

INSPECTOR GENERAL

Department of Defense

March 11, 2017

Report No. DODIG-2017-061

(U) Evaluation of the National Security Agency Counterterrorism Tasking Process Involving Second Party Partners

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NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of the National Security Agency Counterterrorism Tasking Process Involving Second Party Partners

March 1, 2017

(U) Objective

(U) Our objective was to determine whether the National Security Agency (NSA) counterterrorism tasking processes involving Second Party Partners (U.S. partnership with four countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) complied with applicable DoD and NSA policies and regulations.

(U) Finding

(S//SI//NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) NSA is compliant with its own and DoD's applicable policies and regulations about NSA's counterterrorism tasking process used to obtain information from Second Party Partners. After reviewing two DoD directives and NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 Signals Intelligence directives, and interviewing representatives from the Directorate for Data Acquisition and the Directorate for Analysis and Production, we determined that NSA complied with NSA policy NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6.

(S//SI//NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) However, NSA directives are either outdated or unclear, presenting increased risk to the overall counterterrorism tasking process. Specifically:

- United States Signals Intelligence Directive DA3511, "Data Acquisition Directorate Targeting and Data Flow Management," November 28, 2006, NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

- NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

(U) Finding (cont'd)

NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

(S//SI//NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) Additionally, training information detailing counterterrorism tasking procedures NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 are outdated and unclear. After reviewing the four mandatory training classes, we determined that NSA training procedures for NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 do not mention or reference updated techniques:

- Analysts are taught that Second Party Partners NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6
- Training also does not reference NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 or provide instruction on the required procedures for targeting NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6.

(S//SI//NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) As a result, some NSA analysts may not be aware of current procedures for tasking NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

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NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6



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NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of the National Security Agency Counterterrorism Tasking Process Involving Second Party Partners

~~(S//SI)~~ NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

(U) Recommendation

~~(S//SI)~~ NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 We recommend that the Deputy Director of Data Acquisition:

- Update United States Signals Intelligence Directive DA3511, "Data Acquisition Directorate Targeting and Data Flow Management," on the tasking process of NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

[REDACTED]

~~(S//SI)~~ NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 We recommend that the Deputy Director of Analysis and Production and the Deputy Director of Data Acquisition:

- Clarify language in the NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 [REDACTED], so that the process is clear to the analyst workforce; and
- Update training materials with current tasking procedures regarding Second Party Partner counterterrorism tasking NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 [REDACTED]

(U) Management Comments Required

(U) The Deputy Director of Analysis and Production and the Deputy Director of Data Acquisition did not respond to the draft report; therefore, the recommendations are unresolved. Please provide comments that state whether you agree or disagree with the finding and recommendations. If you agree with our recommendations, describe what actions you have taken or plan to take to accomplish the recommendations and include the actual or planned completion dates of your actions. If you disagree with the recommendations or any part of them, please give specific reasons why you disagree and propose alternative action if that is appropriate. We request that you provide comments on the final report by NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6. Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page.

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NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

(U) Recommendation Table

Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Deputy Director for Analysis and Production	2.a, 2.b	None	None
Deputy Director for Data Acquisition	1, 2.a, 2.b	None	None

(U) Please provide Management Comments by NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6.

(U) The following categories are used to describe agency management's comments to individual recommendations:

- Unresolved – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- Resolved – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- Closed – The DoD OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.



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NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3)
PL 86-36 Section 6



**INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500**

March 1, 2017

(U) MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE

(U) SUBJECT: Evaluation of the National Security Agency Counterterrorism
Tasking Process Involving Second Party Partners
(Report No. DODIG-2017-061)

(S) We are providing this report for review and comment. The National Security Agency (NSA) is compliant with policies and procedures for tasking foreign intelligence selectors

NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6


the policy and training are outdated and unclear. We conducted this evaluation in accordance with the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation.

(U) DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. The Deputy Director of Analysis and Production and the Deputy Director of Data Acquisition did not provide comments to the draft report. Please provide comments that state whether you agree or disagree with the finding and recommendations. If you agree with our recommendations, describe what actions you have taken or plan to take to accomplish the recommendations and include the actual or planned completion dates of your actions. If you disagree with the recommendations or any part of them, please give specific reasons why you disagree and propose alternative action if that is appropriate. We request comments on the report by

NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

(U) Please send a PDF file containing your comments to DoDIG: (b)(6) Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We cannot accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, you must send them over the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICs) to DoDIG: (b)(6)

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at (703) 699-DoDIG: (b)(6) or DoDIG: (b)(6) at (410) 854-DoDIG: (b)(6)


Anthony C. Thomas
Deputy Inspector General for
Intelligence and Special
Program Assessments

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NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3)
PL 86-36 Section 6

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(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U//~~FOUO~~) Our overall objective was to determine whether the National Security Agency (NSA) counterterrorism tasking processes and procedures involving Second Party Partners¹ complied with applicable DoD and NSA policies and regulations. See Appendix A for scope and methodology.

(U) Background

(~~S//SI~~//~~FOUO~~) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) issued a report in 2010 concluding in point of failure #11 (of the 14 points of failure) [redacted] NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d), (b)(3) 3024(i) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

[redacted] Although the DoD OIG was not asked to provide a direct response to the 2010 SSCI report, [redacted] NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d), (b)(3) 3024(i) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 expressed in the SSCI report was used as a basis for our evaluation objective. See Appendix C for more information on the 2010 "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Final Report on the Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253."

(~~S//SI~~//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) **Tasking Process.** United States Signals Intelligence Directive (USSID) DA3511 and [redacted] NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 describe the tasking process as consisting of both the targeting and tasking of selectors. The following are key terms within the tasking process:

- **Selectors** - Telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, [redacted] NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6, and other distinctive identifiers of targets.
- **Target** - A person, organization, facility, aircraft, or vessel about which Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) resources, including Second Party Partners, have been directed to gather information.

¹ (U) Second Party Partners - Four countries: Australia (DSD), Canada (CSE), New Zealand (GCSB), and the United Kingdom (GCHQ), along with the United States Government, maintain cooperative SIGINT and Information Assurance (IA) relationships.

² (~~S//SI~~//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

³ (~~S//SI~~//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) U.S. target selector - Any telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, [redacted] NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6, and other distinctive identifiers of a U.S. Person that is of concern or possible target of the U.S. (person, organization, facility, aircraft, or vessel). A U.S. Person is defined as a citizen, a lawful alien, corporations, and other groups of the United States.

- **Targeting** - Validating and reviewing selectors of a particular target for format, appropriateness, and compliance with policy guidelines.
- **Tasking** - Using SIGINT resources, including Second Party Partners, to obtain selector information.

(S//SI//~~NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6~~) **Targeting the Selector.** Targeting the selector is initiated when NSA receives a requirement or a specific question from a customer on a particular target. The analyst uses software tools to research and collect information on the specific target or selector through pre-existing Intelligence Community requirements or SIGINT information. If pre-existing SIGINT information does not address the customer requirement, then the analyst must "target the selectors" (an act of validating and reviewing selectors of a particular target for format, appropriateness, and compliance with policy guidelines) through a target request. The analyst creates a target request and submits the request for tasking.

(S//SI//~~NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6~~) **Tasking the Selector.** Tasking the selector begins once an analyst submits a target request. Tasking the selector (an act of using SIGINT resources to collect selector information) is done by filtering the target requests through a series of ~~NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6~~ system rules. Target requests which pass those rules are ~~NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6~~

~~NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6~~
~~NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6~~ is a software system that ~~NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6~~ the collection and analysis of foreign intelligence selector target requests. ~~NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6~~
~~NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6~~

(U) See Appendix B for more information on the targeting and tasking processes.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Directorate for Analysis and Production and the Directorate for Data Acquisition - Primary Role Players in the Tasking Process

(S//SI//~~FOUO~~ NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) Directorate for Analysis and Production. According to the mission statement of the Directorate for Analysis and Production (hereafter referred to as the S2),⁴ NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6. In response to customers' Information Need or Request for Information,⁵ S2 analysts perform NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

(U//~~FOUO~~) Directorate for Data Acquisition. According to the Directorate for Data Acquisition (hereafter referred to as the S3),⁶ NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6. When the SIGINT enterprise does not have NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 to satisfy a customer's Information Need or Request for Information, NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

(U) Policies Governing Signals Intelligence Counterterrorism Tasking

(U) Management Responsibilities

(U//~~FOUO~~) DoD Instruction O-3115.07. According to DoD Instruction (DoDI) O-3115.07, "Signals Intelligence," November 19, 2010, the Director of the National Security Agency (DIRNSA) is responsible for all SIGINT activities. SIGINT instructions on collecting, processing, analyzing, producing, and disseminating activities issued by the DIRNSA are mandatory for all DoD Components.

(U//~~FOUO~~) DoD Instruction 3325.08. DoDI 3325.08, "DoD Intelligence Collection Management," September 17, 2012, requires the DIRNSA, under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, to coordinate DoD related SIGINT Collection Management resource needs and strategies.

⁴ (U//~~FOUO~~) NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

⁵ (U) See Appendix B for definition of Information Need and Request for Information

⁶ (U//~~FOUO~~) NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

[REDACTED]

(U) Execution of Counterterrorism Tasking Operations

(S//~~FOUO~~) NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) United States Signals Intelligence Directive DA3511.

USSID DA3511, "Data Acquisition Directorate Targeting and Data Flow Management," November 28, 2006, defines targeting and tasking management functions that together comprise an end-to-end process. This process guarantees that only the desired SIGINT is delivered to intended users in the timeframe and format required. The end-to-end process NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

[REDACTED]

(S//~~FOUO~~) NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

[REDACTED]

(U) Finding

(U) National Security Agency's Counterterrorism Tasking Process Involving Second Party Partners

(S//SI//NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) NSA is compliant with its own and DoD's applicable policies and regulations about NSA's counterterrorism tasking process used to obtain information from Second Party Partners. After reviewing two DoD directives and NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 Signals Intelligence directives, and interviewing representatives from the Directorate of Data Acquisition and Directorate for Analysis and Production, we determined that NSA is compliant with DoD Instructions O 3115.07 and 3325.08 by creating NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6, and is compliant with USSIDs DA3511 and NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6, which provide guidance for collection management activities of SIGINT collection resources. In particular, NSA complied with USSID DA3511 by NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6. However, NSA directives, USSID DA3511 and NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 are outdated and unclear. Specifically:

- USSID DA3511 and NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 are outdated and unclear concerning the counterterrorism tasking NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6.⁷
- USSID DA3511 was not updated with the latest tasking processes and tools that are currently being used by NSA Analysts.

(S//SI//NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) Additionally, based on our review of the required analyst training, training information detailing counterterrorism tasking procedures about NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 is outdated and unclear. NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 was not included in training to inform analysts of the NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6. Also, we determined through review of training documents and a staff processing form that the NSA analyst training does not show updated processes NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6.

(S//SI//NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) According to the Analysis and Production and the Data Acquisition Division representatives, the NSA has not updated policy and training because of the constant changes within the counterterrorism signals intelligence environment and associated priorities. As a result, some NSA analysts may not be aware of current procedures for NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6.

⁷ (U) NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

(U) National Security Agency Complied With Policy and Procedures Using Counterterrorism Tasking Methods

(S//SI//NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) NSA complied with policies and procedures on foreign intelligence⁸ counterterrorism by developing a tool that NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 processes tasking requests NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6. According to USSID DA3511, S3 is responsible for directing and managing data flow services throughout the United States SIGINT system. NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

As a result of reviewing current processes and interviewing representatives from both the S3 and S2, we determined that NSA has fulfilled these requirements by developing an NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 tool, NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6, that methodically processes tasking requests on foreign intelligence selectors.

(S//SI//NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 The Technology Directorate developed the NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6, a software tool, using system requirement information from both the S2 and S3. The NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 establishes systematic controls to enable a centralized collection and analysis of selectors. The NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 provides a single point of service where the analyst can enter selector target requests. NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

- NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6
- NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6
- NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

⁸(U) Foreign intelligence – Information significant to U.S. national security, foreign relations, or economic interests. It describes the policies, events, or actions of a foreign government, foreign nongovernmental entity, or foreign individuals. NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

⁹(U) NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

- NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

(S//SI//) NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6] NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d), (b)(3) 3024(i) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

[REDACTED]

(S//SI//) NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6] NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d), (b)(3) 3024(i) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

[REDACTED]

(S//SI//) NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6] NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d), (b)(3) 3024(i) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

[REDACTED]

(S//SI//) NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6] NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d), (b)(3) 3024(i) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

[REDACTED]

10 (S//SI//) NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6] NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d), (b)(3) 3024(i) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

(S//SI//NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d), (b)(3) 3024(i) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

(S//SI//NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) Figure 1 NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d), (b)(3) 3024(i) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d), (b)(3) 3024(i) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

(U) Outdated and Unclear Tasking Policy

(TS//SI//NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d), (b)(3) 3024(i) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

- NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d), (b)(3) 3024(i) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6
- NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d), (b)(3) 3024(i) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

(TS//SI//NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) However, based on our review of USSID DA3511, these types of decisions are not defined or documented within the directive. S3

(~~TS//SI~~ NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) representatives noted that efforts are underway to NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

(~~TS//SI~~ NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d), (b)(3) 3024(i) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

[REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) Outdated Tasking Tools. Current NSA tasking policy is outdated and unclear regarding use of current tasking tools and processes. USSID DA3511, "Data Acquisition Directorate Targeting and Data Flow Management," November 28, 2006, defines data flow management functions that comprise an end-to-end process that guarantees only desired SIGINT is tasked and delivered to intended users in the timeframe and format required. Specifically, the directive provides guidance to the analyst on NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

However, USSID DA3511 is almost 10 years old and several of the tools and processes mentioned in the directive have been decommissioned. For example, the directive stated that selectors are tasked by analysts to collection systems through NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 tools. NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

[REDACTED]. USSID DA3511 needs to be updated to reflect these changes.

(~~TS//SI~~ NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) **Unclear Tasking Processes.** In addition to outdated policies, tasking processes are not detailed clearly in USSID DA3511. The NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 filters all selectors through a series of NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6. According to the Directorate for Analysis and Production and the Directorate for Data Acquisition, NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6,

¹¹ (~~TS//SI~~ NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) Staff Processing Form (SPF) – The Staff Processing Form (SPF) is used to acquire approvals or decisions from leaders and, in some cases, to inform leaders of significant information NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

(~~TS//SI~~ NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 and other pertinent documents. However, the rules are not documented in the directive. USSID DA3511 NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

Although capturing all NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 rules in the current policy may be impractical, providing updated general process guidance in the policy is needed to ensure there is a consistent and basic understanding across the analyst workforce on executing selector tasking. Further, S3 representatives stated that NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

(U) Outdated and Unclear Tasking Training

(~~TS//SI~~ NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) Although NSA maintains a robust mandatory analyst training program, specific training procedures about NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 are outdated and not clearly communicated to the analyst workforce.

(~~TS//SI~~ NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) Tasking Process Training NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 specific tasks to be undertaken to improve the competencies and capabilities of the SIGINT Directorate (SID) workforce in executing targeting and tasking functions. In response, subject matter experts in the Directorate for Analysis and Production, Directorate for Data Acquisition, Directorate of SID Oversight and Compliance, and Associate Directorate for Education and Training developed the Smart Targeting Enhancement Program to ensure targeting and tasking are compliant with legal and NSA policy guidelines. The program has evolved into Targeting Proficiency, which encompasses:

- Training the workforce,
- Implementing a Technical Targeting Specialist framework,
- Leveraging technology for oversight and compliance with legal guidance, and
- Ensuring management accountability in overseeing the SIGINT targeting and tasking system.

(~~TS//SI~~ NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) According to the Directorate for Analysis and Production, analysts are taught the procedures for targeting and tasking selectors through their Cryptologic Skills Smart Targeting classes. The mandatory Smart Targeting classes describe how to research, target, and maintain all selectors. All analysts who create, review, release, or otherwise approve SIGINT targeting under SID authorities and who

(TS//SI//^{NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6}) use SIGINT targeting and tasking tools must complete, at a minimum, the required four part-training which consists of:

1. Introduction to Targeting
2. Targeting Research
3. Targeting Application
4. Targeting Maintenance

(TS//SI//^{NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6}) Outdated Training Information

. After reviewing the four mandatory classes, we determined that NSA training procedures

. Currently, in the "Cryptologic Skills Course 1301 – Foundations of Smart Targeting,"

(TS//SI//^{NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6}) NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

(TS//SI//^{NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6}) NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

¹² (TS//SI//^{NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6}) NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

¹³ (TS//SI//^{NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6}) NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

(~~TS//SI~~) NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

(~~TS//SI~~) During our review of the training material, we determined that the training courses NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

(~~TS//SI~~) NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

NSA representatives stated during our review that because of the ever changing environment, current processes and procedures are being updated and rewritten. Representatives from the S2 stated that current efforts are underway in updating Smart Targeting Enhancement Program Training courses by NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6. Also, S2 representatives stated that they are in collaboration with S3 to revise targeting strategy efforts. They are also doing a joint review of old and new targeting and tasking policies and are NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

(U) Conclusion

(~~S//SI~~) NSA is compliant with its own and DoD's applicable policies and regulations about NSA's counterterrorism tasking process used to obtain information from Second Party Partners. We determined that NSA is compliant with

(S//SI//NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) DoD Instructions O 3115.07 and 3325.08 NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

[REDACTED], and is compliant with USSIDs DA3511 and NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6, which provide guidance for collection management activities of SIGINT collection resources. Particularly, we determined that NSA complied with NSA USSID DA3511 by developing an NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 tool that ensures appropriate format, content, and processes of foreign intelligence selector tasking NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6. However, we determined that:

- USSID DA3511 and NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 [REDACTED]
- NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 [REDACTED]
- NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 [REDACTED]
- Cryptologic Skills Smart Targeting training NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 [REDACTED]

(U) Recommendations

(U) 1. We recommend that the Deputy Director, Data Acquisition:

(S//SI//NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) Update "United States Signals Intelligence Directive DA3511 Data Acquisition Directorate Targeting and Data Flow Management" to clearly document the decision process pertaining to NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 [REDACTED]

(U) 2. We recommend that the Deputy Director, Analysis and Production, and the Deputy Director, Data Acquisition:

a. (TS//SI//NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6) NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 [REDACTED]

(S//SI//SI) NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

[REDACTED]

b. (S//SI//SI) NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

[REDACTED]

(U) Management Comments Required

(U) The Deputy Director of Analysis and Production and the Deputy Director of Data Acquisition did not respond to the draft report; therefore, the recommendations are unresolved. Please provide comments that state whether you agree or disagree with the finding and recommendations. If you agree with our recommendations, describe what actions you have taken or plan to take to accomplish the recommendations and include the actual or planned completion dates of your actions. If you disagree with the recommendations or any part of them, please give specific reasons why you disagree and propose alternative action if that is appropriate. We request that you provide comments on the final report by [REDACTED].

(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from November 2014 through December 2016 in accordance with Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation. Those standards require that we plan and perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence that would provide a reasonable basis for our finding and conclusions based on our evaluation objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our finding and conclusions based on our evaluation objective.

(~~TS//SI//~~ ~~(U)~~) Using the 2010 SSCI report recommendation ~~NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6~~

~~NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6~~

- (U//~~FOUO~~) We coordinated with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to determine whether DoD has any overarching counterterrorism policies and procedures for tasking SIGINT information.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) We conducted on-site visits, interviewed representatives from the Signals Intelligence Directorate and from various operational directorates to include: Foreign Affairs Directorate, Technology Directorate, and the Research Directorate. We obtained policies, procedures, and data from appropriate DoD components directly involved in the target and SIGINT collection management processes.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) We also conducted background interviews with appropriate Second Party Partner operational support directorates to include, but not limited to, the Foreign Affairs Directorate, Technology Directorate, and the Oversight and Compliance division within the Signals Intelligence Directorate.
- (U) We sent a data call requesting background information to include, but not limited to, memorandums of understanding, directives, instructions, and policies pertaining to NSA and the Second Party Partner relationship, and the overall CT tasking process.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) No prior coverage has been conducted on NSA counterterrorism tasking to Second Party Partners during the last 5 years.

(U) Appendix B

(U) The National Security Agency Counterterrorism Targeting and Tasking Processes

(S//SI//^{NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6}) **Targeting Process.** According to United States Signals Intelligence Directive DA3511 and NSA analyst training procedures, targeting refers to validating and reviewing selectors for format, appropriateness, and compliance with policy guidelines. The analyst enters the selectors ^{NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6} for forwarding to collection systems. The target process begins with NSA and its organizations receiving a requirement or a specific question from a customer, either in the form of an Information Need or a Request for Information:

- An Information Need is the formal request of the National Signals Intelligence Requirements Process which drives collection and reporting in line with the Director of National Intelligence-National Intelligence Priorities Framework.
- A Request for Information is an informal question from a customer seeking clarification of disseminated SIGINT. Requests for Information are not intended to circumvent the Information Need process and are not to be used to request first time release of foreign intelligence information.

(S//SI//^{NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6}) Once a SIGINT gap is identified, the analyst ^{NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6}

the target analyst creates a target request¹⁴ through the ^{NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6} and collaborates with S3 for tasking collection sites, ^{NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6} This process begins the tasking process.

(S//SI//^{NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6}) **Tasking Process.** According to United States Signals Intelligence Directive DA3511 and NSA analyst training procedures, tasking refers to the direct levying of SIGINT requirements ^{NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6}. The tasking process begins when a targeting request is submitted to the ^{NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6} is a tool that NSA analysts use to submit targeting requests for distribution to the front-end collection systems including


¹⁴ (S//SI//^{NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6}) A target request - request that is released in the correct format to front-end collection and filtering/selection systems.

(S//SI//) NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

[REDACTED]

(See Figure 2)

(U) Figure 2. Tasking Process



(S//SI//) NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

(U) Appendix C

(U) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Final Report on the Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253

(~~TOP SECRET//SI~~) NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 On December 25, 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, traveling on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan, tried to detonate an explosive. As a result of this attempted terrorist attack, on March 10, 2010, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) issued a report identifying the following 14 Intelligence Community (IC) points of failure that prevented the detection of the threat posed by Abdulmutallab:

1. Abdulmutallab's Visa was not revoked by the State Department.
2. Abdulmutallab's name was not placed in the "Terrorist Screening Database" (TSDB), on the Selectee List, or on the No Fly List.
3. NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6; DoDIG: (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) [REDACTED]
4. NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d), (b)(3) 3024(i) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6; DoDIG: (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) [REDACTED]
5. DoDIG: (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) [REDACTED]
6. NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d), (b)(3) 3024(i) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6; DoDIG: (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) [REDACTED]
7. NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d), (b)(3) 3024(i) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6; DoDIG: (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) [REDACTED]
8. FBI counterterrorism analysts NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 [REDACTED]
9. NCTC's Directorate of Intelligence failed to connect the reporting on Abdulmutallab.
10. NCTC's watchlisting office did not conduct name traces or additional research to find additional derogatory information to place Abdulmutallab on a watchlist.

11. NSA did not pursue all potential collection opportunities that could have provided NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d), (b)(3) 3024(i) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 [REDACTED]
12. NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d), (b)(3) 3024(i) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 [REDACTED]
13. NSA did not nominate NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d), (b)(3) 3024(i) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 for watchlisting or the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE).
14. Intelligence analysts were primarily focused on al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), threats to U.S. interests in Yemen NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 [REDACTED] rather than on potential AQAP threats to the U.S. homeland.

(S//SI//NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 [REDACTED])

- NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6; DoDIG: (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d) [REDACTED]
- Failure point #11 concluded that NSA did not pursue all potential leads that might have revealed NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d), (b)(3) 3024(i) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 [REDACTED]
- NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d), (b)(3) 3024(i) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 [REDACTED]

¹⁵ (S//SI//NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d), (b)(3) 3024(i) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6 [REDACTED])

NSA (b)(1) 1.4 (c)(d), (b)(3) 3024(i) and (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

- Failure point #13 concluded that NSA's policy of not making partial name nominations to the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment, may have contributed to the failure of the Intelligence Community to identify Abdulmutallab as a potential threat. The SSCI recommended that the NSA immediately clear the backlog of messages that require review for watchlisting. In 2012, the Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense completed a review in response to failure point #13.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CT Counterterrorism

DIRNSA Director of the National Security Agency

NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

NSA/CSS National Security Agency/Central Security Service

S2 Directorate for Analysis and Production

S3 Directorate for Data Acquisition

SID Signals Intelligence Directorate

SIGINT Signals Intelligence

SSCI Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

USSID United States Signals Intelligence Directive

NSA (b)(3) PL 86-36 Section 6

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
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