

Erga Omnes Securitas

International Security and Reliance on Sustainable Partnerships

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Sustaining the United States partnership with Japan will require continued investment in the people who will carry this alliance forward in a turbulent and unpredictable world.

—Mike Mansfield, former US Ambassador to Japan

The global state of affairs requires mutually beneficial security partnerships to counterbalance the emerging threats to global peace and stability. Without sustainable security partnerships, the long-term viability of the United States of America as an international actor will undoubtedly come into question. It is more important than ever, for national security leaders, policy makers, and military leadership to critically analyze the state of international security partnerships and the impact security cooperation has on the stability of the international order and national security. Leaders must ask, will existing security partnerships continue to produce the needed advantage to be successful in the current and future security environment? Furthermore, how should engagement with current partners change or evolve to meet future US national security objectives?

Using US–Japan security cooperation as a case study, this article will aim to be informative for US military leaders and policy makers, while encouraging creative, innovative solutions to strengthen existing and future security partnerships. Based on firsthand research, interviews with key leaders, politicians, and scholars, and information provided by various ministries within the Government of Japan during tenure as a Mansfield Fellow, I found that improvement to security cooperation could be achieved through a number of easily implemented and innovative policy recommendations. Strategies including an increase of personnel exchanges, assessment of large-scale exercises from the unit perspective, and creative restructuring and planning must all be considered. I further concluded that when genuine strategic policy discussions regarding international security cooperation take place, it becomes clear that, based on the changing global security environment and increased challenges in maintaining a globally dominate force, the United States must be willing to critically examine its current partnerships. Similarly, Washington must be creative with establishing new, mutually beneficial security cooperation activities. Innovative strategies including the increase of personnel exchanges, assessment of large-scale exercises from the small-scale or unit per-

spective, along with creative restructuring and planning all must be considered as options for improvement. The future of international partnerships and coalitions from the broader perspective of the DOD and the United States Government as a whole depend highly upon positive human-to-human, bureaucrat-to-bureaucrat, military officer-to-military officer interactions beginning at the lowest level and continuing all the way to the highest of leadership positions.

The US–Japan alliance teaches policy makers and military leaders alike that there is a clear need for strong regional alliances that directly impact regional and global stability. The US–Japan relationship will be the most important international relationship for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the US–Japan relationship will continue to rely heavily on strong and sustainable interpersonal relationships. As such, if a healthy human-based mutual understanding can be fostered on a regular basis, then the US–Japan relationship will never dissolve.

If the USAF intends to meet the dynamic and ever-changing security environment of the global community, strategists and policy makers alike must reassess the current partnership strategy and defense cooperation agreements, including exercise planning and formulation of new innovative and practical approaches to strengthening those security partnerships that are most vital to global stability and US national security interests. Personal diplomacy, innovative thought, and interpersonal relations founded on trust will be vital to the future ability of USAF personnel to work effectively with security partners during times of conflict or in highly contested regions of the world. In today's dynamic security environment, leaders must understand the complexities associated with bilateral security cooperation and foreign domestic politics in some instances.

The future of not only international security partnerships but also the fundamental opinion that other nations have of the United States will continue to be highly dependent upon the example set by individual members. Security partnerships are the critical asymmetric advantage that the United States has with regards to great-power competition. The human-level interaction, both positive and negative, has the potential to impact every aspect of the current and future rapport of the United States. If the DOD and the USAF intends to meet the dynamic and ever-changing security environment of the global community, specifically the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region, strategists and policy makers alike, must reassess the current security partnership strategy and defense cooperation agreements in accordance with the most recent *National Security Strategy* and *National Defense Strategy*. This should include an assessment of current exercise planning, along with the formulation of new and practical approaches to strengthening those security partnerships that are most vital to global stability and US national security interests. If a healthy human-based mutual understanding can

be fostered on a regular basis, then sustainable security relationships will continue to be a cornerstone of stability in numerous regions around the globe.¹

Revitalizing the Squadron: The Tactical Bridge

In delving into revitalizing the squadron through deepened operational coordination and security activities and a brief discussion on pace setting, the core of the research comes from five site visits coordinated through the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) Air Staff Office to five JASDF bases and interactions with base-, group- and squadron-level leadership and unit officers and enlisted personnel. In recent years, it has been adamantly articulated that the war-fighting unit of the USAF is the squadron, and that it requires revitalization—meaning empowering tactical-level leaders to make in-time combat and noncombat related decisions, which represents the moving of the locus of decision-making authority to individuals who have greater proximity to the fight.

One potential area where the service should empower squadron-level leadership is when engaging with security partners and counterparts who operate at the same tactical level. While the US–Japan security agreement is one of the most vital to global stability in general and East Asia and the free and open Indo-Pacific in particular, the United States and Japan have never actually been engaged in combat operations together. Through various discussions and interactions with the JASDF, it became abundantly clear that there was much to be learned from security partners' command structure and approach to decision making. Thus, the most opportune times in which to observe Japan's command structure and decision-making chain tends to be in the context of large-scale, bilateral and multilateral defense exercises.

Large-scale Exercises

The United States and Japan cooperate on numerous levels, one of which is large-scale, multforce, multiservice exercises. These occur in both a bilateral and multilateral context at regular intervals. Large-scale exercises serve as an opportunity to execute and practice in a controlled environment the simultaneous employment of capabilities from each of the participants.

Sometimes exercises tend to be more of an execution of operations in the same area of responsibility rather than truly operating together. Additionally, bilateral cooperation activities are often concluded with some sort of ceremony in which each side expresses gratitude to the other for participation while vowing to continue to work more diligently together. This style of cooperation is superficial at best. Post-exercise feedback along with pre- and post-exercise personnel ex-

changes have the potential to make large-scale exercises more effective for each participant nation. Fundamental knowledge of the command and rank structure, unit hierarchy, and culture and language fundamentals all support the development of mutual understanding. This was a readily apparent area for improvement when examining Cope North Guam, the longest running bilateral exercise. Arriving at an exercise with individuals who possess a mutual understanding for each other, as well as departing with the intent to address lessons learned and conduct activities that would allow for mutual improvement will more likely have a greater overall effect on the security partnership than the actual exercise itself.

Cope North has an overarching goal of increasing the ability of JASDF and USAF assets to effectively complete a variety of missions together. Cope North Guam 2018 was the first to be conducted as a trilateral exercise with “the US Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, and the Royal Australian Air Force to enhance multilateral air operations between the nations,” and focused specifically on integrated operations for, “humanitarian assistance and disaster relief with aerial and force employment events focused on increasing readiness.”²

The JASDF Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (AMES) is responsible for maintaining and employing the *Kido Eisei* unit.³ The *Kido Eisei* unit is a cargo container that has been adapted into a plug-and-play unit for medical and casualty evacuation operations. The JASDF has the capability to place two of the four units they have on either a C-130 or their C-2 mobility aircraft. Each unit has the capability of carrying up to three patients and, in extremely critical situations, has all necessary equipment to conduct small-scale lifesaving surgeries while airborne. The *Kido Eisei* unit also resolves the issues of poor aircraft lighting and excessive aircraft noise. The AMES unit brought the *Kido Eisei* unit to Cope North Guam 2018 as an opportunity to share and show a capability that both the US and Australian forces do not have, at least not as a consolidated plug-and-play system.

The commander of the JASDF AMES gave frank feedback from the Japan perspective on Cope North Guam. Some points that the colonel elected to make during a feedback session were that, firstly, he felt that there still exists a clear language barrier among the nations, even within the medical career field where there is a relatively high percentage of English-speaking doctors and nurses. The colonel articulated that the JASDF participants felt more like observers; they felt like they could not keep up because of the language barrier and essentially were left behind. There was recognition that solving this will require better language training on the Japanese side. However, the AMES commander also articulated the idea that more personnel exchanges focused on casualty evacuation and medical evacuation prior to the exercise would be highly beneficial to the overall co-

operation effort and would perhaps lead to a more reciprocal and effective exercise.⁴

Small-scale Exercises

While large-scale exercises provide a training and validation opportunity for contingency-level responses, smaller-scale exercises at the tactical and operational levels help develop the lethality of the force. There is an annual small-scale bilateral fighter exercise conducted between Japan and the United States, often hosted at a JASDF base. A few years ago, during one of these exercises, aircraft were segregated on the ramp, and no actual flying occurred together. Essentially, the US fighter squadron traveled to the JASDF base and operated in shared airspace but not directly with the JASDF unit. Responsibility for this arrangement falls equitably on each side; however, from the Japanese perspective there was a lack of after-action discussion on how to increase the effectiveness of the exercise in the future.⁵

The JASDF commander suggested an idea worth considering as a necessary shift in current bilateral exercise management practices: line maintenance exchanges. What this means is that JASDF maintenance personnel would work side-by-side with US ground crew from the time the pilots arrived for preflight inspection, through engine start and block out. The key part of this idea was the fact that it would not be a solely JASDF ground crew launching a US fighter but instead an integrated ground crew with an USAF lead. This discussion from the squadron commander was brought up in large part due to the force structure; JASDF flying units tend to take the same form as Army Aviation units, with an imbedded maintenance flight and capability. Regardless of the differences in force and command structure, however, a line maintenance exchange had the potential to be a highly effective method of further integrating capability. This line maintenance exchange would ideally provide opportunity to have younger JASDF and US enlisted personnel work together toward the common goal of safely launching the aircraft for its mission. The 305th Fighter Squadron commander further articulated that perhaps this was a way to prepare for contingency environments in which JASDF line maintenance may have a necessity to fuel, marshal, and launch US aircraft due to limited availability of US forces or adaptive basing requirements. This insightful and forward-thinking observation ought to be taken seriously by leadership across the spectrum of Indo-Pacific region's numerous security cooperation agreements.

Recent observation of this same exercise (October 2020), two years after the 305th Fight Squadron commander's feedback, revealed a much different story. While the line maintenance exchange has yet to be implemented, the level of in-

tegration and interoperability has been drastically improved: the groups do not simply fly in the same airspace but also actually fought together. The most recent iteration of the exercise involved flights with commanders of both US and Japan units, bilateral news and public affairs announcements, integrated airborne and ground control operations, and bilateral air-refueling support in which US receivers conducted air refueling with JASDF tankers and vice versa. Continued efforts in this area, including further development of an integrated operations tactics handbook and use of each nations' various strengths and assets, will result in a significantly positive outlook for future security cooperation efforts and the lethality of the alliance.

Informal Personnel Exchanges

Informal operational-level exchanges support the intent of the more formalized strategic level exchanges of personnel. Through another firsthand experience, I observed that the Naha Rescue Squadron has often participated in rescue exchanges with personnel from Kadena Air Base—at one point they even participated in an annual exercise called Cope Angel. While these exchanges are highly beneficial for the JASDF pararescue jumpers (PJ), there is still a significant lack of knowledge regarding what survival equipment USAF pilots take with them when they fly. This lack of knowledge limits the effectiveness of the JASDF PJs in water rescues when US pilots eject. An exchange in which survival tactics and the differences in training between Japanese and US pilots is highlighted would help improve the efficacy of these training events.

Personnel exchanges between various partner and allied nations occur regularly. Within the US–Japan relationship, there are a number of officer exchanges that include an exchange of aviators, maintenance, and even cyberspace or communications personnel.⁶ However, these exchanges tend to be limited to educational positions. Often, exchange pilots, such as the USAF F-15 exchange officer imbedded with the JASDF F-15J unit at Nyutabaru Air Base in Miyazaki Japan, are limited to instructing new F-15J pilots or teaching ground school.

While formalized programs such as the Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs' (SAF/IA) Military Personnel Exchange Program are beneficial and worth continuing, there is a gap at the operational unit level that needs to be filled. Bureaucratic red tape often creates a nightmare of limitations; however, no actual limitations exist to prevent either side of a partnership from engaging in informal personnel exchanges. Nonetheless, all too often such innovative efforts aimed at improving bilateral interpersonal relationships, albeit the simplest idea, frequently elicit an immediate negative response from leadership. Some of the most easily accomplished exchanges involve simply visiting a security partner's base and par-

ticipating in a day-long shadow exchange like the types of exchanges and site visits I was privileged to participate in as a Mansfield Fellow.

Formalized exchanges serve the purpose of supporting the overall strategic concept of the alliance or partnership. Less formal and more substantial interpersonal relationship-focused exchanges increase operational cooperation, streamline bilateral coordination processes, and, ultimately, enhance the effectiveness and lethality of the bilateral partnership. If there is mutual interest and benefit, then informal level personnel exchanges should be pursued and encouraged from the lowest level up.

Bottom-to-Top Approach

Most exercises and exchanges outlined in formal policies and agreements tend to have solely a strategic-level focus and involve mostly coordination and planning at the upper echelons of leadership and policy making. This leaves a significant cooperation gap at the lower levels of cooperation, specifically the squadron level. To fill this cooperation gap there is a need to reassess the way cooperation takes place, which is currently top to bottom. There are significant areas in which lower-level, laterally coordinated cooperation could occur that would inherently be supportive of the larger exercises and the overall strategic goals of the security partnership.

The issue that arises from informal cooperation tends to be top support. In most situations where concrete benefit cannot be clearly articulated, most leaders are less willing to be supportive. Despite the abstract benefit these informal cooperation practices produce, the long-range impact is far more valuable than merely objective accomplishment during large- or small-scale exercises. If anything, the informal coordination processes allow for a more rapid and smooth execution of tactical and operational objectives in both peacetime exercises and would ideally have the same effect in future conflict. A bottom-to-top approach would be highly beneficial to the strategic objective of any security partnership and would allow greater bilateral decision-making capability at the squadron level. Critical in-time decision making and execution coordinated with tactical-level partners affords the most lethal response to developing threats; furthermore, action taken would remain in line with overall strategic objectives and the principle of centralized command and decentralized execution. Tactical-level ideas with operational support and strategic integration allow for greater bilateral decision making at the squadron level. Lateral cooperation with security partner equivalents should be a key concept in continuing to revitalize the squadron. The bottom-to-top approach will be vital to winning future conflicts, specifically in the Indo-Pacific region.

Pacesetting

International security partnerships require formulation of common goals and coordination of security cooperation activities to achieve those goals. In most instances, the cooperation-and-coordination piece rarely addresses the operational execution processes, and instead procedures and challenges tend to be thought of as strategic in nature. Despite having positive intentions and coordinated goals and objectives, when one party outpaces the other or has a different concept of what execution should look like, the partnership becomes less effective than it should be, and the potential for a breakdown in security cooperation overall could occur. Coordinating objective and purpose is only the first step in security cooperation, and operational execution coordination and pacesetting are just as vital, if not more important, to the overall health of the relationship. Working toward a common goal and working together to achieve a common goal are not always the same thing.

The United States' Pace—Train Like You Fight

The DOD approach to training and military readiness is to “train like you fight.” Every motion and action taken in the training environment is intended to increase lethality and provide realistic training. The intent is to prepare people to eventually use developed skill sets in a lethal manner during times of real-world conflict or contingency operations. US forces train like they fight by fostering simulated environments that are intended to mimic actual contingency conditions: “Success hinges on practicing the profession of arms in the same manner it will be executed on the battlefield or during a contingency.”⁷ The DOD’s *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* even defines exercise as, “a military maneuver or simulated wartime operation involving planning, preparation and execution carried out for the purpose of training and evaluation.”⁸ Thus the DOD approach to training is simply to train for real-world operations through simulated contingency environments to validate or evaluate mission capabilities.⁹

While this is highly effective and practical, do bilateral or multilateral large-scale exercise and exchanges produce the same sort of effectiveness, or are we setting a pace that is too fast for US security partners? If the goal is to fight alongside security partners, then improvement of security partners’ operational capability through training and education needs to be a priority of security cooperation. There is an obligation to adjust the pace of the simulated contingency exercises currently being conducted with security partners.

The Security Partners' Pace—Train to Improve

JASDF leadership at various levels articulated a common theme of feeling as though they could not “keep up” with the US military.¹⁰ When this defense “gap” becomes apparent, it essentially has two significantly detrimental effects. First, a loss of effectiveness in training and development ultimately results in a loss of trust. The Japan Self-Defense Force often adjusts US training objectives and goals to ones that are more reasonably achievable for its own level of capability.¹¹ Additionally, objectives such as “ensuring that they are not a hindrance on the US execution portion” or “do the best to provide necessary support to US assets when unable to maintain unified action” speak to a common sentiment that sometimes the goal is to just “not be in the way.”¹²

A second detrimental effect of US security partners is the development of dependence. Fundamental to the overall US foreign policy is the development of self-reliance, a desire to empower friends and allies to become self-sufficient—be that economically or within the context of national security. This idea of dependency is not one desired by a majority of security partners, most of whom maintain significant capability, such as Japan, which has a strong desire to make a significant contribution to the security relationship.¹³ However, when outpaced in training exercises, the habit of leaving certain tasks to US forces becomes the root cause of dependency on US military power. This is called “induced” dependency. In times of actual conflict, this kind of dependency would make US security partners less reliable.

From the strategic perspective of security cooperation, and in accordance with the emphasis in Joint Publication 1-0 *Joint Personnel Support* on “unity of effort,” understanding allies’ and partners’ training and education “pace” is more vital than having a comprehensive exercise to validate all aspects of DOD capabilities.¹⁴ Reflecting the US train-like-we-fight mentality, in almost every case the US pace far exceeds a pace that allies and partners can maintain. In most instances, and as explained by JASDF officers, security partners of the United States often view training as “an opportunity to learn about DOD capabilities, learn from more experienced partners and develop their own talents, skills and capabilities [sic].”¹⁵ Essentially, US security partners “train to improve.”

However, if the United States intends to continue to facilitate unity of effort through security cooperation, then in certain bilateral instances it would behoove the United States to either set a pace that is more appropriate to its security partner and/or allow partners to take a larger role in planning, preparing, and leading execution of such exercises and training events. Aligned ends do not always ensure coordinated means.

Partnership Development

If the goal is to fight alongside our security partners, then the United States has an obligation to facilitate the improvement of security partners' operational capability through training and education as a priority for fostering sustainable security partnerships. Fundamental to the overall US international security posture is the development of self-reliant, self-sufficient security partners. In a manner similar to the way the DOD approaches force development through training and education, there is a need to establish clear guidance, procedures, and practices for partnership development. Joint Publication 3-16 *Multinational Operations*, Joint Publication 3-20 *Security Cooperation*, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, through discussion on "security assistance," articulate some very broad and overarching goals of security cooperation and partnerships but offer no real concrete methodology that could be useful to commanders who work with security partners on a regular basis.

This "crawl, walk, run" approach could also be applied to US security partnerships throughout the world. Furthermore, the same approach to partnership development through training and education cannot be a one-size-fits-all approach due to the vast range of capabilities that US partners maintain. Joint Publication 3-16 lays the foundational support needed for a partnership development strategy and standalone doctrine, articulating "When the situation permits, FCs at all levels should seek opportunities to improve the contributions of member nation forces through training assistance and resource sharing . . . this could include the development of interoperable C2 [command-and-control] and joint fires capabilities and procedures; the sale or loan of equipment; consistent and shared doctrine; common TTP [tactics, techniques, and procedures]; and participation in multinational exercises, including training at US national train centers when appropriate."¹⁶ If the United States is to continue to be influential throughout various regions in the world, then commanders with responsibilities within the context of a bilateral or multilateral security cooperation agreement should seek to improve the contributions of partner nation forces through training assistance and educational programs.

Conclusion

The US–Japan relationship teaches policy makers and military leaders that there is a clear need for strong regional alliances that can directly influence regional and global security stability in a positive manner. While this article takes a comprehensive approach to framing the issue, it does not offer a solution for every problem that emerged during research conducted for the thesis from which it is

excerpted. It does articulate a clear need for innovative and creative minds willing to work directly on an interpersonal and, in some instances, ad hoc basis with counterparts from partner and host nations to achieve a common objective in the most efficient and productive way possible.

The squadron is the war-fighting unit of the USAF and, as such, it should be the focus of security cooperation efforts. Squadron leadership should be actively engaging with their security partner equivalents on a regular basis and encouraging personnel exchanges, smaller-scale unit exercises, and/or informal learning opportunities. This requires continued empowerment of squadron commanders from the upper levels of leadership; without such empowerment, lower-level cooperation is stonewalled unnecessarily. Failure to cooperate at the tactical level could potentially have dire consequences when conflicts give rise to a need to conduct coordinated operations. Before a conflict arises is the time for the development of cooperation at the squadron and unit levels.

The DOD pace is often fast and lethal, and this is almost never the same pace as that of US security partners. During times of peace, it would be more beneficial for the US side of the partnership to slow the pace, educate and encourage understanding, facilitate capability development, and work side-by-side with security partners. While there is a need to train for realistic wartime situations, we must understand that this also requires developing our security partners. If security partners are left in the dust during peacetime exercises and cooperation activities, it would be illogical to assume those partners would be a benefit to operations during times of conflict. There is a time for both training and executing at the DOD pace of lethality, and there is also a time to work at a pace appropriate to security partners and facilitate comprehensive education and employment of capabilities.

Ultimately, sustainable security partnerships depend highly upon positive human-to-human interactions from the lowest level of leadership to the highest. Even in long established security partnerships, interpersonal relationships are irreplaceable. Personal diplomacy founded on innovative strategies that increase critical personnel exchanges and facilitate trusting interpersonal relations will be vital to the USAF ability to capitalize on the asymmetric advantage that such partnerships provide. The success of these relationships relies heavily on the cross-cultural competency of the individual.

If a healthy human-based mutual understanding can be fostered on a regular basis, then the US–Japan security relationship will continue to be the cornerstone of stability in East Asia. The lessons suggested in this article are not only applicable to the US–Japan alliance but also apply to the bilateral and multilateral relationships throughout the Indo-Pacific and across the globe. That same concept

of sustainable interpersonal relationships as applied to the US–Japan relationship also holds true of other security relationships. Interpersonal relationships and cultural and language competence will be vital to sustainable security relationships continuing to be an asymmetric advantage in regions around the globe. 🌐

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Notes

1. The abovementioned concerns were the focus of the fellowship thesis titled, *Erga Omnes Securitas: International Security & Reliance on Sustainable Partnerships*, which was completed while assigned to Air University, Air War College, Air Force Fellows from the summer of 2018 to the summer of 2019. Most research and anecdotal evidence are based on firsthand research from interviews conducted with key leaders, politicians, and academic experts, as well as information provided by various ministries within the Government of Japan during tenure as a Mansfield Foundation Fellow. The primary focus of the Mike Mansfield Fellowship is the US–Japan relationship; in this article the US–Japan security alliance will be the primary case study for considering a reassessment of current security partnerships.

The Mansfield Fellowship is a yearlong experience in which selected federal employees work with their counterparts and other bureaucrats within ministries and offices of the Government of Japan. This experience gives unique government leadership engagement opportunities and represents a hands-on approach to understanding the strategic implications and importance of the US–Japan partnership at various strategic and operational policy levels. The purview of the research is restricted to US–Japan security cooperation. To this end, this research partially draws upon firsthand interviews as well as site visits to vitally important Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) bases to provide insight into cooperation gaps in communication and highlight a number of missed opportunities for strengthening collaboration and focused efforts to mitigate these shortfalls. The hindsight from firsthand interviews and site visits to JASDF units during the latter part of 2018, specifically those in Naha Air Base (Naha Rescue Squadron) and Nyutabaru Air Base (305th Fighter Wing, F-15J) provided significant insight into Japan's security partnership perspective.

Erga Omnes Securitas: International Security & Reliance on Sustainable Partnerships is available in its entirety. The thesis is a 113-page in-depth analysis that focuses on nine topics critical to sustainable partnerships. Those topics included: economic partnerships and national security, congressional delegations, revitalizing the squadron, pace setting, peace cooperation, humanitarian

assistance and disaster relief cooperation, enterprise engagement, and the impact of foreign domestic politics. However, this article will provide a brief synopsis and extract of only few of the most relevant chapters of the thesis, specifically focusing on revitalizing the squadron and pace setting, through a discussion on large- and small-scale exercises as well as “outpacing.” These topics will frame the discussion to provide necessary hindsight, insight and foresight into sustainable security partnerships and their vital role in the United States’ asymmetric advantage in the Indo-Pacific region. A number of practical policy recommendations that further strengthen, not only the US–Japan alliance but any strategic partnership that the US currently maintains or will pursue in the future are also articulated.

2. Charisy Panzino, “More than 2,000 troops, 100 aircraft train on Guam for Cope North 2018.” *Air Force Times*, 15 February 2018, <https://www.airforcetimes.com/>.

3. *Kido Eisei* 機動衛生—Japanese word most accurately translated as “mobile medical unit.” The Japanese characters utilized are 機 ki [machine, aircraft, and so forth], 動 do [movement], 衛 ei [protection], and 生 sei [life].

4. Commander of JASDF Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, interview by author, Komaki Air Base, Nagoya, Japan, 30 November 2019.

5. Commander JASDF 305th Tactical Fighter Squadron, interview by author, Nyutabaru Air Base, Miyazaki, Japan, 18 December 2019.

6. Former US Military Personnel and Exchange Program Officer, interview by author, Tokyo, Japan, 19 November 2019.

7. LeMay Center for Doctrine, Annex 1-1 *Force Development: Common Guiding Principles*, <https://www.doctrine.af.mil/>.

8. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, June 2019).

9. LeMay Center for Doctrine, Annex 1-1 *Force Development*.

10. JASDF 403rd Tactical Airlift Squadron Pilots and Loadmasters, interview by author, Miho Air Base, Yonago, Tottori, Japan, 5 December 2018.

11. Commander of JASDF Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, interview by author, Komaki Air Base, Nagoya, Japan, November 30, 2019.

12. MOD, Defense Policy Bureau, Joint Training Division Officials, interview by author, Ichigaya, Tokyo, Japan, 16 April 2019.

13. Jeffrey W. Hornung, *Japan’s Potential Contributions in an East China Sea Contingency* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020).

14. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-0 *Joint Personnel Support* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, May 2016), vii.

15. JASDF 404th Tactical Airlift Tanker Squadron, interview by author, Komaki Air Base, Japan.

16. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16 *Multinational Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, March 2019), III–10.