Audit of the Department of Defense Strategic Planning for Overseas Civilian Positions
Objective
The objective of this audit was to determine whether the DoD conducted strategic planning to hire its overseas civilian workforce in support of the DoD’s global mission and ongoing operations.

Background
The DoD maintains a significant overseas civilian workforce to support active duty Service members and provide continuity as military units rotate in and out of theaters of operation. Although the DoD has identified the overseas civilian workforce as key to the DoD’s global mission success, the DoD faces additional considerations unique to the overseas hiring process that present challenges to hiring a sufficient and qualified overseas civilian workforce. Such considerations include limits on duration of employment, changes to U.S. tax law, and availability of living quarter allowances.

To effectively hire the overseas civilian workforce, the DoD must follow a number of Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulations, including the Human Capital Framework (HCF), which are designed to ensure agency human capital programs support the agency mission, goals, and objectives through analysis, planning, investment, and measurement. Within the DoD, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD[P&R]) provides overarching leadership and tools that align civilian hiring priorities and efforts across the DoD. In addition, each Military Department and DoD Component has a civilian human resources agency that works with local commands’ human resources officials to hire and retain personnel. Collectively these human resources agencies and officials are referred to as the workforce owners for personnel under their jurisdiction.

To accomplish these tasks, human resources officials from civilian human resources agencies use two systems: a personnel data system that tracks individual civilian employees (referred to as “faces”), including where they are stationed; and a manpower and authorizations data system that tracks authorized end strength, also known as billets (referred to as “spaces”). It is the responsibility of human resources officials within the Military Departments and DoD Components to ensure the information in these systems is correct and up to date.

For this audit, we selected a nonstatistical sample of 14 overseas duty stations across the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), to review workforce statistics, such as vacancy rates and hiring timeframes as well as hiring policies and procedures.

Finding
The DoD’s strategic planning efforts to hire its overseas civilian workforce require improvement to more effectively align the DoD’s human capital programs with the DoD’s global mission and ongoing operations. Specifically:

- OUSD(P&R) and DoD Component human resources officials could not conduct consistent strategic planning efforts for the overseas civilian workforce, including:
  - identifying vacancies by matching individual personnel to authorized and budgeted positions, or;
  - conducting skills gap analyses based on individual geographic locations to facilitate collaboration across DoD Components in order to achieve mission objectives;
Results in Brief
Audit of the Department of Defense Strategic Planning for Overseas Civilian Positions

Finding (cont’d)

• For the 14 overseas duty stations we reviewed, we determined that DoD Component workforce owners inconsistently identified and hired the overseas civilian workforce needed to support the DoD’s global mission. Specifically, as of early 2021, we found a wide variation in vacancy rates and hiring timelines for civilian personnel. Additionally, we observed numerous vacant authorized positions that were not being actively recruited.

These conditions occurred because the:

• information within DoD personnel and manpower data systems were updated and maintained separately within each DoD Component and did not provide human resources officials with easily reconcilable data on current personnel compared to authorized and budgeted positions; and

• OUSD(P&R) did not provide workforce owners with guidance to effectively hire an overseas civilian workforce. Specifically, the OUSD(P&R) did not:
  ○ provide DoD Components with benchmarks by identifying and integrating measureable and observable hiring and vacancy goals for the overseas civilian workforce into the DoD’s human capital performance metrics, or
  ○ capture and disseminate best practices on overseas hiring timelines and methods to minimize vacancy durations across all DoD workforce owners.

Because DoD data systems, performance metrics, and guidance did not provide human resources officials with clear direction or readily accessible tools for hiring civilian personnel overseas, the DoD human capital programs were not fully aligned to the DoD’s mission, goals, or objectives in accordance with the principles of OPM’s Human Capital Framework. Although the responsibility for planning for and managing the civilian workforce rests with the workforce owners, the lack of a unified DoD personnel and manpower data system, performance metrics, and best practices guidance meant Military Departments and DoD Components had no benchmarks to produce policies and procedures for their local commands.

As a result, each of the 14 overseas duty stations we reviewed lacked detailed written procedures related to hiring of their overseas civilian personnel and faced persistent challenges to overseas civilian personnel management, including additional time required to onboard personnel, vacancy rates of up to 39 percent, and gaps between outgoing and incoming personnel. Therefore, the DoD did not have reasonable assurance that it was hiring an overseas civilian workforce adequate to support the DoD’s readiness, global mission, and ongoing operations.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD[P&R]) ensure the Defense Civilian Human Resources Management System provides human resources officials within the Department the capability to match individual civilian personnel to specific authorized and budgeted positions across all DoD Components in order to assist in identification and closing of skill gaps.

We also recommend that the USD(P&R) identify relevant performance metrics related to hiring and retaining a sufficient and well-qualified DoD overseas civilian workforce (such as vacancy, hire, and fill rates) that account for unique overseas conditions, incorporate the metrics in relevant human capital planning documents or systems, and use the metrics to monitor improvement in the hiring of the overseas civilian workforce. Finally,
we recommend that the USD(P&R), in coordination with the civilian human resources agencies of the Military Departments and DoD Components, identify, capture, and disseminate standardized guidance for hiring overseas civilians that identifies best practices for workforce owners.

Management Comments and Our Response

The USD(P&R) agreed with our recommendation to ensure the Defense Civilian Human Resources Management System provides human resources officials within the Department the capability to match individual civilian personnel to specific authorized and budgeted positions. The USD(P&R) stated that the OUSD(P&R) is striving to ensure that DCHRMS includes the capability to match individual civilian personnel to specific authorized and budgeted positions. Comments from the Under Secretary addressed the specifics of our recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but remains open.

The USD(P&R) disagreed with our recommendation to coordinate with the civilian human resources agencies of the Military Departments and the DoD Components to capture and disseminate overseas hiring guidance that identifies best practices. The USD(P&R) stated that the responsibilities identified in this recommendation are the responsibilities of individual workforce owners, not the OUSD(P&R). Comments from the Under Secretary did not address the specifics of our recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. In response, we revised the recommendation to state that the OUSD(P&R) serves as a resource to workforce owners by collecting and disseminating best practices that will allow workforce owners to implement policies and guidance consistent with their needs and capabilities.

Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of recommendations.
### Recommendations Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management</th>
<th>Recommendations Unresolved</th>
<th>Recommendations Resolved</th>
<th>Recommendations Closed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness</td>
<td>1.b.1, 1.b.2, 1.b.3, 1.c.1, 1.c.2, and 1.c.3</td>
<td>1.a</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please provide Management Comments by December 16, 2021.

**Note:** The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- **Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.

- **Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.

- **Closed** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.
MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS


This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General’s audit. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management’s comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

This report contains recommendations that are considered unresolved because the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness did not agree or did not fully address the recommendations presented in the report.

Therefore, as discussed in the Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response section of this report, the recommendations remain open. We will track these recommendations until an agreement is reached on the actions that you will take to address the recommendations, and you have submitted adequate documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions are completed.

DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, please provide us within 30 days your response concerning specific actions in process or alternative corrective actions proposed on the recommendations. Send your response to either followup@dodig.mil if unclassified or rfnet@dodig.smil.mil if classified SECRET.

If you have any questions, please contact me at [redacted] (●●●●●●●●●●●●●●). We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the audit.

Richard B. Vasquez  
Assistant Inspector General for Audit Readiness and Global Operations
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Introduction

Objective

The objective of this audit was to determine whether the DoD conducted strategic planning to hire its overseas civilian workforce in support of the DoD’s global mission and ongoing operations.

Background

The DoD maintains a significant overseas civilian workforce that requires a wide range of talents and skills to perform peacetime and wartime missions in support of DoD’s global military operations. The DoD must structure the roles and responsibilities of the overseas civilian workforce to support the current and emerging challenges that impact National security. A well-managed overseas civilian workforce is indispensable to accomplishing DoD’s mission and goals.

As stated in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance report released by the White House in March 2021, the United States requires a highly skilled National security workforce to ensure an effective National security strategy.\(^1\) The report specifically states that investments in the skills and training of the DoD and other National security agencies’ workforces, particularly in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics fields will maintain the United States’ strategic advantage.

Overseas Civilian Workforce

As of March 31, 2021, the DoD had 35,000 U.S. civilian personnel employed in 90 foreign countries and overseas U.S. territories.\(^2\) These civilians supported 172,000 active duty and 20,400 reserve Service members deployed overseas. While accounting for only 4 percent of the DoD civilian workforce, these overseas civilian personnel support 12 percent of active duty Service members and provide continuity as military units rotate into and out of theaters of operation.

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\(^2\) The overseas civilian personnel are U.S. citizens who work in non-contract positions and were hired using appropriated funds. This number does not include personnel in classified positions. See Appendix A for additional information on the scope of the audit.
DoD overseas civilian personnel provide important mission support services to deployed units, Military Service component commands, and geographic combatant commands, including medical, logistics, contracting, intelligence, financial management, human resources, and procurement. Table 1 shows the total number of DoD civilian personnel in overseas countries by geographic combatant command for each Military Department and all other DoD Components.³

Table 1. DoD Civilian Personnel in Foreign Countries and Overseas U.S. Territories by Geographic Combatant Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combatant Command</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>DoD Components</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Northern Command</td>
<td>1,379</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>2,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Southern Command</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
<td>8,079</td>
<td>1,315</td>
<td>2,212</td>
<td>6,194</td>
<td>17,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Africa Command</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>1,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Indo-Pacific Command</td>
<td>2,909</td>
<td>4,345</td>
<td>1,272</td>
<td>4,828</td>
<td>13,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,923</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,267</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,856</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,933</strong></td>
<td><strong>34,979</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DoD Civilians Supporting Overseas Contingency Operations**

According to DoD officials, while providing mission support services to deployed military personnel around the globe, the DoD overseas civilian workforce also plays a significant role in supporting Overseas Contingency Operations (OCOs). OCOs are operations designated by the Secretary of Defense that require members of the Armed Forces to become involved in military actions or operations against an enemy of the United States or opposing military force.

For example, within the U.S. Central Command’s (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility, there are two ongoing OCOs: Operation Freedom’s Sentinel in Afghanistan and Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq and Syria. According to the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, in their final report to Congress, OCOs are often located in harsh, remote, or dangerous areas outside well-established supply chains, oversight mechanisms, and with limited support personnel. As a result, ensuring that combatant commands fill civilian support positions, also referred to as billets, with highly skilled civilian personnel is essential to ensuring the success of the operations.

**Additional Considerations Required to Hire an Overseas Workforce**

Although the DoD has identified the importance of the overseas civilian workforce to the success of the DoD’s global mission and missions supporting OCOs, the DoD faces additional considerations unique to the overseas hiring process that present challenges to hiring a sufficient and qualified overseas civilian workforce.

For example, DoD Instruction 1400.25, Volume 1230, limits the duration of employment for civilian personnel overseas to a maximum of 5 years. At the end of this 5-year period, under normal circumstances, DoD civilian personnel must return to a position within the United States for a period of at least 2 years before being eligible to return to another overseas position. Heads of DoD Components may extend overseas personnel tour of duty for up to 2 years beyond the 5-year limitation; however, the Heads must justify the additional tour extension and produce a succession plan that outlines how the DoD Component will replace the person at the close of the extension period. Beyond that extended period, DoD Component Heads may only grant additional overseas tour extensions under extreme circumstances. This policy increases turnover in overseas positions, necessitating constant hiring and replacement as well as strategies by DoD Components to retain knowledge and expertise as employees rotate through positions.

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According to DoD human resources officials, another consideration that presents a challenge in hiring for overseas civilian positions is the additional time and effort it takes to complete the Permanent Change of Station (PCS) process for personnel moving from the United States to a foreign nation. A PCS includes the moving of household items, such as furniture, belongings, and other goods from the employee’s home to their new location overseas. The overseas transition can also involve significant responsibilities on the employee and their family, including locating suitable housing, employment for a spouse, and schools for children. For example, DoD human resources officials from DLA and the Department of the Navy stated that they must factor in the time required to complete a PCS in the hiring process for overseas positions. These time and effort commitments, along with the desirability of a particular duty station, put an increased burden on DoD civilian employees and their families during the PCS process, and according to DoD human resources officials limit the availability of applicants to those who are comfortable undertaking them.

There are also a number of other considerations specific to the employment of DoD personnel overseas that can make it a challenge to recruit sufficient qualified personnel. For example, according to a DoD analysis, recent changes to U.S. tax law have limited the ability for DoD civilian employees to deduct the reimbursement of PCS costs from their taxable income, often resulting in thousands of dollars of additional costs to the employee as a result of the overseas move. Additional, DoD hiring officials we interviewed noted overseas civilian employees do not always qualify for a living quarters allowance, which provides a stipend to the employee to pay for housing costs. Without a living quarters allowance, employees must pay out of pocket for overseas housing, raising the cost to them of living overseas. As a result, an employee may not be able to maintain a home in the United States that they plan to return to at the completion of their tour and pay for housing overseas.

These limits to the duration of overseas tour of duty, additional administrative requirements involved in transferring personnel overseas, and other considerations to hiring can create challenges for the Military Departments and DoD Components when hiring a sufficient, qualified overseas civilian workforce. These additional considerations make strategic planning necessary to monitor and assess ongoing human capital needs and workforce trends in order to predict future needs and ensure the DoD fills positions (particularly positions in support of OCOs) with a well-qualified civilian workforce.

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6 Public Law 115-97 (Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017) amended 26 USC §132 to remove the tax deductibility of reimbursement for moving expenses for DoD civilian personnel.
Introduction

Management and Strategic Planning of the DoD Civilian Workforce

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and a number of DoD Components have specific roles in developing and implementing civilian personnel policy, hiring the DoD civilian workforce, and conducting strategic planning to identify and meet future workforce needs.

The Office of Personnel Management

The OPM serves as the lead human resources agency and personnel policy manager for the Federal Government. It provides policy direction and leadership in designing, developing, and implementing Government-wide human resources systems, programs, and policies that support the current and emerging needs of Federal agencies. The OPM also provides human resources support to Federal agencies throughout the hiring process through the USA Staffing system. USA Staffing provides hiring officials with tools and data, including the ability to post job openings on the USAJobs website and identify selection criteria to assist in the review of applications.

The OPM requires Federal agencies to align their human capital programs to their mission and defines strategic planning and alignment as a system that ensures agency human capital programs support agency mission, goals, and objectives through analysis, planning, investment, and measurement. The OPM issues guidance through the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), which identifies the strategic human capital management policies and procedures that all Federal agencies must follow. These include:

- developing a comprehensive workforce planning and analysis policy that monitors and addresses skill gaps by using comprehensive data analytics and gap closure strategies;
- recruiting and developing an effective workforce; and
- documenting key human capital management practices in the agency's annual performance plan.

To achieve strategic planning and alignment of human capital goals, the OPM also requires Federal agencies to develop a Human Capital Operating Plan (HCOP) that aligns to the agency's strategic and annual performance plans, OPM's Human Capital Framework (HCF), and the 2018 Federal Workforce Priorities Report. The OPM HCF states that the goals of aligning human capital efforts within an agency are to:

- integrate strategic plans, annual performance plans and goals, and other relevant budget, finance, and acquisition plans;

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7 Title 5 CFR sections 250.203 through 250.205 (2016).
• measure and observe performance targets, and;
• communicate in an open and transparent manner to facilitate cross-agency collaboration to achieve objectives.

In addition, the HCF sets a number of desired outcomes for Federal agencies, including:

• agency operations that are mission focused, where the goals, objectives, and expected outcomes for executives, managers, and employees are all aligned with the mission of the agency, creating a common understanding of expectations throughout the organization;

• clear opportunities for best practices, where senior executives ensure that their staff partner across functional areas to leverage program experiences and expertise to resolve challenging issues by capturing, collecting, and sharing the lessons learned and outcomes of these collaborative efforts to showcase and strengthen the collaborative process;

• informed and engaged stakeholders that agency leaders can engage to capture input and suggestions on strategic goals, measures, and impact; and

• focused measures and evaluation that align performance metrics at all levels of the organization (strategic, operations, and employee) to the mission and goals of the agency, specific programs, and individual components within the agency.

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD(P&R)) is the office within the DoD responsible for developing civilian workforce policies and guidance that align with OPM requirements and for overseeing their implementation by DoD Components. Because DoD civilian hiring is decentralized across numerous DoD organizations with hiring authorities that are responsible for hiring their own personnel, the OUSD(P&R) is responsible for providing overarching leadership and tools that align priorities and efforts across the DoD.

The OUSD(P&R) provides guidance to all Military Departments and DoD Components regarding manpower management to determine proper workforce mix. Under DoD policy, the OUSD(P&R) also qualitatively and quantitatively analyzes military and civilian personnel requirements, utilization, readiness, and support. Finally, the OUSD(P&R) oversees and monitors the work of a number of other DoD entities that each play specific roles in strategic planning and human capital management. Table 2 shows these agencies and their roles in strategic planning and human capital management.
Table 2. The Role of the OUSD(P&R) and Its Subordinate Components in Strategic Planning and Human Capital Management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUSD(P&amp;R) Component Roles in Strategic Planning and Human Capital Management</th>
<th>Defense Human Resources Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs</strong></td>
<td>Develops and delivers all personnel policy, both civilian and military, and implements human resources solutions that support the Total Force and mission readiness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy</strong></td>
<td>Supports the development and oversight of civilian personnel plans, policies, and programs for the more than 930,000 DoD civilian personnel, including 35,000 DoD personnel serving overseas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defense Human Resources Activity</strong></td>
<td>Provides centralized and comprehensive personnel data management, research, and analysis across the entire DoD. Oversees the work of the Defense Civilian Personnel Advisory Service (DCPAS) and the Defense Manpower Data Center.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defense Civilian Personnel Advisory Service</strong></td>
<td>Leads the development and implementation of civilian personnel policies and human resources solutions that ensure mission readiness through policy development, advisory and consulting services, operational execution, and training development and support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defense Civil Manpower Data Center</strong></td>
<td>Uses a system known as the Defense Competency Assessment Tool, independently or at the request of a DoD Component, to develop and validate competency models for specific occupational series in the DoD to identify and close competency gaps in the DoD’s civilian workforce.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defense Civil Manpower Data Center</strong></td>
<td>Collects and maintains an archive of automated manpower, personnel (military and civilian), training, and other databases for the DoD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defense Civil Manpower Data Center</strong></td>
<td>Serves as a central repository for 35 million personnel records across the DoD contained within 230 current and historical databases, which support the information needs of the Defense Human Resources Activity, DCPAS, and other DoD Components.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The DoD OIG.

**Civilian Human Resources Personnel for Military Departments and DoD Components**

Each Military Department and DoD Component also has a civilian human resources agency or department tasked with overall human capital management for civilian personnel within their Department or Component located in the Continental
United States (CONUS) and Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS). These human resources agencies work with human resources officials embedded within local commands to identify and fill vacant positions and assist with onboarding of new employees. These human resources agencies and officials are referred to as the workforce owners for personnel under their jurisdiction, and have the primary responsibility for planning for and managing their civilian workforces.

Workforce owners and management officials from personnel divisions of Military Departments are also responsible for updating and maintaining data on personnel and manpower authorizations within the data systems each Military Department uses to track that information. Specifically, DoD human resources officials stated a personnel data system tracks individual civilian employees, including where they are stationed, while a manpower and authorizations data system tracks authorized end strength (AES).\(^8\)

For example, the Army uses the following two systems.

- **Defense Civilian Personnel Data System (DCPDS):**
  - used for civilian personnel data;
  - provides a wide range of human resources tools; and
  - allows Army and DoD human resources officials to identify the location, job series, pay plan, and grade of all civilian personnel.

- **Force Management System:**
  - used for manpower and authorizations data; and
  - provides information on authorized force structures across the Army, effectively showing the number of authorized positions for a specific command by job series and grade.\(^9\)

According to DCPAS officials, while all DoD components use DCPDS to track and manage their civilian personnel, Military Departments and DoD Components use different manpower authorizations data systems similar to Force Management System. For example, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) uses a system called the Fourth Estate Manpower Tracking System.

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\(^8\) AES represents manpower requirements identified by DoD in its annual manpower requirements report as necessary to accomplish the agency’s mission that Congress has subsequently authorized as part of the National Defense Authorization Act.

\(^9\) A force structure is a document that details the roles and responsibilities of staff and provides guidance for hiring officials regarding the skills needed to fill particular roles.
Workforce owners and management personnel within the Military Departments and DoD Components have the responsibility of ensuring the information in these systems is correct. They also have the responsibility to incorporate data from DCPDS and their individual manpower authorization system to identify and address human capital needs, like gaps in staffing or required skillsets (referred to as competency gaps) as part of their human capital management processes.

**Overseas Duty Stations That We Reviewed**

As of March 2021, the DoD, Military Departments, and DoD Components had 34,979 civilian personnel employed in 90 foreign countries and overseas U.S. territories. For this audit, we reviewed DoD, Army, Navy, Air Force, and DLA policies and procedures regarding strategic planning for their overseas civilian workforce. We also used data on DoD civilian personnel provided by DCPAS to select a nonstatistical sample of 14 overseas duty stations across the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as DLA, to review workforce statistics, such as vacancy rates and hiring timeframes as well as hiring policies and procedures. As part of this sample, we selected four overseas duty stations with civilian personnel from each Military Department, as well as two duty stations with DLA civilian personnel. We also selected locations where multiple Military Departments had civilian personnel duty stations to allow for a comparison across Military Departments. Table 3 below identifies our sample of duty stations.

**Table 3. Overview of Duty Stations Selected for Review**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Military Department or DoD Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Manama, Bahrain</td>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Manama, Bahrain</td>
<td>Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Manama, Bahrain</td>
<td>DLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Bahrain Island, Bahrain</td>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Kuwait, Kuwait</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Camp Arifjan, Kuwait</td>
<td>Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Naha Okinawa, Japan</td>
<td>Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Naha Okinawa, Japan</td>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Naha Okinawa, Japan</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Stuttgart, Germany</td>
<td>Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Stuttgart, Germany</td>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 For the purposes of our audit, we identified an overseas duty station as a city, town, or geographic location outside the United States and its territories that contained permanent duty stations for a number for personnel from a specific Military Department or DoD Component. For example, Department of the Army personnel in Stuttgart, Germany would be one duty station, while Department of the Navy personnel in Stuttgart, Germany would be a separate one.
Review of Internal Controls

DoD Instruction 5010.40 requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls. 11 We identified internal control weaknesses with OUSD(P&R) and DoD Component human resources officials’ strategic planning efforts to hire its overseas civilian workforce. Specifically, OUSD(P&R) and DoD Component human resources officials could not conduct some consistent strategic planning efforts for the overseas civilian workforce. In addition, human resources officials at the sampled overseas duty stations did not consistently identify and hire the overseas civilian workforce needed to support the DoD’s global mission.

We will provide a copy of the final report to the senior official responsible for internal controls in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

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Finding

**DoD’s Strategic Planning Efforts and Guidance Did Not Fully Address Overseas Civilian Workforce Needs**

The DoD's strategic planning efforts to hire its overseas civilian workforce require improvement to more effectively align the DoD's human capital programs with the DoD's global mission and ongoing operations. Specifically:

- OUSD(P&R) and DoD Component human resources officials could not conduct consistent strategic planning efforts for the overseas civilian workforce, including:
  - identifying vacancies by matching individual personnel to authorized and budgeted positions, or
  - conducting skills gap analyses based on individual geographic locations to facilitate collaboration across DoD Components in order to achieve mission objectives,

- For the 14 overseas duty stations we reviewed, we determined that DoD Component workforce owners inconsistently identified and hired the overseas civilian workforce needed to support the DoD’s global mission. Specifically, as of early 2021, we found wide variation in vacancy rates and hiring timelines for civilian personnel. Additionally, we observed numerous vacant authorized positions were not actively being recruited.

These conditions occurred because the:

- information within DoD personnel and manpower data systems were updated and maintained separately within each DoD Component and did not provide human resources officials with easily reconcilable data on current personnel compared to authorized and budgeted positions; and

- the OUSD(P&R) did not provide DoD workforce owners with guidance to effectively hire an overseas civilian workforce. Specifically, the OUSD(P&R) did not:
  - provide DoD Components with benchmarks by identifying and integrating measureable and observable hiring and vacancy goals for the overseas civilian workforce into the DoD’s human capital performance metrics, or
  - capture and disseminate best practices guidance on overseas hiring timelines and methods to minimize vacancy durations across all DoD workforce owners.
Because DoD data systems, performance metrics, and guidance did not provide human resources officials with clear direction or readily accessible tools for hiring civilian personnel overseas, the DoD human capital programs were not fully aligned with the DoD's mission, goals, and objectives in accordance with the principles of OPM's HCF. Although the ultimate responsibility for planning for and managing the civilian workforce rests with the workforce owners, the lack of a unified DoD personnel and manpower data system, performance metrics, and best practices guidance meant Military Departments and DoD Components had no benchmarks to produce policies and procedures for their local commands. As a result, each of the 14 overseas duty stations we reviewed lacked detailed written procedures related to hiring of their overseas civilian personnel and faced persistent challenges to civilian personnel management, including additional time required to onboard personnel, vacancy rates of up to 39 percent, and gaps between outgoing and incoming personnel. Therefore, the DoD did not have reasonable assurance that it was hiring an overseas civilian workforce adequate to support the DoD's readiness, global mission, and ongoing operations.

**DoD’s Strategic Planning to Hire Its Overseas Civilian Workforce Was Limited**

The DoD's strategic planning efforts to hire its overseas civilian workforce require improvement to more effectively align the DoD's human capital programs with the DoD's global mission and ongoing operations. Although the DoD followed Federal regulations and OPM guidance related to overall strategic planning for the total civilian workforce, we found that the DoD did not effectively implement OPM's HCF in strategic planning for the overseas civilian workforce. OUSD(P&R) and DoD Component human resources officials could not conduct consistent strategic planning efforts to measure and track the state of the overseas civilian workforce. Specifically, human resources officials within DCPAS, the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the DLA could not match individual overseas personnel to authorized and budgeted positions. The human resources officials also did not conduct skills gap analyses for specific overseas locations, which could have identified duty stations where one DoD Component lacked sufficient personnel with certain skills, but another Component had ample or excess personnel with those skills and the two Components could have collaborated to their mutual benefit. Additionally, in a sample of 14 overseas duty stations, we determined that DoD human resources officials inconsistently identified and hired the overseas civilian workforce needed to support the DoD's global mission. Specifically, as of early 2021, we found...
wide variation in vacancy rates and long hiring timelines for new personnel. Additionally, we observed numerous vacant authorized positions were not actively being recruited.

**DoD’s Strategic Planning for the Overall Civilian Workforce Complied With Federal Regulations**

The DoD implemented strategic planning efforts for the total civilian workforce that complied with Federal regulations. Specifically, the DoD complied with provisions of the CFR that required the DoD to develop an HCOP, implement human resources performance metrics, and align overall DoD human capital priorities with the agency’s mission in accordance with the principles of OPM’s HCF.

**The DoD Prepared an HCOP That Aligned With Agency Human Capital Goals and Identified Skills Gaps**

The DoD complied with provisions of the CFR that required the DoD to develop an HCOP, implement human resources performance metrics, and align overall DoD human capital priorities with the agency’s mission, according to the principles of OPM’s HCF. The CFR requires each Federal agency to develop an HCOP that aligns with the agency’s Strategic Plan and the Annual Performance Plan and to update it regularly. The DoD’s HCOP is published every 2 years. The current version covers FY 2020-2021 and was published October 2019. The DoD’s HCOP complies with that requirement and supports the FY 2018 – FY 2022 National Defense Business Operations Plan (NDBOP) by identifying civilian human capital strategies in support of the DoD effort to improve performance and reform business operations.

As stated in the HCOP, the plan implements the human capital priorities in the NDBOP, outlining milestones and metrics to gauge DoD progress towards meeting key goals. In addition, we identified that the DoD produced an Annual Performance Plan that aligned to the NDBOP and included updates on human capital priorities. See Table 4 for an example of how the DoD’s human capital goals align between the NDBOP, the Annual Performance Plan, and the HCOP.

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12 Title 5 CFR section 250.205 (2016).
13 The NDBOP is the DoD version of an agency strategic plan and is required under the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010.
Table 4. DoD Human Capital Priorities Align Across Organizational Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NDBOP Strategic Objective</th>
<th>Annual Performance Plan Program Goal</th>
<th>HCOP Human Capital Objective</th>
<th>HCOP Human Capital Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Implement initiatives to recruit and retain the best total force to bolster capabilities and readiness</td>
<td>1.5.1 Improve recruitment and retention of the civilian workforce</td>
<td>1. Deliver Talent</td>
<td>1.1 Improve Recruitment and Hiring</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.2 Expand Capabilities for Strategic Workforce Planning and Management</td>
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<td>1.3 Modernize Classification and Compensation Models</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Maximize Employee Performance</td>
<td>2.1 Improve Alignment between Performance Management and Recognition Programs</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.2 Strengthen Supervisor and Manager Support and Accountability</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.3 Improve Acquisition and Delivery of Training, Education, and Professional Development Opportunities</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Transform Human Resources</td>
<td>3.1 Implement integrated end-to-end human resources processes supported by technology</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.2 Establish Standards for Service Delivery, Program Performance and Evaluation</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>3.3 Enhance Human Resource workforce capabilities</td>
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</tbody>
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We also identified that the DoD FY 2020-2021 HCOP directly supported the NDBOP strategic goals of rebuilding military readiness and building a more lethal joint force, and the strategic objective to implement initiatives to recruit the best total force to bolster capabilities and readiness. As seen in Table 4, the DoD FY 2020-2021 HCOP establishes the three following objectives to fulfill these efforts.

1. Deliver talent
2. Maximize employee performance
3. Transform human resources
To achieve these goals, the HCOP defines specific human capital strategies, identifies key performance indicators and desired outcomes, and establishes milestone performance targets and implementation dates to track and measure progress towards the agency’s goals. Examples of metrics and performance targets within the HCOP include:

- average time to hire new civilian employees (target was 76 days for FY 2021);
- hiring manager satisfaction rate (target was 80 percent for FY 2021);
- staffing gaps in select occupational series (target for FY 2021 varied from negative 12.5 percent to 0 percent depending on occupational series); and
- results of the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (target for FY 2021 varied from 45.5-percent positive to 80-percent positive by specific Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey question).

**The OUSD(P&R) and DoD Components Could Not Perform Consistent Strategic Planning Efforts for the Overseas Civilian Workforce**

While the DoD's strategic planning efforts for its total civilian workforce complied with statutory requirements, the DoD's strategic planning efforts for the overseas civilian workforce were not aligned to the agency's mission and goals in accordance with the principles of OPM's HCF. Specifically, OUSD(P&R) and DoD Component human resources officials could not perform consistent strategic planning efforts for the overseas civilian workforce to identify and address significant vacancies or skills gaps. Human resources officials within DCPAS, the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the DLA could not match individual civilian personnel to authorized billets and budgeted positions in order to identify vacant overseas positions. These officials also did not conduct skills gap analyses for individual overseas locations which could identify duty stations where one DoD Component lacked sufficient personnel with certain skills, but another Component had ample or excess personnel with those skills and the two Components could have collaborated to their mutual benefit. Additionally, Military Departments and DLA workforce owners at 14 overseas duty stations we reviewed used non-standardized data systems and methods to match civilian personnel to authorized billets and budgeted positions for the duty stations they managed. These workforce owners also inconsistently

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14 A negative 12.5 percent staffing gap indicates that across the DoD, the selected occupational series is missing 12.5 percent of total authorized and budgeted personnel.
identified and hired the overseas civilian workforce needed to support the DoD’s global mission. As of early 2021, we found wide variations in vacancy rates and long hiring timelines for civilian personnel among the 14 duty stations we reviewed. Additionally, we observed numerous vacant authorized and budgeted positions were not actively being recruited.

**DoD Human Resources Officials Could Not Adequately Match Personnel to Budgeted Positions and Vacancies**

DoD human resources officials, including officials within DCPAS, the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the DLA could not conduct consistent strategic planning efforts, such as matching individual personnel to authorized and budgeted positions (also known as a “faces to spaces” match) that would allow the officials to determine how many vacancies existed within specific overseas duty stations or even in specific countries. According to DCPAS officials, the separation of data systems between personnel systems that track individual DoD civilian employees and manpower authorizations data systems that track a DoD Component’s AES makes it very difficult to match personnel with authorized and budgeted positions across the entire civilian workforce. The DCPAS and DoD Component officials stated that because the data systems were separate and had no interoperability, it was generally not practical to conduct in-depth analyses of specific portions of the DoD’s or a DoD Component’s workforce to determine how current staffing levels match with AES for a country, location, or operational unit.

DoD human resources officials also stated that due to the separation between the personnel and manpower authorization data systems, they could not effectively conduct additional strategic planning efforts. Specifically, DCPAS officials stated the quarterly skills gap analysis they produce that covers the entire DoD civilian workforce could not be refined to focus on a particular location, such as a city or country due to the inability to compare data between the personnel and manpower data systems. Likewise, DCPAS and Military Department human resources officials also stated that they did not identify skills gaps for overseas civilian positions across DoD Components, which could identify duty stations where one DoD Component lacked sufficient personnel, but another Component had ample or excess personnel with those skills and the two Components could have collaborated to their mutual benefit. An example of this would be to analyze workforce data to identify that the Navy lacked the ability to perform mission critical duties based on current staffing levels at a particular overseas geographic location, but that Army civilian personnel stationed in the same location had such

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15 AES represents the positions within a DoD Component that Congress has approved for funding in the current fiscal year and therefore available for a Component to fill when they become vacant.
capabilities and could assist based on staff availability. If more interoperability between the personnel and manpower data systems did exist, DoD human resources officials would likely be able to perform a reconciliation of personnel to billets (“faces to spaces”), increasing overall DoD awareness of gaps in the DoD’s civilian workforce, to include overseas locations.

**DoD Human Resources Officials Responsible for 14 Overseas Duty Stations Inconsistently Identified and Hired Civilian Personnel**

The Military Departments and DLA workforce owners at 14 overseas duty stations we reviewed inconsistently identified and hired the overseas civilian workforce needed to support the DoD’s global mission. We reviewed staffing, manpower, and hiring tracking documents and data provided by workforce owners at the 14 overseas Army, Navy, Air Force, and DLA duty stations we selected for review, we also interviewed those workforce owners. We identified inconsistent application of workforce planning and management efforts to hire a sufficient overseas civilian workforce at those locations.

Overall, the average time to hire new civilian personnel during 2020 across the 14 overseas duty stations we reviewed was 225 days, with the shortest average among the 14 duty stations being 106 days and the longest average being 489 days. Comparatively, the average time to hire all civilian personnel across all of the DoD during FY 2020 was 83 days. The Military Departments reported similar times of 91 days for the Army, 84 days for the Navy, and 77 days for the Air Force. While these figures include both CONUS and OCONUS hires, OCONUS hires represent only about 4 percent of the DoD’s civilian workforce, making them heavily weighted towards CONUS hiring timelines.

Given the unique considerations and challenges in hiring overseas civilian personnel (including the PCS process and suitability for living quarters allowances), coupled with safety precautions implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, long hiring timelines and delays in hiring do not themselves indicate deficiencies in strategic planning or human capital management. However, we observed significant differences in hiring timelines across Military Departments even within the same geographic location. For example, in Stuttgart, Germany during the period covering October 2019 through December 2020, the Department of the Army required an average of 154 days to hire civilian employees, compared to 275 days for the Department of the Air Force, and 489 days for the Department of the Navy. Figure 2 shows the average number of days to hire personnel across all 14 duty stations we reviewed.

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16 Hiring in 2020 refers to personnel who began duty between October 1, 2019, and December 31, 2020. This is due to the fact that some locations provided data for Fiscal Year 2020, while others provided data for calendar year 2020.
Finding

Figure 2. Average Days to Hire at 14 Overseas Duty Stations, October 2019 Through December 2020

Source: The DoD OIG.
Note: Department of the Navy human resources officials reported hiring no personnel stationed at Naha Okinawa, Japan during the October 2019-December 2020 period.

In addition to long and widely different hiring timelines, we also observed high vacancy rates for civilian personnel at the 14 overseas duty stations we reviewed. Across the 14 duty stations we reviewed, we were able to determine the vacancy rate at 12 of them. For those 12 duty stations, the average vacancy rate in February through April 2021 when we conducted our review was 15.5 percent.\(^{17}\)

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\(^{17}\) For the purposes of our audit, we defined a position (billet) as vacant if it 1) was an authorized, appropriated position within a command designated for a non-contract US civilian and 2) did not currently have a non-contract US civilian employee assigned to the position. Therefore, in our definition, a position could be considered vacant even if a command was not actively recruiting to fill the position.
However, vacancy rates—like hiring timelines—varied greatly depending on the particular duty station and even across Military Departments with personnel stationed in the same location. For example, the highest vacancy rate among 12 duty stations for which we obtained vacancy rate data was for Department of the Air Force civilian positions located in Stuttgart, Germany, where 39 percent of appropriated positions were vacant as of early 2021. In contrast, 26 percent of positions for Department of the Navy civilian personnel were vacant during the same period at Stuttgart. Similarly, at Naha Okinawa, Japan, both the Army and Navy reported 0 civilian vacancies, but the Air Force reported 17 percent of positions were vacant in March through April 2021. Figure 3 shows the vacancy rate for the 12 duty stations we obtained data on as of February through April 2021.

**Figure 3. Vacancy Rates at 12 Overseas Duty Stations, as of February Through April 2021**

Source: The DoD OIG.

Note: Naha Okinawa (Army) and (Navy) as well as Kuwait, Kuwait (Air Force) reported 0 percent vacancy rates.
During our analysis of vacancy rates, we also identified positions that commands were not actively recruiting. For instance, the 39 percent vacancy rate for Air Force positions in Stuttgart, Germany reflects 16 vacant positions out of an AES of 41. However, among those 16 positions, human resources officials stated that only 2 were being actively sought for recruitment. Air Force human resource officials also stated that this was because the Air Force was in the process of realigning those positions under new organizational structures, primarily due to the designation of the Space Force.

Overall, DoD human resources officials reported challenges to hiring overseas civilian personnel in 9 of the 14 duty stations we reviewed. Specifically, human resources officials stated that challenges with obtaining passports (5 of 14 duty stations), a lengthy security clearance process (3 of 14 duty stations), and specialized occupational series skillsets (2 of 14 duty stations) all extended hiring timelines for overseas positions. In most cases, onboarding a new overseas civilian employee took more than 200 days, and, as of our review date a number of unfilled authorized and budgeted positions existed across the duty stations.

**DoD Data Systems, Performance Measures, and Guidance Did Not Support Overseas Civilian Hiring Efforts**

The DoD’s strategic planning efforts to hire its overseas civilian workforce were not fully aligned to the DoD’s global mission and ongoing operations in accordance with OPM’s HCF because the:

- information within DoD personnel and manpower data systems were updated and maintained separately within each DoD Component and did not provide human resources officials with easily reconcilable data on current personnel compared to authorized and budgeted positions; and

- the OUSD(P&R) did not provide DoD workforce owners with guidance to effectively hire an overseas civilian workforce. Specifically, the OUSD(P&R) did not:
  - provide DoD Components with benchmarks by identifying or integrating measureable and observable hiring and vacancy goals for the overseas civilian workforce into the DoD’s human capital performance metrics, or
  - capture and disseminate best practices guidance on overseas hiring timelines and methods to minimize vacancy durations across all DoD workforce owners.
**DoD Personnel and Manpower Data Systems Were Segregated, Making Matching Personnel to Authorized Positions Difficult**

The information within DoD personnel and manpower data systems was updated and maintained separately within each DoD Component and did not provide human resources officials with easily reconcilable data on current personnel compared to authorized and budgeted positions. The existing DoD and Military Department civilian human resources data infrastructure operated at two levels: personnel data and manpower authorizations data. This segregation of data limited the DoD’s ability to conduct top down strategic planning efforts, such as monitoring skills gaps in the overseas civilian workforce and identifying and sharing best practices for hiring overseas civilian personnel.

According to the personnel and manpower data we reviewed and interviews we conducted with DoD human resources officials, the personnel and manpower authorizations data systems used by each DoD Component were separate and did not communicate with each other. Additionally, data retrieved from one system were not comparable to data retrieved from another without extensive analysis. For example, while human resources officials could retrieve data on DoD civilian personnel within a specific DoD Component stationed in a specific location from DCPDS (for example, Department of Army civilians stationed in Stuttgart, Germany), those human resources officials could not match those personnel against authorized billet data from the DoD Component’s manpower authorizations data system (for example, the Army Force Management System). The data could not be matched because there were no common data formatting standards between the two systems that would allow officials to easily match an individual employee to a specific authorized billet. While the personnel and manpower data systems do contain some overlapping information—such as occupational series data—there were no variables or other data elements common between the two systems that directly linked a billet to the person filling it. Because DoD Component personnel and manpower data systems covered all civilian employees, this limitation was not unique to the overseas civilian workforce.

As a result, the human resources officials did not have the capability to identify how many civilian personnel that a DoD Component was authorized to employ in that location that would allow them to “match” each civilian employee to a specific position. To reconcile the two datasets, the human resources officials need to perform an extensive manual review to ensure the list of personnel obtained from the civilian personnel data system corresponded with specific authorized positions.
According to human resources officials, the inability to easily compare data from the two types of systems was a consequence of the systems' purposes and designs. The DCPDS is a human resources data system that contains data on an employee's permanent duty station, and it allows human resources officials to generate reports based on particular duty stations (including overseas duty stations) and identify all personnel currently stationed there. In contrast, manpower authorizations data systems, like the Department of the Army's Force Management System, contain force structures and identify the occupational series and grades of personnel and can be associated with a particular geographic location or duty station; however, they do not contain personnel data for specific personnel assigned to any of the positions.

The significant differences between the data captured within these two systems made the process very difficult for the DoD human resources officials we interviewed to have visibility into staffing gaps at locations around the world or to identify locations where critical shortages of civilian personnel may exist. The Department of the Army used a custom field in the DCPDS data that it entered on employees to capture that employee's billet information. However, Department of the Army human resources officials stated that while this information existed in theory, the data were incomplete and unreliable in practice, making it impractical to do any comprehensive match of personnel to billets using currently available data.

Additionally, due to the difficulty to identify shortages of personnel using the existing human resources data systems, DoD human resources officials also could not determine how to prioritize hiring overseas civilian personnel based on need at any particular location. Although the DoD tracked shortages of civilian personnel by occupational series across the DoD, that information could not be provided or queried by specific location, limiting the DoD’s human resources officials’ ability to conduct strategic planning efforts that identify where targeted hiring efforts may be needed.

Based on our review of planning documents and interviews with DoD human resources officials, the Defense Manpower Data Center was currently in the process of implementing a new human resources data system, the Defense Civilian Human Resources Management System (DCHRMS) that would provide the ability to compare personnel data and manpower data by standardizing the information input across all of DoD. DCHRMS is being designed to replace six existing human resources data systems used by Military Departments and DoD Components with a single system.

*The Defense Manpower Data Center was implementing a new human resources data system to replace six existing systems.*
that will facilitate the sharing of information across components, standardize employee data into a single database, and allow for human resources officials to conduct a “faces to spaces” match of personnel to authorized positions within their commands.

If implemented as planned, that DCHRMS will likely provide the DoD significantly more robust capabilities for strategic planning for overseas civilian personnel. The implementation timeline for DCHRMS has shifted throughout its development process. The Defense Manpower Data Center approved the development of DCHRMS in May 2018 with an original initial operational capability target of December 2019 and a full operational capability target of May 2020. As of April 2021, DCPAS officials stated that they did not have updated estimated initial or full operational capability deployment dates for DCHRMS. Therefore, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness should ensure that DCHRMS, when fully implemented, provides human resources officials within the Department the capability to match individual civilian personnel to specific authorized and budgeted positions across all DoD Components in order to assist in identification and closing of skill gaps. In the interim, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with the civilian human resources agencies of the Military Departments and DoD Components, should develop and disseminate overseas civilian hiring guidance that identifies best practices to collect and report data on vacant positions, also known as skills gaps, in a standardized format to support DoD-wide analysis.

**The OUSD(P&R) Did Not Develop or Implement Performance Metrics or Guidance to Address Unique Challenges in Hiring an Overseas Civilian Workforce**

The OUSD(P&R) did not develop or implement a top-down strategic approach consistent with the principles of OPM's HCF to hiring civilians for overseas positions that included performance targets contained within the DoD's human capital performance metrics or supplemental best practices guidance for Military Department and DoD Component workforce owners that addressed the unique challenges with hiring an overseas civilian workforce. Specifically, the OUSD(P&R) did not develop or integrate performance metrics or best practices guidance identifying: (1) a target hiring timeline for overseas civilian positions; or (2) how to structure the hiring process to minimize the duration of vacancies for overseas civilian positions.
The OUSD(P&R) Did Not Implement Performance Targets Specific to Overseas Civilian Workforce in the DoD’s Human Capital Performance Metrics

The OUSD(P&R) did not identify or integrate measureable or observable performance goals for the overseas civilian workforce into planning documents, such as the DoD’s FY 2020-2021 HCOP or the upcoming series of performance metrics known as the Human Resources Program (HRP). While the FY 2020-2021 HCOP did include metrics on time-to-hire for all civilian personnel across each of the Military Departments and the DoD Components, those metrics did not separate personnel hired for CONUS positions from those hired for OCONUS positions, where unique considerations exist. For example, the FY 2020-2021 HCOP sets a target hiring timeline metric of 76 days across all of DoD. However, this metric ignores significant challenges with hiring civilian personnel overseas, including longer hiring timelines due to the need of an employee to relocate their household overseas, and difficulty recruiting for positions in less desirable locations to work. All of these challenges necessitate detailed planning, measurement, and policymaking to provide human resources officials the tools they need to effectively hire civilians overseas.

Similarly, the OUSD(P&R) did not plan to include hiring or vacancy performance metrics for the overseas workforce into the upcoming HRP metrics. Officials from the OUSD(P&R) stated that they did not view the overseas civilian workforce as distinct from the overall civilian workforce and that as a result they had not planned to include a series of metrics related specifically to the overseas civilian workforce into the HRP. According to OUSD(P&R) officials, the HRP metrics, when implemented later in CY 2021, will provide OUSD(P&R) with data and information on the state of the DoD’s civilian workforce that will allow the OUSD(P&R) to assess the effectiveness of various aspects of human resources programs. The metrics will be updated periodically and briefed out to members of the DoD’s Civilian Personnel Policy Council, similar to metrics included within the DoD’s HCOP.

Consistent with OPM’s HCF, alignment of an agency’s human capital goals to the agency’s mission objectives requires observable and measurable performance targets. If the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy and DCPAS—the components of the OUSD(P&R) responsible for producing the HCOP and HRP—included performance metrics related to the OCONUS civilian workforce into the HCOP, HRP, or another similar system designed to measure the effectiveness of civilian personnel policy, the DoD’s ability to make informed civilian policy decisions would improve. Therefore, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness should establish relevant performance metrics for the DoD’s overseas civilian workforce, incorporate them into relevant human capital planning documents or systems, and use these metrics to monitor improvement in the hiring of the overseas civilian workforce.
The OUSD(P&R) Did Not Have Guidance on Hiring Timelines or Processes for Overseas Positions

The OUSD(P&R) did not capture or disseminate DoD-wide best practices or guidance for the Military Departments and DoD Components that encouraged them to develop a hiring process for their overseas civilian personnel to minimize hiring timelines. Additionally, DCPAS officials stated that the OUSD(P&R) had not implemented the OPM 80-day, end-to-end hiring initiative guidance or any other standard instructing Military Departments or DoD Components to identify a target number of days from the decision to fill an overseas civilian position to entrance on duty of a new employee.

In the absence of DoD-wide guidance, the Army and Air Force implemented Military Department level guidance for their own workforce owners. For example, in April 2017 the Army implemented an 80-day hiring timeline requirement across all Army commands, consistent with OPM guidance. Air Force human resources personnel stated that the Air Force executes hiring timeframes to meet the intent of the OPM 80-day initiative. However, due to the unique considerations with overseas hiring, human resources officials we spoke with from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the DLA acknowledged that the OPM 80-day initiative was not practical guidance. Specifically, those officials stated that PCS process can take from 60-80 days, or longer. Additionally, the officials stated that passport issuance, security background checks, and verification of living quarters allowance can all also add significant amounts of time to the hiring process that make it extremely unlikely for an overseas location to execute a hiring action within the OPM 80-day initiative.

Elsewhere, local officials within individual commands have implemented their own overseas hiring timeline standards in the absence of top-down guidance. For example, Navy officials located in Bahrain produced a local document designed to present supervisors and managers with an understanding of how OCONUS hiring differs from CONUS hiring and identified an “OCONUS standard number of days” to hire of 143.

However, even though overall civilian workforce policy decision making rested with the workforce owners, we found that 10 of the 14 overseas duty stations we reviewed did not have any local or Component guidance regarding the target number of days to hire, other than the 80 day OPM initiative. As a result, human resources officials did not have practical target metrics to work towards in their hiring efforts. Conversely, some duty stations that did have local or Component guidance on hiring timelines saw
hiring timelines that were below the sample average. For example, among the four locations with guidance on the number of days to hire, we noted that the average time to hire for the Navy in Bahrain Island, Bahrain was just 106 days—the shortest among the entire sample. Likewise, the Navy’s 2020 hiring in Manama, Bahrain was 180 days, which was significantly below the average of 225 days across the entire sample. Under OPM’s HCF, agency leaders must establish and foster cross agency collaboration to achieve common goals, including using experiences and expertise to resolve challenging issues by collecting, capturing, and sharing lessons, best practices, and outcomes across the agency. Therefore, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with the civilian human resources agencies of the Military Departments and DoD Components, should capture and disseminate overseas civilian hiring guidance that identifies best practices to supplement the Office of Personnel Management 80-day, end-to-end hiring initiative to account for the additional hiring actions, including the permanent change of station process, needed to onboard employees at overseas locations.

**The OUSD(P&R) Did Not Provide Guidance on Minimizing Vacancy Gaps for Overseas Positions**

The OUSD(P&R) also did not provide human resources officials with any best practices guidance related to structuring the hiring process for overseas civilian personnel to avoid gaps in coverage or extended vacancies. For CONUS based positions, best practices would not likely be beneficial, because civilian employee departures within the United States tend to occur without much advance notice, such as an employee giving a 2-week notice before starting a new job or an employee who is terminated for poor performance or due to unprofessional behavior. However, for OCONUS positions, vacancies tend to occur due to the expiration of an overseas tour of duty, which is known the day an employee enters onto duty.

As with specific hiring timelines, the individual DoD workforce owners have the responsibility to develop policies and procedures to manage their workforces’ upcoming vacancies. Based on our analysis of the 14 duty stations we reviewed, some individual local commands did identify their own standards with regard to identifying soon to be vacant positions and beginning the hiring process in advance. For example, the Commander, Navy Region Europe, Africa, Southwest Asia implemented guidance in January 2019 that instructed Navy human resources officials to initiate hiring requests “ideally” 6 to 9 months ahead of a predicted vacancy. Other military commands have unwritten norms, such as the Army’s
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command stationed in Manama, Bahrain, which begins the replacement of a civilian employee 6 months before they are scheduled to depart.

Similarly, the DLA also issued standard operating procedures in January 2018 explicitly designed to minimize the time between the departure of overseas employees and the arrival of their replacements that state recruitment efforts should begin immediately for any employee scheduled to return to the U.S. within the next 12 months. DLA human resources officials then follow up 6 months before an employee is scheduled to return to the United States to determine whether the hiring process for a replacement has begun. If not, DLA officials escalate the situation both internally and within the chain of command of the overseas duty station installation to ensure the position is filled within a timely manner and with minimal vacancy gap. According to DLA human resources officials, this policy has resulted in more effective overseas hiring, reduced vacancy gaps, and increased opportunities for effective knowledge transitions between outgoing and incoming personnel.

However, for 7 of the 14 overseas duty stations we reviewed, the commands had not established a local policy or standard for when to begin the replacement process for personnel whose overseas tours were ending. As a result, the overseas duty stations we reviewed often experienced long vacancy durations for positions. Across the 14 overseas duty stations we reviewed, we were able to identify the average vacancy duration (defined as the time between one employee’s departure and their replacement’s arrival) for 6 of the 14 duty stations. For those six duty stations, the average vacancy duration for positions that were subsequently filled was 285 days between October 2019 and December 2020. This was significantly longer than the average time to hire of 225 days, which suggests that human resources officials may not be starting the hiring process at overseas duty stations in advance of the departure of previous employees, which would reduce the time a position would be vacant. This occurred even though, as stated, officials often know in advance when an employee will be departing.

As a result, capturing and disseminating DoD-wide best practices guidance highlighting the need for Military Department and DoD Component human resources departments to develop policies and procedures consistent with their own needs could be beneficial. Such local policies and procedures could provide workforce owners with guidance that would enable them to structure the hiring process to minimize the duration of vacancies for overseas civilian positions by beginning the process significantly before the existing employee’s tour of duty is scheduled to end. Such guidance could also potentially improve knowledge retention for critical positions if an employee’s replacement was able
Finding

to be onsite prior to the existing employee's departure and able to receive on the job training. As with hiring timelines, the collection, capturing, and sharing of best practices across the agency in accordance with the principles of OPM's HCF has the potential to foster agency collaboration and the achievement of mission objectives. Therefore, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with the civilian human resources agencies of the Military Departments and DoD Components, should capture and disseminate overseas civilian hiring guidance that identifies best practices to assist human resources officials at overseas locations in developing practical local hiring timelines to minimize the quantity and duration of vacancies among overseas positions and to aid in the transition of duties.

Lack of Guidance and Tools to Overcome Overseas Hiring Challenges Resulted in Reduced Readiness for Overseas Locations

Because DoD data systems, performance metrics, and guidance did not provide human resources officials with clear direction or a unified data systems for hiring civilian personnel overseas, the DoD human capital programs were not fully aligned to the DoD’s mission, goals, and objectives in accordance with the principles of OPM’s HCF. Although the ultimate responsibility for planning for and managing the civilian workforce rests with the workforce owners, the lack of a unified DoD personnel and manpower data system, performance metrics, and best practices guidance meant Military Departments and DoD Components had no benchmarks to produce policies and procedures for their local commands. As a result, each of the 14 overseas duty stations we reviewed lacked detailed written procedures related to hiring of their overseas civilian personnel.

Overall, we found that:

- 7 of 14 overseas duty stations lacked a written policy for when to begin the replacement process for an outgoing employee;
- 10 of 14 overseas duty stations lacked a written policy defining how long the hiring process for personnel should take at that location; and
- 14 of 14 overseas duty stations lacked a written policy detailing a process for the transition of responsibilities from an outgoing employee to their incoming replacement.

Overall, each of the overseas duty stations lacked at least one of the above written policies related to the hiring of overseas civilian personnel. Seven overseas duty stations lacked two of the three, and five duty stations lacked all three.
Additionally, overseas DoD duty stations continue to face persistent challenges to civilian personnel management, including additional time required to onboard personnel, vacancy rates of up to 39 percent, and gaps between outgoing and incoming personnel. Therefore, the DoD did not have reasonable assurance that it was hiring an overseas civilian workforce adequate to support the DoD's readiness, global mission, and ongoing operations.

Management Comments on Report Finding and Our Response

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD[P&R]) provided detailed comments on the Finding related to:

1. unique issues that negatively impact time to hire and the overseas civilian hiring process;
2. the OUSD(P&R) role in providing policy guidance to workforce owners on hiring an overseas civilian workforce;
3. data systems issues, including the feasibility and responsibility of workforce owners to match personnel to authorized billets; and
4. the OUSD(P&R)’s role in assisting workforce owners with strategic workforce planning.

Below is a summary of USD(P&R) comments and our response.

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Comments on Unique Issues That Negatively Impact Overseas Civilian Hiring

The USD(P&R) stated that the report failed to account or recognize unique issues that negatively impact the time to hire civilian personnel for overseas positions. He stated that we did not take into account the impact of the Priority Placement Program, use of local national personnel in the civilian workforce, COVID-19 and DoD-wide stop movement orders, and human factors including time of year. The USD(P&R) also stated that by not taking the challenges into account, the report did not fully consider their impact on the time to hire for overseas civilian positions.

Our Response

We identified several unique issues that negatively impacted the time to hire civilian personnel for overseas positions, including the 5-year limit on overseas civilian deployments, the PCS process, availability of qualified applicants, availability of living quarters allowances, and delays caused by COVID-19.
While the report did not identify every specific issue that may have resulted in excessive hiring timelines for overseas civilian positions, the Finding identified the consequences of these excessive hiring timelines, including high-vacancy rates that may leave overseas duty stations understaffed. The recommendations of the report are therefore designed to improve the ability of overseas duty stations to hire personnel in a timely manner and to improve the DoD’s overall understanding of where positions may be vacant, not to identify all the unique issues that negatively impacted the time to hire civilian personnel for overseas positions.

**Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Comments on the OUSD(P&R) Role in Providing Policy Guidance to Workforce Owners On Overseas Hiring**

The USD(P&R) stated that the report did not accurately reflect the relationship between the OUSD(P&R) and workforce owners. Specifically, he stated that while the report may identify desirable solutions to the lack of guidance from the OUSD(P&R) to workforce owners on hiring an overseas civilian workforce, there is no requirement that the OUSD(P&R) provide such guidance, and that workforce owners are ultimately responsible for producing policies and procedures for local commands on how to plan for and manage their civilian workforces. The USD(P&R) also stated that it was unrealistic to expect the OUSD(P&R) to provide guidance for each unique workforce group given their individual requirements and unique populations.

**Our Response**

DoDI 1400.25 Vol. 100 states:

> The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy, under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, shall develop and issue uniform DoD-wide civilian personnel policies, procedures, programs, and guidance based on [DoDI 1400.25, the DoD Civilian Personnel Management System], the references cited in that reference, and this instruction.\(^{18}\)

The DoDI further states that this responsibility also extends to developing “model civilian personnel management procedures for DoD wide use.” As a result, the OUSD(P&R) is responsible for authorizing, directing, and controlling the establishment and implementation of all guidance on civilian personnel management for workforce owners. Additionally, we do not recommend that the

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\(^{18}\) The title “Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy” has changed since the publication of the DoDI and is now the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy.

OUSD(P&R) should provide detailed guidance that covers all possible situations that individual overseas workforce owners might encounter. Instead, we recommend that the OUSD(P&R) coordinate with workforce owners to collect and disseminate best practices that may allow workforce owners to develop individual local level policies and guidance to improve hiring timelines and reduce vacancies for overseas civilian positions.

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Comments on Data Systems Issues, Including Matching Personnel to Authorized Billets

The USD(P&R) stated concerns related to the feasibility and responsibility of workforce owners using existing DoD personnel and manpower data systems to match their civilian personnel to authorized billets. While separately acknowledging that doing so was prohibitive and “near impossible,” he stated that workforce owners have a responsibility to identify discrepancies between their personnel data systems and authoritative manpower systems in terms of personnel and vacant billets or positions before reporting that data up for assessment by managers and leaders. The USD(P&R) also stated that current DoD human resources systems, metrics, and guidance capture the human resources lifecycle for the total DoD civilian workforce, but that the DoD's systems, metrics, and guidance cannot delve into each unique situation.

Our Response

We recognize the extreme difficulty that human resources personnel responsible for overseas duty stations face in trying to conduct such analyses using the current DoD human resources systems. Without DoD-wide personnel data systems, standardizing information across the DoD is time consuming and challenging. We did not recommend DoD human resource systems, metrics, and guidance delve into each unique situation. Rather, we recommend that the OUSD(P&R) collect best practices from workforce owners on how to match personnel to billets across the DoD’s various personnel and manpower data systems and then disseminate that information back to workforce owners to allow them to better collect and standardize this information for possible DoD-wide use. This would assist the workforce owners responsible for overseas duty stations in the interim while awaiting new capabilities of DoD systems. In the long term, we recommend permanently solving this challenge by ensuring the new DCHRMS system includes the capability to match personnel to authorized billets across the Total Force.
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Comments on the OUSD(P&R) Role in Assisting Workforce Owners With Strategic Workforce Planning

The USD(P&R) stated that the OUSD(P&R) was not responsible for several of the functions discussed in the report. Specifically, he stated that the OUSD(P&R) did not have a role in matching individual personnel to authorized and budgeted positions and the application of workforce planning and management efforts to hire a sufficient, competent overseas civilian workforce. Instead, the USD(P&R) stated that these were functions to be performed by workforce owners.

Our Response

We did not state that the OUSD(P&R) was responsible for the specific items outlined by the USD(P&R). However, according to DoDI 1400.25, Volume 250, the OUSD(P&R) “has overall responsibility for overseeing the DoD Strategic Workforce Plan and competency-based Strategic Human Capital Planning.” As a result, the OUSD(P&R) does have overall responsibility for overseeing workforce owners’ efforts to hire their civilian workforces, including for overseas positions. Our recommendations are consistent with that responsibility.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

Revised Recommendations

As a result of management comments, we revised draft Recommendation 1.b to clarify the intent that OUSD(P&R) would coordinate with the Military Departments and DoD Components to identify relevant performance metrics that take into account the unique circumstances of overseas locations. We also revised draft Recommendation 1.c to clarify the intent that workforce owners would ultimately be responsible for collecting and reporting data on vacancies, as well as developing practical hiring timelines and guidance; however, OUSD(P&R)’s role would be to capture and disseminate best practices from across the DoD Components to facilitate their actions.

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**Recommendation 1**

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness:

a. Ensure the Defense Civilian Human Resources Management System, when fully implemented, provides human resources officials within the Department the capability to match individual civilian personnel to specific authorized and budgeted positions across all DoD Components in order to assist in identification and closing of skill gaps.

**Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Comments**

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness agreed with the recommendation, stating that the OUSD(P&R) is striving to ensure that DCHRMS includes the capability to match individual civilian personnel to specific authorized and budgeted positions.

**Our Response**

Comments from the Under Secretary addressed the specifics of our recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we review evidence demonstrating that DCHRMS has been implemented and that the system includes the capability to match individual civilian personnel to specific authorized and budgeted positions.

b. In coordination with the Military Departments and DoD Components:

1. Identify relevant performance metrics related to hiring a sufficient and well-qualified DoD overseas civilian workforce (such as vacancy/hire/fill rates) that account for unique overseas conditions.

2. Incorporate the metrics in relevant human capital planning documents or systems.

3. Use the metrics to monitor improvement in the hiring of the overseas civilian workforce.

**Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Comments**

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness disagreed with the recommendation, stating that the OUSD(P&R) does not view overseas civilians as separate and distinct from the rest of the DoD civilian workforce. The Under Secretary also stated that establishing a single goal or metric for all overseas locations may not be feasible or desirable because there may be unique aspects
per country or specific location, such as service considerations, visa entry restrictions or requirements, and others that make a one-size-fits-all approach impossible or undesirable.

**Our Response**
Comments from the Under Secretary did not address the specifics of our recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. Our recommendation was not designed to encourage a “one-size-fits-all” approach to overseas hiring. Indeed, the current HCOP does not take such an approach to the overall DoD civilian workforce, so we would not expect metrics developed by the OUSD(P&R) for the overseas civilian workforce to do so. The current HCOP identifies a number of different metrics for the civilian workforce that are differentiated based on Service branch or DoD Component, type of position, hiring authority, and other relevant considerations. Our recommendation similarly suggests that the OUSD(P&R) should identify metrics relevant to the overseas civilian workforce, differentiating them as needed to take into consideration unique conditions that apply.

The intent of this recommendation is to improve the DoD’s ability to monitor hiring patterns for the overseas civilian workforce in order to inform policy decisions. We request that the Under Secretary reconsider his position on the recommendation and provide comments on the final report that identify the steps that the OUSD(P&R) will take to ensure that the DoD’s human capital planning documents, such as the HCOP, include relevant metrics to monitor hiring within the DoD’s overseas civilian workforce.

c. In coordination with the civilian human resources agencies of the Military Departments and DoD Components, capture and disseminate overseas civilian hiring guidance that identifies best practices to allow workforce owners to:

1. collect and report data on vacant positions, also known as skills gaps in a standardized format to support DoD-wide analysis.

**Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Comments**
The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness disagreed with the recommendation, stating that the identification of vacant positions is the responsibility of workforce owners. The Under Secretary also stated that data on vacant positions is infeasible at the enterprise level and that had the recommendation been solely to identify and disseminate overseas hiring guidance best practices, the Under Secretary would have agreed with the recommendation.
Our Response

Comments from the Under Secretary did not address the specifics of our recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. The intent of this recommendation was not to indicate that the OUSD(P&R) should impose a “one-size-fits-all” approach to overseas hiring. The OUSD(P&R) should identify and disseminate best practices to allow DoD Components to establish guidance most relevant to their unique considerations.

This recommendation resulted from our observations that most duty stations we reviewed did not have such guidance in place. We request that the Under Secretary reconsider his position on the recommendation and provide comments.

2. Supplement the Office of Personnel Management 80-day, end-to-end hiring initiative to account for the additional hiring actions, including the permanent change of station process, needed to onboard employees at overseas locations.

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Comments

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness disagreed with the recommendation, stating that the OUSD(P&R) does not view the overseas civilian workforce as separate and distinct from the rest of the DoD’s civilian workforce. The Under Secretary also stated that establishing a single goal or metric for all overseas locations may not be feasible or desirable because there may be unique aspects per country or specific location, such as service considerations, visa entry restrictions or requirements, and others that make a one-size-fits-all approach impossible or undesirable.
on the final report that identify the steps that the OUSD(P&R) will take to collect and disseminate best practices to the DoD Components to improve their ability to establish hiring timeline guidance that best fits with their needs.

3. **Assist human resources officials at overseas locations in developing practical local hiring timelines to minimize the quantity and duration of vacancies among overseas positions and to aid in the transition of duties.**

**Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Comments**

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness disagreed with the recommendation, stating that developing practical hiring timelines is the responsibility of workforce owners, not the OUSD(P&R). The Under Secretary stated that the term “practical” might be relative to each overseas location and that what works for one location might not work for another. The Under Secretary also stated that the OUSD(P&R) had previously implemented changes to the Priority Placement Program handbook at the request of DoD Components to better manage their non-displaced overseas workforce for those without return rights. The Under Secretary concluded that if that policy change were implemented effectively, it could assist the DoD Components with mitigating their time to hire for vacancies.

**Our Response**

Comments from the Under Secretary did not address the specifics of our recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. The intent of this recommendation was not to indicate that the OUSD(P&R) should develop practical hiring timelines for the workforce owners. The OUSD(P&R) should capture and disseminate best practices to allow DoD Components to develop practical hiring policies that minimize vacancies, where possible. An example of this would be a Component instituting a policy stating that hiring of an expected vacancy due to the completion of an overseas tour of duty begin 180 days prior to the expiration of the employee’s tour.

This recommendation resulted from our observations that most duty stations we reviewed did not have such guidance in place. We request that the Under Secretary reconsider his position on the recommendation and provide comments on the final report that identify the steps that the OUSD(P&R) will take to collect and disseminate best practices to the DoD Components to improve their ability to establish hiring timeline guidance that best fits with their needs.
Appendix

Scope and Methodology

We conducted this performance audit from September 2020 through November 2021 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The scope of our audit included strategic planning efforts conducted for the overseas civilian workforce by the OUSD(P&R); the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the DLA. For the purposes of our audit, we defined strategic planning as data gathering, analysis, and guidance with the goal of ensuring overseas civilian positions are consistently staffed with required personnel.

To accomplish the audit, we:

- reviewed DoD guidance, as well as Army, Navy, Air Force, and DLA policies and procedures;
- analyzed data provided by DCPAS on all overseas non-contract, unclassified personnel as of November 2020; and
- used the DCPAS data to select a nonstatistical sample of 14 overseas duty stations in order to review hiring timelines, vacancy rates, and whether the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the DLA had implemented local policies or procedures to increase the effectiveness of overseas civilian hiring.


To understand DoD strategic planning efforts to hire its overseas workforce, we reviewed the following Federal, DoD, Army, Navy, Air Force, and DLA requirements, policies, procedures, and guidance.

- Title 5 CFR sec. 250.203 (2020)
- Title 5 CFR sec. 250.204 (2020)
- Title 5 CFR sec. 250.205 (2020)
- Office Of Personnel Management End-to-End Hiring Initiative, March 2017
- 2018 Federal Workforce Priorities Report February 2018
Identification and Categorization of DoD Overseas Civilian Workforce

We obtained and analyzed a universe of data provided by DCPAS that identified all DoD noncontract U.S. citizen civilian employees serving in appropriated fund positions overseas as of November 2020. The data included information on the military department or DoD Component, occupational series, job title, pay grade, and location of personnel, but did not include any personally identifiable information.
We verified the reliability of the data we received from DCPAS to the data provided by the Departments of the Army and Navy covering the same universe of employees employed by each Military Department. We determined that although the numbers were not an exact match, differences in the data were likely due to changes in personnel numbers over the time period between when the reports were generated and that the numbers were close enough that we could rely on the DCPAS data to identify the number of personnel in specific locations.

We used the location information provided in the DCPAS data to associate each location with its relevant combatant command. This information allowed us to produce an initial analysis that identified the relative number of civilian personnel within each combatant command, as well as the dispersion of those personnel across different locations within each combatant command. See Table 5 for a description of this information.

Table 5. Overseas Civilian Personnel by Combatant Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combatant Command</th>
<th>Number of Civilian Personnel</th>
<th>Percent of Total Civilian Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Northern Command</td>
<td>2,229</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Southern Command</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
<td>17,629</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Africa Command</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
<td>1,065</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Indo-Pacific Command</td>
<td>13,210</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>34,553</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


We used the data to cluster locations within combatant commands by the number of individual civilians employed at each location. Based on the data, we identified the locations as high, medium, and low density as defined below.

- High-Density Locations: more than 100 personnel
- Medium-Density Locations: 11 and 100 personnel
- Low-Density Locations: less than 11 personnel

See Table 6 for details on the number and size of the overseas civilian personnel for each combatant command.
Table 6. Number and Size of Overseas Civilian Personnel Locations by Combatant Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combatant Command</th>
<th>Number of Locations With Civilians</th>
<th>Number of High Density Locations (More Than 100)</th>
<th>Number of Medium Density Locations (11 – 100)</th>
<th>Number of Low Density Locations (Less Than 11)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Northern Command</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Southern Command</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Africa Command</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Indo-Pacific Command</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>375</strong></td>
<td><strong>63</strong></td>
<td><strong>86</strong></td>
<td><strong>226</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Selection of the Audit Sample**

Based on our breakdown of the DCPAS data by Military Department, geographic combatant command, and size, we selected a nonstatistical sample of 14 overseas duty stations for review from a total universe of 767 duty stations. We defined a duty station as a single location with personnel from a single Military Department or DoD Component. In consultation with the Quantitative Methods Division, we used a nonstatistical sample due to time and resource constraints. We also determined a nonstatistical sample of multiple duty stations and DoD Components within the same location would yield results that allowed comparison by controlling for differences in desirability of duty location by country. As part of this sample, we selected four duty stations with civilian personnel from each Military Department (including at least one within each size category established above—high, medium, and low density), as well as two duty stations with DLA civilian personnel. We also selected duty stations in locations where multiple Military Departments had civilian personnel present to allow for a comparison across Military Departments. Table 7 below identifies our sample of locations.
Table 7. Overview of Duty stations Selected for Review

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Military Department or DoD Component</th>
<th>Geographic Combatant Command</th>
<th>Number of Civilian Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Manama, Bahrain</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Manama, Bahrain</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Manama, Bahrain</td>
<td>DLA</td>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bahrain Island, Bahrain</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Kuwait, Kuwait</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Camp Arifjan, Kuwait</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Naha Okinawa, Japan</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>USINDOPACOM</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Naha Okinawa, Japan</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>USINDOPACOM</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Naha Okinawa, Japan</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>USINDOPACOM</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Stuttgart, Germany</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>1,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Stuttgart, Germany</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Stuttgart, Germany</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Kaiserslautern, Germany</td>
<td>DLA</td>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Osan, South Korea</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>USINDOPACOM</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


After selecting the audit sample, we identified points of contact within the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as the DLA who would be able to provide information related to the duty stations we selected. We then submitted requests for information to these points of contact and reviewed the data and information they provided in response to identify hiring timelines, vacancy rates, and policies and procedures across each of the 14 duty stations in our sample.

Because we selected this nonstatistical sample of 14 duty stations out of 767 potential duty stations included within the data we reviewed, the results of our sample could not be applied to the other 753 duty locations with overseas civilian personnel.
Internal Control Assessment and Compliance

We assessed internal controls and compliance with laws and regulations necessary to satisfy the audit objective. In particular, we assessed DoD’s compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements and guidance issued by the OPM related to strategic workforce planning and the DoD’s ability to perform consistent strategic human capital management efforts including the ability to match personnel to existing positions. We determined that the DoD complied with Federal regulations related to civilian strategic workforce planning, but that the DoD lacked the ability to perform consistent strategic human capital management efforts, especially with overseas civilian personnel. However, because our review was limited to these internal control components and underlying principles, it may not have disclosed all internal control deficiencies that may have existed at the time of this audit.

Use of Computer-Processed Data

We used computer-processed data from DCPAS to identify the number of DoD civilians serving in overseas positions to perform this audit; however, the conclusions and recommendations in this report were supported by evidence in addition to DCPAS data. To test the reliability of the data DCPAS provided, we requested similar data from the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the DLA and compared it to the data that we received from DCPAS. We determined that the DCPAS data were sufficiently reliable for selecting specific geographic locations for review.

Use of Technical Assistance

We received assistance from the Quantitative Methods Division to categorize and select a nonstatistical sample that covered a wide range of locations, Military Departments, and differently sized duty stations with civilian personnel. We also worked with the Data Analytics Team to develop Figure 1 of the report.

Prior Coverage

No prior coverage has been conducted on DoD strategic planning for hiring of civilian employees during the last 5 years.
MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Response to the Department of Defense Inspector General General Report on Audit of Department of Defense Strategic Planning for Overseas Civilian Positions

On behalf of my Component, my formal response to the recommendations in this draft report is non-concur. Below are comments that detail my Component’s objections to this report. Additional comments are included in the attached DD Form 818.

- **Recommendation 1a:** Ensure the Defense Civilian Human Resources Management System (DCHRMS), when fully implemented, provides human resources officials within the Department the capability to match individual civilian personnel to specific authorized and budgeted positions across all DoD Components in order to assist in identification and closing of skill gaps.
  - **Comment and Justification:** Concur. We are striving to ensure DCHRMS provides this capability.

- **Recommendation 1b:** Identify performance metrics related to hiring a sufficient and well qualified DoD overseas civilian workforce, incorporate the metrics in relevant human capital planning documents or systems, and use the metrics to monitor improvement in the hiring of the overseas civilian workforce.
  - **Comment and Justification:** Non-Concur. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD(P&R)) does not view overseas civilians as separate and distinct from the rest of the workforce. Establishing a single goal or metric for all overseas locations may not be feasible or desirable. There may be unique aspects per country or specific location, such as service considerations (type of housing, educational and health services available within the overseas area, etc.), visa entry restrictions/requirements, and others that make a one-size-fits-all approach impossible or undesirable.
  - **Recommended Change:** USD(P&R) provide strategic direction, guidance, and overarching policy. DoD Components, in turn, use that direction, guidance, and policy to develop specific processes, internal and organizational policies, and develop metrics for maximizing their human capital planning efforts in each location.
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (cont’d)

- **Recommendation 1c1**: Collect and report data on vacant positions, also known as skills gaps, in a standardized format to support DoD-wide analysis.
  - **Comment and Justification**: Non-Concur. Identification of vacant positions is the responsibility and purview of workforce owners. If this recommendation were solely to identify and disseminate overseas hiring guidance best practices, it would be a concur. Any data on vacant positions is infeasible at the Enterprise level.
  - **Recommended Change**: DoD Components should develop processes to systematically identify vacancies in their overseas workforces and develop strategies and initiatives to mitigate skills gaps issues, in accordance with guidance and policy promulgated by the USD(P&R).

- **Recommendation 1c2**: Supplement the Office of Personnel Management 80-day, end-to-end hiring initiative to account for the additional hiring actions, including the permanent change of station process, needed to onboard employees at overseas locations.
  - **Comment and Justification**: Non-Concur. OUSD(P&R) does not view overseas civilians as separate and distinct from the rest of the workforce. Establishing a single goal or metric for all overseas locations may not be feasible or desirable. There may be unique aspects per country or specific location, such as service considerations (type of housing, educational and health services available within the overseas area, etc.), visa entry restrictions/requirements, and others that make a one-size-fits-all approach impossible or undesirable.
  - **Recommended Change**: DoD Components identify real and potential bottlenecks and long lead-times in their overseas workforce hiring processes, to establish realistic hiring timeline expectations.

- **Recommendation 1c3**: Assist human resources officials at overseas locations in developing practical local hiring timelines to minimize the quantity and duration of vacancies among overseas positions and to aid in the transition of duties.
  - **Comment and Justification**: Non-Concur. This is the responsibility of workforce owners, not OUSD(P&R). “Practical” might be relative to each overseas location as what works for one area might not work for another. OUSD(P&R) previously implemented changes to the Priority Placement Program handbook (per the request of the DoD Components) to better manage their non-displaced overseas workforce for those without return rights. If implemented effectively, this can assist the DoD Components with mitigating their time to hire for vacancies.
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (cont’d)

- **Recommended Change:** DoD Components assess their HR policies and processes to minimize the quantity and duration of vacancies in their overseas workforces, and to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the transition of duties from incoming to outgoing personnel.

  My point of contact for this action is [Redacted]

  [Signature]

  Gilbert R. Cisneros, Jr.

Attachment:
As stated
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (cont’d)

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<td>1. ii</td>
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<td>(page line 5), and others</td>
<td>Report fails to recognize numerous, unique issues that negatively impact time to hire and the overseas civilian hiring process.</td>
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<td>Page ii, Col 1, Line 5: There is no mention of COVID-19 having an effect on overseas hiring efforts. We know that COVID had an effect, particularly on the amount of time it took to PCS employees from the U.S. to the overseas areas following selection and acceptance of the position.</td>
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<td>Page 19, Lines 17-19: It is not fair to the Components or HR to compare overseas TTH against overall or CONUS TTH given the additional external factors described (passports, PCS, etc.). There is also a human factor in this that may be contributing to lengthier TTH in that depending upon the time of year, families may request to PCS after the school year ends, etc.</td>
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<td>Page 19, Lines 22-23: There is no mention of the emphasis on the hiring of military spouses in this report. DoD has worked to increase the hiring and employment of military spouses in overseas areas. Selection of a military spouse typically increases the amount of time it takes to onboard to a position because their availability is subject to the military member's PCS. While this may significantly increase time to hire, the White House and DoD has determined that military spouses having access to Federal employment in overseas areas is very important.</td>
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<td>Page 26, 7th line from bottom: We established Departmental standards that did not call out a specific community. This is an inaccurate interpretation of implementing the 80 day standard.</td>
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<td>Page 28, Line 10: The actual departure date of the employee is only known if they have return rights back to a position in the US. If the employee does not have return rights, then they are registered in the Priority Placement Program</td>
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Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (cont’d)

As a result of the excessive time limits on PPP, the handbook was revised in 2019/2020 to allow the Components more flexibility and oversight in managing this portion of their overseas workforces. The Components implemented their polices in 2019 so there may not have been time to see any benefit/result of the streamlined procedures when this review was conducted.

Page 28, last line: This report did not examine the impact of the local national (LN) workforce with regards to civilian personnel. The LN workforce allows for continuity and stability of operations during the times when civilian vacancies are under recruitment and/or vacant. This is a unique aspect of overseas recruitment that I think is lacking in this review/report.

Page 29, Line 6: Did IG consider the 60 day SecDef stop movement order on all PCS (civ & mil) between Mar - May 2020? That would have added 60+ days onto any fill/recruit action. Plus, when the restriction was lifted, military PCS would have had priority over civilian PCS. Also, any host nation country restrictions on entry could have potentially added additional time on recruitment (from either a visa aspect or entry into country). It does not appear that IG took this anomaly into consideration during their review period when reporting TTH metrics.

Page 30, Recommendation 1b: Not sure how feasible establishing a single TTH goal is for all overseas locations. There may be unique aspects per country, such as visa requirements, is it a hard to fill location, service considerations (like what...
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (cont’d)

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"The OUSD(P&R) did not provide workforce owners with guidance to effectively hire an overseas civilian workforce."

Coordinator Comment and Justification: Non-Concur.

Page ii, Col 1, Line 12: Disagree with the way this is written. I think it should be reworded in the positive that "JED workforce owners, with guidance to effectively hire an overseas workforce, found it difficult to apply to their specific overseas conditions". Furthermore, "as reported metrics for hiring and vacancies are encompassed within the total civilian workforce metrics, workforce owners..."

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<td>found it difficult to consistently monitor and benchmark against like positions.</td>
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Page ii, Col 1, Line 12: There is a fundamental flaw in that there is an assumption that this is / has been a requirement. I'm not sure that we can point to any policy that requires P&R to take such actions. While they may be desirable, they are not required. I still see no reference to the DoDI on SWP in this document.

Page ii, Col 1, Line 12: Inclusion of overseas civilian HCOP initiatives and/or metrics is arbitrary and implies that like metrics should be established for any other geographic area. HCOP is not end all / be all for force planning and management. Those responsibilities lie with workforce owners.

Page ii, Col 1, Line 24: Disagree as written. DoD HR data systems, identified performance metrics, and guidance capture the HR lifecycle for total DoD civilian workforce. As each specific functional community, organization, etc. may have unique properties or processes, Departmental guidance, metrics, and data systems cannot delve into each unique situation. Therefore, the touchpoints of the lifecycle captured allow the Department to take a total force management approach to identify and address workforce issues and/or gaps.

Page ii, Col 1, Line 32: Disagree with this statement as it implies that workforce owners are exempt from producing policies and procedure for local commands on how to plan for and manage their civilian workforces without specific guidance from P&R / big DoD. Workforce owners for overseas personnel have the same authority & responsibility as workforce owners for CONUS personnel.

Page ii, Col 2, Line 2: Disagree as written. It should also be noted that each Component provides unique direction and HR practices that impact / cause this disparity. As Departmental guidance provides the parameters for which

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Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (cont’d)

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Component HR offices operate, and Components turn this guidance into guidance for their own workforce, this is not something that P&R can independently remedy.

Page ii, Col 2, Line 2: The assumption is that these problems are directly linked to the "lack of P&R guidance," however, the report fails to address DoD component responsibility for procedures and strategies for addressing these challenges.

Page ii, Col 2, Line 9: This responsibility rests at the workforce owner level.

Page ii, Col 2, Line 21: The Department has goals/metrics for the entirety of workforce. OIG should include in its recommendations how P&R should carry this out. In other words, what would be a reasonable approach for similar metrics for the overseas workforce.

Page 5, Line 20-27: Recommend adding a reference to the Department of State (DOS) and their role, particularly the use of their regulations, The Department of State Standardized Regulations (DSSR). The DSSR is the underlying authority for all overseas allowances and differentials and DoD must adhere to these regulations when authorizing these allowances and differentials. As such, DoD works closely with DOS, Office of Allowances.

Page 8, Table 2, Line 1: Recommend including the manpower and readiness offices as their role also effects overseas civilian HR management.

Page 14, Para 2: We don't view the overseas civilian workforce as a separate entity from the CONUS workforce. While there are differences in some of the processes and rules that govern the overseas civilian workforce, it's illogical to say that "DoD following Federal regulations and OPM guidance related to..."

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<td>overall strategic planning for the civilian workforce...” but that &quot;DoD did not effectively implement OPM's HCF in strategic planning for the overseas civilian workforce.” The responsibility is again the workforce owners'.</td>
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<td>Page 14, Last 2 Lines: Previous comment suggested the DoD didn't effectively implement OPM's HCF, while this comments suggests we complied with fed regulations; these thoughts are conflicting.</td>
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<td>Page 14, Last 2 Lines: The report does not state whether we complied with DoD policy.</td>
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<td>Page 17, Line 17: As discussed, OUSD(P&amp;R) provides policy and guidance for the total force. It is unrealistic for P&amp;R to provide guidance for each unique workforce group given their individual requirements and unique populations. This does not mean that P&amp;R did not align “to the agency's mission and goals in accordance with the principles of OPM's HCF”. Furthermore, as the overseas population is equally as diverse in mission and function, specific functional community managers should partner with DoD Component HR offices to address functional specific requirements/gaps.</td>
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<td>Page 28, Line 1: This is not inherently true. DoD workforce planning guidance and practices themselves are applicable regardless of situation (CONUS, OCONUS). Community hiring guidance advises HR/managers to begin recruitment immediately upon acknowledgment of an upcoming vacancy.</td>
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<td>Page 28, Line 1: Guidance is included in the DoD.</td>
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<td><strong>Other cited locations:</strong> Page 13, Line 25; Page 13, Last line: Page 22, Line 27; Page 25, Line 17; Page 25, Lines 29-30. <strong>Coordinator Recommended Change:</strong> Recommend that Components ensure consistent internal practices. OUSD(P&amp;R) can help to facilitate a gathering of best practices as a whole; however, Components must ensure their own internal practices are consistent as well. Recommend adding the roles of the Department of State and the Manpower and Personnel Offices to listing as referenced above. <strong>Originator Response:</strong> Choose an item. <strong>Originator Reasoning:</strong></td>
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<td>3. ii</td>
<td>4 (page line 24), and others</td>
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<td><strong>Coordinator Comment and Justification:</strong> Non-Concur. Page ii, Col 1, Line 24: Disagree as written. DoD HR data systems, identified performance metrics, and guidance capture the HR lifecycle for total DoD civilian workforce. As each specific functional community, organization, etc. may have unique properties or processes, Departmental guidance, metrics, and data systems cannot delve into each unique situation. Therefore, the touchpoints of the lifecycle captured allow the Department to take a total force management approach to identify and address workforce issues and/or gaps. Page 10, Line 3: Workforce owners and Component HR offices also have the responsibility to validate an discrepancies between the two systems to ensure accurate data is being viewed by managers and leaders. Page 13, Line 21: It is the responsibility of the Component HR office to work with workforce owners to ensure that these discrepancies are reconciled for accurate assessment. I think that the better argument is that this is a manual</td>
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**REPLACES SD FORM 818, WHICH IS OBSOLETE**
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (cont’d)

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<td>process that requires a lot of time and must be done consistently in order to ensure the integrity of the data.</td>
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<td>Page 14, Line 23: While true, it should be noted that the Authoritative Manpower Systems and the Personnel Data System make this near impossible.</td>
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<td>Page 18, Line 7: Recommend this be revised to read that they do not have the IT solutions to effectively conduct consistent strategic planning. This can, and is done, manually now; however, is tedious and must be consistently done in partnership with local/agency budget and manpower offices. Additionally, this is an operational HR function and not something that DCPAS, a policy centric organization, would do.</td>
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<td>Page 23, Line 23: The AF manpower system / DCPDS coding is a best practice way for manually comparing this data. While in operations, I would biweekly update my manpower office with the associated position number for billets and work closely with their office to ensure that the information was correct. Your analysis is correct that this is not easily or consistently achieved; however, although difficult it is possible. The long term and effective solution; however, as you indicate is to automate this in the future, which would also reduce the margin of error.</td>
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<td>Page 23, Line 31: Would recommend that you characterize this differently. They do have the capability; however, it is not easily accomplished and must be done manually and is a manual partnership for both offices. You characterize it this way later in the report, but this opener is misleading.</td>
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<td>Page 24, Line 4: This statement is true, but consider expanding the explanation of the AMSs, which is distinctly different that the personnel data system.</td>
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<td>Workforce Planning for Overseas Positions (skills/competency gaps, matching authorizations/ billets/vacancies, etc.)</td>
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<td>Coordinator Comment and Justification: Non-Concur.</td>
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<td>Coordinator Recommended Change:</td>
<td>Recommend using &quot;utilize&quot; rather than “incorporate” DCPDS data.</td>
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<td>Originator Response:</td>
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<td>Originator Reasoning:</td>
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Page 24, Line 30: We don't know when this capability will be operational.

Page 13, Line 9: Question: Was data provided about how often internal DoD employees were selected for these vacancies versus from other Federal agencies or external sources? This would have an impact on their ability to competency match. This could also venture into merit systems principle territory. If announcements are open to more than DoD candidates, the more accurate statement would be that we need to do a better job of identifying and matching competencies versus specific personnel.

Page 13, Line 9: Are we matching "personnel" or "competencies"? Recommend to reword as "...matching specific competencies held by DoD personnel..."
### Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (cont’d)

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<td>Rec. 1a</td>
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<td>Page 19, Line 4: The title of this paragraph and its reference throughout do not match the content. This title implies that they are not correctly hiring the right competencies, while it appears to actually stating that they are not doing it in a timely manner (aka effective workforce planning...beginning recruitment prior to an individual's departure to minimize gap or create overlap for knowledge transfer).</td>
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<td>Page 19, Line 4: What's missing is the link to mission, which they indicated was the catalyst for the report but is not covered in this report. If that's the issue, this report needs to so state and provide something more to back up the findings.</td>
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<td>Page 23, Line 9: This statement implies that there is some desire / need to conduct 'top-down' strategic planning efforts. Workforce planning is, and to be effective, really must be decentralized. Workforce owners determine their own needs based on the missions they must accomplish.</td>
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<td>Page 25, Line 17: The overseas civilian workforce is not viewed as a separate entity, and disagree with the recommendation that specific HCP initiative / metrics should be developed for overseas civilian.</td>
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Coordinator Recommended Change:

Originator Response: Choose an item.

Originator Reasoning:

Choose an item.

Recommendation 1a: Ensure the Defense Civilian Human Resources Management System, when fully implemented, provides human resources officials within the Department the capability to match individual civilian

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<td>personnel to specific authorized and budgeted positions across all DoD Components in order to assist in identification and closing of skill gaps.</td>
<td>Coordinator Comment and Justification: Concur.</td>
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Coordinator Comment and Justification: Concur.

Coordinator Recommended Change:  

Originator Response: Choose an item.

Originator Reasoning: Choose an item.

Recommendation 1b: Identify performance metrics related to hiring a sufficient and well qualified DoD overseas civilian workforce, incorporate the metrics in relevant human capital planning documents or systems, and use the metrics to monitor improvement in the hiring of the overseas civilian workforce.

Coordinator Comment and Justification: Non-Concur.

Overseas civilians are not viewed as separate and distinct from the rest of the workforce from the Enterprise / P&R perspective. This recommendation would be akin to implementing specific metrics and monitoring for employees in Ohio.  

Not sure how feasible establishing a single TTH goal is for all overseas locations. There may be unique aspects per country, such as visa requirements, is a hard to fill location, service considerations (like what type of housing is available, are educational and health services available within the overseas area), visa entry restrictions/requirements, etc., that are unique to each area - so a one size fits all approach may not be applicable. I also think it might be difficult to identify performance metrics without some form of consult with the Components - which could take a long time and research to develop.  

Attachment

DD FORM 818, AUG 2016 REPLACES SD FORM 818, WHICH IS OBSOLETE
## Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (cont’d)

### Recommendation 1c1: Collect and report data on vacant positions, also known as skills gaps, in a standardized format to support DoD-wide analysis.

**Coordinator Comment and Justification:** Non-Concur. Identification of vacant positions is the responsibility and purview of workforce owners. If this recommendation were solely to identify and disseminate overseas hiring best practices, it would be a concur. Any data on vacant positions is infeasible at the Enterprise level.

**Originator Response:** Choose an item.

**Originator Reasoning:**

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### Recommendation 1c2: Supplement the Office of Personnel Management 80–day, end-to-end hiring initiative to account for the additional hiring actions, including the permanent change of station process, needed to onboard employees at overseas locations.

**Coordinator Comment and Justification:** Non-Concur. See previous comment above for recommendation 1b.

**Coordinator Recommended Change:**

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**DD FORM 818, AUG 2016 REPLACES SD FORM 818, WHICH IS OBSOLETE**
### Recommendation 1c3:
Assist human resources officials at overseas locations in developing practical local hiring timelines to minimize the quantity and duration of vacancies among overseas positions and to aid in the transition of duties.

**Coordinator Comment and Justification:** Non-Concur.

Practical might be relative to each overseas location as what works for one area might not work for another.

As mentioned in an earlier comment, we did implement changes to the PPP handbook (per the request of the Components) to better manage their non-displaced overseas workforce for those without return rights. If implemented effectively, this can assist the Components with mitigating their TTH for vacancies.

**Coordinator Recommended Change:**

---

**Originator Response:** Choose an item.

**Originator Reasoning:**
### Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (cont’d)

**“DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON AUDIT OF DEFENSE STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR OVERSEAS CIVILIAN POSITIONS”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
<th>PARA</th>
<th>Basis for Non-Concur?</th>
<th>Comments, Justification, and Originator Justification for Resolution</th>
<th>Component and POC Name, Phone, and E-mail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### HOW TO FILL OUT THE DD 818 MATRIX

**GENERAL GUIDANCE:**
- **To sort table** by page/paragraph number, hover your mouse over the top of the first cell in the “page” column until a downward arrow appears; click and drag to the right to select both page and para columns. Under Paragraph on the Home ribbon, select A-Z button, set to sort by Column 3 and then Column 4, and select “OK.” **To add new rows,** copy and paste a blank row to keep consistent formatting. **To add automatic numbering to column 2,** select entire column and click on the Numbering button under Paragraph on the Home ribbon.

**COORDINATING OSD AND DOD COMPONENTS:**
- Do not use the DD Form 818-1.
- Fill in the memo indicating your Component’s position on the issuance. Fill in the authorized coordinator’s name, position, and Component. The authorized coordinator (digitally) signs the response after the comment matrix has been completed. Making additional changes after filling in a digital signature invalidates and removes the signature.
- Use the comment matrix to provide comments to the OSD Component that created the issuance. Complete the header and footer and Columns 1 -7:

  1. **Column 1** Enter the classification of the comment. If any material is classified, follow DoDM 5200.01 guidance for marking the document. If all comments are unclassified, mark the header and footer and ignore the column.
  2. **Column 2** Order comments by the pages/paragraphs that they apply to in Columns 3 and 4.
  3. **Columns 3&4** As stated.
  4. **Columns 5** Only mark this box if you non-concur with the issuance and the comment in the applicable row is part of the basis for that non-concur. A nonconcur is typically used only when an issuance contains: (a) a violation of the law or contradiction of Executive Branch policy or of existing policy in a DoDD, DoDI, or other instrument approved by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense; or (b) an unnecessary risk to safety, life, limb, or DoD materiel; waste or abuse of DoD appropriations; or unreasonable burden on a DoD Component’s resources.
  5. **Column 6** Place only one comment per row. Enter your comment, justification, and recommended changes in the first two areas provided. If any material is classified, follow DoDM 5200.01 guidance for marking the document.
  6. **Column 7** As stated.

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**DD Form 818, Aug 2016** REPLACES SD Form 818, WHICH IS OBSOLETE
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (cont’d)

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<table>
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<tr>
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<th>#</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
<th>PARA</th>
<th>BASIS FOR NON-CONCER?</th>
<th>COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION</th>
<th>COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL</th>
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- **Review** the comments, **resolve** any conflicting views, and **confirm** that the completed matrix accurately represents your Component’s position. Upload the form to the DoD Directives Program Portal in Microsoft Word format (.docx), with the signed memo representing your Component’s position.

**DD FORM 818, AUG 2016** REPLACES SD FORM 818, WHICH IS OBSOLETE
# Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AES</td>
<td>Authorized End Strength</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Code of Federal Regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCHRMS</td>
<td>Defense Civilian Human Resources Management System</td>
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<td>Defense Civilian Personnel Data System</td>
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<td>Defense Civilian Personnel Advisory Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLA</td>
<td>Defense Logistics Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCF</td>
<td>Human Capital Framework</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<td>HCOP</td>
<td>Human Capital Operating Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDBOP</td>
<td>National Defense Business Operations Plan</td>
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<td>OCO</td>
<td>Overseas Contingency Operations</td>
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<td>Outside the Continental United States</td>
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<td>Office of Inspector General</td>
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<td>Office of Personnel Management</td>
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