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Report No. DODIG-2013-110

July 26, 2013

Inspector General

United States
Department of Defense



(U) Guidance Needed to Adequately Integrate Military
Information Support Operations into Civil-Military
Operations in the Horn of Africa

Classified by: Michael J. Roark, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for
Readiness and Cyber Operations
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(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

CA	Civil Affairs
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
HOA	Horn of Africa
IO	Information Operations
MISO	Military Information Support Operations
TCP	Theater Campaign Plan
USAFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command



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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

July 26, 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
COMMANDER, COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE-HORN
OF AFRICA

SUBJECT: (U) Guidance Needed to Adequately Integrate Military Information Support
Operations into Civil-Military Operations in the Horn of Africa
(Report No. DODIG-2013-110)

(U) We are providing this report for your information and use. This is one in a series of reports on civil-military operations in the Horn of Africa region. Although the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa embedded military information support operations soldiers in civil affairs teams, it did not clearly define their mission and responsibilities. However, in June 2013, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa removed all military information support operations soldiers from the civil affairs teams.

(U) We considered management comments to a discussion draft of this report when preparing the final report. Due to management actions taken, no recommendations were made, and no written response was required. Therefore, we are publishing this report in final form.

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at (703) 604-8905 (DSN 664-8905).

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Amy J. Frontz".

Amy J. Frontz
Principal Assistant Inspector General
for Auditing

cc:
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Director, Joint Staff

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(U) Results in Brief: Guidance Needed to Adequately Integrate Military Information Support Operations into Civil-Military Operations in the Horn of Africa

(U) What We Did

(U) Our objective was to determine whether the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was adequately integrating military information support operations when planning and executing civil-military operations. This report is one in a series of two reports regarding civil-military operations in the Horn of Africa region.

(U) What We Found

(U) CJTF-HOA officials did not adequately integrate military information support operations when planning and executing civil-military operations. Specifically, CJTF-HOA officials did not clearly define the mission and responsibilities of military information support operations soldiers embedded in civil affairs teams to support civil-military operations.

(U) This occurred because command publications, such as the U.S. Africa Command Theater Campaign Plan and the East Africa Campaign Plan, contained only broad information operations guidance, and CJTF-HOA officials did not develop and disseminate formal guidance to further direct the activities of military information support operations soldiers embedded in civil affairs teams.

(U) As a result, CJTF-HOA underutilized military information support operations soldiers and missed opportunities to maximize the benefits of military information support operations to support civil-military operations. Without formalized

(U) guidance, CJTF-HOA may also unintentionally blur traditional lines of separation between public affairs, military information support operations, and their respective audiences, creating the perception that military information support operations soldiers are conducting other communication activities.

(U) From September 2012 through February 2013, we briefed multiple CJTF-HOA officials regarding our observations that the military information support operations soldiers in support of civil-military operations were not adequately integrated into civil affairs teams. In June 2013, CJTF-HOA removed the military information support operations soldiers from the civil affairs teams. This action no longer prompts the need for our planned recommendations. However, if military information support operations soldiers are employed in support of future civil-military operations, CJTF-HOA officials should develop and disseminate formal guidance to clearly define soldiers' mission and responsibilities.

(U) What We Recommend

(U) Management actions taken during the audit addressed our concerns, and no recommendations were made.

(U) Management Comments

(U) We provided a discussion draft of this report on June 6, 2013. No written response to this report was required. Therefore, we are publishing this report in final form.

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(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) Our objective was to determine whether the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was adequately integrating military information support operations (MISO) when planning and executing civil-military operations (CMO). This is one in a series of reports on CMO in the Horn of Africa (HOA) region. Site visits for the series of audits were conducted from August 2012 through October 2012. The other report will address whether CJTF-HOA officials were adequately planning and executing CMO in accordance with U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) objectives. See Appendix A for the scope and methodology and prior coverage related to the objective.

(U) Background

(U) CMO activities establish, maintain, or influence relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area to achieve U.S. objectives. CMO can also build trust and confidence for host nation populations vulnerable to violent extremism. CMO can be performed by designated civil affairs (CA) officials, other military forces, or by a combination of CA and other forces. CA teams perform CMO through a variety of means, including humanitarian assistance and humanitarian and civic assistance projects.¹ Humanitarian assistance and humanitarian and civic assistance activities include construction, renovation, and repair of public structures such as medical clinics and schools, construction of roads and bridges, excavation for water wells, and repair and installation of water sanitation, waste treatment, or waste management systems.


(U) Information operations (IO) are the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. MISO, an IO capability, are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. MISO are applicable to a wide range of military operations such as stability operations, security cooperation, and foreign humanitarian operations. Typically, CA and MISO units form the core of CMO planning efforts and are mutually supportive of CMO. For example, MISO broadcast both the existence and successes of CMO to generate target population confidence in and positive perception of U.S. or host nation actions.

¹ (U) Humanitarian assistance projects promote regional stability and improve visibility, access, and influence with foreign military and civilian counterparts. Humanitarian and civic assistance activities promote the security and foreign policy interests of the United States, interests of the country to which the activities are performed, and the operational readiness skills of the U.S. armed forces.

(U) Organizations Involved in Operations

(U) USAFRICOM, a geographic combatant command, is primarily responsible for DoD operations, exercises, and security cooperation on the African continent. Its mission is to protect and defend the national security interest of the United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African countries. When directed, USAFRICOM conducts military operations to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development. CJTF-HOA, a subordinate command of USAFRICOM, is responsible for conducting operations to enhance partner nation capacity, promote security and stability, dissuade conflict, and protect U.S. and coalition interests. Its mission is to defeat violent extremist organizations and transnational threats and to strengthen the operational and institutional capabilities of East Africa partner nation militaries to promote security and stability within each country's borders and throughout the region. The CJTF-HOA area of responsibility includes 10 countries: Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda. CJTF-HOA is located at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. See figure 1 for a map of the region.

(U) Figure 1. Map of the CJTF-HOA Area of Responsibility



(U) Source: USAFRICOM

(U) CJTF-HOA comprises core staff components, a CA Battalion, an IO Division, and a MISO detachment. In 2012, CJTF-HOA officials embedded MISO soldiers in CA

(U) teams. As of September 2012, 10 CA teams were deployed throughout the CJTF-HOA area of responsibility.

(U) U.S. Africa Command Strategic Guidance

(U//~~FOUO~~) The USAFRICOM Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) operationalizes the Theater Strategy by providing command guidance and planning processes to link national policy and strategy to tasks and resources. The TCP covers five years and synchronizes the command's steady-state activities, such as security cooperation.

(~~S//REL TO USA, ACGU~~) AFRICOM (b)(1), 1.4(a)
[Redacted]

1. (~~S//REL TO USA, ACGU~~) AFRICOM (b)(1), 1.4(a) [Redacted]
2. (~~S//REL TO USA, ACGU~~) AFRICOM (b)(1), 1.4(a) [Redacted]
3. (~~S//REL TO USA, ACGU~~) AFRICOM (b)(1), 1.4(a) [Redacted]
4. (~~S//REL TO USA, ACGU~~) AFRICOM (b)(1), 1.4(a) [Redacted]
5. (~~S//REL TO USA, ACGU~~) AFRICOM (b)(1), 1.4(a) [Redacted]
6. (~~S//REL TO USA, ACGU~~) AFRICOM (b)(1), 1.4(a) [Redacted]

(~~S//REL TO USA, ACGU~~) AFRICOM (b)(1), 1.4(a)
[Redacted]

(~~S//REL TO USA, ACGU~~) AFRICOM (b)(1), 1.4(a)
[Redacted]

(U) Review of Internal Controls

(U) DoD Instruction 5010.40, "Managers' Internal Control Program (MICP) Procedures," May 20, 2013, requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls. We identified an internal control weakness concerning guidance for MISO in support of CMO. Specifically, CJTF-HOA did not develop and disseminate formal guidance to clearly define the mission and responsibilities of MISO soldiers embedded in CA teams. However, in June 2013, CJTF-HOA removed the MISO soldiers from the CA teams. This action addresses our concerns, and no recommendations were made.

(U) Finding. Mission and Responsibilities of Military Information Support Operations in Support of Civil-Military Operations Not Clearly Defined

(U) CJTF-HOA officials did not adequately integrate MISO when planning and executing CMO. Specifically, officials did not clearly define the mission and responsibilities of MISO soldiers embedded in CA teams to support CMO. This occurred because command publications, such as the USAFRICOM TCP and East Africa Campaign Plan, contained only broad guidance, and CJTF-HOA officials did not develop and disseminate formal guidance to further direct the activities of MISO soldiers embedded in CA teams. As a result, CJTF-HOA officials underutilized MISO soldiers and missed opportunities to maximize the benefits of MISO to support CMO. Without formalized guidance disseminated throughout the command, CJTF-HOA may also unintentionally blur traditional lines of separation between public affairs, MISO, and their respective audiences, creating the perception that MISO personnel are conducting other communication activities.

(U) Military Information Support Operations Were Not Adequately Integrated with Civil-Military Operations

(U) CJTF-HOA officials did not adequately integrate MISO when planning and executing CMO. Specifically, officials did not clearly define the mission and responsibilities of MISO soldiers embedded in CA teams to support CMO. Joint Publication 3-57, "Civil-Military Operations," July 8, 2008, states "CMO, by their nature, usually affect public perceptions in their immediate locale." Distribution of information about CMO efforts through MISO can affect the perceptions of a broader audience and favorably influence key groups or individuals. Within CJTF-HOA, we met with or obtained documentation from officials at various levels of the command. For example, we met with officials from the IO Division, a MISO detachment official, the CA Battalion, CA team leads, and MISO soldiers on the CA teams.

(U) Information Operations Division and Military Information Support Operations Detachment

(U) IO Division and MISO detachment officials did not have a clear understanding of the MISO mission and responsibilities in support of CMO. Within the IO Division, one official stated he was unaware of the intent behind the decision to embed MISO soldiers in the CA teams because it was not communicated to him when he rotated to the command. Another IO official stated that the MISO agenda will not support CMO with "influence" operations, which he further stated generally do not support CMO, but may support other operations. In contrast, a MISO detachment official provided briefing slides that listed influencing a civilian population's attitude toward U.S. policy and preparing the population for CA operations as the MISO mission in CMO.

(U) The MISO detachment's briefing also listed command information dissemination as a benefit of MISO. However, command information is a public affairs term² that is not usually associated with MISO.

~~(FOUO)~~ An IO official provided examples of missions conducted by embedded MISO soldiers, such as key leader engagement, conducting assessments for future projects, and providing multi-media support. He also provided examples of informational products developed by MISO soldiers, including coloring books and safety course certificates. Another IO official provided a document that states MISO communicate the commander's mission and disseminate strategic communication products.

(U) Civil Affairs Battalion

(U) CA Battalion officials did not have a clear understanding of the MISO mission and responsibilities. Specifically, officials provided three informal documents they described as MISO guidance. The documents provided inconsistent missions and responsibilities. Two of the documents also referred to MISO soldiers as "MISO Communicators" and "Strategic Communicators," which are terms that could also refer to public affairs officials and be perceived as MISO soldiers performing public affairs activities. Joint Publication 3-13.2, "Military Information Support Operations," December 20, 2011, states MISO and public affairs are separate and distinct communication activities.

(U) On September 26, 2012, the CA Battalion provided a briefing on the MISO mission supporting CMO. Specifically, the MISO mission included:

- (U) influencing the civilian populations' attitude toward U.S. policy,
- (U) developing information for CA teams on civilian state of mind and health,
- (U) disseminating information concerning safety and welfare of the civilian population, and
- (U) maximizing direct support of CA.

(U) However, CA Battalion officials also provided an informal guide, titled, "The CA Team Leader's Guide to Employment of a MISO Communicator," which referred to the MISO soldiers as "MISO Communicators." The guide further states MISO Communicators were added to each CA team to facilitate improved communication with the local community. The guide provides suggestions for using the MISO Communicator to achieve MISO success, such as developing talking points, coordinating with the CJTF-HOA and U.S. Embassy public affairs office, and developing informational products.

(U) The third document obtained from the CA Battalion titled, "Integration of Strategic Communicators with CJTF-HOA Maneuver Units," referred to MISO soldiers as

² (U) Joint Publication 3-61, "Public Affairs," August 25, 2010, states that public affairs is public information, command information, and community engagement activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the DoD.


(U) "Strategic Communicators." The mission of the Strategic Communicators is to deploy with maneuver units to improve CJTF-HOA's ability to communicate with targeted audiences and generate comprehensive assessments. On November 28, 2012, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, issued a memorandum stating the term "strategic communication" causes confusion and to avoid using the term. The more accurate terminology that will be used in future joint publications is communication synchronization. The memorandum further reminds individuals that most things previously termed "Strategic Communications" are in fact public affairs responsibilities.

(U) Civil Affairs Team Leads and Embedded Military Information Support Operations Soldiers

(U) The CA team leads and embedded MISO soldiers did not have a clear understanding of the MISO mission and responsibilities. One CA team lead stated the MISO soldier was assigned to conduct strategic communications and ensure proper communication occurred with the host nation population. Another CA team lead stated the MISO add no value to his team. He also stated that the embedded MISO soldier refused to develop an informational flyer because it was not a MISO-related activity. Therefore, the team lead had the public affairs office develop the flyer. One embedded MISO soldier stated that he was responsible for printing flyers; however, he was unclear how CJTF-HOA envisioned his role on the team. He further stated the CA team already had the capability to accomplish the tasks he had been assigned; therefore, he was unaware of his value to the CA team.

(U) Formal Guidance Needed for Conducting Military Information Support Operations

(S//REL TO USA, ACGU) AFRICOM (b)(1), 1.4(a)



(U) Missed Opportunity to Maximize Civil-Military Operations

(U) Without formalized guidance, CJTF-HOA cannot ensure MISO are being adequately integrated into CMO. CJTF-HOA underutilized MISO soldiers and missed opportunities to maximize the benefits of those soldiers in support of achieving CMO objectives such as enhancing the perception of the United States and increasing host nation support. Furthermore, CJTF-HOA cannot ensure MISO soldiers will be consistently utilized as personnel deploy and redeploy from the HOA. In addition, without effective integration, MISO soldiers could be perceived as conducting activities other than MISO, which may unintentionally blur traditional lines of separation between public affairs, MISO, and their respective audiences.

(U) Audit Briefing to Management Regarding Mission and Responsibilities of Military Information Support Operations Soldiers

(U) In September 2012, we briefed the CJTF-HOA Director, J3 Operations, regarding our observations that the MISO soldiers in support of CMO were not effectively integrated into CA teams. The Director agreed with the audit team's observations and discussed the need for strategic guidance. In October 2012, we conducted an out brief with senior CJTF-HOA officials to discuss our concerns with the unclear mission and responsibilities and reporting structure for MISO soldiers on CA teams. In February 2013, we conducted a follow-up meeting with CJTF-HOA IO officials. At that time, the MISO soldiers were still embedded in the CA teams, and no formalized guidance had been developed or disseminated.

(U) Management Actions Taken to Remove Military Information Support Operations Soldiers From Civil Affairs Teams

(U) According to CJTF-HOA, J39 Current Operations, as of June 2013, all MISO soldiers were removed from the CA teams, and there were no plans to continue to provide future MISO support to CA missions. USAFRICOM officials confirmed the MISO soldiers were removed from the CA teams. One USAFRICOM official stated that the audit team's observations were accurate, and the lack of formalized guidance contributed to the removal of MISO soldiers on the CA teams.

(U) Prior to the MISO soldiers' removal from the CA teams, we planned to recommend that the Commander, CJTF-HOA, develop and disseminate formal guidance to clearly define the mission and responsibilities of MISO soldiers embedded in CA teams in the CJTF-HOA area of responsibility. In addition, we planned to recommend that the Commander, CJTF-HOA, review activities conducted by MISO soldiers to ensure soldiers are not conducting public affairs. However, because CJTF-HOA took action to address our concerns during the audit, no recommendations were made. If MISO soldiers

(U) are employed in support of CMO in the future, CJTF-HOA officials should develop and disseminate formal guidance to clearly define soldiers' mission and responsibilities.

(U) Appendix A. Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this performance audit from January 2013 through July 2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

(U) We reviewed guidance, to include:

- (U) Joint Publication 3-57, "Civil-Military Operations," July 8, 2008;
- (U) Joint Publication 3-13.2, "Military Information Support Operations," December 20, 2011;
- (U) U.S. Africa Command Campaign Plan, "Commander, United States Africa Command Theater Campaign Plan 7000-12 Fiscal Years 2012-2016," January 25, 2012;
- (U) East Africa Command Campaign Plan, January 25, 2012; and
- (U) CJTF-HOA Campaign Plan, "Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa Campaign Plan," October 10, 2012.

(U) We obtained documentation on the MISO mission and responsibilities from the IO Division and the CA Battalion, including the "The CA Team Leader's Guide to Employment of a MISO Communicator," "Integration of Strategic Communicators with CJTF-HOA Maneuver Units," command briefing slides, and examples of MISO missions.

(U) For the series of audits, we contacted, visited, or interviewed officials from Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, Joint Staff, USAFRICOM, and CJTF-HOA. We met with officials from CJTF-HOA IO Division, CA Battalion, and MISO soldiers from the CA teams. We also met with CA team leads.

(U) We conducted site visits to Djibouti and Tanzania, obtained source documentation, and observed CMO projects.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued three reports and the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) issued two reports discussing USAFRICOM, CJTF-HOA, IO, or MISO. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.gao.gov>. Unrestricted DoD IG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm>.

(U) GAO

(U) GAO-12-359, "Project Evaluations and Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage the Military's Efforts," February 8, 2012

(U) GAO-10-794, "Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa," July 28, 2010

(U) GAO-10-504, "DoD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of Africa Task Force," April 15, 2010

(U) DoD IG

(U) D-2011-051, "DoD Needs Synchronized Communication Activities and an Integrated Information Operations Capability in Afghanistan," March 21, 2011 (classified report)

(U) D-2010-033, "Information Operations in Iraq," January 21, 2010 (classified report)

(U) Appendix B. List of Classified Documents

(U) COMMANDER, UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND THEATER
CAMPAIGN PLAN 7000-12: SECRET

Declassified Date: October 1, 2035

Generated Date: January 25, 2012

(U) COMMANDER, UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND EAST AFRICA
CAMPAIGN PLAN 7110-12: SECRET//REL TO USA, ACGU

Declassified Date: Undated

Generated Date: January 25, 2012

(U) COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE HORN OF AFRICA CAMPAIGN PLAN:
SECRET//REL TO USA, ACGU

Declassified Date: Undated

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(U) APPENDIX 3 to ANNEX C to USAFRICOM EAST AFRICA CAMPAIGN PLAN
7110-12 INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO): SECRET

Declassified Date: October 25, 2031

Generated Date: January 25, 2012

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