HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY SECURITY AGENCY AND
SUBORDINATE UNITS

FISCAL YEAR 1957

VOLUME II - TECHNICAL OPERATIONS

Prepared by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2

1959
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TO THE READER

In order to expedite publication of this document, the authors have eliminated the usual cross-reference foot note system. Source material was largely provided by Annual Historical Reports submitted by USASA units world-wide. A complete listing of these reports, in the order in which they appear in the book, is available in the back of the book. The list was prepared utilizing the Roman numerals, letters, and numbers of each section in order to provide some method of reference. Any reference problems concerning this document should be referred to Historical Division, OACofS, G2, Hq, USASA, Arlington Hall Station, Arlington 12, Virginia.
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I. Foreword

This document presents an account of FY 1957 operations of field units of the United States Army Security Agency in the conduct of COMINT and ELINT for the Army and NSA. From missions imposed upon USASA units, or NSA Field Stations manned by USASA personnel, specific accomplishments have been discussed to provide a comprehensive guide for future planning and instructio

Of special interest to COMINT during the year was the exploitation of intercept during Project SUN SPOT. The project attempted to provide a realistic realignment of positions and missions to improve quality of intercept.

ELINT, established the previous year, continued operations, operations were improved in Alaska when Det E, USASA-Alaska was relocated to St. Lawrence Island. In Turkey, ELINT operations were removed from Samsur and concentrated at Sinop. In the Far East, a special COMINT/ELINT mission covering Soviet Naval maneuvers was successfully carried out by the 254th USASA Detachment.

Meanwhile, the vital operational objectives continued to be high degree of mission fulfillment, effective liaison, and collection of special intelligence pertaining to the war potential, military forces, and related activities of foreign countries. Efforts to improve DF in the Far East theatre included establishing of Taiwan local DF net in support of the 176th Company, Elsewhere, personnel shortages forced deactivation of several DF sites in Europe and hampered DF operations USM-7, Alaska.

Facts for this compilation were derived from records, reports, and correspondence arising from requirements imposed upon commanders of USASA units. Controversial information was resolved through discussion with qualified military and civilian counsel. Special authority and methods of compilation for this document included:
(1) AR 10-122, 23 Jun 55
(2) SR 525-45-1, Command Reports, 24 Mar 53
(3) AR 220-345, 18 Oct 54, subj: Field Organizations
(4) DA Pamphlet 20-200, June 1956
(5) Cir Nr 23, Hq, USASA, 28 Jun 55, subj: Historical Activities
   of the United States Army Security Agency.
(6) Letter, GAS 22 314.7, 21 Mar 57, subj: Specifications for USASA
   Annual Reports (Historical)
(7) SR 320-50-1, 23 Nov 53, including C1, 28 Oct 54, C2, 16 Apr 55,
   C3, 3 Jan 56, superseded by AR 320-50, 7 May 57, C1, C2, 4 Sep 57,
   1 Nov 57.

Dissemination of information contained herein is to be handled in strict
accordance with requirements set forth in the existing DA Regulation for Securi-
and Dissemination of Communications Intelligence, dated 1 Jul 51, subj:
Regulations for Security and Dissemination of Communications Intelligence.

Cross references at the end of units summaries in this volume indicated
the first page of supplementary administrative information in Volume I.
II. Operational Highlights

Throughout FY 1957, US Army Security Agency directed its operational efforts toward analysis of requirements, activities, capabilities and deficiencies of field units. Technical support toward improving Agency operations, consisted of staff lectures on USASA activities and visits to USASA Theater Commands. Additionally, daily coordination with NSA was maintained to insure that support rendered would be timely and adequate.

USASA Personnel, conducted daily liaison with NSA staff and analytical elements at Fort Meade, reviewed and analyzed data derived from collection, control, exploitation, field technical support and end product reporting of world-wide COMINT entities. During this Fiscal Year, COMINT problems were decentralized to field units. European unit covered Russian and Satellite problems within the European area. Far East units performed continuous liaison on military and para military COMINT entities of the Far East Russian, "CHICOM", "North Korean", Western and South Pacific nets.

Field guidance was provided through staff visits, inspections, orientations tours and special trips made by Agency representatives. As a result COMINT operational training of the 313th Battalion was stepped up with the addition of more realistic T/A, C/A, and reporting responsibilities. Certain unproductive missions were deleted from the program and more active missions, such as T/E and Technical Support Letters, were substituted. Major revisions were made in the DF operator training course, and an RFP operator course was implemented. In all-over-all effort to improve COMINT end product and increase close support tactical command, two Russian language specialists were assigned in February to the 502d Group, Heilbronn, one Chinese linguist to the 501st ASA Group, Seoul, Korea, and another assigned the 301st ASA Battalion, Uijongbu, Korea, and one Arabic linguist to the 313th ASA Battalion, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

One of the chief COMINT problems during the year was the exploitation of intercept during Project SUN SPOT. Although, ionospheric conditions were expected to provide unprecedented intercept opportunities during the 18 month cycle, the immediate aim included a realistic realignment of positions and missions to improve quality of intercept,
and a demonstration of the capabilities of various categories of intercept operations.

In direct support of this project, NSA considered early activation of 15 VHF search positions located as follows:

By February 1957, the Agency had capability for participation in the VHF Special Search Program at fifteen positions. These included:

<table>
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DF site evaluations resulting from staff visits made in December 1956, revealed that the majority of USASA-Far East and Pacific sites were considerably below accepted physical standards. Sites in USASA-Europe were better, however each theater headquarters advised to make an all out effort to bring the DF sites up to the maximum standards prior to a 90 day field survey in January 1957, which a special NSA operational and technical team was to conduct.

USASA-Europe experienced a shortage of technically trained DF personnel throughout the year. In October, this became so acute that manual morse operators had to be used as DF operators at the expense of the manual morse mission.
In Alaska, improved operational advantages were obtained by relocating ELINT operations section of Detachment E, USASA-Alaska to Mt. Sevokok, St. Lawrence Island.

In Turkey, ELINT intercept capability was removed from Samsun and concentrated at Sinop.

A Naval reconnaissance squadron at Port Lyautey, Morocco, dispatched flights periodically to Adana, Turkey. From there Ferret flights were made over the Black Sea. This project, identified as LAND BOOM SPECIAL, was a coordinated Army-Navy effort to establish an airborne platform as a means of enhancing intercept of non-communications signals associated with the Soviet Missile program at Kapustin Yar.

In October 1956, disapproval was made to proposed and existing SHAPE
On 15 Apr 57 the 4th USASA Fld Sta, Asmara, Eritrea, was assigned an ELINT responsibility.

In the Far East, a COMINT/ELINT mission was assigned to the 254th USASA Detachment, Hokkaido, Japan.

Staff members visiting ELINT sites in Asmara, Samsun, Sinop, and European sites reported that it had been difficult to find interest of support for the Army's ELINT problems. Lack of high level planning and coordination were believed to be basic reasons for the ELINT situation noted on the visit. As a remedy, it was believed that ELINT operations personnel should have some preliminary training as provided COMINT personnel.
Another TAREX Team deployed to Chicago where a Hungarian refugee supplied information covering biographical sketches of the present military attaché at the Hungarian Legation, Washington, D.C.

III USASA UNITS WORLD-WIDE
A. Continental United States
1. (NSCH) 311th Army Security Agency Battalion, Camp Wolter, Texas
2. 313th Army Security Agency Battalion, Fort Bragg, N.C.

Throughout FY 1957, the 313th Battalion (USM 613) maintained in fulfillment of its operations mission, which was to provide intercept coverage of specified Central and South American targets. In addition to its general assignment, the battalion was charged for a short time with coverage of
3. **30** 1st USASA Field Station, Vint Hill Farms Station, Warrenton, Va.

Operationally, the station was charged by NSA and Chief, USASA with monitoring COMINT emanating from South/Central American, Near Eastern, European, networks, with additional responsibility for General Search, and Voice of America jammers.

*Manual Morse Assignment, 1 Jul 57*
4. 2nd USASA Field Station, Two Rock-Ranch Station, Petaluma, California
Throughout FY 1957, the primary operational mission of this station was to monitor communications emanating from Soviet networks, and to engage in Gen Srch.
1. **HQ USASA Alaska, Fort Richardson**

During FY 1957, this headquarters shared responsibility with NSA for processing and reporting on the Soviet Border Otryad problem. Military and Border forces located in the Far Eastern Military District north of 50 degrees latitude and east of 150 degrees longitude were principal targets until early 1957. On 9 Apr 57, primary responsibility for processing Soviet Military communications passed to HQ USASA Far East. Secondary missions were to process intercept from Far East Soviet Ground Force targets associated with the Kamchatka or Chukotski areas.

To determine the suitability of Shemya site, tests were conducted from 10 March to 10 April 1957.
2. Detachment "E", USASA Alaska, St Lawrence Island
   Operationally, Detachment "E" was responsible for
   monitoring COMINT traffic emanating from Soviet Border
   and Military nets. Responsibility for compiling and forwarding
   TECSUMS pertinent to Soviet Border and Military forces.
3. (1967) 7th USASA Field Station, Kenai
C. Caribbean

HQ USASA Caribbean, Fort Kobbe, Canal Zone

Throughout FY 1957, this headquarters was charged with gathering raw intercept from targets in Colombia, Nicaragua, Honduras, Argentina, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Venezuela. In addition, four special missions were assigned by the local command with concurrence of NSA. A fifth requiring USM-84 to monitor traffic was a continuation from the previous report period.

All raw traffic was forwarded to NSA.
The operational mission of this Hq was to gather COMINT pertaining to Chinese Communist (CHICOM) and Southeast Asia (SEA) war potential, military forces, future plans, and other military or related activities. Accordingly, all SEA COMINT was reviewed during the report period in an attempt to minimize time lapse between interception and consumer receipt of intelligence.

Mission accomplishment was facilitated by reorganization of both CHICOM and SEA sections according to areas of interest (with a Special Projects desk added later). Subject reorganization encouraged a high degree of specialization, hence enhanced depth and accuracy of analysis.

Further, on 21 Dec 56, a decision was made to widen COMINT Branch responsibility to include support of local commands with requested intelligence concerning Soviet Far East, Communist Indochina (MR/PL), Burma, Cambodia, Indochina, Philippines, South Viet Nam, and Thailand. Military intelligence was to receive priority treatment, but other fields previously mentioned were to be scanned.
2. (FIDON) 5th US Army Security Agency Field Station, Helemano, TH

Throughout FY 1957, the 5th USASA Fld Sta (USM-702) intercepted foreign communications, applied SIT techniques, submitted technical reports and raw material and performed ancillary tasks as required in support of the National COMINT effort. On 4 Jun 57, NSA directed USM-702 to assume intercept control of all Russian Military Far East controlled circuits.
TOP SECRET DINAR

HQ USASA Far East, Tokyo, Japan

Throughout FY 1957, in accordance with its continued responsibility for processing Chinese Communist (CHICOM) and Russian COMINT intercepted by subordinate units, the Operations Division, HQ USASA Far East maintained ______ nationality sections and their attendant subsections, whose activities are summarized below:

EO 3.3(h)(2)
P.L. 86-36
Nanking Military District

Contributors were 3d Fld Sta and 176th Company. A major change in
East China Military structure, effected 1 Jul 56, resulted in
establishment of Nanking District Headquarters (formerly Hq East
China Military District) and Foochow District Headquarters on an
equal basis. Newly-formed Nanking District comprised Kiangsi,
Anhwei, and Chekiang provinces.

included:

1) Nanking Military District Hq.
2) Chekiang Military District Hq.
3) Kiangsu Military District Hq, 20th, 22d, and 27th Armies.
4) 66th AAA Div, 16th Pub Sec Div, and 17th Pub Sec Div.
5) An AAA Div tentatively identified as 62d AAA Div in October 1956.
The operational mission delegated this company by NSA during FY 1957 required it to intercept and copy Chinese Communist networks.

A summary of operations follows:
6. (CEO) 10th USASA Field Station, Kyoto, Japan

The operational mission delegated to this station by NSA during FY 1957 required it to intercept assigned Soviet communications, apply SIT, perform DF, submit raw material to HQ USASA-Far East, and perform auxiliary assignments in support of the national COMINT effort. In addition, the following special missions were undertaken:

1) Thirty-day monitoring of "Voice of UN Command" initiated 5 Jan 57, indicated deliberate jamming.

2) Twenty-four-hour coverage by the Gen Srch and SIT Section, 26 Mar 57. (Results insignificant)

3) Verification of the existence of an outstation in the Far East complex. (Unverified)

A summary of individual section activities follows:

Manual Morse
7. (SFA) 12th USASA Field Station, Chitose, Japan

This station's continued operational mission during FY 1957 required it to intercept, perform DF and report on Russian Military, Air, Naval Air, Naval, Unidentified, and Armed Forces Communications activity (the latter not identified as to service category). In fulfillment of an assignment received 16 Oct 56, a special team began on 23 Oct 56 to search for Soviet guided missile activity in the Far East. A resume of individual operational section activities follows:

Traffic Control
8. (SECRET) 14th USASA Fld Sta, Camp Hakata, Japan

The mission of the 14th Fld Sta was to operate designated intercept facilities and conduct processing as directed in support of the overall National COMINT effort.

In addition to performing Gen Srch..., intercepted the following CHICOM activity: Commercial [ ] Shipping [ ] Military [ ] and Naval [ ]
In FY 1957, the 501st Group continued its general operations mission to USM-3, USM-41, and with information to Hq NSA, USM-702, and USM-702 with information to Hq NSA, USM-702:

EO 3.3(h)(2)
P.L. 86-38

9. (TS/NO) 501st ASA Gp, Yongdong-po, Korea
10. 301st ASA En, Uijongbu, Korea

In fulfillment of its mission this battalion intercepted, analyzed, and disseminated traffic originating from PVA (CHICON).
11. (class) 330th ASA Co (Intel), Siksong-ni, Korea.

12. (class) 3d USASA Fld Sta, Sobe, Okinawa.

The 3d Field Station's primary operational mission during FY 1957 required it to intercept and process transmissions emanating from CHICOM Military, circuits.
12. (TS/SCI) 176th USASA Co, Taipei, Taiwan

The 176th Company's operational mission was to intercept and process COMINT emanation from Chinese Communist
F. Europe

1. (SECRET) Hq, USASA Europe, Frankfort, Germany

Hq, USASA-Europe Intelligence Branch was operationally responsible for COMINT and ELINT support for United States Army elements in Europe, England, and Turkey throughout FY 1957.

The continued trend towards decentralization was reflected in the transfer of the Bulgarian Section to the 312th Battalion. Analysis on RP identified as Soviet Forces, Hungary (SFH), including the Carpathian Military District, was transferred to the 312th Battalion, 10 Nov 56. Polish Navy mission was transferred to the USN 40 in October, while RP intercept between 302d Battalion and 502d Group was consolidated.

A continued shortage of DF personnel resulted in curtailment of operations at some sites, and deactivation of the others. To combat this, the 502d ASA Gp Mobile DF Net and the USASA-Europe fixed DF net were combined to form the USASA-Europe Integrated DF Net. The Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG) and German Communist (GC) missions of the 502d ASA Group were combined with the USASA-Europe mission and were assigned the highest possible priority.
Although successful in its purpose, this new plan did not accomplish any outstanding improvements. The situation was gradually corrected, until over all performance reached a steady level in March 1957.

Records Section prepared end-product reports on Northern Group of Forces, European Soviet Military Districts, and Satellite Countries including Czchoslovakia. Reports were also prepared on Yugoslavia when information became available. In addition the section exercised post-publication review of reports published by the 502d Group on GSFG and East German activities, and over reports concerning Hungary and Romania emanation from the 312th Battalion.

Special Projects Section issued a format change on 1 October 56, when a weekly Soviet Bloc Conditions Report (SBCR) replaced the daily report. On 18 March 1957, however, the USASA-Europe Daily Soviet Bloc Conditions Journal was initiated. This journal represented a return to the pre-October system, and remained in use for the rest of the year.

Machine Aids Section mission was to mechanize the processing of COMINT, ELINT, COMSEC, and ECM data. On 15 May 1956, Machine Aids support was authorized to activities other than COMINT, and action was taken to offer support to all applicable activities. In cooperation with the 20th Detachment, definite processing procedures for ELINT activities were formulated. In August intercepted data was received by this section and the first machine reports for use by the 20th Detachment were prepared. Two significant jobs were initiated in coordination with the 312th Battalion.

Other projects within the Section included an IBM file on foreign personalities and two patternization dictionaries, one in Czech and the other in Yugoslavian.

Operations were divided into sections according to target areas and language. Because of the events in Poland and Hungary, primarily emphasis was placed upon Polish, Hungarian, and Russian communications.
Polish Problem

The Polish Processing Sub-section of Hq, USASA-Europe and the various field units continued intercept and analysis of their sources with great success. The year was marked by [redacted] first of these occurred on 3 Jul 56 when the Poznan riots broke out. Internal Guard and Border Guard [redacted] increased their activity and Polish Army maneuvers which were being conducted in the Silesian Military District came to an end.

The second instance occurred in late September when Border Guard and Internal Police [redacted]

A third peak of tension was indicated during the Polish general elections in January.

In October the reorganization of several units began, New network structure provided skip-echelon communications. Division and brigade level operated directly with the military district headquarters, thus permitting the Ministry of Defense to assume direct control over division level should the need arise.

Russian-Polish maneuvers with command jurisdiction exercised by the Russians.
Other intelligence sources included the 16th Polish RDF Battalion and Naval DF. The 16th RDF Battalion and its subordinate units had moved during the blackout to different locations; Headquarters was relocated at Wronki, one subordinate unit at Nowy Tomsyl, and another at Jelenia Gora.

The primary mission of the Naval RDF net seemed to be the performance of DF against the Swedish Navy, with increasing emphasis on Norwegian and Danish entities beginning on 1 Dec 56.

Hungarian Problem

The crux of material gleaned from this problem was supplied by the 312th ASA Battalion and attached units. Operations were split into two parts: Soviet Forces in Hungary (SFH) and the Hungarian Army with the former supplying most of the traffic during the Hungarian revolt.

SFH units participated in exercises from 14 July to 18 September, the most extended maneuvers since the Soviet withdrawal from Austria in September 1955.

2d Guards Mech Div without regard for normal security procedures marked the first COMINT references to unrest in Hungary.

On 24 October all Hungarian Army Radio Groups reverted to a stand-by status, not to reappear again until 7 November. However, it was believed that some elements were dispatched to Budapest. At the same time units from the 2d Guards Mech Div, Soviet INA, and 32d Mech Div descended upon the city.
The following day elements of the 38th Army of the Carpathian Military District had been ordered to Hungary. Hungarian Army Radio Groups resumed transmissions on 7 November. These groups were passing plain text messages indicating that the major concern of Hungarian Forces was bringing existing units to an effective operating level. Plain language transmissions and radio communications began to decrease after 8 November within SFH, 32d Mech Div and entities from the Carpathian Military District.

Reorganization of the Hungarian Army was started 19 September 1956 when the IX Rifle Corps, one of three units serving the Hungarian General Staff, became silent. At the same time, one of the divisions of the III Rifle Corps ceased communicating with its subordinates, but continued correspondence with its HQ, III Rifle Corps. Reorganization indicated the establishment of a two, rather than a three, corps structure. This was in effect on 24 October at the outbreak of the civil rebellion. After the struggle a new Hungarian Army structure arose. The Special Police had a function in the reorganization. The reduced Hungarian Army was composed of a General Staff HQ with three division-level subordinates. No corps structure exists and each division had five subordinates with the exception of the unit located at Gyongyos. Here, one subordinate originally existed, but five were operative at the end of the year. The other two subordinates were determined to be the 17th and 27th Rifle Divisions. The 17th Rifle Division was responsible for areas west of the Danube. The unit at Gyongyos commanded the area northeast of the Danube, while the 27th exercised authority over the area southwest of the Danube. In assuming these responsibilities, these divisions probably absorbed units in their areas.

Headquarters of two groups was found to be located with the Army General Staff in Budapest.

The stabilized army structure reflected increased security in military
East German Problem

Intercept of this problem was the responsibility of the 502d ASA Gp and its subordinate units. Coverage involved both Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) and East German Communications activity. Until the Polish and Hungarian uprisings in October, intercept of the GSFG was fairly routine.

From 1 August to October, a general reallocation of BST's took place within the Third Shock Army, with its two corps level nets deactivated.

The Polish uprising brought on an immediate and highly perceptible reaction within GSFG. Three Divisions (25th Tank Div, 7th Guards Mech Div of the Fourth Guards Mech Army, and 11th Guards Tank Div of the First Guards Mech Army) proceeded to strategic points along the East German-Polish border. A general state of alert was also noted in other GSFG units, and during this period Hq, GSFG intervened on the Main Army Command Net in order to be in a position to assume control.

In April-June 1957 the 25th Tank Div was resubordinated to the Second Guards Mech Army and the 1st Mech Div was placed under the Fourth Guards Mech Army. As a result of the switch the Second Guards Mech Army consisted of three tank divisions and one arty div, while the 4th Guards Mech Army was composed of three mechanized divisions, one tank division, and three anti-aircraft divisions.
Soviet Problem

Intercept on targets located within the Soviet Union was handled by 11th USASA Fld Sta, while Hq USASA-Europe did the processing. The first abnormal communications occurred from 25 Oct-11 Nov 56 and was attributed to the celebration of the Russian October Revolution, the Hungarian situation, and the Suez crisis.
Other Satellites and Yugoslavia

Processing and intercept of Romanian, Bulgarian, Czechoslovakian, and Yugoslavian communications continued to be decentralized to the field units. The 312th Battalion was in charge of Romanian and Bulgarian processing, Hq USASA-Europe handled Czech processing with the 302d Battalion, and Yugoslav processing with 8th Fld Sta.
Between September 1956 and February 1957, the volume of private mail intercepted from Eastern Bloc sources was increased 100% in order to provide more depth for surveys during the satellite situations. During April, however, Hq ORD cut the filming of private mail by 40%. By June private mail intercepted reached an all time low due mainly to the lack of microfilm.

ELINT Operations

Primary ELINT mission of this headquarters was the control and coordination of the various objects assigned to the ELINT field units. This involved technical guidance and evaluation of potential COMINT-ELINT missions in the theater.
DI/USAF O PLAN 1-56 (Soviet Bloc Jammer Monitoring Project)- Soviet Bloc Jammer Monitoring was a combined Army, Navy, Air Force project under operational control of the Air Force. Analysis was performed by the National Technical Processing Center (NTPC), Washington with the 276th USASA Co and 261st USASA Det as participating units in this command. The first phases of this project were primarily utilized as a means of training operators and correlation of activities between the three services and NTPC. NTPC's report did not cover a sufficient period of time to determine the extent and significance of Soviet Jamming.
2. (200W) 502d ASA Group, Heilbronn, Germany

Primary mission of the 502d Group during FY 1957 concerned COMINT responsibility for the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GFSFG). An additional responsibility, that of reporting on the German Communist (GC) mission, was shared jointly with NSA. The group received support for both problems from the 302d and 307th Battalions, and the 6th USASA Fld Sta. Other support in the form of IBM listings were provided in support of the COMINT mission:
An immediate reaction to the Polish crisis of late September 1956 was noted in GSFG. Three divisions proceeded to strategic points along the East German-Polish border. A general state of alert was noted in other GSFG units. Before this situation was relieved the Hungarian crisis arose and alert status was maintained until mid-December. Upon termination of the alert status, the normal yearly training cycle was resumed.
Beginning 2 Oct 56 and continuing on Army controlled nets of all six armies. The change appeared to be a result of the Polish crisis and done so that Hq, GSFG would be able to intervene within any GSFG army and take control in event of an emergency.

During the Hq, GSFG communications exercised, of the 11-15 March therefore, sufficient signal personnel could remain in place simulating normal operation, while the bulk of the unit moved.

A resubordination of the 125th Tank Division to the Second Guards Mechanized Army and of 1st Mechanized Division to Fourth Guards Mechanized Army was reflected in COMINT evidence obtained during the months of April-June 1957. It represented the first of many possible changes in GSFG. As an immediate result of the switch Second Guards Mechanized Army had three mechanized divisions and one tank division directly subordinate.

GSFG voice R/T take was obtained from eight intercept sites:

USM 10, Berlin
USM 42KL, Coberg
USM 43, Rothwestern
USM 43KL, Behrdrorf

USM 43L1, Lubeck
USM 43LZ, Altefeld (closed 26 May 57)
USM 85, Bad Aibling
USM 85J, Nottau

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3. (S) 302d ASA Battalion, Herzo Base, Germany

The FY 1957 mission of the 302d Battalion included collecting and reporting radio communications of the Eighth Guards, Army, German Communist Police, Border Guards, suspected military nets, and Czech
Numerous CFX's were conducted and elements of at least two line divisions were noted conducting field exercises in March and April 1957.

A November increase of GSFG alert activity was possibly stimulated by the Hungarian revolt.
During the late summer and early fall, Czech Military Units were engaged in training exercises. A great deal of OB material, (divisional, regimental, and battalion unit designators, unit locations and training areas, personalities and continuity) was accumulated during this period. Following
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4. (ecret) 307th ASA Battalion, Rothwesten, Germany

Throughout FY 1957, the 307th Battalion intercepted, processed, and analyzed radio communications traffic emanating from the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG).

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During July, August, and September 1956, normal field training involving VI Corps elements was observed. Only unusual event was possible participation of Hungarian Air Force. On 19 Sep 56 the Hungarian Army began reorganizing: The IX Rifle Corps became silent, one of its divisions was resubordinated to the III Rifle Corps, one continued active with no direct subordination, and the other may have been deactivated. At the same time, one of the divisions of the III Rifle Corps ceased communication with its subordinates, although it continued to correspond with its headquarters. This division was probably in the process of being deactivated. The reorganization appeared to indicate a two rather than three corps structure in the Hungarian Army.
The 17th Rifle Div gained new subordinates, while the 8th Rifle Div and the 5th Mech Div disappeared almost entirely from its own group and the Army General Staff group, it was suspected that reorganization, rather than exercises, was taking place.

Army structure crystalized 15 and 16 April. The reduced Army appeared to be composed of a General Staff Hq with three division level subsidiaries (17th Rifle Div, responsible for areas west of Danube; and an unidentified unit at Gyogus, responsible for areas northeast of Danube and 27th Rifle Div; responsible for areas southeast of Danube.) Each division had five subordinates, except the one located at Gyongyos which had only one originally, but which increased to five during May and June. Additionally the headquarters of two groups having four and three subordinates respectively were found to be collocated with Hq, Army General Staff in Budapest. With the apparent stabilization of the Hungarian Army Order of Battle, the monthly OB report was thought to be unnecessary, and after coordination with consumers, the report was discontinued with the provision that changes in OB would be reported electrically.

The stabilized army structure reflected increased security with a
Later, as a result of the Hungarian revolt, the Carpathian Military District problem, was permanently assigned this branch.

From 1 Jul-22 Oct 56 the communications structure and activities of SFH and IMA remained relatively stable. COMINT reflected field training activity involving SFH ground units from 14 July to 18 September. This represented the longest continuous period of training since Soviet forces withdrew from Austria in September 1955.

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This was the situation on 23 October, when the Hungarian revolt broke out.

Initial COMINT reflections of unrest in Hungary were observed at 2330 on 23 Oct 56. At that time, unusual communications activity was noted within the 2d Guards Mech Div in the form of numerous detached elements and plain text messages transmitted without regard for normal security measures. In the early hours of the following morning it became apparent that elements of this division were proceeding to Budapest. Radio communications of the Command Radio Group, and of the 2d Guards Mech Div increased to an all-time high, with nearly continuous transmissions being noted.

Extending into November, communications of the Soviet Forces in Hungary continued to reflect political unrest. Contrary to Soviet edicts and press reports during the period 1-3 November, COMINT revealed no indications of Soviet withdrawal from Hungary. By 8 November, plain language transmissions and radio communications in general began to decrease within the radio groups of the Soviet Forces in Hungary which at that time also included the 32d Mech Div and entities from the Carpathian Military District. From the latter part of November through the end of the calendar year communications, characterized by routine contacts and a minimum of plain text revealed, the 32d Mech Div and entities from the Carpathian Military District to be on a stand by status.

The final highlight concerning COMINT coverage of the Hungarian insurrection was the timely reporting of the withdrawal of the 32d Mech Div from Hungary.
Overall control of Soviet Forces Hungary was maintained by Hq, Southern Group, with former Hq, SFM retitled "Hq, Unidentified Formation" and subordinated to Hq, Southern Group. Also under the Southern Group command were Hq, 8th Mech Army, Hq, 38th Army, 32d Mech Div, and possibly other unidentified headquarters. Other changes in command placed the 35th Guards Mech Div and its subsidiaries, the 110th and 112th Mech Regts, under Hq, 8th Mech Army in November. After January the 35th Div resubordinated to Hq, Unidentified Formation, replacing the 17th Guards Mech Div which went under control of the 38th Army. The 38th Army was also responsible for the 13th Guards Mech Div. The 32d Mech Div controlled the 106th and 53d Mech Regts. During the final half of the report period the communications activities of the Soviet Ground Forces in Hungary gradually stabilized, and continuity was maintained on all radio groups. However, on 25 Apr 57, the radio group serving 38th Army to division communications went silent, and on 26 April an alternate radio group serving the Soviet Southern Group became active. Subsequently, on 6 and 18 May the radio group serving the Unidentified Formations and the Command Radio Group of Hq, Southern Group became inactive except for the period 23 May to 1 June when the Command Radio Group of Hq, Southern Group was also active. As each radio group became inactive the alternate radio group became increased in its activity and eventually assumed the responsibility of Hq, Southern Group's communications down to division level. This alternate radio group was characterized by complex receiving and skip-skip-skip working; i.e. division level stations communicated directly with Hq, Southern Group in addition to their immediate higher headquarters.
On 24 October COMINT also noted that elements of 32d Mech Div of the Soviet Independent Mechanized Army were called in to help put down the revolt.

Carpathian Military District indicated participation of the 38th Army.

The most significant activity of the Soviet Independent Mechanized Army in Romania was the participation of the 32d Mech Div in the Hungarian Insurrection described above. No changes in OB were noted.
"E" Branch

Throughout the year this branch performed routine processing on the assigned Romanian communications entities; specifically, Romanian State Security Police, Internal Guard, Naval, and an unidentified network believed to serve the Romanian Border Guard. On 30 Apr 57 responsibility for the Bulgarian and the Soviet/Satellite COMINT problems was transferred from Hq. USAS-Europe to the battalion and integrated into the Romanian branch. For the brief period during which the processing of Bulgarian entities was the responsibilities of this headquarters,

Weekly technical notes on the Bulgarian and the Soviet/Satellite COMINT (DP) activities were incorporated into a combined Satellite weekly. Traffic analysis was performed by a Romanian linguist under the supervision of a senior traffic analyst. Technical data and necessary records were maintained by the OB specialist of the Bulgarian section. Significant events noted by the Bulgarian section follow:
6. (NEW) 328th ASA Co (Intelligence), Bad Aibling, Germany

The operational section of the 328th Company was subordinate to the 312th Battalion, and dependent upon it for technical support. In turn, two detachments, Lima and Kilo, were assigned to the company; the former, composed of three positions, engaged in Russian while the latter used one manual morse position for intercept of Yugoslav radio links.

The assigned mission included the following intercept targets, Soviet Forces Hungary, Independent Mechanized Army of Romania, Carpathian Military District, Kiev Military District, Odessa Military District, and North Caucasus Military District. At the beginning of the year Bulgarian Border Guard, Naval and Police nets were assigned to the company. Later, these were reassigned to the 332d Company. In October 1956, one position was added to the mission in an effort to intercept radio transmissions of the Bulgarian Navy.
7. 332d ASA Co., Böd Aibling, Germany

During FY 1957, the general mission of the 332d Co was to assist the 312th Battalion in its joint COMINT responsibility with NSA for intercept of Hungarian Military, Border Guards, Internal Guard, and Romanian Naval, Air, Internal Security Police, and Internal Guard nets. In rendering this mission the company covered the following...
Hungarian Problem

During the last six months of the year most of the Hungarian links were reestablished. Activity indicated that a major change occurred in the function of Hungarian Military type communications as a result of the Soviet intervention.

Romanian Problem

At the start of the year the Romanian targets (Air, Naval, Internal Security Police, Internal Guards, and Unidentified) were copied.

Bulgarian Problem

The Bulgarian assignment first consisted of a General Search mission. Main effort in identification was towards Border Guards targets.
B. (CIA) 339th ASA Company, Rothwesten, Germany

The operational mission of the 339th Company during FY 1957 included intercept of Czech, Russian and Polish communications.
9. (TOP SECRET) 6th USASA Field Station, Herzgenaurach, Germany

The continuous operating mission of the 6th Field Station as a radio intercept station in FY 1957, was to collect and process COMINT from Russia, Russian satellites, and other European nations.
10. (comp) 8th USASA Fld Sta, Scheyern, Germany

The operational mission of the 8th USASA Field Station (USM-8) was provided through directives from Hq. USASA-Europe. COMINT targets for FY 1957 remained satellite countries with concentration on those Polish (PL) and Yugoslavian (YO) entities which included

Polish Problem

Early in September it was suspected that Polish

The exceptional amount of Unidentified and Military traffic which occurred in October was attributed to the movement of Russian troops in troubled Poland and the insurrection in Hungary.
Early in May, Poles began preparation for annual maneuvers. Full scale maneuvers began.

The following represents highlights of the Polish mission during the year.

Polish Military exercises were being conducted in the Silesian MD came to an abrupt end on 3 Jul 56 with the Poznan riots.

In 1956 four groups were controlled at the Ministry of Defense. The outstations were Naval Hq, Air Hq, MD Hq, and Corps level units. After the structural change only a link to a Corps level unit, were controlled by the Ministry of Defense. Five groups controlled at MD Hq with outstations of Division level had direct communication links with the Ministry of Defense through the last outstation of these groups.
11. (SSN) 11th USASA Fld Sta, Baumholder, Germany

Operational mission of the 11th Fld Sta throughout FY 1957 was to intercept foreign communications, perform DF, apply Special Identification Techniques, and to perform ancillary tasks as required in support of the National COMINT effort.
period 25 October to 11 November 1956 when traffic increased. This was attributed to the Hungarian situation and the Suez crisis.

From 25 October to 11 November 1956, a heavy traffic flow occurred. This was attributed to the celebration of the Russian October Revolution, the Hungarian situation, and the Suez crisis.
In support of USASA effort against Soviet ballistic missiles, during FY 1957, was to operate intercept facilities as designated by NSA.

The operational mission of the 276th USASA Company.

12. (276th) 276th USASA Company.
F. Africa

1. (FOIA) 4th USASA Fld Sta, Asmara, Eritrea

At the start of FY 1957, the general mission of 4th Field Station (USM-4) was to intercept Russian Military

However, when French, British, and Israeli forces invaded the Suez Canal, mission assignment was changed
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FOOTNOTES

Material contained in this book was obtained from the documents named below: (listed by Roman numeral, letter, and number corresponding to section of the book)

I. ) (Taken from entire book and collection of all of these documents)

II. 

III.

A.

B.
3. Ann Hist Rept, 7th USASA Fl d Sta, FY57, Vol II, pp2-10; Tabs A, B.

C.

D.
7. Ann Hist Rept, 12th USASA Fl d Sta, FY57, Vol II, ppl1-15; & Tab B.

E.

F.