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# INSPECTOR GENERAL

*Department of Defense*

February 17, 2016

Report No. DODIG-2016-049

## Summary of Nuclear Enterprise Weaknesses Identified in DoD OIG Reports Issued from September 30, 2010 to June 18, 2015 (U)

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


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## (U) Results in Brief

*(U) Summary of Nuclear Enterprise Weaknesses Identified in DoD OIG Reports Issued From September 30, 2010, to June 18, 2015*

**February 17, 2016**

### Objective

(U) We reviewed DoD OIG reports issued from September 30, 2010, to June 18, 2015, in order to summarize the key observations and recommendations.

### (U) Findings

(U) We summarized 10 reports issued by the DoD Office of Inspector General from September 30, 2010, to June 18, 2015, that contained findings on aspects of the nuclear enterprise. Weaknesses identified in the nuclear enterprise include: planning and coordination, guidance, requirements, manning and training, budget or funding priority, and logistics and parts issues. Chart 1 depicts the number of reports having findings in the specified category. Note that the reports had more than one weakness area identified.


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### (U) Recommendations

(U) This summary report analyzed recommendations from previous reports and does not contain new recommendations requiring a response from management.

(U) Eighty-five recommendations, 48 of which are already closed, were contained in the 10 reports analyzed. Those recommendations are designed to correct deficiencies and strengthen controls, thereby sustaining the DoD's nuclear deterrence mission.

*(U) Chart 1.*



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INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE  
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

February 17, 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION


SUBJECT: Summary of Nuclear Enterprise Weaknesses Identified in DoD OIG  
Reports Issued From September 30, 2010, to June 18, 2015 (U)

(U) We are providing this report for your review and use. Since 2010, DoD OIG reports identified six systemic finding categories that hinder improvement of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise. As a result, there are many areas in which the DoD Nuclear Enterprise could be improved through more efficient management and organization.

(U) We conducted this assessment in accordance with Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, except for planning and evidence requirements of the field work standards, because this assessment summarizes previously issued DoD OIG reports.

(U) This report contains no recommendations for action. We did not issue a draft report, and no written response is required. Please direct questions to me at

(b) (6) [s@dodig.mil](mailto:s@dodig.mil) or (b) (6)

  
Anthony G. Thomas  
Deputy Inspector General for  
Intelligence and Special  
Program Assessments

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DDIG-2016-049 | iii

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## Introduction

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### Objective

(U) Our objective was to review DoD OIG reports issued from September 30, 2010, to June 18, 2015, on the DoD Nuclear enterprise in order to summarize the key observations and recommendations. Specifically, we reviewed these reports to identify common areas of concern or trends that could assist senior management in deciding where to focus their own reviews or emphasis in their applicable portion of the DoD Nuclear enterprise.

### Background


(U) From September 30, 2010, to June 18, 2015, the OIG issued 10 reports relating to the DoD Nuclear Enterprise. These reports evaluated many aspects of the Nuclear Enterprise, which included communication systems, nuclear weapons security, nuclear weapons maintenance, organizational structures, mission planning, and DoD U.S. Continental based nuclear weapon accident or incident response. The reports contained 19 findings and 85 recommendations. See Appendix B for a list of the 10 reports, and Appendix C for a list indicating which recommendations have been closed.

(U) We reviewed the findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in the 10 reports and identified six systemic weakness areas that hinder or prevent improvement of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise. As shown in chart 2, we identified weaknesses in the following categories:

- (U) planning and coordination,
- (U) guidance,
- (U) requirements,
- (U) manning and training,
- (U) budget or funding priority, and
- (U) logistics and parts.




(U) Chart 2.



## Planning and Coordination

(U) We identified areas within the Nuclear Enterprise where planning and coordination would increase the probability of mission success. Lack of proper planning to execute a function and lack of proper coordination with the appropriate organizations were shortfalls identified in five of the reports issued. Twenty of the 85 recommendations included in the reports addressed planning

or coordination. Little to no money is required to address these recommendations, which can increase effectiveness or reliability of the systems or programs we assessed.



(S) One of the most significant examples of a planning and coordination recommendation is discussed in Report No. DODIG-2015-134, "Assessment of the U.S. Theater Nuclear Planning Process," June 18, 2015. We found that (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(f), 1.4(g), 1.4(h)

[REDACTED]



Planning and Coordination

(S) (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(d), 1.4(g), 1.4(h)

(S) An example of coordination issues between commands is described in Report No. DODIG-2014-19, "Assessment of Continental United States-Based Nuclear Response Task Force (NRTF) Program," December 3, 2013. (b) (1), 1.4(g), 1.7(e), (b) (3), 10 USC § 128, (b) (7)(E)

Once identified, U. S. Northern Command (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g) The NRTF report also found planning and coordination gaps (b) (1), 1.4(g), (b) (3), 10 USC § 128, (b) (7)(E)

In this case, management agreed that an "Execute Order" needed to be created and coordinated to expedite a response, if required. That action is not yet completed.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2013-085, "Cryptographic Modernization of Critical Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Systems," May 29, 2013, identified another area that had serious coordination problems. (b) (1), 1.7(e), (b) (3), 10 USC § 128

(S) In another example of lack of coordination, Report No. 11-ISPA-15, "Review of United States Navy Nuclear Weapon Security Program," September 19, 2011, we found that (b) (1), 1.4(g)

(S) (b) (1), 1.4(g)

## (U) Summary

(S) Although not all inclusive, the examples in this report highlight areas where a lack of planning or coordination between organizations jeopardized the success of the nuclear mission. Attention from management helped close many of the recommendations in this area, without additional resources. Under the planning and coordination category, 10 of the 20 recommendations are still open, but 8 of those are from FY 2015 reports. The most important are the open Theater Nuclear Planning recommendations discussed above.


(b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(f), 1.4(g), 1.4(h)



## Guidance

(U) Guidance is a fundamental component of DoD's implementation of national strategic direction. It also is essential for management of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise. To maintain and enhance efficiency within the nuclear mission, leaders must take measures to improve doctrine when possible and ensure guidance is being implemented. Findings in this category were noted in four of the reports. Thirteen of the 85 recommendations addressed those findings.

(U) Outdated or Incomplete Guidance Recommendations



(U)

(S) In our previously cited 2015 report on Theater Nuclear Planning, we found that

(b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(f), 1.4(g), 1.4(h)

[REDACTED]

(S) (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(f), 1.4(g), 1.4(h)

(S) Report No. DODIG-2014-083, "Insufficient Infrastructure Support to the Fixed Submarine Broadcast System," (FSBS), June 23, 2014, found that (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

Additionally, Department, Service, and lower guidance was contradictory, unclear, or missing altogether. We also found that, in some cases, there was not a clear chain of command. Navy regionalization was, in part, a cause. The result was an FSBS infrastructure deterioration that could have led to (b) (1), 1.4(g), (b) (7)(E). The absence of a clear chain of command for broadcast transmission stations also negatively affected the FSBS community's ability to plan, direct, and control operations to achieve objectives. The Navy responded to our recommendations by issuing guidance clarifications and reorganizing some lines of authority to improve management accountability for the FSBS.

(U) Report No. DoDIG-2014-19, "Assessment of Continental United States-Based Nuclear Response Task Force Program," December 3, 2013, noted that DoD officials had not completed actions required to fully carry out DoD guidance issued in 2002. Specifically, a mission analysis for the NRTF was never conducted, and Joint Mission Task Lists were never created. (b) (3), 10 USC § 128

In response to our recommendations, guidance was updated, mission task lists were created, and a reporting methodology was put in place to enable the Joint Staff to monitor the readiness of the NRTFs.

(U) The previously cited 2013 report on cryptographic modernization found that an excessive number of Air Force guidance documents hindered cryptographic modernization efforts. Guidance documents were outdated, conflicting, and identified responsibilities for offices that no longer existed. We recommended consolidating the



(U) guidance. The Air Force agreed to address this issue. As a result, Air Force instructions pertaining to crypto have been reduced from eight to three instructions, and Air Force manuals have been reduced from five to three.


### (U) Summary

(U) Although not all-inclusive, these examples highlight areas where outdated or incomplete guidance can result in failure to meet (b) (1), 1.7(e), thereby jeopardizing the success of the nuclear mission. Attention from management helped close many of the recommendations in this area. However, under the guidance category, 7 of the 13 recommendations remain open. The most significant open recommendations are identified in the Theater Nuclear Planning report. Specifically,

(b) (1), 1.7(e)

## Requirements

(U) Requirements provide the specifics to implement national and departmental guidance. Undetermined or vague requirements can result in capability gaps or vulnerabilities. Outdated requirements can waste resources. Findings in this category were included in 6 of the reports, and 21 recommendations addressed those findings.



(S) The previously cited

2014 report on the FSBS found (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We recommended the Navy develop a strategy and timeline to prioritize and correct these (b) (1), 1.4(g), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] which it agreed to do by December 1, 2015. The Navy has developed (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



(S//FRD) Report No. D2014-031, "Review of DoD Requirements for Nuclear Gravity  
Weapon Delivery Parameters," January 14, 2014, identified

(b)(1), 1.4(a), 1.4(f), 1.4(g), (b)(3), 10 USC § 128; (b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

(S) One of the most significant open recommendations regarding requirements involves an instance of not following existing requirements, which was documented in Report No. DODIG-2012-079, "Review of United States Air Force Nuclear Weapon Security Program," April 20, 2012. DoD, Air Force, and Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) regulations require

(b)(1), 1.4(a), 1.4(f), 1.4(g), (b)(3), 10 USC § 128; (b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

## Requirements

(S) (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(f), 1.4(g), (b) (3), 10 USC § 128; (b) (7)(E)

(S) Report No. 10-INTEL-13, "Sustaining the Weapons Storage and Security System (WS3)," September 30, 2010, (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(f), 1.4(g), (b) (3), 10 USC § 128

The WS3 program office performed a comprehensive review of all WS3 technical orders after our draft report was issued.


### (S) Summary

The requirements category has 3 of the 20 recommendations still open. The most significant open recommendation is on (b) (1), 1.7(e), (b) (3), 10 USC § 128; (b) (7)(E) Our report documented results from exercises and independent analysis showing a significant increase in effectiveness of (b) (1), 1.7(e), (b) (3), 10 USC § 128; (b) (7)(E)



## Manning and Training

(U) Having sufficient manning to execute a mission is clearly a resource issue. However, the lack of properly manned organizations and trained personnel presents challenges outside of simply getting more funding. Findings in this category were found in 6 of the reports, and 13 recommendations addressed those findings.



(S) The previously cited 2015 Theater Nuclear Planning report found (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(i), 1.4(g), 1.4(h)

[REDACTED]

(U) Report No. DODIG-2015-051, "Air Force Leadership Action is Required to Sustain the Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Through 2030," December 8, 2014, identified some areas where manning to support the ICBM missile maintenance was falling short. We recommended that the Commander, Air Force Materiel Command, prioritize funding of authorizations for sustainment and support engineers. In response, the Air Force Materiel Command conducted an Acquisition and Sustainment Force Improvement Program and identified the need for 321 additional positions

Manning

(U) in support of ICBM program office and supply chain management efforts at Hill Air Force Base. This total includes sustainment engineers and engineering support personnel. The DoD indicated that a portion of these will be funded in FY 2016, with the balance advocated for within the FY 2017 budget cycle.

(U) The 2013 Crypto Modernization report identified that the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), the sole organization with a complete overview of the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communication (NC3) architecture, (b) (1), 1.7(e), (b) (3), 10 USC § 128

[REDACTED]

(S) Our previously cited 2012 report on Air Force Nuclear Weapon Security identified a

(b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(f), 1.4(g), (b) (3), 10 USC § 128; (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]



Manning

(S) (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(f), 1.4(g), (b) (3), 10 USC § 128, (b) (7)(E)

### (U) Summary


(S) The manning category has 7 of the 13 recommendations still open or completion is yet to be validated. However, all of the open recommendations were contained in FY 2015 reports, and management has not completed changes in response to those recommendations. The most significant open recommendations (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(f), 1.4(g), 1.4(h)

## Budget or Priority Funding

(U) Our review identified issues that could be corrected only by an increased budget or priority funding. Findings in this category were found in 6 of the reports, and 11 recommendations addressed those findings.

(U) Our previously cited 2014 report on the Minuteman III determined

that centralized funding for Minuteman III facilities and support equipment was lacking because it was not treated as part of the weapon system. The facilities and equipment are needed to ensure the weapon system's viability. To correct this condition, we recommended that Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) develop a plan to fund the Payload Transport Replacement Program in FY 2016 and validate manpower requirements for munitions and maintenance squadrons. AFGSC agreed with the recommendation and has programed 26 Payload Transporters for delivery by 2021, with 2017 as the first production year.



(S) Our previously cited 2012 report on Air Force Nuclear Weapons security found that

(b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(f), 1.4(g), (b) (3), 10 USC § 128; (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



Priority Funding

(S) (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(f), 1.4(g), (b) (3), 10 USC § 128, (b) (7)(E) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
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[Redacted]  
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(S) (b) (1), 1.4(g) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
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[Redacted]  
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(S) Our 2010 report on the Weapons Storage and Security System (WS3) determined that (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(f), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]

Priority Funding

(S)

(b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(f), 1.4(g)

## (U) Summary

(U) Adequate funding plays a critical role in securing, maintaining, and assuring complete functionality of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise. The funding increases in response to our reports shows a renewal of priority funding for the DoD Nuclear Enterprise. The funding category has 4 of the 11 recommendations still open. The most critical is (b) (1), 1.7(e), (b) (3), 10 USC § 128, (b) (7)(E)

The Air Force has programmed procurement money starting in FY 2016, with initial deliveries starting in September 2017.


## Logistics

(U) Various logistical issues or problems with parts availability were identified in 4 of 10 reports issued. Findings highlight that decisions to extend weapon system life have strained the supply system. Seven logistics recommendations were issued to address those findings. The majority of these recommendations

addressed issues involving the need for better management and processes. Responses to our recommendations have helped to make the supply system more efficient and effective until weapon systems can be replaced.

(U) The reports, most notably the previously cited 2014 report on the Minuteman III, have shown some weapon systems still in use have parts, pieces, equipment, test sets, or communications equipment that were developed and installed in the 1950s and 1960s. The age of the items combined with obsolete technologies have resulted in a parts shortage. Additionally, cost saving initiatives have, in some cases, further reduced the inventory of assets. An example is the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure, which resulted in the transfer of management of all consumables to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The unique parts associated with legacy weapon systems have been proven problematic for DLA because of engineering and testing requirements, and the inability to establish demand patterns. These problems have resulted in mistakes affecting the warfighter with a supply system that lacks responsiveness.

(U) A significant example is in our previously cited 2014 report on sustaining the Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, which mentioned management issues about system-specific parts. Insufficient management oversight resulted in the inability to effectively monitor requirements. Parts obsolescence, diminishing manufacturing





(U) sources and material shortages, budgetary uncertainties, cost variances, and poor demand forecasting resulted in deferred maintenance and aging, unsupportable equipment. We recommended that the Air Force develop a plan to identify weapon-specific, low-demand parts managed by the DLA for return to Air Force management, which it agreed to do. Implementation is still ongoing.

(S) Our previously cited 2010 WS3 report contained another example of (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(D), 1.4(g)

[REDACTED] The WS3 is a nuclear weapon storage vault that lowers into the floor of an aircraft storage shelter. (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(D), 1.4(g) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

### (U) Summary

(U) These examples illustrate how legacy weapons systems, performing well beyond their intended life goals, have increased logistics problems and parts availability issues. These difficulties affect the supply chain management's responsiveness to meet operational availability. Six of the recommendations were made in FY 2015 and remain open. The only one closed is the WS3 recommendation discussed above.

## Conclusion

---

(U) Our reports covered a diverse set of areas within the nuclear weapons enterprise. We reviewed nuclear weapons security, operations, command and control, consequence management and logistics. One important theme that stands out from our categories of findings and recommendations is how much can be done without funding increases. Our reports found that many improvements could be achieved within the DoD Nuclear Enterprise through better planning and coordination or by updating or completing guidance. Almost half of the reports lacked any finding directly addressing funding shortfalls or issues. Only 11 of the 85 recommendations directly addressed the need for additional funding. The majority of recommendations addressed guidance, requirements, or planning and coordination. For example, we found instances where guidance needed to be reviewed, updated, or clarified at the Department or Service level. Even more prevalent were instances where requirements were either outdated or not being followed.

(U) One significant area for improvement is in the planning and guidance section. Lack of coordination between responsible agencies was a root cause of deficiencies within our reports on Crypto Modernization, Theater Nuclear Planning, ITW/AA Mobile Ground System, NRTF, and the FSBS. Fixing many of these issues identified in our reports is not a matter of funding, adding manpower, or establishing requirements. Rather, better overall communication and prioritization of nuclear issues among key players within the DoD Nuclear Enterprise would correct many of the deficiencies we identified. The lack of agreement on who is responsible for programs or processes negatively impacted capabilities within the nuclear enterprise.

(U) Much can be done without redirecting money within the DoD budget. Many of the systems we evaluated are beyond their original designed life. Some are not getting the preventive maintenance they need in order to be assured of continued reliability. This was especially true for the Minuteman III, the ITW/AA Mobile Ground System and the FSBS.

Conclusion

(U) The logistics issues we highlighted cannot be fixed strictly with money. The supply system needs to recognize the uniqueness of some of the older, low demand parts, and the challenges of ensuring new vendors are identified and replacement parts are designed in time to prevent a negative impact to the mission. Planned recapitalization of significant portions of the nuclear enterprise will help alleviate this logistics challenge.

(U) Finally, the 10 DoD IG reports conveying issues from across the nuclear enterprise identified common themes among distinct examples of findings and recommendations. The 85 specific recommendations that resulted were categorized in the six systemic weakness areas addressed in this report. Currently, 37 recommendations are open, with follow-up actions ongoing.



## **Appendix A**

### **Scope and Methodology**

(U) We conducted this review from April 2015 through December 2015 in accordance with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, except for planning and evidence requirements of the field work standards, because this assessment summarizes previously issued DoD OIG reports. To prepare this report, we reviewed 10 DoD IG reports, identified in Appendix B, issued by the Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence and Special Program Assessments from September 30, 2010, to June 18, 2015. These reports assessed a diverse set of areas within the DoD nuclear weapons environment. We reviewed the findings and recommendations of these reports and grouped them into what we believe to be weaknesses and problem areas within the DoD Nuclear enterprise.

### **Use of Computer-Processed Data**

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

## Appendix B

### DoD OIG Assessment Reports on the DoD Nuclear Enterprise

"Sustaining the WS3 Security Storage System," Report No. 10-INTEL-13, September 30, 2010

"Review of United States Navy Nuclear Weapon Security Program," Report No. 11-ISPA-15, September 19, 2011

"Review of United States Air Force Nuclear Weapon Security Program," Report No. DODIG-2012-079, April 20, 2012

"Cryptographic Modernization of Critical Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Systems," Report No. DODIG-2013-085, May 29, 2013

"Assessment of Continental United States-Based Nuclear Response Task Force Program," Report No. DoDIG-2014-19, December 3, 2013

"Review of DoD Requirements for Nuclear Gravity Weapon Delivery Parameters," Report No. D2014-031, January 14, 2014

"Insufficient Infrastructure Support to the Fixed Submarine Broadcast System," Report No. DODIG-2014-083, June 23, 2014

"Air Force Leadership Action is Required to Sustain the Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Through 2030," Report No. DODIG-2015-051, December 8, 2014

"Assessment of the U.S. Theater Nuclear Planning Process," Report No. DODIG-2015-134, June 18, 2015

"Evaluation of the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment's Mobile Ground System," Report No. DODIG 2015-133, June 18, 2015

## Appendix C

### Recommendation status by report

PROJECT	RECOMMENDATION	Summary Cat
Sustaining the WS3 Security Storage System, 10-INTEL-13, (Sep 2010)	1	Funding
	2.a	Requirements
	2.b	Funding
	3.a	Planning/Coord
	3.b	Logistics
	3.c	Requirements
	3.d	Requirements
	3.e	Funding
	3.f	Funding
Review of the US Navy Nuclear Weapons Security Program, 11-ISPA-15 (Sep 2011)	1.a	Funding
	1.b	Funding
	2	Planning/Coord
Review of the US Air Force Nuclear Weapons Security Program, DODIG-2012-079 (Apr 2012)	1.a	Funding/Budget
	1.b	Funding/Budget
	2.a	Requirements
	2.b	Planning/Coord
	2.c	Manning
	2.d	Requirements
	2.e	Manning
KEY: <span>OPEN</span> <span>CLOSED</span>		



PROJECT	RECOMMENDATION	Summary Cat
Review of the US Air Force Nuclear Weapons Security Program, DODIG-2012-079 (Apr 2012) (cont'd)	2.f	Requirements
	2.g(1)	Requirements
	2.g(2)	Requirements
	2.g(3)	Requirements
	2.g(4)	Requirements
	3.a	Planning/Coord
	3.b	Requirements
	3.c	Requirements
	3.d	Requirements
Cryptographic Modernization of Critical Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Systems, DODIG-2013-085 (29 May 2013)	1.a	Guidance
	1.b	Planning/Coord
	1.c	Planning/Coord
	2	Planning/Coord
	3	Requirements
	4	Manning
Assessment of Continental US Based Response Task Force Programs, DODIG-2014-19 (3 Dec 2013)	A.1	Requirements
	A.2	Guidance
	A.3	Guidance
	A.4	Manning/Training
	A.5	Guidance
	B.1	Planning/Coord
	C.1	Planning/Coord
Review of DoD Requirements for Nuclear Gravity Weapon Delivery Requirements, DODIG-2014-31 (Jan 2014)	1.a	Requirements
	1.b	Requirements
	1.c	Requirements
	1.c	Requirements
	2	Requirements
KEY:	OPEN	CLOSED

PROJECT	RECOMMENDATION	Summary Cat
Insufficient Infrastructure Support to the Fixed Submarine Broadcast System, DODIG-2014-083 (June 2014)	A.1	Planning/Coord
	A.2	Guidance
	A.3	Guidance
	B.1	Requirements
	B.2	Funding
	C.1	Funding
	D.1	Manning/Training
	D.2	Guidance
	E.1	Guidance
(U) Air Force Leadership Action is Required to Sustain the Minuteman III ICBM Through 2030 DODIG-2015-051 (December 2014)	A.1	Logistics/Old Parts
	A.2	Funding
	A.3	Manning/Training
	B.1	Logistics/Old Parts
	B.2	Logistics/Old Parts
	B.3	Logistics/Old Parts
	B.4	Logistics/Old Parts
	B.5	Manning/Training
	B.6	Manning/Training
	C	Logistics/Old Parts
(U) Evaluation of the ITW/AA's Mobile Ground System DODIG-2015-133 (June 2015)	A.1.a	Planning/Coord
	A.1.b	Planning/Coord
	A.2	Planning/Coord
	A.3	Planning/Coord
	B.1	Planning/Coord
	B.2	Planning/Coord
	B.3	Manning/training
KEY:	OPEN	CLOSED

PROJECT	RECOMMENDATION	Summary Cat
(U) Assessment of the U.S. Theater Nuclear Planning Process DODIG-2015-134 (June 2015)	1.a	Guidance
	1.b	Guidance
	1.c	Guidance
	1.d	Planning/Coord
	1.e	Guidance
	1.f	Planning/Coord
	2.a	Guidance
	2.b	Planning/Coord
	2.c	Resource/Manning
	3.a	Planning/Coord
	3.b	Resource/Manning
	3.c	Resource/Manning
	4	Resource/Manning
KEY:		
	OPEN	CLOSED



## Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<b>AFGSC</b>	Air Force Global Strike Command
<b>DISA</b>	Defense Information Systems Agency
<b>DLA</b>	Defense Logistics Agency
<b>FSBS</b>	Fleet Submarine Broadcast System
<b>ICBM</b>	Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
<b>ITW/AA</b>	Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment
<b>JSEIO</b>	Joint System Engineering and Integration Office
<b>NC3</b>	Nuclear Command Control and Communications
<b>NRTF</b>	Nuclear Response Task Force
<b>WS3</b>	Weapons Storage and Security System

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
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