Special Report: Lessons Learned
From the Audit of DoD Support for
the Relocation of Afghan Nationals

AUGUST 5, 2022

Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense

INTEGRITY ★ INDEPENDENCE ★ EXCELLENCE
MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION


This special report provides the lessons learned as identified in the 11 management advisories issued in relation to Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome. From September 2021 through November 2021, the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) conducted 10 site visits within and outside the continental United States to installations responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for final resettlement. The DoD OIG issued management advisories to the appropriate organizations responsible for supporting the Afghan relocation effort for each site visited, for their review and use.

We identified eight lessons learned within the management advisories, such as the lack of memorandums of agreement between the DoD and the lead Federal agencies responsible for the resettlement of Afghan evacuees and issues obtaining licensed medical personnel. The lessons learned in this report provide opportunities for improvement regarding the in-processing, sustainment, medical care, and physical security for non-DoD personnel temporarily housed on DoD installations. We prepared this special report in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We previously provided copies of the discussion draft report and received written comments from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, 86th Airlift Wing, and 21st Theater Sustainment Command. We considered those comments in finalizing the report.

These lessons learned can be used by the DoD in future instances should it be responsible for housing non-DoD civilians on installations throughout the world in support of another Federal department or agency.

If you have any questions, please contact me at [redacted].

Richard B. Vasquez
Assistant Inspector General for Audit
Readiness and Global Operations
Distribution:
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)/CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER, DOD
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY NORTH
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Executive Summary

Two operations supported the U.S. Government's effort to evacuate and resettle Afghan evacuees within the United States. Operation Allies Refuge airlifted at-risk Afghan evacuees who supported the U.S. and Coalition forces to U.S. installations overseas. Operation Allies Welcome was an effort of the U.S. Government to support Afghan evacuees as they resettled in the United States. We identified eight lessons learned within 11 management advisories in relation to Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome.

We determined that the DoD did not establish a comprehensive memorandum of agreement with the lead Federal agencies overseeing Operation Allies Refuge or Operation Allies Welcome, and none of the individual task forces established a memorandum of agreement with the Department of State or the Department of Homeland Security.

In addition, we determined that despite having minimal time to prepare for the Afghan evacuees, the DoD successfully provided housing, sustainment, medical care, and security for more than 34,900 Afghans traveling through two installations in Germany and more than 73,500 Afghan evacuees temporarily staying at eight U.S. installations.

We visited two installations in Germany (Ramstein Air Base and Rhine Ordnance Barracks) used to provide Afghan evacuees with temporary lodging, food, and medical care. Due to extremely limited planning time and the number of Afghan evacuees far exceeding initial estimates, Ramstein Air Base personnel were not fully prepared to in-process Afghan evacuees.

Furthermore, we visited all eight installations within the continental United States used to house Afghan evacuees prior to resettlement and identified several challenges encountered by the task forces, including:

- medical care and licensure obstacles for contracted medical personnel,
- a lack of civil affairs advisors,
- accountability and physical security of Afghan evacuees,
- law enforcement and jurisdiction concerns when Afghan evacuees committed felonies and misdemeanors, and
- limitations on the appropriated funding available to support the mission to relocate Afghan evacuees at every installation.

The DoD should review the challenges and lessons learned presented in this report in the event of similar operations in the future.
Objective

The objective of this audit was to determine whether the DoD adequately provided support, such as housing, medical care, and security, during the relocation of Afghan evacuees. See Appendix A for the scope and methodology and Appendix B for a summary of the management advisories we issued between November 2021 and March 2022.

This report also includes results from a DoD OIG evaluation that determined the extent to which the DoD managed and tracked displaced persons from Afghanistan through the biometric enrollment, screening, and vetting processes. See Appendix C for a summary of the evaluation report issued in February 2022.

Background

Two operations supported the U.S. Government’s effort to evacuate and resettle Afghan evacuees within the United States. Operation Allies Refuge airlifted at-risk Afghan evacuees who supported the U.S. and Coalition forces. Military installations in countries across Europe and the Middle East supported the relocation of Afghan evacuees under Operation Allies Refuge. Operation Allies Welcome was an effort across the U.S. Government to support Afghan evacuees as they resettled in the United States.

Operation Allies Refuge

On July 14, 2021, the President announced Operation Allies Refuge, with the Department of State (DOS) as the lead Federal agency, to support the relocation of Afghan evacuees who previously supported the U.S. Government and were in the process of completing their Special Immigrant Visa applications. The immediate family members of applicants were also included in the relocation effort. The U.S. Government employed Afghans in supporting roles to assist during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, which were the names of military operations used by the United States. Due to that employment, some Afghans, their families, and close friends faced ongoing and serious threats from the Taliban. According to a statement by the President on August 30, 2021, the DoD executed the largest airlift of people in U.S. history, evacuating over 120,000 people from Afghanistan in just 17 days.

2 The locations supporting Operation Allies Refuge included Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Germany, Kosovo, and Spain.
3 In 2014, Congress amended the Special Immigrant Visa program to provide U.S. visas for translators and interpreters who performed “sensitive and trusted activities” for the U.S. Government in Afghanistan.
The DOS activated the Afghanistan Coordination Task Force and requested and received DoD-provided support in the form of temporary housing, sustainment, and other support at suitable DoD facilities both within and outside the continental United States (OCONUS). Figure 1 shows Afghan evacuees arriving at Ramstein Air Base.

**Operation Allies Welcome**

On August 29, 2021, the President announced that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would serve as the lead Federal agency for Operation Allies Welcome, coordinating ongoing efforts across the U.S. Government to resettle vulnerable Afghans in the United States, including those who worked for U.S. and Coalition forces since 2001. The DHS processed, screened, and vetted Afghans in coordination with the DoD, the DOS, and other Federal agencies. The DOS and the Department of Health and Human Services were responsible for the final resettlement and integration efforts.

---

4 The DOS leads the Afghanistan Coordination Task Force that includes experts from various U.S. Government agencies, including the DoD, the DHS, and the Department of Health and Human Services.
The DoD transported Afghan evacuees to nine intermediate staging installations located in several countries. These staging installations served as emergency processing centers. Personnel screened Afghan evacuees at these installations before transporting evacuees to a DoD-provided temporary housing facility in the United States.

On August 15, 2021, the Secretary of Defense directed the U.S. Northern Command to provide temporary housing, sustainment, and support inside the United States for Afghan evacuees, their families, and other individuals at risk from the Taliban. The U.S. Northern Command, the lead combatant command, formed task forces at eight installations within the continental United States (CONUS) with the mission to safely receive, house, support, and prepare Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement locations. The task forces were composed of military and DoD civilians, as well as personnel from the DHS, the DOS, and non-governmental organizations providing support to Afghan evacuees. A task force was located at the following eight installations: Fort Lee, Virginia; Marine Corps Base (MCB) Quantico, Virginia; Fort Bliss, Texas; Camp Atterbury, Indiana; Holloman Air Force Base (AFB), New Mexico; Fort Pickett, Virginia; Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; and Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst (JB MDL), New Jersey.

**Installations Supporting Both Operations Received Minimal Advance Notice**

The 10 installations we visited supporting both Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome received minimal advance notice of the number of Afghan evacuees scheduled to arrive at their installation. Personnel at two of the OCONUS installations—Ramstein Air Base and Rhine Ordnance Barracks (ROB), both located in Germany—received a 2-day notice before the first Afghan evacuees arrived. Ramstein Air Base and ROB housed more than 34,900 Afghan evacuees while supporting Operation Allies Refuge. The last Afghan evacuees left these two installations in October 2021.

The eight CONUS task forces received advance notice of 3 to 15 days before the arrival of Afghan evacuees. The eight CONUS installations housed 73,878 Afghan evacuees before task force personnel completed their support of Operation Allies Welcome in February 2022. Table 1 shows the number of days’ notice each of the 10 installations received before the first Afghan evacuees arrived. Additionally, Table 1 shows the total number of Afghan evacuees housed at each installation and the date each task force completed its support of assigned Afghan evacuees.

---

5 Though interagency and non-governmental organizations supported the task forces, for the purposes of this report, we refer to task force personnel as DoD personnel.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Installation and Task Force (TF)</th>
<th>Date of Installation Notification</th>
<th>Date of First Afghan Evacuee Arrival</th>
<th>Number of Days’ Notice</th>
<th>Total Number of Afghan Evacuees</th>
<th>Date of Final Afghan Evacuee Departure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Ramstein Air Base, Germany (Ramstein Air Base personnel)</td>
<td>August 18, 2021</td>
<td>August 20, 2021</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22,900</td>
<td>October 30, 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Rhine Ordnance Barracks, Germany (ROB personnel)</td>
<td>August 18, 2021</td>
<td>August 20, 2021</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>October 9, 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. MCB Quantico, Virginia (TF Quantico)</td>
<td>August 24, 2021</td>
<td>August 29, 2021</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,081</td>
<td>December 22, 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Fort Bliss, Texas (TF Bliss)</td>
<td>August 13, 2021</td>
<td>August 21, 2021</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11,472</td>
<td>December 30, 2021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Afghan Evacuees housed and sustained at Ramstein Air Base and ROB: 34,900
Total Afghan Evacuees housed and sustained at the eight CONUS Installations: 73,878

1 According to U.S. Army Garrison Rheinland-Pfalz, more than 34,900 Afghan evacuees traveled through Ramstein Air Base and ROB. Of this number, ROB accommodated approximately 12,000 Afghan evacuees.

2 On April 28, 2022, the U.S. Northern Command provided the total number of Afghan evacuees that departed from the eight CONUS installations.

Source: The DoD OIG.
In addition, the DOS did not provide the DoD with accurate forecasts of the number of Afghan evacuees arriving at the installations. For example, on August 18, 2021, Ramstein Air Base leadership was informed they had to prepare to receive 2,500 evacuees. Less than 2 weeks later, 28,517 evacuees had arrived at Ramstein Air Base. The lack of advance notice of the significant number of Afghan evacuees led to several challenges. Figure 2 is a picture of Afghan evacuees departing from Afghanistan.

The DoD Provided Adequate Support for Afghan Evacuees

Over the course of our audit, we determined that the DoD provided adequate support for Afghan evacuees under Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome. Specifically, the DoD provided adequate support, such as housing, sustainment, medical care, and security, at 10 installations we visited (2 OCONUS installations in Germany and 8 CONUS installations) for Afghan evacuees awaiting permanent resettlement within the United States. Despite having had minimal time to prepare, the DoD housed and sustained more than 34,900 Afghans traveling through two Germany installations and more than 73,500 Afghan evacuees at eight U.S. installations, completing its support for Operation Allies Welcome on February 19, 2022. Task force personnel at all 10 installations experienced successes and challenges in providing support for Afghan evacuees. In this special report, we outline examples of the successes and challenges experienced and identify lessons learned that can be applied in the event of similar operations in the future.

---

6 The 28,517 evacuees includes Afghan evacuees housed at ROB because all evacuees sustained at ROB were in-processed at Ramstein Air Base.
**Housing, Sustainment, Medical, and Security Successes**

At the 10 installations we visited, command and task force personnel provided sufficient housing for Afghan evacuees using either existing structures on the installations or temporary structures, such as tents. In addition to housing, the command personnel provided Afghan evacuees with:

- food and bottled water,
- medical care, and
- physical security on the installations.

**Housing**

To house Afghan evacuees in Germany, command personnel from the two installations used existing structures or constructed temporary structures on the installations. For example, the ROB facility was composed of 5 pre-existing structures, which ROB personnel called Primary Housing Areas, and 6 temporary living areas. Each of the 11 living areas at ROB provided electricity, heating, and cooling, while the Primary Housing Areas also provided wireless internet connection.

ROB personnel kept immediate family members together and only separated genders when necessary. As a result, eight of the living areas housed families, while two were male-only and the remaining one was for single females. Figure 3 shows a Service member preparing a temporary housing area at ROB.

---

7 The 21st Theater Sustainment Command and 16th Sustainment Brigade supported ROB. The 86th Airlift Wing personnel supported Ramstein Air Base. For the purposes of this report, we refer to them as command personnel.
To house and sustain Afghan evacuees, personnel at the eight CONUS task forces converted existing structures into barracks and constructed temporary structures. For example, TF Eagle used an existing privately owned hotel on Fort Lee to house Afghan evacuees. The hotel provided 512 standard rooms and 64 family suites. TF Eagle personnel housed up to four Afghan evacuees in each standard room and six Afghan evacuees in each family suite. Both rooms and suites had a private bathroom with a toilet and a shower. In addition, task force personnel used temporary structures, such as tents, to house Afghan evacuees. For example, at JB MDL, TF Liberty erected 11 tents to provide additional housing for Afghan evacuees. The tents had walls to create private spaces of varying sizes designed to house between four to eight people and were insulated for winter weather conditions. Additionally, attached to each tent was a gender-segregated restroom facility with 15 toilets and 12 shower stalls. Figure 4 shows a picture of the hotel (permanent structure) used to house Afghan evacuees at Fort Lee (left) and a tent used as a temporary housing facility at JB MDL (right).

Food and Water

Ramstein Air Base and ROB personnel provided food and water to the Afghan evacuees. For example, the Ramstein Air Base personnel used the Ramstein Air Base Officer’s Club to prepare meals. Because they did not know exactly how many Afghan evacuees would arrive, Ramstein Air Base personnel also maintained a supply of Meals Ready-to-Eat to supplement other food options.

All eight CONUS task forces used their base operations support services contract to provide culturally appropriate food and water to Afghan evacuees. For example, TF Bliss used four contractor-operated dining facilities that served three hot halal meals per day.\(^8\)

\(^{8}\) Halal is Arabic for “permissible” and indicates the food was prepared in accordance with Islamic law.
TF Bliss personnel said that the four dining facilities at Fort Bliss served approximately 32,000 plates daily. In addition, the eight task forces provided Afghan evacuees access to bottled water throughout the installations. Figure 5 shows examples of available pallets of water (left) and food served (right) at Fort Bliss.

Furthermore, all eight task forces offered self-service laundry or the option to have their clothes washed and dried by contractor personnel. In addition, each of the eight installations had distribution centers that provided Afghan evacuees with clothing, toys, toiletries, and baby items. For needed items not collected by donations, task force personnel worked through different avenues to obtain necessary items, such as winter clothing and baby food. Figure 6 shows examples of donated items available for Afghan evacuees at Fort McCoy.
**Medical Care**

Personnel at both installations in Germany provided medical care, including initial medical screenings. For example, Ramstein Air Base medical personnel conducted an initial medical screening of all arriving Afghan evacuees. The initial medical screening included temperature checks and treatment for all visible medical issues. Additionally, Ramstein Air Base medical personnel working in the medical screening tent treated victims wounded in the August 26, 2021 suicide bombing at the Kabul airport.

Medical personnel at both installations provided care to Afghan evacuees before they traveled to the United States. For example, Ramstein Air Base personnel established a field hospital to manage medical care, offering treatment up to minor surgeries. According to Ramstein Air Base personnel, when Afghan evacuees required more significant medical care, the personnel transported them by ambulance to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center or other local medical facilities.

Further, at ROB, medical personnel vaccinated 10,000 Afghan evacuees for measles, mumps, rubella, and varicella (chicken pox). On September 25, 2021, ROB medical personnel began providing coronavirus disease–2019 vaccinations to Afghan evacuees. Figure 7 shows a Soldier vaccinating an Afghan evacuee at the ROB medical facility during a vaccination event on September 28, 2021.

![Figure 7. Vaccination Event at ROB](source: The 21st Theater Sustainment Command.)
Medical personnel at all eight CONUS task forces performed medical exams, administered the 13 immunizations required by the DHS for immigration into the United States, and provided medical services to preserve the health and well-being of Afghan evacuees. For example, to satisfy immigration requirements, TF Quantico medical personnel provided each Afghan evacuee a medical exam that included a routine physical and screening for four communicable diseases (tuberculosis, chlamydia, gonorrhea, and syphilis). In addition, TF Quantico medical personnel provided Afghan evacuees with screenings for mental health and substance abuse.

TF Quantico medical personnel documented each Afghan evacuee’s medical records on a SF 600 “Chronological Record of Medical Care” form. TF Quantico personnel provided each Afghan evacuee a copy of their medical record, including their immunization record, at the completion of their customs and immigration process. Finally, TF Quantico personnel established two medical clinics, one for males and one for females, each operating 24 hours per day, 7 days per week to provide Afghan evacuees with immediate medical support for illnesses and injuries.

Furthermore, the eight CONUS task forces provided specialized care, such as pediatrics and obstetrics. Medical care was provided by DoD medical personnel, contracted medical personnel, or some combination of both. The task forces provided each Afghan evacuee a paper copy of their medical packet upon departure from the installations. Figure 8 is a picture of a medical examination area at Fort McCoy.

Figure 8. Medical Examination Area at Fort McCoy
Source: The DoD OIG.
Personnel at each of the eight task forces established areas to quarantine Afghan evacuees with communicable diseases, such as measles and coronavirus disease–2019. For example, TF Pickett personnel designated barracks and trailers as isolation facilities to separate Afghan evacuees with communicable diseases from the general population and prevent the spread of disease. Figure 9 is an example of the contractor-provided medical isolation tents at Fort Pickett.

![Medical Isolation Tents at Fort Pickett](image)

**Figure 9. Medical Isolation Tents at Fort Pickett**
Source: The DoD OIG.

**Physical Security**

Command and task force personnel took steps to ensure a safe environment for Afghan evacuees from their first arrival until their final departure. For example, Ramstein Air Base security forces used luggage checks, initial physical screenings, appropriate fencing, roving and static security in the housing area, and departure screenings to ensure a safe environment for Afghan evacuees living within the installation. Upon arrival at Ramstein Air Base, Afghan evacuees exited arriving flights and placed all luggage outside of the airplane. Ramstein Air Base security forces used K-9 units to screen the luggage for explosives. Then, security forces physically screened Afghan evacuees for weapons and prohibited items using metal detectors and handheld scanners.

Personnel at each task force implemented security measures appropriate for its physical location. Specifically, personnel at each task force implemented several layers of security, including entry control points, traffic control procedures, quick response forces, and perimeter and roaming patrols by task force security personnel. For example, TF Holloman personnel created a comprehensive plan for the safety and security of personnel and property within the housing village. TF Holloman Security Forces personnel led the coordination with other security and law enforcement agencies and focused on security in and around the village.
Lessons Learned from Our Site Visits

During our site visits to the 10 installations used to house Afghan evacuees, we identified eight lessons learned:

- establish agreements between Federal agencies to define roles and responsibilities,
- obtain contracted medical personnel with a medical license in the state of operation,
- provide specialty medical care,
- use military civil affairs advisors to support the mission,
- establish standard accountability procedures,
- select installations with perimeter and access controls,
- establish agreements with law enforcement organizations and develop procedures for responding to alleged criminal activity, and
- identify funding limitations and reprogram funds when possible to resource mission-essential requirements.

Lesson Learned 1 – Establish Agreements Between Federal Agencies to Define Roles and Responsibilities

Federal law and DoD guidance require Federal entities to establish documented terms and conditions of support for interagency operations, to include any terms for reimbursement. Specifically, the United States Code requires agencies to document obligations of the U.S. Government with a binding agreement between the agency providing support and the receiving party in writing. DoD Instruction 4000.19 also provides guidance to DoD Components on entering into agreements to support other Federal agencies. According to the Instruction, DoD Components must document all support agreements to “the extent necessary for the terms and conditions to be clear and understandable to the parties involved.” Section 4 of the Instruction provides documentation and records management guidance, including a summary of the minimum information required in a support agreement with an expectation of payment. For example, the Instruction states that support agreements should include the name of each party, the purpose and scope of the agreement, an acknowledgement of responsibility, start and end dates, and the roles and responsibilities of each party.

---

9 Joint Publication 3-28, “Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA),” December 29, 2010, requires that the DoD provide support to civil authorities on a reimbursable basis unless directed otherwise by the President.


We found that the DoD did not establish comprehensive memorandums of agreement (MOAs) with the lead Federal agencies, the DOS or the DHS, overseeing Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome, to define the terms and conditions of its support. In addition, the DoD did not have any signed installation-level support agreements to define the roles and responsibilities of the eight CONUS task forces and the DOS or the DHS.

**Lack of Memorandums of Agreement Between Lead Federal Agencies**

According to officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the DoD attempted to establish MOAs with the DOS for Operation Allies Welcome. The officials stated that they had made a good faith effort to establish MOAs but were unsuccessful because the DOS would not sign them. The officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy explained that they had attempted to establish MOAs at each installation with the DOS instead of the DHS, the lead Federal agency, because the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy officials believed aspects of the Operation Allies Welcome response to be a DOS mission. In addition, officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy stated that installation-level MOAs would be more helpful than a comprehensive MOA, as each installation was in a unique situation.

**Lack of Installation-Level Memorandums of Agreement**

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy officials and a Joint Staff Operations (J3) official confirmed that none of the eight task forces supporting Operation Allies Welcome had an installation-level MOA with the DOS or the DHS. However, TF Eagle at Fort Lee established a support agreement with the DOS. Specifically, TF Eagle completed a signed memorandum of understanding on July 30, 2021, with the DOS to outline the general responsibilities and support requirements. TF Eagle personnel stated that unlike the memorandum of agreement, the memorandum of understanding was nonbinding and did not include terms of reimbursement.

**Lack of Memorandums of Agreement Impacted the Mission**

The lack of MOAs between the DoD and the DOS and the DHS resulted in unclear expectations of individual roles and responsibilities. For example, during our site visits, we identified several areas where roles and responsibilities between the DoD, the DOS, and the DHS were unclear, including accountability of Afghan evacuees, law enforcement jurisdiction, and provision of services beyond basic sustainment. MOAs at the installation level that assign roles and responsibilities to the DoD, the DOS, and the DHS would have assisted task force personnel and interagency partners understand their responsibilities.

In addition, the DOS, DHS, other supporting interagency partners, and each task force would have benefited from a signed MOA to document cost-sharing responsibilities. Without an agreement, the task forces did not know which expenses would be reimbursable or by which agency. For example, TF Pickett officials expressed frustration over the lack of clear guidance...
on the funding and reimbursement processes. TF Pickett officials stated they were concerned with the total costs of Operation Allies Welcome for the DoD and whether those costs would be reimbursed.

**Actions Taken to Address Memorandums of Agreement Challenges**

The DoD OIG raised concerns regarding the lack of MOAs in a March 2022 management advisory and recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy establish a comprehensive MOA with the appropriate interagency partners. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Integration and Defense Support to Civil Authorities, responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, agreed with the recommendation. She explained that over the course of the operation, roles and responsibilities were refined and the Office of Management and Budget facilitated an interagency process to clarify funding roles and responsibilities, including reimbursement, for Operation Allies Welcome, in late fall 2021.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense also stated that the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Integration and Defense Support to Civil Authorities, in coordination with Joint Staff and the Military Departments, was developing template language for inclusion in draft memorandum of understandings that would delineate responsibilities. However, the eight task forces resettled their last Afghan evacuees and Operation Allies Welcome concluded before the template language was fully developed. In July 2022, officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Integration and Defense Support to Civil Authorities stated that the DoD continues to work with the DHS, the DOS, and others on an MOA template to document roles and responsibilities.

Therefore, for future missions or operations involving interagency partners, such as the DOS or the DHS, the DoD should consider developing a comprehensive MOA as soon as feasible to establish and document the specific terms and conditions of support, including any terms for reimbursement, law enforcement authority, and accountability of non-DoD civilians on U.S. installations. Establishing these agreements early will eliminate confusion regarding responsibilities and authorities, and allow for timely reimbursement.

**Lesson Learned 2 – Obtain Contracted Medical Personnel With a Medical License in the State of Operation**

On November 3, 2021, the U.S. Northern Command issued a memorandum to the State Medical Licensing Boards stating that medical providers within the DoD are normally only required to maintain a current, unrestricted license in one state. Federal law grants these providers the ability to practice medical care across all jurisdictions as long as the scope of practice is within the DoD mission. The memorandum further explained that the statute did not apply to
the contractors delivering medical care services in support of Operation Allies Welcome even though their scope of practice is within the DoD mission. The memorandum requested the states supporting Operation Allies Welcome authorize DoD-contracted medical providers to practice within the scope of the care provided to Afghan evacuees housed within the state on Federal installations until the conclusion of the operation.

However, we found that TF Bliss and TF Holloman did not obtain state exemptions for their contracted medical personnel not licensed to provide medical care in the state where the task forces housed Afghan evacuees. For example, TF Bliss contracted medical personnel did not have the required state licenses to practice in New Mexico. TF Bliss personnel stated that the contractor had submitted licensing applications to the State of New Mexico for all their medical providers. As of December 15, 2021, TF Bliss personnel stated that the State of New Mexico had approved 10 applications, and was still processing 60 applications for the 70 medical providers supporting TF Bliss at that time.

TF McCoy contracting personnel said that contracted medical professionals required licenses issued by the state before they could work on an installation in that state. TF McCoy personnel said that, as of November 2, 2021, approximately 70 percent of the contracted medical staff working for TF McCoy did not have the required license to practice in Wisconsin. As a result, TF McCoy contracting personnel worked with the State of Wisconsin to obtain a state licensure waiver for contracted medical personnel supporting Operation Allies Welcome at Fort McCoy. On November 15, 2021, the State of Wisconsin confirmed that all medical personnel licensed to practice medicine in another U.S. state were exempt from the requirement to obtain a Wisconsin medical license while practicing at Fort McCoy. By November 15, 2021, the States of Virginia, Indiana, and Wisconsin granted waivers to allow contracted medical personnel to provide medical services on installations in the U.S. Northern Command area of responsibility supporting Operation Allies Welcome.

For future missions or operations where the DoD requires medical care of non-DoD personnel at U.S. installations, the DoD should ensure contracted medical providers are licensed to practice in the state in which they are to provide medical services. If the DoD must use medical providers licensed in other states, the DoD should obtain waivers from the states in which contracted medical personnel will provide care.

Lesson Learned 3 – Provide Specialty Medical Care

We found that seven task forces (TF Eagle, TF Bliss, TF CAIN, TF Holloman, TF Pickett, TF McCoy, and TF Liberty) did not include needed specialty medical care in their original medical services contracts. According to TF McCoy and TF Pickett personnel, initially the DoD anticipated Afghan evacuees would spend 21 days at an installation before resettlement; therefore, task force personnel did not foresee the need for specialty medical services, such

13 Fort Bliss used Doña Ana Range Complex in New Mexico to support the mission; therefore, TF Bliss personnel stated that contractor medical providers needed a medical license from New Mexico.
as behavioral health services for the evacuees. However, we spoke to Afghan evacuees at Fort Bliss, who stated they had already been there for 2 months and did not know how much longer they would be at the installation before resettlement.

We found that TF Eagle and TF Pickett did not provide behavioral health specialists for Afghan evacuees during our site visits. Afghan evacuees living at each of the eight DoD installations had faced a long and uncertain journey out of Afghanistan, then met unfamiliar living conditions and uncertainty regarding eventual relocation. Afghan evacuees explained that this concern, combined with the uncertainty regarding when or where they would resettle in the United States, “weighed heavily on their minds,” contributing to mental stress.

During our site visits, Afghan evacuees described the behavioral health issues they experienced during their transition from Afghanistan to the United States. For example, Afghan evacuees told TF Bliss and TF McCoy personnel that they were constantly worried about the safety and financial well-being of family and friends still living in Afghanistan. As a result, the task forces needed to provide comprehensive mental health support to Afghan evacuees during this transition.

We found that TF Eagle, TF Bliss, TF CAIN, TF Holloman, TF Pickett, TF McCoy, and TF Liberty did not include dental services in their original medical services contracts to provide medical services to Afghan evacuees. TF Quantico was the only CONUS task force that provided dental services from the start of the mission, including routine and emergency dental care. Figure 10 shows the dental examination area at MCB Quantico.

---

Figure 10. Dental Examination Area at MCB Quantico
Source: The DoD OIG.

---

14 The audit team visited TF Eagle from September 16 through 21, 2021, and TF Pickett from September 24 through 27, 2021.
TF McCoy personnel did not provide dental services when Afghan evacuees first arrived; however, several Afghan evacuees approached TF McCoy personnel to report dental issues. One Afghan evacuee reported that she could not eat due to significant pain in her teeth. Due to the urgent need, TF McCoy personnel took the Afghan evacuee to a military dentist for evaluation and the examination revealed the Afghan evacuee required a root canal. The Afghan evacuee received an emergency root canal off base.

TF Pickett personnel said 10 percent of Afghan evacuee patients had dental problems that could lead to medical emergencies if not treated. TF Pickett personnel stated that this would not be a concern if Afghan evacuees were only on site for 21 days. However, TF Pickett personnel stated that dental issues left untreated for several months could lead to more significant medical complications. TF Pickett personnel stated that if they had routine dental care on base, they could treat dental issues before they became dental emergencies. The significant unaddressed oral health conditions and extended wait time before resettlement resulted in Afghan evacuees at the installations needing both routine and emergency dental services. In order to provide necessary treatment, the task forces had to rely on off base facilities to provide emergency services, such as emergency dental services.

For future missions or operations where the DoD is required to provide medical care of non-DoD personnel at U.S. installations, the DoD should consider including specialty medical care, such as behavioral health and dental services as an option in the contract at the time of award.

**Lesson Learned 4 – Use Military Civil Affairs Advisors to Support the Mission**

We found that five task forces (TF Eagle, TF Bliss, TF CAIN, TF Pickett, and TF McCoy) did not include military civil affairs advisors.¹⁵ This omission challenged task forces without civil affairs advisors to determine how to best disseminate information to Afghan evacuees in culturally appropriate ways.

Military civil affairs advisors provide assistance to meet the life-sustaining needs of the civilian population and provide expertise in civilian sector functions that are normally the responsibility of civilian authorities. Military civil affairs advisors are trained to:

- identify cultural complexities that could affect mission security;
- provide civil information and analysis to the DoD and other agencies on the political, economic, social, and cultural characteristics of a populace; and
- shape expectations and disseminate information in culturally appropriate ways.

¹⁵ TF Bliss personnel had civil affairs advisors assist TF Bliss in conducting an assessment. However, TF Bliss did not have civil affairs advisors for the entire mission.
Military civil affairs advisors possess the tools to identify, gauge, and address grievances from Afghan evacuees early and in a culturally appropriate way. Providing the capability for task force personnel to address emerging issues early while being culturally sensitive was critical to maintaining a safe and secure environment for Afghan evacuees, interagency partners, and DoD personnel. For example, at MCB Quantico, civil affairs advisors advised the Commander on establishing lines of communication with Afghan evacuees and potential second and third order effects of some of the command's decisions, and coordinated with non-Governmental organizations to host Afghan-led English language and American culture classes.

The lack of military civil affairs advisors assigned to TF Pickett may have hindered its ability to provide appropriate cultural context to communicate and mitigate safety and security concerns. TF Pickett security personnel expressed concern with several Afghan evacuees possessing homemade weapons. TF Pickett security personnel stated that there had been several instances of reported crimes, including knives stolen from the dining facility, and weapons made from pipes found in an Afghan evacuee's possession. TF Pickett security personnel believed that Afghan evacuees made weapons for protection against other Afghan evacuees. TF Pickett personnel stated that the task force could have benefited from civil affairs personnel providing cultural observations and understanding to inform key leaders and interagency working group decisions. Therefore, if TF Pickett had civil affair advisors, the advisors could have provided appropriate cultural context to best address the security concern. Additionally, the TF McCoy commander stated that military civil affair advisors would have helped the task force by providing cultural education to TF McCoy personnel. TF McCoy personnel, through U.S. Army North, submitted a request for forces for military civil affairs advisors. According to the U.S. Northern Command personnel, the Army non-concurred and did not fill the request for forces.

Therefore, for future missions or operations where the DoD provides humanitarian support to foreign non-DoD personnel at U.S. installations, the DoD should consider including military civil affairs advisors.

Lesson Learned 5 – Establish Standard Accountability Procedures

Establishing accountability measures for Afghan evacuees in housing areas on installations challenged task force personnel. TF Quantico and TF Pickett did not establish direct methods to ensure the accountability of Afghan evacuees under their supervision. Specifically, TF Quantico and TF Pickett personnel did not perform direct accountability checks once evacuees completed in-processing procedures at the installation.\(^\text{16}\) TF Quantico personnel relied on an indirect method where Afghan leaders and interagency partners

\(^\text{16}\) According to TF Pickett personnel, they started conducting accountability checks to ensure accountability of each Afghan evacuee in October 2021.
informed task force personnel when an Afghan evacuee went missing or failed to show up for scheduled appointments. Similarly, TF Pickett personnel tracked Afghan evacuees indirectly by cohorts when scheduling medical appointments or meetings with DOS personnel. Without conducting accountability checks, TF Quantico and TF Pickett personnel could not quickly determine if Afghan evacuees were missing in the event of an emergency.

Other task forces implemented various types of direct accountability procedures to determine if Afghan evacuees were missing in the event of an emergency. For example, TF Liberty personnel implemented an accountability system where Afghan evacuees wore wristbands with four-digit identification numbers that DoD personnel used to conduct weekly censuses of living quarters. TF Holloman accountability centered on a wristband system, in which task force personnel conducted a 10-percent sample census of the Afghan evacuee population every day, resulting in a complete census every 10 days. Figure 11 shows an example of an accountability wristband used by TF Holloman.

![Accountability Wristband used by TF Holloman](image)

For future missions or operations where the DoD is responsible for the safety of non-DoD personnel temporarily housed on its installations, the DoD should consider outlining accountability requirements and a methodology for conducting accountability, such as determining the frequency of checks and establishing specific reporting requirements and badging expectations.
Lesson Learned 6 – Select Installations With Perimeter and Access Controls

Five task forces (TF CAIN, TF Quantico, TF Pickett, TF Liberty, and TF Bliss) had challenges limiting access to the areas where the task forces housed Afghan evacuees. TF CAIN and TF Quantico personnel encountered security challenges with installation perimeter fencing. For example, TF CAIN personnel stated that several teenage Afghan evacuees left the base through a gap in the perimeter fence and walked to a nearby campground where they took bikes from campers to explore the area. In addition, a food delivery driver met Afghan evacuees near the edge of the camp to deliver prohibited items, including alcohol.

Additionally, we found that TF Pickett personnel did not have procedures in place to restrict access to the areas used for housing Afghan evacuees. TF Pickett personnel had challenges with restricting access because the installation contained a wastewater treatment facility, a local truck driving school, and a daycare facility accessed regularly by the local population using a valid state driver's license. TF Pickett's security personnel reported incidences of unauthorized personnel in the area where Afghan evacuees were located. After our site visit, TF Pickett personnel implemented access controls to include use of entry control points, an access list, and placards for authorized vehicles.17

Furthermore, we found that TF Liberty and TF Bliss had procedures in place to restrict access, such as access badges and guards to verify only authorized personnel entered the area where the task force housed Afghan evacuees. However, both task forces did not always enforce the procedures in place to restrict access. For example, TF Bliss personnel stated that military police were required to verify that each occupant in a vehicle had an access card to enter the main entrance to the living area for Afghan evacuees. However, the military police granted DoD OIG auditors access to the entrance when auditors displayed a gift card and a metro card instead of the proper access cards. Having procedures in place to restrict access and following those procedures are important to prevent unauthorized personnel from entering the areas used for housing Afghan evacuees.

For future missions, the DoD should consider perimeter and access controls already in place when selecting installations to be used for housing non-DoD personnel. In addition, the DoD should ensure procedures are implemented to prevent unauthorized access to the areas where evacuees are housed and the procedures are being enforced.

17 The placard is a sticker or decal that is placed on the vehicle to visibly discern the vehicle is authorized to be within the restricted area.
Lesson Learned 7 – Establish Agreements With Law Enforcement Organizations and Develop Procedures for Responding to Alleged Criminal Activity

Three task forces (TF Pickett, TF Liberty, and TF CAIN) encountered challenges holding Afghan evacuees accountable for alleged crimes committed on their installations. For example, Fort Pickett is a National Guard installation; therefore, the State of Virginia has jurisdiction over the installation and was responsible for conducting all law enforcement functions in response to allegations of misconduct by Afghan evacuees, including interviews, investigations, and the filing of charges. However, due to the limited capacity of the Virginia State Police to investigate alleged criminal activity by Afghan evacuees, TF Pickett personnel only referred potential felonies to Virginia State Police, leaving lesser crimes, such as thefts, committed by Afghan evacuees unaddressed. As a result, TF Pickett personnel stated that alleged crimes committed by Afghan evacuees continued because no mechanism existed to deter future criminal activities by Afghan evacuees.¹⁸

Additionally, TF Liberty and TF CAIN personnel did not always refer alleged criminal incidents, such as spousal and child abuse, assault, theft, and prostitution, to appropriate law enforcement. For example, TF CAIN personnel stated that instead of referring alleged criminal incidents to the County Sherriff’s Department and the DHS, TF CAIN security personnel often diffused situations and counseled Afghan evacuees after alleged crimes were committed. Dealing with these alleged criminal incidents internally resulted in no consequences for the alleged perpetrators and did little to deter future offenses or protect victims of these crimes.

Therefore, the DoD should consider establishing agreements with local, state, or Federal law enforcement organizations to ensure alleged criminal activity is treated appropriately. In addition, the DoD should establish procedures to ensure alleged criminal activity is appropriately referred to law enforcement.

Lesson Learned 8 – Identify Funding Limitations and Reprogram Funds When Possible to Resource Mission-Essential Requirements

According to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer’s report to Congress, as of March 16, 2022, the U.S. Government appropriated $8.2 billion in Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds and

¹⁸ By October 12, 2021, after our site visit, TF Pickett had 28 DHS agents and 21 Air Marshals to help mitigate security risks. These agents were not able to execute law enforcement duties, but TF Pickett personnel stated their presence deterred crime.
$312 million from military personnel appropriations funds in support of the missions (Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome) to relocate Afghan evacuees.\textsuperscript{19} According to the report, the DoD has obligated $4.2 billion and expended $2.5 billion in OHDACA funds.

The DoD uses OHDACA funding to provide a range of humanitarian, disaster relief, and civic aid programs in support of foreign countries. Personnel at all 10 installations used OHDACA funding to provide services and products in support of Afghan evacuees at the installations, including the provision of:

- temporary shelters, such as tents;
- temporary health facilities;
- medicines and immunizations;
- winterized clothing, blankets, and beds; and
- hygiene facilities and latrines.

However, OHDACA funding had specific limitations for its usage and the task forces could not use it for the following activities:

- provision of non-humanitarian goods and services;
- any support for administration or enforcement of immigration laws, regardless of location;
- provision of supplies or equipment including, generators, food, and medical facilities that will remain on military installations or with the partner security forces;
- support to law enforcement, detention, or security functions;
- military construction;
- provision of vocational education;
- restoring facilities; and
- support to religious, social, or recreational activities.\textsuperscript{20}

TF McCoy, TF Pickett, and TF Quantico faced challenges due to the OHDACA funding limitations. For example, the task forces could not use OHDACA funds to pay for wireless internet for the primary purpose of providing religious, social, or recreational activities to support Afghan evacuees. TF McCoy and TF Pickett personnel stated that this OHDACA funding limitation excluded them from increasing existing internet capabilities despite the

\textsuperscript{19} The DoD Report on Execution of Funding Provided for Support of Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome, March 16, 2022. The $8.2 billion includes reprogramming actions from the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa program. A reprogramming is a change in the application of funds. The reprogramming could also be a transfer if it involves the movement of funds from one appropriation to another.

\textsuperscript{20} The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy issued a memorandum on June 10, 2022 stating the Deputy Secretary of Defense authorized certain facility restoration as part of the continuing humanitarian support to the DOS for Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome.
addition of several thousands of Afghan evacuees at each installation. According to TF McCoy personnel, Afghan evacuees considered internet service critical to their mental well-being because it allowed them to keep in contact with relatives and friends still in Afghanistan.

According to TF McCoy personnel, the wireless internet range on the installation was limited and only available at select facilities. However, since there was limited space inside the facilities with wireless internet, TF McCoy personnel stated that they worried that Afghan evacuees would sit outside the facilities for wireless internet access during the winter, which would expose Afghan evacuees to freezing conditions. Similarly, TF Pickett personnel stated that the installation suffered from poor internet and cellular service. TF Pickett personnel stated that they wanted to run a broadband cable; however, OHDACA funding prohibited use for broadband expansions.

Finally, OHDACA restricted funding use for individual recreational supplies, such as sports equipment, uniforms, or athletic footwear. TF Quantico personnel stated that they needed funding to purchase athletic equipment to provide Afghan evacuees on the installation with activities throughout the day. According to TF Quantico personnel, soccer practice and games helped keep the morale of Afghan evacuees high. Task force personnel needed funding to purchase soccer balls; however, OHDACA funding was not authorized for recreational activities. Therefore, the task force had to rely on other sources such as donations. In other instances, task force personnel had to use DoD funding or rely on other funding sources to purchase items and services needed to adequately support Afghan evacuees.

Therefore, prior to the start of missions or operations where the DoD provides humanitarian support at U.S. installations, the DoD should identify mission-essential requirements that cannot be funded due to restrictions on the funding sources designated for the operation and if possible reprogram other funds to resource those requirements.

### Conclusion

The DoD successfully provided housing and sustainment, medical care, and security for more than 34,900 Afghans traveling through two installations in Germany and for more than 73,500 Afghan evacuees at eight U.S. installations. We identified successes and challenges the DoD faced at each installation in providing housing, medical care, security, and funding.

In addition, we identified lessons learned as ways to improve in the event a similar operation occurs in the future. We are not making any recommendations. However, the lessons learned presented in this special report should assist the interagency partners, as well as the commands directly and indirectly responsible for the housing of non-DoD civilians on installations throughout the world on behalf of another Federal department or agency.
Appendix A

Scope and Methodology

We conducted this performance audit from August 2021 through June 2022 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

What We Reviewed

We interviewed Under Secretary of Defense for Policy officials to determine if MOAs existed to document the roles and responsibilities of the agencies involved in the resettlement of Afghan evacuees, including the DOS, the DHS, and the DoD, and whether cost-sharing agreements existed between the three agencies.

We conducted site visits to 10 installations (2 installations in Germany and 8 CONUS installations) that supported Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome. In September 2021, we visited two installations in Germany—Ramstein Air Base and ROB—that served as hubs for Afghan evacuees after their departure from Afghanistan but before their arrival at one of the eight installations in the United States. At both Germany installations, we reviewed:

- in-processing procedures,
- sustainment procedures, and
- physical security.

Between late September and early November 2021, we visited all eight CONUS locations responsible for housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement locations to determine whether the DoD adequately planned and provided support for the relocation of Afghan evacuees. At each of the eight installations, we reviewed:

- in-processing procedures;
- sustainment support, including housing, food, and water;
- medical treatment and facilities;
- accountability procedures; and
- physical security.

We interviewed task force officials at each installation and officials from the U.S. Northern Command to identify challenges the DoD experienced while housing Afghan evacuees. In addition, during our site visits at Fort Bliss, Camp Atterbury, Holloman AFB, and
Fort McCoy, we interviewed Afghan evacuees to understand their experience regarding the housing, medical care, and essential items provided, as well as their perceptions of the security environment. Furthermore, we identified the funding sources used in support of the Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome missions, including any limitations the task forces faced with using the funding.

Finally, a DoD OIG Evaluations team conducted site visits at three CONUS installations (Fort Lee, MCB Quantico, and Fort Pickett) and interviewed personnel from two other installations (Holloman AFB and Fort McCoy) to discuss the enrolling, screening, and vetting processes for Afghan evacuees. The team met with DoD officials to identify shortfalls, issues, and concerns related to the communication and sharing of screening information of Afghan evacuees between the DoD, the DOS, and the DHS. The team also collected rosters of Afghan evacuees to evaluate how task force personnel tracked the movements of Afghan evacuees in and out of the designated living area at the respective installations before the DHS had fully vetted and cleared evacuees.

**Internal Control Assessment and Compliance**

We assessed internal controls and compliance with laws and regulations necessary to satisfy the audit objective. We assessed internal controls and underlying principles related to the planning and support for the relocation of Afghan evacuees. Specifically, we assessed the control environment to determine if comprehensive MOAs with lead Federal agencies overseeing Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome were established. In addition, we determined if the task forces and commands supporting the 10 installations established MOAs with the DOS or the DHS to define roles and responsibilities.

We also assessed the control activities as it relates to the support the DoD provided for the relocation of Afghan evacuees in regards to housing, medical care, and physical security of Afghan evacuees. Control activities are actions management establishes through policies and procedures to achieve objectives. We identified challenges with the design and implementation of control activities as it relates to the accountability and security at installations housing Afghan evacuees. However, because our review was limited to these internal control components and underlying principles, it may not have disclosed all internal control deficiencies that may have existed at the time of this audit.
Appendix B

Prior Coverage

From November 2021 through March 2022, the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) issued 12 reports on the DoD support for the relocation of Afghan Nationals. The DoD OIG reports can be accessed at http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/.

DoD OIG


This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from a DoD OIG site visit to TF CAIN at Camp Atterbury, Indiana. The DoD OIG reviewed TF CAIN operations as part of the “Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals (Project No. D2021-D000RJ-0154.000).” While TF CAIN housed and sustained Afghan evacuees, task force personnel experienced challenges, such as communicating with Afghan evacuees, tracking medical records, and addressing security incidents. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.


This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from a DoD OIG site visit to TF Holloman at Holloman AFB, New Mexico. The DoD OIG reviewed TF Holloman operations as part of the “Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals (Project No. D2021-D000RJ-0154.000).” While TF Holloman housed and sustained Afghan evacuees, task force personnel experienced challenges due to limited resources in the local economy, such as purchasing needed supplies and providing medical care for Afghan evacuees. Additionally, the base operations and support services contractor experienced challenges hiring personnel. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.


This management advisory informed DoD leadership of the lack of MOAs between the DoD, the DHS, and the DOS for DoD support for Operation Allies Welcome. As part of the “Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals (Project No. D2021-D000RJ-0154.000),” the DoD OIG visited eight DoD task forces at eight installations between September 16 and November 12, 2021. During those site visits, the DoD OIG identified the lack of MOAs...
as a systemic issue. The DoD OIG determined that the lack of MOAs caused confusion concerning the roles and responsibilities of DoD, DOS, and DHS personnel, limiting the effectiveness of task force operations. The DoD OIG identified several areas where roles and responsibilities between the DoD, DOS, and DHS were unclear, including decision making at the task force level, accountability of Afghan evacuees, law enforcement jurisdiction, and provision of services beyond basic sustainment. In addition, not establishing an overarching MOA at the department level, or MOAs at the installation level, created confusion and put the DoD at risk of not receiving reimbursement for all or part of the costs incurred on behalf of interagency partners. The DoD OIG made one recommendation that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy establish MOAs with the appropriate interagency partners to clarify roles and responsibilities and to define cost-sharing and reimbursement terms and conditions for Operation Allies Welcome, in accordance with DoD policy and the Economy Act.


This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from a DoD OIG site visit to TF Bliss at Fort Bliss, Texas. TF Bliss used the Doña Ana Range Complex, New Mexico, to support the mission. The DoD OIG reviewed TF Bliss operations as part of the “Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals (Project No. D2021-D000RJ-0154.000).” While TF Bliss housed and sustained Afghan evacuees, task force personnel experienced challenges, such as contractor medical providers obtaining licenses to practice in New Mexico and inadequate implementation of security measures. Additionally, according to TF Bliss personnel, the extensive use of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, for the TF Bliss mission degraded the 2nd Brigade Combat Team’s ability to train for future combat missions. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.


This evaluation determined that the DoD had a supporting role during the biometric enrollment of Afghan evacuees in staging locations outside the continental United States and assisted in screening Special Immigrant Visa applicants. However, the DoD did not have a role in enrolling, screening, or overseeing the departure of Afghan parolees at temporary housing facilities (safe havens) within CONUS. The evaluation found that Afghan evacuees were not vetted by the National Counter-Terrorism Center using all DoD data prior to arriving in CONUS. This occurred because Customs and Border Patrol enrollments were compared against the DHS Automated Biometric Identification System data, which did not initially include all biometric data located in the DoD
Automated Biometric Identification System database. In addition, the DoD’s National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) has agreements with foreign partners that prohibit the sharing of some Automated Biometric Identification System data with U.S. agencies outside of the DoD. The evaluation also found that, during their analytic review, NGIC personnel identified Afghans with derogatory information in the DoD Automated Biometric Identification System database who were believed to be in the United States. As a result of the National Counter-Terrorism Center not vetting Afghan evacuees against all available data, the United States faces potential security risks if individuals with derogatory information are allowed to stay in the country. In addition, the U.S. Government could mistakenly grant Special Immigrant Visa or parolee status to ineligible Afghan evacuees with derogatory information gathered from the DoD Automated Biometric Identification System database. The DoD OIG made two recommendations, including that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security develop procedures for sharing derogatory information on Afghan evacuees with the DoD and interagency stakeholders.


This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from a DoD OIG site visit to TF McCoy at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. The DoD OIG reviewed TF McCoy operations as part of the “Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals (Project No. D2021-D000RJ-0154.000).” While TF McCoy housed and sustained Afghan evacuees, task force personnel experienced challenges, such as maintaining dining facilities, identifying required contracted medical skill sets, providing behavioral health services, and holding Afghan evacuees accountable for misdemeanor crimes. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.


This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from a DoD OIG site visit to TF Liberty at JB MDL, New Jersey. The DoD OIG reviewed TF Liberty operations as part of the “Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals (Project No. D2021-D000RJ-0154.000).” While TF Liberty housed and sustained Afghan evacuees, the DoD OIG identified potential procedural obstacles for law enforcement officers investigating potential criminal activity and challenges for other security personnel ensuring only those with proper credentials could access the villages. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.

This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from a DoD OIG site visit to TF Pickett at Fort Pickett, Virginia. The DoD OIG reviewed TF Pickett operations as part of the “Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals (Project No. D2021-D000RJ-0154.000).” While TF Pickett housed and sustained Afghan evacuees, task force personnel experienced challenges, such as providing medical screenings and medical care, and ensuring accountability of Afghan evacuees. TF Pickett personnel also experienced security challenges, including controlling access to the joint operations area where Afghan evacuees were located and holding Afghan evacuees accountable for misdemeanor crimes. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.


This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from the DoD OIG site visit to TF Quantico at MCB Quantico, Virginia. The DoD OIG reviewed TF Quantico operations as part of the “Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals (Project No. D2021-D000RJ-0154.000).” While TF Quantico housed and sustained Afghan evacuees, task force personnel experienced challenges, such as ensuring accountability of Afghan evacuees and providing Afghan evacuees with all 13 immunizations required by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. In addition, the 2nd Marine Logistics Group, the main Marine Corps unit supporting TF Quantico, dedicated resources to support the effort, including personnel, equipment, and supplies. The extensive use of the 2nd Marine Logistics Group personnel and equipment resulted in missed training opportunities and increased wear and tear on the 2nd Marine Logistics Group’s equipment. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.


This management advisory provided the officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from the DoD OIG site visit to TF Eagle at Fort Lee, Virginia. The DoD OIG reviewed TF Eagle operations as part of the “Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals (Project No. D2021-D000RJ-0154.000).” TF Eagle housed and sustained Afghan evacuees, and aside from one fire and safety issue in the privately
owned hotel used for housing Afghan refugees, the DoD OIG did not identify any significant issues or challenges at TF Eagle. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.


This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for the relocation of Afghan evacuees with the results from the DoD OIG site visit to ROB, Germany. The DoD OIG reviewed ROB operations as part of the ongoing “Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals (Project No. D2021-D000RJ-0154.000).” While ROB personnel provided sustainment resources and had security measures in place to help ensure Afghan evacuees, Service members, and volunteers were safe, the execution of this effort came at a significant cost to the 21st Theater Sustainment Command. Specifically, the 21st Theater Sustainment Command reported that, as of September 30, 2021, it had obligated $37.5 million in support of Operation Allies Refuge and anticipated that it would continue to incur additional costs in FY 2022. The 21st Theater Sustainment Command reported that Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid funding had replenished the majority of incurred costs. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.


This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for the relocation of Afghan evacuees with the results from the DoD OIG site visit to Ramstein Air Base, Germany, on September 14, 2021, where the audit team observed the housing conditions and support of Afghan evacuees. The DoD OIG reviewed 86th Airlift Wing operations at Ramstein as part of the ongoing “Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals (Project No. D2021-D000RJ-0154.000).” The DoD OIG determined that the 86th Airlift Wing and other personnel supporting Operation Allies Refuge at Ramstein Air Base implemented procedures for identifying and screening Afghan evacuees, and provided living conditions and other resources to meet Afghan evacuees’ basic needs. Additionally, the DoD OIG determined that 86th Airlift Wing personnel had security measures in place to help ensure that Afghan evacuees, Service members volunteers, and local residents were safe. However, the execution of this effort did come at a significant cost to the command. The 86th Airlift Wing dedicated substantial resources, including funds, staff, equipment, and supplies to support the effort. For the funds spent on the Operations Allies Refuge effort at Ramstein Air Base, the 86th Airlift Wing reported approximately $56.3 million in FY 2021 costs. The 86th Airlift Wing reported that Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid funding replenished all costs. The 86th Airlift Wing expected an additional $50 million in FY 2022 costs. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.
Appendix C


On August 21, 2021, a Joint Staff Director of Operations (J3) general administration message directed DoD personnel to enroll Afghan evacuees in the Noncombatant Evacuation Operation Tracking System, which assigns a unique number that is printed on a wristband for each Afghan evacuee. DoD personnel were then tasked to support the enrollment of every Afghan evacuee assigned a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation Tracking System number in the Biometric Automated Toolset System or the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Automated Targeting System for biometric screening. On August 29, 2021, the President designated the DHS as lead for biometric screening of Afghan evacuees traveling to CONUS and OCONUS military installations. The DHS worked with DoD personnel to conduct OCONUS biometric enrolling, screening, and vetting activities.

The DoD had a supporting role during the biometric enrollment of Afghan evacuees in OCONUS installations and assisted in screening Special Immigrant Visa applicants. However, the DoD did not have a role in enrolling, screening, or overseeing the departure of Afghan evacuees at the eight CONUS installations.

Several DoD Components were involved in developing policy and direction for the DoD in support of the inter-agency effort to relocate Afghan evacuees.

- The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security is the lead authority for DoD oversight of and guidance on DoD Biometric Enabled Intelligence programs, activities, and initiatives, which includes biometric enrolling and screening, and vetting.
- The Joint Staff issued Operation Allies Welcome Noncombatant Evacuation Operation-focused general administrative messages for all combatant commands detailing how DoD elements should enroll, track, and screen the Afghan evacuees.
- The National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) supports the Operation Allies Refugee and Operation Allies Welcome screening and vetting effort led by the DOS. The Army tasked the NGIC with screening Afghan Special Immigrant Visa applicants for derogatory information that would make the applicant ineligible for the Special Immigrant Visa program.

---

21 General Administration messages provide general information, request information, or request support, but do not task commands or staff offices.
22 Enrollment in the Biometric Automated Toolset System or the CBP Automated Targeting System is limited to activities that include collecting biometrics and biographic data and does not entail any analysis. The enroller enters the evacuee’s information into the respective database and determines if there is any derogatory information on the evacuee.
23 Screening is the process of taking the enrollments and searching for other information available about the individual on the various databases to create a dossier. Vetting is a determination of suitability. The U.S. Government uses the enrollment and screening information to decide whether an Afghan evacuee is suitable for something, such as access to an installation.
• The Defense Forensic and Biometrics Agency is a component of the U.S. Army’s Office of the Provost Marshal General. The Defense Forensic and Biometrics Agency leads, consolidates, and coordinates forensics and biometrics throughout the DoD across the range of military operations. The Defense Forensic and Biometrics Agency, in coordination with the NGIC, is responsible for negotiating sharing agreements with the DHS for forensic and biometric data as it relates to Afghan evacuees.

Biometric Enrollment, Screening and Vetting Challenges

The National Counter-Terrorism Center personnel did not vet Afghan evacuees using all DoD tactical data before they arrived in CONUS. Specifically, National Counter-Terrorism Center personnel did not have access to:

• some DoD biometric and contextual data located in the DoD Automatic Biometric Identification System database, or

• intelligence databases used by the DoD that were located on the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network when they vetted Afghan evacuees.

Additionally, agreements in place with foreign partners prohibited sharing some DoD Automatic Biometric Identification System information outside of the DoD.

Because Afghan evacuees were not screened against all data found in the DoD Automatic Biometric Identification System database, NGIC personnel expanded their analytic review of biometric watchlist matches to include non-watchlist matches of all Afghan evacuees located within the United States. This analytic review began in August 2021, and consisted of reviewing DoD tactical data to determine if the Afghan evacuees located in the United States had derogatory information in DoD databases that would make them ineligible to be in the program. Additionally, according to NGIC personnel, they included all Afghan evacuees, not just evacuees enrolled by the CBP, because, at the time, the National Counter-Terrorism Center did not use intelligence databases located on the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network when they vetted the Afghan evacuees. According to NGIC personnel, by not including intelligence databases located on the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network, the National Counter-Terrorism Center did not include multiple databases that contain DoD tactical data. As of November 2, 2021, NGIC personnel had identified 50 Afghan evacuees in the United States with information in DoD records that would indicate potentially significant security concerns.

---

24 DoD tactical data is information and data that is collected and details tactical operations, typically on operations in deployed environments. Examples of tactical data are tactical patrol reports from ground units, tactical operation debriefings, after-action reports, detention operations, and fingerprints on improvised explosive devices. This information also includes the who, what, when, where, and why of enrollees.

25 The biometric watchlist (watchlist) is developed from information from various Federal organizations and is used to identify potential terrorists, criminals, immigration violators, or other persons of interest. Non-watchlist matches refers to Afghan evacuees who did not match when compared to the biometric watchlist.

26 Significant security concerns include individuals whose latent fingerprints have been found on improvised explosive devices and known or suspected terrorists and for which the NGIC sends derogatory information notifications to appropriate DoD personnel.
In addition, NGIC personnel stated that they could not locate some Afghan evacuees when attempting to report derogatory information to the DoD and U.S. Government agencies supporting CONUS installations. For example, as of September 17, 2021, the NGIC had identified 31 Afghans in CONUS who had derogatory information. Of those 31, only 3 could be located. To attempt to locate the 31 individuals, the NGIC developed an informal process of sending e-mails detailing the derogatory information to DoD and U.S. Government personnel who either were located at, or had oversight of, all CONUS installations that housed Afghan evacuees.

Because NGIC personnel needed access to CBP records to complete their analysis, the NGIC entered into an agreement with the DHS to access the necessary CBP records. This agreement was set to expire December 27, 2021, prior to NGIC completing a full review of all Afghan evacuees. In addition, on December 27, 2021, the NGIC was initially required by the sharing agreement to purge all unmatched DHS Afghan enrollment information provided under this agreement, which would limit the NGIC’s ability to conduct an analytic review on any Afghan evacuees not yet reviewed. According to NGIC personnel, their ability to do an analytic review on any remaining identities, as well as on any Afghan evacuees enrolled after December 27, 2021, would be severely inhibited if they were required to purge all unmatched DHS Afghan enrollment information.

On December 13, 2021, NGIC personnel provided an updated data sharing agreement with DHS that extends NGIC’s access to CBP data until July 27, 2022. By extending the agreement, NGIC personnel will be able to complete their analytic review of Afghan evacuees for derogatory information.
Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFB  Air Force Base
CBP  Customs and Border Protection
CONUS  Continental United States
DHS  Department of Homeland Security
DOS  Department of State
JB MDL  Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst
MCB  Marine Corps Base
MOA  Memorandum of Agreement
NGIC  National Ground Intelligence Center
OCONUS  Outside the Continental United States
OHDACA  Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster Assistance, and Civic Aid
ROB  Rhine Ordnance Barracks
TF  Task Force
TF CAIN  Task Force Camp Atterbury, Indiana
TF Eagle  Task Force Fort Lee, Virginia
TF Liberty  Task Force Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey
Whistleblower Protection  
U.S. Department of Defense

Whistleblower Protection safeguards DoD employees against retaliation for protected disclosures that expose possible fraud, waste, and abuse in Government programs. For more information, please visit the Whistleblower webpage at http://www.dodig.mil/Components/Administrative-Investigations/Whistleblower-Reprisal-Investigations/Whistleblower-Reprisal/ or contact the Whistleblower Protection Coordinator at Whistleblowerprotectioncoordinator@dodig.mil

For more information about DoD OIG reports or activities, please contact us:

Congressional Liaison  
703.604.8324

Media Contact  
public.affairs@dodig.mil; 703.604.8324

DoD OIG Mailing Lists  
www.dodig.mil/Mailing-Lists/

Twitter  
www.twitter.com/DoD_IG

DoD Hotline  
www.dodig.mil/hotline