
696. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
697. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.
698. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

699. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 1/11/2022.

700. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 030, 12/22/2021.

701. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 028, 12/22/2021.

702. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 028, 12/22/2021.

703. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 028, 12/22/2021.

704. CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 028, 12/22/2021.

705. John Saleh, "The Women of ISIS and the Al-Hol Camp," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 8/2/2021; Save the Children, "When Am I Going to Start to Live?" 9/23/2021; UN, transcript, "Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Martin Griffiths," 8/21/2021; Louisa Loveluck, "Syrian Detention Camp Rocked by Dozens of Killings Blamed on Islamic State women," Washington Post, 9/19/2021.

706. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

707. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 1/11/2022.

708. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 1/11/2022.

709. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 027, 12/22/2021.

710. Zana Omer, "Women Reportedly Linked to IS Set Syria Camp on Fire," Voice of America, 12/21/2021.

711. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

712. International Committee of the Red Cross, "A Statement from Fabrizio Carboni, the Regional Director for the Near and Middle East for the ICRC, on the Major Issues Confronting the Region in 2021," 12/21/2021.

713. International Committee of the Red Cross, "A Statement from Fabrizio Carboni, the Regional Director for the Near and Middle East for the ICRC, on the Major Issues Confronting the Region in 2021," 12/21/2021.

714. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

715. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

716. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 1/11/2022.

717. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 1/5/2022; DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; DoS vetting comment, 1/11/2022.

718. USAID, "Syria–Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #1," 12/3/2021.

719. DoS, vetting comment, 1/14/2022.

720. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; DoS, vetting comment, 1/11/2022.

721. USAID, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/22/2021.

722. USAID, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/22/2021.

723. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.

724. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.

725. USAID, "Syria–Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #2," 1/7/2022.

726. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

727. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

728. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021; World Food Programme, website, "Syrian Arab Republic," undated.

729. DoS, response to DoS OIG request for information, 12/16/2021.

730. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.

731. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.

732. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.

733. USAID, "Syria–Complex Emergency Fact Sheet, Humanitarian Update #726," 11/5/2021.

734. USAID, "Syria–Complex Emergency Fact Sheet, Humanitarian Update #726," 11/5/2021.

735. USAID, "Syria–Complex Emergency Fact Sheet, Humanitarian Update #726," 11/5/2021.

736. USAID, "Syria–Complex Emergency Fact Sheet, Humanitarian Update #726," 11/5/2021.

737. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.

738. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.

739. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.

740. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.

741. USAID, "Syria–Complex Emergency Humanitarian Update #730," 12/17/2021.

742. USAID, "Syria–Complex Emergency Humanitarian Update #730," 12/17/2021.

743. USAID, "Syria–Complex Emergency Humanitarian Update #730," 12/17/2021.

744. USAID, "Syria–Complex Emergency Humanitarian Update #730," 12/17/2021.

745. WHO, "Syrian Arab Republic: WHO Coronavirus Disease Dashboard," 12/23/2021.

746. Syrian American Medical Society Foundation, "Second Wave of COVID-19 Surging in Northwest Syria," 10/13/2021.

747. Syrian American Medical Society Foundation, "Second Wave of COVID-19 Surging in Northwest Syria," 10/13/2021.

748. WFP, "Syria mVAM Bulletin #61: November 2021," 12/15/2021.

749. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.

750. WHO, "Update on COVID-19 Vaccination in Syria, 12 November 2021," 11/12/2021.

751. USAID, "Syria–Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #1," 12/3/2021.

752. WHO, "Syrian Arab Republic: WHO Coronavirus Disease Dashboard," 12/23/2021.

753. WHO, "Update on COVID-19 Vaccination in Syria, 12 November 2021," 11/12/2021.

754. Physicians for Human Rights, "Destruction, Obstruction, and Inaction: The Makings of a Health Crisis in Northern Syria," 12/15/2021.

755. UNRWA, "Syria–Humanitarian Snapshot, September and October 2021," 12/13/2021.

756. USAID ME Bureau, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.

757. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.

758. USAID, "Syria–Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #11," 9/30/2021.

759. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.
760. USAID, "Syria–Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #1," 12/3/2021.
761. USAID, "Syria–Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #1," 12/3/2021.
762. USAID ME Bureau, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.
763. USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/21/2021.
764. Doctors Without Borders, "Syria: Eleven children among patients treated following airstrike in Idlib," 12/13/2021.
765. Physicians for Human Rights, "Destruction, Obstruction, and Inaction: The Makings of a Health Crisis in Northern Syria," 12/15/2021.
766. Physicians for Human Rights, "Destruction, Obstruction, and Inaction: The Makings of a Health Crisis in Northern Syria," 12/15/2021.
767. Physicians for Human Rights, "Destruction, Obstruction, and Inaction: The Makings of a Health Crisis in Northern Syria," 12/15/2021.
768. Physicians for Human Rights, "Destruction, Obstruction, and Inaction: The Makings of a Health Crisis in Northern Syria," 12/15/2021.
769. WHO, "WHO Strengthens Response to Attacks on Health Care in the Eastern Mediterranean Region," 12/8/2021.
770. USAID, "Syria Complex Emergency Humanitarian Update #726," 11/5/2021.
771. Consulate General Istanbul, cable, "Syria: Second UN Cross-Line Humanitarian Mission Arrives in Idlib," 21 ISTANBUL 766, 12/10/2021.
772. USAID, "Syria Complex Emergency Humanitarian Update #725," 10/22/2021.
773. USAID, "Syria Complex Emergency Humanitarian Update #730," 12/17/2021.

Sources for "ISIS Violence Spurs ISF-KSF Coordination Along the KCL" (p. 47): DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 016, 12/22/2021; CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.1 OIR 062, 12/22/2021; Presidency of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, press release, "A Statement from Kurdistan Region President—Presidency of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq," 11/28/2021; Dana Taib Menmy, "Why Iraq's Kurdish Peshmerga Are Facing a Deadly IS Resurgence," The New Arab, 12/23/2021; Dilan Sirwan, "Five Peshmerga Dead and Four Injured in ISIS Diyala Attack," Rudaw, 11/27/2021; Kurdistan Regional Government, news release, "Joint Coordination Centre Activation Urgently Needed: KRG," 11/28/2021; NRT, "Peshmerga Member Dies From Wounds Sustained in Kifri Attack," 11/30/2021; Shafaq News, "ISIS Terrorists are Heading to Garmyan to Target the Peshmerga, Official Says," 11/30/2021; Ahmad Zebari and Namo Abdulla, "Islamic State Attack Leaves Over Dozen Kurds Dead," Voice of America, 12/3/2021; Shafaq News, "PM Barzani Stresses the Need for Cooperation Between the Peshmerga, Iraqi Forces, and the Global Coalition," 12/3/2021; Brwa Kiyani, "ISIS Carried out Deadly Attack on Villagers and Peshmerga in Makhmour," Rudaw, 12/2/2021; Shelly Kittleson, "Islamic State Targets Peshmerga in Iraq's Disputed Diyala and Makhmour," Al-Monitor, 12/3/2021; Reuters, "Iraqi Forces, Kurdish Peshmerga Retake Northern Village From IS Fighters-Sources," 12/6/2021; The Cradle, "Forced Out of Luhaiban Village, ISIS Strikes Qara Salem Village with Casualties," 12/6/2021; Hardi Mohammed, "Peshmerga Forces Deployed to Liheban: Increased Cooperation with Iraqi Forces," Rudaw, 12/7/2021.

TO REPORT FRAUD, WASTE, OR ABUSE RELATED TO
OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
AND PROGRAMS, CONTACT:

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HOTLINE

www.dodig.mil/Components/
Administrative-Investigations/DoD-Hotline

1-800-424-9098

DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOTLINE

stateoig.gov/hotline

1-800-409-9926 or 202-647-3320

**U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT HOTLINE**

oig.usaid.gov/report-fraud

1-800-230-6539 or 202-712-1023