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INAME: LAYTON, Edwin T. , RADM, USN, Ret.

IPLACE: Layton Residence, Carmel, California

IVIEWER: FARLEY, Robert D. (Bob)

Farley: ((TR NOTE: Audio begins with Mr. Farley speaking in mid-sentence, as follows:)) Let's continue the...Let's see...

Layton: Well, I might mention here, just to get it...I jumped quite a way now. When I left there, I went to Tokyo as Assistant Naval Attaché and had charge of the course of instruction in Japanese. Of course, I still couldn't change it to give them a Japanese Kana radio and so forth, or abbreviations. I...By that time, I knew that, having been indoctrinated down there, that you couldn't talk about these things. Of course, I knew you couldn't talk about them because (B% it was) a matter of common sense. But I thought you could do something about it. Anyway. ..

Farley: Were you given an orientation or a briefing? Or sign a security oath?

Layton: No. No, I didn't sign anything. Just...You read pages x to x of RIP 10...No, RIP 3—Radio Intelligence Publication Number Three, I think it was. But anyway, that's the one I had...

Farley: (B% Correct.)

Layton: That's the one Joe indoctrinated me in 1941, January the 6th.

Farley: Right.

Layton: I don't think anything worthwhile mentioning while I was Assistant Naval Attaché—except that I knew the Japanese were moving some oil tankers out of schedule. I picked up, by quite chance, a little notice. It was...It wasn't classified, but it was restricted to distribution. This was a Japanese Naval Department notice.

The notice said that the two tankers—whatever they were; naval tankers—

would be...have their schedule changed. And would depart and go to San Pedro to load. And that they'd stay...They'd have to wait. No—they would load rapidly in San Pedro and turn around as soon as possible so to get back.

Well, I knew there's a naval maneuver being...taking place then off of Honolulu, off the Hawaiian Islands. And so, I...By this time—having been smartened up by the Marines out there and a few other things, and by working OP-20-G—I thought, “Ah, these guys are going to run this thing.” So they run by there and then hurry back. So they run by again during our maneuvers. So I sent a message to Chief of Naval Operations with the Naval Attaché in Tokyo saying what these things were doing.

Now, up to this time, we'd been getting these routine notices. They were about changing the uniform regulations and a few other things like this. And after we sent that message, we no longer got one of those messages. No more of those notices. They were just...I knew better than to ask why. I just kept quiet. But they'd broken our message, which was sent in the strip cipher.

Farley: Hmm.

Layton: That was the...

Farley: So they were pretty active in those days against us?

Layton: This is now 1937 to 1939. I think the date is 1938. And so, they're working...According to my book in there, they organized officially...officially now 1929. Their...They don't call it the “secret chamber”. They call it the...Well, you know, their communications intelligence organization. And they started off with four officers and three clerks. I got their names.

Farley: Okay.

Layton: Mm hmm. There, it's in the book. The author of this book has taken all these things...all these books that have been written and put them together. And taken out what they have in there. (2-3G)...Time to halt! ((He chuckles.))

Farley: Oh, that's (B% alright). Good. ((TR NOTE: Audio stops. When it resumes, Mr. Farley is speaking, as follows:)) Alright, sir.

Layton: Ask the question.

Farley: Yes, sir. The Blue Code: what sort of a level did it serve? Was it a low-

level navy...Japanese navy code? Or was it a dip code?

Layton: It was the highest level code they had then.

Farley: It was a high-level code?

Layton: It was (for) Fleet use.

Farley: Okay.

Layton: But I...My instruction was from ((Thomas)) Tommy Birtley: what he'd been doing, everything he'd done, and how he filed things, and how he found things. And how the IBM machines helped him by...He asked a clerk to get the runs on certain code groups. And then, all of the sudden, they'd come magically. There they were.

Farley: That's a good question. Just a little diversion [sic]. What sort of machine support or IBM support did OP-20-G have at that time?

Layton: In those days, they had several IBM punch card machines and several sorters. Other than that, I didn't look, examine... My curiosity was what do they do. And I learned that a...an idiot punched punch cards.

Farley: ((He acknowledges.))

Layton: That they got a person with the lowest intelligence they could get 'cause they was [sic] the lowest paid. And they just punched punch cards. So like all things, it's just as good as what you punch in there. And we found many errors.

However, it was a wonderful thing in that, when you wanted to know what the code group (B% Ah, Cah, Sah, Tah) appeared, you asked. And the machine room would bring out to you a folder showing you where every time it occurred—the ones before it, the ones after it, and the sequence. And it also printed in there, the previous translations that were there.

So that you could see in what context (1G) were used and if it was a good value. Or whether it was a value that wasn't consistent all along. You had to have a...Japanese knowledge because all these things you had to read had to make sense. Otherwise, it proved (of) no value.

Farley: Right.

Layton: That's as far as I went with machines. All I wanted to know was what they

would do for you, which I had learned. But my instruction (B% on) how to do this was from Birtley, who had been working on it for the previous three years. Either three or two.

Farley: (B% Oh, right.) Sir, did you have any course of instruction at all in basic or elemental cryptanalysis?

Layton: None whatsoever.

Farley: None. But you did sort of pick up the techniques by working on these codes?

Layton: That's right. We had to what...You're self-taught and taught by people who were doing it. There was no one else other than Birtley that knew what this was doing.

Farley: You mention breaking a message—breaking a message and translating it. What process would be used to break a message?

Layton: Well, first in using this Blue Code at the time—at that time I speak of—what you did was recover the code values. So that when they were put together in short messages...a short message, that it would make sense in Japanese. If it made sense in Japanese, then it was most likely the proper code group.

This was not a mixed code. This was an alphabetic code. So that made it easy. If it came under what I would say the "K's" and it fit the "K's," fine. But if it came under the "M's" it might. But if it came (B% on to) the "A's" it wouldn't. Therefore, it was a question of elimination.

Then you then checked it through the machine runs to see if other uses for that one you were working would also fit logically. And then, you had to work out all those messages. This may require to get some other messages to see the unknown values (B% and to see what they would be). So getting those, you might go out and get some more mess(ages)...other values in that one message. And you may have to find whether they would be consistent. By doing this you might, in the end while working on one message, end up by solving 15.

Farley: Ah, yes.

Layton: But they all had to be consistent. It took a long time to do it. But once they were consistent, it was just like winning a jackpot. (1-2G)...It fell apart.

Farley: Were you involved in what we used to call "book breaking", where you

would build a basic code?

Layton: This was it. That was it.

Farley: Okay.

Layton: That was it. But the code, as I say, was a one-part code and alphabetic. So the Blue Book was not difficult. Of course, we had the crib to go with it, but that was no longer good. That was the old Red—the one that had been photo-statted.

Farley: Right.

Layton: You know about that one?

Farley: Yes, right, sir.

Layton: Do you know the year that was done?

Farley: No, sir.

Layton: I don't either.

Farley: I don't re...

Layton: I read ((Laurance)) Safford's story.

Farley: Right. Oh, yeah.

Layton: I wish he'd been more specific about dates. And incidentally, in his story, he gives that ((Japanese battleship)) *Nagato* speed that isn't correct.

Farley: Oh, no?

Layton: I'm the one that recovered that value. And it was the (B% "Hei a"), as I say in my thing.

Farley: Tell me about it, please. ((He chuckles.))

Layton: Well, in the course of this recovery, working on something, (B% it was)

brought out, I had to identify the “Hei a”. And finally identifying the “Hei a” in other messages, I finally come (B% upon) this very, very short message, which hardly was filled at all. It had been worked on years ago, or months and months ago.

And in working on this, I thought, “Oh! This thing comes out as official trials—acceptance trials that hadn’t been entered. That had been left blank years ago and had not been marked on them since. But that hadn’t been brought out.

And so, when I put in “official acceptance trials” and it said “It reached the speed of...” And we had (B% “sokuruku). That was (B% in there. It was good. “Speed”). And that brought it out, the speed of...I think it was...I’ve forgotten now what...It was an awful high speed. It was...Of course, it was a former battle cruiser, but it had been turned into a training ship and had some its boilers removed, and so forth. I think the speed was 28...

Farley: Really? (B% Well, moving out!)

Layton: I think it was 31 knots.

Farley: It’s moving out! ((He laughs.))

Layton: I think it was 31 knots. It was way up. So I took this to show to ((Joseph)) “Skinny” Wenger and others. And of course, I took it up and showed it to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Navy War Plans, and the Chief of Naval Intelligence. When I took these around, I saw to it that—and including the Chief of Naval Communications—I saw to it that they all got it so there’d be none of this argument or fuss that had gone on before. “See what I’ve got!”

And then, the Chief of Naval Operations thought that was fun. So he called in Old ((William D.)) Puleston, the Director of Naval Intelligence, and gave him hell for not knowing information. And said, “Did you know this?” “No.” Then he ‘d go give (B% Courtney), who was head of communications, hell for he [sic] wanting to sneak behind his back and told the Chief of Naval Operations.

Farley: ((He chuckles.)) Sir, could you recall the procedures in OP-20 whereby traffic was intercepted, came into the area, and ultimately...?

Layton: (B% Knew) nothing about it. None of my business. I didn’t care about it.

Farley: Okay. You weren’t aware of who was giving you the traffic? What Navy intercept...?

Layton: I wasn't handling traffic. I was handling old traffic [that had been] intercepted years before. It wasn't current.

Farley: Oh, okay. Beautiful, okay.

Layton: This was recovering old code groups. This was recovering code (B% groups).

Farley: Good, good. That pins it down.

Layton: They did bring in some...Wenger would bring in, once in a while, a message. And it was (B% in Blue). And he'd ask me if I had any new values on it. So I'd take it and look it (B% up) in the book—the master book I was working on. Where sometimes I would fill in a couple more values. They'd say, "Well, is it all you got?" And I said, "That's all I got.

Most of these...And they were current. This is during the time of the Japanese current midshipmen training squadron came under Admiral Ezungo Yoshida. And came to Baltimore and New York. ((He pauses.)) That's right. He landed on the West Coast, too.

And these were regarding signals strengths. They were testing out new frequencies. And they were getting back messages from Tokyo giving them the signal strengths that were received. And (2-3G) didn't get any message through.

And they had...Then they assigned certain radio communication schedules for the training squadron to use on certain frequencies and signal tests at certain hours. And these were varied all the time.

What they were doing: they were checking out the radio transmission capabilities under various frequencies at various times of sunset, sunrise, night and day, and so forth.

Farley: Mm hmm.

Layton: And these, I translated. And they were current. And they were also in the old Blue—but I think it was the old Blue Code with a new encipherment.

Farley: I see.

Layton: Because Mrs. ((Agnes Meyer)) Driscoll had done the breaking of the cipher.

Farley: Okay, good. That leads me right into the next question. I have about five or six people that I'd like you to comment on. First, Commander ((Laurance)) Safford. I'm interested in what type of people they were; their talents; their competence and...

Layton: Safford...Safford is...was a brilliant man, except that his brilliance was such that he couldn't communicate it to somebody else. He could not administer an organization. He could not...I don't mean this to deprecate his history or his fame. But he had no way of transmitting administration and action over to somebody else. If he did it himself, it took forever to do it. And sometimes he didn't do it right.

But he had a brilliant mind and he knew what he was doing. And I think communication intelligence as the Navy had it at World War II owes an awful lot to Safford for having maintained the training program, and had an eye on the future toward expansion and wartime mobilization—which very few officers in those days had any idea of.

Farley: Mm hmm.

Layton: ((He pauses.)) Personally, he was very brilliant. Personally, a very nice fellow. But his mind was off there. When you talk to him...After you talked to him for a while, his mind went off somewhere else. He was always working on another problem.

Farley: Ah, yeah. How about Commander Wenger?

Layton: Very intense. It was obvious to me when I was working with him there in 1936 and '37 that Skinny Wenger was suffering from ulcers. Ulcers were the kind that ((Redfield)) "Rosie" Mason had later on. Too intense, too hard working, too...Not...Unable to relax. Unable to get away from the seriousness of the business right now (B% at hand).

He had good administrative talents by turning over responsibility to do things to someone and say, "Now, that's your job."

Farley: I see.

Layton: And never interfering thereafter, or trying to kibitz it or high five it.

Farley: Hmm. ((He chuckles.)) Captain ((Alwin)) Kramer?

Layton: Well, I have to remember this. When he was a language student, he was known then as a very strange person. He would study all night and sleep all day. Now, that didn't suit his instructors' schedules at all. And the instructor, who I knew quite well, said, "What's the matter with this man?"

And I said, "He's just...he's different than any other man. He must sleep in the daytime and he must work at night. So he studies at night and he sleeps all day. And that's why you give him a lesson late in the evening when he has just awakened." ((Chuckling heard.)) (B% He was all day asleep.)

Farley: Right.

Layton: I can tell you....A slight...In the same area in which Rosie Mason and I lived in one house (and) Kramer and another guy lived in another house—we were all language students—lived another family who was the Commercial Attaché at the embassy. And he had two daughters of marriageable age. And they were kind of anxious to get one of us four guys tied into this. But ((laughter heard))...I think we all individually recognized this thing as one of the hazards of living in the Far East. ((More chuckling.))

They invited us...And they did this twice a year. They had a big formal dinner. And it was very finely done. And they were nice people. So we went there—Rosie and I and this other guy. I think it was (B% "Tall") Al Dusenbury. I'm not really sure now. Went there in our tuxedos all dressed up in the appropriate amount. Had a nice dinner. And then, noticed that Kramer hadn't appeared. Well, (B% no one had seen him). Well, maybe he's out of town. Maybe he was ill. We didn't think about it.

The next evening at the appointed hour, Kramer—all dressed up in tuxedo and so forth with some flowers for the hostess—arrived for dinner. ((He chuckles.)) She said, "Oh!" He said, "Yes, I've come for dinner." They said, "That was last night." ((Laughter heard.)) Now, this is typical of Kramer.

Farley: Yes.

Layton: Typical of Kramer. During the war, I had the misfortune of having him come to work for me for a while. And he was absolutely of no use. He was...He'd lost his (B% value). I think some shock hit him as regard to Pearl Harbor. I think he realized...And he never told me this. But I think he then came to realize that he bore some responsibility for this. And I think that this bore hard on his mind.

Farley: Yeah, yeah.

Layton: And I think this upset him, such that there was a permanent change in him. Because, (B% well), he used to shoot pool. He was a good pool player. Billiards actually—in Japan. We each had our own cue. Go to a billiard parlor and shoot billiards. He would, during the war, go out to Honolulu to shoot billiards during working hours. And I had to send for him once.

Farley: Oh, gosh.

Layton: I gave him a translation of importance one day. And I said, “I want to have that by five o’clock this afternoon. I’m sure you can do it by 3. But I want to have it finished, (1-2G), (1-2G), and take it to Admiral Nimitz at 5 o’clock. ‘Cause I’ve told him it’ll be up there at 5 o’clock.” At 3 o’clock, I called over where he worked. He didn’t work in my shop. They said, “I know where he is (B% or where he went).

So Joe Twitty—now General Twitty in charge of JICPOA ((Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area))...And since he ((Kramer)) was working in JICPOA, I got a hold of Joe and I says, “Get this. You’ll recognize it. It’s the report of So-and-so. And it’s got red borders on it. It’s got a memorandum from me to have it done by 5 o’clock.”

Joe picked it up and says, “It’s on his desk and it isn’t touched. What’ll I do with it?” I says, “Bring it over to me right away.” So I sat down and translated it. Then took it up to Nimitz at 5 o’clock. It had more than just an ordinary translation. I won’t go into that. But there was a connection with some of our operations which had gone a little sour.

Farley: Ah, yes.

Layton: When the man...I think the admiral in charge had (B% commented) and reported quite a different thing to Admiral Nimitz. Admiral...Well, I might as well tell you. That was the morning following the Battle of Kula Gulf in which we lost a cruiser. I think it was the *Helena*. I’m not real sure. And had another ship badly damaged. And they had claimed in their report that they’d sank two or three cruisers and a couple of destroyers. I’ve forgotten. But it was (B% greatly)...a great battle, a great victory for them.

Nimitz asked me the next morning at the briefing if the radio intelligence reflected this. And I said, “Not at all. As a matter of fact, I can tell you right now there was no cruiser within five hundred miles. So they didn’t see any cruisers.”

I said, "The only two destroyers that we believe having (B% any) trouble: one of them is aground. It was being bombed...It was bombed afterward by aircraft, and destroyed. And the other one was sunk. But of those 10 or 12, they reported (B% seeing OR sinking), (2-3G) no such thing."

He said, "Are you sure? And I said, "Admiral, I don't know everything, but from radio intelligence (B% intercept)...Well, I know there's no cruiser within a thousand miles. (B% At most, I'd) say five hundred."

The next morning, in comes this admiral. And the admiral told him about all this stuff. And he says, "Well, I want you to hear what Layton's got to say." This is what I'll never forgive Nimitz for doing. He had me up there, and said, "What'd you report to me this morning?," (B% I guess it was). And I gave what I reported.

Well, I got a little embarrassed naturally because this admiral said: here I was on my flat ass, thousands of miles away, telling what had been done. And he was there and saw it: "What kind of a thing was this?" (2-3G)...The document was captured from the destroyer *Monganami*, which had been sent ((to the bottom)) by a mine only recently after that. Shortly—10, 15 days.

And somebody (B% had smartly sent up by the Clipper—the four-engine flying boat)...And as I had seen it, I told Admiral Nimitz when it came in because it was delivered to me immediately. Dan McCallum down on Guadalcanal had seen to it that it came to me direct—addressed to me. (B% Well, he'd picked it up) (3-4G) (B% people). And it was the Japanese official report of that action in which they said what they lost

Farley: Mm hmm.

Layton: And when they opened fire, and this and that. Which don't fit with our figures at all. And that they had sighted us. We had said with our radar they couldn't sight us. We (1-2G) picked them up. And Admiral Nimitz said, "I want that ((report)). And I want it today." So that's where I had to translate and take it up to him.

And he sent it to this admiral with a letter. He wrote the letter, saying, "I request that you study this very carefully." ((In background, clock chiming 12 o'clock.)) "And I request that you review the statements you made in my office to me and to my intelligence officer. You'll note, they don't jibe."

((He pauses.)) He sent one to another officer who was the skipper of the ship who had just made admiral and then killed in an aircraft crash—(3-4G). That's why that was important—at least to me and to my...

Farley: Absolutely, absolutely.

Layton: But that...Going back to Kramer, he...Irresponsible.

Farley: Too bad.

Layton: Waste. A waste of a good man 'cause he could do good work.

Farley: Yeah. You mentioned Captain Zacharias.

Layton: Mm hmm.

Farley: Do you have any comments on him?

Layton: Zacharias was one of the most brilliant men—who was a Japanese language student—that I know. He was full of ideas. There wasn't a dead point anywhere in him. Unfortunately, he liked to use the name of "Zacharias". He liked to get it before the public, and he liked the people to know that he was a pretty hot shot himself.

Well, he was a pretty hot shot, I think. But he offended all of his Japanese language students when he exposed what we were doing or supposed to be doing. We thought it showed bad judgment. He was discussed with me—when his book came out—by a senior officer.

Well, that senior officer said, "Why would he be doing this?" And I said, "I don't know. But I suspect that he has a...is still suffering from a [sic] inferiority complex that manifests itself by having to get his name up front." I was still on speaking terms with him. I always been friendly with him. Always was friendly with him until post war.

Suddenly, he had a radio program called *Behind Closed Doors* or something like that. Or *Secret Missions*. I think it was *Secret Missions*. He had two of them. One was *Behind Closed Doors* and one was *Secret Missions*.

And in this radio program, which I heard—and I was in Washington D.C. on duty—this ((program)) had a "Lieutenant Commander Layton" as the Fleet Intelligence Officer ((chuckling heard)) in Honolulu on the night of Pearl Harbor out with some German gal, dallying ((laughter heard)), trying to learn...And almost learning the secrets of an attack on Pearl Harbor that did happen. And so forth.

And I wrote him a letter that said if he ever did this again, I would sue him for every dime he ever had and everything he ever owned. When I had been a friend of his, and (B% Claire) his wife, and his sons—who were Naval aviators at this time—I said, “I can’t understand how you would treat your own friends this way.”

Farley: Was he trying to sell more books by injecting a little sex into it? ((He laughs.))

Layton: I think that he (1-2G) injecting the correct names.

Farley: Oh.

Layton: So this is my end of the story of Zacharias.

Farley: Okay, good. Aggie Driscoll. Now, she has a reputation of being a character.

Layton: I think she is really a character, but I think she loves being known as a character.

Farley: Ah, yes.

Layton: She’s a brilliant woman. And she’s had some, as I understand it...And this is not what she told me. I think she has been badly treated sometimes by the Navy and by Naval Intelligence, by Naval cryptographic intelligence, and by Army. I think she’s as smart as Friedman ever was. And I think some of Friedman’s successes she helped him with, (B% but) he takes all the credit and doesn’t give her any.

I thought at first that she had a passion for anonymity—and that’s probably true. But I think when she got older, she realized that she had a right to have her name somewhere. And I don’t think she got it the proper way.

Farley: Hmm.

Layton: She was always kindly, considerate and helpful. And I went to her several times to help her...She came to me once, and I was able to help her. And I was prouder of that than most anything I’ve ever done.

She was working on a new cipher. I think it was the new attaché machine cipher. I’m pretty sure it was. She never told me and I never asked her. But here were a lot of things coming down on zigzags. And she had them marked with various colors and stuff.

And she says, “ I know from the sequence here, these are the words. These are the...This is T-O-M-I-M-U-R-A. And we have gone...Naval Intelligence, everybody’s gone through everything we can find—every list for a Japanese called “Tomimura”. It’s a Japanese word, isn’t it?”

I says, “‘Mura’ is good with a name—a Japanese name. ‘Tomi’ is not normally used except as a personal name. That would be just ‘Tomi’. But then ‘Mura’ wouldn’t be alone. Couldn’t be used alone. So this is ‘Tomimura’.”

I said, “Let me think about it.” Well, I thought about it, oh, I think quite a while. Maybe a couple of days. I finally went to her. And I said, “You know, there’s a Japanese guy that they’re working with...American they are working with. And his name Thompson. And ‘son’ is the off sound...or reading of ‘Mura’. So ‘Tomi Son’ would be ‘Tomimura’. ((He snaps his fingers.)) She said, “That’s it.”

Farley: Very good.

Layton: And then they arrested Tomimura.

Farley: Well, that’s interesting, very interesting.

Layton: Yeah.

Farley: Did she have some of the younger Navy officers pretty frightened because she was on speaking terms with the commanders and the captains?

Layton: I never noticed that. I was only a...I was a ((lieutenant)) JG at the time.

Farley: Oh!

Layton: I was taking my lessons. No, what ...? I don’t know. No, I was a lieutenant. ((He pauses.)) No, I was a lieutenant. I was a lieutenant—but then a lieutenant wasn’t very high in those days. Of course, in OP-20-G, you didn’t have a lot of rank. ((Joseph)) “Skinny” Wenger was a lieutenant. ((Wesley)) “Ham” Wright was a JG.

Farley: Was ((Thomas)) “Tommy” Dyer there at all during that time?

Layton: If he was, I didn’t...don’t recall. It could have been ((he pauses))...No, no. No, at that time, Tommy Dyer went from the *Pennsylvania* to 14th Naval District, and opened up the first...Station Hypo.

Farley: Alright.

Layton: That's right.

Farley: Good.

Layton: See, he had Turret 3 and I had Turret 4 on the *Pennsylvania*. So we...

Farley: He was an old classmate, right.

Layton: We (1-2B) worked side by side.

Farley: Right.

Layton: And we were also classmates.

Farley: Yes, right.

Layton: And we...Our rooms, down in "Skunk Hollow", was [sic] down below on the third deck. ((Chuckling heard.)) Our rooms were adjacent—our state rooms.

Farley: You mentioned...You want to take a break, sir?

Layton: I think I'll go get a cup of coffee. Would you...?

Farley: Alright, sir, let's do. ((Chuckling heard.)) TR NOTE: Recording stops. When it resumes, Admiral Layton is speaking, as follows:))

Layton: ((Redfield)) "Rosie" Mason's one of the most intense men I've ever known. He and I shared a house for two years. He's a fine roommate. He's a fine man to live with. So has a buoyant sense of humor, a wonderful sense of laughter and understanding of the world. He realizes all people have foibles, that no one is perfect.

He's a brilliant man, too, 'cause he suffered with the most horrible stomach ulcers in these two years. And he took his medicine and kept working. I tried to get him to stop playing tennis. I thought that would let his ulcers lighten up. No, he had to play tennis.

He was a great student of Japanese, a very fine student. And is a fine man in all regards. He was a bachelor in those days. That was before he was married.

Farley: Ah, yeah. ((John M.)) "Long John" Lietwiler? Did you know him, or was he...?

Layton: Lietwiler? He was the one who came out of captivity in the Philippines, did he not? And cleared his departure with Commander ((Frank)) Bridget, who was in command of a prison camp where he—Commander Bridget—was a senior prisoner. And offered Bridget to share their very meager, little rations.

(4-5G) if he wanted to go with him. And Bridget said he'd think about it—had to think about it. And he said he thought his duty to them...Although he wanted see his children and his wife, his duty to the captives—the Americans held in that prison camp—was greater. And he had to stay to take the blame for their escape.

I didn't know him other than when he came by Pearl Harbor, he came and told me the story.

Farley: Sir, is there anybody else at OP-20-G that we should record? I have quite a list of names in Hawaii like Wright and Dyer and all these people, which we'll talk about later. But do you think of anyone else? Can you think of anyone who you would class a "prima donna" or an eccentric or a...?

Layton: No, I don't...I don't...Being one myself ((laughter heard)), I would recognize another one. ((More laughter heard.))

Farley: Okay, fine. Sir, why did you leave OP-20-G...or ((OP-20))-Z?

Layton: I had asked for the job of Assistant Naval Attaché in Tokyo sometime in January 1937. Zacharias had now left, and (B% Wells Roberts) was now the head of the Far East Section of ONI. And he called me in one day in connection with other matters.

And in the end, he said, "By the way, you had requested Tokyo, had you not?" And I said, "Yes." He said, "Do you still want to go to Tokyo?" And I said, "Sure." He says, "Okay, get ready to go next month." He said...

I said, "How about...?" And I'll leave out the name. "How about the man who was supposed to go?" And he said, "It's been determined that he will not go. And I suggest you don't ask (B% the) reasons." I think it was a matter of personalities. So I left there. I wrote up a turnover file since Rosie Mason was to relieve me in OP-20-G in 1937.

And since he wouldn't be there in...when I left in February, I left there a big turnover file of instructions of what...how you do this and a lot about the best I could to explain the job. And left for Tokyo in February to become Assistant Naval Attaché.

Farley: Mm hmm.

Layton: I was there from '37 until '39. Then I came back and took command of a (B% four piper) that had been converted to radio control—the ((U.S.S.)) *Boggs*— B-O-G-G-S. And I had that until my orders came in. I believe it was November of 1940. ((He pauses.)) No, it was October 1940, to be the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet.

Farley: Okay. Sir, could I bounce back just a little bit to the Assistant Attaché in Japan? Did you receive any communication intelligence reports? Or did you get any support at all from Navy channels while you were there?

Layton: Communication intelligence was so secret in those times, no one would tell you about it or write about. And you'd get no...none of that information. Intelligence is like a machine (B% in which you) make concrete. It receives all this stuff: gravel, cement, water, so forth. It grinds it up and sends it out.

Farley: Beautiful, okay. ((He chuckles.)) That is...That's great. I like that. That's fine. Would...? Again, possibly you remember (B% the)...

Layton: And it only sends it out to those concrete delivery things that come there to pick it up.

Farley: Yeah.

Layton: You can't get it in an ordinary wagon or a bucket.

Farley: Yeah, yeah. It's very specialized, is right.

Layton: Very specialized delivery.

Farley: Right. ((Chuckling heard.)) Would you know whether the Navy had any COMINT effort in Japan at that time—clandestine or otherwise?

Layton: If they had any clandestine, I didn't know about it.

Farley: Okay.

Layton: You didn't want to know about any of these things 'cause if they'd picked you up, they could squeeze it out of you. There' no doubt, they knew how to squeeze. And the Japanese, while you were in there as a...in the Diplomatic Corps, you would always get a telephone call at least once a year that said that this man had a certain package he wanted to give to you 'cause he was an American sympathizer, and America was being mistreated. And he got some stuff he'd like to show you. If you'd just be at (B% Ueno) Station beside the statue of the dog there, he'd get it to you. Oh, yes, he'd like to have a little money, too.

Farley: Oh, gosh, yeah.

Layton: An Army officer once bit on that when he was picked up by the police and thrown out of Japan.

Farley: They were setting up the Americans?

Layton: Oh, they'd done it all along.

Farley: I see.

Layton: You can count on it. When this guy called me the second time, I...he said, "You know, I got something here for you." I said, "Friend, go down and give it to the police. Go down and give it to the police. And you'd get it there faster. 'Cause if I go there, the police will get it through me. And if you want to give it to the police, get it to them right away." ((They both chuckle.))

Farley: Sir, would you recall what type communications equipments or codes and ciphers that you used to communicate with our own as an attaché?

Layton: Strip cipher; a simple substitution cipher for personal things. That's all I remember. But they were in the Naval Attaché safe. And I used these to...As Assistant Naval Attaché, used these to send messages. Of course, when I was a student, I was aware that the safe had been opened and locked shut when they decided that the Type 2 or Mark 2 Navy code box had been considered compromised.

And I took it down. They put it on board the *Gold Star* in Moji. Actually, (B% Mi-ee-kay. Yeah, Mi-ee-kay)—the old (B% coaling spot). But other than that, I wouldn't know what was in the safe unless the Assistant Naval Attaché said, "I want you to send that cipher." Then, you would work with him. Always used two to work the cipher and code.

Farley: I see.

Layton: And when I was Assistant Naval Attaché, I did what ciphering there was. But it was...Most of it was all... almost all went in the strip cipher. Some...Like "The *Gold Star* arrived today" went in a simple substitution cipher. It was a blue-covered book. But it was a simple substitution. Either a different substitution every day (3-4G)...

Farley: Yeah, yeah.

Layton: (B% It didn't complicate it any.) ((He chuckles.))

Farley: The Navy has always made officers do their code and cipher work, haven't they?

Layton: Yes, yes.

Farley: Enlisted or a chief or...?

Layton: During the war they did, but, I mean...

Farley: Did they relax that (B% rule)?

Layton: In ordinary time, if they got an officer, they put the officer to do it. It wasn't that they didn't trust enlisted men. It was just that wasn't an enlisted man's job.

Farley: Yeah.

Layton: It was like tradition. Certain things were traditionally the job of an officer. Certain were traditionally the job of the men.

Farley: Right. Sir, during your tenure as Attaché...Assistant Attaché, was when Amelia Earhart made her flight.

Layton: Yeah.

Farley: Can you tell me about that? And I'm primarily concerned is, whether the Navy was providing any surveillance or any support to her flight?

Layton: I don't know. I was there when she was down. The Navy sent us a radio gram or cable gram—whatever it was. The Naval Attaché (was) asked...directing the Naval Attaché to approach the Japanese naval authorities to request their assistance in any way they could toward finding Amelia Earhart's plane—which was down somewhere between Salamau I guess it was—or Lae or somewhere like that—and Howland ((Island)) or...(2-3G) (B% wherever) she was going.

I took the official letter from Captain Bemis—the Naval Attaché—to the Navy Minister—then Admiral ((Mitsumasa))Yonai—to deliver it and get a receipt for it. I delivered it in fact to Admiral Yamamoto—who was then the Vice Minister—in person.

And he asked did I know anymore about this. I said I only know what's in the newspapers, and that she was on this flight around the world. He said they didn't have any ships in the area we spoke about. But they would see if any ships of theirs went through that area, they would pay heed and try to do anything they could.

They...That was the way it sat for about three days. And then, Captain Kondo, who was the senior aide to Yonai and Yamamoto, called on the telephone and said to me...He wanted to talk to me instead of Captain Bemis because I understand Japanese and Captain Bemis didn't, and his (Kondo's) English wasn't good enough.

And he was told by Yamamoto to give this message. Would I take it? "Yes." "We have found we do have a [sic] auxiliary seaplane tender; the *Kamoi* has been in that area. She has now returned to port. We didn't know where she was. At the time, she was doing surveys."

"She had been through part of that area and had seen no signs of this plane. Because she was overdue for her overhaul and refurbishment after being at sea for a long time where she was out of supplies..." Because of that, they couldn't send her back. That they regret that.

Farley: Oh, I see, I see. Were you aware of the itinerary—Earhart's itinerary?

Layton: Same as everybody else. Read the newspapers.

Farley: Only, but not through official channels at all?

Layton: Other than that, they said: she's down; she's not reported in. She took off and didn't land. Asked the Japanese to look for her in a search.

Farley: I see. I don't know how to phrase this. It's...If the Japanese were unwilling to cooperate, do you think that there was a reason for them not wanting to reveal any information about any installations on the islands or anything?

Layton: No, I don't think that. I think they were unwilling...I think they were willing to cooperate. I think they were honestly willing—except they didn't want *us* down there searching around. And they didn't want us to know at the time, apparently, that the *Kamoi* was in the area—which they well knew.

This, I explained to Captain Bemis when I reported this thing. I said, "There's something screwy about this. They know where the *Kamoi's* been. They know its itinerary. And to say they didn't know where it was because it was surveying and it hadn't reported, just doesn't wash." I said, "It's suspicious. So..."

Farley: Mm hmm.

Layton: I know Fred Goerner up here, who wrote *The Search for Amelia Earhart* and the rest of it. And I don't doubt in my mind that she and ((Earhart's navigator Fred)) Noonan crashed landed on an island in the Eastern Marshalls. The Japanese picked them up. And that she died either by some fault or some blow or something else. Or Noonan was killed and she would talk about it. And so, dead men tell no tales: they killed her. I don't know.

Farley: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

Layton: It could happen! It could be she just went down in the water, period.

Farley: Sure. We'll never know. We'll never know.

Layton: Well, they didn't want us to know what was going on in the Marshalls at that time. But from reading these histories, there's one thing that's clear. The Japanese decided somewhere in the 1927s or '8s or '9s that they had to have some plans to remilitar...to militarize these Mandated Islands—as they were a very strategic group—in case of war with us. And at that time, they were thinking very definitely as us as their most potential enemy.

And that they had made plans...And I can prove their plans were that they would set aside certain grounds as drying grounds for agricultural and maritime sea products. Now strangely enough later on, when they decided with their plans to build airfields, all these drying grounds became airfields. Isn't that strange? ((Chuckling heard.)) The very same places, too.

Farley: Right. ((TR NOTE: Recording stops. When it resumes, Mr. Farley continues speaking, as follows:)) Alright, sir, anything more on...?

Layton: And aside from that, they did openly plan seaplane bases...or bases for seaplanes. These are flying boats, which they then flew some of those as a civilian line to look at the flights of sea animals and whales and so forth and so on.

For the record now, at that very time in 1938, we had a letter in the Naval Attaché's office to Captain Bemis in the pouch, saying that there were more rumors that the Japanese were starting to remilitarize these islands here and there. And that the fact that they wouldn't let (B% in) naval ships go in there anymore. And they had definitely said no.

The fact that they were so secretive about this: that maybe it would be a good idea to have one of the Assistant Naval Attachés go down and make a trip through there as an inspection trip. Since they had “nothing to hide” and since they professed “nothing was going on”, and they should have no objection. It was not a closed area; not a fortified area. They could keep you out of these others by law.

I volunteered to go. And Captain Bemis said, “Alright, you go make arrangements. Suit your time and the rest of it. And you’ll go” So through a Japanese friend of mine, I got a Japanese—in Japanese—schedule of these ships that ran down to the Mandated Islands. They weren’t like the regular ship schedules you can get off of any...They came from inside the (B% NYK) line.

And so, I went down on my appointed day, and I had my little schedule with me. And I asked for a reservation on the *Palau Maru* leaving on so-and-so a date at so-and-so a time to go to Saipan and Tinian, and then back to Tokyo. I was going to do that just first. And he said, “Oh, I’m very sorry for you,” in Japanese: “That ship is all sold out.” ((Chuckling heard.))

So I walked to the door and turned around and came back. I said, “Oh, now, how about the...?” I’ve forgotten the name of it now, but it was like the *Palau Maru*. It was the sister ship. And she’s leaving to go to Yaruto, Jaluit in the Marshalls. And then she goes to Truk. “So I’d like to make reservations on this ship leaving that time to go to the Marshalls. And I’ll ride her, and then go to Truk. And then, I’ll come back to Yokohama.” “Ah, very sorry. Sold out.” ((Chuckle heard.))

Now, I had all the schedules for about six months. So I went through each and every ship with this man. And heard each time, “Oh, very sorry,” in Japanese, “ah, that ship is sold out.” And finally, having gone through three months of this, I said, “Mr. Nakagawa,” or whatever your name was, “You certainly must have some sense of reason. You cannot have *all* those ships *all* sold out *all* this time for three months?” I said, “According to my figures, that is some 18,976 berths.” ((Laughter heard.))

“Well,” he says, “Those are all sold out, I’m sorry.” And I said, “Well...” ((He pauses.)) Oh, yeah, he first said, “No, all of first class is sold out. You, a ‘round eye’, wouldn’t want to go with second class or third class.” I said, “Oh, no, I would go second class or third class.” “(B% Won’t you detest) Japanese food?” I said, “I eat Japanese food all the time here now. What would be different there?” I said, “Is something wrong?” Well, finally, he admitted they were sold out. He’s sorry, they were sold out, too.

So I went back and reported to the Naval Attaché what had happened. And he said, "Well, you go up and report that to Mr. (B% Duman), who was a counselor of the Embassy. Keep them informed on what they're doing." (4-5G) (B% strictly military). I went and reported to him. And he said, "Well, do you want to enter a protest?" And I said, "Well, I think Captain Bemis, the Naval Attaché, is the one who should tell you that. I personally would like to see a protest entered." I says, "You know, Mr. Duman, I'm tired of being put over openly by the Japanese this way."

You see, previous to that, I had taken a pouch to Shanghai so as to make contact with (B% Eddie Hagen), who was with the 4th Marines who was with the Chinese Army in Shanghai, fighting (1G) a special (B% landing force) there. And coming back from there, they'd known I'd made contact with Hagen, who I'd known when I went up to Peking before, you see, when I was up there as a Assistant Naval Attaché. He was a Chinese language student just finishing and working in the office. So we became good friends.

And since the Japanese knew I had made contact with Hagen—who they knew was with the Chinese Army—and knew that I was picking up some information/intelligence, they harassed me all the way back. 'Cause I came back via the *Shanghai Maru* out of Shanghai to Nagasaki to get on the train.

Well, everything's fine. I helped them on the ship with a problem they had with an American who wouldn't produce a sample of her stool for Customs...for Health's...You had to have that, or you don't get in. The cholera was on.

Farley: Yeah.

Layton: She wasn't going to do it. And I said, "Okay, you'll just stay here in the place for a long..." "Well, I know Ambassador Drew." I said, "So do I. And he won't help you one bit. You'll stay right there."

Anyway, I thought I was doing alright. Well, I got on this train. And then came one of these (B% Kempeitai). And he just kept wanting to bother you all the time. Lots of questions and so forth. They'd give him...Show him your passport. And I (2-3G) my passport there because I knew you couldn't get away with...I could get to Tokyo without a passport.

Anyway, it got worse and worse. He came and harassed me at the dining car. Put his dirty finger in front of me. Finally, I rose and said, "Get out of here" in front of a lot of people. Nobody ever talked back to the Kempeitai down there.

Farley: Yeah.

Layton: Then came a guy in civilian clothes. Showed me his card: "Metropolitan Police". I said, "Show me some authority." I said, "I have here a diplomatic card. [It] says who I am." I says, "It's got the Imperial 16-petal (3-4G) and the seal (1-2G). That shows who I am. Now, you show me your authority to come and ask me questions."

And I was then having some fun with these bastards. And I belittled him in front of all these people, which is...he should have gone out and killed himself. ((Chuckling heard.)) When they got to Kokura, (3-4G), another guy came out. They kept this going on. So when I got back, I reported all these in detail to Mr. Duman. And I said, "This is the way they're harassing a diplomatic courier. If we did that to them, they'd shit their britches."

Farley: Yeah.

Layton: I says, "I want something done about this." Well, you know, the State Department didn't want to make any protest: this might upset the apple cart. It might make it a little difficult for them. They might have to do something. Well, they didn't do anything.

I wanted them to do something about this Mandated thing. They made a protest—a verbal protest. It's got some name. Oh ((he pauses as he tries to remember the name))...Oh, anyway, they made an oral protest. Didn't make any difference. But that was when they were starting to work on it. They didn't want us there.

Farley: ((He acknowledges.))

Layton: They wouldn't let us there. But I made an effort.

Farley: Good.

Layton: Well, that's what the Navy wanted me to do. ((Laughter heard.)) I had a lot of fun, too.

Farley: Alright. Sir, I think in April of 1939, since you were a general line officer, you were ordered back to sea. How did that hurt or influence or affect your intelligence career?

Layton: Well, ((he chuckles)), you see, I didn't have an intelligence career yet.

Farley: As such, none. (B% Yeah.)

Layton: I...My assignments had been, oh, kind of as they happened and when they happened. And if you're around and they can use you, well, then they'd use you. But that was the way I understood it. See, there was no intelligence manual and no intelligence indoctrination. There were no secret handshake(s). None of this stuff you read about in the novels. ((He chuckles.))

Farley: Did they have any spec numbers like (B% 1610s) or...?

Layton: No, no, that all came later.

Farley: That came later, okay.

Layton: I'm responsible for that.

Farley: Oh, okay, good.

Layton: During the war—the early part of the war when ...It was right after the Coral Sea and before Midway. I said to Admiral Nimitz, who I got to know awfully well by this time...When you get to know him real well, you can talk to him like a friend. I said to Admiral Nimitz one day when he was very happy about the intelligence he had...The Coral Sea had turned out well and Midway was going to come up. And he knew enough about this (3-4G).

I says, "Admiral Nimitz, I'd like to have you remember that you were Chief of Bureau of Navigation at one time—Personnel. And that this intelligence you're getting now you like so well...It is so skillful and so well done is all done, practically without exception, by officers who have been passed over for promotion." He says, "Is that so? I can't believe it." I says, "I can, and I'll name them. Rochefort, Dyer, ((Thomas)) Huckins, ((Jack)) Williams." I went down the... and named them. Run them right off the hat.

I says, "Each and every one of those had been passed over for promotion because the work they were doing was so secret it didn't go on their fitness report. And no one who judged them could know what value it was." And I felt very, very upset about this. He was proving that the selection system was wrong, and that the people who had been the most value right now, when they needed them, had been the ones who had suffered in the past.

He said he couldn't hardly believe it. And I...And he said, "Give me the information." So I went and got all the information. I had a Navy register I had marked up over a period of about five years, and it had all the ones there. Well, he said he wanted to meet Rochefort, of course. And he wanted to see all these people some time or other when he had some time. Well, time went on and, you know, he didn't meet Rochefort (B% 'til the end).

As the war went on, about the time that (B% Stone) was Fleet Radio Officer, he called me in for a long talk about this same subject. (B% Someone...something) had been working on the man. And he asked what we could do about this. I said, "Well, you could make them specialists." I says, "You got aeronautical engineering specialists. What do they do? Well, they get promoted." I says, "You got engineering specialists. What do they do? They run shipyards not very well. They get promoted."

I said, "You got lots of specialists, if you wanted to use them." I said, "You could have communication specialists, intelligence specialists and legal specialists. The legal guys were kicking that about not being promoted. Oh, yeah! The meteorologists were kicking like all get out 'cause they weren't promoted." And I named them all. I said, "All you got to do is create them as specialists. They won't have to go between sea and a shore, and sea and a shore that way. And they can still pay their way in the Navy."

Well, he told me himself later that that was the kernel or the sprout that became the Personnel Act of 1947 (B% while) he was Chief then of Naval Operations. And he is the one that forced that through the Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel—((James L.)) "((Lord)) Plushbottom" Holloway.

And he told Holloway he wanted it to be the law. And it became the law. When it became the law, he then wrote me a letter and said, "Now that you've pushed this law, you're the man who should put in for specialist intelligence." And that's where you got the 1600s, (B% and that came about from that).

Farley: That's great. I wonder how many young officers know that story that you're responsible?

Layton: I don't know.

Farley: I'm going to tell some of them. ((He laughs.)) Sir, what sort of job did you have aboard the *Boggs*?

Layton: Commanding officer.

Farley: Oh, were you?

Layton: Yeah.

Farley: Good. Tell me about intelligence. Again, I keep coming back. How did you get your intelligence? Did you have an intelligence officer or a unit aboard?

Layton: No, no. No, everything were mobile targets. I...When I was aboard, I had some...I had more time than you usually have. You do a lot of work, out towing targets at high speed. And you pass targets to big ships to tow. And you can practice good seamanship. And you can establish yourself as being a man who knows what he's doing.

I remember when I was on battleships before and a tug would come and pass the tow over to the battleship to tow it. And the battleship would tow it for another battleship to shoot at. And this was all...The bosun on the ship ran it. The captain didn't have the foggiest idea what was going on. The exec and the rest of them—they just sit around and see what's going on and say, "Gee, they do this well."

Well, by this time, Mobile Target Division 1, run by (B% Count Burkey)...And he's a good man, too. We got our technique of passing these targets down. We could pass a target to a cruiser, and not make him slow below about 10 knots. Get the target out of here, the target in tow, in about seven minutes.

And you bring this thing up there...You brought it up at high speed, then you slow it down. And, of course, it just stops you...right alongside of you. Pass the line over. He takes the line and runs the messenger out. Pull the messenger in. Pull it in and then, all of the sudden, you snap off the (B% tug OR toggle), and he had the targets. He didn't know he had it (B% until) you pull out at high speed and went off.

Well, I established a reputation for being smart with the target, and getting it there on time, and being there (3-4G). And getting it off his tail. They always wanted to get rid of it. They don't like this thing hanging onto them. So you get up there quickly and...to (3-4G) this target back. He passes you a line, a...Shoots a...a line throwing gun at you. And if your men are smart and you're a real...you done this (3-4G), it's just routine. You go up there and you take this thing off of them. And you take off. And he's glad. Then he gets (XG), says, "Thanks very much," and all this sort of...

Well, word got around, I guess, that we people in the target division were a bunch of hot shots. Well, of course, this is when you get a message of appreciation from Admiral Kimmel. And Admiral Kimmel stands out in my mind because one cruiser—I think it was the *Philadelphia*; I'm not real sure—didn't come up to the point he was supposed to be. I was supposed to go there, and then go there. And then go back, pick a target, and pass it again to the other guy for him to shoot. (B% He) just passed this thing all day long. And did it all night.

This *Philadelphia* wouldn't...didn't come to a rendezvous. It told me to go to this rendezvous, which was 30 miles away. And I sent a message to Admiral Kimmel: "Respectfully seek...invite your attention to the fact that my next rendezvous is 30 miles further to the west. That will mean now I have to go 30 miles to pick it up from the *Philadelphia*." No 15 miles, sorry. "Fifteen miles to pick it up and 15 miles back over. It's 30 miles. I can't do that in an hour. But I'm supposed to be there in 30 minutes with that target." And his firing is scheduled for so and so time. And that will mess up the cruiser under his command.

Oh, he sent a message to the *Philadelphia* that would bury them. "Proceed at highest speed to *Boggs*' position. Pass target. *Boggs* is to pass that target to *Helena*," or whoever it was, "at so-and-so a time 15 miles further away. If you do not do this promptly, you will screw up the whole deal up like this. Carry out my orders."

Boy, here comes the *Philadelphia* steaming like hell. He never liked it. But that was Kimmel: "Do it. Do it right." So got to ((he chuckles))...You got to know some of these people. And not (2-3G)...Just...It was just fun.

Farley: Good, good. Okay, about the intelligence. I guess there's no need for intelligence on this...on the *Boggs*?

Layton: (B% No...) I took some cryptography course at that time on my own.

Farley: Was that the Safford courses?

Layton: I don't know whose they were, but I did a little bit. I also was...read a book that opened my eyes—that I recommend to anybody that's...has any interest. It's not the greatest in the world, but to mine, it's good. Fletcher Pratt's *Secret and Urgent*.

Farley: I have a copy, yes.

Layton: I have a copy. I (1-2B)...

Farley: I bought a copy in Australia when I was there in World War II.

Layton: Well, I have the copy that was on board the *U.S.S. Boggs* because the *U.S.S. Boggs* was going out of commission. And the chief radio electrician, who... This thing was (1-2G) all radio controlled. Who took over the job of putting the library and stuff out of commission... They didn't have a library when I boarded. So I wrote a letter to the Chief of the Bureau of Personnel for a library for the ship. I said, "It was an outrage that the ship had 108 men on it, and didn't have a library." Of course, you make a lot of friends with librarians that way.

Farley: Oh, yes, right. ((He chuckles.))

Layton: You always get good books, too.

Farley: Right, right.

Layton: And he knew that I liked *Secret and Urgent* because I... He was doing cryptography lessons from CNO/OP-20. And he knew I liked this book because I read it, and I had him read it. So the ship went out of commission. He sent the book to me in the guard mail, saying, "Knowing you'd like to have it," and "All the books are going to be destroyed." You don't pass them on to other ships. You have new books in libraries. ((Laughter heard.))

Farley: (B% Alright.) (He chuckles.))

Layton: They destroyed them.

Farley: Alright. Sir, on the 7th of December of 1940, you were saying...

Layton: I was aboard the *Pennsylvania* as Fleet Intelligence Officer.

Farley: *Pennsylvania* or *New Mexico*?

Layton: *New Mexico*, right.

Farley: Alright.

Layton: *Pennsylvania* was back in the Navy yard.

Farley: As Fleet Intelligence Officer to Admiral Richardson?

Layton: Admiral Richardson.

Farley: Okay. Was this your first assignment as a Fleet Intelligence Officer?

Layton: Yes.

Farley: Okay, tell me about it. How...? Was it extremely challenging, or was it routine since you had so much background...?

Layton: ((He chuckles.)) It was surprising. I opened up a great big safe that they had on there. It was...I'm in charge. (1G) the Fleet Intelligence Officer's safe. And then there were all kind of folders. They all dated back to World War I.

Farley: My gosh.

Layton: And most of them had nothing in them. (2-3B). And one of them had a newspaper clipping here, and another one had a newspaper clipping here. They all dated around 1919, 1920, 1921. None later than '21. Beautiful, great, big safe with all these folders, and nothing in it. There was no file.

(B% George Dyer), who had been the Flag Secretary to Admiral Richardson, had acted as Fleet Intelligence Officer or as Intelligence Officer. So I was the first one ordered specifically as Fleet Intelligence Officer. And that was done at Zacharias's recommendation, I learned.

Farley: Hmm. He recommended you personally?

Layton: Yes. And furthermore, he recommended to set up a Fleet Intelligence Office of the Pacific Fleet before 1940 because the war was coming, as he said and everybody else (1-2G)...But he was a realist in that he saw that this was going to happen.

We all knew it was going to happen. But no one stood up and says, "It's going to happen," and write a letter and say, "It's going to happen. And you better do this, and you better do that now." Give him credit. He rubbed a lot of people the wrong way because he thought of things they should have thought of.

Farley: Hmm, right.

Layton: But this is true of ((British Admiral John)) "Jacky" Fisher in the British Navy. He thought about the ((HMS)) *Dreadnought* and a few other things. And he rubbed a lot of people the wrong way because he and Churchill got along alright. Well, they were both known as fine people. Had he been against Churchill, he'd been nowhere.

Farley: Yeah, yeah. That's right, that's right. Was Admiral Richardson pretty easy to support intelligence-wise, or...?

Layton: Well, now I'll get into...

Farley: Alright, sir.

Layton: The story I'm going to tell.

Farley: Good.

Layton: I reported in December 7th, 1940. Joe was ashore then in Pearl Harbor or was just arriving—despite what you read anywhere else about '35...about 1940 or whatever it was they say. It's wrong. He was there when I was there. He had been there some time because he had been in Pearl Harbor as Admiral Andrews' Intelligence Officer with a...scouting for a special outfit they sent out there at the time of...

Farley: Yes.

Layton: Conditions in the Pacific getting (B% straightened). Anyway, I had...I called up Joe on the telephone and said, "We ought to have some means of communication." He said, "I'm going to take steps to have a meeting with you. Why don't we get together?" Well, I went over.

And the review of the situation in the Pacific was: "Everything is pretty fine and we got a good call sign recover list. We're following the call signs. We're following the traffic analysis." Johnny Williams hears the traffic. And so, I'll get Johnny to tell you about it." So we talked about...And he gave me who's cruising in what waters—(B% bays, river, and all).

On 1 January ((he pauses))...On 2 January, the day after the 1st, Joe called me and said, "I think we better have a conference." And I said, "I'll be right over." And I got over there and he said, "They changed call signs on the 1st of January as usual." He said, "Right now, we're putting all our effort working in call sign recovery. So I can't give you any information until we get this squared...straightened out."

He said, "I would like to have you, if you can, give me a little hand 'cause we're shorthanded." And I said, "Sure, I will. I got a project right now. It..." "Oh," he says, "a week will be alright." So about a week later, I got over to see him.

And he said, "I have noticed that the...Of course, a lot of the call signs...The WE WE—((spelled)) W-E-W-E—cipher...the address cipher also changed. ((TR NOTE: The WE WE cipher is a Japanese simple substitution cipher; pronounced "way-way".))

Farley: Oh, yes, mm hmm.

Layton: The address cipher also changed. So we haven't worked on that at all." He said, "But I noticed it before the 1st that there was some pretty strange addresses in there when we were breaking it then. But I hadn't looked at it much. Noticed also that a lot more ships using that.

And they're mostly Marus ((Japanese ships)) that are going down the Marshalls and the Marianas and the Carolines. How about you taking over the WE WE cipher things I got here, and working on them for me. And we wanted to work on that. We want to get that as soon as we can." I said, "Fine, I'll do that.

He said, "I don't whether I can let you have it." I said, "If you can't let me have it, I can't work. Because I want to work on it in the evenings." He says, "Alright, I guess I can trust you If you keep it in your safe." I said, "Yeah, I got a safe. It's a good three-combination safe." And so, I took it, and I played around with it. This is now pretty close to Christmas time by the time I got working on some of these things. By this time...

Oh, yeah, he called me again and said that the Guam report had come in by Clipper. And I think it was the Guam 1st of December report. Then he called me again and (2-3G) the 15th or the 17th (XG) the second station Guam report had arrived. And they had a lot of this. And he would give me only the WE WE part of it, which he started out with this WE WE. Well, the first thing I noticed in there was that...

I'll have to stop again. I'll go on from there. ((Paper rustling.))

Farley: Alright, sir. Let's take another break here.

Layton: (2-3B) turn off...

Farley: Oh...((TR NOTE: Recording stops. When it resumes, Mr. Farley is talking as follows:)) Want to continue on the WE WE code then, sir?

Layton: The first thing I noticed is...It's a matter of the Japanese language. Certain of the katakana symbols have a nigori—or hard or dirty sound. And only five of these have a half nigori—or a half dirty or I call it a soft sound.

The...This group is the "ha, hee, hoo, hay, ho." Begin with an H. (B% And the) "ah, ee, oo, a, oh". When they have the soft sound, they become "pa, pee, poo, pay, poh." And with the hard sound, they become, "ba, bee, boo, bay, boh."

Since only five of these have the soft sound...And it's indicated on the kana typewriter by the little...a little round circle. I notice in there, there was a far greater number of these soft sound indicators than we'd find in normal, by...oh, by thirty percent. And that's why there were a goodly number of the hard sounds. That would be about the normal.

And this said to me right away—I'm no expert in these things—was, well, of course, these are South Sea sounds. But I had worked on all of these, you see, back in OP-20-G on the Blue Book. And I would approach this end. And look here: three times I saw the same one. It has three characters—three kana symbols—where they start out with a soft sound and end with a soft sound.

There is only one island in all the South Pacific (that) can start out with a soft sound and end with a soft one. And that's Ponape ((modern day Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia)). Po-na-pe. So that solves that one.

And then, I look some more. And I find it turns out the "p"... And they just hit you in the face then after a while. "Sai-pan" ((Saipan)), "Pa-la-o" ((Palau)) and Po-na-pe ((Ponape)): has the same (B% "p"). So from there, you notice in there, there's a ((he pauses))...

Oh, yes, there's "Pa-gan." And that "ga" is the hard "ga." So that gives you the "ka". And when you get these...one of the hard or the soft, you get the original character, which then appears later. So eventually, you end up by having...And there's one of them in there that doesn't have hard or soft sounds. But it's always between two, which it looked very interesting. One of them was ((he pauses))...

Well, anyway, they came out "To-ra-ku". To-ra-ku. And...Oh, I've forgotten them now. But they...One led to another until this thing started to fall apart in your hands. The further you got on it, the more you got.

It seems that this address cipher, the WE WE cipher, was used by these Marus and others when they didn't have a navy call sign book. And the call sign...What would be the call sign was enciphered in this simple substitution cipher. So it now came out...You've found "Boh Bee Tai", which is "Defense Forces" See, "boh" is that same one that could be "boh ba" or "boo".

Farley: Yes.

Layton: But “bee” is the hard sound of that. So “Boh Bee Tai” came out. Then “Koh Ku Tai”—Air Force/Air Group/Air Squadron. And then, you had a shore battery force. And then, you got towns in Saipan like As Lito and other things. One by one, they all come up. Then you got (B% Marshi Aru) for the Marshall Islands. And you had an education in the...I had learned this, of course, that Eniwetok ((Atoll, Marshall Islands)) is called by the Japanese, strange enough, “Brown”: Bru-ah-oon.

Farley: I wonder why?

Layton: I don’t know. The same way they don’t call “wooly eyes” (4-5G). They call it something else. To make a long story short, I...By this time, my assistant, Bob Hudson, had come onboard. And I said, “Bob, I want you to check a few of these to be sure I’m not...just not jumping at conclusions.” So I asked him to check these. He checked them out, and became as enthusiastic as I did.

And about the 4th or 5th of January, I went to Admiral Richardson. And I said, “I want to have a private conference with you on something very secret. And I think your chief of staff should be there, too.” He says, “Alright.” So...Actually, we went to the chief of staff’s office. And sent the yeoman out. And I took a chart along and I showed what I had.

I had their airfields. I had defense forces. I had construction forces. I had munitions depots...or branches of munitions depots. Branches of (B% the Yokosuka OR Yokuska) construction forces. A submarine base. A submarine base on Kwajalein was going in. (B% But not enough there to) (2-3G), “Here’s a remilitarization of the Mandated Islands.” And Admiral Richardson was tickled to death to get it, but was very skeptical of it.

Farley: Right.

Layton: To make a long story short, he said, “Well, just keep me advised.” Now, my original agreement with ((Joseph)) Rochefort was, of course, was in accordance with RIP 3 in the Radio Intelligence Publication. These things were not for the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. They were not addressed to him. They were...He was not on the list for those things for they were part of OP-20-G’s organization. Properly so.

Up to OP-20-G to put these together; not for (B% me). But because we wanted to keep up on things, Rochefort and I, we just decided, “Well, this is a good thing to do,” and I would be able to tell my admiral about this. And he would be able to tell his admiral about it. ((Telephone can be heard ringing in background.)) Well, there’s that telephone again. You better turn this off.

Farley: Right, sir, right. Mm hmm. ((TR NOTE: Recording stops When it resumes, Mr. Farley is talking as follows.)) Okay, so the support should have gone back to OP-20-G...

Layton: Oh, yeah.

Farley: Rather than (B% on a level...)?

Layton: And then, these reports from Station G for example—Guam—were addressed to OPS-20-G with a copy to COM-16 and a copy to COM-14, since COM-16 was in this business.

Farley: Yes.

Layton: There are more of these developed little by little. And when Admiral ((Husband)) Kimmel was ordered to take over on 1 February 1941, he came aboard the...Now we're back in the...No, we're still on the *New Mexico*. ((He pauses.)) No, I think we're back on the *Pennsylvania* now. It doesn't matter.

He came aboard the flag ship and was told in private by Admiral Richardson he was going to (B% relief). And they had some of the various conversations and briefings and so forth. And Richardson sent for me and said, "Bring your chart." And I went in and I briefed Admiral Kimmel on this new development. Admiral Kimmel was very interested. And after he became the C-in-C, he said he wanted to be kept up to date on this. And so, I kept him up to date.

And as June approached—and I think it was June; it may have been May, 1941—he went back to CNO to have a conference with Admiral ((Harold)) Stark and others—including ((Richmond)) Kelly Turner and others. He said...He told me he was going back. He says, "Is there anything I can do for you back there?" I said, "Yes, I wish you'd ask them back there about this remilitarization of the Mandated Islands? We've heard nothing from them. I think this is important enough that we should be hearing from them." He said he would.

The next thing I knew was a radio message that came to CINCPACFLT Admin—since Kimmel was missing—in the intelligence channel. Now, I didn't realize it was the OP-20-G channel it was sent in. All I got was a message. You know, I didn't look at the crypto groups and stuff in those days.

It started it out like this: “It has come to our attention that the Fleet Intelligence Officer has in his possession certain vital information that he has not seen fit to pass on to the Chief of Naval Operations (3-4G) of Naval Intelligence. ((Laughter heard.)) I can almost remember it word for word.

“You will immediately, by this same channel, report all matters having to do with the remilitarization of the Mandated Islands. And amounts of personnel,” and so forth. The where, the what—time, date and the amount.

Farley: Yeah.

Layton: Place, date. So I sat down. I wrote a five-page answer to it. And the Acting Chief of Staff—who was acting—said, “That’s telling him, Eddie.” He says, “But they’re not going like it.” And I said, “The fact is this.” Our reply went back to this...Gave them all the information and said, “This information was not reported to the Chief of Naval Operations because it was derived from intercept reports from Station Guam and Station HYPO. And was not addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.” “It was obtained through the liaison under chapters...under paragraph 5 of RIP 3, which states such liaison between the intercepting units and the Fleet Intelligence Officers is authorized.

Since they were not addressed to the Commander-in-Chief and were addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations, OP-20-G, it was assumed that they would take the responsib...they would take the initiative of reporting this. And not required that it be done by the Commander-in-Chief, since it wasn’t addressed to him.” Didn’t think it was proper for him to make comments on things not addressed to him.

Farley: Right. ((He laughs.))

Layton: Didn’t hear anything for several days. Now, in several days...And this was done in June—early June.

Farley: This is June ’41.

Layton: The message comes in, which I have a copy of (when) I got back from Washington a couple of years ago. Not out of your archives—out of the Naval archives.

Farley: The Navy’s, right.

Layton: Yeah. In which it says, "From CNO. We have heard that COM-14 and CINCPAC, through direction finding and radio traffic analysis, have concluded that there's a remilitarization and...of these things and...Please report in detail. And keep us advised." And...So we answered that one, giving them in detail. Now, I always wondered why there were two.

Suddenly, it dawned on me that the first one came in the OP-20-G back channel—the Copek ((secure cipher system)) channel. The other one came in the official channel 'cause it was released—'cause I have a copy of it—by Admiral ((Alan)) Kirk, Chief of ONI then. It was initiated...The dispatch was written up by ((Commander)) McCollum. His name's on it, too.

And to make a long story short, that was where the remilitarizations of the Mandated Islands first came into knowledge. Now, I asked what happened. And all I could learn was McCollum, who wrote and said it seems this stuff came to OP-20-G and was filed. Safford never saw it. OP-20-G...Z never saw it. No one in traffic saw it. The stuff was just put on the shelf.

Farley: Hmm.

Layton: And...

Farley: What a shame.

Layton: Well, if I hadn't done something about it, it never would have been done.

Farley: Right.

Layton: But there's where I used my little bit of knowledge that I had used before. But it certainly came in...It came in handy, particularly when you recognize that...when you see that "po-na-pe" ((Ponape)) could be the only one that would fit that one (1-2G).

Farley: Hmm. Again, wonderful. Was Admiral Richardson pretty accessible?

Layton: Yes.

Farley: And if you had a bit of intelligence...

Layton: Oh, yes. All admirals that I've served with are always accessible when you got some intelligence. Believe you me!

Farley: And they like to get it.

Layton: They want to get it. And if they think you got the right stuff, boy, you can get in. Admiral Nimitz said, "That door is open for you day or night, any moment. And even if I'm in conference with a high-ranking officer and you have important messages, you tell (B% LeMar,)" his aide, "that you have a hot stuff. And he'll...I will remove the other guy, and you can come in right away."

Farley: How did you normally provide the intelligence? Did you have a morning briefing or a...?

Layton: Oh, yeah. Always had a morning briefing.

Farley: I see.

Layton: 8 o'clock or thereabouts. With Nimitz, it was after the last stroke of the *Star Spangled Banner* in the morning.

Farley: Oh, I see.

Layton: With Kimmel, it was about 8:15 or 8:30, he would send for you. But that was when he was free. Nimitz, you went in. That was it.

Farley: Yeah, yeah. Did you ever have to clear the room of certain staff officers...

Layton: Yeah.

Farley: Because of sensitive intelligence?

Layton: (B% I forget)...If I went in there and you had sensitive information and (B% there's somebody there, I would say), "Well, Admiral, I can't...I have to give this to you in private." And he'd say, "Would you please leave the room?"

Farley: Okay, good. ((He chuckles.))

Layton: They soon learned.

Farley: Ah huh. Well, let's see. Code room. I guess the code room was off limits to the regular crew. It was pretty...?

Layton: It was off limits to everybody, except who worked in the code room.

Farley: Did you...? Your Intelligence...Your Fleet Intelligence Office: was it in a special area set aside with a "Off Limits" sign or...? Was it protected in any way from the regular crew members?

Layton: Ah...Well, onboard the *New Mexico*...((TR NOTE: Sound of timer buzzer can be heard in background.)) Okay, we better stop now, and we'll have some lunch.

Farley: ((He acknowledges.))

Layton: And then, we can go again.

Farley: Alright, sir. ((He laughs.))

Layton: We can start again with...((TR NOTE: Recording stops here. When it resumes, Mr. Farley is talking, as follows: .))

Farley: Alright, sir, let's continue.

Layton: (B% Let me...) The Fleet Intelligence Office was...

Farley: Yes.

Layton: In the flag ship. There was no proper security because no one is allowed to go into certain areas. And the area of the Fleet staff offices was only open to those who worked there and...or messengers who came there. In the *New Mexico*, we were ideally located, in that Admiral Richardson assigned the two offices up in the mast of the *New Mexico*.

It's a big structure. And there was a one door in, one door out. So when Bob and I—my assistant Bob Hudson—was working there, we had the door closed. And we knew who was there and who wasn't. We had a safe there for our stuff.

When...After...One decision that Admiral Kimmel took—which people don't realize how important it was at the time, or what was involved in making the decision—was to carry forward a decision that Admiral Richardson had made but held in abeyance 'til Admiral Kimmel came onboard—and would either do it or wouldn't. And that was to move the entire Fleet staff off the flag ship and ashore.

Farley: Hmm.

Layton: Stop cluttering up a ship and making it so it was an...almost an immobile battleship by cluttering it up with a big staff and a lot of yeomen and a lot of radiomen and so forth. And...You couldn't train the turrets around a certain time. You couldn't train the men in the turrets. There were a lot of things you couldn't do because the staff was onboard. And they were expecting visitors or you ran "honors" on the double...quarterdeck (1-2G).

After hearing all the arguments pro and con, Admiral Kimmel said that since Richardson and his staff had worked this out and...over a period of several years...And *he* had now thought about this. In the past, he had thought something about it, but now, he decided we *would* go ashore. But you have...To move bureaucracy in the Navy, it takes a strong shoulder and a big wheel. And he was a big shoulder and a big wheel.

The submarine base...We said we'd move over to the submarine base. "Why?", said the submarine bases. "Because you got a vacant upper deck that's not being used (B% in) the BOQ. You have a vacant upper deck in the submarine base with a storehouse (2-3G) the base now. And it's not being used. And we're going to put it to use."

"Well, we haven't got any money." He got some money. And he got those...the officers' quarters furnished. Got them fixed up. And we moved ashore. And it operated.

Now, as a lesson of the war, it's interesting to me because I was there and saw it. Admiral Yamamoto, you know, kept his flag ship in the...first the *Nagato* and later on the *Yamato* and the *Musashi*.

Now, the old-fashioned Naval officers had said, "What's the Commander-in-Chief going to do when there's going to be a Fleet action? He has to be out there to lead his forces and direct the action."

Admiral Kimmel finally came to the conclusion he could direct it a lot better from the...from shore than he could from the ship. Because 1) from shore, the ship could keep radio silence. And once he was afloat, if he used his radio, well, the enemy knew where he was.

Farley: ((TR NOTE: Added from the original transcript:)) Sir, let me switch tapes. I'm sorry. ((TR NOTE: Recording stops at this point.))

////////////////////////////////////End of transcript////////////////////////////////////