Report No. DODIG-2021-083

INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

MAY 19, 2021

(U) Evaluation of the Readiness of the U.S. Navy's P-8A Poseidon Aircraft to Meet the U.S. European Command's Anti-Submarine Warfare Requirements

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Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20460519

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
INTEGRITY
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of the Readiness of the U.S. Navy's P-8A Poseidon Aircraft to Meet the U.S. European Command's Anti-Submarine Warfare Requirements

(U) May 19, 2021

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether the readiness of the U.S. Navy's P-8A *Poseidon* fleet met the anti-submarine warfare requirements of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM).

(U) Background

(U) The P-8A *Poseidon* is a multi-mission maritime aircraft. It is primarily used by Theater Commanders to conduct Anti-Submarine Warfare operations to deny the enemy the effective use of its submarines against the U.S. or allied assets.

~~(S)~~ In its area of responsibility, USEUCOM faces a Russian naval force that operates ballistic missile submarines capable of reaching targets in the United States, as well as attack submarines that can destroy surface, subsurface, and land targets. [redacted]

(U) Findings

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(U) Findings (cont'd)

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(U) Examples of sustainment problems within the P-8A *Poseidon* fleet included:

- (U) P-8A *Poseidon* squadron maintenance personnel experienced delays identifying and receiving P-8A *Poseidon* spare parts.
- (U) The Maritime Patrol Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA) Program Office and the Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support personnel did not provide maintenance personnel with detailed maintenance procedures and technical data for P-8A *Poseidon's* mission-specific systems and equipment.
- (U) P-8A *Poseidon* squadrons experienced consumable spare parts shortages, such as O rings, valve assemblies, bolts, and rivets, while deployed in the USEUCOM area of responsibility.

(U) The P-8A *Poseidon's* low mission capability rate occurred because the MPRA Program Office and Program Executive Office, Air Anti-Submarine Warfare, Assault and Special Mission Programs (PEO[A]) did not develop a supportable sustainment strategy for the P-8A *Poseidon* fleet. Also, the PEO(A) officials did not oversee the MPRA Program Office personnel's implementation of corrective actions to address sustainment challenges identified in P-8A independent logistics assessments, in accordance with Secretary of the Navy Instruction 4105.1B and Secretary of the Navy Instruction 4105.1C.

(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of the Readiness of the U.S. Navy's P-8A Poseidon Aircraft to Meet the U.S. European Command's Anti-Submarine Warfare Requirements

(U) Findings (cont'd)

(U) Furthermore, Navy officials did not require the MPRA Program Office to conduct the 5-year sustainment review in accordance with United States Code. Finally, MPRA Program Office and Naval Supply Systems Command personnel did not provide sufficient on-hand stocks of P-8A *Poseidon* consumable spare parts to meet the USEUCOM demand.

~~(S)~~ MPRA's implementation of an incomplete sustainment strategy and program along with a lack of oversight by the PEO(A) throughout the P-8A lifecycle led to sustainment problems that further contributed to the P-8A *Poseidon's* low mission capability rate. [redacted]

(U) Recommendations

(U) We recommend that the MPRA Program Manager, in coordination with the Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support, and the Naval Air Systems Command P-8A *Poseidon* Fleet Support Team Engineering and Logistics Leads, develop and implement a plan to address sustainment challenges of the P-8A *Poseidon* Fleet.

(U) Further, we recommend that the Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support coordinate with the MPRA Program Manager to develop and implement a demand forecast for P-8A *Poseidon* consumable spare parts in the USEUCOM area of responsibility.

(U) We recommend that the PEO(A):

(U) Recommendations (cont'd)

- (U) Develop and implement a plan of action and milestones to correct and monitor sustainment
- (U) deficiencies in the P-8A *Poseidon* program, in coordination with the MPRA Program Office.
- (U) Conduct a review of the MPRA Program Office's processes and procedures to determine whether critical sustainment analyses are conducted, and to improve internal controls of the P-8A *Poseidon* sustainment strategy.

(U) Finally, we recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Sustainment direct the MPRA Program Manager to conduct 5-year sustainment reviews in accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 2441 (2016) for P-8A *Poseidon* aircraft.

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) The MPRA Program Manager agreed to develop a plan to address the incomplete provisioning of P-8A *Poseidon* parts and the lack of P-8A *Poseidon* technical data. This recommendation is resolved but remains open.

(U) The NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support Commander addressed P-8A consumable parts at NAS Sigonella, therefore, we consider this recommendation closed.

(U) The PEO(A) agreed to develop plans of action and milestones to correct, monitor, and validate P-8A *Poseidon* sustainment deficiencies, and review processes for critical sustainment analyses and improving internal controls. This recommendation is resolved but remains open.

(U) The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Sustainment addressed our recommendation to conduct a P-8A *Poseidon* sustainment review. This recommendation is resolved but remains open.

(U) Recommendations Table

(U) Management	(U) Recommendations Resolved	(U) Recommendations Closed
(U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Sustainment	(U) 4	
(U) Program Executive Officer for Air Anti-Submarine Warfare, Assault and Special Mission Programs	(U) 3.a., 3.b., 3.c., 3.d.	
(U) Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support		(U) 2
(U) Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft Program Manager	(U) 1.a, 1.b.	

(U) NOTE: The following categories are used to describe agency management's comments to individual recommendations.

- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **(U) Closed** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.

INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

May 19, 2021

(U) MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

(U) SUBJECT: Evaluation of the Readiness of the U.S. Navy's P-8A *Poseidon* Aircraft to Meet the U.S. European Command's Anti-Submarine Warfare Requirements (Report No. D2021-083)

(U) We are providing this report for information and action, as appropriate. We conducted this evaluation from March 2020 through November 2020 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations," published in January 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

(U) We considered management comments to a draft of this report while preparing the final report. The MPRA Program Manager, the Program Executive Officer for Air Anti-Submarine Warfare, Assault and Special Mission Programs, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Sustainment have initiated or proposed actions that address the findings underlying Recommendations 1, 3, and 4 respectively. Therefore, Recommendations 1, 3, and 4 are resolved but remain open. These recommendations may be closed when we receive adequate documentation that actions to implement the recommendations are complete. Additionally, the NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support Commander addressed Recommendation 2 and we consider the recommendation closed.

(U) DoD Directive 7560.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, please provide us, within 90 days, your response concerning specific actions in progress or completed on the recommendations. Please send your response to either [redacted].

(U) We appreciate the cooperation we received during the evaluation. Please direct questions to [redacted]

Michael J. Roark
Deputy Inspector General for Evaluations

(U) Contents

(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether the readiness of the U.S. Navy's P-8A *Poseidon* fleet met the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) requirements of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM).

(U) Background

(U) The P-8A *Poseidon* is a multi-mission maritime aircraft. It is primarily used by Theater Commanders to conduct ASW operations to deny the enemy the effective use of its submarines against the U.S. and its allies. The Navy began developing and acquiring the P-8A *Poseidon* in April 2000 to replace its P-3C *Orion* fleet, which entered Navy service in 1962. In FY 2019, the estimated total acquisition cost for the Navy's P 8A *Poseidon* fleet was $35 billion, and the estimated total operation and sustainment cost for the Navy's P-8A *Poseidon* fleet was $55 billion.[1] As of December 2019, the Navy planned for at least 117 P-8A *Poseidon* aircraft.

(U) The P-8A *Poseidon* is a militarized variant of the Boeing 737 commercial aircraft, with system modifications to support the Navy maritime patrol mission requirements. The Navy developed the P-8A *Poseidon* to meet its need for rapid-response and long-range search capabilities. The Navy also needed an aircraft that could work independently or in conjunction with carrier strike groups and other joint and allied assets to ensure a maritime area free of surface and subsurface threats.[2] Table 1 demonstrates the P-8A *Poseidon's* capabilities compared to the P-3C *Orion*.

(U) Table 1. P-8A Poseidon Improved Capabilities

Capability	P-3C *ORION*	P-8A *POSEIDON*
Time On-Station	3 hours and 20 minutes	4 hours and 30 minutes
Transit Speed	300 Knots	420-440 Knots

[1] (U) DoD Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval System Selected Acquisition Report, "P-8A *Poseidon* Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft, as of FY 2020 President's Budget," December 2018. Costs are measured in then-year dollars, which includes the effects of price inflation/escalation.

[2] (U) A carrier strike group represents a collection of ships, aircraft, and support equipment designed to support U.S. global interests.

Capability	P-3C *ORION*	P-8A *POSEIDON*
Altitude Ceiling	28,300 feet	41,000 feet
Sonobuoy Load Monitor Capacity[3]	84 sonobuoy capacity 32 sonobuoy monitoring capacity	126 sonobuoy capacity 64 sonobuoy monitoring capacity
Sensor capability	Standard definition electro- optical and infrared sensors	High-definition electro-optical and infrared sensors
Command, Control, and Communication	Digital computer that supports tactical displays, ordnance, and flight information	Joint, allied, and interagency interoperability; simultaneous voice and data transmissions; Internet Protocol-based communications with secure e-mail and attachments

(U) Source: Commander Patrol and Reconnaissance Group

(U) The Navy plans to complete the transition from the P-3C *Orion* to the P-8A *Poseidon* in FY 2022. The Navy will use a mix of P-8A and P-3C aircraft until it completes its transition to the P-8A. As of October 13, 2020, the Navy's maritime patrol aircraft inventory included 9 P-3C *Orion* and 104 P 8A *Poseidon* aircraft assigned to Maritime Patrol Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA) patrol squadrons.

(U) USEUCOM Anti-Submarine Warfare Mission

(U) In its area of responsibility (AOR), USEUCOM faces the Russian Navy; specifically, the Russian Northern Fleet. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Northern Fleet is Russia's most capable naval force, and it operates technologically-advanced ballistic missile submarines that can reach targets in the United States.[4] The Northern Fleet also operates attack submarines that can destroy surface, subsurface, and land targets. The U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet Deputy Commander for Theater Undersea Warfare stated that the U.S. deploys a range of assets to conduct ASW in the North Atlantic, consisting of aircraft, surface ships, submarines, and integrated underwater surveillance systems. Additionally, he stated that, with its improved

[3] (U) A sonobuoy is a buoy equipped for detecting underwater sounds and transmitting them by radio.

[4] (U) Russia: Military Power - Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations," 2017, Defense Intelligence Agency.

(U) capabilities, the P-8A *Poseidon* is the Navy's primary air asset to effectively counter Russia's most technologically advanced submarines.

~~(S)~~ [redacted] The officer-in-charge of the Sigonella Aviation Support Division (ASD) stated that Naval Air Station (NAS) Sigonella is the primary deployment site for P-8A *Poseidon* aircraft in the USEUCOM AOR.

(U) To determine whether the readiness of the U.S. Navy's P-8A *Poseidon* fleet met USEUCOM's ASW requirements, we collected Navy mission capability data and feedback from the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM), Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support (NAVSUP WSS), and P-8A *Poseidon* wing and squadron personnel from the Navy's CPRG in the United States and USEUCOM area of operations. Specifically, we collected and reviewed the daily aircraft mission capability data of the entire P-8A *Poseidon* aircraft fleet. We also collected and reviewed the mission capability data for the deployed P-8A *Poseidon* aircraft in support of USEUCOM's daily ASW requirements over an 18-month period from October 2018 through March 2020.

(U) P-8A Poseidon Deployment Cycle to Support USEUCOM's Daily ASW Operations

~~(S)~~ [redacted] To support USEUCOM's daily ASW operations, the Navy deployed an average of seven P-8A *Poseidon* aircraft to NAS Sigonella, Italy, on 6-month rotations from October 2018 through March 2020.

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

[5] ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

[6] (U) CPRG is responsible for the training, readiness, and command, control, and coordination of 12 land-based, operational P-8A *Poseidon* patrol squadrons, in addition to reserve, special reconnaissance, fleet replacement, special projects, and unmanned aircraft squadrons and units.

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(U) The P-8A Poseidon Sustainment Plan Impacts to Operational Readiness

(U) In 2004, the Navy identified that the P-8A *Poseidon's* initial sustainment strategy would be through contracted logistics support (CLS). This meant that the P-8A *Poseidon* Prime Contractor would be responsible for maintenance and supply chain management. However, as the Fleet Support Team (FST) Leader stated, in 2008 the Navy subsequently determined that the CLS support strategy was not the most cost-effective approach for the P-8A *Poseidon* fleet's sustainment. The FST Leader stated that, beginning in 2008, the Navy changed its sustainment strategy so that the Navy would be primarily responsible for its own maintenance and supply chain management.

(U) The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Logistics & Materiel Readiness) approved the P-8A *Poseidon* Life-Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP) on November 20, 2013. The LCSP outlines the sustainment strategy, which serves as the basis for all sustainment efforts to achieve key performance metrics, such as operational availability. The P-8A *Poseidon's* current sustainment strategy encompasses maintenance and supply chain management that is primarily supported by a Navy workforce.

(U) The P-8A Poseidon Operational Availability Metric is Consistent with the Commander, Naval Air Forces Mission Capability Goals

(U) The Navy defined key sustainment requirements and metrics for the P-8A *Poseidon* as part of the capability development process, as documented in the LCSP. The P-8A *Poseidon* operational availability objective of 80 percent is consistent with the overall P-8A *Poseidon* mission capability goal of 80 percent defined by the Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF). According to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 3000.12a, operational availability is the Navy's primary measure of material readiness for weapon systems, and is defined as the probability that the

[7] (U) The Chief of Naval Operations is responsible for organizing, training, and maintaining the readiness of Navy forces for the performance of military missions as directed by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[8] (U) CTF-67 forces conduct ASW in support of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet, and commands all MPRA in the European and African theaters.

(U) system is capable of performing its specified function when randomly called at any point in time.[9]

(U) Similarly, Commander Naval Air Forces Instruction (COMNAVAIRFORINST) 4790.2 specifies the P-8A *Poseidon* overall mission capability goal of 80 percent. The Instruction also defines the deployed mission capable goal of 85 percent. Mission capable is defined as the material condition of an aircraft that can perform at least one, and potentially all, of its missions.

(U) In determining P-8A *Poseidon* mission capability, the Navy uses a Mission Essential Subsystem matrix that identifies the subsystems required for a specific mission in terms of Equipment Operational Capability codes. To qualify as fully mission capable for ASW operations, a P-8A *Poseidon* must meet the operational capability code requirements for each of the subsystems listed in Table 2. The P 8A Mission Essential Subsystem Matrix, approved by the Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific, in March 2019, defines the requirements for fully mission capable ASW subsystems. If any of the subsystems in Table 2 are inoperative, the P-8A *Poseidon* aircraft's capability to conduct ASW missions is degraded, and the aircraft is partially mission capable. Additionally, an aircraft with a "Z" code is not safely flyable, and is not mission capable for any missions.

(U) *Table 2. P-8A Poseidon Equipment Operational Capability Codes for ASW Missions*

P-8A *Poseidon* Subsystem	Equipment Operational Capability Code	Description
Weapon Mission Systems	D	The aircraft may not be capable of delivering weapons.
ASW Mission Systems	H	The aircraft is not fully capable of detecting (passive or active), identifying, and tracking surface or subsurface contacts.
Basic Tactical Mission Systems	J	The aircraft may not be capable of use of encrypted identification, friend or foe, operating displays, computer systems and recorders.
Mobility Mission Systems	K	The aircraft may not be capable of long-range, over-water navigation, and communication.

[9] (U) OPNAVINST 3000.12a, "Operational Availability of Equipments and Weapons Systems," September 2, 2003.

P-8A *Poseidon* Subsystem	Equipment Operational Capability Code	Description
Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) Flight Mission Systems	L	The aircraft is not capable of day or night instrument meteorological conditions field flight operations with necessary communication, identification friend or foe, navigation, flight and safety systems required by applicable Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization.[10]
Not Mission Capable	Z	The aircraft is not able to fly safely. The aircraft is not capable of day, field flight operations visual meteorological conditions with two-way radio communication necessary for an aircraft and crew safety provisions. Note: If an aircraft is assigned the Z code, the aircraft is not mission capable.

(U) Source: P-8A Mission Essential Subsystem Matrix and Patrol Squadron Readiness Standards

(U) The Navy Did Not Conduct Required Periodic Assessments of the P-8A Sustainment Strategy

(U) Various laws and regulations govern the requirement to conduct periodic assessments of weapon system sustainment strategies. For the P-8A *Poseidon*, the assessment and review requirements include sustainment reviews and Independent Logistics Assessments (ILAs), as well as updates to the LCSP.

(U) Section 2441, title 10, United States Code (10 U.S.C. § 2441 [2016]) requires sustainment reviews no later than 5 years after a weapon system achieves initial operational capability (IOC) to assess the product support strategy, performance, and operations and support costs. Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 4105.1D requires that after a system has achieved full-rate production, the nine elements of the sustainment review must be assessed as part of the ILA, and the status of the elements documented in the ILA report.[11] The P-8A *Poseidon* achieved IOC in December 2013. However, according to an official from the Office of the Deputy

[10] (U) The Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) program prescribes general flight and operating policies and procedures applicable to the operation of all naval aircraft and related activities.

[11] (U) SECNAVINST 4105.1D, "Independent Logistics Assessment and Certification Requirements," March 12, 2018. P-8A *Poseidon* achieved IOC in December 2013 and full-rate production in January 2014. 10 U.S.C. § 2441 sustainment review elements include analyses of short and long-term program costs, including maintenance and spare parts; an evaluation of weapon system reliabilities; and assessments of system manpower requirements and fuel efficiencies.

(U) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Product Support, as of September 2020, the MPRA program had not conducted a P-8A *Poseidon* sustainment review.

(U) In addition, DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02 (2013) and DoDI 5000.02T (2015) required components to conduct ILAs for each major weapon system to assess product support performance in satisfying warfighter needs.[12] According to these instructions, the results of ILAs will inform updates to the LCSP/Product Support Strategy. In addition to these ILA requirements, SECNAVINST 4105.1B (2008) and SECNAVINST 4105.1C (2012) state that the weapon system program manager must provide a plan of action and milestones (POA&M) schedule for ILA corrective actions, and document the ILA results and corrective actions to the ILA Team Leader.[13] The NAVAIRSYSCOM Commander conducted an ILA for P-8A *Poseidon* in 2010 and in 2013 prior to the acquisition milestones leading up to full-rate production and IOC of the P-8A *Poseidon*. However, the MPRA Product Support Management Team stated that the MPRA Program Office did not document the correction of the deficiencies through POA&Ms.

(U) Furthermore, DODI 5000.02T (2015) states that, after achieving initial operational capability, a program office should update its LCSP whenever there are major changes to its strategy for sustaining the weapon system, or every 5 years, whichever occurs first.[14] As of January 2021, the MPRA Product Support Management team had not updated the LCSP, which DoDI 5000.02T required in December 2018.

(U) Roles and Responsibilities of Key Stakeholders in P-8A Poseidon Sustainment

(U) The P-8A *Poseidon* sustainment process describes actions and responsibilities for planning, budgeting, and executing the sustainment for P-8A *Poseidon* aircraft. According to CPRG, the MPRA Program Office, and NAVSUP WSS officials, the process includes determining maintenance priorities to support P-8A *Poseidon* missions, determining the allowances for spare parts and forecasting demand for parts, and developing and executing the LCSP for the P-8A *Poseidon* aircraft. Several key stakeholders have roles and responsibilities in P-8A *Poseidon* sustainment.

[12] (U) DoDI 5000.02 (Interim)"Operation of the Defense Acquisition System," November 2013. DoDI 5000.02 was replaced by DoDI 5000.02T in January, 2015; Change 7 to DoDI 5000.02T, April 21, 2020, still included this ILA requirement.

[13] (U) SECNAVINST 4105.1B, "Independent Logistics Assessments and Certifications Requirements," December 18, 2008, and SECNAVINST 4105.1C, November 9, 2012, were updated by SECNAVINST 4105.1D, March 12, 2018, which also includes the ILA and POA&M requirements.

[14] (U) DoDI 5000.02T, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System," January 7, 2015, incorporating change 7, April 21, 2020.

(U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Sustainment

(U) The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Sustainment (DASN-S) is responsible for the Navy-wide planning, budgeting, and execution of sustainment and supply chain activities. Additionally, according to an Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition realignment memorandum, September 2019, the Navy created the DASN-S to bring together both the logistics functions and supply chain management within a single office. According to an official of the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Product Support, as of September 2020, the DASN-S was in the process of implementing a Sustainment Program Baseline pilot program to better manage the sustainment programs for major weapons systems, including the P 8A *Poseidon*.

(U) Program Executive Office for Air Anti-Submarine Warfare, Assault and Special Mission Programs

(U) The Program Executive Office, Air ASW, Assault and Special Mission Programs (PEO[A]) provides fleet capability and capacity supporting development and sustainment of Navy and Marine Corps helicopters, special mission aircraft, and aviation ASW equipment and aircraft. According to the Assistant PEO(A) for Sustainment, the PEO(A) conducts reviews of the metrics provided by the MPRA Program Office for the P-8A *Poseidon*. The PEO(A) is also responsible for monitoring subordinate program offices in meeting their performance benchmarks, in addition to identifying and allocating their funding needs.

(U) Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft Program Office

(U) The MPRA Program Office manages the acquisition, development, support, and delivery of the P-8A *Poseidon*. The MPRA Program Manager stated that he coordinates with sustainment support inside and outside NAVAIRSYSCOM, and has overall responsibility for the P-8A *Poseidon* aircraft's LCSP. The Program Manager also stated that the MPRA Program Office is responsible for coordinating with all entities to meet the P-8A *Poseidon* fleet operational readiness requirement.

(U) Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support

(U) The NAVSUP WSS provides Navy program and supply support for the P-8A *Poseidon*. According to the Deputy Director, NAVSUP WSS Integrated Weapons Support Team, NAVSUP WSS executes provisioning responsibilities for the P-8A *Poseidon*, including entering spare parts information, such as parts numbers and stockage quantities, into the supply system. The NAVSUP WSS is also responsible for conducting demand-based parts forecasts and coordinating with the Program Office to help set the parts allowance levels for repairable and consumable parts for the P-8A *Poseidon*.

(U) Defense Logistics Agency

(U) A Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Aviation Officer stated that the DLA supports the MPRA Program Office by fulfilling requests for P-8A *Poseidon* consumable parts in support of the overall Navy sustainment plan. The officer-in-charge of Sigonella ASD stated that at NAS Sigonella, the DLA Distribution warehouse was in charge of managing P-8A *Poseidon* consumable parts.

(U) Commander, Naval Air Forces

(U) CNAF is the aviation Type Commander for Navy aviation units. Type commands manage resources and procedures for a "type" of weapon system within a fleet organization. CNAF is responsible for supervising the manning, training, and equipping of Naval Aviation forces to improve mission capability and support military operations. According to the CPRG Maintenance Officer, the P-8A *Poseidon* wings and squadrons are subordinate to CNAF.

(U) Commander, Patrol Reconnaissance Group

(U) CPRG is responsible for training, readiness, command, control, and coordination of the P-8A *Poseidon*. According to the CPRG Maintenance Officer, CPRG also manages the maintenance for the P-8A *Poseidon*. Maintenance management includes determining the priority for high-demand parts through guidance provided to its subordinate wings and squadrons. CPRG supports combatant commanders by providing combat-ready Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Forces. According to the CPRG Training Officer, these forces are forward-deployable; interoperable; and trained, manned, and equipped to command and control assigned forces in support of combatant commanders' operational plans. CPRG oversees 2 P-8A *Poseidon* wings of 12 active duty squadrons that are comprised of officer and enlisted air crew and support personnel.

(U) Commander, Task Force-67

(U) CTF-67, located in NAS Sigonella, Italy, is responsible for providing responsive, interoperable, and expeditionary combat-ready maritime patrol aircraft and supporting forces to the U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Unified Commanders.

(U) P-8A Poseidon Fleet Support Team

(U) According to P-8A *Poseidon* FST Engineering and Logistics leaders, the FST is responsible for providing responsive support to fleet and maintenance organizations when engineering and logistics technical support issues are encountered. The FST Lead stated that the FST is responsible for publishing and updating the Interactive Electronic

(U) Technical Manual used by the P-8A *Poseidon* fleet maintenance and logistics personnel to maintain the P-8A *Poseidon* aircraft.

(U) Finding

~~(CUI)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(U) Examples of sustainment problems within the P-8A *Poseidon* fleet included:

- (U) P-8A *Poseidon* squadron maintenance personnel experienced delays in identifying, ordering, and receiving P-8A *Poseidon* spare parts.
- (U) The MPRA Program Office and the NAVSUP WSS personnel did not provide maintenance personnel with detailed maintenance procedures and technical data for properly maintaining the P-8A *Poseidon*'s mission-specific systems and equipment.
- (U) P-8A *Poseidon* squadrons experienced consumable spare parts shortages, such as O-rings, valve assemblies, bolts, and rivets, while deployed in the USEUCOM AOR.

(U) The P-8A *Poseidon's* low mission capability rate occurred because the MPRA Program Office and PEO(A) did not develop a supportable sustainment strategy for the P-8A *Poseidon* fleet. Specifically, there is no evidence that the MPRA Program Office personnel conducted an analysis of materiel support alternatives in support of the

15 ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(U) original CLS sustainment strategy.[16] The Navy changed from CLS to Navy logistics support in 2008. After the Navy's decision to change its sustainment strategy, PEO(A) officials did not oversee the MPRA personnel's implementation of corrective actions to address P-8A *Poseidon* sustainment challenges identified in P-8A independent logistics assessments, in accordance with SECNAVINST 4105.1B and SECNAVINST 4105.1C.[17]

(U) Furthermore, Navy officials with responsibilities for sustainment reviews did not require the MPRA Program Office to conduct the 5-year sustainment review in 2018 to assess the P-8A *Poseidon* product support strategy, performance, and operations and support costs, in accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 2441 (2016).[18] Finally, the MPRA Program Office and NAVSUP WSS personnel did not provide sufficient on-hand stocks of P-8A *Poseidon* consumable spare parts to meet the USEUCOM demand.

~~(S)~~ MPRA's implementation of an incomplete sustainment strategy and program along with a lack of oversight by the PEO(A) throughout the P-8A lifecycle led to sustainment problems that further contributed to the P-8A *Poseidon*'s low mission capability rate.

[redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

[16] (U) DoD 4140.1-R, "DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation," May 2003, required program managers to develop a sustainment strategy based on results from analysis of materiel support alternatives. The Navy awarded the P-8A *Poseidon* System Development and Demonstration contract to The Boeing Company in June 2004.

[17] (U) This report cites three regulations that were updated over the P-8A *Poseidon's* lifecycle: DoD 4140.1-R. (1998) was updated in 2003 and 2014, SECNAVINST 4105.1B (2008) was updated in 2012 and 2018, and DoDI 5000.2T (2015) was under revision in 2020.

[18] (U) 10 U.S.C § 2441 (2016) requires the Secretary of each Military Department to conduct the review and make the results available to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment within 30 days after completion.

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[19] (U) Between April and September 2020, the P-8A *Poseidon* fleet gained five new aircraft. With the new total number of P-8A *Poseidon* aircraft at 104 as of September 2020, the average number of aircraft for the 3rd quarter of 2020 was 103, and the average mission capable rate was 75 percent, or 77 aircraft. In December 2019, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition projected the total inventory of P-8A *Poseidon* aircraft at 119, and stated there was limited time for increased P-8A procurement after FY 2021.

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(U) We determined that based on historical mission capability rates for ASW, the Navy may not be able to fully support future USEUCOM daily and contingency ASW requirements. Specifically, COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2C defines an 85 percent mission capable rate goal for deployed aircraft. This instruction defines mission capable as the material condition of an aircraft that can perform at least one, and potentially all, of its missions. For a deployed P-8A *Poseidon* squadron of seven aircraft, an 85 percent mission capability rate equates to six mission capable aircraft.

(U) Although the daily mission capability rates of the P-8A *Poseidon* aircraft deployed to USEUCOM met the 85 percent overall requirement, we found that the mission capability rates for the P-8A *Poseidon* to conduct its ASW mission while deployed to USEUCOM remained below 85 percent. During the period from October 2018 through March 2020, the P-8A aircraft averaged 60 percent mission capable for the ASW mission while deployed to USEUCOM.

(U) We reviewed the daily mission system capability statuses of the five systems that the Navy identifies as essential to conduct ASW-related missions. According to the P-8A *Poseidon* Mission Essential Subsystem Matrix, an aircraft is degraded for ASW missions if Navy maintainers annotated any of the five subsystems related to ASW capability as inoperative: (1) weapon delivery, (2) tactical aircraft and mission capability, (3) capability for long-range flights over water, (4) flying by instruments in low visibility, or (5) the ability to detect, identify, and track subsurface targets.

(U) We found that for over 90 percent of the time from October 2018 through March 2020, at least one of the deployed aircraft had one or more of the five subsystems described above identified as inoperative. Table 4 illustrates, by quarter, the number of P-8A *Poseidon* aircraft at NAS Sigonella and available for ASW, along with the corresponding mission capability rates. The mission capability rates and numbers of aircraft available were calculated based on the number of P-8A *Poseidon* aircraft deployed to USEUCOM.

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(U) Sustainment Problems Delayed P-8A *Poseidon* Maintenance and Affected Mission Capability Rate

(U) MPRA's incomplete sustainment strategy and program, along with a lack of oversight by the PEO(A) throughout the P-8A *Poseidon* lifecycle led to sustainment problems that further contributed to the P-8A *Poseidon*'s low mission capability rate. P-8A *Poseidon* sustainment problems included incomplete parts lists, technical data shortfalls, and lack of consumable spare parts for deployed squadrons. Specifically, the Navy lacked a complete list of P-8A *Poseidon* components and parts. The P-8A's maintenance manuals lacked technical data, such as maintenance procedures, diagrams, drawings, part numbers, and part descriptions, which contributed to maintenance delays and low mission capability rates. Finally, the lack of consumable spare parts at NAS Sigonella affected the mission capability of squadrons deployed to the USEUCOM area of operations.

(U) The Navy's Incomplete List of P-8A Poseidon Spare Parts Led to Maintenance Delays

(U) The P-8A *Poseidon* squadron maintenance personnel experienced delays in identifying, ordering, and receiving P-8A *Poseidon* spare parts from October 2018 through March 2020. Maintenance personnel described the parts process as "lengthy" and "time-consuming." Specifically, according to FST leaders, the MPRA Program Office and NAVSUP WSS personnel responsible for provisioning did not provide the complete list of P-8A *Poseidon* spare parts in support of the P-8A *Poseidon* fleet to establish the

(U) parts and their sources in the supply system. According to the ASD Sigonella officer in charge, without this data, it could take up to a year to order and receive the parts.

(U) OPNAVINST 4441.12D states that the Navy's goal for logistics response time, or the time to receive parts from an off-station source, is 23 days.[20] Moreover, DoD Materiel Management Regulations in effect at the start of the P-8A *Poseidon* program stated that DoD components shall ensure that provisioning goals and objectives consistent with system readiness goals are included in the product support strategy, beginning in the concept development phase.[21] However, we conducted 23 interviews with 14 P-8A *Poseidon* affiliated units and organizations across the fleet, and 21 personnel brought up ongoing challenges with lack of spare parts. Additionally, 7 of 23 personnel we interviewed mentioned problems with maintenance delays due to lack of spare parts.

(U) The MPRA Program Office and NAVSUP WSS personnel stated that the Navy did not receive all the Boeing 737 aircraft provisioning data from Boeing. Specifically, according to the Deputy Director, NAVSUP WSS Integrated Weapons Support Team, the MPRA Program Office and NAVSUP WSS did not receive a complete Bill of Materials that identified the list of sub-components and parts, nor the quantities of each, to maintain the P-8A *Poseidon* fleet.

(U) According to the FST leaders, the Navy did not attempt to buy technical data rights to identify maintenance procedures and parts while under the CLS arrangement with Boeing. After the Navy transitioned from CLS to Navy maintenance and supply, the Navy and Boeing signed a memorandum of agreement that gave FST personnel access to restricted technical data through Boeing representatives. This agreement allowed the FST to obtain proprietary technical data from Boeing representatives, and then provide this information to the P-8A *Poseidon* maintenance and supply personnel.

(U) NAVSUP WSS personnel stated that they made significant progress in provisioning, in that NAVSUP WSS identified a partial list of approximately 880 parts that were not on the Bill of Materials. However, NAVAIRSYSCOM's FST personnel stated that they did not know how many more parts remained unidentified. FST personnel stated that there had been no effort to determine the complete list of P-8A *Poseidon* components and parts. Instead, the FST works to identify missing parts when the fleet submits problems or requests assistance with parts. FST logs showed 2,660 requests for assistance

[20] (U) OPNAVINST 4441.12D, "Retail Supply Support of Naval Activities and Operating Forces," April 12, 2012.

[21] (U) DoD 4140.1-R, "DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation," May 2003. This regulation was reissued in February 2014 as DoD Manual 4140.01, Volume 3, "DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Procedures: Materiel Sourcing," which continued to emphasize inclusion of provisioning goals in the product support strategy, beginning in the materiel solution analysis phase.

(U) related to P-8A maintenance processes, and 2,258 requests for assistance related to parts between October 2018 and July 2020.

(U) According to the P-8A *Poseidon* FST Lead, the process to acquire parts can take 12 months or more, which negatively affects the Navy's ability to bring aircraft to mission capable status. DoD Materiel Management Regulations and Manuals state that the objective of provisioning technical data management is timely access to all data required to identify and acquire initial support items. However, the MPRA Product Support Manager stated that if a part has not been provisioned and stocked in the supply system, turnaround time to receive the part can be significant.[22] For example, the parts listed in Table 5 were neither provisioned nor listed in the P-8A parts manual, and one of the parts had to be manufactured. According to MPRA Program Office and FST personnel, parts are identified after maintenance problems or questions arise from fleet operators. When operators identify a problem that is related to a part that was not previously identified by FST or NAVSUP WSS, FST personnel must conduct research on the part and work with NAVSUP WSS to identify the source for the parts. The FST must also conduct this research when the parts are not included in the parts list provided by Boeing.

(U) We found that this reactive approach to provisioning contributed to delays in bringing aircraft to mission capable status. We reviewed the P-8A *Poseidon* squadron maintenance reports from October 2018 through March 2020 for a sample of aircraft belonging to squadrons that deployed to Sigonella between 2018 and 2020. The maintenance reports showed that during the 18-month period the average number of non mission capable days due to awaiting parts was 59.

(U) During the period from October 2018 through July 2020, FST records identified approximately 449 individual requests for assistance with identifying, ordering, and receiving P-8A *Poseidon* parts. The average number of days for the FST to complete the assistance actions requested for the 449 parts was 12 days. Additionally, we identified examples of parts that were not previously provisioned and the length of time to acquire the parts, which is included in Table 5.

[22] (U) "Defense Acquisition University's Product Support Manager Guidebook," December 2019, states that the product support manager is responsible for developing and implementing a comprehensive support strategy, and for adjusting performance requirements and resource allocations across the life cycle of the weapon system.

(U) Table 5. Examples of P-8A Poseidon Requests for Logistics Technical Assistance for Missing, Incorrect, or Unclear Provisioning Data

Aircraft Identification Number	Maintenance Problem and Related Part	Date Identified	Date Received/Expected Receipt Date	Total No. of Days to Acquire the Spare Part
168852	Damaged Thrust Reverser	March 6, 2019	December 30, 2019	299
168758	Replacement of a video control display	April 3, 2019	March 2, 2020	334

(U) Source: DoD OIG Analysis of P-8A Maintenance and Supply Readiness Reports

(U) According to P-8A squadron maintenance officers, if the parts were not readily available in the Federal supply system, such as the examples provided above, then the P-8A *Poseidon* squadrons would cannibalize these parts from other P-8A *Poseidon* aircraft.[23] To reduce the long lead time, MPRA Program Office, FST, and NAVSUP WSS personnel stated that they instituted processes to obtain parts at a faster rate, such as establishing an Aircraft on Ground contract and utilizing the government purchase card, when appropriate.[24] However, the MPRA Product Support Manager stated that parts availability will continue to be a challenge, particularly in situations when a production process for the required part is not readily available.

(U) The Navy Lacked Comprehensive Technical Manuals to Maintain the P-8A Poseidon

(U) The MPRA Program Office and the NAVSUP WSS personnel did not provide maintenance personnel at P-8A squadrons with detailed maintenance procedures and technical data for properly maintaining the P-8A *Poseidon*'s mission-specific systems and equipment.[25] According to COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2C, technical data, such as maintenance procedures, diagrams, drawings, part numbers, and part descriptions, are required to guide personnel in the performance of maintenance support tasks.

[23] (U) COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2C, January 2017, defines cannibalization as "the removal of serviceable material, parts, or components from one aircraft or equipment for installation into another aircraft or equipment to restore the latter to a serviceable condition."

[24] (U) The Product Support Manager stated that NAVSUP WSS has an "Aircraft on Ground" contract in place with Boeing to procure readily available commercial parts that will render a not mission capable P-8A *Poseidon* ready to fly. The part cannot be placed in inventory for future use.

[25] (U) Title 22 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Section 120.10 states that technical data includes information that is required for assembly, operation, repair, testing, and maintenance of defense articles, and is in the form of blueprints, drawings, photographs, plans, instructions, or documentation.

(U) Despite the COMNAVAIRFORINST requirement for technical data, 20 of the wing and squadron personnel we interviewed, including Maintenance Officers, Maintenance Master Chief Petty Officers, and Maintenance Material Control Officers, stated that there is a lack of P-8A *Poseidon* technical information. These materials included missing blueprints and drawings, maintenance procedures, and parts data necessary for repairs. Additionally, 10 of the 20 interviewees identified P-8A *Poseidon* maintenance delays due to missing or incorrect technical data.

(U) Several wing and squadron maintenance personnel stated that they rely on FST engineer personnel for assistance when they encounter missing technical data or unclear guidance related to P-8A *Poseidon* maintenance procedures. FST personnel confirmed the challenges with P-8A *Poseidon* technical data. The FST personnel stated that the Navy's access to high-level technical data from Boeing, required for resolving maintenance questions, was limited. FST personnel stated that when FST engineers could not resolve questions from wing and squadron personnel, for example, due to the lack of full access to Boeing intellectual property, FST personnel reached out to Boeing for the necessary guidance and resolution. An FST official stated that, although this practice of FST personnel coordinating with Boeing worked, it was time-consuming and repetitive.

(U) The P-8A *Poseidon* FST Lead stated that the FST maintained a tracking system on requests it received from the fleet for assistance with technical engineering instructions. The tracking system showed the FST received 2,660 requests from the P-8A *Poseidon* fleet maintainers from October 2018 through July 2020. Requests for technical engineering assistance included requests for maintenance procedures, instructions, drawings, and diagrams, and clarification of information in publications and manuals, including missing information in the P-8A *Poseidon* interactive electronic technical manuals.

(U) We reviewed the P-8A *Poseidon* squadron maintenance reports from October 2018 through March 2020 for a sample of aircraft belonging to squadrons that deployed to Sigonella between 2018 and 2020. The reports showed that the average non mission capable days for maintenance for the 18-month period was 64 days per aircraft due to awaiting maintenance. A lack of technical data contributed to delays in the squadrons' ability to complete P-8A *Poseidon* maintenance.

(U) P-8A Poseidon Squadrons Identified Consumable Spare Parts Problems While Deployed in the USEUCOM Area of Responsibility

(U) P-8A *Poseidon* squadrons experienced consumable spare parts shortages while deployed in the USEUCOM AOR. The ASD Acting Deputy listed the top-20 consumable

(U) items with the greatest demand over an 18-month period ending in September 2020, and found that only three of these consumable items were carried on site at NAS Sigonella. Table 6 identifies the top 20 consumable items.[26]

(U) Table 6. Demand for Top 20 High-Priority P-8A Poseidon Consumable Items at NAS Sigonella over 18-month period ending in September 2020

Top 20 Consumable Parts	National Item Identification Number	Demands Over 18 Months	Quantity of Consumable Parts On-Hand at DLA Distribution Sigonella
O-Ring	000862459	7	0
O-Ring	002519378	8	0
Packing, Pref, O-Ring	002913310	5	0
O-Ring	004317276	4	0
O-Ring	005993071	5	0
O-Ring	009424442	7	0
Packing Material	010961282	5	0
Screw, Close Tolerance	012385834	15	0
Nut, Self-Locking, Plate	012535926	10	0
O-Ring	013108372	5	0
O-Ring	013872248	9	33
Battery Pack	014938794	8	101
Rivet, Solid	016141088	10	0
Chiller Filter	016219094	6	8
Away Sensor, Emi	016225776	5	0

[26] (U) The ASD coordinates all material requirements for supported activities at a supported site. The NAS Sigonella ASD supports the units at NAS Sigonella, including CTF-67 and the deployed P-8A *Poseidon* squadron.

Top 20 Consumable Parts	National Item Identification Number	Demands Over 18 Months	Quantity of Consumable Parts On-Hand at DLA Distribution Sigonella
Coupling, Tube	016245039	6	0
O-Ring	016248803	9	0
O-Ring	016325613	6	0
Bolt, Close Tolerance	016465260	10	0
Valve Assembly Special	016585068	20	0

(U) Source: NAS Sigonella ASD

(U) The lack of consumable parts negatively affected P-8A *Poseidon* mission capability. The ASD Acting Deputy Director stated that when a consumable part is not stocked at the DLA Distribution Sigonella warehouse, the part must be ordered through NAVSUP WSS, and NAVSUP WSS places an order for the part through DLA. A Maintenance Master Chief Petty Officer deployed to NAS Sigonella stated that it takes several weeks to receive ordinary and inexpensive consumable parts through this process.

(U) In October 2020, in an effort to address the consumables problems at NAS Sigonella, NAVSUP WSS personnel developed a list of 154 recommendations for consumable parts they considered critical for support to NAS Sigonella. However, according to a NAVSUP WSS Deputy Director, as of October 2020, the Navy had not approved funding for the parts. Additionally, the ASD developed a list of 365 consumable parts that had five or more demands at NAS Sigonella over a 30-month period between 2018 and 2020. The ASD Acting Deputy Director stated that, as of January 2020, none of the 365 parts were in stock at the DLA Distribution Sigonella warehouse. Additionally, of the NAVSUP WSS list of 154 consumable parts, only 44 matched the ASD's demand-based consumable parts list, while only 7 items on the NAVSUP WSS consumable parts list matched the ASD's top 20 consumable items, which means that no more than one third of the parts the ASD had identified as high-demand parts were on the parts list that NAVSUP WSS developed for NAS Sigonella.

(U) MPRA Program Office and PEO(A) Did Not Develop a Supportable P-8A *Poseidon* Sustainment Strategy

(U) The P-8A *Poseidon's* low mission capability rates occurred because the MPRA Program Office and PEO(A) did not develop a supportable sustainment strategy for the

(U) P-8A *Poseidon* fleet. A sustainment strategy should include an analysis of material support alternatives to develop weapons systems, and should consider commercial and organic sources of materiel support at program initiation, in accordance with DoD 4140.1-R (2003). However, there is no evidence that this analysis occurred. Furthermore, there is no evidence that beginning at program initiation, program managers were involved in provisioning spare parts, determining technical and logistics data, and documenting the material support process to make it accessible to commercial and Navy materiel managers responsible for provisioning and follow-on support, as required by DoD 4140.1-R.

(U) Additionally, the PEO(A) did not oversee the development of the P-8A *Poseidon* sustainment strategy. A Product Support Management Team member stated that no POA&Ms were created for the deficiencies identified in the two P-8A *Poseidon* ILAs. The PEO(A) did not ensure the MPRA Program Office personnel established POA&Ms to address identified sustainment challenges, in accordance with SECNAVINST 4105.1B and 4105.1C.[27] Furthermore, the DASN-S did not require that the MPRA Program Office conduct the 5-year sustainment review of the P-8A *Poseidon* Program required in 10 U.S.C § 2441 (2016), to assess the P-8A *Poseidon* product support strategy, performance, and operations and support costs.[28] Finally, although the MPRA Program Office acknowledged its responsibility to coordinate P-8A repairable and consumable parts, a NAVSUP WSS Deputy Director stated he was not aware of previous coordination between the Navy's MPRA Program Office and NAVSUP WSS to establish a P-8A consumable parts process in Sigonella. However, he stated that as of October 2020, efforts were underway at NAVSUP WSS to establish on-hand stocks of critical P-8A consumable items in Sigonella.

(U) MPRA Program Office Personnel Did Not Provide Evidence Supporting the Original P-8A Poseidon Sustainment Strategy Decision of Contracted Logistics Support

(U) The MPRA Program Office did not provide evidence showing that the MPRA Program Office personnel conducted an analysis of materiel support alternatives to the original sustainment strategy of CLS during the early portion of the acquisition phase of the P-8A *Poseidon* from 2000 to 2004. However, DoD 4140.1-R required program managers to develop a sustainment strategy based on results from analysis of materiel support alternatives.[29] Also, DoD 4140.1-R required materiel managers to document and maintain records of end-item supply support, beginning with provisioning planning

[27] (U) SECNAVINST 4105.1B, "Independent Logistics Assessment and Certification Requirements," December 18, 2008, was in effect during the 2010 ILA, and SECNAVINST 4105.1C (2012) was in effect during the 2013 ILA.

[28] (U) 10 U.S.C. § 2441 (2016) directs the Secretary of each military department to conduct the review, and make it available to the Assistant Secretary of Defense Acquisition & Sustainment no later than 30 days after completion.

[29] (U) DoD 4140.1-R, "DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation," May 23, 2003.

(U) at program initiation, to aid in further supportability analysis and follow-on support. When asked about the justification and assumptions used to establish the CLS strategy, the MPRA Program Office personnel could not provide the specific justification or assumptions, and stated that personnel involved in the original sustainment strategy formulation no longer worked at the MPRA Program Office.

(U) In 2008, the Navy changed its sustainment strategy for P-8A aircraft from CLS to Navy logistics support because the revised contract cost that Boeing provided to the MPRA Program Office showed a significant increase in sustainment costs. The Navy shifted to an in-house maintenance workforce, after conducting a formal manpower business case analysis in 2008, which determined that CLS was the most expensive and highest manpower risk alternative, with the potential for significant cost growth. In addition, a comprehensive business case analysis published in 2014 stated that Government-managed supply chain, maintenance, and technical data were preferable in terms of cost, risk, and benefits, and only recommended contracted maintenance for depot-level repair of P-8A *Poseidon* airframes and engines.

(U) The Navy's business case analysis for the transition from CLS sustainment assumed that access to proprietary technical data would be limited, but Boeing representatives would support the FST. However, the MPRA Program Office and FST personnel stated that the 2008 change in sustainment strategy created challenges for the Navy, such as sustaining the P-8A *Poseidon* with limited access to the contractor technical data necessary to identify maintenance procedures and parts lists for the P-8A *Poseidon* aircraft. The FST Lead stated that under CLS, the Navy was not required to consider acquiring technical data rights from Boeing. He stated that after the change in strategy, the Navy found that the technical data rights it needed to provision parts and conduct maintenance were not readily accessible. Without adequate documentation to support the original sustainment strategy, the Navy may not be able to effectively identify the root cause of its sustainment strategy problems, and improve its sustainment planning efforts in the future.

(U) PEO(A) Did Not Oversee the MPRA Program Office Establishment of Plan of Action and Milestones Schedules to Address P-8A Poseidon Sustainment Challenges Associated with the Change in Sustainment Strategy

(U) PEO(A) officials did not oversee the MPRA Program Office personnel's implementation of corrective actions to address P-8A *Poseidon* sustainment challenges, as reported in the 2010 and 2013 ILAs. Secretary of the Navy Instructions in effect during the 2010 and 2013 ILAs stated that Program Executive Offices shall ensure that program managers provide POA&Ms to address ILA corrective actions.[30] Moreover,

[30] (U) SECNAVINST 4105.1B, "Independent Logistics Assessment and Certification Requirements," December 18, 2008, and

(U) program managers must submit the corrective actions to the assigned ILA team leader for closure. However, an MPRA Program Office representative stated that the MPRA Program Office did not use the ILA POA&Ms to track its progress in addressing sustainment challenges.

(U) Furthermore, the former MPRA Product Support Manager stated that even though the MPRA Program Office did not report the status of ILA corrective actions through the formal ILA POA&M process, the MPRA Program Office did internally track, manage, and mitigate the challenges the ILAs identified. However, we found that between the 2010 and the 2013 ILA reports, the number of deficiencies, including failing deficiencies, increased in the 2013 ILA report. Many of the deficient 2010 ILA assessment areas were still deficient in 2013. Furthermore, the 2013 ILA report assessed declining results for several areas, such as technical data availability, and system reliability, availability, and maintainability. The 2013 ILA report found that the MPRA Program Office had not ensured that missing and incomplete technical data documents were developed, fully available, and adequately addressed the needs of the P-8A program.

(U) Multiple P-8A *Poseidon* stakeholders later reported the same deficiencies the Navy identified in the 2010 and 2013 ILA reports. For example, Commander Operational Test and Evaluation Force personnel found incorrectly provisioned P-8A parts in the supply system during its 2018 evaluation of the P-8A *Poseidon*. In addition, the wing and squadron personnel reported challenges with procuring spare parts and lack of maintenance technical data during our interviews in July 2020.

(U) The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Sustainment Did Not Require the Statutory Sustainment Reviews of the P-8A Poseidon Program

(U) The DASN-S did not require the MPRA Program Office to conduct a 5-year sustainment review of the P-8A *Poseidon* program in 2018 to assess the P-8A *Poseidon*'s product support strategy performance, and operations and support costs.[31] According to 10 U.S.C § 2441 (2016), a sustainment review was required no later than 5 years after the P-8A *Poseidon* achieved initial operational capability in 2013. Further, 10 U.S.C. § 2441 (2016) requires Service components to report sustainment reviews to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment.

(U) However, an official in the Office of the DASN-S, formerly from the MPRA Program Office, stated that the MPRA Program Office delayed conducting the ILA and

(U) SECNAVINST 4105.1C, November 9, 2012.

[31] (U) SECNAVINST 4105.1D instructs the Navy to perform the nine elements of the 10 U.S.C § 2441 (2016) sustainment review in conjunction with the post-Full-Rate Production ILA, but this ILA was not performed.

(U) sustainment review in 2018. The delay was because the Navy was implementing the Sustainment Program Baseline, which is a separate program designed to govern the overall sustainment support of Navy weapon systems. In our review of the Sustainment Program Baseline Playbook, we found requirements similar to those specified in 10 U.S.C § 2441 (2016) on sustainment reviews, such as intent to focus on support cost estimates and on reliability requirements. However, we did not find requirements in the Sustainment Program Baseline Playbook for the Navy to report its results to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, as required by 10 U.S.C § 2441 (2016). Thus, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment might not be fully informed of P-8A *Poseidon* sustainment challenges.

(U) In addition, before the DoD published DoDI 5000.85 on August 6, 2020, the DoD Instruction lacked guidance on implementing the requirements in 10 U.S.C § 2441 (2016) for conducting sustainment reviews.[32] DoDI 5000.85 now directs Service components to conduct a sustainment review of each major weapon system no later than 5 years after IOC.

(U) MPRA Program Office and Naval Supply Systems Command Personnel Did Not Provide Sufficient Consumable Spare Parts to Meet the USEUCOM Demand

(U) The lack of available consumable parts at NAS Sigonella occurred because the MPRA Program Office and NAVSUP WSS personnel did not provide sufficient on-hand stocks of P-8A *Poseidon* consumable spare parts to meet the USEUCOM demand in support of USEUCOM ASW operations. DoD 4140.1-R stated that Service components are required to conduct demand and supply planning, including identifying requirements, computing inventory levels, and forecasting demand.[33] A NAVSUP WSS Director stated that at P-8A *Poseidon* site activation in Sigonella, NAVSUP WSS should have coordinated repairable and consumable parts requirements and inventory levels with the MPRA Program Office and the aircraft manufacturer, as well as Navy N4 (Logistics), Commander, Naval Air Force Pacific, and CPRG. However, the ASD Acting Deputy, present at the Sigonella site activation, stated that the stakeholders at activation did not discuss consumable parts for ASD and CTF-67 support for the P-8A *Poseidon*. Further, a NAVSUP WSS Team Lead stated that NAVSUP WSS personnel did not forecast demand for consumable spare parts in NAS Sigonella.

(U) According to a NAS Sigonella supply representative, NAVSUP WSS did not develop the initial consumable spare parts allowance because of challenges that were unique to NAS Sigonella. NAS Sigonella relied on the DLA Distribution Sigonella warehouse to manage and store consumable stock levels. Additionally, a NAVSUP WSS Deputy

[32] (U) DoDI 5000.85, "Major Capability Acquisition," August 6, 2020.

[33] (U) DoD 4140.1-R, "DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Policy," May 23, 2003.

(U) Director stated that NAVSUP WSS experienced supply system connectivity problems with the DLA warehouse. Moreover, she stated that NAVSUP WSS found that naval aviation command policy prevented the Navy from transferring Navy aviation consumable parts, purchased with aviation procurement funds, to the DLA Distribution Sigonella warehouse. The NAS Sigonella supply representative stated that NAVSUP WSS personnel could not resolve the connectivity and funding problems that prevented the consumable items from being carried at NAS Sigonella. When asked about the efforts to resolve the Sigonella consumable parts problems, NAVSUP WSS personnel stated they were working on the funding and information technology challenges, and were developing a list of consumable allocations. NAVSUP WSS personnel also stated that they recognized the need to begin demand-based forecasting of consumable parts at Sigonella.

(U) Moreover, according to the CTF-67 Maintenance Officer, beginning in 2016, to avoid wait times for consumable parts, squadron personnel deploying to NAS Sigonella brought consumable items that they ordered from home station. He stated that this alternative action exacerbated the consumable inventory problem because NAVSUP WSS could not develop accurate historical demand-based information to establish an allowance list for consumable spare parts at NAS Sigonella. According to a NAVSUP WSS Deputy Director, as of October 2020, NAVSUP WSS had established a consumable parts allowance list for NAS Sigonella, but funding for the allowance list was not yet available.[34]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ MPRA's implementation of an incomplete sustainment strategy and program along with a lack of oversight by the PEO(A) throughout the P-8A *Poseidon* lifecycle led to sustainment problems that further contributed to the P-8A *Poseidon's* low mission capability rate. [redacted]

[34] (U) On March 25, 2021, the PMA-290 Product Support Manager stated that NAVSUP had provided funding to DLA to purchase the initial Sigonella consumable parts allowances. The NAVSUP WSS Director confirmed the funding.

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(U) Recommendations

(U) Recommendation 1

(U) We recommend that the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft Program Manager, in coordination with the Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support, and the Naval Air Systems Command P-8A *Poseidon* Fleet Support Team Engineering and Logistics Leads:

a. **(U) Develop and implement a plan and schedule to address sustainment challenges from the incomplete provisioning of P-8A *Poseidon* parts.**

b. **(U) Develop and implement a plan and schedule to address sustainment challenges from the lack of P-8A *Poseidon* technical data for conducting maintenance.**

(U) Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft Program Comments

(U) The MPRA Program Manager agreed and stated that his office, PMA-290, in coordination with the NAVSUP WSS Commander and NAVAIRSYSCOM P-8A *Poseidon* FST, has developed and implemented plans and schedules to address the incomplete provisioning of P-8A *Poseidon* parts and the lack of P-8A *Poseidon* technical data. The Program Manager listed numerous provisioning initiatives and provided FST data for the P-8A *Poseidon* that showed a decrease in the amount of new parts provisioned in the supply system. The Program Manager also provided FST data for the P-8A *Poseidon* program that showed an increase in technical data availability, including a reduction in the time spent awaiting technical data updates and a reduction in reported technical publication deficiencies.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the MPRA Program Manager were responsive to the recommendation. The recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once the Program Manager provides us with the plans and schedules that address the changes in P-8A *Poseidon* provisioning and technical data.

(U) Recommendation 2

(U) We recommend that the Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support coordinate with the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft Program Manager to develop and implement a demand forecast for P-8A *Poseidon* consumable spare parts at Naval Air Station Sigonella.

(U) Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support Comments

(U) The NAVSUP WSS Commander agreed and stated that 143 P-8A *Poseidon* primary consumable parts were not allowanced at NAS Sigonella. NAVSUP WSS analyzed historical demand for consumables at Sigonella, procured funding for these parts, and in November 2020 began to replenish the consumable parts stocks in Sigonella. The NAVSUP WSS Commander reported a doubling of the NAS Sigonella P-8A Gross Supply Effectiveness Rate from November 2020 through March 2021, and NAVSUP expects the effectiveness rate to continue to increase as more consumable parts arrive.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the NAVSUP WSS Commander addressed the recommendation, and NAVSUP WSS provided documentation of actions taken. Specifically, NAVSUP WSS staff analyzed demand, determined shortages, and obtained funding for 143 lines of consumable parts totaling 2,166 items for Sigonella. NAVSUP WSS staff officers are now conducting quarterly P-8A *Poseidon* consumable parts demand forecasts for NAS Sigonella to ensure that parts inventories continue to meet customer demand. Therefore, we consider this recommendation closed.

(U) Recommendation 3

(U) We recommend that the Program Executive Officer for Air Anti-Submarine Warfare, Assault and Special Mission Programs:

a. **(U) Develop and implement a plan of action and milestones to correct sustainment deficiencies in the P-8A *Poseidon* program, in coordination with the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft Program Office, consistent with current requirements.**

b. **(U) Develop and implement a process to monitor and validate progress for plans of action and milestones for correcting P-8A *Poseidon* sustainment deficiencies.**

c. **(U) Conduct a review of the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft Program Office's processes and procedures to determine whether critical sustainment analyses are conducted and decisions are reviewed and**

(U) approved at appropriate levels, consistent with current statutory requirements and DoD and Navy Instructions.

d. (U) Conduct a review of Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft Program Office's records management to improve internal controls and maintenance of critical records on sustainment strategy and plans as needed.

(U) Program Executive Officer Air ASW, Assault and Special Mission Programs Comments

(U) The PEO(A) agreed and stated that he directed PMA-290 to develop and implement a plan of action and milestones to correct P-8A *Poseidon* sustainment deficiencies. The PEO(A) also stated that he directed PMA-290 to monitor and validate progress on plans of action and milestones for correcting P-8A sustainment deficiencies.

(U) Additionally, the PEO(A) stated that he has directed PMA-290 to identify critical sustainment plans, processes, and procedures to ensure compliance with statutory requirements and DoD and Navy Instructions. Lastly, the PEO(A) directed PMA-290 to provide a critical sustainment records management plan. The PEO(A) estimated completion of the compliance review and records management plan by the end of third quarter, FY 2021.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the PEO(A) addressed the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once the PEO(A) provides the plan to correct, monitor, and validate P-8A *Poseidon* sustainment deficiencies; and provides the results of the sustainment process reviews.

(U) Recommendation 4

(U) We recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Sustainment direct the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft Program Manager to conduct 5-year sustainment reviews in accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 2441 (2016) for P-8A *Poseidon* aircraft.

(U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Sustainment) Comments

(U) The DASN(Sustainment) agreed and stated that the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) is updating SECNAVINST 5000.2F and will include the current requirements for programs to conduct sustainment reviews in accordance with 10 USC § 2441 through a process the Navy refers to as Gate 7 of the Navy's six-pass/seven gate review. The DASN(Sustainment) provided a copy of the

(U) Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) sustainment review schedule for all covered systems, with the P-8A program scheduled for a sustainment review in FY 2023.

(U) Our Response

(U) The DASN(Sustainment) comments addressed the recommendation. Although the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) has scheduled the P-8A *Poseidon* program for a sustainment review in FY 2023, 10 USC § 2441 requires a sustainment review not later than five years after declaration of initial operating capability, which occurred in 2013. However, the U.S. Navy has not yet conducted a sustainment review. We will close this recommendation after verification that the U.S. Navy has conducted a P-8A sustainment review.

(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from April 2020 through October 2020 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation," published in January 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met. The standards also ensure that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

(U) The scope of this evaluation focused on the P-8A *Poseidon* fleet equipment readiness to meet USEUCOM's ASW requirements. Equipment readiness depends on sustainment of the P 8A *Poseidon* fleet, including maintenance and the spare parts supply chain. The scope included deployed squadrons at NAS Sigonella, Italy, that supported USEUCOM ASW, and the squadrons at home station in Whidbey Island, Washington, and Jacksonville, Florida. The scope included readiness of aircraft from October 2018 through March 2020.

(U) We gained an understanding of the sustainment policies and processes, including that specific to the Navy and its readiness requirements, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders involved in the sustainment of the P-8A *Poseidon*. Specifically, we reviewed applicable laws and regulations, in addition to DoD and Navy policies. We also reviewed records on P-8A *Poseidon* readiness, including Aviation Maintenance Supply Readiness Reports and sustainment plans. Furthermore, we interviewed key stakeholders to understand ASW operations, processes, and sustainment challenges. Finally, we reviewed the USEUCOM Operation Plan 4020 19, and interviewed the CPRG headquarters staff, planners and staff at U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet, and the U.S. Naval Forces Europe Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet Deputy Theater Undersea Warfare Commander, to determine USEUCOM ASW requirements.

(U) Laws and Regulations

- (U) 10 U.S.C § 2337a (2018), "Assessment, management, and control of operating and support costs for major weapon systems"
- (U) 10 U.S.C. § 2336 (2018) "Major defense acquisition programs: determination required before Milestone A approval"
- (U) 10 U.S.C. § 2441 (2016), "Sustainment Reviews"

- (U) 10 U.S.C. § 2464 (2018), "Core Logistics Capabilities"

(U) DoD Directives and Instructions

- (U) DoD Directive 4151.18, "Maintenance of Military Materiel," Incorporating Change 1, August 31, 2018
- (U) DoD Directive 5000.01, "The Defense Acquisition System," September 9, 2020
- (U) DoDI 5000.02, "Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework," January 23, 2020
- (U) DoDI 5000.02T, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System," January 7, 2015, Incorporating Change 7, April 21, 2020
- (U) DoDI 5000.85, "Major Capability Acquisition," August 6, 2020
- (U) DoD 4140.1-R, "DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Policy," May 23, 2003

(U) Navy Standards and Instructions

- (U) SECNAVINST 5000.2D, "Implementation and Operation of the Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System," October 16, 2008
- (U) SECNAVINST 4105.1D, "Independent Logistics Assessment and Certification Requirements" March 12, 2018
- (U) COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2C, "Naval Aviation Maintenance Program Instruction," January 15, 2017
- (U) OPNAVINST 3000.16, "Navy Integrated Readiness," February 15, 2019
- (U) OPNAVINST 3501.383, "Fleet Readiness Reporting Guidance," October 20, 2010
- (U) OPNAVINST 4440.19F, "Policies and Priority Rules for Cannibalization of Operational Equipment and Diversion of Material at Contractor Plants to meet Urgent Operational Requirements," June 5, 2012
- (U) OPNAVINST 5450.350A, "Missions, Functions, and Tasks of the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command," October 14, 2018

- (U) OPNAVINST 5440.78A, "Mission, Functions, and Tasks of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Africa, Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet, and Commander, Task Force Six," May 8, 2018

(U) Evidence and Documentation Reviewed

(U) To determine whether the P-8A *Poseidon* fleet equipment readiness meets USEUCOM's ASW requirements, we reviewed NAVAIRSYSCOM, NAVSUP WSS, and CPRG documentation and reports related to P-8A *Poseidon* readiness. We collected and analyzed maintenance and supply non mission capable times from a sample of aircraft belonging to squadrons that deployed to Sigonella between 2018 and 2020. We reviewed the USEUCOM Operation Plan and the CPRG planning documents on USEUCOM ASW contingency requirements. We also reviewed COMNAVAIRSYSCOM ILAs of the P-8A program and the P-8A Aviation Maintenance Supply Readiness Reports from October 2018 through March 2020. We conducted interviews with P-8A *Poseidon* leadership and maintenance and supply personnel both in the United States and in the USEUCOM AOR. Lastly, we reviewed the U.S. Navy, CPRG, NAVAIRSYSCOM, and U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet staff roles, responsibilities, and processes related to P-8A *Poseidon* fleet equipment readiness in support of USEUCOM's ASW requirements.

(U) Interviews

(U) We conducted interviews with DoD and Navy officials via teleconference on P-8A *Poseidon* fleet equipment readiness to meet USEUCOM's ASW requirements. Specifically, we interviewed officials from:

- (U) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
- (U) Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition
- (U) PEO(A)
- (U) Naval Supply Systems Command
- (U) DLA
- (U) CPRG
- (U) U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We obtained and used computer-processed data to perform this evaluation. Specifically, we cross-checked daily and monthly squadron and aircraft maintenance and supply reports from the Aviation Maintenance Supply Readiness Reports system with mission capability trend data and percentages. The data was reported by the MPRA Program Office and CPRG over an 18-month period, from October 1, 2018, through March 31, 2020. We collected this maintenance and supply data to determine P-8A *Poseidon* mission capability across the fleet and in support of the USEUCOM AOR. The data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this evaluation.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) issued four reports discussing Navy readiness.

(U) Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed at http://www.gao.gov. Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/.

(U) GAO

(U) Report No. GAO-19-225T, "Navy and Marine Corps: Rebuilding Ship, Submarine, and Aviation Readiness Will Require Time and Sustained Management Attention," December 12, 2018.

> (U) GAO testimonial report stated that the Navy had taken steps to address training shortfalls in the surface fleet, but faced persistent maintenance and personnel challenges as it sought to rebuild ship and submarine readiness.

(U) Report No. GAO-19-229, "Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Costly Maintenance Delays Facing the Attack Submarine Fleet," November 19, 2018.

> (U) GAO's analysis of Navy maintenance data showed that between FY 2008 and FY 2018, attack submarines incurred 10,363 days of idle time and maintenance delays as a result of delays in getting into and out of the shipyards.

(U) Report No. GAO-20-257T, "Navy Maintenance: Persistent and Substantial Ship and Submarine Maintenance Delays Hinder Efforts to Rebuild Readiness," December 4, 2019.

> (U) GAO reported that the Navy continued to face persistent and substantial maintenance delays that affected the majority of its maintenance efforts and hindered its attempts to restore readiness. From FY 2014 through FY 2019, Navy ships spent over 33,700 more days in maintenance than expected. The Navy was unable to complete scheduled ship maintenance on time for about 75 percent of the

(U) maintenance periods conducted during fiscal years 2014 through 2019. More than half of the delays in FY 2019 exceeded 90 days.

(U) DoD OIG

(U) Report No. DODIG-2020-056, "Audit of Readiness of Arleigh Burke-Class Destroyers," January 31, 2020.

(U) This audit focused on whether the Navy identified and addressed readiness challenges of the Arleigh Burke-Class destroyers. These destroyers are multi mission, surface-combatant ships capable of conducting anti-air warfare, ASW, and anti-surface warfare.

(U) Appendix B

(U) History of the P-8A *Poseidon* Acquisition and Sustainment

(U) Table 7 lists the timeline of key events related to the acquisition and sustainment of the P-8A *Poseidon* aircraft.

(U) Table 7. Timeline of Events

Date	Event
February 2000	(U) The Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated and approved the Broad Area Maritime and Littoral Armed Intelligence and Reconnaissance mission needs.
April 2000	(U) The P-8A *Poseidon* program entered the concept exploration phase or Milestone 0. This phase focused on efforts to define and evaluate the feasibility of alternative concepts in terms of initial, broad objectives, such as cost, schedule, and performance.
January 2002	(U) The P-8A *Poseidon* program entered the Component Advanced Development work, which included contract awards to Lockheed Martin for the *Orion* 21 concept (P-3 derivative) and to Boeing for the military derivative of the 737 aircraft.
December 2003	(U) The Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated and approved the P-8A *Poseidon* program Operations Requirements Document that contained operational performance requirements and cost for the proposed concept of system.
May 2004	(U) The P-8A *Poseidon* program entered the Milestone B phase, which is the initiation of the acquisition program. This phase involved developing the acquisition strategy to reduce program risk; and ensure operational supportability, production, and affordability.
June 2004	(U) The Navy awarded the System Development and Demonstration contract to Boeing Company to design, develop, and build ground and flight test articles.
June 2008	(U) The Navy completed a formal Business Case Analysis to determine the most cost effective organizational level maintenance manning. The resulting Business Case Analysis recommendation shifted the organization level maintenance workforce from contracted logistics support to an organic workforce.
June 2010	(U) PEO(A) conducted the first Independent Logistics Assessment of the P-8A *Poseidon* program.

Date	Event
August 2010	(U) The Under Secretary for Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics approved Milestone C, granting authorization to proceed with the low rate initial production of P-8A *Poseidon* aircraft.
July 2013	(U) The P-8A *Poseidon* completed and passed the initial Operational Test and Evaluation.
July – September 2013	(U) Identified by NAVSUP as the planned start date for the formal provisioning process for the P-8A *Poseidon*.
July 2013	(U) PEO(A) conducted the second Independent Logistics Assessment on the P-8A *Poseidon* program.
November 2013	(U) The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Logistics & Materiel Readiness) approved the Life-Cycle Sustainment Plan for the P-8A *Poseidon.*
December 2013	(U) The P-8A *Poseidon* achieved initial operational capability and commenced first fleet operational deployment.
January 2014	(U) The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics approved the full-rate production of the P-8A *Poseidon.*
October 2015	(U) The P-8A *Poseidon* Material Support Date, and the date scheduled for NAVSUP WSS to take over the responsibilities of supply chain management for the P-8A *Poseidon*.
October 2016	(U) According to the CTF-67 N4 Maintenance Officer, P-8A *Poseidon* operations commenced in NAS Sigonella, Italy.
October 2019	(U) The Sigonella ASD Acting Deputy Director stated that CTF-67 identified consumable problems in NAS Sigonella, Italy. He stated that the problem was communicated to Commander, Naval Air Force Pacific in January 2020.

(U) Source: DoD OIG analysis of P-8A *Poseidon* LCSP, Selected Acquisition Reports, and P-8A *Poseidon* stakeholder interviews.

(U) Management Comments

(U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Sustainment

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
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RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION
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WASHINGTON DC 20350-1000

DASN(S)/21-106
26 April 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL – PROGRAM DIRECTOR, COMBATANT COMMANDS

Subj: DASN (Sustainment) Concurrence for DOD Inspector General's Recommendation #4

Ref: (a) DoD OIG Draft Audit Report "Evaluation of the Readiness of the P-8A Poseidon to meet USEUCOM ASW Requirements"
(b) SECNAV 5000.2G (draft)
(c) 10 USC 2441

Encl: (1) DON Sustainment Review Plan

1. DASN (Sustainment) concurs with DoD IG's recommendation #4 of reference (a) with comment.

2. Recommendation #4 states - "We recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Sustainment direct the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft Program Manager to conduct 5-year sustainment reviews in accordance with 10 U.S.C. Section 2441 (2016) for P-8A Poseidon aircraft."

3. ASN(RDA) is updating reference (b) to outline the requirements for programs to conduct Sustainment Reviews (SR) in accordance with reference (c) under the Navy's six-pass/seven gate review process as Gate 7s. Enclosure 1 outlines ASN(RDA)'s plan to conduct Sustainment Reviews for all covered programs over the next few years with the P-8A program scheduled in FY23.

[redacted]

BURKE.SEAN.J [redacted] Digitally signed by BURKE.SEAN.J [redacted] Date: 2021.04.26 12:48:37 -04'00'

Sean Burke

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Sustainment

(U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Sustainment (cont'd)

Sustainment Review	SYSCOM	PEO	Program	Program Name	ACAT
2021	AIR	TACAIR	MIDS JTRS	Multi-Functional Information Distribution System (Includes Low Volume Terminal	IC
2021	AIR	U&W	TACTOM	TACTICAL TOMAHAWK	IC
2021	SEA	IWS	CEC	Cooperative Engagement Capability	IC
2021	SEA	SHIPS	ESB (Formerly MLP)	Expeditionary Sea Base	IB
2021	SEA	SEA21	MCM	Mine Counter Measure Ship	n/a
2021	SEA	IWS	SSDS	Ship Self Defense System	IC
2021	MCSC	APfM LCES	Joint MRAP	Mine Resistant Abush Protected Vehicle	ID
2021	MCSC	LS	CAC2S	Common Aviation Command & Control System	IAC
2021	WAR	C4I	NMT	Navy Multi-Band Terminal	IC
2022	AIR	TACAIR	T-45TS	Goshawk Aircraft Trainer	IC
2022	AIR	TACAIR	**F/A-18 Series**	**Super Hornet Series**	**1C**
2022	AIR	TACAIR	*F/A 18 A/D*	*Hornet*	IC
2022	AIR	TACAIR	*FA-18 E/F*	*Super Hornet*	IC
2022	AIR	TACAIR	*F/A-18 IRST*	*F/A-18 Infrared Search and Track*	IC
2022	AIR	TACAIR	*EA-18G*	*Airborne Electronic Attack -18*	IC
2022	AIR	TACAIR	*NGJ - LB*	*Next Gen Jammer - Low Band*	IB
2022	AIR	TACAIR	*NGJ-MB*	*Next Gen Jammer - Mid Band*	IC
2022	AIR	TACAIR	*ALE-55 IDECM (Blocks2-4)*	*Integrated Electronic Defensive Countermeasures*	IC
2022	AIR	TACAIR	*AESA AN/APG-79*	*Radar*	IC
2022	AIR	TACAIR	**AIM-9X**	**Sidewinder Series**	**1C**
2022	AIR	TACAIR	*AIM 9X*	*SIDEWINDER Missile*	IC
2022	AIR	TACAIR	*AIM 9X M*	*SIDEWINDER Missile*	IC
2022	AIR	TACAIR	*AIM-9X-2*	*SIDEWINDER Missile*	IC
2022	AIR	U&W	**AARGM**	**AARGM Series**	
2022	AIR	U&W	AARGM-ER	*Air Anti Radiation Guided Missile-Ext Range*	IB
2022	AIR	U&W	AGM-88E AARGM	*Air Anti Radiation Guided Missile*	IC
2022	AIR	U&W	AGM-154 JSOW	*Joint Standoff Weapon*	IC
2022	SEA/AIR	CVN	**CVN-78 Series**	**Ford Class Carrier**	
2022	SEA	CV	*CVN-78*	*Ford Class Carrier*	IC
2022	AIR	TACAIR	*EMALS*	*Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System*	IC

(U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Sustainment (cont'd)

2022	AIR	TACAIR	*AAG*	*Advanced Arresting Gear*	IC
2022	SEA	USC	**LCS Series**	**LCS**	
2022	SEA	USC	*LCS*	*Littoral Combat Ship*	IC
2022	SEA	USC	*LCS MM- SUW (ASW & MCM IOC -TBD)*	*LCS Mission Modules*	IC
2022	SEA	SUBS	SSN 774	VA Class Submarine	IC
2022	MCSC	LS	G/ATOR	Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar	IC
2022	MCSC	APfM LCES	MRAP Buffalo	MRAP Buffalo	IC
2023	AIR	AIR	KC-130J	Transport Aircraft	IC
2023	AIR	AIR	P-8A	POSEIDON Aircraft	ID
2023	AIR	AIR	H-1 UPGRADES (AH-1Z/UH-1Y)	*Attack Helicopter*	IC
2023	AIR	AIR	MH-60R/S	*Multi-Mission Helicopter*	IC
2023	**AIR**	**AIR**	**V-22 Series**	**Osprey Series**	
2023	AIR	AIR	V-22	*Osprey*	IC
2023	AIR	AIR	MV 22/CMV-22B	*Osprey Vertical Lift*	IC
2023	AIR	TACAIR	E-2D AHE	Advanced Hawkeye	IC
2023	SEA	CVN	CVN-68	In Service Carriers (Nimitz)	I
2023	**SEA**		**Amphib**	**Amphibious Series**	
2023	SEA	SHIPS	LHA 6	*America Class Amphib*	IC
2023	SEA	SEA21	LHD 1	*WASP Amphibious Assault Ship*	I
2023	SEA	SHIPS	LPD17 FLT I	*SAN ANTONIO CLASS Amphib FLT I*	IC
2023	SEA	SHIPS	EPF	Expeditionary Fast Transport	II
2023	**SEA**	**IWS**	**SM Series**	**Standard Missile**	
2023	SEA	IWS	SM 6 BLK I	*Standard Missile-6*	IC
2023	SEA	IWS	SM 2 (BLKS III, IIIA, IIIB)	*Standard Missile*	IC
2023	SEA	SUBS	SSGN	Ohio Class Conversion	ID
2023	SEA	SUBS	SSN 688	Los Angeles Class Submarine	I
2023	MCSC	APfM LCES	MTVR	Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement	IC
2024	AIR	U&W	MQ-8C	Firescout	IC
2024	AIR	U&W	OASUW Inc I (LRASM)	Offensive Anti Surface Warfare	IC
2024	AIR	TACAIR	DoN LAIRCM	Large Aircraft Infrared Counter Measures	IC
2024	**SEA**		**DDGs**	**Destroyer Series**	
2024	SEA	SHIPS	DDG 51 FLT I	*Arleigh Burke Destroyer*	IC
2024	SEA	SEA21	DDG 51 FLT II	*Arleigh Burke Destroyer*	IC

(U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Sustainment (cont'd)

2024	SEA	SHIPS/ SEA21	DDG 51 FLT IIA	*Arleigh Burke Destroyer*	IC
2024	SEA	SHIPS	DDG FLT III	*Arleigh Burke Destroyer*	IC
2024	SEA	SHIPS	DDG-1000	*Zumwalt Class Destroyer*	IC
2024	SEA	SHIPS	T-AKE	Lewis & Clark Cargo/Ammo Ship	IC
2024	SEA	DRMP SSP	TRIDENT II D5 Missile	TRIDENT II D5 Missile	IC
2024	SEA	IWS	ADS (AN/WQR-3)	Advanced Deployable System	IC
2024	WAR	C4I	CANES	Consolidated Afloat Networks & Enterprise Services	IAC
2025	USMC	LS	ACV FOV	Amphibious Combat Vehicle	IC
2026	AIR	TACAIR	JPALS	Joint Precision Approach and Landing System	IC
2026	AIR	AIR	CH53K	King Stallion Program - Helo	IC
2026	USMC	LS	MRAP ATV	MRAP ATV	IC
2026	AIR	AIR	VH 92A	Presidential Helo	IC
2027	SEA	SHIPS	T-AO 205	John Lewis Oiler	IB
2027	AIR	U&W	MQ 4C	Triton	IC
2028	SEA	SHIPS	SSC	Ship to Shore Connector	IC
2029	SEA	USC	FFG(62)	Constellation Class Guided Missile Frigate	IB
2029	SEA	IWS	AMDR	Air Missile Defense Radar	IC
2030	AIR	U&W	MQ-25	Stingray	IB
TBD	AIR	U&W	NG LAW	Next Generation Land Attack Weapon	ID
2035	SEA	COL	SSBN 726	Columbia Class Submarine	ID
TBD by USAF	Air Force	USAF (USSF)	****MUOS	Mobile User Objective System	IC

(U) Program Executive Officer for Air Anti-Submarine Warfare, Assault and Special Mission Programs



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Ser PEO(A)/130-21
22 Apr 2021

From: Deputy Program Executive Officer, Air ASW, Assault and Special Mission Programs (DPEO(A))
To: Department of Defense Inspector General – Program Director, Combatant Commands

Subj: PEO(A) CONCURRENCE FOR DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL'S RECOMMENDATION 3

Ref: (a) DoD IG Draft Report for Project # D2020-DECOPC-0094.000, dtd 31 Mar 2021

1. PEO(A) concurs with the DoD IG's recommendation 3a through 3d in Ref (a) with the following comments.

2. DoD IG Recommendation 3a. We recommend that PEO(A) develop and implement a plan of action and milestones to correct sustainment deficiencies in the P-8A Poseidon program, in coordination with the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft Program Office (PMA-290), consistent with current requirement.

PEO(A)'s response to recommendation 3a. PEO(A) concurs with the recommendation and has directed PMA-290 to develop and implement a plan of action and milestones to correct P-8A Poseidon sustainment deficiencies. PMA-290 currently reports to PEO(A) in recurring forums for P-8A's sustainment execution and performance to plan on initiatives for reaching and sustaining mission capable (MC) readiness goals. These include but are not limited to biweekly Naval Sustainment System - Aviation (NSS-A) Heads Up Display (HUD) briefs that track 30-day averages on MC and full mission capable rates; monthly program reliability control boards (P-RCBs) that identify critical degraders impacting MC rates; and semi-annual program management reviews (PMRs) that detail MC rate trending, sustainment funding, and readiness initiative performance.

3. DOD IG Recommendation 3b. We recommend that PEO(A) develop and implement a process to monitor and validate progress plans of action and milestones for correcting P-8A Poseidon sustainment deficiencies.

PEO(A)'s response to recommendation 3b. PEO(A) concurs with the recommendation and has directed PMA-290 to develop and implement a process to monitor and validate PMA-290's progress on plans of actions and milestones for correcting P-8A sustainment deficiencies. PEO(A) started receiving P-8A NSS-A HUD briefs on 2 Mar 2021. These briefs allow PEO(A) to monitor and validate the P-8A team's progress in meeting and sustaining MC readiness goals.

4. DoD IG Recommendation 3c. We recommend that PEO(A) conduct a review of the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft Program Office's (PMA-290's) processes and procedures to determine whether critical sustainment analyses are conducted and decisions are

(U) Program Executive Officer for Air Anti-Submarine Warfare, Assault and Special Mission Programs

Subj: PEO(A) CONCURRENCE FOR DOD IG'S RECOMMENDATION 3

reviewed and approved at appropriate levels consistent with current statutory requirements and DoD and Navy Instructions.

PEO(A)'s response to recommendation 3c: PEO(A) concurs with the recommendation and has directed PMA-290 to identify critical sustainment plans, processes, and procedures with its current status to ensure statutory requirements and DoD and Navy Instructions are complied with. The estimated completion date is the end of Q3 FY21.

5. DOD IG Recommendation 3d. We recommend that PEO(A) conduct a review of the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft Program Office's (PMA-290's) records management to improve internal controls and maintenance of critical records on sustainment strategy and plans as needed.

PEO(A)'s response to recommendation 3d. PEO(A) concurs with the recommendation and has directed PMA-290 to provide a critical sustainment record management plan. The estimated completion date is the end of Q3 FY21.

[redacted]

G. A. PERRYMAN

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(U) Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support

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IN REPLY REFER TO:
4200
Ser N9815/005
21 Apr 21

From: Commander, NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support
To: Department of Defense Inspector General – Deputy, Assistant Inspector General Acquisition and Sustainment Management

Subj: NAVSUP WSS COMMENTS ON DOD OIG DRAFT AUDIT REPORT, "EVALUATION OF THE READINESS OF THE P-8A POSEIDON TO MEET USEUCOM ASW REQUIREMENTS" DOD OIG DISCUSSION DRAFT REPORT [PROJECT NO. D2020-DEV0PC-0094.000]"

Ref: (a) DoD OIG Discussion Draft Report, "Evaluation of the Readiness of the P-8A Poseidon to Meet USEUCOM ASW Requirements" DoD OIG Discussion Draft Report [Project No. D2020-DEV0PC-0094.000]"

Encl: (1) NAVSUP WSS Comments on DoDIG Draft Audit Report, "Evaluation of the Readiness of the P-8A Poseidon to Meet USEUCOM ASW Requirements" DoD OIG Discussion Draft Report [Project No. D2020-DEV0PC-0094.000]

1. NAVSUP WSS Comments on Recommendation 2 of DoD OIG Discussion Draft Report, "Evaluation of the Readiness of the P-8A Poseidon to Meet USEUCOM ASW Requirements" DoD OIG Discussion Draft Report [Project No. D2020-DEV0PC-0094.000]" are provided:

RECOMMENDATION 2: We recommend Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command Weapons Systems Support coordinate with Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Program Manager to develop and implement a demand forecast for the P-8A Poseidon consumable parts at Naval Air Station Sigonella.

NAVSUP WSS Comments: Concur with recommendation 2. Per enclosure (1) consumable allowance levels at Aviation Support Detachment Sigonella's collocated Defense Logistics Agency depot were refreshed and new allowances established along with a $144K BP28 funds investment. Resulting metrics produced an increase in Gross Effectiveness (total number of requisitions filled divided by total number of requisitions received at Sigonella) from 24% in November 2020 to 50% in March 2021. NAVSUP WSS P-8 Integrated Weapon Systems Team will refine implemented demand forecast consumable program at NAS Sigonella and improve upon results to increase effectiveness of inventory to support P-8A fleet.

It is the opinion of NAVSUP WSS that the intent of Recommendation 2 was met by corrective actions already taken as detailed in enclosure (1) and request the proposed recommendation be excluded from the final report or listed as a footnote or finding without recommendation.

[redacted]

(U) Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support (cont'd)

Subj: NAVSUP WSS COMMENTS ON DOD OIG DRAFT AUDIT REPORT, "EVALUATION OF THE READINESS OF THE P-8A POSEIDON TO MEET USEUCOM ASW REQUIREMENTS" DOD OIG DISCUSSION DRAFT REPORT [PROJECT NO. D2020-DEV0PC-0094.000]"

J. D. Noble RDML, SC, USN

J. D. Noble

20 APR 2021

Date

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(U) Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support (cont'd)

NAVSUP WSS Comments on DoDIG Draft Audit Report, "Evaluation of the Readiness of the P-8A Poseidon to Meet USEUCOM ASW Requirements" DoD OIG Discussion Draft Report [Project No. D2020-DEV0PC-0094.000]

1. Background. Sigonella, Italy P-8A Squadrons' post deployment briefs reported concerns with inadequate consumable parts availability at Aviation Support Detachment (ASD) on Naval Air Station (NAS) Sigonella. Squadrons were concerned about a lack of consumables on station and corresponding increased downtime of aircraft as customer wait time (CWT) is impacted by customs implications when items are shipped from continental United States (CONUS) locations.

2. Discussion. Initial analysis discovered consumable allowances were not physically carried per usual at ASD Sigonella but instead at the collocated Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Distribution Depot. NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support (WSS) ran levels analyzing historical demands in form of not carried and not in stock transactions to determine optimal consumable stock posture to support P-8A detachments at NAS Sigonella. The recently established Critical Items List (CIL) subset of the Deputy Assistant of the Secretary Navy (DASN) Sustainment Performance Baseline (SPB) program was used to evaluate consumables of primary importance. The CIL identifies items most critical to P-8A's ability to complete its mission based on Anti-Submarine Warfare relevance, airworthiness, and demand. SPB is tracked monthly and reported quarterly via Program Executive Office for Air Anti-Submarine (PEO(A)) to DASN Sustainment.

3. Analysis. 70% of the consumables items on the CIL were not allowanced at the collocated DLA Distribution Depot on NAS Sigonella. This amounted to a quantity of 143 individual items not being carried and leading to a poor Gross Effectiveness metric (total number of requisitions filled at Sigonella divided by total number of requisitions received at Sigonella) of 24%.

4. Actions. $144K in BP28 funds were invested to bring deficit 143 items to 100% allowancing range as well as to an appropriate inventory depth, which amounted to 2,166 items.

5. Results. March 2021 Gross Effectiveness was 50%, a two fold increase from November 2020's numbers. As more of the material delivers and transactions analyzed, Gross Effectiveness numbers will continue to increase. CWT decreased significantly as more requisitions were filled locally vice CONUS.

6. Future. SPB will be used to measure effectiveness of allowances at all sites supporting P-8As. Combining this program with other Naval Sustainment System-Supply (NSS-S) initiatives such as End to Ends, Reliability Control Boards, Aircraft on Ground Calls, and Heads up Display meetings will ensure maximum support to P-8A community. Testament to NSS-S' efficacy is the improvement in P-8A's overall SPB numbers using aforementioned initiatives, overall P-8A Gross Effectiveness baseline improved from 65% fall 2020 to 84% in February 2021. Continued efforts with the fleet and program office will optimize Sigonella's consumable inventory to achieve Gross Effectiveness levels in the 80% range.

Enclosure (1)

(U) Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft Program Manager

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Ser PMA-290/038
15 APR 2021

From: Program Executive Officer, Air ASW, Assault and Special Mission Programs (PMA-290)
To: Department of Defense Inspector General – Deputy, Assistant Inspector General Acquisition and Sustainment Management

Subj: PROGRAM MANAGER, MARITIME PATROL AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT COMMENTS ON DoD OIG DRAFT AUDIT REPORT, "EVALUATION OF THE READINESS OF THE P-8A POSEIDON TO MEET USEUCOM ASW REQUIREMENTS" DoD OIG DISCUSSION DRAFT REPORT [PROJECT NO. D2020-DEV0PC-0094.000]"

Ref: (a) DoD OIG Discussion Draft Report, "Evaluation of the Readiness of the P-8A Poseidon to Meet USEUCOM ASW Requirements" DoD OIG Discussion Draft Report [Project No. D2020-DEV0PC-0094.000]"

1. Program Manager, Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft Comments on Recommendation 1 of DoD OIG Discussion Draft Report, "Evaluation of the Readiness of the P-8A Poseidon to Meet USEUCOM ASW Requirements" DoD OIG Discussion Draft Report [Project No. D2020-DEV0PC-0094.000]" are provided:

(U) RECOMMENDATION 1: We recommend that the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft Program Manager, in coordination with Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support, and the Naval Air Systems Command P-8A Poseidon Fleet Support Team Engineering and Logistics Leads.

a. (U) Develop and implement a plan and schedule to address sustainment challenges from incomplete provisioning of P-8A Poseidon parts.

(U) Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft Program Manager, PMA-290, concurs with the Recommendation. PMA-290, in coordination with Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command Weapons Systems Support (NAVSUP WSS), and Naval Air Systems Command P-8A Poseidon Fleet Support Team (FST) Engineering and Logistics Leads have developed and implemented a plan and schedule to address sustainment challenges that have resulted from incomplete provisioning of P-8A Poseidon parts. This plan is continually reassessed at the subject matter expert (SME) working level [i.e, Navy Engineering/Logistics, Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), NAVSUP WSS /Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)], and when warranted, adjusted in response to any emergent Fleet parts issues or evolving risks in the supply chain that are forecasted to impact MC aircraft availability. Based on this proactive and continuous review cycle, the P-8A team was able to identify specific parts provisioning gaps and resource ~$425M of APN-6 to refresh and procure additional P-8A Initial Spare Allowances

(U) Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft Program Manager (cont'd)

from FY18 through FY21. Based on manufacturing lead times, those spares are estimated to continue to deliver to the Navy through FY23.

(U) The PMA-290 Provisioning Plan is currently executed through Maintenance Plan approvals and updates. Maintenance Plans contain the necessary provisioning data needed to support the fielded P-8A configuration. They are formally updated every three years after signature, but as stated above, are continually reassessed for adjustment based on the current P-8A sustainment response posture. New systems introduced via the P-8A Configuration Management process via Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs), require Configuration Control Board approval that has the P-8A Assistant Program Manager, Logistics (APML) as a voting member. The voting members approve ECPs after being presented to the weekly Configuration Review Board. The APML ensures Supply Support requirements developed by NAVSUP WSS address Maintenance Planning and Provisioning requirements and deliveries.

(U) PMA-290 acquires Logistics Supportability Analysis Data to allow the dedicated FST Maintenance Planning Team to develop, build, and update Maintenance Plans for existing and new systems. Maintenance Plans include provisioning data required to identify consumable and repairable components on the P-8A. In addition, PMA-290 Deputy Assistant Program Managers, for Logistics (DAPMLs) work with NAVSUP WSS Logistics Element Managers to identify Provisioning Requirements within Statements of Work requesting Deliverables from Industry. Those deliverables include: Interim Support Items List, Provisioning Parts List, Engineering Data for Provisioning, Long Lead Item Lists, and Design Change Notices.

(U) Existing processes with FST and NAVSUP WSS allow for provisioning of "not stocked" items that the Fleet requisitions. If a part is not provisioned and stocked by the Supply System, and it is needed to conduct maintenance, it will be processed as a "Part Number Buy" which will drive the FST to analyze projected usage so the part can be stocked in the future. Parts are purchased and expedited using existing contracts to fill the Fleet's immediate need.

b. (U) Develop and implement a plan and schedule to address sustainment challenges from the lack of P-8A Poseidon technical data for conducting maintenance.

(U) Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft Program Manager, PMA-290, concurs with the Recommendation. PMA-290, in coordination with Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command Weapons Systems Support (NAVSUP WSS), and Naval Air Systems Command P-8A Poseidon Fleet Support Team (FST) Engineering and Logistics Leads have developed and implemented a plan and schedule to address sustainment challenges that had, prior to 2019, resulted from the lack of P-8A Poseidon technical data.

(U) In March 2019, the Navy implemented a P-8A Technical Data Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that was negotiated with The Boeing Company [P-8A Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)]. The P-8A Technical Data MOA provides the Navy with perpetual access to both Boeing commercial (e.g., 737NG) and non-commercial (e.g., P-8A) technical data required to sustain (i.e., Operations, Maintenance, Installation and Training [OMIT]) the P-8A throughout the life of the aircraft. This agreement, which is formalized in a series of Special License Agreements (SLAs), grants access to all necessary engineering and logistics related data required

(U) Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft Program Manager (cont'd)

for the Navy to ensure continued P-8A airworthiness. Subsequent to the P-8A Technical Data MOA being implemented in March 2019, the P-8A program has not had any sustainment issues directly related to a lack of access to P-8A OMIT data.

(U) Based on obligations negotiated under the P-8A Technical Data MOA, PMA-290 has established an "augmented" FST that, in addition to Navy SMEs, includes ~twenty Boeing engineers/logisticians. In order to obtain access to Boeing commercial proprietary 737NG data, five of the Boeing engineers are embedded on-site at the Navy's P-8A FST in NAS Jacksonville, FL. These personnel are equipped with the necessary remote network connectivity and credentials required to directly login to Boeing's commercial engineering and design portals (i.e., 737NG 3D models, finite element models, stress and loads) for development of P-8A non-standard repairs. Additionally, the Navy has obtained twenty licenses for USN personnel to access a Boeing privately developed Navy Integration Visualization Tool (NIVT) to support a 3D representation of Boeing's engineering drawings necessary to complete the FST design of P-8A non-standard airframe repairs.

(U) The Technical Data MOA provides the P-8A FST and PMA-290 personnel with access to MyBoeingFleet (MBF), which is a Boeing commercial web-based data portal that is the repository for Boeing commercial 737NG and P-8A Engineering Data and Drawings that are used to conduct P-8A repairs, engineering/airworthiness disposition, and assess P-8A parts requirements and associated logistics support data.

(U) PMA-290 procured and provides regular updates to all necessary P-8A maintenance publications. This includes providing the P-8A Fleet with an Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals (IETMs) and a Structural Repair Manual (SRM) that provide detailed maintenance and repair instructions that are used by P-8A Organizational Level Maintenance personnel to maintain aircraft. The P-8A maintenance publications are updated and released three times per year, and are aligned with Boeing's Commercial 737NG publication updates. When urgent safety of flight related changes are required in between regular release cycles, P-8A Publications are updated by the FST via Emergent Rapid Action Changes (ERACs).

(U) To provide the Fleet with direct access to OEM expertise, PMA-290 has contracted with Boeing to provide four Boeing Field Service Representatives (FSRs), with two each located at the P-8A main operating bases at NAS Whidbey Island, WA (homeport of Commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing-10) and NAS Jacksonville, FL (homeport of Commander Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing-11). The Boeing FSRs provide skilled airframe and mission systems support directly to the P-8A VP squadron/organizational-level maintenance personnel, in order to assist in testing, troubleshooting, removing, repairing, and replacing components.

(U) Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft Program Manager (cont'd)

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ERIC M. GARDNER
Captain, USN
Maritime Patrol and
Reconnaissance Aircraft
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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AOR	Area of Responsibility
ASD	Aviation Support Division
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
CLS	Contracted Logistics Support
CNAF	Commander, Naval Air Forces
COMNAVAIRFORINST	Commander Naval Air Forces Instruction
CPRG	Commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Group
CTF	Commander Task Force
DASN-S	Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Sustainment
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DODI	Department of Defense Instruction
FST	Fleet Support Team
GAO	Government Accountability Office
ILA	Independent Logistics Assessment
IOC	Initial Operational Capability
LCSP	Life-Cycle Sustainment Plan
MPRA	Maritime Patrol Reconnaissance Aircraft
NAS	Naval Air Station
NAVAIRSYSCOM	Naval Air Systems Command
NAVSUP WSS	Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support
OPNAVINST	Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction
PEO(A)	Program Executive Office, Air Anti-Submarine Warfare, Assault and Special Mission Programs
SECNAVINST	Secretary of the Navy Instruction
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command

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