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HISTORY OF THE ARMY SECURITY AGENCY AND SUBORDINATE UNITS

FISCAL YEAR 1956

VOLUME II - Technical Operations

Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 01-19-2017 pursuant to E. O. 13526, MDR Case # 62314

Prepared by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2

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FISCAL YEAR 1956

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I. FOREWORD

This document presents an account of FY 1956 operations of field units of the Army Security Agency in the conduct of COMINT and ELINT for the Army and NSA. From missions imposed upon ASA units, or NSA Field Stations manned by ASA personnel, specific accomplishments have been discussed to provide a comprehensive guide for future planning and instruction.

Operationally, FY 1956 witnessed the withdrawal of ASA units from Austria and their subsequent re-establishment in Germany.

Relocation from Korea to Japan, and from Far East to Hawaii continued. Another endeavor of operational importance during the year was the addition of ELINT responsibility and the establishment of a joint COMINT-ELINT site at Sinop, Turkey. An ELINT facility was set up in Washington and charged with operational and technical control of Army ELINT teams. Additionally, an ASA-Europe Control Center was formed to provide mission control for all related European units.

Meanwhile, the vital operational objectives continued to be a high degree of mission fulfillment, effective liaison and collection of special intelligence pertaining to the war potential, military forces, and related activities of foreign countries. Efforts to improve DF nets were also underway as a new site was added at Adak, Alaska and plans to reorganize the ASA-Europe DF net were revised. The trend toward more sophisticated identification techniques also continued.

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Facts for this compilation were derived from records, reports, and correspondence arising from requirements imposed upon commanders of ASA units. Controversial information was resolved through discussion with qualified military and civilian counsel. Special authority and methods of compilation for this document included: AR 10-122, 23 Jun 55; AR 220-345, 18 Oct 54, subject: Field Organizations; DA Pamphlet 20-200, June 1956, subject: Guide to the Writing of American Military History; Cir Nr 23, Hq ASA, 28 Jun 55, subject: Historical Activities of the Army Security Agency; Ltr, GAS22 314.7, 30 Jun 55, subject: Specifications for Historical Reports; AR 320-50-1, 23 Nov 53, as changed, subject: Military Terms, Abbreviations, and Symbols.

Dissemination of information contained herein is to be handled in strict accordance with requirements set forth in the existing DA Regulation for Security and Dissemination of Communications Intelligence, dated 1 Jul 51 and Ltr, AGAS-S 380.01 TS (21 Jun 51), G2, DA, dated 1 Jul 51, subject: Regulations for Security and Dissemination of Communications Intelligence.

Cross references at the end of unit summaries in this volume indicate the first page of supplementary administrative information in Volume I.

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II. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

Throughout FY 1956, the Army Security Agency directed its operational efforts toward analysis of requirements, activities, capabilities, and deficiencies as well as relative effectiveness and efficiency of field units. The following is a series of extracts from Special Operations Division (GAS50), and Quarterly Program Reviews as prepared by the Comptroller, covering FY 1956 Operational Highlights:

"Technical support, improving Agency operations, consisted of staff lectures on ASA activities and visits to ASA theater commands. Additionally, daily coordination with NSA was maintained to insure that support rendered would be timely and adequate. Stateside COMINT training was provided by the 504th Comm Recon Group, Fort Devens and the 313th Comm Recon Battalion, Fort Bragg.

"Meanwhile, the Agency girded itself to organize its newly acquired ELINT mission. An ELINT facility was set up in Washington and charged with operational and technical control of Army ELINT teams and staff supervision over the conduct of an ELINT search and analysis program. A Technical Processing Center was also organized to centralize control of the newly gathered information. ASA ELINT operator instructions were provided at Naval Security Station. Operational officers received training courses at Fort Monmouth, NJ, while others visited ASA-Europe, Alaska, and Far East to observe ELINT test field operations. Thus, a continuous training program was established. An electronic operational and technical directives program, providing technical support for field units, was established and directives were forwarded


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to the field covering recording procedures for Army search teams and reporting of ELINT data by electrical means. By the end of the report period, the Agency had approved ELINT processing facilities for ASA-Alaska, Europe, Far East, and Washington. Preparations were also made for a special ELINT collection effort against [redacted]

EO 3.3(h)(2)
P.L. 86-36

"Highlighting the Agency's newly acquired mission, and stemming from visits to England, Germany, and Turkey, was the establishment of a joint COMINT-ELINT team at Sinop, Turkey. Necessary equipment was set up at Vint Hill Farms Station, and then shipped to the Sinop site. By the end of the year, DF, RFP, manual Morse, and R/T positions were in operation. Information gleaned from this site was used as technical support for the ELINT



"The incorporation of ELINT into the Agency's mission did not hamper COMINT operations. Extensive site testing determined Camp Hakata, Kyushu, Japan as the most suitable location for Fld Sta 7202. Operations commenced there 1 May 56. Fld Sta 8609 was transferred from ASA-Far East to ASA-Pacific,

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15 Aug 55, and the 326th Comm Recon Company was relocated from Korea to Camp Momoyama, Japan 8 Sep 55.

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"Responsibility for T/A processing of ChiCom voice and LLVI problems was transferred from 501st Comm Recon Group to 301st Comm Recon Battalion 17 Aug 55. Fld Sta 8603 exchanged three [] positions for three Chinese positions with Fld Sta 8610. All intercept and processing of [] traffic performed at Fld Sta 8603 by Army personnel would now be accomplished by the Navy. Operational control remained with USN-27. Hq ASA recommended that two 2-channel positions be converted to single channel, that two flexible multichannel (FLEX MUX) positions be transferred to Fld Sta 8610, and that one radio printer search position be installed and manned for development of the ChiCom [] problem. Equipment from the three multichannel positions was stored in the ASA-Far East reserve.

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"Detachment K, Fld Sta 8608 transferred from Wels, Austria to Bad Aibling, Germany. Detachment B, Fld Sta 8606 moved from Bremen, Germany 10 Oct 55, and commenced operations at Neunwalde, Germany the following day. Two manual Morse positions were transferred from Fld Sta 8608 and installed at Detachment L, Fld Sta 8606 for a 30-day test. At the end of the testing period, these positions were re-installed at Fld Sta 8608.

"Ninety days of additional testing was begun by ASA-Europe, 1 Mar 56, for development of [] low-level manual Morse activity. The 339th Comm Recon Company conducted a Czech LLVI test 1 Apr 56 and continued this operation throughout the year. Two teams, comprised of one radio telephone position each, operated along the West German-Czech border, supplementing the main two position effort at Mahring. Movement of the 302d Comm Recon

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Battalion from Bamberg to Herzo Base, Germany was planned, and in conjunction with this projected move, an intercept test to determine the capability of German Communist targets to Herzo Base was conducted between 10 May and 6 Jun 56.

"A site survey to determine the best possible location for a fixed intercept station in the Republic of Korea commenced 21 Jun 56. Special emphasis was placed on the Seoul, Pusan, Mokpo, and Toksan areas. A DF site at Adak, Alaska became operational in the ASA-Far East Northern Net, 3 Jul 55. Installation of a DF net to be operated by the 327th Comm Recon Company on Formosa was approved by ASA-NSA, and the intercept requirement was changed to reflect [redacted] installed and manned. Plans to reorganize ASA-Europe's DF net were revised. Inactivation of DF sites at Landshut and Weiden, Germany (312th Bn DF Net), and ASA-Europe's absorption of the Bad Aibling Flash and DF station at Vicenza, Italy were scheduled for 15 Nov 55. Meanwhile, ASA-Europe anticipated early installation of a tactical DF site at [redacted]

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P.L. 86-36

"Reportorial activity included advising field elements of deficiencies in their reports or inadequate application of various directives. Lists of discrepancies found in the Operations Capability Reports were forwarded to all ASA theater headquarters, and Fld Sta's 8601, 8602, and 8604 for clarification following monthly review. Delay in the arrival of Czech Voice TECSUM's, prepared by the 339th Comm Recon Company, greatly decreased the value of the report for processing purposes. ASA-Europe was advised that NSA received no technical information other than the TECSUM's from the 339th. Consequently, NSA recommended a daily English condensation of transcriptions

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instead of the belated TECSUM. A new NSA procedure of [redacted] provided better results and greater intercept copiability to each automatic Morse position, and also raised the manning factor from [redacted] operators per position. Change II to NSA Intercept Deployment Plan for FY 1961 programmed the installation of [redacted] positions at ASA units. These positions were to employ a special version of the Model 28 printer GOBLIN (AFSAV-508). Interference from a Navy transmitter forced some positions to move from Kagnew Station to Camp Ghinda, Eritrea. The move was declared a complete success and one simplex and five manual Morse positions were installed with the approval of NSA as an interim measure in solving the interference problem.

"Highlighting field operations was project GENETRIX, a balloon project established in December by the AF to record Russian reaction to released balloons. All ASA-Europe units had been notified of the initial launching and had been warned that all activity indicative of balloon observation by the Soviet Bloc countries was not to be reported as associated with GENETRIX. Special efforts on the project were discontinued in February 1956, however, responsibility of routine reflections were handled by daily wrap-ups on second echelon reporting units, with Point-of-Intercept reporting units responsible for spot reports of unusual or especially significant items. Additionally, NSA required ASA-Europe to monitor the [redacted]

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"On 20 Sep 55, the National Indication Center (NIC) established as part of the Watch Committee of the Intelligence Advisory Group under the jurisdiction of NSG, was placed on the Addressee List. Its function was to channel

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alert reports reproduced in accordance with NSA Cir 53-2.

"On 23 Jun 55, AR 10-122 was implemented, expanding machine aids functions to include COMSEC, ELINT, and COMJAM as well as COMINT activities. All ASA field machine units were provided technical supervision through documentary material, personal visits, and guidance in machine processing techniques and equipment. Operational tests of the Flexowriter and the CXCO unit, conducted November 1955-March 1956, indicated that this equipment could save time on various transcribing problems. The Flexowriter was recommended for use within analytic processing sections, but because none were immediately available, three CXCO 1 units were obtained in October 1955 from NSA and forwarded to Seoul, Korea to meet the demands of the 501st Comm Recon Group. NSA also lent 2 CXCO 1 units to Fld Sta 8601 for operational tests, while 2 Flexowriters were procured and air-shipped to Fld Sta 8603, Okinawa, for use in the T/A Processing Section. In March 1956, the SOCRATES IV was sent to Machine Aids Section, Hq ASA-Far East to replace SOCRATES I. At the request of the Navy, through NSA, the SOCRATES I was transferred from Fld Sta 8601 to Hq ASA for additional study and evaluation of operational techniques. Monthly Machine Aids Utilization Report was implemented in ASA-Europe, Far East, and the 502d Comm Recon Group in November 1955. Information obtained from these reports aided evaluation of Machine Aids efforts on specific jobs and the formulation of plans for more efficient utilization of machine processing equipment for COMINT, ELINT, DF, COMSEC and battlefield surveillance equipment. Finally, a Machine Support Analysis Section was planned for Fld Sta's 8603 and 8609 in FY 1957.

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"The Special Identification Techniques (SIT) Subsection was transferred from Fort George G. Meade to Arlington Hall Station early in the year in order to employ SIT personnel in both COMINT and ELINT fields. Technical support was furnished ASA field units in RFP, DF, and SIT activities.

"In April 1956, ASA-Europe moved the AFSAV-D37, the 502d Comm Recon Group's technical library and RFP analysts from Fld Sta 8606 to the 307th Comm Recon Battalion. Earlier in the year, DF and RFP efforts had been combined at Fld Sta 8606 by transferring a portion of ASA-Europe DF Plotting Section to that station. Seven intercom stations (LS-127/FI) were at the point of intercept. RFP facilities were established during April [redacted] [redacted] AFSAV-D37 equipment, a photographic laboratory, trained personnel and supplies were furnished through ASA channels.

"Inability to conduct DF site surveys of the proposed Shemya/Attu area in March 1956 caused the interim retention of USM-614 at Adak. ASA-Europe submitted a special map projection designed for plotting bearings observed on targets in Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia. The projection was returned to ASA-Europe for improvement. A new high frequency DF system was approved and submitted by the AFSS Military Characteristics Group in June to the Radio Frequency Equipment Panel, Intercept Technical Committee. Additional features and capabilities were recommended which would increase the effectiveness and long term value of the system.

"Collateral Intelligence sources for FY 1956 were ASA-Europe landlines and mail intercept projects, certain [redacted] and ASA-Europe and Far-East TAREX projects.

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"TAREX activity at ASA-Europe continued to provide valuable information concerning cryptologic and general communications developments. In West Germany, information was supplied regarding invention, manufacture, and principles of operation of new cryptographic and communications devices. Information concerning VHF/UHF, microwave, and decimeter equipment, as received from Team 2J attached to the 522d Mil Intel Battalion in Berlin, remained timely and of great interest to NSA. This team also assisted in the interrogation of defectors and returnees acquainted with communications.

"ASA-Far East TAREX supplied technical advice to US Army Intelligence units engaged in clandestine collection of foreign cryptologic and communications information. In addition, several agent interrogations and a large number of intelligence reports were furnished. A Chinese-English Dictionary proved of extreme value to NSA in both training and operations. Other submissions included a map and chart catalogue, the first of a series of translations of articles dealing with electrical communications, and six sets of North Korean field manuals. Information was also forwarded concerning three separately developed systems for the transmission of Chinese characters via teletype which was of interest to NSA-741.

"Special operations during the year included the following projects:

PINK LADY - Project involved a possible doubled Russian agent in Bremerhaven. Tapes and RFP shots containing related traffic were forwarded by ASA-Europe on a monthly basis. An additional Category D position was assigned Fld Sta 8611 for reporting this operation as ASA-Europe desired all information that might aid in the exploitation of the project.

CATSUP - Project recorded results of the mobile intercept team provided by 501st Comm Recon Group, Korea, to cover a doubled North Korean agent and his control--the 308th CIC in Pusan--by a 30-day one-position mobile radio team in the Taegu area. In addition, information was forwarded concerning


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
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III. ASA UNIT OPERATIONS (WORLD-WIDE)

A. Continental United States

1. 311th Communications Reconnaissance Battalion,
Fort Devens, Mass

Throughout FY 1956, the 311th Battalion remained operationally subordinate to the 504th Group. At the beginning of the year, seven training intercept positions were operated, while at the end of the year, a deficiency in personnel strength reduced this number to three.¹




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1. Ann Hist, 311th CRB, FY56, Vol II pl.
2. Ibid. Tab A.

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Performance of the operational mission was continuous 24 hours a day from 13 Apr 56 to the end of the report period. The number of positions manned fluctuated with assigned strength.¹ REF: VOL I P. 151

2. 313th Communications Reconnaissance Battalion,
Fort Bragg, NC

The general mission of the 313th Battalion was the interception and processing of traffic from assigned Central and South American targets. This was interrupted while the battalion prepared for and participated in Exercise SAGEBRUSH.²

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P.L. 86-36

On 7 May 56, the battalion resumed intercept operations with an assignment calling for Morse and teletype positions. Targets again were Central and South American cases. Operations were conducted from truck-mounted huts. Due to manpower shortages and mobile type positions, results were small and T/A proved difficult.³

1. Ann Rept, 311th CRB, FY56, Vol II, pp2-3.
2. Ann Rept, 313th CRB, FY56, Vol II, p2.
3. Ibid. p2.

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The T/A Section continued processing intercepted traffic until 14 Aug 55, when preparations for Exercise SAGEBRUSH interrupted the mission. On 7 Feb 56, this section instituted an 80-hour technical training program. Normal mission was resumed 7 May 56.¹ [REF: VOL. ~~5~~ P. 153]

3. Field Station (8601), Warrenton, Va

The operational mission of Fld Sta 8601 was intercept of certain South American, Central American, and European nets and search for unidentified links. As a special mission the station machine processed multiplex type reperforated tape forwarded by NSA and returned the finished product to NSA. Accordingly, the mission was divided among the Manual Morse, Automatic Morse, and Radio Printer Sections.²

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1. Ann Rept, 313th CRB, FY56, Vol II, p3.
2. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8601), FY56, Vol II, p4.
3. Ibid. pp33-34.

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Automatic Morse Section was assigned 428 links divided as follows:¹

<u>Area</u>	<u>Nr of Asgd Links</u>
South America	223
Central America	64
Europe	115
Africa	18
Near East	8

In addition, there were 36 diversity positions (OOK) installed and operating during the first quarter of the fiscal year, and 18 each quarter thereafter. Eighteen diversity positions (FSK) were installed and operated in each of the last three quarters of the year.²

Radio PrinterEO 3.3(h)(2)
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The R/P Section, utilizing JX1, JX6, and JX8 positions, scanned and processed certain tapes forwarded by NSA. Coverage during the year follows:³

<u>Type & Nr of Positions</u>	<u>Nr Links Asgd</u>	<u>Hours Copied</u>
JX1 - 	164	184,523:20
JX6 - 	12	18,807:45
JX8 - 	14	1,795:10

REF: VOL. I. P. 155

4. Field Station (8602), Petaluma, Calif

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
Fld Sta 8602 received its operational assignment directly from NSA and its mission was carried out by the following sections of the Operations Branch:⁴

1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8601), FY56, Vol II p35.
2. Ibid. p35.
3. Ibid. pp12, 36.
4. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8602), FY56, Vol II, ppl-16.

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1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8602), FY56, Vol II, pp5-12.

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


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Automatic Morse

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
At one time or another during the year, this section devoted full coverage to links originating in [redacted]



While transcribed traffic intake dropped, messages taken produced more desired traffic. Intensive coverage was devoted to the Geneva Convention with good results being achieved.²

Radio Printer

Radio Printer receiving conditions during the year were only fair. Message volume decreased from previous years by reason of a change in target transmission methods. The station had no intercept equipment to cope with these changes.³ Targets covered included [redacted]



EO 3.3(h)(2)
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1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8602), FY56, Vol II, Tab 3.
2. Ibid. p12.
3. Ibid. p13.
4. Ibid. pp13-15.

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


B. Alaska

1. Hq ASA-Alaska (8614), Fort Richardson

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The continuing operational mission of Hq ASA-Alaska during FY 1956 included processing of Morse, voice, R/T, and R/P traffic. Special emphasis was placed on



An additional mission, that of

was assigned in October 1955.

Operational branch of Hq ASA-Alaska was divided into three units: C/A, Translation, and T/A.


1. Ann Rept, ASAAL, FY56, Vol II, p2.

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Cryptanalysis



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Translation

The Translation Unit was responsible for translating [redacted] [redacted] traffic and chatter for T/A, and for checking transcriptions from USM-83 and USM-7. (Although the transcribing mission was assigned USM-83 and USM-7, it was performed at this headquarters until an adequate member of personnel could be assigned these units.) Problems encountered throughout the year consisted mainly of poor operational equipment and lack of sufficient working aids. The latter was greatly alleviated with the receipt of technical Russian Language texts and [redacted] working aids.²

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
Traffic Analysis

The Traffic Analysis (T/A) Unit analyzed signal communications and related material to obtain COMINT and technical information. TECSUM's were forwarded to this unit by [redacted] USA-28, USA-29, [redacted] USM-46, USM-5, USM-83, and USM-7. The T/A unit was operationally divided into [redacted] [redacted]

1. Ann Rept, ASAAL, FY56, Vol II, p6.
2. Ibid. p7.
3. Ibid. pp8-9.


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a. Detachment E, Gambell, St Lawrence Island



1. Ann Rept, ASAAL, FY56, Vol II, pp8-9.
2. Ibid. p9.
3. Ibid. p10.
4. Ann Rept, Det E (8614), Vol II, FY56, p27.
5. Ibid. pp27-28.

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2. Field Station (8607), Kenai

The operational mission of Fld Sta 8607 during FY 1956 included manual Morse, automatic Morse, and radio printer intercept of [redacted] As a special mission this station furnished support on special [redacted] missions as requested by a [redacted]

Automatic Morse

At the start of the year, the section had a large [redacted] and a small [redacted] mission for its priority coverage. The results of this mission were poor, most of the section's production was obtained from an additional [redacted] mission. In January 1956, this link was discontinued in order to devote more time to developing the priority assignment. In February, the section received a new [redacted] mission, which continued to the end of the year with increasingly encouraging results. The [redacted] assignment was discontinued from May to the middle of June.² Total automatic Morse groups copied equalled 1,222,080 (228,456 [redacted] and 993,624 [redacted])³

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Manual Morse

The Manual Morse Section was primarily concerned with [redacted] [redacted] In August, a series of General Search positions were assigned at the expense of [redacted] mainline targets. Personnel shortages necessitated dropping five General Search and one Russian position during the year.⁴

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1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8607), FY56, Vol II, p2.
2. Ibid. pp7-8.
3. Ibid. Tab Q.
4. Ibid. p19.

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C. Caribbean

1. Hq ASA-Caribbean (8616), Fort Kobbe, CZ

The mission of ASA-Caribbean was to provide COMINT support to USARCARIB by performing intercept and DF on foreign nation's nets affecting the security of the Canal Zone.³

Excellent coverage was obtained from the following nets:⁴

- Argentina
- Brazil
- Chile
- Colombia
- Costa Rica
- Cuba



1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8607), FY56, Vol II, p32.
2. Ibid. p34.
3. Comd Rept, ASACARIB, FY56, Vol II, p3.
4. Ibid. Tab 6.

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
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Peru
Surinam
Venezuela



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The only manual Morse position in operation at the start of the year was General Search JM1 which operated on a rotating frequency band 30-day cycle (3-3.5 mcs first 10 days, 3-5.4 mcs second 10 days, 4-4.5 mcs third 10 days). In August, as a result of a visit by the Chief, ASA-Caribbean, it was suggested that two DF positions be converted to manual Morse in order to aid the assigned mission.¹ NSA concurred and redesignated these AM2 and AM3 manual Morse positions, and assigned mission for both as follows:²

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Date Assigned
24 Sep 55

25 Nov 55
(Deleted 22 Feb 56)

25 Nov 55

17 Apr 56

1. Comd Rept, ASACARIB, FY56, Vol II, pp3-4.
2. Ibid. pp4-6.

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Date Assigned
1 Oct 55

25 Nov 55

22 Feb 56

17 May 56

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A special mission in January 1956 requested this headquarters to forward information on the [redacted] to CINCCARIB, and Hq USARCARIB. This could not be done as there was no intercept obtainable from [redacted]. In March, magnetic tape recordings of live Portuguese and Spanish language traffic were sent for training purposes to the 313th ASA Battalion and to ASATC. As a result of reported Colombian Communist Guerrilla activity JMI was assigned to intercept all [redacted] [redacted] nets. Translations of plain text intercept were furnished to the local SSO who disseminated same to interested consumers.¹ In June, NSA indicated a plot of international importance in certain Central and South American countries and directed this headquarters to exercise extreme caution in covering the [redacted] assignment.²


At the end of the year, changes in the intercept assignments produced the following mission for the three manual Morse positions:³

PRI POR JMI
General Search

1. Comd Rept, ASACARIB, FY56, Vol II, pp7-8.
2. Ibid. p9.
3. Ibid. p6.

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End product reporting to local consumers was limited to translations of plain language intercepts and [redacted] traffic. The request to NSA for [redacted] to enable more timely end-product reports on Venezuelan Guerrilla intercept was not provided because of difficult translation problems. Intercept was obtained in appreciable amounts from all Central and South American countries except Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia.¹

REF: VOL. I P. 202

D. Hawaii


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1. Field Station (8605), Helemano

The general mission of Fld Sta 8605 during FY 1956 included intercept of foreign communications, application of SIT, submission of technical reports and raw material, and performing ancillary tasks as required in support of the National COMINT effort.²

The Manual Morse Section intercepted manually-keyed [redacted] radio signals on all positions, except one, which dealt exclusively with General Search. The original assignment covered [redacted]


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1. Comd Rept, ASACARIB, FY56, Vol II, ppl8-19.
2. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8605), FY56, Vol II, p2.

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
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1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8605), FY56, Vol II, pp2-3.
2. Ibid. pp17-19.
3. Ibid. p7.

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1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8605), FY56, Vol II, p12.
2. Ibid. pp21-23.

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A total of 7830 R/P references were noted and exploited. This represented an increase of 2598 references over the previous year.¹ Total intercept time recorded by the R/P Section during FY 1956 was 10,238 hours of [] and 16,222 hours of [] coverage.² At the end of the year, R/P assignment consisted of 25 [] circuits.³

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On 24 Jun 56, at the request of NSA, the Morse General Search position was employed to intercept [] cases for 20 days. Object of this special mission was sampling to determine station copying capability on these cases.⁴ REF: VOL. I P. 202

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E. Philippine Islands

1. Field Station (8609), Clark Air Force Base, Pampanga

Fld Sta 8609 intercepted and performed DF on Russian, Chinese, [] and certain Asian nets during FY 1956.⁵ Accordingly the Operations Section was divided into Automatic Morse, Manual Morse, R/P, and R/T Sections. A list of the activity of each follows:

Automatic Morse

At the start of the year, this section covered 59 links, 29 of which were devoted full coverage. Assignments fluctuated markedly during the year, finally becoming stable in April 1956 with 32 links covered. Nine were devoted to full coverage- []

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1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8605), FY56, Vol II, p16.
2. Ibid. p19.
3. Ibid. p11.
4. Ibid. p12.
5. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8609), FY56, Vol II, pp1-2.

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Manual Morse

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The manual Morse assignment was composed of Viet Minh, Viet Nam, ChiCom

[Redacted]

Cases, plus General Search.

In October 1955, the mission was altered to include 70 hours of Indonesian Military. Coverage proved unproductive and mission was shortly dropped.

Principal assignments were Viet Minh and ChiCom nets. The former was given 372 hours of daily coverage, while the latter was assigned 110 hours of daily coverage, and 141 of General Search. The [Redacted] mission required

only 58 hours per day. A special intercept "Alert" mission for Russian [Redacted]

[Redacted]

circuits was unproductive principally due to the

fact that the execution of the primary mission precluded the use of intercept time for search of these cases.²

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Radio Printer

The mission of the R/P Section was to intercept and forward to NSA all pertinent information from assigned [Redacted]. In September 1955, [Redacted]

[Redacted] were deleted while [Redacted] and reverse,

and [Redacted] and reverse were added. In November, [Redacted] was dropped,

thus terminating the [Redacted] mission. In April 1956, there was a complete

mission change in [Redacted]. This change, in priority order, was as follows:

[Redacted]

1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8609), FY56, Vol II, p11.
2. Ibid. pp18-19.

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[Redacted]

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Radiotelephone

The R/T Section intercepted and forwarded to NSA, traffic passed on assigned [Redacted] circuits. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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An intercept control function, composed of a team chief and Viet Minh and General Search identification personnel, was established in the Traffic Control and Reports Section. This team provided rapid identification of all targets, aided in tipping off [Redacted] and maintained coordination and liaison between T/A, SIT, and intercept. In anticipation of a major [Redacted]

[Redacted]

During the report period, the Chinese [Redacted] the Chinese [Redacted] and the Viet Minh Military Identifications Bulletin were added to the station's recurring reports, while [Redacted]

1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8609), FY56, Vol II, pp25-27.
2. Ibid. pp27-29.
3. Ibid. pp32-33.

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Unidentified Daily Coverage Reports were discontinued. The station also produced end-product reports on both ChiCom and Viet Minh [redacted] activities. No end-product report was produced on ChiCom [redacted] 1

During the year, the station had numerous special missions. A Chinese [redacted] mission was assigned 27 Apr-11 Jun 56, Vietnamese Press mission 15-18 Feb 56, Indonesian Military manual Morse 25 Oct-15 Dec 55, and special Chinese [redacted] mission 27 Mar-27 Apr 56. The last mission [redacted]

[redacted] General Search

position developed Viet Minh Civil Air traffic on 18 Dec 55, and Viet Minh Naval traffic, 20 Feb 56. As a result of a [redacted] assigned in December 1954, [redacted] was added to the assignment. Nets covered included:

[redacted]

cept averaged only 13 messages daily since the 14 March change. The largest percentage of intercept continued to be the [redacted] cases.² REF: VOL. I P. 212

F. Europe

1. Hq ASA-Europe (8620), Frankfurt, Germany

The Intelligence Branch, ASA-Europe was divided into Administrative, Processing, Reports, SIT, Traffic Control, and Special Projects Sections.³

Processing

The general mission of this section continued to be performing T/A,

1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8609), FY56, Vol II, pp33-34.
2. Ibid. pp3-7.
3. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, p5.

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C/A, translations; correlating DF and [] results in certain []
[] and providing Report-
ing Section with necessary technical details. The section also provided
intercept sites and other processing centers with technical data. At the
end of the year, [] were assigned.¹

Traffic from USM 85X at Vicenza and Udine was processed for intercept
evaluation and site guidance. At the beginning of evaluation in December
1955, only 45% of the traffic was unidentifiable. Through Machine Aids a

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[] After this publica-
tion a higher percentage of traffic was identified.²

The Processing Section was divided into two support subsections; R/T
and Machine Aids and national units representing target areas.

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The R/T subsection obtained in August, about eight cuts of very good
quality Romanian [] How-
ever, it was not again picked up. A 30% increase in Russian voice activity
in late September-early October 1955 was attributable to []
Beginning in the spring of 1956, a considerable amount of low-echelon
[] was intercepted. It was unique in that it was intercepted
on both [] In addition, a special document show-
ing the organization and equipment of [] was compiled

1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp17-18.
2. Ibid. p108.

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along with a list of approximate 250 frequently used [redacted]

and sent to subordinate units.¹

The Machine Aids Subsection reproduced and forwarded monthly the following files: [redacted] effective January 1956, initial deck 192,000 cards; [redacted] effective January 1956; and [redacted] effective June 1956, initial deck 56,000 cards. The [redacted] deck of approximately 84,000 cards was forwarded in March. Decks for [redacted] were forwarded quarterly.²

Liaison was maintained chiefly with the 502d Group and Fld Sta 8606. With the inclusion of ELINT machine processing, much closer liaison with ASA Europe Group (Prov) was expected. The 502d Group was furnished monthly DF bearings and [redacted] placements. Changes in [redacted] were stabilized at the close of the year, and with the anticipated standard [redacted] machine handling of this traffic was expected to improve.³

The Processing Section was further sub-divided into international units:

Russian

This subsection processed and performed T/A on manual Morse and R/P intercept of Soviet [redacted] communications identified with the Soviet

1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp85-88.
2. Ibid. p99.
3. Ibid. pp99, 105.

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[Redacted]

Specific technical support was given to Morse and R/P intercept stations having assignments in the areas of interest. [Redacted] data was collected, processed, and published.

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The subsection with [Redacted] was further divided into functional groups: Manual Morse Analysis, Radio Printer Analysis, [Redacted] Processing, and Cryptanalysis.

Six different types of technical reports were prepared and a total of special releases were issued. They were based on analysis of [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Manual Morse Analysis - As of 30 Jun 56, a total of 29 Category J

manual Morse positions and 14 non-Morse radio printer block groups at intercept stations provided coverage for [Redacted] assigned to ASA-Europe. Intercept coverage on the [Redacted] was dropped at Fld Sta 8608 on 15 Jun 56, when duplicate coverage was eliminated and homogeneous assignments established.

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[Redacted] were assigned Fld Sta 8606; [Redacted] were assigned Fld Sta 8611 and [Redacted] were assigned the 328th Company. Insofar as practical, R/P assignments at each station were adjusted to parallel manual

1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp32-34.

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Morse coverage. [redacted] General Search items were received from Fld Sta 8606; search and non-mission material from several US Army stations and [redacted] from the 502d Group

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and the 312th Battalion. In April, arrangements were made by NSA [redacted] allowing ASA-Europe to receive [redacted] manual Morse messages from the 1st Wireless Regiment. Additional [redacted] TECSUM and raw traffic was received from Fld Sta 8604 after May 1956. Additional valuable [redacted] intercept was obtained from [redacted] Srch assignments at the 339th Company on 10 shared Category C positions which had scheduled [redacted] cases as their primary assignment. Reports to ASA-Europe from the field, were initially by TECSUM and DARE with raw traffic and page print received from 1-5 days after the electrically transmitted reports.¹

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Morse Processing - Normal T/A was performed on manual Morse

Traffic of the [redacted]



schedules and frequencies were referred to R/P analysts, while associated printer parallel activity was reported back to Morse analysts. Call sign and [redacted] were collected. TEXTA and technical histories on each case were maintained by individual analysts working on each problem.


1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp20-22.

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Sufficient Morse intercept was obtained and identified to permit maintenance of continuity on what were considered to be the



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Unidentified or partially identified traffic was processed and all locally usable material channeled into regular analysis. Traffic which could not be used locally and that separated from assigned target material was redistributed, when identified as to user, to other processing units.¹

Radio Printer Processing - Daily T/A was performed on radio printer intercept of the




1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp22-25.

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
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


1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp25-28.
2. Ibid. pp28-29.

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


1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp29-32.
2. Ibid. pp34-36.
3. Ibid. p41.

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Translation and analysis of radiotelephone intercept was a major activity of the subsection. The volume of traffic intercepted during the second half of 1955 was roughly tripled in the first six months of 1956 despite a relatively inactive winter. The ability of personnel to handle the material also improved considerably over the year. Forty-seven releases

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[Redacted]

were tapped consistently for tactical intelligence. Intercept was programmed at ASA-Europe and carried out at 10 test sites during April, May and June 1956, in an effort to determine location for a summer site on the Czech-West German border south of, and in addition to, the permanent site at Mahring. The low-level voice mission was scheduled for transfer from the 339th Company to the 302d Battalion on 25 Jul 56.

After an intensive three-month effort, analysts published a revised version of the [Redacted] 2 on 11 April. The book included 51

[Redacted] A


complete listing of [Redacted] used during the first six months of 1956 was also published.¹

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[Redacted]

1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp43-46.

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Linguists were given training in Polish telegraphic text. Both T/A and clerical training was accomplished. Much assistance was received from Machine Aids Section.

Any analysis resulting in information considered of possible COMINT value was discussed with Reporting Section. Liaison was also maintained with other sections. The TAREX representative supplied a daily Polish newspaper and occasionally Defector Reports. In addition to work on the specific Polish problems covered, a volume of unidentified Polish voice, Morse and teletype traffic was analyzed to determine if it could be identified. In many cases net continuity was maintained on unidentified nets; technical data compiled and disseminated; and in some instances entered.

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A Polish technical dictionary containing 6700 technical terms was compiled and a Polish word pattern book prepared. A daily Polish newspaper was scanned and translations of interesting articles made. A small number of Polish language tapes were transcribed by the subsection linguists.² Details


1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp47-48.
2. Ibid. pp66-70.

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reported to Seventh Army Hq in the field. The special releases and six supplements were published during the exercise. It was felt that a maximum of field support had been supplied and that the material had been well received by Seventh Army. Analysis showed approximately

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1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp49-55.


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


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1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp55-60.
2. Ibid. pp60-62.


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
1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp63-65.

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


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
1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp71-77.
2. Ibid. pp78-79.

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


1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp80-81.

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Reports

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
Strength rose from 2 Off and 14 EM to 6 Off and 15 EM. During the year, a total of 520 reports were produced. The section was divided into Reporting, Information, and Administrative and Processing subsections.

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1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp82-84.
 2. Ibid. p115.

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1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp119-134.

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Mission assignments were based on USAREUR requirements, major international political events, stability of major networks and interesting development activity. Tests were conducted when quality and quantity of traffic did not meet required standards.¹

Among mission assignment problems was the movement of Detachment K, Fld Sta 8608 from Wels, Austria to Bad Aibling, Germany on 15 Jul 55. Maintaining monitoring intercept continuity on the Hungarian problem was difficult at the new site. After a test in August 1955, an intercept site was established at Nottau on 1 Oct 55, with two manual Morse and one voice position to solve this problem.

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Starting 5 Aug 55, a 15-day capability test was conducted at Bad Aibling on [] cases. Commencing 26 Sep 55, a similar test was conducted at Rothwesten; this latter proved the better site for [] intercept and plans were initiated to move the [] mission to Rothwesten.

By 2 Nov 55, transfer of 11 manual Morse positions from Fld Sta 8611 to 8606 was completed. The 332d Company absorbed Detachment K, Fld Sta 8608 upon arrival at Bad Aibling. Two positions of the Hungarian problem were transferred from Fld Sta 8611 to the 332d Company and were operated by operators already assigned. The remaining three positions of that assignment were transferred from Fld Sta 8611 to the 302d Battalion.²

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1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp147-148.
 2. Ibid. pp153-156.

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Special Projects

This mission of this section was to produce COMINT reports from [redacted]
 [redacted] plain text communications and exercise staff responsibility for
 certain other activities that functioned in support of the COMINT effort.
 The activities included TAREX, Spectrum Search, UHF Intercept, and Detach-
 ment B, Berlin. Communications were [redacted] in that they were not
 passed by [redacted] nor did they concern pri-
 marily [redacted] They did concern

[redacted]

There were five general types of communications available from which

[redacted] plain text was derived. Teletype lines, including East German

[redacted]

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1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp158-159.

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[REDACTED] ASA-Europe was the sole recipient

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of East-West landline teletype. The number of positions available could not be increased as [REDACTED] However, ASA-Europe had the option as to which among the available lines were to be monitored.

[REDACTED]

At the beginning of FY 1956, those segments of the Special Projects Section that were in existence formed Team Six, Team Seven (TAREX) and the

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- 1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, ppl61-166.


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Photo Laboratory. The first was engaged in processing material intercepted by the COMINT Service Detachment (7746) of G2, USAREUR and the [redacted] intercepted by Fld.Sta-8606. It had three subsections, East-West [redacted] Personalities and Activities, and East German Transportation.

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In November 1955, processing began on UHF voice and teleprinter communications of the [redacted] For this purpose a provisional section subsequently called Electronic Communications Processing was formed using some Team Six personnel. Team Six was renamed the Special Processing Section and the section became Special Projects Section. Work of the subsections follows:¹



The unit contained an Evaluation Panel that scanned all traffic to determine eventual disposition, a Current Reporting Group responsible for daily and weekly publications and a Monthly Reports Group responsible for

1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp166-167.
2. Ibid. pp169-170.

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Bulgarian, Hungarian, East German, Soviet, Czechoslovakian, Romanian and Polish monthly reports. Other panels were: Translator with [redacted] Russian, Polish, Czechoslovakian and Romanian linguists; Communist China Trade; POL, reporting on East-West trade in petroleum and related products; USSR Ship Construction; and Shipping.¹


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Messages of immediate and urgent intelligence value were issued electrically. Less urgent messages were translated for the ASA-Europe Daily East-West Trade Journal. The ASA-Europe Daily Merchant Shipping Journal had one section devoted to shipping to or from Soviet Bloc ports on the Baltic and one miscellaneous. The ASA-Europe Weekly East-West Trade Highlights gave in narrative and chart form important East-West trade trends and agreements, Soviet Bloc imports of embargoed goods as enumerated by the [redacted] movements of munitions and weapons, and other relevant developments.

A Communist Chinese Trade in Strategic Goods with Western Nations monthly report concerned trade activities meeting requirements of the International China Embargo List and the Master Export Security List. All policy and organization changes, trends, and methods of circumventing Western controls were reported. The ASA-Europe USSR Ship Construction Report concerned ship construction and repairs carried out in West European shipyards for the USSR.²

Accomplishments of selected panels follow:

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1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp170-171.
2. Ibid. pp173-175.

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[Redacted]

Editorial: Copies of letter traffic regarding embargoed goods were sent to the Eastern Economic Relations Division, US Embassy, Bonn after removal of source identity. Other materials were added in June 1956.²

[Redacted]

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After October, only information indicating new contracts to build ships or actual deliveries were reported daily. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] maintained an uninterrupted flow of all types of copper, including embargoed wirebars and cathodes, cobalt, nickel and mercury from

[Redacted] suppliers despite attempts by the Western powers to prevent such transactions. After 1 Jan 56, shipments from [Redacted] were included in the regular report on Polish trade in strategic goods with [Redacted] The

1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II pp175-176.
2. Ibid. pp177-178.
3. Ibid. pp179-181.
4. Ibid. pp183, 185-186.

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activities of the East German firm Chemiepha GmbH, Berlin were observed in January and February 1956 on special request. Chemiepha was one of the principal East German agencies for obtaining strategic goods from the West. A report on East German wheat imports was also made in response to a special request. OCA requested ASA-Europe maintain a watching brief on the food situation as a result of the spectre of famine overshadowing the northern satellites.¹ From 23 Nov 55 to 11 Apr 56, all messages indicating Soviet Bloc arms trade with Middle Eastern countries were released electrically.²

Second part of the Special Processing Subsection was the Personalities, Activities and Conditions Unit. This unit reported on movements of Soviet Bloc officials and of Westerners entering the Soviet Bloc; the activities of German scientists in the USSR; general conditions within the Soviet Bloc countries; and the activities of Communists, Communist front organizations and extreme rightists. A Personality Movements Panel used all sources of raw material, but mainly landline and radio telegrams, and telephone calls. Activities and Conditions-East Panel, which dealt with German scientists as well as general conditions in the Soviet Bloc, worked with private mail written by persons living in the Soviet Bloc to persons in Activities and Conditions-West Panel followed activities of Communists and rightists, largely from telephone and mail intercept.³

The unit reported through two publications issued five days a week to permit wider dissemination of Category I material. The Category I Journal

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1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp187-189.
 2. Ibid. p192.
 3. Ibid. p201.

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contained three parts: Personalities, Activities and Conditions-East; Personalities, Activities and Conditions-West; and Personality Movements. This document was composed entirely from mail.

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The Category II Journal was divided into two parts: Personality Movements; and Personalities, Activities and Conditions-West. This Journal was derived from [redacted] intercepted phone calls.¹

Material on the Eastern Bloc was considered of intelligence value if it fell into one of the following categories: Political-Communist Party activities, mention of prominent Communist Party members, new laws of Communist Party line, religious oppression, effect of Western propaganda, radio broadcasts, extraordinary police action. Sociological--deflation, oppression of Germans, German language, general economic conditions, prejudice in employment. Standard of living--prices, wages, shortages, housing, disasters. Agricultural--crop conditions, floods, collectives, quotas, stock piling and hoarding. Industrial--mines, bridges, factories, production figures. Labor--employment, bonuses, work norms, sabotage, competence of labor. Military--troop locations, draft laws, morale, desertion, deployment of soldiers. Scientific or Technical--new research, German scientists in Russia. Clandestine--travelers, counter-espionage, defectors. Transportation and Telecommunications--railroads, highways, mail, censorship.²

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
Also included was information about German scientists engaged in research, the [redacted] Communist Party, Communist Front organizations, active right wing extremists, all Soviet Bloc officials in the West and businessmen moving

1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, p203.
2. Ibid. p204.

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1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp205-207.
2. Ibid. pp210-211.
3. Ibid. pp213-215.

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The unit produced releases of political character from monitored

[Redacted]

These included reports on Communist efforts to prevent East Berliners from crossing Sector borders, and May Day parades in which the founding of the Peoples' Army was announced.¹

[Redacted]

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East German

[Redacted]

- This subsection reported items

of intelligence interest derived from traffic passed on the UHF net serving the [Redacted] in

East Germany. Numerous specific consumer requirements could be satisfied from this source.³ A test, prior to July 1955, had indicated that there were

interceptable signals in the UHF range. Of several heard UHF frequencies,

[Redacted]

was selected to receive early exploitation. Beginning in mid-

October, all [Redacted] intercept was forwarded to ASA-Europe on a daily basis.

It was clear that all traffic was by [Redacted] and aside from technical messages,

was political in nature. As of 1 November, an ASA-Europe East German

Political Journal was distributed to consumers. It contained information

covering the entire range of Party activity and reflected methods, means and procedures employed by the Party and gave a picture of general Soviet policy

in satellite nations.⁴ By November's end, it was apparent that the [Redacted]

1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp221-228.
2. Ibid. pp229-232.
3. Ibid. pp235-236.
4. Ibid. pp242-246.

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(telephone) intercept presented the widest possible range of intelligence opportunities. It could be used with collateral information found in open published sources.¹

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Tests on [redacted] gave audibility "poor-to-good" averaging "fair."
 The circuit was a long distance microwave link between East Berlin Fernamt (long distance telephone exchange) and Dresden Fernamt. Channels 14 and 15 were used for [redacted]. At least one of the teletype circuits was apparently being used by the Russians to connect [redacted] [redacted]. From this frequency, information could be gathered in the fields of [redacted]

On 27 April 56, a change occurred in the routing of telephone and teletype messages. Almost all teletype traffic from [redacted] disappeared and the volume of telephone traffic was reduced. Tests of various frequencies were made in an attempt to pick up lost volume. Only four valid [redacted] frequencies were interceptable in Berlin (with additional equipment needed to pick some of them up successfully)- [redacted]

Beginning in May 1956, a serious attempt to process traffic of a technical nature was made. A narrative survey of the structure and functioning of the [redacted] net was published 31 May. The study and others like it showed the [redacted] To satisfy consumer and


1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp249-250.

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processing requirements on SED organization the subsection published a names of personalities cumulative IBM-run report and a study of names and functions of officials and employees of various [redacted] headquarters, [redacted] [redacted] traffic provided a great volume of information on the organization of various offices and activities of numerous individuals. Also gained was special information such as news of a [redacted]

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TAREX Subsection - Information for this subsection was obtained through foreign publications; defectors, refugees, and returnees; employees of foreign manufacturers of communications equipment; employees or members of foreign intelligence organizations; [redacted] intercept operators; industrial fairs; and private inventors of cryptographic systems. Sources who were members of foreign intelligence organizations included 1-D-1 who was organizing a Cryptanalytic Bureau for the [redacted] military establishment; 1-E-1 who recruited Russian voice intercept operators for the [redacted] [redacted] and 1-P-1 who expected to be hired by either the [redacted]



1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp262-268.

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Sources that were employees of electronic firms supplied information on automatic perforators for the [redacted]

[redacted] an automatic perforator that interested NSA, a portable teletype and a telephone cover that would prevent pick-up of room conversation when not in use. Source 1-G-10 supplied much infor-

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mation; the most interesting of which concerned a [redacted]

[redacted]

valuable source. 1-80M was a full-time intercept operator working under cover of his amateur radio station. The intercept was of very high quality. 1-80M-2 also operated under cover of an amateur radio. However, this source operated only part time.

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Among the approximately 50 defectors interrogated and reported on, a few had information of particular interest. A German scientist returned from Soviet internment, gave details of the [redacted] and successive models. A Soviet signal lieutenant provided information on Soviet Army intercept and DF in East Germany. He pointed out the superiority of Exercise CORDON BLEU over INDIAN SUMMER.

A defecting Soviet agent from Iran provided detailed information on agent signal training including a precise description of the [redacted] he was to use. A lieutenant and an enlisted man from a [redacted]

[redacted]

A Yugoslav artillery major furnished information on [redacted] low-level voice traffic during

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artillery practice firing. Another source told of training of [] intercept and DF operators. Two radio operators from the Polish Navy jointly provided information on the []

[] Team 2J Berlin was organized 9 Jan 55. The primary target objective was penetration of the communications system of the [] Sources normally consisted of defectors, refugees and bonafide residents behind the Iron Curtain. Those of the latter who indicated a desire to be agents for the West were processed through covert channels. Team 2J briefed and debriefed sources having [] The team produced 373 memorandum. At the end of FY 1955, two rover sources were available; however, during FY 1956, the team gained one courier, three rover and seven penetration sources. Six casual sources were being briefed.² Sources included:³

A-6779: A rover who provided excellent observational and photographic coverage of communications and electronic sites within the DDR. At one time he also served as a penetration of Koepenick Cable Works and provided production figures and samples of nickel wire.

A-6815: A rover provided observational and photographic coverage. He was frequently able to furnish advance copies of DDR propaganda papers and pamphlets.

A-7354: A penetration source was frequently able to provide miscellaneous by-product and general communications information of a fairly high level. Was expected to be able to furnish information about the decimeter network to be installed in 1958.

A-7394: A penetration source at the Telecommunications Works who provided widely varied information gained at conferences and union meetings.

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1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp276-282.
 2. Ibid. pp289-292.
 3. Ibid. pp292-296.

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C-22-60: A penetration source at General German News Service who provided information on installed equipment and organizational mission.

C-22092: A rover who provided observational and photographic coverage of communications sites.

Other sources included a penetration source who was concerned with the maintenance of decimeter-TV stations and would eventually be able to supply detailed data including engineers' orientation factors and photographs of interior equipment on every communications site under Post und Fernmeldesesen; and a female penetration of Furstenwalde Airfield who was attempting to become acquainted with communications personnel.

The most important single accomplishment of the team was the procurement of a [redacted] A plan for hiring young men for penetration of [redacted] was worked out but disapproved by the 522d MI Bn which controlled the unit, as the sources were under 21 years of age. However, the team felt that so long as the Soviets suppressed the political, religious and economic life of these behind the Iron Curtain, it was possible to reach the target objective.¹

Detachment J-1, the Technical Search Team, was one of the three ASA-Europe COMINT activities in the Berlin area supported by the Berlin Detachment. It performed in support of the Office of Research and Development, NSA.² At the beginning of the fiscal year, the operational area was located in the hangar building at Tempelhof Air Base. A 10 ft dish and a television antenna were mounted on a rotating mast. A stationary 4 ft dish was also available.

1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp296-300.

2. Ibid. p301.

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The latter monitored the service channel on [] on a 24-hour basis. Technical search was conducted in frequency ranges 50-260 mcs with the TV antenna and 1000-2000 mcs with the 10 ft dish. Activity highlights follow:

In August, the team received and installed equipment that broke out and copied all teletype channels present on []. This equipment provided a very efficient method of separating the three teletype canals on any channel. The AFSAV D88 UHF Preamplifier yielded a 30-decibel gain in signal strength. The Polarad Receiver was received and functioned very satisfactorily.

On 17 September, the Intercept Team began full-scale operation on the [] signal. Tests showed the APR-9 more sensitive than the AN/TLR-1; however, the latter was far superior from the analyst's standpoint.

In December, the search assignment was changed to include VHF Spectrum search (25-250 mcs) UHF Spectrum search (250-4500 mcs) and Line frequency system radiation investigation (10 weeks on 5-160 kcs). For the latter a long wire antenna, 1½ miles long, and the AFSAV D90, as a receiver, was used. Tests were run on 54.9 and 57.5 mcs; little teletype traffic was intercepted.

In mid-April 1956, the multichannel signal on [] went off the air and traffic volume dropped on []. A series of tests showed a minor reorganization of the [] net was taking place.¹

In May, a signal at 52.5 was investigated. A summary was made listing number of teletype and telephone channels present, number of telephone canals present on each channel, and type of modulation system employed.

1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp305-312.

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From 17 Sep 55, when the Intercept Team began operating from 0800-1600 daily, until the end of October when 24-hour coverage was begun, the Team primarily trained and tested equipment.¹ The mission of the Team was to intercept the [redacted] record all voice signals and print teletype signals.²


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During the rioting in Dresden in May 1956, the maximum amount of East German traffic was requested and the [redacted] signal was intercepted continuously.³

Detachment J-2 conducted research and development in the decimeter (VHF-UHF) communications. The detachment was located in Hof, Germany. It was active from July 1955 until April 1956 when it was withdrawn to Hq ASA-Europe for rehabilitation and reorganization.⁴



2. 502d Communications Reconnaissance Group, Heilbronn, Germany



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1. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, p317.
2. Ibid. p314.
3. Ibid. p323.
4. Ibid. p326.
5. Ibid. p331.

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and 307th Battalions and Fld Sta 8606.¹ In addition, liaison was maintained with [redacted]

The analytical section contained T/A and C/A subsections for both Russian and German missions. The other COMINT section maintained intercept control of the [redacted] problems by providing mission assignment, and evaluating manual Morse, R/T, R/P, DF, and RFP results.³

TEXIN was assigned to subordinate units and other headquarters interested

in [redacted]

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[redacted] CW Intercept - With its northern location, the 307th Battalion

was responsible for intercept of the [redacted] nets. The 302d Battalion and Fld Sta 8606 were jointly responsible for

The 302d operated between five and seven CW positions covering the

[redacted] The 307th and its subordinate units operated between

[redacted]


the higher priority nets received full coverage while nets of lesser priority received priority POROCO or sampling POROCO coverage. Additional search positions were maintained.⁵

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1. Ann Rept, 502d CRG, FY56, Vol II, p5.
 2. Ibid. p7.
 3. Ibid. p47.
 4. Ibid. p51.
 5. Ibid. pp7-8.

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1. Ann Rept, 502d CRG, FY56, Vol II, p13.
2. Ibid. pp15-19.

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basis. Special reports were furnished T/A as required. Weekly and monthly DF reports were furnished theater consumers and higher headquarters. These reports contained the locations of [REDACTED] targets based solely on DF results of the Group net. Accuracy studies and status reports were published showing the percentage of each station's response to flashes and fix participation.

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The Group mobile DF voice net ceased operations 13 Oct 55. It worked with a flash and report net located at control. Tip-offs were received from voice intercept. Control was located at Bahrdorf with sites at Tulau, Bahrdorf and Solingen. The mission was low echelon voice activity in [REDACTED] particularly [REDACTED]. The net ceased operations after the close of summer [REDACTED]. When operations were reopened 1 May 56, a special mission of CW [REDACTED] was added. The net was re-constituted with Bahrdorf as control and Luchow, Tulau, Bahrdorf, and Schoningen as sites. Operations showed a great improvement over previous years during FY 1956.¹

[REDACTED] CW Traffic Analysis - The analytical sections at the battalions and Fld Sta 8606 worked closely with intercept operators and forwarded results to T/A Section. Group furnished end-product reports to local and theater consumers, both [REDACTED]. In the section, work was divided into administrative, [REDACTED] nets, individual Russian line carrier, search, fusion, R/P and C/A units. The section also furnished technical assistance to the 307th Battalion's voice effort.²

1. Ann Rept, 502d CRG, FY56, Vol II, pp28-32.

2. Ibid. pp8-9.

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[redacted] The volume of valid traffic declined during the months October-December. However, it increased in the last part of the year, largely due to communications and [redacted] TRD's (Temporary Recognition Data) were published whenever a suspected valid system was received by Group.

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Analytical success was achieved on 19 of the systems published. The majority of these were [redacted] while some employed both [redacted] One system consisted of [redacted] [redacted] were superimposed on [redacted] and two also employed the appropriate [redacted] [redacted] for the day. One of the few systems with [redacted]

[redacted]


[redacted]

1. Ann Rept, 502d CRG, FY56, Vol II, pp13-14.

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


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


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
1. Ann Rept, 502d CRG, FY56, Vol II, pp5-13.

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P.L. 86-36


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


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
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P.L. 86-36



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P.L. 86-36

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1. Ann Rept, 502d CRG, FY56, Vol II, pp19-27.

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P.L. 86-363. 302d Communications Reconnaissance Battalion,
Bamberg, Germany

The [] mission was assigned by the 502d Group while the [] problem was controlled and assigned through 502d Group by NSA. At the beginning of the year, the 332d Company covered the entire COMINT mission of the 302d Battalion, with the battalion operating no positions of its own. Programmed positions for FY 1956 included [] printer positions.¹

On 2 Jul 55, the DF Section of the 332d Company, consisting of alternate control (Bamberg) and three outstations (Schweinfurt, Straubing, and Furth), was transferred to Hq. & Hq Co, 302d Battalion.² This assignment was part of the mission of the 502d Group and was performed for group by the battalion. On 3 Jul 55, the Furth site was moved to Giebelstadt, and on 12 Jan 56, the site previously at Schweinfurt became operational in Berlin.³

On 13 July, under reorganization of the 302d Battalion, Company A became operationally responsible for [] all radio printer intercept, and the Hof voice site. After 1 Nov 55, that portion of the mission covered by the battalion, with the personnel and equipment involved, were transferred to Herzo Base. Company A then furnished the only intercept for the 302d.

During the month of November, two [] CW positions were added and an additional voice site at Hof. When the voice site at Altefeld was transferred to the 307th Battalion, one [] position from it was established at

1. Ann Rept, 302d CRB, FY56, Vol II, pp2,6,7.
2. Ibid. pp2-3.
3. Ann Rept, ASAE, FY56, Vol II, pp140-141.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)
P.L. 86-36~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~INAR~~

Hof. On 28 December, [] CW positions were picked up and the Coburg site established.

In January 1956, [] CW position was changed to [] On 20 January [] voice position was added at Hof making [] positions there. On the 25th, one additional [] CW position was attached to the Coburg site. Again on 18 February, [] voice positions were picked up by Coburg although the [] position was dropped 22 January.

In March, one CW position was dropped but Coburg again picked up a [] voice position. A CW position at Hof operated by the 502d Group was transferred to the 302d Battalion during the same month. The three [] test positions were given official designations. On 23 March, the CW mission at Hof was dropped.

In April, due to increased personnel losses, [] CW position were dropped. On 15 May, the mission equipment and personnel at Hof were transferred to Coburg except for an [] position installed at Bamberg. That position produced no intercept and was transferred to Coburg 29 May.¹

Five special missions were performed by the battalion. These included a test of reception quality at Bamberg, Herzo, and Coburg, with the DF Section providing tip-offs for the test by flashing intercept targets to Herzo and Coburg. During April 1956, a three-day reception test was made at various sites around Bamberg. A VHF test position covering 100-120 mcs

1. Ann Rept, 302d CRB, FY56, Vol II, pp2-5.

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P.L. 86-36

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was established at Hof during the same period. Only slight activity was noted and the position was transferred to Coburg in May.¹ In March, the 302d watched for effects of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
no abnormal affects were noted.² On 21 June, one [REDACTED] position was transferred from Bamberg to Coburg to cover any activity reflecting [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] no activity was noted.³ REF: VOL I P. 207

4. 307th Communications Reconnaissance Battalion,
Rothwesten, Germany

EO 3.3(h)(2)
P.L. 86-36

For the most part, FY 1956 COMINT operations of the 307th

Battalion included the interception, processing, and analysis of radio communications traffic originating within [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
This separation continued until 1 Jun 56, when a joint operation was established.⁵

Manual Morse Section assignment consisted of that portion of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] No major difficulties were encountered during the year as [REDACTED] were handled with relative ease. [REDACTED] took place in January and recovery

1. Ann Rept, 302d CRB, FY56, Vol II, pp5-6.
2. Ann Rept, 502d CRG, FY56, Vol II, p33.
3. Ann Rept, 302d CRB, FY56, Vol II, pp5-6.
4. Ann Rept, 307th CRB, FY56, Vol II, pl.
5. Ibid. pp6-7.
6. Ibid. p2.

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P.L. 86-36

[REDACTED] was made on a daily basis. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was con-

tinued with considerable success. Noteworthy progress was also made in

the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In December 1955, the section began submitting

practice intelligence reports on the [REDACTED] to higher head-

quarters. T/A personnel noted a series of changes in the communications

network beginning in March 1956. Analytic evidence indicated that the main

[REDACTED]

The Radio Telephone effort (LLVI) was assigned coverage of low echelon

units of the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] However, any R/T traffic identified as LLVI was intercepted

and a considerable amount was found in areas well within the interior of

³

From July to October 1955, the R/T Section was occupied

[REDACTED]

All R/T

transmissions ceased from 30 April through 4 May 56, probably as a result

of May Day Holidays.⁴

1. Ann Rept, 307th CRB, FY56, Vol II, p8.
2. Ibid. pp8-9.
3. Ibid. p2.
4. Ibid. pp9-10.

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Radio printer assignments paralleled the manual Morse effort. How-



- 5. 312th Communications Reconnaissance Battalion,
Bad Aibling, Germany

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- 1. Ann Rept, 307th CRB, FY56, Vol II, p2.
- 2. Ibid. p3.
- 3. Ann Rept, 312th CRB, FY56, Vol II, p8.
- 4. Ibid. p24.


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1. Ann Rept, 312th CRB, FY56, Vol II, p25.
2. Ibid. pp25-26.
3. Ibid. p26.
4. Ibid. pp26-27.


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P.L. 86-36




1. Ann Rept, 312th CRB, FY56, Vol II, p27.
2. Ibid. pp27-28.
3. Ibid. pp28-29.
4. Ibid. p31.

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
1. Ann Rept, 312th CRB, FY56, Vol II, p31.
2. Ibid. pp31-32.
3. Ibid. p33.

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
1. Ann Rept, 312th CRB, FY56, Vol II, p35.

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
1. Ann Rept, 312th CRB, FY56, Vol II, p36.
2. Ibid. p37.
3. Ibid. pp38-39.
4. Ibid. pp44-45.

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


1. Ann Rept, 312th CRB, FY56, Vol II, pp39-40.
2. Ibid. p49.
3. Ibid. p43.

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
1. Ann Rept, 312th CRB, FY56, Vol II, p44.
2. Ibid. p44.
3. Ibid. p40.

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1. Ann Rept, 312th CRB, FY56, Vol II, pp42-43.
2. Ibid. p46.

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Branch "E" - This branch was organized 21 Jan 56 and given responsibility for the Romanian problem. The first few weeks were devoted to a study of technical information concerning identities and designations of

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1. Ann Rept, 312th CRB, FY56, Vol II, p48.
 2. Ibid. pp49-50.
 3. Ibid. pp50-51.

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
1. Ann Rept, 312th CRB, FY56, Vol II, pp51-52,59.

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
1. Ann Rept, 312th CRB, FY56, Vol II, pp57-58.
2. Ibid. pp59-60.
3. Ibid. p60.
4. Ibid. p50.
5. Ibid. pp54-55.

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
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P.L. 86-36



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- 6. 328th Communications Reconnaissance Company,
Bad Aibling, Germany




- 1. Ann Rept, 328th CRC, FY56, Vol II, p6.
- 2. Ibid. p19.

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A major operational improvement was made with the installation of a Cyrillic keyboard typewriter to aid the Russian problem. This new keyboard made grammatical construction more readily apparent, decreased spelling errors by aiding phonetics, and saved time in the initial preparation of the text. ¹ REF: VOL. I P. 280

- 7. 332d Communications Reconnaissance Company,
Bamberg, Germany



EO 3.3(h)(2)
P.L. 86-36

- 1. Ann Rept, 328th CRC, FY56, Vol 11, pp11-12.

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
1. Ann Rept, 332d CRC, FY56, Vol II, pp3-4.
2. Ibid. pp3-4.

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
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1. Ann Rept, 332d CRC, FY56, Vol II, pp5-6.
2. Ibid. p6.
3. Ibid. pp6-7.

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1. Ann Rept, 332d CRC, FY56, Vol II, p7.
2. Ibid. p8.
3. Ibid. pp7-8.
4. Ibid. p9.

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Special Mission - From 25 Nov-8 Dec 55, a test was conducted at an abandoned air strip near Pocking, Germany to determine the possibility of moving the detachment from its present location in order to avoid severe winter conditions connected with the Nottau site. One Hungarian Voice

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1. Ann Rept, 332d CRC, FY56, Vol II, p9.
 2. Ibid. p9.
 3. Ibid. pp9-10.

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position from Bad Aibling and one Hungarian Morse position from Nottau were utilized. Results of the test were satisfactory, but the move could not be made due to the difficulty in obtaining permanent land rights.¹

Detachment "M," a roving detachment, was assigned to this company 17 Feb 56 by the 312th Battalion. Operating in the northern sector of Germany and receiving operational control from ASA-Europe, the detachment searched for, intercepted, and developed [redacted]

EO 3.3(h)(2)
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Personnel for the detachment were drawn from Fld Sta's 8608 and 8606, and the companies of the 312th Battalion.²

The detachment, operating [redacted] positions, tested five sites before its inactivation 4 Jan 56. Results are listed below.³


	<u>Known Nets</u>	<u>Unique Nets</u>
Altefeld	8	33
Rothwesten	31	25
Lubeck	23	139
Bahrdorf	28	74
Marienthal	24	54

REF: VOL. I P. 284

- 8. 339th Communications Reconnaissance Company, Herzogenaurach, Germany

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The operational mission, under control of Hq ASA-Europe, concentrated on Russian and Czech LLVI throughout FY1956.⁴



- 1. Ann Rept, 332d CRC, FY56, Vol II, p11.
- 2. Ibid. p11.
- 3. Ibid. p12.
- 4. Ann Rept, 339th CRC, FY56, Vol II, pl.
- 5. Ibid. pl.

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operator and published in the unit Weekly Technical Notes. This report was turned over to ASA-Europe, and in turn published as an Interim Report for greater distribution.¹ Outstanding work was done by this section on the recovery and collocation of [redacted]² In addition to the Czech problem, Russian search was conducted on targets in the majority of the [redacted] Intercept volume of Russian circuits nearly doubled during the year. An assist in identifying [redacted] on the RU circuits was provided by the introduction of "Traffic Hits" recording all traffic passed on these circuits. The greatest problem encountered by this section was extracting [redacted] [redacted] which were encountered for 18 months.⁴

The R/P mission covered all [redacted] Printer activity parallel to the manual Morse assignment. Specifically assigned were all known active printer links in the [redacted] and search for [redacted] [redacted] Unrestricted [redacted] search was conducted within the frequency spectrum of one to eight mcs.⁵

Detachment "K" recorded LLVI (2-30 mcs) on the Czech nets at four positions on tape recorders located in one Shelter S-44. Traffic was then forwarded to Herzo Base by enlisted courier.⁶ In addition, a [redacted]

1. Ann Rept, 339th CRC, FY56, Vol II, p5.
2. Ibid. p6.
3. Ibid. p1.
4. Ibid. p6.
5. Ibid. p2.
6. Ibid. p9.


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net search was assigned between seven and eight mcs.¹ On 10 May 56, the detachment commander, accompanied by an interpreter, commenced a reconnaissance for additional areas of voice traffic exploitation. Areas were selected and tested along the entire Czech border. At a point near Voithenberg, the first contact with non-duplication of effort at Mahrng was made and the site continued to operate there until the end of the year.²

REF: VOL. I P. 287

9. 23d ASA Detachment, Sinop, Turkey




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1. Ann Rept, 339th CRC, FY56, Vol II, p2.
2. Ibid. p9.
3. Ann Rept, 23d ASA Det, FY56, Vol II, p15.
4. Ibid. p4.
5. Ibid. pp24-25.

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1. Ann Rept, 23d ASA Det, FY56, Vol II, p15.
2. Ibid. p4.
3. Ibid. pp19-20.
4. Ibid. Tab I, pp1-2.

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10. Field Station (8606), Herzogenaurach, Germany

Significant among operational developments at this station during FY 1956 was the transfer of [redacted] from the 332d Company along with [redacted] manual Morse Category C positions on 1 Nov 55. This support produced excellent results, and brought about integration of the [redacted] [redacted] into the intercept mission.²

EO 3.3(h)(2)
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Difficulties in manual Morse general search identification at the various intercept sites in Germany led to consultation with analysts and operators in that area during December 1955. At Bad Aibling, talks with 312th Battalion personnel led to better identification of two satellite



1. Ann Rept, 23d ASA Det, FY56, Vol II, Tab I, pp5-7.
2. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8606), FY56, Vol II pp7-8.

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
Manual Morse general search intercepted items by category during report period included:

EO 3.3(h)(2)
P.L. 86-36

Red (Identified)	79,950
Amber (Partially Identified)	90,185
Green (Unidentified)	<u>3,825</u>
Total	173,960

Average monthly total was 14,080 items ranging from a low of 12,488 in July 1955 to a high of 18,366 in May 1956. Approximately 40% of all green items intercepted were later identified through depth of intercept continuity and technical assistance from higher headquarters.

Twelve cases of [redacted] (development notations) were assigned for coverage and the majority were identified through depth of intercept continuity and assigned as regular missions. Remainder were intercepted over a period of time.²



A 20-day coverage mission on [redacted] links was assigned to two of the [redacted] manual Morse general search positions for the period 30 Mar 56 to 18 Apr 56. The purpose was to obtain good samplings to determine copiability in event it became necessary to assign these to the station for full coverage.

NSA, on 12 Apr 56, directed one of the two positions to return to normal general search and the other to concentrate only on coverage of 15 of the original links with an attempt to copy full messages rather than strict sampling. The mission was terminated 18 Apr 56, and the position

1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8606), FY56, Vol II, pp35-37.
2. Ibid. p32.

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
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returned to normal general search.

An NSA evaluation followed, based on the first ten days of intercept. This indicated that of the 38 links assigned, 24 were heard. In addition, 67 links not assigned were heard. Overall results concluded that the station could maintain required continuity.¹

Operational organization of the Non-Morse Section (incl non-Morse general search) during the year included following subsections:

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P.L. 86-36



As of 30 Jun 56, operational intercept missions of the station comprised the following:⁴


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1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8606), FY56, Vol II, p33.
 2. Ibid. p38.
 3. Ibid. p39.
 4. Ibid. Tab 5.

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
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11. Field Station (8608), Scheyern, Germany

EO 3.3(h)(2)
P.L. 86-36

The primary mission of the Operations Branch of Fld Sta 8608, as assigned by NSA and ASA-Europe, was the intercept of Polish Morse, Yugoslavian Morse and voice, and until late December 1955, certain Russian Morse nets with R/P links. In order to facilitate accomplishment, Operations was divided into several sections including Control, Maintenance, Communications, and Production. The latter was consolidated on 1 Feb 56, from the Morse, Voice, R/P, and DF Sections.²

The Production Section assumed the continuous mission on a 24-hour, seven days-a-week basis by dividing its personnel into four operating tricks. Of an authorized [] positions, [] were utilized for Polish manual Morse coverage, [] for Yugoslavian manual Morse, and [] for Yugoslavian voice, making a total of [] positions in use by the end of FY 1956. The remaining two were Category "D" positions used for back-up search whenever possible.³

Difficulties in Polish intercept were experienced from July to September 1955 because of poor atmospheric conditions and [] A

- 1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8606), FY56, Vol II, pp43-44.
- 2. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8608), FY56, Vol II, pl.
- 3. Ibid. p5.

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chronological listing of Polish intercept activity in the Manual Morse Section follows:¹




November - All assigned Polish cases resumed normal functions, and their recovery permitted increased attention to low-level workings.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
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
December - Low-level intercept was increased and a hitherto unheard net, [redacted] was monitored.

January - Polish nets underwent expected changes, but, because of prior preparations, nets were systematically



February - Frequency rotas were developed, operating schedules confirmed, and [redacted] [redacted] Also, an increase in low-level intercept was realized.

March -



1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8608), FY56, Vol II, pp6-8.


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April

May

June



EO 3.3(h)(2)
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Yugoslavian Morse (YO) intercept increased noticeably during the year with best coverage in December 1955, and June 1956. Improved coverage was had on [redacted] nets and all [redacted] nets from February to June. Improvement was attributed to continued efforts of operators and traffic analysts to establish definite schedules and more accurate frequency rotas on these nets. Conversely, coverage on [redacted] nets was below average in January, February, and March. This was especially true of [redacted] which was intercepted only occasionally from 12 January to 18 March, after which it resumed normal operating procedures.¹

Voice Intercept

Yugoslavian voice assignment consisted of [redacted] positions until the first of the year when a third, or back-up net, was added at the

1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8608), FY56, Vol II, p9.

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station's request. In addition, the station also recommended that the entire voice mission be changed from Priority Position Rotating Coverage (PRI POR) to schedule groups as the majority of cases on assignment were of this type, thus making intercept difficult. ASA-Europe then recommended to NSA that positions JT1 and JT2 be changed to schedule groups. NSA's revision not only failed to resolve the problem, but placed an additional burden on JT2 by assigning six very active nets to that position. On the same day, ASA-Europe requested the station re-recommend adjustments. Again, a deletion of PRI POR coverage followed. It was further recommended that DT3 be changed to JT3. On 7 Jun 56, NSA concurred by authorizing three schedule group positions.¹

Radio Direction Finding (RDF)

Throughout the year, the RDF Section recorded locations and movements of Polish communications nets while the station reported bearings to net control on all Russian and Satellite missions flashed on circuit. In early January, the predicted [redacted] took place. The change was not so dramatic as in previous years, hence, RDF assistance was not deemed quite so exigent. However, close coordination between each subsection in the Production Section was maintained. From 24 January to the end of February inclusive, the DF Section forwarded a Daily Bearing Report to [redacted]

Non-Morse

At the direction of NSA, transmission procedures of the Daily Analysis

1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8608), FY56, Vol II, pp9-10.
2. Ibid. pp11-12.

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Report (DARE) on the Russian R/P search spectrum of 3 to 7 mcs was revised 27 Jul 55. On 22 November, an [] [] was assigned. In order to implement the latter assignment, the Russian R/P mission was dropped and [] simplex positions added. This alteration of mission provided time for an all out [] search program which was conducted from the end of December to the middle of January with excellent results. More than 40 [] links, hitherto unassigned and undetected, were intercepted, resulting in 10-16 [] links, [] Search, and an additional position being assigned by the end of February.

On 12 Apr 56, ASA-Europe re-noted [] tapes as Polish printer and assigned them to the station with the request that both an ST-35 and M-15 printer be used simultaneously. However, the M-15 proved unsatisfactory and an M-14 was used which provided legible copy, though in Cyrillic characters. On 18 Apr 56, a [] search assignment was added. Intercept was of a sporadic nature with the station being heard 7-12 May and again 15-18 June.¹

Traffic Control and Reports Section

This section was responsible for scanning, sorting, packaging, forwarding raw traffic, producing TECSUM's following formats [] forwarding bonafide traffic reports, submitting a daily traffic analysis report on Polish activity, and composing and producing Weekly Technical Notes. Analysts working with this section were divided into three teams; Polish Morse, Yugoslavian Morse and voice, and Russian Morse and radio printer. The Russian R/P mission was dropped and voice analysts formerly working on

1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8608), FY56, Vol II, ppl4-16.

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
this team were used on the Yugoslavian team.¹

Traffic Analysis

EO 3.3(h)(2)
P.L. 86-36

Analysis of Polish communications showed no unusual activity from

July through October, except for from




1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8608), FY56, Vol II, pp16-17.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)
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1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8608), FY56, Vol II, pp17-21.

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
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and one voice position, began operations. On 26 March, ASA-Europe requested that the station take over the coverage of cases on which continuity had been established by the test team, thus providing the team with opportunities for further search. Another special mission was completed in June 1956 when the station, in compliance with an ASATC request, forwarded 30 tape recordings--10 each of [redacted] to be used at the school for training purposes.¹ REF: VOL. I P. 331

12. Field Station (8611), Baumholder, Germany

EO 3.3(h)(2)
P.L. 86-36


EO 3.3(h)(2)
P.L. 86-36



1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8608), FY56, Vol II, p27.
2. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8611), FY56, Vol II, Tab 2.


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P.L. 86-36

Coverage consisted of copying the target to get all traffic transmitted, if possible. This allowed the section to furnish quick and complete information to non-Morse and DF sections.¹




1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8611), FY56, Vol II, p3.

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
1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8611), FY56, Vol II, pp3-4.
2. Ibid. Tab 2.

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


1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8611), FY56, Vol II, Tabs 3 & 4.

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G. Far East

Japan

1. Hq ASA-Far East (8621), Tokyo

The intelligence mission of the Operations Division, ASA-Far East was to supervise and coordinate intelligence activities of related subordinate units and special activities and detachments. Coordination of intelligence efforts for the theater G2 was maintained by liaison with Air Force and Navy counterparts.¹ Operations Division was divided into four separate branches:² Intelligence, TAREX, Communications, and Security. The first two branches were devoted to intelligence collecting and processing and discussion follows:

Intelligence Branch

In order to carry out its COMINT mission, this branch was divided into three processing sections, each having its own specific mission:³

- 1) The Chinese Section provided second echelon analysis in support of field units intercepting Chinese Communist radio communications with primary translation and reporting responsibility for the [redacted]
- 2) The Korean Section provided technical support on the North Korean problem to the 501st Group, including [redacted] research and study of radio communications procedures and facilities.
- 3) The Russian Section processed all available intercept on the Soviet [redacted] communications system. Included in this mission was the responsibility for providing technical support and assistance to intercept stations engaged in Russian intercept.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
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1. Ann Hist of ASA & Subordinate Units, Vol II, FY55, p134.
 2. Comd Rept, ASAFE, FY56, Vol I, Tab 7.
 3. Comd Rept, ASAFE, FY56, Vol II, pp2-4.


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In general, radio traffic intercepted by an ASAFE intercept station was forwarded to Hq ASAFE for traffic analysis. After initial processing by the Traffic Analysis Subsection, the traffic was turned over to the



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1. Comd Rept, ASAFE, FY56, Vol II, pp7-9.

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
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Chinese Section

EO 3.3(h)(2)
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Traffic Analysis: In the latter part of FY 1956, following loss in continuity of a large portion of the nets in



Because of the limited number of identifying characteristics on the recovered networks, it was extremely difficult to establish continuity on these nets. Three communications changes of net characteristics were noted during FY 1957.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
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1)



1. Comd Rept, ASAFE, FY56, Vol II, p74.

125


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2)

3)



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case notations were identified at the end of the fiscal year.

The rapid change in communication patterns, the absence of valid schedules and traffic, and the failure to recover any operating procedure peculiar

to  resulted in  In

addition, the large scale decrease in message volume at this time pointed to the conclusion that landlines were replacing radio transmissions and that CW radio networks were retained only for practical emergencies.³


EO 3.3(h)(2)
P.L. 86-36

Northeast China - Exploitation and analysis of raw traffic, SIT material, and other technical data revealed an extremely fluid communications network within the Northeast China area. Through extensive T/A, a few nets were definitely identified as serving areas in Northeast China while several practice nets were tentatively identified. As a result, it was determined that the 

1. Comd Rept, ASAFE, FY56, Vol II, pp10-12.
2. Ibid. p75.
3. Ibid. p12.

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
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1. Comd Rept, ASAFE, FY56, Vol II, pp13-14.
2. Ibid. p75.
3. Ibid. pp14-15.

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
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1. Comd Rept, ASAFE, FY56, Vol II, pp15-18.
2. Ibid. p18.
3. Ibid. p20.
4. Ibid. p21.

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
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1. Comd Rept, ASAFE, FY56, Vol II, p22.

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1. Comd Rept, ASAFE, FY56, Vol II, p26.
2. Ibid. pp26-27.
3. Ibid. p27.
4. Ibid. pp29-30.

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
1. Comd Rept, ASAFE, FY56, Vol II, p31.

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


1. Comd Rept, ASAFE, FY56, Vol II, pp36-37.
2. Ibid. p43.

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
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1. Comd Rept, ASAFE, FY56, Vol II, pp77-78.
2. Ibid. pp42-43.
3. Ibid. pp38-39.

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


1. Comd Rept, ASAFE, FY56, Vol II, pp40-41.
2. Ibid. pp41-42.

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1. Comd Rept, ASAFE, FY56, Vol II, p44.
2. Ibid. pp2-3.
3. Ibid. p47.

135


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1. Comd Rept, ASAFE, FY56, Vol II, p45.
2. Ibid. p46.


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1. Comd Rept, ASAFE, FY56, Vol II, pp3-4.


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
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Morse T/A Subsection: The mission of the Morse T/A Subsection was to maintain continuity on five specific areas of activity in the Soviet Far East so that any unusual occurrences or abnormalities could be immediately detected and reported through proper channels.



Following is an account of each activity including significant changes and occurrences that were noted:




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1. Comd Rept, ASAFE, FY56, Vol II, pp48-49.
2. Ibid. p49.
3. Ibid. p52.

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
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


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1. Comd Rept, ASAFE, FY56, Vol II, pp49-51.

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


1. Comd Rept, ASAFE, FY56, Vol II, pp52-54.

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1. Comd Rept, ASAFE, FY56, Vol II, pp54-56.

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
1. Comd Rept, ASAFE, FY56, Vol II, pp56-58.
2. Ibid. p58.

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1. Comd Rept, ASAFE, FY56, Vol II, pp59-61.
2. Ibid. pp58-59.


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TAREX Branch

The mission of the TAREX Branch in support of the Army's responsibilities to the National Intelligence effort involved the exploitation of known or suspected sources of collateral cryptologic information in the Far East. During FY 1956, the TAREX mission was enlarged to cover the exploitation of collateral sources of ELINT information. Sources which were exploited included cryptographic documents and devices, captured enemy agents, defectors and repatriates, covert intelligence activities, foreign newspapers and periodicals and pertinent files of US Intelligence agencies in the theater.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
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1. Comd Rept, ASAFE, FY56, Vol II, pp61-63.

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
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- 2. 326th Communications Reconnaissance Company,
Camp Momoyama, Japan

The operational mission, directed by the Chief, ASA-Far East,
continued much the same as in the previous year.



- 1. Comd Rept, ASAFE, FY56, Vol II pp81-82.
- 2. Ibid. pp85-86.


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1. Ann Rept, 326th CRC, FY56, Vol II, pp2-3.
2. Ibid. pp3-4.
3. Ibid. pp3-4.
4. Ibid. p9.

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
T/A operations were begun at Camp Momoyama on 9 Aug 55 with a total of [] positions being supported. Additional increments of the company arrived to bring the section up to full operating strength by the end of the first quarter. Difficulty was encountered in the intercept of []

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traffic and intelligence value was thereby limited. Poor intercept and resultant poor analysis were also found with regard to []

[] assignments. Only limited continuity of coverage was achieved with [] traffic. This traffic could be identified by the use of []

[] Especial intercept and analysis difficulties occurred with this net during the third quarter when the net underwent a communications change. During the fourth quarter, []



3. 11th ASA Detachment; Makubetsu, Japan

During FY 1956, the 11th Detachment searched for and intercepted non-communication type electronic signals emanating from standard Soviet Bloc equipment in the frequency range of 15 kcs to 12,000 mcs. These were analyzed and their characteristics determined to allow identification of the type and purpose of the transmitting apparatus. Sources of intercepted signals were also located by DF.²

1. Ann Rept, 326th CRC, FY56, Vol II, pp6-10.
2. Ann Rept, 11th ASA Det, FY56, Vol II, p2.

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Six special missions were assigned during the report period. These included:¹



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4. Field Station (7202), Camp Hakata, Japan

Fld Sta 7202 assumed its operational mission 1 May 56. Primary assignment included




- 1. Ann Rept, 11th ASA Det, FY56, Vol II, pp3-4 & Tab M.
- 2. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (7202), FY56, Vol II, p16.

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
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1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (7202), FY56, Vol II, pp4-5.
2. Ibid. p5.
3. Ibid. pp5-6.

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
1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (7202), FY56, Vol II, pp8-9.
2. Ibid. p10.
3. Ibid. p7.

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
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5. Field Station (8610), Kyoto, Japan

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1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (7202), FY56, Vol II, p7.
2. Ibid. p15.
3. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8610), FY56, Vol II pp7-8.
4. Ibid. p12.

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The Morse Section employed [] civilian operators during the year. The first of these arrived in August 1955 and, following training, were assigned one full position on [] At the close of the year, civilians were covering [] [] Manual Morse positions.¹

In December, Manual Morse General Search picked up an unusual volume of traffic which was temporarily notated as [] Tapes and chatter rolls were sent to NSA for analysis. General Search also did fine work on identification of [] notations. Difficulties in [] intercept control were overcome by installation of one new long wire antenna with a direction of 240 degrees. [] circuits showed an increase in stations, links, and nets which were adequately covered.

During July 1955, positions covered totaled [] broken down as follows: [] while at the end of the year, position coverage totaled [] (1). Deleted from the mission were [] in November 1955, and [] in April 1956.²

Radio Printer Section: The R/P category assignment was changed 1 Aug 55 to a numbering system as shown in the following recapitulation:

[]


1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8610), FY56, Vol II, pp10-11.
2. Ibid. pp15-16.

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Activity on two-, six-, and nine-channel multiplex positions continually decreased, and indications were that target circuits would changeover to flexible multiplex operations. At the end of the year, the station was being considered for installation of two flexible multiplex positions.²


Voice Section: Nineteen experienced linguists departed during July and August 1955, leaving a backlog of 90 tapes. As a result, Position JT-4 was dropped. On 14 Sep 55, permission was granted to maintain JT-1 on a 24-hour basis and JT-2 at the discretion of the station commander. The section then concentrated on disposing of the backlog, which was completed 10 Nov 56. The personnel shortage was alleviated with the arrival of [] new linguists on 16 September and [] more on 7 Nov 55. Full coverage was resumed on JT-2 on 12 November. Full coverage of DT-3 and partial coverage of DT-4 was resumed on 29 December. Between 10 December and 10 January, [] more linguists arrived. After 11 January, [] 24-hour positions were maintained.³

1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8610), FY56, Vol II, pp17-18.
2. Ibid. p18.
3. Ibid. p18.

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[redacted] voice men served as members of the site survey team at Miho Air Base in March. Voice intercept conditions were reported to be excellent, particularly on the difficult [redacted] traffic. All voice intercept was recorded and forwarded to ASA-Far East for transcription.²

Traffic Control Section: The T/A mission was performed by Manual Morse, Non-Morse RCA Scanning, Intercept Support, and Filing Sections. The Intercept Support Sub-section, composed of analysts working the trick schedules, aided operators in identifying targets, handling and editing traffic, skeletonizing [redacted] traffic for priority forwarding to USN-39, collecting and integrating all data pertinent to individual position assignments, and

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1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8610), FY56, Vol II, p19.
 2. Ibid. pp19-20.

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maintaining all identification aids.¹

Radio Printer Analysis Section: This section conducted analysis of operator's characteristics on a limited basis as well as maintaining a traffic hits file of [redacted] activity. No other projects beyond routine analysis were attempted. The subsection completely identified 45.7 percent of the 12,798 items processed and lowered the percentage of unidentified items from 2.9 percent to 0.9 percent. This, however, represented a drop in the number of completely identified items of 8.0 percent from the preceding year. This drop, in a large measure, was due to an almost complete loss of parallel Morse coverage with a resultant drop in [redacted]

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Special Missions: Three special missions were assigned the unit during the year. In November 1955 [redacted]

[redacted]

The mission was unproductive.³
REF: VOL: I P: 425

6. Field Station (8612), Chitose, Japan

Fld Sta 8612 had a most successful operational period during FY 1956, and, on several occasions, was commended by higher headquarters.

- 1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8610), FY56, Vol II, p24.
- 2. Ibid. p26.
- 3. Ibid. pp2-3.

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
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Enthusiastic opinion was also registered over the high quality and quantity of intercept by Hq ASA, ASA-Far East, Hq NSA, and NSA-Far East.¹

The station's operational mission remained intercept, DF, and reporting on the following targets:²

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Technical channels of command for operations were established between the station, NSA, and ASA-Far East Hq. Liaison was maintained on technical matters with Fld Sta 8610.³

One special mission was added to the station in March 1956. This was brought about by heavy increase in [redacted] Voice activity coupled with suspected [redacted] links operating [redacted] As a result, special emphasis was placed on [redacted] Search which was added to the station's overall assignment as a Sierra DF priority.⁴

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Activities of the various operational sections follow:

Traffic Control: In January 1956, a major [redacted] communications change was anticipated. It proved unfounded however, as only normal [redacted] change took place. [redacted]

1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8612), FY56, Vol II, p39.
2. Ibid. p3.
3. Ibid. pp1-2.
4. Ibid. p4.

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effected, and reported to higher headquarters.

The complete [redacted] problem was assigned by higher headquarters to the USAF's 6902d Special Comm Gp in April 1956. All traffic was passed to that unit for analysis during the remainder of the fiscal year. On 30 April, position JM 13 was redesignated AM 20. This, in effect, placed the [redacted] problem under NSA control.¹

In May, it was assumed that the [redacted] [redacted] had become silent. Continuous search proved fruitless. In the same period, [redacted] became inactive. In June, there was considerable [redacted] activity observed on [redacted] links in the [redacted] area. Complete coverage was obtained and reported to ASA-Far East Hq.

Manual Morse: This section placed into operation a Category "D" position 10 Sep 55. Two training positions were also installed.² On 11 Feb 56, four EM were placed on TDY to test various [redacted] sites for the suitability of intercept of [redacted].
[redacted] The team returned in late March.³

Voice: Personnel shortages created a large backlog of intercept for transcription in tapes. Increases in [redacted] during August and September 1955 further added to the problem. In October, backlog reached a point where it could not be coped with and necessitated the forwarding of tapes to NSA and dropping of [redacted] from assignment to reduce intercept.⁴

1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8612), FY56, Vol II, pl6.
2. Ibid. pl7.
3. Ibid. pl9.
4. Ibid. p21.

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In April 1956, [redacted] search, covering the 20 to 90 mc spectrum was assigned, however, little activity was noted within this general range, most of which covered 20 to 30 mcs.¹

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Radio Printer: Two-channel positions were increased on 13 Aug 55 by the installation of two simplex positions to be used as [redacted] and, in November, [redacted]

On 10 Jan 56, installation was completed on two additional 2-channel positions and one standard simplex position. A limited assignment to cover the frequency spectrum of 2 to 7 mcs was expanded to include search for [redacted] 2-channel cases over the entire spectrum. As a result, the amount of intercept doubled. Installation was also completed on one flexible multiplex position (less AFSAV D-39), but since proper aligning equipment was not available, the station was given only a limited assignment after dropping AX-3.

The intercept of [redacted] traffic remained average although a slight drop in effectiveness of copy was noticed due to adverse weather conditions.³ A [redacted]

[redacted] was obtained and it was anticipated that future efforts to intercept this case would be most successful.

During May and June 1956, operators practiced monitoring flexible multiplex signals and forwarded tapes to NSA for an accuracy study. As a result of the experience gained, it was expected that an assignment would be made.

1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8612), FY56, Vol II, p22.
2. Ibid. p22.
3. Ibid. p24.

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early in FY 1957.¹

Coverage of all other activities remained normal. High speed automatic Morse on [redacted] did not meet required schedules and made intercept poor. Despite this, the station made an outstanding contribution to the COMINT effort in that for the first time in the history of [redacted] successful intercept was made of its [redacted]. This was shortlived for additional efforts to continue intercept failed.² REF: VOL: I P. 732

7. 501st Communications Reconnaissance Group, Yongdong-po, Korea

Continuing COMINT missions of the 501st Group in FY 1956,

were the [redacted]

[redacted] In the third quarter, the [redacted]

[redacted] problem was transferred to the 301st Battalion.³ In addition,

the [redacted] problems were transferred to the

6902d Special Comm -Gp.⁴

In carrying out its assigned mission, the Intelligence Branch, 501st

Group, was organized at the beginning of the fiscal year into two sub-

branches, one concerned with intercept and DF, the other with technical

analysis of [redacted] problems.

Following reorganization under the "New ASA Concept," the branch was divided into Intercept and DF, Control, Analysis, and Integration Sections.⁵

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1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8612), FY56, Vol II, p25.
2. Ibid. pp25-26.
3. Ann Rept, 501st CRG, FY56, Vol II, p2.
4. Ibid. p6.
5. Ibid. p5.

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In the traffic analysis activity, decentralization from NSA to ASA-Far East of the [redacted] was effected 15 Nov 55. Prior to this date, the group's T/A effort succeeded in isolating and notating one case during July, eight cases during August, twelve during September, and nine cases during October and November. Decentralization resulted in the division of responsibilities for [redacted] between ASA-Far East and the 501st Group, and replacement of the requirement for TECSUM's with one for "editing traffic". In addition to [redacted]

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[redacted] the group maintained continuity on [redacted]
[redacted]

Intercept continuity on the [redacted] was interrupted 2 Jul 55, as a result of a change in call sign and frequency rota. Although the new call sign rota was recovered, it was noted that the nets had discarded the frequency rota altogether. Also on 2 July, a new net was heard consisting of a [redacted] but location and identity of the [redacted] were not recovered. On 8 September, four [redacted]

[redacted] causing a marked change in the pattern of intercept nets. As a result, the number of outstations was reduced, and the volume of traffic greatly decreased.

During the third and fourth quarters of FY 1956, a sharp decline was noted in the activity of [redacted] At the end of the report period, [redacted] activity was confined to those [redacted] serving [redacted]

1. Ann Rept, 501st CRG, FY56, Vol II, p10.

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[redacted] This decrease in radio traffic was attributed to extensive land-line construction and the widespread use of wire facilities.¹

[redacted] subscribers continued activity with limited change except in certain operating procedures. A gradual decrease in activity from the [redacted] was noted, while groups serving [redacted] remained static. Unidentified [redacted] traffic continued to be passed, but nothing was established concerning the [redacted] system.

From March 1956 until the end of the report period, a study was conducted of practice traffic passed on all identified [redacted] subscribers. Results forwarded to technical consumers pointed to three main conclusions:

- 1)
- 2)
- 3)

[redacted]

Studies were also made on the isolation of [redacted] and, in particular, of [redacted]

[redacted]


1. Ann Rept, 501st CRG, FY56, Vol II, pp10-11. See also Ann Rept, Hq ASAFE, FY56, Vol II, p43.

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1. Ann Rept, 501st CRG, FY56, Vol II, pp11-13.
2. Ibid. pp14, 16.
3. Ibid. p15.


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


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1. Ann Rept, 501st CRG, FY56, Vol II, pp14, 15.
 2. Ibid. p17.

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
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8. 301st Communications Reconnaissance Battalion,
Uijongbu, Korea



1. Ann Rept, 501st CRG, FY56, Vol II, pl8.
2. Ibid, pp17-19.

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In the fourth quarter of FY 1956, the 301st Battalion's COMINT Section was reorganized into three subsections--LLVI, Traffic Analysis, and Cryptanalysis.² Following is an account of the operational activity of individual sections during the report period:

LLVI: Throughout FY 1956, the LLVI effort concentrated on callups,



Much of the effort

was wasted because operators copied Operators

were instructed to drop transmissions which could be

identified as such and to continue their search for valid traffic.³

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Low Level Intercept of ChiCom radio transmissions showed operators were

using On 9

and 10 April, the 301st Battalion made tapes of these transmissions and

forwarded them to Hq ASA-Far East for further study.

On 22 Jun 56, a new reporting system was established for daily reports

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1. Ann Rept, Hq & Hq Co, 301st GRB, FY56, Vol II, pl.
 2. Ibid. p3.
 3. Ibid. pl4.

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containing Category I COMINT information. Translations of clear text messages collected from LLVI positions were submitted daily to G2, I Corps (Gp); SR, AFPE/Eighth Army; ASA-Far East; and 501st Group. Special spot reports were sent when the situation warranted.¹

[redacted] information to a great extent was dependent upon LLVI. The battalion's [redacted] Section, utilizing information obtained from LLVI along with information obtained from collateral intelligence sources, was able to maintain accurate and up-to-date files on [redacted]

[redacted]

Traffic Analysis: To facilitate identification of [redacted] nets, a DF monitoring unit was installed to cover the [redacted]. The monitor received bearings transmitted by reporting sites and passed them to the T/A Section for plotting.³

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Because of the security measures which [redacted] practiced, it was extremely difficult to maintain continuity on [redacted] cases. Most nets seemed to change their characteristics daily; and continuity was frequently lost. Following is a chronological account of T/A efforts on [redacted] cases during the fiscal year:

In July and August, special studies were performed on the [redacted] with no positive results. A frequency and schedule study was also ineffectual until 9 Aug 55, when a [redacted] occurred in cases [redacted] and it became possible to separate these cases. It was suspected that [redacted]

- 1. Ann Rept, Hq & Hq Co, 301st CRB, FY56, Vol II, p15.
- 2. Ibid. p4.
- 3. Ibid. p10.


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1. Ann Rept, Hq & Hq Co, 301st CRB, FY56, Vol II, pp10-14.


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
Cryptanalysis: The cryptanalysis effort of the 301st Battalion was divided by traffic type--R/T, LLVI, and CW. Cryptanalysis on R/T traffic was dropped 22 Mar 56.

In November 1955, research was initiated on a



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Other C/A developments included:²




1. Ann Rept, Hq & Hq Co, 301st CRB, FY56, Vol II, p6.
2. Ibid. p7.

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
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- a. Company A, 301st Communications Reconnaissance Battalion

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- 1. Ann Rept, Co A, 301st CRB, FY56, Vol II, p2.
- 2. Ibid. pl.
- 3. Ibid. p6.

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b. Company B, 301st Communications Reconnaissance Battalion

The primary mission of Company B was intercept of [] voice and Morse radio communications. A few special missions on very high frequency ranges undertaken during the fiscal year recorded only nominal success as there were no antennas gauged for such ranges.¹

At the beginning of FY 1956, Company B's intercept section comprised [] positions, copying [] nets in addition to assigned [] nets. On 13 July, when two positions were closed out, two [] cases were added to the mission assignment. On 28 July, three more positions were closed out and the [] cases were dropped from the company's mission assignment. On 19 August, [] cases were dropped. At the same time, a Morse operator analysis position was transferred to Company B from the 326th Company, increasing the total number of positions to []

After a temporary interruption in traffic following the annual [] [] on 13 Jan 56, a new case, [] was notated and added to the mission. This case, increasing daily in volume until mid-February, comprised almost 80% of the traffic copied by Company B at this time. In June, [] again began passing a large volume of traffic. Continuity on this case was established by repeated call signs.³

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On 3 Apr 56, five positions were assigned set frequency ranges for search. This new procedure, introduced after a liaison visit by the battalion Traffic Analysis Officer to Hq ASA-Far East, was intended to offset an all-time low in traffic volume by insuring complete coverage of the

1. Ann Rept, Co B, 301st CRB, FY56, Vol II, pl.
2. Ibid. pp4-5.
3. Ibid. pp5-7.

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
entire frequency band.¹

In April 1956, a test team, consisting of 1 Officer, 6 Operators, and an analyst, was sent [redacted] Using AN/GRC-9 receivers and long wire and whip antennas, a sampling was taken of every signal heard. Reception was excellent. A 72-hour check of the test team's logs against those of Company's A and B revealed only a 16% duplication in intercept coverage. As a result, it was recommended that more mobile CW units be sent [redacted]

[REF: VOL. I P. 367]

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- 9. 330th Communications Reconnaissance Company, Siksong-ni, Korea



- 1. Ann Rept, Co B, 301st CRB, FY56, Vol II, p6.
- 2. Ibid. p6.
- 3. Ann Rept, 330th GRC, FY56, Vol II, p2.
- 4. Ibid. p5.

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10. Field Station (8603), Sobe, Okinawa

NSA outlined a new station mission setting forth additional reporting responsibilities to consumers with respect to exploitation of

[redacted] Traffic.¹

Automatic Morse mission covered [redacted] links.

On 19 Nov 55, there was a change in programming from 18 to 16 diversity positions, consisting of eight triple diversity positions for on-off keying, and eight double diversity positions for frequency shift keying.² Auto-

matic Morse links, [redacted]

[redacted] were not heard since the assignments were received in February 1956. The Radio Printer Section, working in conjunction with Automatic Morse, conducted search for possible radio printer activity on these links, but with negative results. [redacted]

[redacted] were uncopyable due to weak signals.³

Manual Morse mission included coverage on [redacted]

[redacted]

At the beginning of the fiscal year, [redacted] positions were manned. On 11 Aug 55, two positions were dropped due to a shortage of personnel. It was not until 16 Oct 55 that the station received sufficient replacements to man its programmed number of [redacted] positions.⁴

1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8603), FY56, Vol II, p6.
2. Ibid. pp6, 15.
3. Ibid. pp15-17.
4. Ibid. pp7-8.

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Intercept continuity on the [] continued exceptionally well. Not only was intercept continuity maintained on assigned cases but specific improvement was made on maintaining day to day coverage of unidentified communications circuits. Many circuits were determined to be

[] Special identification techniques (SIT) were applied to the manual Morse intercept problem with assigned targets on [] cases. A secondary mission of SIT was to assist in search and rescue operations for friendly lost aircraft or ocean vessels.²

Two [] intercept operators were placed on TDY for 60 days to determine copiability and quality of [] traffic at USM-44, prior to the transfer of the three RD positions from this station to USM-44.³

A joint [] assignment, received on 12 Aug 55, was reported to be using a combination of voice Morse and manual Morse; however, the link was never heard and the assignment dropped 26 Sep 55.⁴

NSA directed a 15-day sampling test on [] using

1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8603), FY56, Vol II, pp24-26.
2. Ibid. p10.
3. Ibid. p10.
4. Ibid. pp10-11.

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a newly installed voice position. The test was conducted with a fair degree of success.¹

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] was added to the SIT operation in July 1955.³ Many problems were encountered in establishing [Redacted] at this station.

Equipment arrived with many components unserviceable or broken. Constant maintenance work was necessary to maintain the equipment in operating condition and in June 1955, a request was submitted for new [Redacted] equipment based on the unsatisfactory performance record of the unit. While waiting for

[Redacted] supplies essential for the [Redacted] problem, personnel worked on the [Redacted]

[Redacted] problem. When film was received in December 1955, work on

PVA was discontinued. The [Redacted] phase was rather unique. [Redacted] circuits

used [Redacted] which could be used for analysis purposes.

Of the [Redacted]

[Redacted]

1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8603), FY56, Vol II, p12.
2. Ibid. p12.
3. Ibid. p29.
4. Ibid. pp31, 33-34.

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At the beginning of the fiscal year, the Radio Printer mission was to cover [redacted] non-Morse type signals. This mission was dropped as the station underwent an equipment and mission change. By December 1955, the mission which existed at the beginning of the year was dropped and the new R/P mission was composed entirely of [redacted]

[redacted] intercept. A general search mission was assigned on 30 Apr 56.¹

Traffic Analysis was directed primarily on the [redacted]

[redacted] Limited

T/A for local intercept control purposes was performed on [redacted]

[redacted] UNCODED [redacted] T/A

work on Russian problems discontinued with the termination of Russian

[redacted] intercept missions. The [redacted] T/A problem

was turned over to [redacted] in April.² In preparation for the [redacted]

[redacted]

A letter

of appreciation was received from the Chief, ASA, citing the outstanding success in maintaining continuity of intercept and traffic analysis and for superior performance of duty.³

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No difficulty was experienced in maintaining intercept continuity on the [redacted] SIT support was given [redacted] when requested.

Integration of Naval personnel began on 28 Feb 56 and on 11 May 56, the Navy

1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8603), FY56, Vol II, p9.
2. Ibid. p9.
3. Ibid. pp36-37.

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assumed complete jurisdiction and the number of positions were increased from [redacted]. The Navy also took over manning of one [redacted] position.¹ A separate COMINT unit, [redacted] was established for Naval personnel working at USM-3.² In [redacted] there was a decrease from [redacted]

The control and integration function was production of first instance end-product reports, and spot reports on the [redacted] area. The task of scanning [redacted] data was also included. Scanned material was that which was intercepted on [redacted] take received through USM-79. Scanning of [redacted] was discontinued on 30 Apr 56 when USM-79 assumed responsibility for the scanning and reporting.⁴ REF: VOL: I P. 465

11. 327th Communications Reconnaissance Company, Taipei, Formosa

The operational mission of the 327th Company was to perform intercept, T/A, C/A, translation, and special reporting on designated [redacted] [redacted] targets and to maintain operational liaison with other COMINT units in the area.⁵

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
The Manual Morse mission, as assigned by NSA, was as follows:⁶

1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8603), FY56, Vol II, pp27-28.
2. Ibid. p8.
3. Ibid. p28.
4. Ibid. p7.
5. Ann Rept, 327th CRC, FY56, Vol II, p2.
6. Ibid. pp4-5.

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
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Continuity in the Manual Morse Section was difficult to maintain, thus the main intercept effort was on a search basis in an effort to develop a high degree of predictability. However, at the close of the year, predictability reached a high level and promised within a short time to reach the same peak of excellence which existed at 

The Radiotéléphone mission during the year included the following:²

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


1. Ann Rept, 327th CRC, FY56, Vol II, pl6.
2. Ibid. pp7-8.

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Progress was slower in this section than in the Morse Section, partly because of the relatively slight voice activity, partly because of insufficient antenna selection. Continuity increased near the end of the year due to close coordination between the voice operators and analysts.¹

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1. Ann Rept, 327th CRC, FY56, Vol II, p16.

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
H. Africa

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1. Field Station (8604), Asmara, Eritrea

The continuing operational mission of Fld Sta 8604 included intercept of foreign communications, DF activities, special identification techniques, submission of technical reports and raw material, and performance of ancillary tasks as required in support of the National COMINT effort.¹ To facilitate accomplishment of the mission, the Operations Branch was divided into four sections.

The Traffic Control and Reports Section, utilizing knowledge of [redacted]



TECSUM's on Morse intercept from [redacted]

[redacted] were prepared and transmitted daily to NSA. Additional

TECSUM's on all [redacted] activities,

and on [redacted]


1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8604), FY56, Vol II, p2.
2. Ibid. p3.
3. Ibid. p3.

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


1. Ann Rept, Fid Sta (8604), FY56, Vol II, p4.

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1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8604), FY56, Vol II, pp5-6.
2. Ibid. p6.
3. Ibid. pp6-7.
4. Ibid. p7.


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1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8604), FY56, Vol II, p7.
2. Ibid. p8.
3. Ibid. p8.
4. Ibid. p9.

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The R/P Section conducted a 30-day special search mission for links on two multiplex positions from 17 Dec 55 to 15 Jan 56. Results were negative. 2

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
Chief problems encountered during the year resulted from increased coverage of Middle East activities during the third and fourth quarters. This increase necessitated installation of new transmitters in an already congested field resulting in heavy radio interference. To alleviate the situation, a series of site surveys was undertaken and an alternate site at Ghinda, Eritrea was established. Positions covering

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1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8604), FY56, Vol II, p10.
 2. Ibid. p10.

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and one simplex standard R/P position were installed. Results at the new site were excellent.

Interference, especially at low and medium frequencies, continued to adversely effect the station at the end of the year. Efforts were made to eliminate this, but it was expected to continue until construction permitted all transmitters to be moved to a new site.¹

REF: VOL. I P. 346

1. Ann Rept, Fld Sta (8604), FY56, Vol II, p14.

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