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HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY SECURITY AGENCY AND
SUBORDINATE UNITS

FISCAL YEARS 1958 - 1959

VOLUME II - TECHNICAL OPERATIONS

Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 02-16-2017 pursuant to E. O. 13526,
MDR Case #62316

Prepared by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2

1961

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SECURITY AGENCY

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Prepared by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

1951

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FISCAL YEARS 1958 - 1959

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I. FOREWORD

This document presents a consolidated account of the technical operations of the United States Army Security Agency during FY's 1958-1959. From missions imposed upon USASA units, specific accomplishments have been discussed to provide a comprehensive guide for future planning and instruction.

Method of coverage provided in this document represents a departure from usual historical reporting procedure. At the direction of ACoFS, G2, Lt Colonel Harry B. Sewell, two fiscal years (1958-1959) were combined into one document, thus enabling the Historical Division to achieve current status. In some instances, quantity of reported information was sacrificed. This, however, in no way effected reporting accuracy.

To streamline reporting, the footnote system used in previous years was eliminated. This decision was made in view of the fact that source material was double in volume and footnotes would have become extremely cumbersome. Those so desiring may refer to the historical reports used in this compilation by consulting Retired Records Unit, AG, "A" Building, Arlington Hall Station.


Special authority and pertinent guidelines to the production of this history are contained in the following publications:

- AR 10-122, 13 May 57, subject: Organization and Functions, USASA. USASA Historical Reports Manual (U), 13 Mar 58, including Change 1, 18 Feb 59.
- DA Pamphlet Nr 20-200, June 1956, subject: The Writing of American Military History, A Guide.
- NSA Basic Cryptographic Glossary, 1955.
- AR 320-50, 29 Oct 58, including Change 1, 29 Jan 59 and Change 2, 8 Jan 59, subject: MILITARY Terms, Abbreviations, and Symbols.

II. ~~(S)~~ OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

Throughout FY's 1958-1959, US Army Security Agency directed its operational efforts toward analysis of requirements, activities, capabilities, and deficiencies of field units. Technical support toward improving Agency operations consisted of staff lectures on USASA activities, visits to USASA theater commands, closer coordination with the United Kingdom COMINT effort and with communications gathering services of other US Armed Forces. Additionally, daily coordination with NSA insured that support rendered would be timely and adequate. In this connection, the Office of the Assistant to the Chief, USASA and its two subordinate elements, the Operational Control Division and GENS-1, were located at Fort George G. Meade, Md. A summary of activities connected with the operation is incorporated in this volume as Appendix A to the basic text. USASA COMSEC elements were provided advanced distribution of AR 380-46, "Radiation of Intelligence Bearing Information by COMSEC and Duplicating Equipments." Attache crypto facilities in every US Embassy were inspected, and attache posts holding DIANA or ORION cryptosystems were furnished One-Time Pad Joint Service questionnaires.


P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)



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Chiefs, USASA-Europe, Pacific, and Alaska were provided
parameters of the signal, and were advised to pay particular attention to
voice



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USASA-Europe, due to indications of Soviet pressure upon Allied Forces

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in Berlin in early November 1958, emphasized search for information on Soviet Satellite/Soviet Bloc intentions or plans to force the Allies from West Berlin. Special analytic efforts were placed on all communications originating within Europe by USM-701 (Hq USASAEUR).

USM-701


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air defense data. All available data on these transmissions were forwarded to NSA RD Group for analysis.

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


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In the Pacific theater, increase of low level [redacted] traffic on the

[redacted] network enabled USM-79 (176th USASA Co) [redacted]

[redacted] Voice transmissions associated with [redacted]


[redacted] activities intercepted at [redacted] (177th USASA Co),

and extensive use of [redacted] which indicated use of a Chinese

[redacted] transmission net in the [redacted] area of the

[redacted] indicated complete withdrawal of [redacted]

by October 1958.



P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

In September 1958, [redacted] manual Morse communications increased and Chinese [redacted] material provided unsatisfactory coverage. Since US intercept facilities on Taiwan were the only reliable source of CHICOM low level [redacted] TAIWAN ALERT was established designating the following areas of responsibility to the following units:

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Unit

Target

USM-3
USA-752
USN-27 & USN-39
USA-69

All CHICOM
All CHICOM
CHICOM
Served as executive agent for all
CHICOM reports. Responsible for
material collected at


USN-39

(S) TAREX, Pacific

TAREX Pacific obtained and exploited intelligence information on Vietnam, Philippine Islands, Soviet and CHICOM communications networks, radar locations and North Korean and CHICOM Order of Battle (OB). As a result of liaison between TAREX representatives and representatives of other US intelligence agencies, 31 collateral intelligence reports and three special reports of vital interest to USASA/NSA were forwarded to Hq, USASA. TAREX Pacific obtained a large portion of its intelligence through the facilities of the US Army Command Reconnaissance Activity, Pacific (USACRAPAC).

Operation ALPHABET - In FY 1959, a double agent operation in Japan,

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

[REDACTED]

Although the operation was successful, current development of sources by other intelligence agencies which provided similar information, made the continuation of the operation unnecessary. In December 1958, all TAREX effort connected with this activity ceased.

Defector Source - A North Korean radio operator who defected in early 1959 was available to TAREX for interrogation through a third party. The intermediary was advised to exercise extreme care not to reveal [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

(S) TAREX, Europe

TAREX Europe forwarded intelligence reports on communications facilities and activities in East and West Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the Middle East. Military Intelligence Agencies contributing to TAREX activities included TAREX Berlin (Clandestine Unit Team 2J), Frankfurt and Munich, the 513th Military Intelligence Group, and the 66th Counter Intelligence Corps.

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TAREX Europe reported these highlights during FY 1959:

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III. USASA UNITS (WORLD-WIDE)

A. Continental United States

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1. (SCW) 1st USASA Field Station, Vint Hill Farms Station, Warrenton, Va

In carrying out its assigned COMINT mission, the 1st USASA

Fld Sta covered [redacted]

[redacted] assigned as needed by USASA Hq and NSA.

The [redacted] manual Morse positions, including four General Search, were operational during FY 1958. At the outset, [redacted] coverage was stressed, but the Military assignment was dropped shortly after the start of the year. In FY 1959, manual Morse positions placed special emphasis on [redacted] Cases covered were as

follows:

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

FY's 1958-1959

FY 1958 Only

FY 1959 Only

Dominican Republic [redacted]
 Venezuela [redacted]
 Nicaragua [redacted]
 Ecuador (Misc) [redacted]
 Colombia [redacted]
 Mexico Unidentified [redacted]
 Peru (Misc) [redacted]
 Cuba [redacted]
 Cuba [redacted]
 Cuba [redacted]

Haiti [redacted]
 Brazil (Misc) [redacted]
 Czech [redacted]
 Czech Unidentified [redacted]
 Honduras [redacted]
 Ecuador [redacted]

Brazil [redacted]
 Dominican Republic [redacted]
 Hungary [redacted]
 Peru [redacted]
 Peru [redacted]
 Peru [redacted]

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] automatic Morse positions covered Central and South American links at the start of FY 1958; 22 at the finish. [redacted] positions covered European links at the outset, and nine at the end of the year with [redacted] assigned [redacted] At the end of FY 1959, the station

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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had [] positions assigned to cover target transmitters in ten Central and South American countries and [] positions to cover four European targets.

Cities assigned appear below:

FY's 1958-1959

FY 1958 Only

FY 1959 Only

Athens
Bogota
Buenos Aires
Havana
Lima
Lisbon
[]
Madrid
Montevideo
[]
Quito
Rio de Janeiro
[]
Santiago

Mexico City
Berne
Guatemala City
La Paz
Geneva

Asuncion
Caracas
Moscow
San Salvador

Radio Printer missions were generally South American during the report period. Target cities are listed below:

FY's 1958-1959

FY 1959 Only

Guatemala City
Rio de Janeiro
Buenos Aires
Bogota
Lima
San Jose
Tangiers
[]
Caracas

Panama City
Kingston
Havana
Athens
[]
Berne

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

The following Special Projects were assigned during the report period:

Project JOSHUA

CHICOM []

Special Spectrum survey for 40 days

Special Search for Soviet [] activity

Russian [] activity

[]

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BLUE for Indonesian [redacted] activity--5 days

[redacted]

Hearability Test

[redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Venezuelan [redacted] activity

[redacted]

2. ~~(S)~~ 316th USASA Battalion, Camp Wolters, Texas

On 9 Oct 57, the 316th USASA Battalion (then the 311th ASA Bn) was tasked with intercepting all Central and South American targets

[redacted] Coincidental to above was responsibility for performing T/A, processing intercept raw material, and preparing periodic and special technical reports. In addition, two manual Morse positions were used to record possible [redacted]

Operations of intercept mission included six manual Morse positions backed up by DF support, while [redacted]

[redacted] Each intercept position utilized two R-390 radio receivers, and each [redacted] two R-220 radio receivers.

The Traffic Analysis Section identified [redacted]

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[redacted] in the following countries:

Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Colombia
Chile
Cuba
Ecuador

Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela

REF: VOL E P. 95

*3. ~~(S)~~ US Army Garrison, Two Rock Ranch Station,
Petaluma, Calif (Formerly 2d USASA Fld Sta)

Two Rock Ranch's operational mission for FY's 1958-1959 was to intercept foreign communications, perform DF, apply special identification techniques, submit raw material and technical reports, and perform ancillary tasks as required in support of the national COMINT effort.

At the outset of FY 1958, this mission was charged to the 2d USASA Fld Sta, but on 17 Jun 58, the field station was redesignated as a US Army Garrison and the operational mission assigned to Company A, 316th USASA Battalion.

Operational activities were divided among Manual Morse, Automatic Morse, and Radio Printer Sections. The Automatic Morse mission was dropped in FY 1959. Highlights follow:

Automatic Morse

Manned five positions throughout FY 1958. Transcribed 590,387 gpc of traffic taken from intercept of [redacted] as compared with 1,822,641 gpc in FY 1957.

*Coverage of Co A, 316th USASA Bn included.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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Manual Morse


P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Nine COMINT missions, including COMINT search, remained on assignment. During the first half of FY 1958 many nets used either manual Morse or automatic Morse at first hand speeds. During the latter part of the year, most of these nets changed to high speed frequency shift key or on-off key signals

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and increased in traffic passed.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)



P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Intercept was performed on the following CHICOM links during FY 1959:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]


[Redacted] A CHICOM COMINT

test mission took place on 21 Feb 59, utilizing five manual Morse intercept positions.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Radio Printer





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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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B. Alaska

1. ~~(TOP)~~ Hq, USASA-Alaska, Fort Richardson

Operational mission of Hq, USASA-Alaska during FY's 1958-1959 was to provide COMINT and COMSEC support to the CG, USARAL in accordance with the directives of NSA and Hq, USASA. Though general mission assignment was unchanged from one year to the next, directives from the two higher headquarters drastically curtailed specific functions during the latter part of FY 1958 and the entire FY 1959.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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ELINT Section--Consisted of two electronic countermeasures search specialists and one officer. Performed checks on all ELINT administrative and operational reports submitted by the 281st USASA Company and provided unit with all technical information received from higher headquarters.

REF: VOL. I P. 119

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

2. ~~(TSCW)~~ 7th USASA Field Station, Wildwood Station, Kenai

The 7th USASA Fld Sta (USM-7) was tasked with intercept of Russian [redacted] communications, performed general search, and operated research and development facilities during FY's 1958-1959.

Manual Morse Section manned [redacted] positions at start of [redacted] covering Russian [redacted] and general search. Early in the year, [redacted] positions were [redacted] assignment was changed, adding Russian [redacted] to the mission.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Outstanding Manual Morse Activities, FY 1958:

[redacted]

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

The [redacted] positions manned at start of FY 1959 continued with the same mission except for deletion of Russian [redacted] and General Search, and expansion of Russian [redacted] problem.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Outstanding Manual Morse Problems, FY 1959:

Due to impending close-out of this station personnel strength.

began declining in March, and portions of the assignment were dropped. However, on 2 Jun 59, USM-7 was notified by NSA of a possible Soviet

[redacted]

Throughout FY 1958, the Automatic Morse Section manned [redacted] positions devoted entirely to [redacted] high speed automatic Morse type transmissions. In the following year, a [redacted] position was added; all were manned until 31 May 59, when assignment was deleted.


NSA requested emphasis on several links during the course of FY 1958. These missions dealt with the priority electrical forwarding of various types of [redacted] traffic as follows:

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)


[redacted]

During FY 1959, NSA requested emphasis on several Automatic Morse links. Intercept material was forwarded from the following circuits:

[redacted]



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EO 3.3(h)(2)



However, unsettled status of USM-7 prodded NSA to delete voice assignment from station's mission.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Special mission Hot List Tan, involving a 30-day search for one CHICOM [redacted] and four Russian [redacted] entities was unsuccessful in FY 1958, as was the 1959 activity covering Soviet [redacted] Activity. In February of FY 1958, another special mission searching for Russian [redacted] [redacted] transmissions began. No recoveries were made in FY 1958, but in the following year suspected related activity reports were sent to NSA and USN-39.

Other special missions assigned this station, follow:

FY 1958



All information furnished NSA was given to the Manual Morse and Radio Telephone Sections.

FY 1959



Results were negative and test was resumed 17 March with additional equipment. Results again were negative.



Fifteen attempts were noted, eight appearing successful and seven unsuccessful.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
P.L. 86-36

REF: VOL I P. 122

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3. ~~(TSC)~~ 281st USASA Company, Shemya Island

During FY's 1958-1959, the 281st USASA Company's operational mission included intercept, processing, and reporting of intelligence derived from coverage of communications [redacted]


[redacted] Technical mission was devoted primarily toward intercept of ground morse stations [redacted]

COMINT operations encompassed a daily, full coverage program in target intercept of a communications complex engaged in [redacted]

Manual Morse during FY 1958 manned six positions covering [redacted]

[redacted] another conducted search, while four were assigned coverage of identified targets within the assignment. In the following year, one position was added and assignment altered so that four positions covered the [redacted]

Throughout both years, the Radio Printer Section maintained two positions, one devoted to coverage of [redacted]



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EO 3.3(h)(2)

C. Caribbean

1. (SIC) Hq, USASA-Caribbean, Fort Kobbe, Canal Zone

Hq, USASA-Caribbean (USM-84) intercepted traffic from communications networks located in South and Central American countries including Colombia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Honduras, Venezuela, Argentina, and Guatemala. In FY 1959, traffic was intercepted from 17 of 21 countries within the areas of interest to this station.

Special missions assigned during the report period are discussed below:



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[REDACTED]

Dominican [REDACTED] were monitored for 45 hours, starting 4 Aug 58 to clarify information that an attempt was to be made to assassinate Gen Rafael Trujillo, Jr. [REDACTED] Traffic was forwarded electrically to NSA. Dominican plain language messages provided no information of intelligence value.

On 27 Feb 59, USM-84 was alerted for any mention of intent by the [REDACTED] to act in consonance with her declaration regarding the 12-mile limit. The request further stipulated that [REDACTED] material be closely scanned for any indication regarding [REDACTED] [REDACTED] efforts to procure patrol-type boats.

On 26 Apr 59, a [REDACTED] used by the [REDACTED] to cover the advance of a group of rebels was discovered in search for possible rebel frequencies. This circuit used only voice transmission, in Spanish, therefore it was recorded, scanned by translators, and 18 translations were furnished the local command and NSA.

Two "Critic" messages were handled concerning invasions of the Dominican Republic by unknown forces. The first occurred on 20 Jun 59, and the second on 22 Jun 59.

In FY 1959, the output, both in messages copied and total man-hours of copy, more than doubled as a result of increased assignments and the addition of Latin American Search to the mission. Figures appear below:

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	<u>FY 1958</u>	<u>FY 1959</u>
Messages copied	29,727	85,479
Man-hours of copy	3,535	8,002

As a result of the increase in productivity of the Operations Section, TEXIN and TIEPO increased proportionately and resulted in better technical support between USM-84 and NSA. During FY 1959, 26 TIEPO messages were released, instituting 36 new cases and covering 21 country/services. In addition 63 TEXIN messages were released covering 23 country/services and revising 36 cases. REF: VOL I P. 126.

B. Pacific

Hawaii

1. ~~(TECH)~~ Hq, USASA-Pacific, Halemano

In performing its assigned mission of supporting USARPAC; Hq, USASA-Pacific was primarily responsible for processing the work of its subordinates. Accordingly, four sections--CHICOM, Russian, [] and ALLO (All Others) handled operational workload. From 1 Jul to 1 Dec 57, CHICOM Section processed intercepted Chinese [] radio traffic. From 1 Dec 57 to 18 Jun 58, the additional task of monitoring and product and finished technical reports was assigned. The Russian Section processed material concerning the Soviet [] [] was decentralized from USM-702 (Tokyo) to USM-81 (Korea) 1 Apr 58. Operational procedures and responsibilities were transferred to [] (177th USASA Co) in four increments.


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P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)


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while the ALLO Section was held responsible for responding to

consumer requests and/or queries.



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P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Special Identification Techniques (SIT)--As a part of a vulnerability

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study for USARPAC, SIT Section assisted COMSEC in obtaining high frequency
DF (HFDF) bearings or fixes on US Army transmitters.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

From January-April 1958, HFDF coverage was maintained on Chinese

to determine geographical areas

into which

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Significant developments follow:

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

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P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)




entities were transferred from 14th

USASA Fld Sta to 176th and 177th USASA Companies and 508th USASA Group.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

During FY 1959,




were assigned to

14th USASA Fld Sta for development.

CHICOM Subsection received and filled ten specific requests for information from SSO in Hawaii.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)



P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

This proved successful

during the ensuing seven months. Russian Sub-section received six specific requests for information from the SSO in Hawaii. All were filled.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

COMINT end-product reports emanating from USM-702 in Tokyo and 179ch

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USASA Company on [redacted] entities were released.

During FY 1959, [redacted] Sub-section received and filled four requests from the SSO in Hawaii, and three from the SSO in Korea. A listing of 35 [redacted] identifications was submitted to G2, USARPAC.

ALLO (All Others)--Published an unofficial wrap-up COMINT Viet Minh OB report 26 Nov 58, which was sent to USARPAC, and supplemented information contained in Viet Minh OB Nr 15, 1 Nov 57.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

TAREX--[redacted] and rendered periodic reports to CIMCPAC on the success of this doubling program. Political and other factors in Korea resulted in apparent demise of once active North Korean agent exploitation program. Even so, TAREX liaison officer in Korea maintained contact with USARPAC's detention centers in Korea and was able to interrogate captured agents and prepared eight technical interrogation reports in FY 1959. In addition, several Communist Bloc documents were obtained.

Eight specific requests for information were received and acted upon in FY 1958 including:

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EO 3.3(h)(2)


- Development of [redacted]
- [redacted]
- Exploitation of source in [redacted]
- Procurement of certain Communist publications of interest to USASA.

In FY 1959, 54 special information requests were levied on intelligence agencies, 24 from USASA Hq and 30 from USASA-Pacific. At the close of the year, 27 had been fulfilled and five partially completed.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

[redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

2. ~~(TSO)~~ Hq, USASA-Pacific (Rear), Fort Shafter

The FY 1958 operational mission delegated this headquarters by NSA and Hq, USASA-Pacific required it to provide local commands with COMINT support relative the following target areas:

- 1) Soviet
- 2) Chinese Peoples' Republic
- 3)
- 4)
- 5) Burma
- 6) North and South Vietnam
- 7) Thailand
- 8) Republic of Indonesia
- 9) Philippine Islands
- 10) Laos
- 11) Cambodia
- 12) Malaya
- 13) Outer Mongolia

No first-hand COMINT operations were performed by Hq, USASA-Pacific (Rear) during the report period. During June 1958, however, headquarters personnel provided Hq, USASA-Pacific with a report of communications developments in and related areas.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

This report, covering a period from January to June 1958, included information from all COMINT sources, including [redacted] REF: VOL I P. 136

3. ~~(S)~~ 5th USASA Field Station, Halemans

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Although its mission continued to require intercept and limited processing of signals emanating from assigned Russian [redacted] [redacted] nets, Operations Branch experienced a progressive decrease in activity which culminated in the cessation of all station functions on 17 Jun 58. Prior to this date, intercept responsibilities were shared by Manual Morse and Radio Printer Sections, whose specific assignments are described below:

Manual Morse

Especially significant among manual Morse activities was the detection of a major [redacted]

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

[redacted]


Manual Morse assignments at the beginning and end of the report period were as follows:

1 Jul 57

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EO 3.3(h)(2)


[redacted]

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Philippine Islands

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

4. ~~(USCIB)~~ 9th USASA Field Station, Clark Air Force Base,
(Stotsenberg Station)

The 9th USASA Fld Sta's FY 1958 operational mission required
it to intercept and process communications signals emanating from CHICOM,


[redacted] Soviet, Viet Minh, Burmese, [redacted]

[redacted] A summary follows of relevant section activities:

Manual Morse

Viet Minh activity remained fairly constant during the early part of
FY 1958. Now, or previously lost, [redacted] passes were added through use of [redacted]
daily directed search position. During the second half of FY 1958, a marked
increase was noted on mainline groups probably serving GHQ Hanoi and other
units in Northwest Military sector. This increase was represented by a
progressive rise in valid traffic between GHQ and other Northwest sector
units, establishment of two additional outstations in the Northwest sector,
and establishment of additional schedules to accommodate the increase in
traffic volume.

Other significant developments:



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[Redacted]

4) All Gen Srch positions changed from Category "J" to Category "A" 3 Mar 58.

5) Inactivity of two assigned [Redacted] cases during latter part of FY 1958.

6) Assignment on 19 Jun 58 of [Redacted] and Hot List "Tan" mission. Subject nets were heard on 19-24 June.

7) Deletion of [Redacted] assignment 23 Jun 58. Mission had been assigned 13 February with negative results.


[Redacted]

Radio Printer

A special mission [Redacted] commenced 16 Aug 57, directed the section's attention to [Redacted]. During this same period, other mission changes included deletion of [Redacted].

[Redacted]


Results were negative. A report on a special "jamming" practice mission delegated by USASA-Pacific was forwarded to that headquarters.



Radiotelephone

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

At the beginning of the report period, the [redacted]
link was deleted, while [redacted] links were
added. During the second quarter, [redacted] was deleted [redacted]
[redacted] sub-
stituted therefore. Added during the final months of FY 1958 were [redacted]





P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Automatic Morse


Effective 28 Jul 57, the station's entire Automatic Morse mission was deleted and replaced by the following assignments:



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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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EO 3.3(h)(2)



Traffic Analysis

Early in FY 1958, considerable progress was made toward re-establishing continuity on Viet Minh Military cases. This was accomplished during the second quarter, but relatively few entities were co-related with those which existed prior to the major communications changes effected in April 1957.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

The only noteworthy change in Viet Minh party communications occurred when [] cases, located in Laos area, were renotated, using [] diagraph. Although a call sign change took place on all party nets in October, complete continuity was soon regained. [] operated normally during the first half of FY 1958.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Relative Indonesian [] daily continuity was maintained during April 1958. Subject communications were normal, and reflected both military activity and routine administrative traffic. Rebel Forces, Central Sumatra [] were last heard at this station on 18 Apr 58. Subsequently, increases in traffic from Rebel Forces operating in Northern Celebes [] required special emphasis.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Indonesian [] intercepted during May 1958 included mention of births, deaths, [] but little information on the revolution. Also during May, [] (Rebel Forces, Central Sumatra) was

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deleted from assignment, while Rebel Forces operating in Northern Celebes provided 29 messages during the same period.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

On 10 Jan 58; station personnel commenced scanning [redacted] intercept for COMINT. The CHICOM mission at the end of FY 1958 included [redacted]

[redacted] Srch.

Other significant developments:

1) Change to call sign/frequency rota [redacted] nets during second quarter.

2) Procedure change by groups employing [redacted] effective 25 Feb 58. Some workings remained in [redacted]

3) Partial call sign change on [redacted] and receiving call sign at [redacted] Transmitted call sign of [redacted] changed, but immediate recovery was possible.

4) Gradual decrease in Laotian guerrilla and party activity culminated in cessation of activities on 18 Jan 58. Cessation was attributed to integration of Sam Neua and Phong Saly into Royal Laotian regime. Activity, resumed on small scale, was apparently transmitted by [redacted] and former Pathet Lao officials supervising the merger.

5) Tentative identification of outstation of GHQ Gp [redacted] as serving Hq Military sector Northwest.

6) Identification of three outstations of [redacted] as follows: [redacted]-148th Independent-(DZ), Hai Son, Hq Military Sector Northwest-(BZ), Tuan Chai; and [redacted] 335th Div-(BZ), Hoc Chau.

7) Identification of [redacted] as 316th Div (BZ). Subject station later became outstation of [redacted] (GHQ Hanoi).

8) Identification of three other [redacted] outstations as serving 170th Independent Regt, 923d and 925th Security Bns.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Reports Section

Possible transfer of 316th Inf Div from Phu Tho to Dien Bien Phu was reported to NSA by this station on 25 Apr 58, and subsequently confirmed by NSA. This move was apparently designed to strengthen the Viet Minh-Laos border following loss of Sam Neua and Phong Saly as buffer provinces.

As early as 14 Feb 58, the 148th Independent Inf Bgt's move from Dien Bien Phu to Mai Son was indicated. Subsequent intercepts verified this indication.

The 9th USASA Fld Sta's FY 1959 operational mission entailed intercept and processing of COMINT emanating from Viet Minh, CHICOM, and Indonesian nets. In addition, a Gen Srch function was performed throughout most of the year. The following is a summary of station activities relative specific target areas:

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Viet Minh Military

- 1) Appearance of two call signs (18 Jul 58) suspected of being alternates for GBQ workings.
- 2) Observation (19 Jul 58) of possible new call sign rota, and subsequent decrease in GBQ-controlled traffic.

Viet Minh Watch Network

- 1) Equation of three new transmitting, and four new receiving, call signs with [redacted]; two new receiving, and one new transmitting, with [redacted]; and one each with [redacted]
- 2) Tentative location of [redacted] in Sector Northwest (possibly serving Mil Hq or large mil unit) effected on basis of call sign compromise.
- 3) Initial monitoring of [redacted] located in Sector Northwest, on 1 Jul 58. Initial notation of same effected 17 Jul 58.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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4) Initiation of [] Situation One on 26 Jul 58, placing all CMO's on priority. Situation terminated 1 Aug 58. CMO groups had not returned to normal, but their action was identified as semi-routine call sign change and possible minor net re-organization.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

5) Observation of 148th Independent Regt, formerly outstation of [] (GM) Hanoi, in operation as [] (Hq Mil Sector Northwest). Subject change occurred on or about 1 Mar 58, preceding by approximately three weeks the regiment's reputed move from Dien Bien Phu to Mai Son.

6) Tentative co-location of [] (Hq Mil Sector Northwest) with [] (Mil Sector IV Watch Station at Vinh). [] were identified as serving entities in Mil Sector IV. [] was identified as serving entities in Mil Sector Northwest.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

7) Call sign change (9 Sep 58) from Rota 1a to 3b by [] [] Some groups changed to Rota 3c call signs 12 Sep 58. Latter change indicated use of manual call sign progression.

8) Initial observation of new group on 22 Oct 58, and its subsequent notation as [] two days later. Tentatively identified as serving Hq 325th Div, and its subordinate units.

9) Call sign change, from Rota 2 to Rota 1 (1 Oct 58) by [] Hq Mil Sector Northwest at Thuan Chau. New continuity for Rota 2b was established during October.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

10) Identification of [] as 923d Bn of 359th Border Security Regt in Nghe Province, made possible by call sign compromise of []

11) Tentative co-location of unidentified group (first heard 24 Nov 58) with controls of []

12) Establishment, during December 1958, of correct continuity for sub-unit [] of 923d Bn of 359th Border Security Regt in Nghe An Province.


13) Activity by [] (a military communications training group) from 7 to 17 Dec 58. [] revealed that each of four outstations was rotating net control responsibilities for training purposes.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

14) Increase in message volume by group [] on 25-27 Dec 58. Two outstations were identified as serving Hq Mil Sector IV at Vinh.

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[redacted] Hanoi

1) Hanoi-Northwest Sector traffic was not heard during July 1958. However, [redacted] indicated that subject group was still active. Communications of [redacted] to other subordinate [redacted] were normal.

2) Complete call sign and frequency change on [redacted] Rq net on 6 September, first of its type since 25 May 57.

3) Last observation of Hanoi-Northwest link on 21 Jul 58. Subject link was deleted from assignment on 2 October.

4) [redacted] observed working new, unidentified outstation on 3 Nov 58, thus increasing to seven the number of stations in group [redacted]

5) Net structure of [redacted]

Unidentified Workings

- 1) Observation of unusually high traffic volume (beginning 30 Aug 58) on an unidentified group [redacted] Subject group was placed under extensive study an attempt to obtain DF and [redacted] information.
- 2) [redacted] heard daily in October, with six outstations active. Outstations of subject group were believed co-located with [redacted] outstation.
- 3) Call sign change by [redacted] on 15 Nov 58. Partial continuity was reestablished.


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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Military Intelligence Network

- 1) Subject net not observed at outset of FY 1959, despite [redacted]
- 2) Declaration of [redacted] Situation One at start of call sign change on 2 Jan 59. Rapid recovery of continuity resulted in termination of situation on 15 January. [redacted]
- 3) Declaration of Viet Minh Situation Two (5 Apr 59) in response to another call sign affecting [redacted] Rota net. Subject change did not affect [redacted] RSL.
- 4) Removal of [redacted] entity [redacted] from assignment on 13 Jun 59.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)





Chinese Section: A study of [] cases, to determine which could most profitably be intercepted at this station, showed the following results:

- 1) [] yielded highest percentage of reliable COMINT.
- 2) Intercept of message (17 Nov. 58) on [] indirectly planned establishment of link between [] terminal was intercepted on 29 November, passing automatic Morse traffic.
- 3) No intercept of link [] and reverse from 20-23 Mar 59. Silence was attributed to civil unrest in Lhasa. High rate of intercept during subsequent period was attributed to backlog and an increase in traffic relative personnel safety.
- 4) Identification of eight links in Southeast China area from 27 Apr to 15 June. Six were []

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Indonesian Section: During August 1958, there was slight indication of Government and Rebel skirmishes, and during September, there were indications of minor skirmishes between PRRI scouting parties and Central

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~~IOA~~


Government patrols in North Celebes and North Central Sector.

Japan

5. (TSGA) Hq, USASA-Pacific (Japan), Camp Zama, Tokyo


No active COMINT mission was assigned this headquarters, but acting as a local branch of TAREX, USASA-Pacific, it accomplished the following missions or projects during FY 1959:

Operation ALPHABET - As a double agent program, active in Japan since 1947, it covered four Soviet agents, controlled by US Army Command Reconnaissance Activity-Pacific (USACRAPAC), that were operating in Hokkaido, Japan, during FY 1959.



P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

In February 1959, Agent KING made first successful transmission using high speed equipment furnished by Soviet, putting old equipment aside for standby use. Agent QUEEN's old equipment was also held in reserve for emergency operations.




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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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

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several months from USACRAPAC. Coordination was effected with all parties concerned and a new method of passing the material was established which proved to be successful.



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EO 3.3(h)(2)

With reduction of US Forces in Japan during FY 1958, CIC lost its capability and arrangements were made to turn operations over to another US intelligence agency.



P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Publications Procurement - Open source



P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Areas covered ranged from Ethiopia to Japan and publications were procured in 27 languages. Types of publications included dictionaries, technical journals, propaganda material, year books, and newspapers.

TAREX also collected

several thousand intelligence reports of all categories from the following agencies:

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

- Hq USACRAPAC
- Composite Analysis Group
- Office of Special Investigations (Air Force)
- Office of the Army Attache (Diplomatic)
- 6004th ATIS (Air Force)

REF: VOL. I P. 143


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6. ~~(S)~~ 179th USASA Company, Hakata

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Throughout FY 1958, the 179th maintained 16 positions:




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EO 3.3(h)(2)



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[Redacted]

Language Analysis and Order of Battle Section

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

The Language Analysis Section's mission was to produce end product translations of [Redacted] while the OB Section supported language analysis and assisted in processing the end-product. By the end of the year, it was possible to identify, locate, and follow the actions of [Redacted] REF: VOL. I P. 149

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

7. (SCW)- 10th USASA Field Station, Kyoto

The 10th USASA Fld Sta's FY 1958 operational mission required it to concentrate intercept, DF, and SIT efforts on assigned [Redacted] and to submit relevant raw material and technical reports to supported commands. Additionally, the following special Blue missions were assigned:

- 1) Early in report period, station was delegated responsibility for proving or disproving co-location of intercepted marker with [Redacted] Three days' observation of simultaneous activity, plus application of SIT, disproved suspected co-location.
- 2) A 20-day Gen Srch assignment commencing 6 Feb 58 met with limited success.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

In preparation for the phase-out of all operational activities 31 Mar 58, a steady decrease was effected in intercept coverage during FY 1958. With the station's discontinuance, [Redacted] coverage was transferred to USN-39 and USM-46; [Redacted] to USM-46 (12th USASA Fld Sta), and Gen Srch to USM-48 (14th USASA Fld Sta).

The station's FY 1958 effort was regarded as successful, despite complications arising from the impending phase-out. Especially rewarding was attention directed to [Redacted] targets.

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
A summary of relevant section activities follows:

Manual Morse

This section began FY 1958 with 25 positions in operation. In July 1958, five positions previously deleted from assignment were reinstated, thus bringing the total to 30. From this point forward, however, coverage underwent progressive reductions as the phase-out deadline drew nearer. Despite this reduction, traffic intercepted on 21 positions still active during the first two weeks of March 1958 nearly equaled that intercepted by 30 positions early in the report period.

Significant developments:

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EO 3.3(h)(2)



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EO 3.3(h)(2)



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
Voices

Early in the report period, intercept positions [redacted] were redesignated [redacted] respectively, and transferred to USM-702 for operational control. Priorities for these positions were assigned as follows:



Significant developments:

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)



Traffic Control/Reports


A sizable increase in [redacted] activity during October and early November 1957 was attributed to [redacted]. This station was able to copy signals emanating from [redacted].

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Routine changes in presented few difficulties to station analysts.

Significant developments:

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EO 3.3(h)(2)



Radio Printer

Satisfactory receiving conditions enabled the section to achieve a high degree of success during a period marked only by routine mission changes and continuing preparation for final cessation of operational activities. Operations were highlighted by observation of unusual activity

on

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8. ~~(FCI)~~ 12th USASA Field Station, Chitose

The 12th USASA Fld Sta's FY 1958-1959 operational mission

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required it to intercept and process

[Redacted]

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Also

delegated was responsibility for end product reporting, TEXTA notation, and issuance of technical support material relative

[Redacted]

Operation

was con-

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

ducted in the [Redacted] area. Final reports of the operation showed that the KLINT phase produced excellent results, while results of the COMINT and visual phases were of very limited value. During FY 1959, no major special missions or projects were initiated that directly affected the station.

A summary follows of individual section activities:


Traffic Control and Reports

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

At the beginning of FY 1958, the section continued processing and reporting responsibilities relative

[Redacted]

Other significant developments:



P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)


FY 1959 responsibility was extended to include ~~and-product~~ reporting



Manual Morse

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Beginning the report period with 14 operative positions, this section added five new positions on 21 Nov 57 in order to cover



This represented the station's

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Manual Morse coverage at the end of FY 1958.

In an effort to cover FY 1958

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the section was assigned two standby missions [redacted] standby used three positions, in addition to an unassigned development position, for intercept of [redacted]

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] In addition, one Category A and four Category C positions were authorized to drop their routine assignments in favor of [redacted] coverage. This plan, tested during [redacted] activity in January 1959, was adequate. The shift of several [redacted] cases to automatic Morse transmissions during FY 1959 caused no major difficulty.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Voice

The Voice Section assigned two search positions to support Operation [redacted] effective 1 Jun 58, and subsequently transcribed and processed all [redacted] from subject operation.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Midway in FY 1958, special attention was devoted to intercept of [redacted] which had been lost by phase-out of USM-44. Despite erection of special antennas for this purpose, the assignment met with failure.

Curtailement of FY 1959 operations was forced by an acute personnel shortage. Of three positions in operation at the year's beginning, only one remained at the end.

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Radio Printer

Late in FY 1958, a marked increase was noted in [redacted]

New procedures were noted on [redacted]

[redacted]

During FY 1959, the R/P mission remained unchanged, but activities were expanded with addition of a new intercept room.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Machins Aids

In order to support [redacted] reporting responsibility, this section initiated daily IBM runs on the problem during FY 1958. Other reports or listings prepared during FY 1958 included the following:

[redacted]

[redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

OB File Listing

[redacted]

REF: VOL. I P. 155

9. (TCW)- 14th USASA Field Station, Hakata

The 14th USASA Fld Sta's FY 1958 operational mission required it to intercept and process COMINT emanating from assigned ChiCom target areas. With the addition of the 179th USASA Company's mission, the station's local consumer assistance responsibility was expanded to include [redacted]

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] end-product support.

The Manual Morse assignment in effect on 30 Jun 58 is outlined below:


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P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)




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P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)



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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Traffic Analysis

After achieving a fairly high level of intercept during the first two-thirds of FY 1958, the section noted an extreme communications lull during the remainder of the year. Subsequent attempts to regain the previous intercept and analytical volume were highlighted by introduction of a control position which received all pertinent information relative to targets.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Other significant developments:

1) New communications structure of unknown service. First heard 25 Jun 58, subsequently notated [redacted] by USN-3. (3d USASA Fld STA). Unified intercept and analysis effort indicated that subject group represented [redacted] in nearly all areas of Communist China.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

2) Assignment of six temporary case notations to [redacted] problem. Main approaches to isolation were [redacted]

3) Assumption of responsibility for development of [redacted] which became active 25 Jan 58. Effort entailed copying all targets which DF assigned line bearings of [redacted] degrees or higher. Group was believed to represent [redacted]

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

4) Reduction of intelligence capability relative to [redacted] problems on 13 Jun 58, when 18 hours daily coverage of [redacted] communications was assigned.

Language Analysis

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

The section was concerned primarily with production of end product translations of [redacted] communications.

Significant developments:

- 1) Recovery of [redacted] Subsection.

[redacted]

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

- 3) Negative result of two-year traffic study to analyze [redacted] designations placed on record in June 1958. Test represented an attempt to correlate [redacted] [redacted] involved, but no such distinctive association was apparent.

[redacted]

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Cryptanalysis

This section, whose mission was previously performed by the 179th USASA Company, was concerned with [redacted] of assigned [redacted] nats, as well as maintenance of [redacted] entities which were not assigned for processing.

Significant developments:

[redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

[Redacted]

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Direction Finding

Effective 31 Dec 57, the DF Section began monitoring the [Redacted] net and relaying mission to USASA-Pacific Northern DF net.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

FY 1959

In accordance with its FY 1959 operational mission, the station delegated intercept and initial processing responsibilities to ChiCom

[Redacted] Sections. The former emphasized [Redacted]

[Redacted] and [Redacted] throughout the year. Prior to 11 Mar 59, [Redacted] was included in this mission. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

In addition, a Radio Printer mission, assigned

for one year when the 10th USASA Fld Sta terminated operations, entailed manning of two positions on [Redacted]

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

[Redacted] for full coverage and one position for cyclic coverage of

[Redacted] links. A summary follows

of station operational activities:

CHICOM Section

[Redacted]

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

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P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)



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P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)



REF: VOL. I P. 158


10. ~~(TS)~~ 254th USASA Detachment, Makubetsu

Highly significant among the 254th USASA Detachment's

FY 1958-1959 operational activities was the joint COMINT/ELINT project,

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Operation




Other relevant operational activities are outlined below:

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)




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EO 3.3(h)(2)



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Korea

11. (TBC) 508th USASA Group, Yongdong-po

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Prior to its inactivation, effective 15 Oct 57, the 501st

USASA Group was charged with intercept, analysis and reporting of

communications. The concurrently organized

replacement unit, the 508th USASA Group, delegated missions to subordinate COMINT units and supervised performance thereof. Functions assigned subordinate commands during FY's 1958 and 1959 are outlined below:

- 1) 321st USASA Bn - Low level voice intercept and reporting, and RDF.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)



All TAREX reports received from other intelligence agencies were screened and forwarded to the 177th USASA Company if applicable, and to Rq, USASA-Pacific. Information was derived from interrogation of captured agents and North Korean defectors. In addition,

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12. (TCW) 177th USASA Company, Siksong-ni

The 177th USASA Company's FY's 1958 and 1959 operational

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

mission, entailing intercept and analysis of signals from designated

ChiCom [redacted] was highlighted late in FY 1958 by coverage
of the ChiCom [redacted]

[redacted] In order to accomplish its mission, the company maintained
Intercept, T/A, C/A, Language, OB, SIT, and Machine Aids Sections, whose
relevant operational activities are outlined below:

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Intercept

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Devoted [redacted] manual Morse positions to [redacted]
[redacted] Search and Development at beginning of FY 1958, and a 12th
position to ChiCom [redacted] activity. Dropped letter
from assignment effective 26 Aug 57, and devoted vacant position
to search for [redacted]
Accepted responsibility for suspected [redacted]
[redacted] traffic, effective 1 Sep 57. Monitored specific manual
Morse targets in [redacted] during
FY 1959. Devoted 10 positions early in fiscal year to ChiCom
[redacted]

Traffic Analysis

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Accepted responsibility in October 1957 for net and station
continuity, identification and location of stations, and deter-
mination of inter-net relationships in [redacted]
[redacted] communications. Noted following indications
[redacted]

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

[Large redacted block]



P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)



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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Language Analysis

FY 1958 responsibility included [redacted] low level voice activity intercepted by 321st USASA Bn, and translation of significant [redacted] news broadcasts. During FY 1959, section devoted principal efforts to [redacted]


P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)



Order of Battle

Provided extensive coverage of [redacted] during FY 1958. [redacted] during October 1957 were the [redacted]

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)



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Taiwan

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

13. (SOW) 176th USASA Company, Taipei

The 176th USASA Company's FY 1958 operational mission required it to intercept all known [redacted] communications originating in [redacted] and related unidentified activity [redacted]. During FY 1959, signals from [redacted] were the company's operational target.

Accordingly, five operational sections, whose relevant activities are outlined below, operated throughout the report period:

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Radiotelephone

Devoted three positions to [redacted] Search, one to [redacted] traffic, and one to [redacted] Search with emphasis on [redacted]. Noted extensive [redacted] during October 1957, and simultaneous appearance of several unidentified voice nets. Copied [redacted] and [redacted] thus pin-pointing [redacted]. Copied [redacted] type traffic. During FY 1959, recovered [redacted] communications of [redacted]. Observed indications that [redacted] were located in [redacted].

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Language and Translation

Scanned, transcribed, and translated traffic forwarded by [redacted] throughout the report period. Noted initiation of [redacted] Jul 58 by ChiCom [redacted].

Traffic Analysis

Published technical studies of [redacted] procedures, [redacted] and theories relative assignment of [redacted] responsibilities to [redacted]. Isolated and analyzed [redacted]. Identified [redacted]. Assigned designations to following complexes during FY 1959:

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)





SII



Okinawa

14. (ESCA) 3d USASA Field Station, Soba (Torii Station)

The 3d USASA Fld Sta's FY's 1958-1959 operational mission, performed by Analysis, Morse, Non-Morse, and Language Sections, required it to provide supported commands with information relative ChiCom organization, 


Outstanding among efforts directed toward these objectives was the station's performance in support of an X-Ray alert, called in September 1958, in connection with growing hostilities in Taiwan Strait. In its role as tri-service executive agent, the station established a close support reporting and analysis center on Taiwan to reinforce USM-79, and provided

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the latter with badly needed operational personnel.


A detailed account follows of COMINT activities performed during the report period:

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Analysis

Area Team 1 [] exploited and processed []

communications, beginning 15 Apr 58 and continuing throughout the report period. On 3 Jan 59, groups controlled by []



P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Area Team 2 [] performed second echelon analysis of []

[] material in support of initial analysis conducted by USM-79 (commencing 15 Nov 57 and continuing throughout the report period).

In addition, initial and current exploitation of []

communications commenced 14 Jun 58. []

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

[] Aug 58, forced the team to place several experienced analysts on extended TDY with USM-79 to aid the latter in performance of its first echelon mission. Primary emphasis was placed on

[] movements opposite the []

Designation of this station as executive agent for X-Ray alert resulted in an enlarged analytical responsibility. On 30 Sep 58, a new operational procedure was adopted by [] functions

in the [] Further, a minor structural change initiated

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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4 Oct 58, [redacted]

[redacted] functions. All [redacted] underwent a final minor procedural change 7 Jan 59. None of the above changes presented serious obstacles to station mission fulfillment.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Area Team 3 [redacted] performed second echelon analysis and reporting in support of analysis conducted at [redacted] throughout the report period.

The team's specific assignments, however, did not remain constant. Effective 1 Dec 57, it assumed responsibility for [redacted] and [redacted].

The [redacted] problem was added early in FY 1959, as was ChiCom [redacted] radio.

A minor structural change by [redacted] groups on 4 Jan 59 presented no difficulty. During the phasing-in of [redacted] on the [redacted] problem (transferred from USM-48 on 10 Mar 59), the 3d Fld Sta assumed end-product reporting responsibility.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Area Team 4 [redacted] began current exploitation of [redacted] entity on 22 Jul 57 and continued throughout the report period. Current processing of [redacted] and ChiCom [redacted] material commenced 1 Dec 57, but was not mentioned in the team's FY 1959 report.

Activation of four new [redacted]

[redacted] in March 1959, coupled with an overall increase in ChiCom [redacted] activity, placed a heavy strain on team personnel.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Area Team 5 (Special Studies) isolated and performed [redacted]

[redacted] communications systems. Team responsibility included provision of technical support to subordinate C/A, T/A, and intercept

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units on a current basis, as well as call sign analysis and technical support to supported processing units.

Automatic Morse

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Despite sporadic reception, caused in part by solar outbursts, a marked increase was noted in all assigned links. An extensive search and development program, designed to maintain continuity on [redacted] links achieved only moderate success. Special missions undertaken during the report period included:

[redacted]

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Effective 1 Jul 58, the [redacted] mission was deleted from assignment, leaving the [redacted] mission outlined below:

[redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)



P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Manual Morse

FY's 1958-1959 activities were highlighted by the discovery of seven new links. [redacted] with control in [redacted] and outstation in [redacted] and [redacted] with control in [redacted] and outstation in [redacted] were noted during FY 1958. During FY 1959, five new links were discovered and given temporary notations of [redacted]

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Beginning 11 Mar 59, a marked increase in valid message activity on radio facilities serving [redacted] led to acceptance of four temporary cases [redacted]

Cases dropped at this time were [redacted]

[redacted] was dropped shortly thereafter.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

A major communications change, occurring in the [redacted] on 3 Oct 58, affected [redacted]-controlled cases in the [redacted]

Subject change was recovered and under control within a short time.

All original [redacted] were canceled after 3 Oct 58. [redacted]

[redacted] were dropped from assignment.

The Manual Morse mission at the end of FY 1958 was as follows:

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

- 1) [redacted] day trick positions covering [redacted] cases.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
P.L. 86-36

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2) Swing trick positions covering [redacted] cases.

3) Mid trick positions covering 24 [redacted] and 5 [redacted] cases.

At the end of FY 1959, the Manual Morse mission was:

1) Day trick positions covering [redacted]

2) Swing trick positions covering [redacted]

3) Mid trick positions covering [redacted]

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Non-Morse

Appearance of ChiCom [redacted] activity during FY 1959 resulted in several changes in the station's assignment. As a result of a shift in emphasis from [redacted] over 30 different [redacted] links were copied during the year, as opposed to seven [redacted] links copied during FY 1959.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

The following special missions were implemented during FY 1958:

1) A Special Search mission, commenced 11 Jul 57 relative an unidentified RP link using [redacted] transmission. Subject link was identified as [redacted] on 30 Jul 57, and subsequently dropped from assignment.

2) A 20-day Search mission, implemented 22 May 58, which entailed monitoring [redacted] on all Schedules in a highly successful effort to determine the station's ability to provide printer coverage.

3) A 10-day General Search mission, implemented 16 Jun 58, which required concentrated search between 3 and 6 mcs for suspected ChiCom printer activity. Results were negative.

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Language

Translation circuit processed all ChiCom [redacted] and [redacted] traffic received at this station, with special attention to production of spot reports on civil disturbances in China. REF: VOL. I P. 172

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E. Europe

Germany

1. ~~(TSCW)~~ Hq, USASA-Europe, Frankfurt

Operationally, Hq, USASA-Europe supervised European COMINT and ELINT activities during FY 1958. The operational section (Intelligence Division) was subdivided as follows:

Machine Aids Branch

It was the mission of this branch to mechanize all COMINT, COMSEC, ELINT, and COMSEC activities in Europe, with special emphasis placed on COMINT. Machine processing tasks were divided into sustaining and one-time jobs. Sustaining job IBM punch cards were retained for a definite period of time or accumulated with new cards. One-time jobs were reports produced once and then destroyed. In July, NSA-Europe proposed that the

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[Redacted]

This branch supported [Redacted] activities

at the 182d USASA Company, as well as Intercept Control, SIT, ELINT, and Special Project Branches of the Intelligence Division; COMSEC Division, this headquarters; and the Morse General Search Section, 6th USASA Fld Sta.

As a special mission, the Processing Section, 320th USASA Battalion, sent a message to this branch which included [Redacted]

[Redacted]

was completed and shipped back to the 320th Battalion

on the following day, thus demonstrating this branch's ability to support

outlying, unsquipped units. This branch also supplied UEM-89 with one

Type 063 Card Controlled Tape Punch and Type 797 Special Equipment [Redacted]

Processing and Reporting Branch

Prior to 8 July, two separate branches existed for processing and reporting traffic. On 8 July, as a result of the decentralization of the various satellite problems to field units, they were combined into the Processing and Reporting Branch. The new branch was then responsible for post publications review, collection and dissemination of collateral material for USASA-Europe COMINT producers, and supervision and direction of collection, processing, and reporting activities which were decentralized to subordinate units. Processing activities concentrated on Russian, Satellite, and Voice problems.


[Redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)



Voice Processing Section - This section carried out post publication review of reports pertaining to the mission of Hq, USASA-Europe.

Special Identification Techniques (SIT)

Resulting from the phase-out of the 8th USASA Fld Sta during the first part of FY 1958, Polish intercept was transferred to the 182d USASA Company, Rothwestan. The 182d Company then arranged to receive SIT support from the 507th USASA Group until teletype facilities could be installed to permit the flashing of Polish targets to the USASA-Europe Fixed DF. net. [] support was obtained from the 319th USASA Battalion during the year, DF was furnished this company by USASA-Europe Fixed DF Net.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Administrative control of [] was transferred to the 320th USASA Battalion on 14 August and redesignated [] In September, USM-89 moved

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from Udine to Aviano, Italy.

The following tests were conducted by members of the USASA-Europe command:

On 15 Oct 57, the 507th USASA Group's Mobile DF Net commenced field test of the Medea Joint DF Operations Code. Test was terminated after two days due to cumbersome operational procedures. As a result, the Medea was not recommended for use at this headquarters.

On 6 January, a DF test at Schleswig was conducted in order to find a new location for the unreliable DF site at Neuenwalde, Germany. Initial tests were promising, but further tests were canceled because of the erection of a new hangar and runway at the site.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)



From 24-28 June, a test was held to determine the effectiveness of an unproved lightweight radio receiver and transmitter for use by stay behind patrols. USASA-Europe determined its capacity to provide USAREUR with support in detaching and locating enemy long range or stay behind patrols. Results were unsatisfactory due to improperly trained personnel and poorly maintained equipment.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Special Projects Branch

This branch processed plain text

[redacted] Material was supplied by US intercept stations located in Europe and Africa which monitored [redacted] links, and the Operations and Research Detachment of G2, USAREUR which maintained monitoring units in major cities throughout the US Zone of responsibility. [redacted] collection was handled at ORD units located at [redacted] facilities in Berlin, Frankfurt, and Nurnberg. In addition to these, teletype lines of

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the East German Railroad communications complex (BASA) were monitored by the ORD unit in Berlin. In September 1957, these lines were rerouted by the East German authorities and thus bypassed monitored facilities. The loss

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

of these lines and [redacted] telephone lines in the same complex resulted in a discontinuation of reports based on East German railroad transportation.

G2, USAREUR, withdrew its requirement on 19 Oct 57.

In September 1957, the ORD unit at Nuremberg secured taps on the 18-channel [redacted] teletype lines. The intelligence value of this link compensated to a great extent for the loss of the highly productive [redacted]

[redacted] in May 1957. In March 1958, teletype lines in the [redacted] area were relocated, resulting in a temporary loss of traffic. When monitoring was resumed, [redacted]

[redacted] was lost, [redacted]

Linguistic support was provided by two Czech linguists, two Bulgarian linguists, and one Russian, French, and Hungarian linguist who received intercept directly from the evaluation unit. Other subsections included the following:

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Soviet Bloc Travel and Biographical Subsection - Furnished reports and records on movements of Soviet Bloc officials and high ranking [redacted] officials travelling within the Soviet orbit..

Soviet Bloc Conditions Subsection - Reported on agricultural, economic, social and political positions within the Soviet Bloc. [redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] Principal effort was devoted to preparing five weekly summaries and a daily intelligence report on internal conditions within the Soviet Bloc as derived from mail intercept.

Special Activities Unit - Charged with evaluation of collection targets and recommending changes, deletions, and/or additions of coverage on intelligence targets.

Electronic Communications Processing

This section received raw traffic from USM-620K where a logging team listed each message. In addition, the section maintained files on East German personalities and published personality reports, and performed T/A on the [redacted] net in order to better direct the intercept effort. In June 1957,

[redacted]

ELINT

Operations of the ELINT Branch during the year consisted of initiating and correlating ELINT and COMINT-ELINT projects. The branch maintained files of technical directives, analysis reports, collateral reports, information pertaining to type and location of Soviet equipment. Project

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[Redacted]

TUSLOG Detachment 4

and the US Navy coordinated plans to use Navy Ferret planes for the mission, and the Command Issuing Office, NSA in London, was consulted on technical details. The project was scheduled to continue until August 1958, but even though Detachment 4 continued to supply the COMINT tip-off to a similar Air Force project, this headquarters felt that the extended USASA capability for collection of this vital data through [Redacted] should be extended.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

On 16 Sep 57, a combined COMINT-ELINT mission was initiated at Mt Hohenbagen.

The ELINT mission included general search of the [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Intercept quality

was then greatly improved, and the addition of microwave amplifier to the equipment made continued COMINT operation desirable, although the ELINT operation was discontinued after 60 days. COMINT operations were transferred to Mt Schneeberg on 20 December for logistical reasons, and in February, the project was transferred to the 318th USASA Battalion.

[Redacted]


Action

was initiated to coordinate COMINT-ELINT reaction response to any further

[Redacted]

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Detachment 4 and 1st Operations Platoon, 279th USASA Company were relieved




P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

The TAREX Branch supported the COMINT, COMSEC, COMSIG, ELINT and ELSEC efforts of USASA-Europe and NSA through the collection of information relative to foreign [redacted] communications, and electronic activities. Accordingly, the branch exploited the following sources during the year:

Defectors, Refugees, Returnees - TAREX screened all channels for handling of these sources, including the Defector Reception Center, Returnee Exploitation Group, 513th MI Group, 522d MI Group Battalion, G2 USAREUR, USAFE for original or further interrogation of sources having knowledge within the TAREX scope of interest. This branch produced several interrogation reports covering information on [redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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EO 3.3(h)(2)



P.L. 86-36
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
Industrial Fairs - Material collected consisted mainly of brochures of various pieces or components of telecommunication or electronics equipment. Requirement was levied because



Foreign Publications - TAREX continued to procure various publications, such as newspapers, technical periodicals, encyclopedias, books, and magazines. At the end of the year, TAREX was subscribing to 38 publications, including East and West German, Czech, Romanian, Polish, Soviet, and Yugoslavian newspapers and periodicals.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Employees or Members of Foreign Intelligence Organizations - Information from this source covered only Intelligence Services. Through its sources TAREX was posted on a limited, unofficial basis with information concerning effort and success.



P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

During FY 1959, the operational mission of supervising European COMINT and ELINT activities remained unchanged. Operational elements were subdivided as follows:

Political Section

Mission of this section included publication of intelligence gained

from [redacted]

[redacted] Selection of items was made on the

basis of EEI's received from G2, USAREUR and Operational Control Authority.

Special EEI's were also given to NSA and Hq, USASA. Messages of immediate concern were processed and released electrically in advance of publication in the regular journal. Section also kept a name file of [redacted] functionaries and their positions and published reports listing names and positions of [redacted]

Important electronic releases included the following:

- 16 & 20 Dec 58 -
- 23 Jan 59 -
- 4 Mar 59 -

[redacted]

[redacted] Technical Section

Mission was to process all radio telephone and teletype traffic concerned specifically with the structure and operation of [redacted]

[redacted] Accomplishment of assigned

mission was effected primarily through publication of a series of periodic reports comprising weekly traffic analysis summaries and monthly informal

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

notes as well as by periodic technical journals and reverse technical support letters. In addition, selected items were translated and forwarded electrically to consumers.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
P.L. 86-36

At start of the year; intercept assignment for [redacted] at USM-620K

included the following:

[redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Position CH 03 ceased normal operations [redacted] 8-10 July and began search for suspected [redacted] traffic believed being passed in the area of [redacted]. Results were negative. Second search was made by positions CH 02 and CH 03 from 14-18 July with presumed [redacted] signals on [redacted] channels intercepted. On 4 August, position was again diverted from copying [redacted] traffic and was tasked with a 60-day search for [redacted] signals in the 1200-1500 mcs range. Intercepts were made at [redacted] mcs. Teleprinter traffic and 14 tapes were forwarded to this headquarters for processing.

From 14-21 October, a substantial drop in power of the [redacted] signal was noticed at USM-620K. Poor quality made production-copy impossible. Accordingly, on 16 October, position CH 03 was diverted to attempt copy of

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] This was done in an unsuccessful attempt to recover intercept lost by decreased signal strength on [redacted]

On 27 January, a fourth IIF position (CH 06) was activated to perform [redacted] search with alternate [redacted] search. During a [redacted] search at Bahrdorf from 9-14 March, two signals were found suitable for production; the [redacted] signal passing [redacted] and

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the [] signal passing [] from []

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

[] Intercept revealed reference to course of instruction in [] equipment on the [] net. Since introduction of this equipment was accomplished to supplement or replace existing [] equipment this headquarters informed NSAEUR and HQ, USASA of the situation with the result that action was begun to provide this unit with the capability for intercepting these systems.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)


During the year, various personnel of the Technical subsection were assigned to provide linguistic and T/A support on a total of five searches for [] signals conducted at Wasserkuppe, Schneeberg, NE Meissen, and Bahrdorf. Primary purpose (except for Wasserkuppe team which covered the [] was to obtain production copy signal from the [] Successful penetration of [] was effected 27 May 59 at UEM-620K following installation of a 28-foot dish and use of a [] as a preamplifier. This penetration meant an 100% increase in volume of traffic being passed.

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


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Other significant information reported included construction of the Baku-BNE oil pipeline, evidences of Communist China's rising industrial capacity, construction of Czech merchant fleet, Soviet interest in West German steel mill methods, and the Soviet Union's



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EO 3.3(h)(2)



Soviet Bloc Internal Conditions Section

This section reported on agricultural, economic, social, and political conditions as well as the location of military units and personnel within the Soviet Bloc. Source material consisted of US [redacted] (after 4 Dec 58) intercepts of private mail sent from the Bloc to West Germany. Letters were opened, scanned for possible intelligence value and photographed on microfilm.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
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Section published three weekly summaries and a daily intelligence report on domestic conditions within East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Summaries contained translated extracts of items selected from each day's traffic as well as surveys of correlated items. Translations and surveys were categorized under the headings of Agriculture, Standard of Living, Industry and Business, Labor, Politics, Military, Scientific and Technical,

Transportation and Communication, Control, Construction, General, and Disaster.

Soviet Bloc Travel and Biographic Section

Section tasked with reporting the travel of Soviet Bloc personnel to, from, and/or within Eastern European nations; the travel of Western scientific and professional personalities to and from the Soviet Bloc; and as a special supplement the travel of both Eastern and Western personalities to and from the Middle East. Information was derived from postal, [redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] Publications included a Soviet Bloc Air Travel Summary, a monthly IBM index to personalities appearing in the daily Soviet Bloc Travel Bulletin, and special reports as requested from interested consumers.


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[redacted] Section


Section identified and isolated Soviet/Satellite Missile installations and units. As a secondary mission it monitored the [redacted] effort at Sinop, Turkey and provided the station with the most complete up-to-date technical support available. COMINT-ELINT sources, reports were received from other intelligence gathering organizations operating in Europe as well as the United States. All reports were evaluated and extracted information was used to attempt identification of a missile, missile-associated unit or installation. [redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

[redacted]




Production Review Section

Mission entailed the receipt and study of technical and end-product reports from all theater COMINT sources. The Russian and Satellite subsections carried out normal post publication review of incoming technical and end product reports. Both subsections also scanned all cables concerning their respective problems and submitted items to the daily COMINT Summary, which was produced by the branch for the Chief, USASA-Europe and Chief, Intelligence Division. The Soviet/Satellite  subsection was transferred to 318th USASA Battalion, 15 Apr 59.




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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Signal Analysis Section

Section was tasked with coordination and control of assigned ELINT projects. Mission was accomplished through technical guidance and evaluation of ELINT and combined COMINT/ELINT operations. Accordingly, Section was divided into a Communications Analysis Team and an ELINT Analysis Team.

Communications Analysis Team processed 785 magnetic tapes during the year, majority of which were  New developments discovered by Team included use of 



ELINT Analysis Team received intercept material from 276th USASA Company, Sinop; 280th USASA Company, Berlin; 2d Opns Plat, 279th USASA Company, Schneeberg. The 279th USASA Company performed mobile operations at Hof, Schneeberg, Rittsteig, and Bahrdorf. Results evaluated by team. 318th USASA Battalion performed search mission at Schneeberg and Rittsteig. Covered  emissions  Used a COMINT position at each site to provide tip-off for ELINT targets and establish coincidence between specific  No known correlation effected.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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General Search

General Search mission continued throughout the year at Berlin, Mt Meissner, and Schneeberg, Germany, and at Sinop, Turkey. Berlin continued producing a number of new or unusual signals. During June 1958, effort at Berlin produced excellent results from the Gruenewald area. For the first

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

time a high volume of [redacted]

[redacted] Sinop continued routine general search coverage of the Black Sea area while Schneeberg intercepted mostly known signals. In January, the [redacted] mission was transferred from Berlin to Schneeberg. Effort at Mt Meissner continued monitoring routine signals as well as providing personnel and equipment for mobile tactical operations. In April, general search was undertaken only at night, while two 6-week OJT ELINT courses were given to [redacted]

Tactical ELINT Section

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Section conducted the following exercises during the year:

3-30 May 59 - 3d Plat, 279th USASA Company operating from a fixed site at Bahrdorf tested tactical concepts. Original general search mission changed 1 Jul 58 to mission of correlating COMINT and ELINT. Mission was successful and increased number of [redacted] intercepts.

2-15 Jul 58 - Mobile Team from 2d Opns Plat, 279th USASA Company operated at Bruckendorf. COMINT/ELINT integration was attempted resulting in two simultaneous intercepts at same bearing.

18 Jun-11 Sep 58 - 319th USASA Battalion (augmented by personnel from 318th USASA Bn) operated a team on Pelmars Island. Both COMINT and ELINT positions were productive, but [redacted] Team intercepted only one possible [redacted] which was discontinued after thorough signal analysis. At end of this operation, ELINT

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teams of 318th and 319th USASA Battalions joined 3d Opns Plat, 279th USASA Company at Bahrdorf where 3d Plat began site surveys along Czech border. Results at Schneeberg were very good, but second site survey at Rittsteig proved better.

2-7 Feb 59 - Two vans of 1st and 2d Opns Plat, 279th USASA Company, and two vans of 318th and 319th USASA Battalions participated in Seventh US Army Exercise FREE PLAY.

2 Mar 59 - 3d Opns Plat, 279th USASA Company set up a semi-fixed site at Bahrdorf. Later joined by two teams from 319th Battalion and by mobile team of 2d Opns Platoon. Hq, USASA-Europe control and analysis team arrived to coordinate operations and four communications teams were provided by 507th USASA Group. Collection teams flashed intercepts to each other and reported results hourly to C&A team.

1-5 Jun 59 - 1st Plat, 280th USASA Company cooperated a mobile team in the Gruenwalde area of Berlin. Produced first

Chief Special Projects regarding USASA-Europe units follow:

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Soviet Bloc Jammer Monitoring - Combined Army, Navy, and Air Force project under operational control of Air Force. Analysis performed by National Technical Processing Center, Washington, DC. 276th USASA Company only Army unit in Europe participating in the plan.

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2. ~~(TSU)~~ 507th USASA Group, Heilbronn

Primary mission of the 507th USASA Group during FY 1958 included full COMINT responsibility for entities of the [redacted]

[redacted] Also continued were responsibilities for reporting [redacted] problem. However, final authority rested with [redacted]

[redacted] The 318th and 319th USASA Battalions, and the 183d and 184th USASA Companies were directly responsible to the 507th for intercept and analytic support of the [redacted] problems. In August, mission was again expanded, with additional responsibility for intercept of [redacted] transmissions.

Manual Morse

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

At start of FY 1958, the 507th controlled [redacted] manual Morse positions at 302d USASA Battalion and [redacted] at the 307th USASA Battalion to copy Russian and German transmissions. On 23 August, the 339th USASA Company transferred [redacted] positions to the 302d USASA Battalion which were given Czech copy assignments. [redacted] positions added from the 6th USASA Fld Sta were placed under group control. Manual Morse effort underwent organizational change 15 Oct 57. As a result, the manual Morse effort was assigned to numbered companies. The 183d was given [redacted] positions of the 320th Battalion, and the 184th was given [redacted] positions from the 307th Battalion. On 30 May 58, the mission was expanded, giving the group control of a position of the 182d Company for the purpose of testing its ability to copy the German problem and the 183d Company was given control for the mission assignment of [redacted] positions at the 6th USASA Fld Sta.

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Voice Intercept

Started year with [] programmed positions, [] installed, [] manned, and [] programmed. The R/T component remained unchanged until the group was reorganized, and two voice positions changed to []. From 15 October to end of December, the group voice effort was divided into five [] four Czech, 14 Russian, one [] and one Special Search [] positions. In January 1958, [] voice position at Mahring was dropped and by the end of the month, the mission of [] of the positions was changed from []. On 1 Feb 58, [] voice positions were used in the [] saturation effort which lasted until 2 March. Concurrently, [] positions were moved from Mahring to Scheeberg and assigned a mission of operating in the UHF/VHF range, adding a new detachment to the group.

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Little was done to control the intercept of [redacted] transmissions as only scant information was available concerning call signs, frequencies, and schedules. All positions operated on search between [redacted] and [redacted] were closely monitored to avoid duplication as much as possible. Scanning teams maintained a record of each day's traffic, noting instances of duplication and showing stations involved in the intercept, date of intercept, frequencies involved, and readability.

Radio Printer


On 15 Aug 57, the R/P assignment at the 302d USASA Battalion was transferred to the 307th USASA Battalion, which by the end of September, had eight programmed positions, eight installed, and four manned. The four manned were all single positions. The group's R/P intercept assignment was then delegated to the numbered companies.

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
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
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


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
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[redacted] - Intercept test conducted from 2-22 Dec 58 at 318th USASA Battalion. Sought to determine feasibility of transferring mission of 182d USASA Company from Rothwesten to Herzo Base.

[redacted] for administration, and Category "A" for intercept control. Test began 1 May 59 and continued into FY 1960.

Four special Radio Direction Finding exercises were conducted during the year:

Operation PLUTO - Exercise to test lightweight transmitters for use by longrange or stay-behind patrols, and to determine if this type transmitter could be located by DF equipment. Test conducted 24 Jun-3 Jul 58.

Operation DRAGNET - Continuation of above problem, except this operation was conducted in mountainous terrain and simulated intercepting transmitters from guerrilla teams.

Operation LIMBO - Exercise using three AN/PRD-1 RDF machines to determine the feasibility of using bearing correction factors in the operation of tactical DF equipment during combat operations. RDF sites and target transmitter sites were placed in various types of terrain to simulate actual combat-type conditions. No positive conclusions were drawn.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

3. ~~(S)~~ 318th USASA Battalion, Herzogenaurach

During FY 1958, the 318th USASA Battalion collected and provided first echelon reporting on radio communications serving the [redacted]

The battalion also had decentralized

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responsibility of collecting and processing end product reporting on the



Manual Morse Intercept Section

During both fiscal years, this section covered manual Morse nets of

the



Section also possessed capability of copying any of

these two nets on voice, should the need arise.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
P.L. 86-36

FY 1958

At start of year, [] positions were assigned. In second quarter, one Russian Manual Morse search was dropped, leaving [] Czech, [] Russian, and [] GC positions. Later in the year, Czech mission was realigned so that two positions were full cover, eight scheduled group, and two sampling cover. During fourth quarter, a complete revision of position designators and almost complete revision of definitions of the types of position coverage took place. Under the new nomenclature this section had [] positions at end of the year, though the same amount of men and equipment were employed. Redesignation included a marked decentralization of responsibility; DSM-42 was given operational control of [] manual Morse positions at USM-6; one GSM, one GSM, and [] manual Morse position at DSM-620L.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

FY 1959

At start of year, [] manual Morse positions were distributed as follows: [] covered [] GC, and [] covered the Czech mission. In first quarter, one Czech and one GC position were added. No further changes occurred until 25 Mar 59, when 6th USASA Fld Sta was phased out and its mission added to the 318th's. Total number of positions was increased to [] including six General Search positions. Battalion

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also received operational control of [] GC positions resulting from the transfer of reporting responsibilities from the 507th USASA Group. At the year's end, one [] position was added while several were deleted due to personnel losses, leaving a total of [] positions on assignment. These included

[]

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Russian []

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Assigned mission underwent several changes during FY 1958, processing was performed on []

Twelve Czech manual Morse positions were transferred from USM-83 on 23 August, enabling the section to maintain a search mission on nine other Russian

[]

This assignment was deleted from battalion assignment

1 Jan 58. In FY 1959, the 6th USASA Fld Sta's Russian [] mission was transferred to this section. In May 1959; [] and

[]

problems were transferred to the 319th USASA Battalion.

German Communist T/A Section

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Section processed all manual Morse and voice traffic copied at USM-42 and USM-42K1 in FY 1958. In the following year, USM-601 traffic replaced USM-42, however, the section continued reporting all material of intelligence value to the 507th USASA Group for further analysis and eventual release to interested consumers. Intercept mission included all GC [] nets and five [] as well as a general [] search mission.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

FY 1958

After major communications change of 20 May 57, a certain amount of reorganization had taken place. Appearance of [] nets and the disappearance of [] nets was considered of major significance. Minor changes consisted of the rearrangement of the [] to each net. Rearrangement of

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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[redacted] was completed 1 Apr 58, and [redacted] were at least 90% complete by year's end. Minor adjustments of [redacted]

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[redacted] were made by this section in

FY 1959

[redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

During FY 1959, [redacted] voice problem expanded its field of coverage from [redacted] problem to include [redacted] and later, [redacted] problems.

In September 1958, [redacted] problem was assigned to the Scanning and Analysis Section of the 507th USASA Group. The 318th processed traffic for the group, but little or no information of tactical or operational nature was observed [redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

[redacted]

The existence of [redacted] was first indicated in November 1958. At first, it was suspected that [redacted] was connected

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with the [] communications activity. However, a []

[] increased in intensity during first few months of FY 1959, reaching its peak in late October with [] activity within

[] Sufficient traffic was recovered to maintain []

[] Since that date, only one burst of [] activity was noted, []

Jun 59.

Radio Printer T/A Section

[] activity increased during FY 1958. [] activity within these units increased during the first four months, but tapered off considerably during June. [] transmissions were sporadically heard during the year on [] nets and links and during [] [] nets and links became a normal feature in all []

[] These were capable of [] and voice. At close of FY 1958 section had two multiplex positions [] and two simplex positions [] At start of FY 1959, lack of qualified

R/P and T/A personnel impaired mission assignment. During third quarter, many major changes took place beginning with [] net use of more [] was used extensively during the []

[] On 25 Mar 59, 6th USASA Fld Sta merged with this unit so that total strength of R/P section at close of year was [] operators and [] analysts. These were used to accomplish the assigned mission: []

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Czech Processing and Reporting Section

At start of FY 1958, USM-42 covered Czech low level voice effort. On 23 August, [] manual Morse positions were transferred from USM-88 to USM-42. These nets included [] and two unidentified nets. Problem remained static until 29 November when entire Czech problem, including processing and end product reporting, was decentralized from Hq, USASA-Europe to this section. No significant changes were made during FY 1959.

FY 1958 Problem




P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

FY 1959 Problem



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P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)



Special FY 1959 missions resulted from the operational merger of the 6th USASA Fld Sta with the 318th USASA Battalion on 25 Mar 59. Operation PAUSE, controlled by Chief, USASA-Europe monitored on frequencies and schedules furnished by that headquarters. Operation MILE, controlled like Operation PAUSE and monitored in a like manner, at no time afforded affirmative results.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Additionally, manual Morse General Search positions were often tasked with special missions. REF: VOL. I P. 191.

4. ~~(ISCR)~~ 319th USASA Battalion, Rothvesten

During FY's 1958-1959, the 319th USASA Battalion was tasked with intercepting and performing preliminary analysis on signals emanating from With the attachment of the 182d USASA Company, 1 Oct 58, mission was expanded to include intercept, analysis, and COMINT reporting on communications signals emanating from sources.

On 15 Dec 58, battalion mission was further enlarged to include Russian

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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[redacted] manual Morse and conventional [redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Manual Morse

At start of FY 1958, manual Morse mission covered [redacted] and

[redacted] nets and those of [redacted]

[redacted] On 15 Aug 57, mission was increased when

[redacted] problem was transferred to this command. A general

[redacted] mission, covering specific [redacted]

[redacted] was also assigned. In September 1957, preparations

were begun for suspected major [redacted]

[redacted] and with the aid of operators' comments and seven

additional positions [redacted] On 15 Oct 57, a

test was conducted to determine whether station could intercept [redacted]

[redacted] Test appeared to be successful, however, higher headquarters

had not confirmed this by the year's end. In September 1957, a manual Morse

supervisors position was installed with the capability of monitoring all

manual Morse positions. It also enabled targets to be patched directly to

the RDF flash operators position, thus saving time previously used to search

for these targets.

Until the 4th Qtr, FY 1959, there were only minor changes in mission

assignment. Elements of [redacted] were covered by Full Cover and Block Cover

assignments. The former handled [redacted] while the latter

handled [redacted] In addition, three search

positions; [redacted] were manned. The first two were

used for [redacted] Search and the last for [redacted] Search. On 16 May 59

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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SCCM 19 and 20 were transferred to USM-601, and all elements of [] with the exception of the [] were transferred to USM-602 and assigned []. On 11 Jun 59, [] copied on [] was transferred to top priority on [] was deleted from the mission, and on this same date, [] copied at USM-602-1 was dropped and nets assigned to USM-602 []. Four days later, [] and [] Search positions, were added to assignment. These positions were dropped 18 Jun 59 and two full cover positions replaced them.

Radio Printer

While this section's activities closely paralleled the manual Morse effort, a sampling of all single channel links using [] system within [] was included in FY 1958. In the following year, double channel [] printer signals emanating from [] were covered.

Radiotelephone

Intercept of [] traffic was exceptionally high during FY 1958. The sudden rise in intercept commencing 1 Feb 58, indicated that [] Later in year, (5 Oct and 19 Nov 57) attempts were made at Rothwesten to intercept [] transmissions. Tests were conducted intermittently with limited success. Additionally, on 20 December, Operation [] was effected. Test, however, proved unsuccessful.

In FY 1959, mission assignment remained relatively same as in previous year, with more emphasis on [] activities. An additional assignment tasked the battalion with intercepting, recording, and transcribing all

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[redacted] range while entire voice effort continued as a back-up for the manual Morse and R/P efforts. The [redacted] effort was assigned the mission of intercepting, recording, and transcribing all [redacted]. Mission was expanded 11 Mar 59 when [redacted] transmissions were added and scanning activities extended to include both Russian and German signals.

Polish Activities

The Polish problem, added in FY 1959, became the responsibility of the assigned 182d USASA Company. Company was responsible for coverage of Polish

[redacted]

net and [redacted] activities.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
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Manual Morse

At start of the year station manned [redacted] manual Morse posts; [redacted] covered [redacted] nets, one [redacted] nets, while the remainder were used for Polish [redacted]. On 9 July, station added a position to [redacted] mission and merged Polish [redacted] into [redacted] full cover position. NSA, however, did not sanction the additional position and reestablished it as [redacted]. On 20 July, station dropped [redacted] problem and recommended [redacted] problem be assigned [redacted] positions instead of [redacted] full with an alternative mission. On 29 September, station added another Category "D" position for cover of [redacted] low level targets; and on 13 October dropped coverage on [redacted] (voice) due to lack of qualified linguists. Early in May, increased volume of [redacted] activity was observed with several [redacted] notations being case and assigned to the mission. Later in the month the [redacted] missions were deleted and transferred to Herzo Base. With the cancellation came [redacted] full cover positions for intercept of [redacted] and [redacted].

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positions to be used as block cover on [] activity.

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Radio Printer

This section intercepted, analyzed, and reported on R/P targets located within the [] itself. Non-mission intercept included all [] within this station's capabilities. Numerous [] took place with considerable information derived from them. From 1 July through 30 Oct 58, activity consisted of []

[] A link intercepted 20-26 April under analysis proved to be a [] Other satellite traffic copied at this station but assigned elsewhere was forwarded to stations concerned.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Voice

Mission of this section was to intercept and transcribe all Polish [] Voice. Pursuant to this, the battalion utilized four intercept positions at the start of the year, and three (located at Rothwesten, Lubeck, and Berlin) at the end of the year. Proficiency and quality of Polish R/T operators increased continuously throughout the report period.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Summary of Polish Activities

Recovery of []

[] Thus [] was maintained throughout the year. []

[] This entity used the same []

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[redacted] was maintained during the first
half of the year by employing [redacted]

[redacted]

but an intense search

effort on the part of manual Morse with careful direction of intercept by

the

[redacted]

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5. ~~(S)~~ 320th USASA Battalion, Bad Aibling

Operational effort of the 320th USASA Battalion was conducted
with relatively no change during the report period. Specific missions
during FY 1958 included Albanian, Bulgarian, [redacted] and Romanian processing.
Battalion Operations Section performed routine processing on Bulgarian,

[redacted] and Romanian communications entities. In August 1958, the Hungarian, Bulgarian, Romanian, and Yugoslav Processing Branches were consolidated as the Southern Satellite and Yugoslav Branch.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Albania

On 16 May 58, one position at USM-76 was assigned for intercept of Albanian [redacted] however, no intercept was received for processing during the report period.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Bulgaria

During FY 1958-1959, Bulgarian [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] During August 1957, an unidentified link suspected of being a connection between the Bulgarian [redacted] and the [redacted] was noted. However, higher headquarters determined this net as a function of the [redacted] In FY 1959 (28 Dec 58), a

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

[redacted]

One of the most significant developments which occurred during FY 1958 took place 11 Nov 57 on [redacted]

[redacted] In
FY 1959, Branch was assigned to cover Bulgarian [redacted] during mid-April
to [redacted] On

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15 Apr 59.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

were reported

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by this headquarters on 19 February and 4 and 5 Mar 58. This net also
effected [Redacted] in April 1958. Prior to 11 March, the [Redacted]

[Redacted] employed alternate details in addition to the regular day and
night details. As a result of a minor [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Bulgarian [Redacted]

12 Jan

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58. New

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Intercept of this network was discontinued 13 Jun 59.

Romania

Romanian

[Redacted]

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Several of the outstations of both the additional group and the main radio group were also believed to be collocated.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

[Redacted]


On 1 Jun 58, the Romanian

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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On 12 Sep 58, eight Romanian unidentified groups/links were reconstituted [redacted] and assigned to this headquarters for processing. Later in November three of these links were cancelled with the remaining last heard 15 Feb 59.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

HUNGARY

In September of FY 1958, Hungarian [redacted] [redacted] problems were decentralized. However, the mission of the Hungarian Branch was not greatly altered and it continued to perform [redacted] and report significant developments observed on radio communications serving Hungarian entities.

Normal [redacted] involving Hungarian [redacted] occurred periodically during June and July 1957. [redacted] was resumed in late May with a short period of [redacted] occurring from 19-22 May, and a period of extensive [redacted] activity observed from 28 May through 6 June. The latter activity was believed to have involved elements of all Hungarian [redacted]

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[redacted] In October 1957, extensive preparations were made to [redacted]

[redacted] on 15 October and continued to operate

on this group through 8 Nov 57. Also in November, an [redacted]

The first known Hungarian [redacted]

became active in February 1957. Following its appearance, the [redacted]

was determined to be collocated with [redacted]

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[Redacted] Since

March 1959, repeated instances of contact between [Redacted]

[Redacted] were observed. [Redacted] two known Hungarian

[Redacted] were observed in communication with at least six of the [Redacted]

[Redacted]

The Hungarian [Redacted] retained its structure of two collocated stations at Budapest, controlling [Redacted] On that

date the communications structure was revised to consist of [Redacted]


[Redacted] collocated in Budapest, but still communi-

cating with a total of [Redacted] Since this change, these groups

employed a [Redacted] Since 3 January, all

[Large Redacted Area]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Russia


From July through January, FY 1958, the mission of the Russian Branch continued to be processing and reporting of the

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EO 3.3(h)(2)



Effective 28 January, primary processing and reporting responsibilities were assumed for the following decentralized problems:


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Transfer

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of these responsibilities was completed 3 Feb 58.



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EO 3.3(h)(2)




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EO 3.3(h)(2)

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

A brief summary of activities within the various 

 follows:



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
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EO 3.3(h)(2)



In FY 1959, though no major changes were effected, two minor ones took place. Both changes reverted most of the

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maintained almost daily communica-
tions with each other. No such lateral link had been previously noted between

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these

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Yugoslavia

Mission of the Yugoslav Branch continued to be processing of

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Activity was static

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
and no analytical processing was necessary during FY 1958. On 12 May 58, NSA decentralized the Yugoslav [redacted] problem to the field processing unit. In FY 1959, this activity was static and no analytical processing was necessary.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)



[redacted] activity, with occasional voice and Morse parallels, was sporadic throughout the year. Between 27-29 Jun 58, Yugoslav [redacted] became

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EO 3.3(h)(2)



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Special Missions

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

According to Revision of 1 Feb 58, the 320th USASA Battalion was tasked by USAREUR to form Detachment L-1 (Quebec) with the mission of providing COMINT support for the Army Task Force should it be called into the Middle East. Collection capability of this detachment consisted of [] positions to be utilized for R/T intercept, Morse intercept, or COMSEC monitoring.

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On 16 Jul 58, detachment moved to Furstenfeldbruck Air Base, and thence to Lebanon. Four manual Morse positions, one [] and three DF positions were used. At first the alien nature of the problem and the limited operational area hindered results. But as operators became more familiar with the problem, received technical aid from NSA and 4th USASA Fld Sta personnel, and made equipment adjustments, numerous recoveries were made. Principal targets were Lebanese Guerrilla [] stations, but some Syrian and Egyptian targets were also intercepted.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

In FY 1958, the battalion was tasked with a COMINT mission in Italy consisting of one Manual Morse position and one DF team. Mission was to intercept and perform DF on Yugoslav Manual Morse transmissions. On 9 Sep 57, these detachments were moved from Udine, Italy to Aviano, and together with

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a COMSEC team (US Army Test Detachment, SETAF), became part of the 75th USASA Company (USM-76). Other special missions of operational nature included intercept of [redacted] transmissions emanating from Czechoslovakia. This was performed by Detachment "Papa" which was originally located near Phaffeureut, Germany and later moved to various positions along the German-Czech border. Detachment ceased operations on 22 Dec 57. Additionally, on 25 Oct 57, the 320th was tasked by G2, USAREUR to perform additional intercept on Bulgarian targets. One manual Morse position at USM-85 was devoted to this mission and it copied Bulgarian [redacted] [redacted] in that order of priority until 28 February.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

In September 1958, Hq, USASA-Europe directed the 320th USASA Battalion to form Turkish Logistic Detachment 27X to perform intercept tests on Mid-East targets at Mersin and Ankara. On 25 October, the detachment was air-lifted to Mersin where operations commenced on Mid-East targets after receiving training from NSA civilian operators. While at this site the detachment was able to copy, seven [redacted] seven Iraqi, six Egyptian, eleven [redacted] and two Lebanese Morse cases as well as sixteen [redacted] cases. Upon completion of this test, NSA personnel were replaced by personnel from the 4th USASA Fld Sta and the detachment moved to [redacted] [redacted] Reception was notably poorer at this site. On 20 December, Turkish Logistic Detachment 27X departed Turkey with elements of 320th, reaching home base on 29 December. Another special mission, Operation [redacted] was assigned to 180th USASA Company (USM-85) in July 1958. Mission

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
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required daily monitoring of assigned frequencies and schedules for specific call signs. Intercept results were sporadic and mission was deleted in June 1959. REF: VOL I P. 199.

6. ~~(SCL)~~ 182d USASA Company, Rothwesten

This company's mission was to monitor Polish communications.

Accordingly, it intercepted




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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Manual Morse

Prior to 22 Aug 57, this branch intercepted Morse communications

activity of



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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Subsequent to 22

August, the 182d received the mission of the 8th USASA Fld Sta as well as four [] positions from the 11th USASA Fld Sta. Its Czech mission was transferred to the 318th USASA Battalion and the Russian Search problem to the 320th USASA Battalion. The company's new Morse mission provided coverage as indicated below:




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EO 3.3(h)(2)


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EO 3.3(h)(2)



Difficulty was encountered with the Russian mission [redacted]



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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Following concurrence of USASA-Europe, on 8 June, the 507th USASA Group assigned one position to cover [redacted]

At the beginning of FY 1959, the section manned 19 manual Morse and three Voice positions. Another position for cover of [redacted]

[redacted] was added on 9 July. However, NSA did not cancel and reestablished the position as [redacted]

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[redacted] was dropped. At the same time, the [redacted] problem added an assigned position. With this recommendation,

[redacted] was dropped from alternate cover and assigned to a full cover

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type target. On 27 Aug 58, the section canceled [redacted] 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, and reestablished them as [redacted] plus associated position designators.

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With this re-scheduling, targets were given priority coverage when they became active. In like manner, when [] targets were inactive, operators sampled [] targets that had also been assigned these positions. On 29 September, the section added another Category "D" position for cover of assigned [] low level targets.

Detachment K was tasked with the intercept of []

[]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

At the start of this mission, the detachment operated eight hours daily, providing effective intercept on [] A difficulty encountered by intercept operators as operation commenced was the lack of []

[]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

On 16 Aug 58, the parent unit requested special emphasis be placed on [] nets. This was carried out for two days with four of the five [] intercepted.

The company's Detachment B, at Bremerhaven, covered [] nets. The one position utilized covered []

Characteristics were []

[]

The 182d also provided LSM-620L with technical support and control of []


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Horse and Voice intercept. In the discharge of this responsibility, the company initiated operational control of one Voice and two Manual Horse positions at USM-620L in November 1957, and furnished Voice personnel to USM-620L on a permanent change of station basis. Results were considered adequate during both years.

Printer Activity


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In August 1957,



During the first quarter, FY 1959,

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Polish Voice

The 182d USASA Company operated a two position Polish Low Level Voice Intercept Station, using facilities at Rothwesten, Germany. At the end of the fiscal year, it was operating one Voice Intercept position on a temporary status, while serving as an editing-transcribing station for material received from USM-88K and USM-620L. In February, [redacted] [redacted] were deleted and its mission changed to [redacted] Overall increase in intercept occurred due to a [redacted]


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this station was ordered not to copy. In April, some place names were obtained from [redacted] intercept activity which remained steady. On 11 Jun 58, all Polish Voice positions were deleted not to be reinstated until 23 June, and then only on a temporary basis due to a possible crisis in Poland.

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Detachment K's Polish [redacted]



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or [redacted]

found to be in both the [redacted]

At the

end of the year, it was observed by intercept operators that transmission and receipt of traffic was performed efficiently. [redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] All Polish Voice intercept from this detachment, USM-88K and USM-620L was recorded on magnetic tape and processed at USM-88 for transcription and distribution.

Radio Direction Finding

This section provided bearing and fix information to Manual Morse and T/A Sections in assisting to identify and locate targets in Poland. Included

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

[redacted]

Traffic Analysis

The 182d was responsible for traffic analysis of communications of the

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[redacted]

In November 1957, T/A processing of Polish nets was decentralized from Hq, USASA-Europe to the company in order to facilitate timely analysis and mission control. Studies were made throughout FY 1958 on Polish [redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] Through use of RDF and [redacted] locations were

frequently confirmed and a few discovered. Recovery of [redacted] in January 1958, was due greatly to RDF. At this time [redacted]

[redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] RDF confirmed prior known locations and established new locations on [redacted] targets, thus providing continuity.

Simultaneously, all [redacted] acts were observed using [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] was maintained on all mainline nets. Some low level nets went unidentified, but generally, [redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

[redacted]


On 1 Aug 57, the [redacted] problem was decentralized to Hq, USASA-Europe. This gave the 182d the responsibility for performing current and short-term traffic analysis. Decentralization proved to be valuable to timely reporting as better direction of intercept and faster recovery of nets resulted. Hq, [redacted] was located at Liegnitz and

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[redacted]

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


7. ~~(S)~~ 280th USASA Company, Berlin

This company's operational mission was to conduct COMINT and ELINT activities in support of the National COMINT-ELINT efforts under control of Hq, USASA-Europe. Accordingly, the company delegated sub-missions to its operational platoons.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

In FY 1958, 1st Operations Platoon's activities were devoted entirely to the ELINT problem. As FY 1959 ended, three COMINT positions were manned covering intersatellite manual Morse transmissions emanating from Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and East Berlin; and Polish



Only limited processing was accomplished

by this platoon.

The Platoon was tasked with four special missions, outlined as follows:



P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

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[Redacted]

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Numerous construction projects hindered mission accomplishment of 2d Operations Platoon (USM-620Y) during FY 1958. In November, when operations were resumed on a limited basis, the first communications system checked was that of [Redacted]

[Redacted] During December, further monitoring of [Redacted] net was accomplished, and intercept of [Redacted] signals for purposes of system evaluation was begun. By the end of January, all [Redacted] signals which had been intercepted at any station in Europe, had been successfully intercepted at USM-620Y. In April, search for a Russian [Redacted]

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

type transmission referred to as [Redacted] was initiated. System was used in [Redacted] In the following fiscal year, [Redacted] traffic was suspected to be in use in the Berlin area. The suspected user was [Redacted] Frequency tips were

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

supplied by USA-73. Several recordings of suspected [Redacted] were made during the year, but analysis at NSA determined transmissions as being invalid.

Additionally, [Redacted] systems were heard passing voice and unidentified [Redacted] traffic. Intercept of signals which had characteristics similar to [Redacted] was made near the close of the year.

Other VHF activity pursued included [Redacted] transmissions were monitored to determine whether [Redacted] communications were being passed [Redacted] Transmission was assigned temporary designation of [Redacted] On 12 Aug 58, intercept of [Redacted] was accomplished

P.L. 86-36

[Redacted]

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

and sub-task was dropped.

During the year, UHF intercepts were attempted on [Redacted]

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

[Redacted] transmitters. While collateral information indicated these transmitters to be in operation no intercepts were made in the Berlin area. Two East German transmitters were intercepted on [Redacted] in

a link between two East German [Redacted]. Each had characteristics similar to the [Redacted]. On 20 Dec 58, a UHF [Redacted] trans-

mission was intercepted on [Redacted]. NSA assigned temporary designation to [Redacted]

P.L. 86-36

[Redacted] to the transmissions. Analysis determined that the transmissions had [Redacted] traffic capability. On 20 Mar 59, the second [Redacted] was

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

intercepted on [Redacted]. The circuits were transmitted sporadically during the remainder of the year, but no further traffic was noted. On 7 April,

five UHF [Redacted] transmissions were intercepted on [Redacted] and assigned temporary designation of [Redacted] by NSA. Subsequent

translation performed at 3d Operations Platoon proved the transmission to be operating in the Russian [Redacted] network, and passing [Redacted]

[Redacted]

During FY 1958, 3d Operations Platoon intercepted UHF signals emanating

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)


from East German [Redacted] and UHF signals from Russian [Redacted]

[Redacted] traffic. In FY 1959, mission was expanded to cover East German [Redacted] problem [Redacted] and East German [Redacted]

At start of FY 1958, only intercepted [Redacted] traffic occurred on [Redacted]

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Early in July, the company was informed by USASA-Europe of a possible change



P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

In FY 1959, [] coverage was more extensive as new equipment and additional positions were manned. Outstanding [] intercept was provided by the attainment of [] made possible


P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

on a consistent basis by new equipment. By 1 Jun 59, [] intercept was increased as much as 100%, placing a strain on the processing section. Night intercepts were scanned as soon as possible on the assumption that evening activity might be of perishable and important nature. On 27 Nov 58, intercepted [] was noted regarding

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Berlin. The [] was forwarded to USM-701 electrically. Intercept of sporadic [] communications was conducted upon the basis of a number of limited assignments during the first half of the fiscal year, and with the installation of the additional [] position it was put on first priority search assignment in February.

VHF intercept activities included []



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[redacted]
Major problem was the need to obtain maximum coverage at any one time without duplication of effort and with optimum coverage. At the beginning of FY 1959, both stations were engaged in a split-coverage frequency allocation test, with [redacted]
[redacted] This method

proved impractical and others were tried. Finally, in February 1959 a direct teletype line was established between the ComCen's of the two units.

The 507th USASA Group expressed interest in intercept of [redacted] VHF communications during the early months of the fiscal year. Greater emphasis was placed upon [redacted] operations, and [redacted] search was assigned as a primary mission on two of the four [redacted] positions. Traffic, however, was sporadic throughout the year, and produced only occasional peaks of intercept during the second half of the year.

Upon instructions from USM-82, the 3d Operations Platoon began coverage of the frequencies [redacted] suspected to carry transmissions of [redacted] These transmissions had been intercepted a year before, but not included as a regular station assignment, and intercept was dropped. Now assignment was based largely upon information obtained from the previous year's intercept. Traffic consisted of [redacted] transmitted on [redacted]

In the performance of [redacted]
[redacted] a number of transmissions were found and copied in the Spring of 1959. Analysis identified most of these transmissions as

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emanating from West Berlin. Operators were instructed to avoid further copy when on-line identification was possible. Unidentified German language transmissions remain, however, a third priority on a [redacted] position.

[redacted] intercept was first assigned to 2d Operations Platoon. However, at the suggestion of NSA officials, collection effort was moved on a production-test basis to 3d Operations

Platoon. The [redacted]

[redacted] and thereby required 13 recorders for the collection of traffic.

Equipment then on hand proved cumbersome and operator fatigue resulted.

[redacted] was installed the first week in May, alleviating the problem.

At the start of FY 1958, the 4th Operations Platoon (redesignated as Special Project Section in FY 1959) was tasked with the mission of copying

[redacted]

In June 1958, two [redacted] positions were combined to make one 48-hour position to cover [redacted] targets. Also in June, following a redeployment plan the following positions were retained: [redacted]

[redacted] All others were scheduled to be discontinued.

Special missions received by the 4th Operations Platoon included a [redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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[] Additionally, Operation [] was monitored and copied with favorable results.

The Special Project Section operation, Operation [] performed NSA functions dealing with transmissions in the HF range. Specifically, the operation was designed to test and evaluate system capabilities for providing intercept on the [] problem, with an ultimate goal of determining and eliminating undesirable equipment features in order to improve coverage on a productive basis. The operation was initially installed in mid-April 1959. On 1 June, operations began at the renovated operations building at Japan 87. The system was still in the evaluation stage at the close of FY 1959 and its effectiveness had not been determined. REF: VOL. I P.2

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

B. (SOW) 6th USASA Field Station, Herzogenrath

From the start of FY 1958 until 24 Mar 59, when operations ceased, the 6th USASA Fld Sta operational coverage extended to []

[] entities. Russian, Polish and Czech [] were assigned and intercepted as a part of the Manual Morse or Radiotelephone Section mission. Other operational sections included Automatic Morse and Radio Printer.

Manual Morse

At start of FY 1958, 29.4 positions were manned and section strength was [] military and [] civilian operators; at the close of the year, 23 positions were manned and section strength was [] military and [] civilian operators. The reduction to 15.5 manned positions on 24 March was accomplished in part

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

by transfer of six manual Morse positions to 318th USASA Battalion. Five positions were devoted to [redacted] traffic with the remaining position covering [redacted] Mission was augmented in December by modification of one of the [redacted] positions to include an AN/TLR-17. However, because of relatively low power output of [redacted] it was often impossible to differentiate a transmitter signal from static caused by atmospheric conditions. Other manual Morse missions included [redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Radiotelephone

Section intercepted [redacted]

emanating from Communist China, and countries in the Near and Middle East, Europe, and South America during report period.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
P.L. 86-36

Radio Printer

At start of FY 1958, R/P Section intercepted Communist Bloc one and two channel teletype signals. With close of 8th USASA VLA Sta, [redacted] mission was transferred to this station. At time of change, only four positions with [redacted] operators were assigned to this station. At close of FY 1958, [redacted] positions were operated in intercepting newly acquired [redacted] mission. Minimum intercept was performed on Communist Bloc single-channel transmissions at close of the year. No significant changes occurred in FY 1959. Two channel activity decreased due to increased use of [redacted]

[redacted] transmissions employed by [redacted]

[redacted] dual

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

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positions were used during the first half of FY 1959 to intercept [redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] One position was deleted in February though intercept coverage remained unchanged.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Automatic Morse

Except for two [redacted] all targets assigned

this section during FY 1958 were of the [redacted]

[redacted] the majority of which originated in Communist Bloc countries. In

FY 1959, section manned [redacted] positions in accomplishing [redacted] intercept from

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, [redacted] Hungary, [redacted]

Romania, and Switzerland. This section and the Radio Printer Section were

scheduled to be transferred to the 13th USASA Fld Sta.

REF: VOL I P. 215

9. ~~(S)~~ 8th USASA Field Station, Semyara

P.L. 86-36

The 8th USASA Fld Sta's FY 1958 operational mission required

it to intercept and process COMINT emanating from designated Polish [redacted]

Yugoslav [redacted] and [redacted] targets. Specific activities

are outlined below:

Polish

EO 3.3(h)(2)
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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Yugoslav

Despite good intercept volume, a lack of [redacted] made it difficult to [redacted] This situation had existed since 25 Apr 57. The Yugoslav [redacted] mission was transferred to USM-87 (332d USASA Co) 2 Aug 57.

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


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EO 3.3(h)(2)

10. ~~(CSG)~~ 11th USASA Field Station (Rhein Pfalz Station),
Bamholder

Throughout FY's 1958-1959, this station's general operational mission was to intercept foreign communications, perform SW, apply SIT, submit raw material, and perform ancillary tasks as required in support of the National COMINT effort. Specifically covered were Russian [redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)



Naval Morse Section

At start of FY 1958, section covered Russian [redacted]



[redacted] missions along with assigned personnel, were transferred to the 512th USASA Battalion. On 22 August, Russian [redacted] mission, including operators and analysts, was transferred to the 339th USASA Company. Two of the three remaining positions were used to provide [redacted] tip-off and

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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identification, the third was used for a special mission assigned by Hq, USASA-Europe; however, mission was transferred to the 307th USASA Battalion in January 1958. During March, May, and June 1958, five positions were added to cover [redacted] targets.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

In FY 1959, Manual Morse mission consisted of [redacted] and Russian [redacted] nets were considered most important while [redacted] links were still undeveloped and involved much search. In August 1958, because full development was accomplished, [redacted] nets were placed on sample positions. In January 1959, section was reduced to eight positions with interest concentrated on [redacted] low level activity. Added attention was given to an [redacted] link between the [redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] In March, Russian unidentified [redacted] Morse links were added for sampling, but were not assigned as a position. In June, all RPF [redacted] assignments were changed to [redacted] except for the Sampling Position assigned by NSA [redacted]. During September, 1958, the [redacted] net was dropped and low level [redacted] located principally in the Baltic Sea area, was added. Due to lack of information and [redacted] a great deal of development was necessary. At end of the fiscal year, the bulk of the [redacted] problem was deleted from the mission. Emphasis was changed from the Baltic Sea to Berlin during the Berlin crisis. In connection with this net, [redacted] and thus earned commendation from higher headquarters.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Traffic Control and Reports Section

This section supported intercept section of the station and higher

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headquarters by compiling reports on intercepted traffic. Accordingly, section was divided into a control group, a traffic analysis group, and a traffic forwarding group. In October 1957, T/A personnel began performing analysis on [redacted] type traffic. Some of the more evident results of this analysis included more up-to-date [redacted] [redacted] were translated from the plain text passed on the links.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Radio Printer

Primary effort of this section was directed toward Russian R/P [redacted] with emphasis placed upon Russian [redacted] activity. During first half of FY 1958, section concentrated most of its effort on Russian [redacted] links. In last half of FY 1958 and first half of FY 1959, Russian [redacted] portion of the mission consisted almost entirely of [redacted] communications, the bulk of which used a [redacted] type transmission. At end of FY 1959, plain text printer effort consisted of one position assigned for [redacted] All positions were assigned Category A. In December 1957, section concentrated on temporary case notation [redacted] On 31 December, link was identified as [redacted] and given a permanent case notation. Installation of five [redacted] augmented positions during December, January, and February proved timely as a [redacted] on a manpower available basis until NSA made a permanent assignment on 13 Feb 58. In past years, many Russian [redacted]

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greeting type messages. In FY 1959, Russian [redacted] communications expanded necessitating high-frequency search measures. Search was accomplished by breaking down the installed supervisor's position into three categories:

[redacted]

activities. Consequently, four new [redacted] links were found and each was developed and covered by the station as top priority in accordance with existing instructions until assigned for coverage.

Special Missions

In December 1957, NSA requested T/A Section to transliterate and forward electrically, [redacted]

[redacted] In May 1958, NSA requested that the same information be forwarded on the [redacted] Much information concerning Russian [redacted] was being passed on these links. Some of the most valuable information derived from transliteration was [redacted]

On 15 Apr 58, the R/P Section was directed by NSA to use a bench marking system on [redacted] whenever a [redacted] type transmission was employed. Because of the importance of the information, section was requested to perform a one-day test on 7 May 58 whereby the signal was copied simultaneously on an [redacted]

On 13 Nov 58, a special mission was performed by the IF Section on all [redacted] cases in an effort to collocate the [redacted]

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[redacted] Test lasted for 45 days and results were unknown at this section.

On 8 Apr 59, Chief, USASA tasked this station with furnishing on-line intercept of [redacted] used in conjunction with [redacted]. This message also contained information that [redacted] were forthcoming. REF: VOL I P. 218

Turkey

11. (ISOW) 276th USASA Company, Sinop

The 276th USASA Company's operational mission during FY's 1958-1959 required it to conduct COMINT/ELINT activity directed against [redacted] and--during FY 1959--a COMINT effort relative designated [redacted]. The COMINT portion of this mission entailed maintenance of manual Morse, radiotelephone, radio printer, and [redacted] intercept facilities. In addition, DF and [redacted] functions aided target location and confirmation.

The most important data recovered by the company was the operational

[redacted] Such information not only aided [redacted] in

the absence of collateral ELINT information, but also helped ELINT personnel prepare equipment for possible [redacted]

[redacted] was of primary importance to both COMINT and ELINT efforts. [redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

Expansion of Coverage During Lebanon Crisis: At the outset of FY 1959, [] manual Morse positions were added to monitor

[] Effective 26 Jul 58, an additional [] manual Morse and two radiotelephone positions were assigned for coverage of the []

[] This brought the company's total COMINT coverage (manned positions) to [] manual Morse, three radiotelephone, [] radio printer, and [] until a personnel cut (effective during January 1959) forced a commensurate reduction in coverage. REF: VOL. I P. 21

Italy

12. ~~(S)~~ 75th USASA Company, Aviano

Pursuant to its operational mission, the 75th USASA Company was divided into Manual Morse, Radiotelephone, and in FY 1959, T/A Sections.

At its inception, the 75th manned [] manual Morse position used for Yugoslav general search. Despite this limitation, the company covered approximately 10-cased nets daily. On 16 May 58, [] manual Morse positions were in operation; [] for intercept of Yugoslav traffic, the other for

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

Albanian traffic. No notable success was had on coverage of latter problem, but Yugoslav intercept increased notably.

One R/T position, in operation from the company's inception, provided 17 hours of daily coverage (0600-2300). On 3 Mar 58, sufficient operators arrived to enable the position to operate on a 24-hour basis. Section was assigned five case nets with emphasis placed on general search. This was brought about by proximity of station to Yugoslavia. Both Slovene and Serbo-Croatian dialects were copied. Mission priority at start of FY 1959 was recording and transcribing two stations of the Slovene [redacted]

[redacted] network, as well as general search of unidentified Yugoslav voice nets. The two [redacted] ceased transmissions on 17 and 23 Oct 58. Subsequently, on 29 Mar 59, a third station of the [redacted] network was assigned as priority target for the rest of the year.

The T/A Section, consisting of six analysts, processed raw traffic and forwarded it to interested consumers. Specifically, the company furnished information pertinent to Yugoslav communications to larger processing stations. This analysis, forwarded to BSM-89 and NSA, aided the study of many unidentified Yugoslav activities, some of which were assigned case designations. Information indicating possible Yugoslav [redacted] and reported by this section during the year was subsequently proved valid. Late in the year, NSA uncovered a new Yugoslav [redacted]

[redacted] Additional information was furnished by this company through the discovery of a second [redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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England

13. ~~(S)~~ 13th USASA Field Station (Mansfield Hill Station),
Harrogate

In order to determine the most promising target areas for
future exploitation, the 13th USASA Fld Sta conducted a 60-day intercept
capability test late in FY 1959. All intercept from the following

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

was forwarded to NSA for evaluation:

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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This constituted the first and only operational activity of the station of the year. REF: VOL. I P. 231

F. Africa

1. (S) 4th USASA Field Station (Kagnew Station), Asmara


The 4th USASA Fld Sta's FY's 1958-1959 operational mission required it to intercept and process manual Morse, automatic Morse, and radio printer traffic, with special emphasis on communications originating in the Near East. The following is a summary of individual section activities:

Manual Morse

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

At the beginning of FY 1958, [] manned positions provided coverage of

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)



Other significant developments:

P.L. 86-36

1) Egyptian-Sudan border dispute required emphasis Sudanese targets from February 1958 until the end of March.

2) Lebanese internal crisis necessitated deletion of Priority [] (Egyptian) on 19 May 58. Indication of expansion by Egyptian [] not caused station to place it on top priority on [] (New stations and nets were observed on 20 May, and Egyptian [])

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

3) Assignment (27 May 58) of special 60-day Middle East Search mission to determine station's ability to cover Middle East targets. Ten-day tests were devoted to Syria, [] and Iraq. A final ten days were devoted to Lebanon, Libya, and []

4) Year's and Middle East Search results were generally negative. Targets were []

[redacted] and all Middle East unidentified traffic.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

At the outset of FY 1959, [redacted] manned positions were assigned three block cover missions. [redacted] positions [redacted] covered [redacted]

and Sudanese Search [redacted] positions. [redacted] covered [redacted]

P.L. 86-36

[redacted] positions [redacted] covered Egyptian

[redacted] as well as,

Middle East Search [redacted]. In addition, [redacted] General Search positions were manned 24 hours daily.

Other significant developments:

1) Termination (25 Jul 58) of special 60-day Middle East Srch mission carried over from previous fiscal year.

2) Addition (26 Jul 58) of a full cover position to cover [redacted] as alternates.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

3) Relocation of [redacted] post (28 Jul 58) and addition of Egyptian [redacted] target. This marked end of new-Middle East coverage.

4) Elimination of [redacted] (which had been reduced to two positions on 24 Aug 58) on 13 Sep 58. Sampling position handling [redacted] and Sudanese [redacted] traffic was converted to a block of two positions covering Sudanese and Yemeni Search. [redacted] new sampling positions were formed to replace [redacted] thus providing continuity for the changing assignment. A special 10-day Gen Srch mission was assigned 17 Sep 58, in an effort to develop Yemeni targets.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

5) Formation (during second quarter) of new full cover position to intercept signals originating in Yemen. This position was subsequently (22 Dec 58) changed to Middle East Srch with emphasis on Sudanese Srch.

6) Reduction (12 Dec 58) of Egyptian coverage to eight hours daily, and corresponding increase in Egyptian coverage.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

7) Change (3 Feb 59) of [redacted] positions from Category "A" to Category

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"D" (local control). The Yemeni position was reinstated on the same data.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

8) Change (14 Feb 59) of [redacted] and Sudanese positions to [redacted] Order (one for [redacted] Commercial, and two with Sudanese [redacted] targets as first priority and Sudanese [redacted] as second).

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

9) Change (4 Mar 59) of one [redacted] position to Sudanese Development position in view of crisis in latter country. On 15 March, this position was assigned a Sudanese [redacted] link.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

10) Addition (at end of third quarter) of one new position to cover [redacted] links.

11) Readjustment of assignment (during April 1959) to permit expanded coverage of assigned targets within existing schedules. From 2100 to 0500 hours, only Gen Brch and two Middle East Brch positions were manned. During remainder of the day, the station concentrated on communications of [redacted] coverage was dropped, and coverage of [redacted] links was reduced by two positions.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

12) Renotation (25 Apr 59) of most Egyptian activities as belonging to [redacted] changed from Morse to R/P, but continued to use Morse [redacted] At end of report period, subject net appeared to comprise [redacted]

13) Discovery of new [redacted] from Kharbous, during report period.

14) Addition, late in report period, of two Manual Morse [redacted] links to assignment. One link served [redacted] The other served [redacted]

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

In general, [redacted] coverage was satisfactory, although occasional difficulties were caused by the absence of fixed frequencies for these targets. To a lesser extent, this was also a problem in intercepting Yemeni traffic. Both countries were still using poor-quality, out-moded equipment and, in some instances, extremely poor operating personnel.

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

Automatic Morse

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

The section's assignment at the beginning of FY 1958 comprised 132 links and 15 alternates. The following block group assignments were in effect on [] positions: Cairo, Beirut, Baghdad, Teheran, Moscow, New Delhi,

[] Kabul, [] Warsaw, [] and [] Two positions recorded full coverage to [] Priority alternate targets were Tangiers, [] Belgrade; and []

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Significant developments:

1) Deletion of Prague, Baghdad, [] Geneva, and []

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

2) Addition of [] Bern, Tangiers and Baghdad, bringing number of assigned positions to [] full coverage links and seven alternates. This change brought the section's mission to the point at which it remained throughout FY 1958.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

3) Notation (28 Jul 57) of testing on [] Subject test used Double Frequency Shift (DFS) in place of Frequency Shift Keying (FSK).

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

At the beginning of FY 1959, [] positions were covering 120 assigned

links. By the end of the year, 36 positions were in operation. Positions

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3(h)(2)

freed by deletion of [] from mission were assigned []

[] Erch. The

letter was replaced on 16 Jan 59 by an [] assignment.

Radio Printer

Section personnel covered from 27 to 33 circuits during FY 1958,

concentrating on Damascus, [] Tangiers, [] Beirut, Cairo, and Addis Ababa. With the exception of [] and Cairo, whose antenna orientations prevented intercept by this station, results were excellent.

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Significant developments:

1) ~~Initial intercept (September 1957) of teletype testing on~~ [redacted] Tests continued for nearly one month, then were discontinued until late December 1957, after which time intercept was again fairly constant. Tests primarily involved [redacted] with sporadic workings between [redacted] and [redacted] and Damascus.

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2) Assignment (Jul 57-11 Jan 58) of responsibility for SSB intercept of Middle East sideband targets containing R/P, automatic Morse or manual Morse signals. Most signals intercepted during period were voice transmissions, and not desired. In August 1957, [redacted] was observed using DSSB and sending teletype. In September 1957, [redacted] was observed using teletype for transmission to [redacted] After silence from September to January, [redacted] to Damascus and reverse was intercepted. Subsequent intercept included [redacted] using single channel printer and [redacted]

3) Observation of use of DSSB with two channels of [redacted] printer by [redacted] and reverse. Intercepted traffic indicated that [redacted] was major relay point for traffic entering [redacted] Traffic monitored included [redacted] transmissions.

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4) Devotion of nine single channel printer positions to [redacted] traffic, principally search.

5) Little Russian [redacted] intercept, because of unfavorable propagation characteristics and extended range.

6) Observation (14 Dec 57) of [redacted] transmissions by Russian [redacted] link. Contrary to usual practice, control was working [redacted] Procedure was in effect approximately two weeks.

7) Copy of two channel [redacted] transmissions on following cases:

[redacted]

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8) Cases copied most frequently:


[redacted]

9) Russian [redacted]

[redacted]

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The station's FY 1959 Radio Printer mission is outlined below:

[redacted] - At the outset of FY 1959, four positions were devoted to this problem. On 5 Jul 58, these positions were consolidated into two double-ended positions. Assignment centered on the following targets: Damascus, [redacted] Tangiers, Moscow, [redacted] Beirut, Cairo, [redacted] [redacted] Geneva, Peking, [redacted] Warsaw, and Shanghai.

Significant developments:

1) Intercept of links using printer which had previously been listed as Morse links - [redacted]

With the exception of [redacted] only tests were conducted.

2) Change from [redacted]

[redacted] Subject links used printer in one side-band and one or more side-bands of voice.

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3) Increased use of [redacted]

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2 through 4 Feb 59, and subsequently when Morse links were over-
loaded with Arabic traffic. During May and June 1959, tests and
traffic were passed on [redacted] sideband link. Stations
in [redacted]

4) Change from [redacted]

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[redacted] Sideband - Five double-ended [redacted] positions were installed
during July and August 1958 for intercept of DSSB and SSB transmissions.

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Tests conducted to find cause for poor intercept quality showed that filters
and discriminators used in [redacted] were unsuitable for splitting printer
channels. Changes in [redacted] sideband problem consisted mainly of increases
in the number of active printer channels.

Specific changes:

[Large redacted area]


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[redacted] Printer - Activity gradually increased during report
period, with [redacted]

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
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Russian

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
Assigned links:

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Seven of these links were identified and dropped from assignment. At least 10 were considered outside the station's normal reception range.

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..... Russian  - Commencing FY 1959 with five operative positions, and the subsection reduced to one double-ended position in 29 Jul 58 to cover the following links:



Prior to its discontinuance, effective 30 Jun 59, the subsection was

handicapped by [redacted]

[redacted] Hence, very little analysis was accomplished.

Traffic Control and Reports

The FY 1958 case effort was directed to four major targets: [redacted]

[redacted] (in order to permit phase-in of Special Processing Section),

[redacted] Sudanese [redacted]

Significant developments:

1) Initiation of radio printer testing on [redacted] links in November, 1957; [redacted]

2) Initial intercept of [redacted] printer, early in FY 1958. Effective intercept was established during the third quarter.

3) Isolation of five [redacted] Sudanese radio groups, late in FY 1958.

With the assumption of end-product reporting responsibility by Special Processing Section during FY 1959, Traffic Control and Reports Section phased out its T/A responsibility. At the end of the report period, Middle East T/A responsibility included UAR (Egyptian-Syrian), Sudanese, and Yemenese nets. Russian T/A was directed toward [redacted]

[redacted] This coverage terminated at the close of the fiscal year.

Special Processing Section

In a phasing-in status throughout most of FY 1958, this section was charged with ascertaining the possibility of establishing a COMINT Processing and Reporting Center for the Middle East. The mission was established in March 1958.

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T/A and C/A efforts were directed toward [redacted]

nets.

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T/A effort included compilation of [redacted]

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The section's FY 1959 mission required it to publish and-product reports resulting from processing, analyzing, and translating intercept from [redacted] Sudanese, and Yemeni [redacted] entities.

Special Missions

Of 22 special missions assigned during FY 1958, most were successful. Two such assignments, however, were not undertaken, because implementing instructions arrived after the scheduled termination date of the projects. Significant assignments are outlined below:

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[Large redacted area]

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[REDACTED]

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FY 1959 special missions were directed toward Middle Eastern and Soviet targets. The former (terminated 25 Jul 58) was designed to test the station's ability to cover targets in the Middle East area. Principal areas covered were Egypt, Lebanon, Libya and [REDACTED]. Primary target nets were [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and all unidentified elements. Since most of these targets were located in countries with small areas, it was reasonable to expect minimum power usage by target nets. In the light of this expectation, results were judged generally negative. Of nets monitored, Egyptian [REDACTED] yielded the best results, while Iraq produced fair intercept. Other nets intercepted were Lebanese [REDACTED] and Syrian [REDACTED]. Results from [REDACTED] were entirely negative.

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In addition, several Sudanese, Yemeni, and Egyptian nets were assigned to General Search for development. Results were generally good. On several occasions, the [REDACTED] was assigned General Search for development. Again, results were successful.

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The purpose of Russian special missions assigned the station was to find and develop communications between the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Although copy was often good, the mission was discontinued, probably because the target was covered by other intercept sites. REF: VOL I P 233

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APPENDIX A

(TS//) RUSSIAN [redacted]

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Throughout the reporting period, the mission of [redacted] was to develop and exploit SIGINT from the following in support of the national COMINT/ELINT effort:

[redacted]

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[redacted]

In addition, the division was tasked with processing intelligence, and providing operational control over subordinate field units.

A new support section was added to provide linguistic support to the division. [redacted] made a major contribution during the report period by establishing the posture of [redacted]

[redacted]

The following major developments occurred:

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Publication of a series of reports covering a year's communication activity on [redacted]

[redacted]

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Analysis of Soviet [redacted]

[redacted]

A study of Soviet [redacted]

contributed to [redacted]

[redacted]

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A Study of Russian [redacted]

led to recovery of [redacted]

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Operated under Condition 1 from 6 Mar 59 through end of FY 1959, due to Khrushchey's avowed threat to give Berlin to German Democratic Republic. Scanned field reports and included significant items in weekly Berlin Situation Report during this period.

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