




INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

JUNE 18, 2021



Audit of Department of Defense Joint Bases

INTEGRITY ★ INDEPENDENCE ★ EXCELLENCE





Results in Brief

Audit of Department of Defense Joint Bases

June 18, 2021

Objective

The objective of this audit was to determine whether Service Components met the terms outlined in the joint base memorandums of agreement (MOAs) and whether processes are in place to report and address joint base-related concerns.

Background

Military personnel, civilians, and contractors use similar processes to provide common installation support to DoD installations. The DoD used the Base Realignment and Closure process to realign 26 Service installations into 12 joint bases, in part to increase operational readiness and to more efficiently support its forces. Lead Components (Service Components responsible for providing installation support for the entire joint base) at each joint base received resources from the supported Components at the bases. The lead Components assumed responsibility for installation management and for providing support to the entire joint base. We visited three joint bases where the Army, Navy, and Air Force are each designated as a lead Component: Joint Base (JB) Lewis-McChord, JB Anacostia-Bolling, and JB Elmendorf-Richardson.

Finding

Lead Components at JB Lewis-McChord, JB Anacostia-Bolling, and JB Elmendorf-Richardson did not always meet minimum performance standards or other terms specified in the MOA. In addition, while

Finding (cont'd)

the DoD had processes to maintain the MOA, and report and address joint base concerns, these processes were not always followed or effective. Joint base personnel often identified Service-based decisions, operational differences, and a DoD-wide lack of joint base knowledge and operational guidance as reasons why MOA terms were not met and as overall program challenges. Also, joint bases did not always have the resources to meet the performance standards that they were evaluated against.

Lack of relevant operating guidance and processes; exclusion of joint base consideration in Service processes and decisions; and non-adherence to MOA terms can break down the joint construct, reducing efficiencies that can be gained from joint basing. These factors can also hamper relations on the installation and potentially marginalize the input, needs, and mission of the supported Components.

Recommendations

In part, we recommend that the:

- Army and Air Force Vice Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), take appropriate action to resolve the disagreements at JB Lewis-McChord.
- OSD take steps to improve communication on actions to improve the oversight of and adherence to joint base processes and requirements.
- Service Vice Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and the OSD, ensure relationships between joint base and Service policies are clearly defined, and address concerns on joint base operations and potential conflicts in the MOA.



Results in Brief

Audit of Department of Defense Joint Bases

Management Comments and Our Response

The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force; and the Commander, Navy Installations Command, responding for the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, either agreed with the recommendations or agreed to take actions that addressed the intent of 8 of the 12 recommendations. Therefore, these recommendations are resolved but will remain open. They also agreed to take action on 4 of the 12 recommendations, but the actions described in their comments do not fully address the intent of the recommendations; therefore, these recommendations

are unresolved. We are requesting additional comments and documentation from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment and the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Air Force, and Navy to address the actions they will take to fully implement the intent of these four recommendations.

Finally, we added one recommendation to the Joint Base Commander, JB Lewis-McChord, as a result of management comments, requesting that the Commander work with the Joint Management Oversight Structure to determine whether a policy variance is needed to permit the dual-hatting of the deputy commander position. Therefore, we are requesting comments on this new recommendation.

Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of recommendations.

Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment	4.c, 4.d	4.a, 4.b	None
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Real Property	None	2	None
Vice Chief of Staff of the Army	3.b, 3.d	1.a, 1.b, 3.a, 3.c, 3.e	None
Vice Chief of Naval Operations	3.b, 3.d	3.a, 3.c, 3.e	None
Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force	3.b, 3.d	1.a, 1.b, 3.a, 3.c, 3.e	None
Commander, Joint Base Lewis–McChord	5	None	None

Please provide Management Comments by July 19, 2021.

Note: The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- **Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **Closed** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.





**INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500**

June 18, 2021

**MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION
AND SUSTAINMENT
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**

SUBJECT: Audit of Department of Defense Joint Bases (Report No. DODIG-2021-094)

This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's audit. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management's comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force; and the Commander, Navy Installations Command, responding for the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, either agreed with the recommendations or agreed to take actions that addressed the intent of 8 of the 12 recommendations. Therefore, these recommendations are resolved but will remain open. The responding officials also agreed to take action on 4 of the 12 recommendations, but the actions described in their comments do not fully address the intent of the recommendations; therefore, these recommendations are unresolved. The remaining recommendation was added to the report in response to management comments received on the draft report, and is therefore unresolved.

Therefore, as described in the Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response section of this report, all 13 recommendations (resolved and unresolved) remain open. Please provide us within 90 days your response concerning specific actions in process or completed on the 8 resolved recommendations. We will track the 5 unresolved recommendations until an agreement is reached on the actions you will take to address the recommendations, and you have submitted adequate documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions are completed. DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, please provide us within 30 days your response concerning specific actions in process or alternative corrective actions proposed on the unresolved recommendations.

Send your responses to the resolved recommendations to either followup@dodig.mil if unclassified or rfunet@dodig.smil.mil if classified SECRET. Send your responses to the unresolved recommendations to either audrgo@dodig.mil if unclassified or [REDACTED] if classified SECRET. If you have any questions, please contact me at [REDACTED], [REDACTED].



Richard B. Vasquez
Assistant Inspector General for Audit
Readiness and Global Operations

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Introduction

Objective

The objective of this audit was to determine whether Service Components met the terms outlined in the joint base memorandums of agreement (MOAs) and whether processes are in place to report and address joint base-related concerns. See Appendix A for a discussion of the scope, methodology, and prior audit coverage.

Background

Joint Basing Overview

DoD installations employ military personnel, civilians, and contractors to perform common installation support functions, such as financial management, custodial services, grounds maintenance, law enforcement services, and physical security patrols. All installations execute these functions using relatively similar processes. The DoD used the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process to reorganize its installation infrastructure to more efficiently support its forces, increase operational readiness, and facilitate new ways of doing business. The joint basing program, established as part of the 2005 BRAC, represents the DoD's efforts to improve the delivery of installation support across the Services by realigning 26 Service installations into 12 joint bases, based in part on geographic proximity.¹ The 2005 BRAC recommendation designated the lead Component (Service Component responsible for providing installation support for the entire joint base) and the supported Components (Service Components transferring resources and responsibility for installation management functions to the lead Component) at each of the 12 joint bases.² See Table 1 for the 12 joint bases and Appendix B for the 12 joint bases and the Component designations established by BRAC Recommendation 146.

¹ While identifying efficiencies was a consideration of the 2005 BRAC process, the mission capabilities and readiness impact of the BRAC recommendations was the top priority. Joint basing is covered under BRAC Recommendation 146.

The 12 joint bases established by BRAC Recommendation 146 include Joint Region Marianas, which is a joint region and varies slightly from the construct of a joint base. We use the term "joint bases" to describe all 12 installations.

² In addition to the lead and supported Components (MOA signatories identified in BRAC Recommendation 146), tenants and other supported Components also reside on a joint installation. Tenants (like non-DoD organizations, DoD agencies, and DoD activities) are exempt from joint basing and are serviced by the lead Component through a traditional host-tenant support agreement. Other supported Components (Military Department organizations not specifically identified in the BRAC language) transferred resources to the lead Component in exchange for support, and are classified as part of the lead or supported Component under the MOA. Our review does not include host-tenant support agreements.

Table 1. Joint Bases

Joint Base Names and Locations	
Joint Base (JB) Anacostia–Bolling, Washington, D.C.	JB Lewis–McChord, Washington
JB Andrews–Naval Air Facility Washington, Maryland	JB Myer–Henderson Hall, Virginia
JB Charleston, South Carolina	JB McGuire–Dix–Lakehurst, New Jersey
JB Elmendorf–Richardson, Alaska	JB Pearl Harbor–Hickam, Hawaii
Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek–Fort Story, Virginia	Joint Region Marianas, Guam
JB Langley–Eustis, Virginia	JB San Antonio, Texas

Source: The DoD OIG.

Aligned under the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Real Property (DASD[Real Property]) is responsible, in part, for DoD infrastructure and basing, including joint base program oversight.³ The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Joint Basing Office reports to DASD(Real Property), and is the action office that oversees the joint basing program.

Joint Base Implementation

The OSD issued the Joint Base Implementation Guidance (JBIG) on January 22, 2008, to establish a comprehensive framework of joint basing procedures (the JBIG was amended on July 1, 2010). The JBIG establishes roles, responsibilities, and a governance structure; defines installation support functions; and describes other unique joint base requirements, such as the transfer of total obligation authority (budget authority granted [or requested] from Congress for a given fiscal year) and real property, personal property, and plant equipment from the supported Component to the lead Component. Multiple OSD and Service organizations participated in working groups to help develop the joint base framework, or to issue supplements to the JBIG to further develop certain topics discussed in the implementation guidance. The JBIG supplemental guidance covers topics like the development and use of a standard MOA template to document joint base agreements; the transfer and performance of command authorities; the transfer, acceptance, management, and accountability of real property; and details surrounding a specific functional support area. OSD organizations issued the

³ The OSD office overseeing the joint basing program has undergone three realignments—formerly the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment (DUSD[I&E]), followed by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations and Environment (ASD[EI&E]) and within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment.

JBIG supplemental guidance for program areas under their authority (such as the military personnel services [MILPERS] supplement issued by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness).⁴ Joint basing policy and guidance provide unique operating instructions for the joint bases, and supersede Service policy. However, where there is no joint base guidance or policy, the lead Component's Service policies and procedures are followed.

The JBIG and its supplemental guidance identified the types of support and resources transferred to the joint base and those that remained with the supported Component.⁵ For example, civilians who performed covered installation support functions under the supported Component transferred to the lead Component. In addition, supported Components maintain responsibility for their mission-related functions and positions, as well as for the command and control over their Service members. Military personnel who perform installation support are not transferred to the lead Component, but instead can be embedded into the joint base to provide the supported Components' fair share of resources. The joint base commander provides embedded military personnel with day-to-day direction, which is limited to the control necessary to accomplish installation support.

Memorandums of Agreement

The Joint Base Partnership Council must develop and maintain a MOA between the lead and supported Components identified in BRAC Recommendation 146 for each joint base.⁶ The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps approve each MOA on behalf of the identified Service Components.⁷ In 2008, the OSD issued a supplement to the JBIG that provided Components with a standardized MOA template and additional details on how to develop the joint base agreement.

According to the MOA template, MOAs must, at a minimum, define financial arrangements, installation support responsibilities, financial and performance reporting requirements, dispute resolution procedures, disposition of assets other than real property, and other relevant issues. The lead and supported Components cannot modify the standardized MOA template or its language, unless

⁴ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness memorandum, "Department of Defense Supplemental Guidance for Implementing and Operating a Joint Base," April 24, 2008 (MILPERS supplemental guidance). The OSD issued clarifying and supplemental guidance to this memorandum in May, June, and October of 2009.

⁵ Supported Components transferred all the resources, contracts and other support agreements, real property, civilian personnel, and authorities for the installation support functions to the lead Component.

⁶ The JBIG defines the Joint Base Partnership Council as the local leadership group at the joint base responsible for overall implementation of joint base guidance. The council is chaired by the joint base commander and includes representation from the lead and supported Components and the major tenants on the joint base. The council is the first of six tiers in the DoD's overall governance structure for the joint base program.

⁷ Unless otherwise noted, we will refer to the MOA signatories as the Service Vice Chiefs of Staff.

specifically prompted to by the template to incorporate things like attachments or other supplemental information (that is required by OSD guidance), or approved deviations, variances, or other agreements to clarify Components' responsibilities (approved through the Joint Management Oversight Structure [JMOS], the governing body over the joint base program).⁸

Joint base MOAs are not designed to be all-inclusive documents; this provides joint base personnel with flexibility needed to perform duties in a changing environment. However, this flexibility sometimes requires Service coordination and action outside of the MOA to ensure joint base personnel can successfully and efficiently provide installation support and meet agreed-upon terms.

Installation Support Functions and Performance Metrics

The MOA outlines the 44 installation support functions established in the JBIG that lead Components must provide to supported Components. These support functions include a wide variety of support, like grounds maintenance, legal support, emergency management, and utilities, and are arranged into 12 functional categories. See Appendix C for a full list of the 44 installation support functions, by functional category.

The DoD established minimum performance standards, known as joint base common output level standards (JB-COLS), using a common framework of definitions, outputs, output performance metrics, and cost drivers for 40 of the 44 installation support functions. JB-COLS are used by the DoD to measure the level of installation support provided across the joint bases, assess compliance with the MOA, and help equalize differences between the levels of installation support typically provided by the Services.⁹ Joint base MOAs commit the lead Component to deliver installation support to these approved output standards; any changes related to the level of responsibilities outlined in the MOA must be approved through the JMOS.

⁸ Deviations are formal joint base requests to provide and measure installation support at a different level than the established performance standard. Variances are formal requests to diverge from the requirements specified in the JBIG and other supplemental guidance, including the joint base organizational structure and alignment, real property transfers, and the non-transfer of installation support functions or other responsibilities that are typically required to be transferred.

The JMOS decision chain consists of six formal tiers, with representation ranging from the lead and supported Components on the installation, to the Services' regional and headquarters-level offices and the OSD. Further details on the JMOS can be found on the next page of the report and in Appendix D.

⁹ When defining the JB-COLS, the DoD selected the highest performance standard used by any of the Services as the single, joint base standard to provide and measure installation support. Ideally, this would help ensure that a supported Component received installation support that at least met its own Service standards.

Within the JMOS, the Installations Capabilities Council established the JB-COLS, and oversees and approves any changes or departures to the standards. As of July 2020, joint base performance is measured against 246 JB-COLS for 40 of the 44 installation support functions. Performance is measured against the lead Component's Service standards for the four remaining functions (environmental restoration, facilities demolition, facilities new construction, and readiness engineering services).

The Cost Performance Visibility Framework (CPVF) is a web-based reporting tool managed by the OSD Joint Basing Office that joint base personnel use to report on the extent their JB-COLS are met. The CPVF links resources to performance, provides visibility and transparency throughout the JMOS, and supports decision makers in their assessment of efficiencies, successes, and challenges related to the joint base program. Joint bases report performance information two times a year to the OSD Joint Basing Office through the JMOS. Reporting covers the 40 installation support functions with assigned JB-COLS, for a fiscal year's second and fourth quarter reporting periods. The CPVF also provides visibility into manpower and cost information, which each joint base reports on annually during the fourth quarter reporting period for all 44 installation support functions.

Governance Structure, Dispute Resolution, and MOA Update Processes

The JBIG established the JMOS to provide the governing framework over joint basing to justify and approve variances to policies, review and approve changes to the MOA and JB-COLS, ensure Component interests are represented, resolve disputes at the lowest echelon, and provide oversight over compliance with the MOA. The JMOS decision chain consists of six formal tiers, with representation ranging from the lead and supported Components to the OSD and Service-level headquarters, which work together to help ensure fairness. Proposed changes to the MOA and unresolved joint base disputes enter the JMOS at the lowest, installation-level tier, known as Joint Base Partnership Council, and are subsequently forwarded through the higher tiers for additional review and approval, as necessary. See Appendix D for a summary of the roles and participants for each of the six JMOS tiers.

Although the lead or supported Component may propose additional reviews of the joint base agreement at any time, the MOA requires that, at a minimum, the Joint Base Partnership Council review the MOA in its entirety every 3 years, as well as annually to identify mission, manpower, and financial impacts and to ensure installation support functions are performed to the agreed-upon levels. The annual reviews include information collected and reported in the CPVF. In April 2010, the OSD issued a memorandum outlining the types of changes that can be made to a MOA and the processes used to formalize those changes.¹⁰ Proposed MOA changes are processed through the JMOS. Minor and administrative changes, like corrections to the MOA's personal property and plant equipment inventory list, can be reviewed and approved at the installation level by the Joint Base Partnership

¹⁰ DUSD(I&E) memorandum, "Business Rules for Processing and Approving Joint Base Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) Changes," April 12, 2010 (April 2010 Business Rules Memorandum). The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment issued additional guidance related to this memorandum on January 3, 2019.

Council. All significant proposed changes to the MOA, such as altered text or changed conditions that result in a change of responsibilities, must be submitted for JMOS consideration and be approved by the structure's third tier, the Senior Installations Management Group, which will then determine and route the proposed change to the final signature authority.¹¹

Joint Bases Visited

Each of the 12 joint bases have unique considerations and concerns—like those related to an installation's size or geographic area, the number and proximity of locations making up the joint installation, or the types and range of missions performed on an installation. To ensure our review identified common challenges that exist within the program, we visited three joint bases where the Army, Navy, and Air Force are each designated as the lead Service Component responsible for providing installation support: Joint Base (JB) Lewis–McChord, JB Anacostia–Bolling, and JB Elmendorf–Richardson.¹² Our report highlights only some of the common challenge areas observed during the audit. Therefore, these installations may face additional challenges or circumstances that we did not cover in this report. The challenges discussed in this report could also impact the remaining nine installations that we did not visit.

JB Anacostia–Bolling

JB Anacostia–Bolling was initially established as a Navy-led installation by combining Naval Support Facility Anacostia and Bolling Air Force Base, which shared a common boundary. However, in October 2020, the Navy transferred its lead Component responsibilities at JB Anacostia–Bolling to the Air Force. To prepare for the Service transfer, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and Air Force Vice Chief of Staff approved a revised MOA in June 2020 that details the Components' new relationship and responsibilities, and provides the framework for the planned October 2020 through October 2022 transfer of personnel, property, resources, and authorities. The Navy plans to fully transfer 39 installation support functions to the Air Force, remain responsible for 3 functions, and be partially responsible for 2 functions.

¹¹ According to the April 2010 Business Rules Memorandum, significant changes include, but are not limited to: additions, deletions, or modifications to the MOA text (including the implementation plan and annexes); changed conditions that result in a change of responsibilities; changes in resourcing or manpower transfer requirements; and new or changes to existing variances and deviations proposed by the joint base.

¹² The Navy and Air Force Vice Chiefs of Staff approved a modified joint base MOA on June 24, 2020, after we completed the majority of the audit fieldwork, to account for the transfer in lead Service at JB Anacostia–Bolling. As a result, our report discusses JB Anacostia–Bolling as a Navy-led installation, but recommendations concerning the installation reflect the change in lead Component to the Air Force.

JB Anacostia–Bolling, located in southwest Washington, D.C., spans approximately 1,018 acres and is a center for Air Force and Navy ceremonial support. The joint base command is responsible for providing installation support to a workforce of 17,000 military and civilian personnel that represent the military and Federal agencies operating on the installation.

JB Lewis–McChord

JB Lewis–McChord, an Army-led installation, was established by combining Fort Lewis and McChord Air Force Base, which shared a common boundary. JB Lewis–McChord spans approximately 90,283 acres in western Washington State. The joint base also includes the Yakima Training Center, which is located 168 miles away from the installation and encompasses over 323,431 acres to train DoD forces. The joint base command is responsible for providing installation support to a workforce of 54,000 military and civilian personnel that represent the military and Federal agencies operating on the installation.

JB Elmendorf–Richardson

JB Elmendorf–Richardson, an Air Force-led installation, was established by combining Elmendorf Air Force Base and Fort Richardson, which shared a common boundary. JB Elmendorf–Richardson spans approximately 80,000 acres in south-central Alaska, over half of which is designated as training grounds. The joint base command is responsible for providing installation support to a workforce of 15,218 military and civilian personnel that represent the military and Federal agencies operating on the installation.

Review of Internal Controls

DoD Instruction 5010.40 requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls.¹³ We identified internal control weaknesses related to the compliance and execution of joint base MOAs and the processes used to report and address joint base concerns. We will provide a copy of the final report to the senior official responsible for internal controls in the DASD(Real Property), Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, and Department of the Air Force.

¹³ DoD Instruction 5010.40, “Managers’ Internal Control Program Procedures,” May 30, 2013.

Finding

Joint Base Program Processes Require Clarification and Revision

At the three joint bases we visited (JB Anacostia–Bolling, JB Lewis–McChord, and JB Elmendorf–Richardson), installation personnel did not always meet the minimum performance standards or other terms specified in the MOA. In addition, while the DoD had processes to maintain the MOA, and report and address joint base-related concerns, these processes were not always followed or effective.

Joint base personnel often identified Service-based decisions and operational differences, and a DoD-wide lack of joint base knowledge and operational guidance as reasons why MOA terms were not met and as overall program challenges. Furthermore, joint bases did not always have the resources to meet the performance standards that they were evaluated against. Finally, existing DoD processes to maintain the MOA and resolve installation concerns were sometimes cumbersome, untimely, and unclear.

Service-based decisions can impact how a joint installation operates. Lack of relevant operating guidance and processes; exclusion of joint base consideration in Service processes and decisions; and non-adherence to MOA terms can inhibit joint base operations and break down the joint construct and reduce the efficiencies that can be gained from joint basing. These factors can also hamper relations on the installation, and potentially marginalize the input, needs, and mission of the supported Components.

Service Components Did Not Always Comply With Terms Established in the Joint Base MOA, or Maintain the Agreement

Personnel at all three bases we visited did not always comply with the terms established in the joint base MOAs. Specifically, personnel at the three installations did not always meet the minimum performance standards outlined in the MOA for covered support functions. In addition, personnel at JB Anacostia–Bolling and JB Lewis–McChord executed support inconsistent with the joint base organization and responsibilities specified in the MOA and joint base program guidance. Furthermore, personnel at these two joint bases did not follow established procedures to modify the agreement with significant changes approved by the JMOS before implementing them.

Joint Base Personnel Did Not Always Meet Minimum Performance Standards Required by the MOA

Personnel at JB Anacostia–Bolling, JB Lewis–McChord, and JB Elmendorf–Richardson did not always meet the minimum performance standards specified in the JB-COLS when executing installation support under the MOA. Personnel at the three installations reported that the decisions made and actions taken by higher Service-level offices were a major reason why they did not meet the standards. On average, joint base personnel across the DoD aggregately reported meeting at least 82 percent or more of the JB-COLS for 10 functional categories, and cited the most difficulty with meeting the standards for the remaining 2 categories, facilities investment and MILPERS (met 49 percent and 64 percent of the JB-COLS, respectively).¹⁴ Joint base personnel met some but not all of the JB-COLS for the 12 functional categories across the 12 installations.¹⁵

Personnel at the three installations reported that the decisions made and actions taken by higher Service-level offices were a major reason why they did not meet the standards.

Common Reasons Cited in the CPVF for Unmet Performance Standards

Personnel at JB Anacostia–Bolling, JB Lewis–McChord, and JB Elmendorf–Richardson cited funding and manpower constraints and higher Service-level actions as some of the primary reasons for not meeting the JB-COLS for facilities investment and MILPERS-related functions.¹⁶ Other reasons commonly reported in the CPVF included personnel turnover and new hire inexperience, incorrect or untimely closeout of service work, and Service members' late submission of paperwork needed to process their orders.

For example, personnel at JB Anacostia–Bolling, JB Lewis–McChord, and JB Elmendorf–Richardson reported that their ability to meet the JB-COLS was limited by:

- a lack of resources to sustain installation facilities (like the manpower levels needed to consistently perform lower-priority work, such as routine repairs and maintenance, and funding to purchase needed supplies and critical long-lead parts);

¹⁴ CPVF data, as reported and modified by the OSD Joint Basing Office. Values are based on rounded, aggregate totals for all 12 joint bases; actual amounts reported in the CPVF for a single installation may differ.

¹⁵ CPVF data, as reported and modified by the OSD Joint Basing Office for the fourth quarter reporting period for FY 2015 to FY 2017.

¹⁶ Rationale reported in the CPVF for the three installations, covering the FY 2015 to FY 2018 (through the second quarter) reporting periods.

- factors unrelated to the joint base construct (like Service-wide personnel shortages, hiring freezes, or manning reductions stemming from the Federal budget sequestration or a lack of funding due to continuing resolutions); and
- time frames of higher Service-level offices to complete actions that were needed by base personnel to execute support (like releasing short-notice assignments, processing paperwork needed to generate enlisted orders, or resolving technical difficulties with a new personnel system and its associated evaluation forms).

Joint base personnel explained that there are no repercussions for unmet JB-COLS, and that the reporting of performance standards and other metrics into the CPVF is a time-consuming process that rarely results in additional benefits or resources to the installation. For example, an official tasked with preparing the annual CPVF manpower reports at JB Elmendorf–Richardson stated that she must first assess the Service-unique classifications of over 3,000 positions on the installation, then reorganize them under position categories set by the OSD for CPVF reporting purposes. The official explained that the Services do not track data based on the OSD categories, yet existing guidance requires that she use the categories to describe the workforce, regardless of whether the positions actually exist on the installation. In addition, she stated that usefulness of the manpower data submitted to OSD is further limited because it is only a snapshot in time and does not always reflect the actual manpower levels or breakouts on the base.

Joint Base Personnel Did Not Always Execute Other Terms Required by the MOA

Personnel at JB Anacostia–Bolling and JB Lewis–McChord executed support inconsistent with the joint base organization and responsibilities specified in the MOA and outlined in joint base program guidance.

Personnel at JB Anacostia–Bolling and JB Lewis–McChord executed support inconsistent with the joint base organization and responsibilities specified in the MOA and outlined in joint base program guidance. MOAs define

the terms of relationships agreed to between the lead and supported Components. MOAs also include separate annexes for functional support categories and other joint base aspects (like command authority, real property, resource transfers, and the joint base organizational structure), to further define Component responsibilities, roles, and other supplemental information. Through the MOA, lead Components agree to plan, program, budget, and execute budgetary resources for the transferred support functions and real property (except modernization and new mission requirements) to support the missions of all DoD Components and

agencies on the installation.¹⁷ Unless an approved variance or deviation applies, the lead Component is required to execute installation support tasks for all transferred functions, in accordance with the MOA and program guidance.¹⁸

JB Anacostia-Bolling Personnel Did Not Always Perform Responsibilities Outlined in the MOA to Plan and Provide for Common Installation Support

JB Anacostia–Bolling personnel did not always adhere to the responsibilities outlined in the MOA to plan and provide for common installation support when the functional support responsibilities under airfield operations (an installation support function outlined in Annex Q-1 of the MOA) overlapped with the responsibilities to provide support under the MOA's other covered functions.¹⁹ While the MOA did not cite any variances that specified installation support responsibilities retained by supported Military Department organizations on the installation, joint base personnel acknowledged that common support tasks for airfield operations (like hangar sustainment and repair, perimeter lighting, and aircraft ground services) had not always been budgeted, planned, or executed to support a Marine Corps detachment on the installation.²⁰ Joint base personnel explained that this gap in support resulted from interpretive differences over Annex Q-1's supplemental information on Component responsibilities between officials from the installation's public works department and the Marine Corps Installations Command.²¹ Joint base personnel believed the MOA excluded them from providing any airfield operations support to the detachment (since this installation support function was also considered a mission function), whereas Marine Corps officials believed that certain support tasks still applied.

While the DoD did not intend for the common delivery of installation support at joint bases to impact the command and control of mission functions or the operating activities of either Component, the lead Component could still be

¹⁷ Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) memorandum, "Issuance of the Resources Management Supplemental Guidance for Implementing and Operating a Joint Base," April 17, 2008 (personnel and financial resources management supplemental guidance). OSD modified this guidance on February 6, 2009, to clarify and modify the functional transfer budget exhibit that was used to identify personnel and financial resources for covered installation support functions.

¹⁸ Mission-funded support was not exempt from transfer, but could be retained by the supported Component through deviations and variances, which must be specifically approved by DoD leadership and documented in the MOA.

¹⁹ Annex Q covers operational mission services, and consists of airfield operations (Annex Q-1), port services (Annex Q-2), and small arms range management (Annex Q-3). The JBIG defines airfield operations and arranges support into three functional subgroups—airfield support, airfield systems and equipment maintenance, and aircraft services. Covered support includes air traffic control, weather services, airfield management services, maintenance of airfield and air traffic control systems and equipment, and aircraft ground services.

²⁰ The Marine Corps detachment is classified as an "other supported" Component on the installation, receiving support through the Navy and Air Force signed MOA.

²¹ The Joint Base Partnership Council included other agreements within Annex Q-1 to provide additional information on the Components' responsibilities regarding airfield operations. The supplemental information stated that installation support did not include operation of the heliport located within a Marine Corps detachment's enclave because it was operated exclusively by the detachment to support its mission.

responsible for providing support if the responsibilities of a mission function overlapped with those of another installation support function that the lead Component was still responsible for, such as the upkeep and management of facilities (facilities operation and facilities investment functions outlined in Annex B and D of the joint base MOA). During the joint base transition (and unless an exception applied), supported Components transferred ownership of all their facilities, like installation support facilities, common infrastructure, and mission-based facilities, to the lead Component as part of the real property transfer. Since a facility now appeared on the property books for the lead Component's Service and increased that Service's budget authorization, it became the lead Component's responsibility to sustain it (regardless of the facility's use designation). For example, airfield operations support under the MOA, Annex Q-1, includes things like perimeter lighting, airfield repair, aircraft ground services (such as sweeping and snow operations), and hanger sustainment and repair. These functions can overlap with:

- pavement clearance services and utilities functions under the MOA, Annex B (facilities operation support), and
- sustainment efforts for all facilities—including the buildings, pavements, and lighting located on an airfield, under the MOA, Annex D (facilities investment support).

The public works officer at JB Anacostia–Bolling stated that the interpretive differences between his department and the Marine Corps had resulted in inconsistent support to the detachment. He explained that the Commander, Navy Installations Command funded a base operating support contract to augment support to the detachment but noted that any needed repair item over \$2,500 must be funded through the installation's local sustainment funds, which are insufficient to cover both the Marine Corps enclave and the installation. He explained that the public works department still tries to provide some airfield operations functions to the detachment, but since the funds are coming out of local sustainment funds, it is at the expense of base installation support and other mission areas.

JB Lewis–McChord Personnel Did Not Comply With the Established Joint Base Structure

Personnel at JB Lewis–McChord did not adhere to the MOA’s joint base organizational structure, or to the command authorities and responsibilities outlined in program guidance and

Personnel at JB Lewis–McChord did not adhere to the MOA’s joint base organizational structure, or to the command authorities and responsibilities outlined in program guidance and agreed to by the Army and Air Force Vice Chiefs of Staff.

agreed to by the Army and Air Force Vice Chiefs of Staff. When joint basing was first established, the OSD outlined the roles and responsibilities of the joint base commander and the deputy joint base commander in the JBIG, JBIG supplemental guidance, and the standardized MOA template. The OSD dedicated these positions to the delivery of installation support at the joint base. Joint bases are required to establish these leadership positions within the joint base organizational structure depicted in the MOA. A member of the lead Component fills the joint base commander position. He or she is considered to be the installation commander, with the authority and control over the real property making up the joint base. The joint base commander has responsibility for installation management and support functions on the joint base. The deputy joint base commander position is filled by a member of the supported Component. The deputy commander serves as second in command to the joint base commander, assisting in the planning, management, and delivery of installation support. The deputy commander is also the senior supported Component commander for the command authorities retained by the supported Component, as outlined in Annex A of the joint base MOA.²²

The JB Lewis–McChord MOA established the two leadership positions within the joint base command organization, giving command authority and responsibility for the transferred support functions to the joint base commander, as required. However, while no variances were documented in the MOA to permit deviation from the joint base structure or to the program’s implementing guidance, the deputy joint base commander’s responsibilities also included functions to support the Air Force mission. In addition, the joint base commander and deputy joint base commander positions were renamed to joint base garrison commander and deputy joint base garrison commander (which are not outlined in the MOA or in joint base implementing guidance), and the joint base commander title, responsibilities and authorities were realigned to a more senior Army mission commander on the installation.

²² In June 2011, the Army and Air Force Vice Chiefs of Staff approved a revision to the MOA to clarify the joint base commander’s role in the installation’s command organization. Specifically, the MOA was modified to read “the Army will appoint an officer in the grade of Colonel (O-6) to serve as joint base commander and assume the role of installation commander. As the installation commander, the joint base commander is responsible for providing installation services based on the priorities of the Army and Air Force Senior Service Component Commanders.”

Installation officials explained that this occurred because Service officials opted to follow normal Service structures over those established for joint basing. For example, an official administering the JB Lewis–McChord MOA explained that when the Air Force reorganized its installation workforce in preparation of joint basing, it became apparent that some of the functions performed by Air Force organizations were inherently mission in nature. However, instead of breaking apart the traditional Air Force construct, he explained that the Air Force decided to retain all functional capability under its historical formation, transferring it to the joint base construct. As a result, the deputy joint base commander is responsible for delivering both installation support, and support typically categorized as mission support (like fueling support provided by the logistics squadron).²³

Although the Army’s regulation on command policy states that the DoD’s program guidance will prevail over conflicts with the regulation, and even acknowledges that senior mission commanders are not always the installation commander at Army installations, there is still uncertainty within the DoD as to who should fill the role of the JB Lewis–McChord installation commander.²⁴ There are conflicting interpretations at the joint base and within the Army on the MOA requirements regarding the authority of two Army commanders residing on the base, and Federal, OSD, and Army criteria. Some officials believe the position should be filled by a colonel—the Army official who is specifically identified in the MOA—whereas others believe it should be filled by the senior mission commander, the Army official who typically assumes command over Army installations.²⁵ As a result of the interpretive differences, the senior mission commander assumed the role of installation commander and adopted the typical Army construct at JB Lewis–McChord, delegating some, but not all of the installation commander’s authorities listed in the MOA, back to a colonel.

Differing Service cultures, business processes, and command and control structures can create unique relationship challenges at a joint base.

Differing Service cultures, business processes, and command and control structures can create unique relationship challenges at a joint base. The Joint Basing Handbook explains that

²³ Usually, the wing that performs the primary mission on an Air Force installation also maintains and operates the base. Installation support is structured similarly to the operational wing organization, where tasks are completed concurrently, and a clear distinction between base and operational mission support tasks may not always exist.

²⁴ DUSD(I&E) memorandum, “Department of Defense Supplemental Guidance for Implementing and Operating a Joint Base,” April 16, 2008 (command authority supplemental guidance), states Service policies govern the appointment and assumption of command within the respective joint base Components.

Army Regulation 600-20, “Personnel-General, Army Command Policy” (November 6, 2014). The regulation implements various DoD instructions and directives, and prescribes the policy and responsibility of command.

²⁵ As described in the command authority supplemental guidance, the senior mission commander is typically the installation commander at Army installations. The commander will often delegate authority for installation management and support functions to the garrison commander in order to focus more attention on the mission.

while installation and mission command organizations, such as a mission support group or a sustainment brigade, may intermix at traditional Service installations, they are kept separate at joint bases.²⁶ This helps ensure no actual or perceived favoritism exists from the installation command to mission commanders from the same Service. However, personnel across the joint base program identified the dual-hatting of commanders and the command authority concerns at JB Lewis–McChord as known and ongoing issues, citing a range of impacts that either have occurred or could occur at the installation, such as:

- competing priorities with two separate chains of command over the deputy joint base commander;
- an environment permitting the majority of effort to be placed on mission priorities over those of the installation;
- outdated or improperly issued installation policies and plans due to postponing needed updates until after the command authority disagreement is resolved, or by having a commander that may not have the proper authority sign and approve them;
- degraded relationships and working synergies between the Service Components; and
- an actual or perceived lack of impartiality when managing and prioritizing resources and services to support the needs of different or competing missions at the installation.

Installation personnel believed that the OSD Joint Basing Office was slow and did not always take action to address known and ongoing issues or concerns at the installations. To avoid further confusion on command authority, the Army and Air Force Vice Chiefs of Staff should coordinate with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment to resolve the disagreement of command authority at JB Lewis-McChord. Further, the OSD should keep the joint base community informed of the status of items under JMOS review and any effort to improve the program.

JB Lewis–McChord Personnel Disregarded Established Processes in the Transfer and Delivery of Logistics Support Functions

Following a series of Army-wide logistics realignments, personnel tasked as the logistics support provider for JB Lewis–McChord did not adhere to MOA terms covering the transfer and delivery of logistics support. In 2014, the Army and Air Force Vice Chiefs of Staff approved Change 4 to the joint base MOA to support the Army’s efforts to more effectively align logistics support across the Army.

²⁶ The Joint Basing Handbook, approved by the Service Senior Installation Management Group principals on May 19, 2015, and modified on September 15, 2015.

The MOA change permitted the realignment and transfer of the installation's directorate of logistics from the Army Installation Management Command to the Army Materiel Command, which would then transform into a logistics readiness center.²⁷ The change incorporated the transfer agreement between the two Army Commands into the joint base MOA, and its overarching framework for the delivery and transfer of logistics functions. The logistics organization remained under the operational control of the joint base commander, but was assigned to the Army Materiel Command for the purposes of receiving support, and locally, to the Army Sustainment Command's 404th Army Field Support Brigade.

In part, the Army Commands agreed that the DoD's joint base program guidance generally has precedence over Service regulations and instructions, and that the Army Materiel Command would:

- comply with the joint base MOA and program guidance (which requires significant changes to be approved by the JMOS and incorporated into the MOA, like those affecting support levels, responsibilities to provide support, resourcing, or manpower),
- only use Air Force provided resources for logistics installation support services,
- meet all unique support requirements at the installation,
- support unique requirements identified by senior Component commanders, and
- obtain JMOS approval for any personnel adjustments to the former directorate's table of distribution and authorities, or changes to the level of support provided.

However, while Change 4 to the JB Lewis–McChord MOA remained in effect, the 404th Army Field Support Brigade stopped following the MOA and program guidance, and began to unilaterally implement an Army Sustainment Command operations order at the joint base to support an Army-wide initiative to centralize and standardize logistics support across its installations. The brigade indicated that functions not meeting the Army definition of installation support would no longer be supported, and either ceased or planned to stop providing certain types of support previously provided under the MOA. The brigade moved to divest operational control of the installation's logistics readiness center from the joint base commander, and transformed the center into part of, and a subordinate to, the 404th Army Field Support Battalion. Changes to command relationships and the realignment of manpower and other resources were planned or made, without conferring with the Air Force, or properly vetting through and obtaining the JMOS' approval to make such changes.

²⁷ The Air Force's 627th Logistics Readiness Squadron combined with the installation's directorate of logistics when JB Lewis–McChord was established under the Army Installation Management Command.

For example, shortly after the 404th Army Field Support Brigade assumed the role of logistics support provider in 2018, two memorandums were issued concerning the future of logistics support services at JB Lewis–McChord. The 404th Army Field Support Battalion issued one memorandum that stated the Army would no longer fund cellphone or cable accounts in support of Air Force logistics efforts, and directed that any such support contract or account be canceled and closed immediately. The brigade issued another memorandum to notify the Joint Base Partnership Council of upcoming and potential changes to logistics support services provided by the battalion. In part:

- The Army would only fund computer requirements determined by the support battalion to be installation support, and requested computers used in excess of that to be turned in. The computers in question directly supported the execution of Air Force logistics, and had transferred from the squadron to the Army in 2010 during the transition to joint basing. Installation personnel voiced concern over how the battalion performed its assessment, as computers actively supporting the Air Force would no longer be available and replacements may not be provided. In addition, personnel stated that the battalion had not maintained system and security requirements to keep the majority of those transferred computers connected to the Air Force network and functional to support Air Force operations.
- The brigade had conducted a personnel review and determined that several positions were not directly related to installation support. The memorandum stated that these positions, or other positions identified by the brigade in the future, may be reassigned to better support efforts on the base. Installation personnel stated that the support battalion either planned to or had subsequently realigned several key civilians who had extensive knowledge of Air Force logistics, systems, and processes to the battalion—like a senior logistics manager, a resources advisor, and a computer systems management specialist.
- The Army Sustainment Command spent about \$25,000 to provide Airmen with personnel protective equipment for FY 2018, and the brigade would no longer continue to do so, citing it as a unit-level responsibility. Installation personnel stated that the Army had always budgeted and paid for the equipment for the Air Force, and such an abrupt stop would leave Airmen without a consistent supply of safety related items to complete daily installation and mission support requirements.

Personnel from the Air Force, 404th Army Field Support Battalion, and other Army organizations that either administered the MOA or provided functional base support, stated that the disparity in support levels occurred because the Services interpreted the meaning of installation support differently. Personnel from the

brigade and battalion viewed the logistics support services provided by their predecessor to be in excess of the MOA requirements. However, the Air Force and other Army personnel on the installation stated that the Air Force had “paid” for these Services when they transferred resources to the Army to establish the joint base. They explained that within the Air Force, installation support and mission support are consolidated under one squadron to provide a single mechanism of support for its units. Because of this integration, personnel indicated that all funding, equipment, and civilian positions had transferred from the Air Force’s 627th Logistics Readiness Squadron to the Army when the joint base was established. Since the Army now controlled all the resources, the directorate of logistics provided both functions to the Air Force. The Vice Chiefs of Staff for the Army and the Air Force should resolve the disagreement on the transfer and delivery of logistics support functions.

Joint Base Personnel Did Not Always Update the MOA With Significant Changes

Personnel at JB Anacostia–Bolling, JB Lewis–McChord, and JB Elmendorf–Richardson used the OSD’s standardized template to formalize and document the joint basing agreement, and generally included all the required elements in the respective MOAs. However, JB Anacostia–Bolling and JB Lewis–McChord personnel did not always update the MOA with significant changes impacting the agreed-upon terms. According to the MOA template, any requests for changes, modifications, or amendments to the MOA must be in writing, and are subject to approval (by the designated JMOS tier based on type of change). Furthermore, in the April 2010 Business Rules Memorandum, the OSD outlined the types of changes that can be made to the MOA and the processes established to formalize those changes.²⁸ According to the business rules, proposed MOA changes are to be documented on a standardized change template, then routed through select JMOS tiers for review. After the proposed change is approved by the tier designated as the final signature authority for the specific type of change, the change template is appended to the original MOA as part of the official document of record.

Personnel at JB Anacostia–Bolling and JB Lewis–McChord did not always obtain the appropriate approval to make, and update the MOA with, significant changes to the joint base organization and responsibilities at the installation before acting on them.

Personnel at JB Anacostia–Bolling and JB Lewis–McChord did not always obtain the appropriate approval to make, and update the MOA with, significant changes to the joint base

²⁸ During January 2019, the OSD issued supplemental guidance to the April 2010 Business Rules memorandum to expand upon the MOA change submission and arbitration processes.

organization and responsibilities at the installation before acting on them. According to the April 2010 Business Rules Memorandum, the JBIG, MOA template, and Senior Installations Management Group charter require significant proposed changes to the MOA be reviewed and approved through the JMOS.²⁹ Instead, changes to the base organization, command responsibilities, and covered support outlined in the MOA and joint base guidance were implemented at JB Lewis–McChord without the proper approval, or formal revisions to the MOA to reflect changes impacting the joint base commander, deputy commander, and delivery of logistics support. JB Lewis–McChord personnel explained that deputy joint base commanders had always performed additional duties outside the MOA to further the Air Force mission at the installation, and stated that they could not find any requirement in the supplemental guidance prohibiting the dual-hatting of commanders, so they believed an update was not required.³⁰ The Joint Base Commander should work with the JMOS to assess the need for a formal variance to permit the dual-hatting of the deputy joint base commander position at JB Lewis–McChord.

Furthermore, Army organizations on JB Lewis–McChord involved the JMOS only after exhausting Service avenues regarding the designation of the joint base commander and the transfer and delivery of logistics support. As noted by joint base personnel, the Army officials did not provide joint base personnel administering the MOA, the Air Force, or the JMOS with adequate time to assess and comment on the proposed MOA changes before acting on them. Joint base personnel explained that actions are often taken by Service organizations and officials that are not bound by the MOA, and therefore, do not view the MOA change process as a required step that must be completed before executing actions. Joint base personnel added that the Army Sustainment Command did not postpone implementation efforts to resolve the logistics support disagreement because the command believed a delay could threaten timely completion of the Army-wide transformation model.

Joint base personnel explained that actions are often taken by Service organizations and officials that are not bound by the MOA, and therefore, do not view the MOA change process as a required step that must be completed before executing actions.

²⁹ As described in the JBIG and the April 2010 Business Rules Memorandum, significant proposed changes will first be coordinated through the Joint Base Partnership Council and the Intermediate Command Summit before being routed to the Senior Installations Management Group for review. The group will review proposed changes to ensure compliance with existing joint base guidance and with Service policies and objectives. After review, it will either approve the proposed change as written, forward it to the appropriate signature authority, return it for revision and resubmission through the JMOS, or disapprove it. Proposed changes that affect existing policy must be reviewed and approved by the Installations Capabilities Council.

³⁰ The requirement for the joint base commander to be fully dedicated to installation support is plainly stated in the JBIG. However, the requirement for the deputy joint base commander to do the same is inferred through the text of multiple program guidance, like the JBIG; MILPERS supplemental guidance issuances; and the Joint Basing Handbook, approved by the Service Senior Installation Management Group principals on May 19, 2015, and modified on September 15, 2015.

At JB Anacostia–Bolling, personnel did not submit a proposed MOA change to the JMOS to obtain approval and formally revise the MOA with updated agreements on airfield operations support for a Marine Corps detachment on the installation. Joint base personnel explained that the level of required support was often a recurring disagreement between installation and Marine Corps officials. In the past, agreements were reached, but were either short-lived or never finalized. For the most recent disagreement, joint base personnel explained that they worked with the Marine Corps (and informally with some JMOS representatives) to create an inter-Service support agreement that outlines support to the detachment. However, an installation support agreement that exists outside of a joint base MOA goes against the purpose of a MOA—to define the installation support relationship between Components and the requirements to maintain it. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the Navy and Marine Corps reached a formal agreement on the support to provide to the enclave. Discussions in the Senior Joint Base Working Group’s September 2019 meeting minutes indicated that the issue still needed clarification, and efforts to resolve the issue may have been postponed in anticipation of the Air Force’s transition to the lead Service Component on the installation.

Service Decisions and Differences, and a Lack of Joint Base Awareness, Consideration, and Operational Guidance Across the DoD Limited the Ability to Comply With Joint Base MOAs

Although the DoD developed processes to update and execute the MOA and report and address joint base concerns, these processes were not always effective. Installation personnel’s ability to comply with joint base MOAs and effectively execute installation support at JB Anacostia–Bolling, JB Lewis–McChord, and JB Elmendorf–Richardson was limited by Service-based decisions and operational differences. Throughout the joint base community, officials we interviewed also reported that DoD personnel generally did not know about or understand the joint base construct, or have operational guidance available to support joint bases. Furthermore, DoD officials measured joint base performance against standards that the installations were not always resourced by the Services to meet.

As described in the Joint Basing Handbook, the DoD envisioned that combining installations into joint bases would create opportunities to share policies and practices between the Services, resulting in the identification and adoption of best practices. In a December 2014 memorandum to the Services, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics underscored the importance of cross-Service collaboration, asking the Services to continue to consolidate

transferred support functions (where feasible), support joint base staff in efforts to develop hybrid solutions to common challenges, reinforce the joint bases' ability to operate as a single community, and to institutionalize joint basing.³¹

The memorandum stated that joint bases should be an integral part of each Service's programs; however, it noted that after 4 years of fully transitioning to joint basing, the 12 installations were still challenged by a general lack of knowledge on joint basing throughout the DoD. The memorandum stressed that Service staff need to fully understand the ways joint base activities are resourced, executed, and evaluated and incorporate them into their policies and procedures. It noted that improving efficiencies and effectiveness was difficult; at times it may require breaking from the standard way of doing things.

Now, 10 years later, joint bases are still not fully integrated into the DoD. Officials at joint bases face a lack of general awareness and familiarity throughout the Services related to joint basing, have difficulty obtaining approval from higher Service-level offices for actions to support the base that do not align with Service policy or are outside of Service norms, or are not always considered in Service-wide decisions and processes. The Service Vice Chiefs of Staff should clarify the order of precedence between the MOA, joint base policy, and Service policies for joint bases. They should also develop procedures to consider joint bases in Service-specific actions, identify and implement best practices, conduct a review of all joint bases, and establish training or issue guidance to ensure joint base personnel comply with established processes.

Now, 10 years later, joint bases are still not fully integrated into the DoD.

Lack of Joint Base Awareness and Consideration in the DoD

It was commonly believed throughout the joint base program that the Services have not always been fully committed to joint basing, treating joint bases like their non-joint counterparts (without consideration of unique joint base aspects), and that the DoD and Services have not taken the necessary actions to institutionalize the joint base program and help ensure its success.

Lack of Familiarity With the DoD Joint Basing Program and Continuity of Personnel

Personnel performing command, administrative, or functional support tasks at the three joint bases indicated that Service personnel at the installation, major command, and action officer levels often lacked familiarity with the program

³¹ Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics memorandum, "Joint Basing," December 2, 2014 (OSD Joint Basing Memorandum).

and a working knowledge of the program's processes and governance structure. Furthermore, while the OSD Joint Basing Office offered an annual, one-day orientation course, personnel filling command or administrative support positions at the installations indicated that this course, or any experiences gained while at the installation, were often the first and only times personnel were exposed to the joint base concept in the DoD.³² Some officials even acknowledged that they did not always feel prepared to take on the unique management challenges of a joint base, or were uncomfortable departing their position and passing it off to someone else.

Furthermore, personnel throughout the program identified a lack of continuity or knowledge transfer and the need for continuous education among the joint base workforce. For example, installation command and administrative support officials explained that the learning curve was steep; once Service members became knowledgeable on the joint base program and more comfortable in their duties, it was time for them to be reassigned and the learning curve would start over for someone else. Some officials indicated that this was especially frustrating when there was little overlap between the incoming and departing command, and when the joint base commander and deputy joint base commander shared the same or similar appointment timetables. Furthermore, while joint base program personnel acknowledged that joint base success is largely due to working relationships, there were no transition plans, processes or other mechanisms in place at the three installations to maintain any success, progress, or knowledge achieved once a person (military or civilian) leaves his or her position.

Lack of Consideration of the Joint Base Program

Because joint basing represents only a small portion of the DoD's installations, personnel at the three joint bases believed that the Services lacked subject matter experts knowledgeable of the program, or that the Services were less likely to modify Service policies and processes to provide consideration of joint bases. Furthermore, personnel across the program cited a lack of understanding and accounting of the Services' cultural and fundamental differences in DoD and Service-wide processes or decisions, which impacted compliance with the MOA and the ability to effectively execute installation support at the joint bases. They identified a range of impacted areas, including opportunities to consolidate support and realize efficiencies, Service-wide resourcing decisions, and the ability to issue joint personnel awards.

³² The OSD Joint Basing Office hosted an annual, one-day orientation course on policies, procedures, and command authorities to newly assigned joint base commanders, joint base deputy commanders, and other personnel working joint base-unique issues at the installations.

Limited Opportunities to Consolidate Efforts and Realize Efficiencies

Multiple factors can impact the extent to which support functions of two or more Services can be combined. The level of consolidation varies from function to function. At times, functions must remain separate, or only minimal efficiencies may be realized. For example, there is not always a single, DoD-wide process or system in place that installation personnel can use to perform installation support. Installation personnel must rely on the Services' systems, which are not always compatible with one another, or on operating processes and requirements, which are often not standardized across the Services. Efforts to consolidate functions can also be limited by the shared or retained authorities of the supported Component. Unconsolidated support efforts can result in installation personnel duplicating work or devising workarounds to meet mission and policy requirements and can decrease the opportunity for efficiencies. Examples of support functions joint base program personnel identified with limited opportunities for consolidation include information technology services management, facilities investment, MILPERS, installation chaplain ministries, financial management, and military and family support.

Joint Base Resources Tied to Service Standards

DoD officials measured joint base performance against standards that the installations did not always have the resources to meet. When joint basing was first established, the DoD intended that installations would be fully resourced to meet the JB-COLS, the official performance metric used to measure installation support at joint bases. JB-COLS represent the highest performance standard used by any of the Services to help ensure that adequate levels of installation support are provided. This would sometimes require additional funding and manpower from the lead Component's Service to meet these higher standards, above what it typically provided to its own Service installations. However, joint bases are no longer funded to meet these higher performance standards and are only resourced to meet the Service standards of the lead Component.

For example, JB Anacostia–Bolling personnel explained that one reason why they could not meet all of the minimum performance standards for facilities investment–related functions was that the Navy used regional installation support contracts to supplement the efforts taken at the different installations within a region. Joint base personnel explained that these regional contracts did not consider unique joint base aspects or the JB-COLS, and sustained installations only to the Navy's performance standards.

Improvements Needed to Better Manage Joint Base Facilities

Personnel at the installation, OSD, and Service levels all agreed that executing the facilities investment support functions was one of the most challenging, and longest-standing issues of joint basing. When joint basing was first established, only the operations and maintenance portion of the supported Component's sustainment, restoration, and modernization funds transferred to the lead Component. This meant that while a mission support-designated facility transferred to the lead Component, the supported Component would still be responsible for funding and providing for any modernization work.³³ In 2008, the OSD issued supplemental guidance to the JBIG that provided additional guidance on the facilities investment support functions.³⁴ After the joint base transition, the OSD intended to issue additional facilities investment guidance to address the specifics of the non-transfer of funds and mission support modernization projects. In July 2020, the OSD rescinded and reissued the facilities investment supplement.³⁵

JB-COLS Are Not Aligned to Available Resources

Until recently, the DoD remained committed to the JB-COLS, despite having fewer resources than planned to meet them. According to the April 2010 Business Rules Memorandum, before any proposed change to the JB-COLS output standards can take effect, the changes must first be documented on a standardized MOA change template; routed, reviewed, and approved through the appropriate JMOS tiers; and appended to the joint base MOA.

In January 2013, the OSD acknowledged that joint bases were operating in a reduced funding environment and, at a minimum, expected lead Components to service any unique commitments documented in the MOA.³⁶ The Services stopped allocating additional resources to meet the JB-COLS, and joint and non-joint bases began to share in the same funding levels and reductions under the lead Component's Service. Service personnel cited impacts from the Federal budget sequestration, continuing resolutions, and other fiscal realities as some of the funding challenges shaping this decision.

³³ According to the DUSD(I&E) memorandum, "Department of Defense Supplemental Guidance for Implementing and Operating a Joint Base," April 15, 2008 (facilities investment supplemental guidance), the lead Component is responsible for all sustainment and restoration work (regardless of a facility's designation), as well as for the modernization of installation support facilities and common infrastructure. It is the responsibility of the Component generating the requirement for all new construction work and modernization work on mission support facilities.

The JBIG defines modernization as improvements to facility inventories, including the alteration of facilities to implement a new, higher standard (including regulatory changes); to accommodate new functions; or to replace building components that typically last more than 50 years (such as foundations and structural components). Modernization does not include recurring sustainment tasks.

³⁴ The facilities investment supplemental guidance was first issued on April 15, 2008, then modified by the OSD on March 25, 2009, to clarify the requirement for and use of facility condition ratings.

³⁵ Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment memorandum, "Facilities Investment Supplemental Guidance for Operating a Joint Base," July 23, 2020.

³⁶ DUSD(I&E) memorandum, "Operating Joint Bases in a Reduced Funding Environment," January 4, 2013.

The DoD's Planned Transition to Service Standards Will Not Address All Joint Base Concerns and Challenges

In response to continued reductions in funding, the OSD formally announced the Senior Joint Base Working Group's decision to transition from the JB-COLS and the CPVF to the lead Component's Service standards and reporting tools.³⁷ Lead Components are still required to provide the same 44 installation support functions in accordance with the JBIG and individual MOAs. However, since the transition will impact the output standards, each individual base transferred and revised performance standards must first be approved by the JMOS and incorporated into the MOA.³⁸

According to the OSD June 2017 Transition Memorandum, the Services unanimously agreed to the transition, and were to publish a MOA change by March 31, 2019, for each joint base where they are the lead Component.³⁹ However, as of July 2020, the Services had yet to transition to lead Service standards and reporting tools.⁴⁰ Personnel from the Service offices designated as joint base leads explained that comparisons between JB-COLS and Service standards are a complicated and time-consuming process.⁴¹ Service officials noted that new Service standards have to be created and that each Service must agree to the new standards before transitioning to them. Officials noted that ongoing program reviews across the DoD and changes in Service organizations and metrics contributed to the delay in transitioning.

While the transition may result in more favorable performance ratings once it is complete, through use of more subjective assessments and the realignment of performance metrics to available resources, it will not resolve all the challenges and inefficiencies experienced with joint basing, such as the issues discussed in this report. Furthermore, while some personnel at the three installations we visited believed that the transition could provide more useful assessments and allow for more informative comparisons between joint and non-joint installations, other personnel we interviewed stated that little value would be gained at the installations. Joint base personnel explained that performance standards do not capture or measure all the challenges experienced at a joint base. Some stated that future improvements in ratings could potentially provide false impressions that an installation's problems have been resolved.

³⁷ ASD(EI&E) memorandum, "Transitioning Joint Base Reporting Tools," June 5, 2017 (OSD Transition Memorandum).

³⁸ April 2010 Business Rules Memorandum.

³⁹ Service performance standards are resource-informed. They are based on funding levels, with multi-tiered standards. JB-COLS are fixed standards. If the joint base does not fully meet a standard in its entirety, then the rating for that standard is "not met." For example, if a JB-COLS metric requires compliance 90 percent of the time, and joint base personnel meet that standard 89 percent of the time when executing installation support, then that metric is "not met."

⁴⁰ The Air Force plans to use Air Force common output level standards (AF-COLS) in its AF-COLS Reporting Tool, the Army plans to use common levels of support in its Installation Status Report information system, and the Navy does not have a comparable system and will continue to use the CPVF until an alternative is available.

⁴¹ The Service-level action offices for joint basing are the Department of Army Headquarters, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management; Commander, Navy Installations Command; and Headquarters Air Force, Office of the Director of Civil Engineers.

Processes to Report and Address Joint Base Concerns Were Not Always Effective

Although the DoD developed processes to address joint base concerns, these processes were not always effective. Existing processes were sometimes cumbersome, untimely, unclear, and dependent upon Service involvement.

Although the DoD developed processes to address joint base concerns, these processes were not always effective. Existing processes were sometimes cumbersome, untimely, unclear, and dependent upon Service

involvement. Furthermore, the JMOS did not always provide sufficient guidance to effectively perform these processes, and did not always have mechanisms in place to resolve disagreements between lead and supported Components and instances of inaction by joint base personnel. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment should further clarify overall joint base processes, roles and responsibilities, and Service-specific actions that require coordination and agreement with the JMOS.

Improvements Needed in Joint Base Governance and Oversight

While the DoD established a governing framework (JMOS) and issued implementation guidance to initially transition to joint basing (the JBIG and its supplemental guidance), the DoD did not always update its governance and oversight processes

The DoD did not always update its governance and oversight processes to account for the operation and management of joint bases; identify and resolve instances of inaction, unresolved concerns, or challenges caused by differing Service cultures and procedures; or help ensure that joint base MOAs were current and adhered to.

to account for the operation and management of joint bases; identify and resolve instances of inaction, unresolved concerns, or challenges caused by differing Service cultures and procedures; or help ensure that joint base MOAs were current and adhered to. Joint base personnel acknowledged that they underutilized the JMOS, citing a general lack of joint base operational awareness within the JMOS as well as a lack of urgency and accountability to resolve issues at the installations. For example, the OSD last updated the JBIG on July 1, 2010, and its supplemental guidance memorandums, designed to implement solutions for issues not fully covered in the JBIG, are also largely outdated. In addition, available joint base guidance focuses primarily on the consolidation of individual installations and the initial efforts to implement joint basing, not on efforts to operate and maintain established joint bases.

Further, in the absence of specific joint base policy and guidance, installation personnel follow the Service policies of the lead Component. However, joint base program personnel explained that the Services have fundamentally different mission sets, which impact how the Services view real property and installation management. Program personnel explained that this often leads to ambiguity, frustration, and misunderstanding at the installation level because procedural differences (such as those between a centralized and decentralized funding approach) may not be understood by joint base personnel. Further, procedural differences may not be considered and documented by both Services. For example, personnel performing functional support tasks at JB Elmendorf–Richardson explained that the Army uses a decentralized approach to fund and provide installation support, giving its installation commanders more discretion on how funds are spent to support the (largely deploying) fighting force. Since the Air Force views its installations as part of an overall weapons system, installation commanders are not given as much discretion, and funding and installation support are centralized at higher Air Force levels to better support the overall system.

According to OSD Joint Basing Office officials, the OSD began drafting a DoD Directive and a DoD Instruction that would promote joint base sustainment operations and clarify problem areas and processes. However, efforts to issue updated guidance, like the DoD Directive, were postponed pending DoD-wide assessments on the program and completion of other reform initiatives. Although the update to the Directive was postponed, the OSD formally issued two policy updates to begin realigning the focus of program guidance from joint base implementation to sustained operations. In January 2019, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment revised the JMOS submission process to better streamline and resolve proposed MOA changes and other joint base issues; and in July 2020, reissued the facilities investment supplemental guidance.⁴²

OSD and Service-Level Decisions and Actions Impact Joint Base Operations

Service-based decisions can impact how a joint base operates. Lack of relevant operating guidance and processes; exclusion of joint base consideration in Service processes and decisions; and non-adherence to MOA terms can inhibit operations and break down the joint base construct and efficiencies joint basing was intended to provide. These factors can also hamper relations between joint basing officials, and potentially marginalize the input, needs, and mission of the supported Component.

⁴² Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment memorandum, “Supplemental Guidance for Processing Joint Base Issues and Joint Base Memorandum of Agreement Changes,” January 3, 2019.

Management Actions Taken to Address Disagreement on Support to Marine Corps Detachment at JB Anacostia–Bolling

In June 2020, the Vice Chiefs of the Air Force and Naval Operations signed a new MOA for JB Anacostia–Bolling that addressed the relationship between the Air Force, as a supporting Component, and the Marine Corps. For example, the MOA defines facility investment for the Marine Corps, and the MOA clearly identifies the items within airfield operations and facilities, among others, that are considered installation support or mission support in Attachment 1, Annex D. It also clarifies whether the Air Force or the Marine Corps has the responsibility to sustain those items.

Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response

Navy Comments on the Finding

The Commander, Navy Installations Command, responding for the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, recommended that we make clerical changes to the discussion on actions taken at JB Anacostia–Bolling to resolve the Marine Corps installation support disagreement.

Our Response

We considered management comments when preparing the final report and added clarifying information to “Management Actions Taken to Address Disagreement on Support to Marine Corps Detachment at JB Anacostia–Bolling.”

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

Added and Revised Recommendations

As a result of comments received from the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations) on draft report Recommendation 4.d, we added Recommendation 5 to the JB Lewis–McChord Joint Base Commander to—pending OSD action—work with the JMOS to determine whether the Joint Base Partnership Council should submit a policy variance request to the JMOS to permit the dual-hatting of the deputy commander position. In addition, we revised language in Recommendation 4.d to clarify that the OSD should revise joint base guidance to clearly describe the extent dual-hatting is permitted for deputy joint base commanders.

Recommendation 1

We recommend that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, take appropriate action to resolve the disagreements at Joint Base Lewis–McChord surrounding the:

- a. **Designation and authority of the joint base commander.**

Army Comments

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, agreed with the recommendation stating that the Army’s concerns over command relationships and Component roles and responsibilities would be addressed during the upcoming Senior Joint Base Working Group meeting, tentatively scheduled for April 20 through April 21, 2021. The Army explained that senior Army leadership was initially not in favor of changing command authority relationships at JB Lewis–McChord until recently, when the Army’s position changed. After adjudication, a new MOA change will be required to reverse the command authority decision, as well as updates made to Army policy and DoD guidance.

Air Force Comments

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, agreed with the recommendation stating that Air Force Headquarters will coordinate the command authority issue with the Air Mobility Command, Air Force Materiel Command, OSD, and Services, and will formally resolve the disagreement through the JMOS.

Our Response

Comments from the Army and Air Force Deputy Chiefs of Staff addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we confirm the Senior Joint Base Working Group held the scheduled meeting and verify that the Army and Air Force reached an agreement on command authorities and Component roles and relationships through the JMOS, and that appropriate actions have been taken to fully address the recommendation.

Office of the Secretary of Defense Comments

Although not required to comment, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, agreed with the recommendation stating

that as the chair of the Senior Joint Base Working Group, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment will work with the Army and Air Force to resolve the ongoing command authority disagreement at JB Lewis–McChord by April 2022.

Our Response

We acknowledge the comments from the Principal Deputy, and appreciate the OSD's efforts in resolving the ongoing command authority disagreement.

b. Transfer and delivery of logistics support functions.

Army Comments

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, agreed with the recommendation stating that a decision was reached to submit a MOA change request to the JMOS, supporting the continued merger of the Army Field Support Battalion and logistics readiness center. The change will also propose a partial return of total obligation authority to the Air Force—specifically, control over resources that support mission readiness. The Army anticipated that the JMOS will reach a decision on the proposed MOA change and its related variance by December 31, 2021.

Air Force Comments

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, agreed with the recommendation stating that Air Force Headquarters will coordinate the logistics support issue with the Air Mobility Command, Air Force Materiel Command, OSD, and Services, and will formally resolve the disagreement through the JMOS.

Our Response

Comments from the Army and Air Force Deputy Chiefs of Staff addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the Army and Air Force reached an agreement on logistics support through the JMOS, and that appropriate actions have been taken to fully address the recommendation.

Office of the Secretary of Defense Comments

Although not required to comment, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, agreed with the recommendation stating that as the chair of the Senior Joint Base Working Group, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment will work with the Army and Air Force to resolve the ongoing disagreement over logistics support at JB Lewis–McChord by April 2022.

Our Response

We acknowledge the comments from the Principal Deputy, and appreciate the OSD's efforts in resolving the ongoing logistics support disagreement.

Recommendation 2

We recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Real Property develop procedures to communicate the status of items in review with the Joint Management Oversight Structure and to highlight ongoing initiatives to improve joint basing.

Office of the Secretary of Defense Comments

The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment and responding for the DASD(RP), partially agreed with the recommendation and referred to changes recently implemented through the OSD's January 2019 issuance of supplemental guidance, such as the establishment of time limitations and notification requirements for JMOS actions—to improve the visibility of joint base issues and the processing of joint base MOA changes. The Principal Deputy also stated that in addition to posting Senior Joint Base Working Group meeting minutes and decisions to the Joint Basing milSuites website, the DASD(RP) will add a dashboard to the website, by December 2021, to highlight issues submitted for resolution as well as the working group's action items.⁴³

Our Response

Although the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary partially agreed, the comments provided addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation once we verify the DASD(RP) updated the Joint Basing milSuites website with the dashboard.

⁴³ The Joint Basing milSuites is an informational website maintained by the OSD Joint Basing Office. Anyone with a valid DoD common access card can access the website to view joint base guidance, briefings from past OSD-sponsored events, and other types of information.

Recommendation 3

We recommend that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; Vice Chief of Naval Operations; and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in coordination with the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment:

- a. Establish clear order of precedence between the memorandum of agreement, joint base policy, and Service policies for joint bases.**

Army Comments

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, agreed with the recommendation. The Deputy stated that the Army supports a collaborative effort among the OSD and Services to address this recommendation, noting that OSD should include language to clarify the order of precedence for policy within its future issuance of the “Joint Base Operations Guidance.” The Army also responded that in addition to actively participating in multiple joint base document and process revision reviews, it has also revised Army Regulation 600-20, “Personnel-General, Army Command Policy,” on July 24, 2020, which refers to joint basing guidance and the JMOS review process, and clearly establishes an order of precedence between the MOA, joint base policy, and Service policies for joint bases.

Navy Comments

The Commander, Navy Installations Command, responding for the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, stated that the order of precedence between the MOA, joint base policy, and Service policies was currently established in the JBIG and noted that its replacement guidance—currently under revision by the OSD and in coordination with the Services—may provide clarification. The Joint Base Operations Guidance is estimated to replace the JBIG by April 2022.

Air Force Comments

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, agreed with the recommendation and welcomed the opportunity to clarify and develop joint basing policy and operations with the OSD and other Services. The Deputy stated that Air Force Headquarters will coordinate efforts with the Air Mobility Command, Air Force Materiel Command, OSD, Army, and Navy, and will formally address the recommendation through the JMOS.

Our Response

Comments from the Army and Air Force Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander, Navy Installations Command addressed the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation after we verify that the Joint Base Operations Guidance has been issued with, and internal Service regulations for the Army, Navy, and Air Force support, a clear order of precedence for policy that can be followed when planning, managing and executing installation support for joint bases.

Office of the Secretary of Defense Comments

Although not required to comment, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, partially agreed with the recommendation stating that the priority of governing documents is described in each joint base MOA. Further, the Senior Installations Management Group charter also requires the Services to ensure compliance by their respective Components with DoD policies outlined in the JBIG, JBIG supplemental guidance, and the MOA.

Marine Corps Comments

Although not required to comment, the Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics, agreed with the recommendation without further comment.

Our Response

We acknowledge the comments from the Principal Deputy and Deputy Commandant. While we agree with the Principal Deputy's comments, joint base personnel explained that actions are often taken by Service organizations that are not bound by the MOA. We believe that adding clarifying guidance into Service regulations that support joint base policy will assist the Services in their efforts to execute and monitor joint base operations.

- b. Develop internal procedures to ensure joint base needs are considered in Service-specific processes and decisions.**

Army Comments

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, agreed with the recommendation. The Army responded that two recently issued internal documents—Army Directive 2020-11, “Roles and Responsibilities for Military Installation Operations,” October 10, 2020 and the “Army Installations Strategy,” December 14, 2020—ensure joint base needs are considered during Army specific processes, such as in the regionally aligned readiness and modernization model and in the total Army analysis.

Our Response

Comments from the Deputy Chief of Staff did not address the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. Although the Deputy Chief of Staff agreed with the recommendation, the Army Directive and Army Installations Strategy do not ensure unique joint base needs are fully considered in Army processes and decisions. We agree that joint bases are impacted by the overarching processes and responsibilities discussed in Army Directive 2020-11—which clarifies roles, responsibilities, and definitions for military installation operations, and in the Army Installations Strategy—which sets strategic direction for Army installations and guides decision making on policies, planning, and practices at all Army echelons. However as discussed in this report, joint base officials have difficulty obtaining approval from higher Service-level offices for actions to support the base that do not align with Service policy or are outside of Service norms, and are not always considered in Service-wide decisions and processes.

Army Directive 2020-11 and the Army Installations Strategy do not discuss joint basing, and do not specify how the Army ensures that consideration is given to an installation's joint base status during decision making and other processes described within the two issuances. For example, the Army Installations Strategy explains that the Army relies on numerous command and supporting organizations to ensure installations are operated and equipped with capabilities consistent with Army priorities, and cites the importance of education and training to acknowledge the critical role installations have in accomplishing the Army mission. The strategy does not discuss the impact multiple Army commands and organizations may have on a joint base supported Service Component, nor does it mention the priorities or missions of another Service.

Therefore, we request the Vice Chief of Staff provide additional comments to the final report to highlight how the decisions and processes detailed in Army Directive 2020-11 and the Army Installations Strategy include steps, or other built-in assurances to ensure joint base supported Component needs are fully considered.

Navy Comments

The Commander, Navy Installations Command, responding for the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, stated that the Navy is represented throughout the JMOS, and the representation ensures fairness and equitable allocation of funding requirements, oversees compliance with the MOA, and resolves disputes and other issues. As part of the JMOS, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Fleet Readiness and Logistics) coordinates with Service leads on all joint base issues that impact Navy-specific

processes and decisions. The Commander added that issues generally occur when a Service lead at the installation-level elects to resolve joint base issues outside of the JMOS.

Our Response

Comments from the Commander did not address the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. While we agree the JMOS is the governing body used to formally resolve issues at joint bases and to modify the MOA, there is still a need for joint basing to be institutionalized within the Navy. As outlined in the OSD's Joint Basing Memorandum, Service staff need to fully understand the ways joint base activities are resourced, executed, and evaluated and incorporate them into their policies and procedures. We request the Vice Chief of Naval Operations provide additional comments to the final report highlighting how the Navy ensures joint base specific needs are considered within its own processes and decisions.

Air Force Comments

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, agreed with the recommendation and welcomed the opportunity to clarify and develop joint basing policy and operations with the OSD and other Services. The Deputy stated that Air Force Headquarters will coordinate efforts with the Air Mobility Command, Air Force Materiel Command, OSD, Army, and Navy, and will formally address the recommendation through the JMOS.

Our Response

Comments from the Deputy did not address the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. We agree that joint bases are impacted by the overarching processes and responsibilities developed and approved by the JMOS. However, as outlined in this report, joint bases are also impacted by the actions, policies, and decisions internal to the Air Force. We request additional comments to the final report highlighting how the Air Force ensures joint base specific needs are considered within its own processes and decisions.

Office of the Secretary of Defense Comments

Although not required to comment, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, partially agreed with the recommendation stating that joint base policy requires the supporting Component to resource and

deliver installation support to the agreed-upon levels in the MOA. The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary welcomed efforts by the Senior Installations Management Group to improve upon or develop new procedures that ensure joint base needs are considered in Service-specific decisions and processes.

Marine Corps Comments

Although not required to comment, the Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics, agreed with the recommendation without further comment.

Our Response

We acknowledge the comments from the Principal Deputy and Deputy Commandant, and appreciate OSD's support in improving or developing new procedures that ensure joint base needs are considered in Service-specific decisions and processes.

- c. Develop collaborative processes between the Services to identify and implement best practices at joint bases.**

Army Comments

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, agreed with the recommendation stating that OSD and the Services should work together to include language on processes that promote collaboration and the sharing of best practices when developing the Joint Base Operations Guidance. In addition, the Army stated that it recently had several successful engagements with Service counterparts, including: completion of a tri-Service review to assess joint base issues and align Service positions, working with the Air Force to address reform recommendations for two joint bases, and co-hosting a semiannual "Super ICS Summit" with participation from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps Intermediate Command Summit leads. The Deputy also stated that the Army will continue to schedule these summits, which reduce redundancy and promote collaboration, consistency, standardization, information sharing, and problem-solving among the Services. The Army stated that it will also continue to hold its monthly Intermediate Command Summit meetings with joint base leads, to further promote best practices and other efforts across the joint base program.

Navy Comments

The Commander, Navy Installations Command, responding for the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, stated that the OSD already collaborates with joint base commanders during its annual Joint Base Commander's Day and provides the results of the seminar available to joint base personnel. The next Commander's Day is tentatively scheduled for spring 2021.

Air Force Comments

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, agreed with the recommendation and welcomed the opportunity to clarify and develop joint basing policy and operations with the OSD and other Services. The Deputy stated that Air Force Headquarters will coordinate efforts with the Air Mobility Command, Air Force Materiel Command, OSD, Army, and Navy, and will formally address the recommendation through the JMOS.

Our Response

Comments from the Army and Air Force Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander, Navy Installations Command addressed the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We believe the actions described are examples of different ways to promote collaboration and information sharing among the Services. Therefore, we will close the recommendation once we verify that the Joint Base Operations Guidance has been issued to include language on processes that promote collaboration and the sharing of best practices among the Services, and we receive documentation to support the creation and continuing nature of the “Super ICS Summit.”

Office of the Secretary of Defense Comments

Although not required to comment, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, partially agreed with the recommendation stating that the JMOS is made up of representatives from all the Services and the OSD to resolve disputes, review MOAs, and develop joint base policy. The Principal Deputy also stated that as the chair of the Senior Joint Base Working Group, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment encourages new Service efforts to identify and implement best practices on joint bases.

Marine Corps Comments

Although not required to comment, the Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics agreed with the recommendation without further comment.

Our Response

We acknowledge the comments from the Principal Deputy and Deputy Commandant, and appreciate the continued support to identify and implement best practices on joint bases.

- d. Conduct a review of all joint bases, to include the memorandum of agreement to identify potential command authority and organizational conflicts, and assess the effectiveness of support systems to joint bases.**

Army Comments

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, agreed with the recommendation stating that the Army continues to support OSD's established guidelines for processing MOA packages within the JMOS approved timeline. Further, the Army supports the triennial MOA review, and is currently reviewing the OSD's recommended reductions to CPVF reporting—annual CPVF reporting on commonly unmet JB-COLS. The Army estimated completion of this review by April 1, 2023.

Navy Comments

The Commander, Navy Installations Command, responding for the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, stated that joint base reviews and assessments are an ongoing initiative of the OSD-led Senior Joint Base Working Group; and that joint base leadership reviews the MOA triennially to identify conflicts, which may result in recommended changes to the MOA. In addition, the Commander stated that the Services already conducted a tri-Service review for five of the “challenged” joint bases, which resulted in modifications to two MOAs.

Air Force Comments

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, agreed with the recommendation and welcomed the opportunity to clarify and develop joint basing policy and operations with the OSD and other Services. The Deputy stated that Air Force Headquarters will coordinate efforts with the Air Mobility Command, Air Force Materiel Command, OSD, Army, and Navy, and will formally address the recommendation through the JMOS.

Our Response

Comments from the Army and Air Force Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander, Navy Installations Command partially addressed the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. As discussed in the report, installation

personnel's ability to comply with joint base MOAs and effectively execute installation support at JB Anacostia–Bolling, JB Lewis–McChord, and JB Elmendorf–Richardson was limited by Service-based decisions and operational differences. However, the MOA and performance standards reviews cited within the responses alone will not identify every joint base inefficiency.

Joint base personnel explained that annual MOA reviews centered on reviewing and preparing CPVF submissions (personnel acknowledged that performance standards do not capture or measure all the challenges experienced at a joint base) and, at some of the installations, the triennial reviews conducted were minimal and rarely resulted in Components submitting input to the review or in changes to the MOA. Further, joint base MOAs are not designed to be all-inclusive documents. MOAs sometimes require outside Service coordination and action to ensure successful and efficient delivery of installation support.

Therefore, we request the Vice Chiefs of Staff provide additional comments to the final report with the results of the completed tri-annual review, including information on how the results have or will be used in DoD, and the planned frequency of these joint reviews; and information on how the Services plan to identify and assess inefficiencies in internal processes.

Office of the Secretary of Defense Comments

Although not required to comment, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, partially agreed with the recommendation stating that joint base policy requires an annual review of the MOA, (for mission, manpower, and financial impacts) and a review of the entire MOA, triennially. The Principal Deputy also stated that the Senior Installations Management Group charter highlights the responsibility of the Services to review the MOA and to ensure Components comply with the MOA and applicable requirements and guidance.

Marine Corps Comments

Although not required to comment, the Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics agreed with the recommendation without further comment.

Our Response

We acknowledge the comments from the Principal Deputy and Deputy Commandant. While we agree with the Principal Deputy's comments, we previously highlighted how the processes used to update and execute the MOA, and report and address joint base concerns were not always effective, in both the

body of the report and in our response to the Services for Recommendation 3.d. Outside Service coordination and action is sometimes required to ensure successful and efficient delivery of installation support. Therefore, we believe the Services should proactively identify and resolve challenges within their own procedures and operations.

- e. **Establish training or direct joint base commanders to issue local guidance to ensure installation personnel comply with established processes to update the memorandum of agreement and implement its current provisions.**

Army Comments

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, agreed. The Army responded that it supported the OSD's orientation course and Commander's Day briefing, and recommended that these events be incorporated into the OSD's pending issuance of new operations guidance. Further, the Army stated that all new installation leaders attend a pre-command course at JB San Antonio, and instruction emphasizing joint base MOAs and command authority relationships is provided during the Senior Commanders Course. The Army also stated that a briefing—expected to be completed by June 30, 2021—was under development for senior Army commanders who will be assigned to a joint base.

Navy Comments

The Commander, Navy Installations Command, responding for the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, stated that the Navy region commanders already coordinate training with their Service counterparts. The Commander added that although past attempts have been made, training does not always work because Service policies and protocols for some of the installation support functions are unique to each Service, and are therefore incompatible. When this occurs, the joint base is required to obtain a variance to resolve the issue.

Air Force Comments

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, agreed and welcomed the opportunity to clarify and develop joint basing policy and operations with the OSD and other Services. The Deputy Chief of Staff stated that Air Force Headquarters will coordinate efforts with the Air Mobility Command, Air Force Materiel Command, OSD, Army, and Navy, and will formally address the recommendation through the JMOS.

Our Response

Comments from the Army and Air Force Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander, Navy Installations Command addressed the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation after we verify that the Joint Base Operations Guidance has been issued with information on available training opportunities, as supported by Service-specific training established by the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Office of the Secretary of Defense Comments

Although not required to comment, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, partially agreed and stated that DASD(RP) holds an annual joint base orientation course for new commanders and deputies, as well as an annual “Joint Base Commander’s Day” to focus on issues at the installations and to collaborate on potential solutions. The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary welcomed additional efforts by the Services to provide training and comply with joint base MOAs.

Marine Corps Comments

Although not required to comment, the Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics, agreed with the recommendation without further comment.

Our Response

We acknowledge the comments from the Principal Deputy and Deputy Commandant. While we agree with the Principal Deputy’s comments, we reported that joint base personnel identified a lack of familiarity and working knowledge of the joint base program within the Services; as well as a lack of continuity or knowledge transfer and the need for continuous education among the joint base workforce. Further, personnel filling command or administrative support positions at the installations indicated that the DASD(RP) one-day orientation course, or any experiences gained while at the installation, were often the first and only times personnel were exposed to the joint base concept in the DoD. We believe each Service should prepare its workforce and ensure personnel have the knowledge and capability to successfully perform in a joint basing environment.

Recommendation 4

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment issue updated guidance to clarify:

- a. Existing processes, roles, and responsibilities pertaining to joint base governance and operations.**

Office of the Secretary of Defense Comments

The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, partially agreed with the recommendation and referred to efforts initiated by the DASD(RP) in 2019 to develop the Joint Base Operations Guidance. Once complete, this guidance will focus on sustaining joint base operations and will clarify the roles and responsibilities within a revised JMOS structure.

Our Response

Although the Principal Deputy partially agreed, the comments provided addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation once we verify that the Joint Base Operations Guidance has been issued and includes updated and clarified information.

- b. Roles of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Service Vice Chiefs of Staff within the Joint Management Oversight Structure for handling unresolved issues.**

Office of the Secretary of Defense Comments

The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, partially agreed and referred to actions that have already been planned or taken to help address unresolved issues at joint bases. Specifically, in an effort to streamline the development and updating of joint base policy and the issue resolution process, the Deputy Secretary of Defense delegated policy-making and oversight responsibility to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment in September 2020. The Principal Deputy also referred to the pending Joint Base Operations Guidance, with a planned issuance no later than February 2022, that will include an updated JMOS structure with clarified roles and responsibilities.

Our Response

Although the Principal Deputy partially agreed, the comments provided addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation once we verify that the Joint Base Operations Guidance has been issued and includes updated and clarified information.

- c. **When Service decisions directly impact a joint base and the support provided by the lead Component should be documented in the memorandum of agreement, and what actions require concurrence from the Joint Management Oversight Structure.**

Office of the Secretary of Defense Comments

The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, partially agreed with the recommendation and referred to language in existing joint base guidance. Specifically, lead Components must provide supported Components with installation support functions agreed to in the MOA, and lead and supported Components should work together to determine joint base priorities in response to Service funding reductions. In addition, Service actions to remove a covered support function or drastically change the level of support must be documented (in variances or deviations) and approved through the JMOS.

Our Response

Comments from the Principal Deputy did not address the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. We agree that existing joint base guidance provides the framework needed to outline the overarching responsibilities of the Components and the overall functional support areas covered by the MOA. However, as written, joint base MOAs do not provide detailed information on the actual methods used to execute support. Service personnel are responsible for planning, managing, and carrying out installation support tasks, and therefore must often rely on Service-specific policies because existing program guidance lacks detail needed to carry out installation support, and does not account for Service differences.

As stated in this report, personnel across the joint base program cited a lack of understanding and accounting of the Services' cultural and fundamental differences in Service-wide processes and decisions, which impacted their ability to effectively execute installation support. In addition, in the report we also discuss how despite current guidance, Service-specific changes impacting the joint base were implemented without the proper approval or MOA revisions, like the delivery of logistics support at JB Lewis–McChord.

We request the Assistant Secretary of Defense provide additional comments to the final report with details on how the existing guidance clearly includes, or how the anticipated Joint Base Operations Guidance will incorporate, clarifying information on the type and extent of Service decisions, actions, and impacts that should be reflected in the MOA or approved by the JMOS.

- d. The extent that dual-hatting is permitted in the joint base command structure, to include the deputy joint base commander.**

Office of the Secretary of Defense Comments

The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, partially agreed with the recommendation stating that joint base policy has consistently segregated mission support from the installation support roles of the joint base commander and deputy commander. The Principal Deputy described one instance where a MOA was returned to one joint base to eliminate the dual-hatting of the joint base commander position, and another instance where variances were used at a different installation to permit the dual-hatting of the commander and deputy commander positions.

Our Response

Comments from the Principal Deputy did not address the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. Although we agree that the requirement for the joint base commander to be fully dedicated to installation support is plainly stated in available guidance, the requirement for the deputy joint base commander to do the same, as noted in this report, is only inferred.

We revised the recommendation to clarify that the extent dual-hatting is permitted for the deputy commander position should be clearly articulated in guidance. We request the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment provide additional comments in response to the final report addressing how the guidance clearly addresses whether the deputy joint base commander is fully dedicated to installation support or if dual-hatting is permitted.

Recommendation 5

Based on the results of actions taken by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment to address Recommendation 4.d, we recommend that the Joint Base Commander, Joint Base Lewis–McChord, work with the Joint Base Management Oversight Structure to determine whether the Joint Base Partnership Council should submit a policy variance request to the Joint Base Management Oversight Structure to permit the dual-hatting of the deputy commander position.

Appendix A

Scope and Methodology

We conducted this performance audit from July 2018 through February 2021 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Universe and Sample Information

Each of the 12 joint bases are different and have unique considerations and concerns. To ensure our review identified common challenges across the different installations and Services, we selected three joint bases where the Army, Navy, and Air Force are each designated as the lead Service responsible for providing installation support and, to the greatest extent practicable, are also represented as a supported Component. We selected joint bases that reported higher instances in the CPVF of not meeting at least 90 percent of the performance standards specified in the JB-COLS for the 12 functional categories.⁴⁴ We considered OSD and Service-level concerns (identified through preliminary interviews with officials from the OSD Joint Basing Office and offices designated as the Service leads for joint basing), and different joint base attributes (such as an installation's size, structure, location, and range of the CPVF reported information) so our sample was varied. We selected JB Anacostia–Bolling, JB Lewis–McChord, and JB Elmendorf–Richardson.

Our report does not capture every challenge area or inefficiency associated with joint basing; it is intended to highlight only some of the common challenge areas observed during the audit. In addition, we initially limited discussions and reviews related to the performance and execution of installation support functions to facilities investment and MILPERS, the two functional categories for which the 12 joint bases reported the most difficulty in meeting the JB-COLS. However, we also considered other concerns, or functional areas, that joint base personnel identified during the course of the audit.

The facilities investment functional category includes four installation support functions—facilities sustainment, facilities new footprint (new construction), facilities restoration and modernization, and facilities demolition. The MILPERS functional category includes one installation support function—MILPERS, which

⁴⁴ As reported in the CPVF for the fourth quarter reporting period for FY 2015 to FY 2017.

processes workforce changes and provides customer support services (including information systems support) to the military community. These services are separate from human resources services provided to the civilian workforce.

Review of Documentation and Interviews

We evaluated documentation against program criteria, including:

- Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment (DUSD[I&E]) memorandum, “Department of Defense Supplemental Guidance for Implementing and Operating a Joint Base,” April 15, 2008 (MOA template), and subsequent supplemental guidance memorandums detailing Change 1 through Change 5 (July 31, 2008–September 18, 2015)
- DUSD(I&E) memorandum, “Department of Defense Supplemental Guidance for Implementing and Operating a Joint Base,” April 15, 2008 (facilities investment supplemental guidance), and the subsequent supplemental guidance memorandum detailing Change 1 (March 25, 2009)
- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness memorandum, “Supplemental Military Personnel Program Guidance for Joint Base Implementation,” October 15, 2009
- DUSD(I&E) memorandum, “Business Rules for Processing and Approving Joint Base Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) Changes,” April 12, 2010
- DUSD(I&E) memorandum, “Modification to the Joint Basing Implementation Guidance (JBIG),” July 1, 2010
- Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations and Environment memorandum, “Transitioning Joint Base Reporting Tools,” June 5, 2017
- OSD Joint Basing Office, “Cost and Performance Visibility Framework Handbook,” March 2017
- Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment memorandum, “Supplemental Guidance for Processing Joint Base Issues and Joint Base Memorandum of Agreement Changes,” January 3, 2019

We met with multiple DoD stakeholders, including:

- Officials from the OSD Joint Basing Office and offices designated as the Service leads for joint basing—the Department of Army Headquarters, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management; Commander, Navy Installations Command; and Headquarters Air Force, Office of the Director of Civil Engineers, to identify DoD and Service-level concerns.

- Officials from JB Anacostia–Bolling, JB Lewis–McChord, and JB Elmendorf–Richardson. We conducted site visits to identify installation-level challenges and concerns related to joint basing; the extent the MOA is adhered to; and the processes used to update and execute the MOA and report and address joint base concerns. We met with installation leadership; personnel responsible for maintaining the MOA; and representatives from the supported and lead Component that either received or provided installation support, primarily in the facilities investment and MILPERS functional areas.

We obtained and reviewed supporting documentation, such as:

- joint base MOAs, approved changes, and change requests;
- JMOS meeting minutes, to assess specific issues raised and discussed;
- Service-level criteria, to show differences between the Service processes and policy;
- memorandums for record, white papers, or other written communication, to establish a timeline or detail past attempts to resolve concerns; and
- staffing and funding-level information.

Use of Computer-Processed Data

We used computer-processed data from the CPVF to develop an audit sample and determine the extent joint base personnel met the JB-COLS, the minimum performance standards specified in the MOA. The CPVF is the DoD’s reporting tool of record, maintained by the OSD Joint Basing Office. It is used across the DoD to assess the overall well-being of the joint base program, and to collect and report installation support performance data for each joint base against the terms in the MOA and the JB-COLS. The OSD established user roles and responsibilities at the installation level and within select JMOS tiers to input, review, and approve information before it is released into the system. There is no single CPVF data source. Joint base personnel use multiple sources to populate the system since the lead Component’s Service policies and procedures are typically used to provide and monitor installation support for the 44 functions.

Because of this data limitation, we relied on the multi-tiered CPVF approval process and obtained corroborating statements from joint base personnel on performance challenges associated with the facilities investment and MILPERS functional categories to assess the overall reliability of the performance data. We found the information to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review. We used the CPVF data in the report’s finding to provide a general indication of compliance with the performance standards; not to report on numerical calculations regarding

compliance. Furthermore, the reliability of the CPVF data does not affect the overall conclusions and recommendations resulting from this report.

Prior Coverage

During the last 9 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Air Force Audit Agency (AFAA) issued four reports on joint basing. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed at <http://www.gao.gov>. Unrestricted Air Force Audit Agency reports can be accessed from <https://www.efoia.af.mil/palMain.aspx> by clicking on Freedom of Information Act Reading Room and then selecting audit reports.

GAO

Report No. GAO 14-577, “Implementation Challenges Demonstrate Need to Reevaluate the Program,” September 2014

The GAO recommended that the DoD evaluate the 44 support functions identified for joint base implementation to determine which functions are still suitable for consolidation and identify and make appropriate changes to address the limitations in consolidating these installation support functions. Additionally, the GAO recommended the DoD to evaluate the purpose of the program and determine whether the DoD’s current goals of achieving greater efficiencies and generating cost savings for the joint basing program are still appropriate or whether goals should be revised, and communicate these goals to the Military Services and joint bases and then adjust program activities accordingly. However, the DoD did not concur with the GAO’s recommendation to conduct a joint basing goal evaluation and provide direction since it believed joint bases had achieved savings, partially concurred with recommendation to take policy actions to address challenges, and concurred with recommendation to evaluate whether installation support functions remained suitable for consolidation.

Report No. GAO 13-149, “Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Base Realignment and Closure Rounds,” March 2013

The GAO reported in 2012 that BRAC implementation costs grew to about \$35 billion, exceeding the initial 2005 estimate of \$21 billion by 67 percent. The DoD developed and utilized a quantitative model known as the Cost of Base Realignment Actions, which the GAO has found to be a reasonable estimator for comparing potential costs and savings among candidate alternatives, to estimate the costs and savings associated with BRAC 2005 recommendations. However, cost estimations were underestimated when

inputted into this model. Military construction costs for BRAC 2005 increased from \$13.2 billion estimated by the BRAC Commission in 2005 to \$24.5 billion after implementation ended in 2011.

GAO 13-134, "Management Improvements Needed to Achieve Greater Efficiencies," November 2012

The GAO found that the DoD originally estimated saving \$2.3 billion from joint basing over 20 years. However, in the absence of a plan to drive savings, that estimate has fallen by almost 90 percent. The report stated that DoD leadership has not provided clear direction to joint basing officials on achieving the cost savings and efficiency goals of joint basing. It was not clear whether the purpose of joint basing was to meet the joint base common standards for installation support or to achieve cost savings and efficiencies. The GAO concluded that without a consistent interpretation and reported use of the standards, the joint bases will not have reliable and comparable data to assess their service support levels, and the OSD cannot be assured of receiving reliable and comparable data on the level of support services the joint bases are providing.

Air Force

Report No. F2015-0004-020000, "Joint Base Support," April 2015

The Air Force Audit Agency determined that the Air Force was not effective in obtaining manpower and funding resources for growth of supported units at joint bases. Specifically, the Air Force did not identify a net increase of 2,210 supported Army manpower authorizations or determine the base operating support needed for 1,313 Army and Navy manpower authorizations added through basing actions at three locations reviewed. As a result, the Air Force did not request the transfer of \$10.2 million of annual obligation authority for an additional 137 manpower authorizations to support the increased mission.

Appendix B

BRAC-Designated Joint Bases and Components

Joint Base	Installation Management Functions:	
	Supported Component (Moved from)	Lead Component (Realigned to)
Joint Base (JB) Lewis–McChord, Washington	Air Force (McChord Air Force Base [AFB])	Army (Fort Lewis)
JB Myer–Henderson Hall, Virginia	Marine Corps (Henderson Hall)	Army (Fort Myer)
Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek–Fort Story, Virginia	Army (Fort Story)	Navy (Naval Expeditionary Base Little Creek)
JB Anacostia–Bolling, Washington, D.C.	Air Force (Bolling AFB) ¹	Navy (Naval Station Anacostia) ¹
JB Pearl Harbor–Hickam, Hawaii	Air Force (Hickam AFB)	Navy (Naval Station Pearl Harbor)
Joint Region Marianas, Guam	Air Force (Andersen AFB) and Marine Corps ([Future] Marine Corps Base Guam) ²	Navy (Naval Base Guam)
JB McGuire–Dix–Lakehurst, New Jersey	Army (Fort Dix) and Navy (Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst)	Air Force (McGuire AFB)
JB Elmendorf–Richardson, Alaska	Army (Fort Richardson)	Air Force (Elmendorf AFB)
JB San Antonio, Texas	Army (Fort Sam Houston) and Air Force (Randolph AFB)	Air Force (Lackland AFB)
JB Langley–Eustis, Virginia	Army (Fort Eustis)	Air Force (Langley AFB)
JB Andrews–Naval Air Facility Washington, Maryland	Navy (Naval Air Facility Washington)	Air Force (Andrews AFB)
JB Charleston, South Carolina	Navy (Naval Weapons Station Charleston)	Air Force (Charleston AFB)

¹ The Navy and Air Force Vice Chiefs of Staff approved a modified joint base MOA on June 24, 2020, permitting the Navy’s planned October 2020 transfer of its lead Component responsibilities to the Air Force.

² The Marine Corps became a supported Component at Joint Region Marianas due to the future addition of Marine Corps Base Guam into the Joint Region, not because of language in BRAC Recommendation 146.

Source: 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report, Recommendation 146.

Appendix C

Installation Support Functions

Lead Components may provide 44 installation support functions to supported Components, which are arranged into 12 functional categories.⁴⁵ In limited instances, specific joint bases may be exempt from providing certain support functions.

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>I. Housing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Family Housing Services 2. Unaccompanied Personnel Housing Services | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 16. Command Management 17. Financial Management 18. Installation Safety 19. Legal Support 20. Management Analysis 21. Procurement Operations 22. Public Affairs |
| <p>II. Community Services</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3. Children and Youth Programs 4. Lodging 5. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation 6. Military and Family Support | <p>VII. Military Personnel Services (MILPERS)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 23. MILPERS |
| <p>III. Operational Mission Services</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 7. Airfield Operations 8. Port Services 9. Small Arms Range Management | <p>VIII. Security Services</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 24. Installation Law Enforcement Operations 25. Installation Physical Security Protection and Services |
| <p>IV. Information Technology Services Management (ITSM)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 10. ITSM | <p>IX. Logistics Support</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 26. Base Support Vehicles and Equipment 27. Food Services 28. Installation Movement 29. Laundry and Dry Cleaning 30. Supply, Storage, and Distribution (Non-Munitions) |
| <p>V. Environmental</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 11. Environmental Compliance 12. Environmental Conservation 13. Environmental Pollution Prevention 14. Environmental Restoration | <p>X. Facilities Operation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 31. Utilities |
| <p>VI. Command Support</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 15. Chaplain Ministries | |

⁴⁵ The OSD originally established 47 installation support functions and later reduced the total to 44, after 3 functions were no longer considered to be common installation support. The three functions removed were history and museums (under command support); supply, storage, and distribution (munitions) (under logistics support); and readiness engineering (under facilities operation).

- 32. Pavement Clearance Services
- 33. Refuse Collection and Disposal
- 34. Grounds Maintenance
and Landscaping
- 35. Pest Control Services
- 36. Custodial Services
- 37. Real Property Management
and Engineering Services
- 38. Real Property Leases
- 39. Fire and Emergency Services

XI. Emergency Management

- 40. Emergency Management

XII. Facilities Investment

- 41. Facilities Sustainment
- 42. Facilities New Footprint
- 43. Facilities Restoration
and Modernization
- 44. Facilities Demolition

Appendix D

JMOS Roles and Responsibilities

The JMOS governs joint bases and includes representatives from each Component for each joint base. It is responsible for the development and approval of the joint base MOA and oversees compliance. Designed to ensure fairness, the JMOS is also used to resolve issues and disputes at the installation and to provide a basis for equitable resource allocations between the lead and supported Components. Submissions (like a disagreement or proposed MOA change) advance through the JMOS until the appropriate tier approves or resolves them, or when a consensus cannot be reached at a lower tier.

Tier and Title		Participants and Roles
6	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment	<p><i>Highest and final authority in the JMOS decision chain.</i></p> <p>Formerly the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Secretary delegated all policymaking and oversight responsibility for joint basing (including the authority to revise, rescind, or replace the JBIG and its supplemental guidance) to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, further delegable to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment.</p>
5	Service Vice Chiefs of Staff	<p>The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force approve and sign applicable joint base MOAs, and sign (or designate a signatory for) related MOA changes. When necessary, the Service Vice Chiefs of Staff will assess requests to appeal a decision made through the JMOS.</p>
4	Installations Capabilities Council (ICC) Senior Joint Base Working Group (SJBWG)	<p>The ICC includes representatives from the Services, and several different OSD and DoD Agency and organization offices. It is chaired by the OSD, and primarily oversees the development and implementation of installation support policy, and resolves disputes between DoD Components on installation support. The ICC also approves or disapproves variances (to joint base guidance) and deviations (to agreed-upon performance standards).</p> <p>The SJBWG is part of the ICC. It includes representatives from different OSD and DoD organization offices, as well as from the Services' installation management leadership office for each Component. The SJBWG is chaired by the OSD. It oversees joint base development and develops policy recommendations for the ICC.</p>
3	Senior Installations Management Group (SIMG)	<p><i>First tier that participates in the JMOS decision chain for all joint bases.</i></p> <p>The SIMG includes senior representatives of the Military Departments' installation management organizations, and is chaired by the senior assigned member. It provides oversight over programmed resources needed to deliver installation support to the agreed-upon levels outlined in the MOA; tracks implementation; reviews and resolves (or forwards) joint basing issues, disputes, and questions submitted by the ICS; and makes joint base policy recommendations to the ICC.</p>

Table: JMOS Roles and Responsibilities (cont'd)

Tier and Title		Participants and Roles
2	Intermediate Command Summit (ICS)	The ICS includes representatives from the lead and supported Components' installation management echelon immediately above the joint base (major or regional command). The intermediate command for the supporting Component chairs the ICS, which ensures functional expertise is available to support the installation support functions. The ICS provides regional oversight over the installation support functions and reviews and evaluates issues, MOA changes, and the CPVF reports submitted up the JMOS by the Joint Base Partnership Council (JBPC).
1	Joint Base Partnership Council (JBPC)	<i>Entry point into the JMOS decision chain.</i> The JBPC includes senior representatives for the major Service Components (lead, supported, and other supported) and tenant organizations on the installation. It is the installation's local leadership group, chaired by the joint base commander. It resolves issues, approves MOA changes for submittal up the JMOS, communicates budget information, and works other issues with mission commanders.

Source: The JBIG, DoD Joint Bases Handbook, and Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, "Delegation of Authority for Joint Basing Program Management," March 4, 2020.

Management Comments

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment



SUSTAINMENT

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3500 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3500

04/01/2021

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL PROGRAM
DIRECTOR FOR AUDIT READINESS AND GLOBAL
OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: Department of Defense Response to DoD IG Draft Report, Audit of Department of
Defense Joint Bases (Project # D2018-D000RH-0167.000), dated February 4, 2021

Attached is the Department of Defense response to the DoD IG Draft Report, Audit of
Department of Defense Joint Bases (Project# D2018-D000RH-0167.000), dated February 4,
2021.

The Department appreciates the Inspector General's efforts "to determine whether
Service Components met the terms outlined in the joint base memorandums of agreement and
whether processes are in place to report and address joint base related concerns." The
recommendations in the draft report call for the resolution of issues at Joint Base Lewis-
McChord, increased visibility of Joint Management Oversight Issues, Service collaboration to
ensure joint base needs are considered Service decision, and updated guidance to clarify joint
base governance and Service roles.

We share DoD IG's view on the importance of resolving these joint base issues and the
need to provide clear Joint Base guidance. Since the start of this investigation in 2018, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense has clarified joint base decision authority, issued policy to add
visibility to joint base issues and will soon release the Joint Base Operations Guidance to clarify
joint base governance and Service roles in the coming year.

Please contact [REDACTED], Assistant Director of Basing, Office of the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Real Property, at [REDACTED] if additional information is
required.

CRAMER, PAUL D
AVID [REDACTED]

Paul D. Cramer
Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Sustainment

Attachment:
As stated

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (cont'd)

DoD IG Joint Base Draft Audit Project# D2018-D000RH-0167.000

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1

We recommend that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in coordination with the **Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment**, take appropriate action to resolve the disagreements at Joint Base Lewis–McChord surrounding the:

- a. Designation and authority of the joint base commander.
- b. Transfer and delivery of logistics support functions.

DoD Response:

Concur: The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment ASD(S), as the chair of the Senior Joint Base Working Group (SJBWG) will work with the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and the Chief of the Air Force Logistics Engineering and Force Protection to address the unresolved command authority and delivery of logistics support functions at JBLM by April 2022.

Recommendation 2

We recommend that the **Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Real Property** develop procedures to communicate the status of items in review with the Joint Management Oversight Structure and to highlight ongoing initiatives to improve joint basing.

DoD Response:

Partially Concur: The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Real Property (DASD(RP)) identified several joint base issues that stalled at various levels of the Joint Management Oversight Structure (JMOS) without resolution in 2018 and initiated development of new or revised policy to improve the visibility of joint base issues and processing of Joint Base Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) changes.

In 2019 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment issued “Supplemental Guidance for Processing Joint Base Issues and Memorandum of Agreement Changes” requires a joint base to notify the Joint Base Working Group when a MOA change or issue is submitted for decision. This policy also includes timelines for the adjudication at each level in the JMOS with requirements to either approve/disapprove or request adjudication at the next level in the JMOS.

In addition to the Senior Joint Base Working Group decisions and meeting minutes posted to the Joint Basing milSuites website; the DASD(RP) will add a dashboard highlighting the issues submitted for resolution as well as the Joint Base Working Group action items by December 2021.

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (cont'd)

Recommendation 3

We recommend that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; Vice Chief of Naval Operations; and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in coordination with the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment:

- a. Establish clear order of precedence between the memorandum of agreement, joint base policy, and Service policies for joint bases.
- b. Develop internal procedures to ensure joint base needs are considered in Service-specific processes and decisions.
- c. Develop collaborative processes between the Services to identify and implement best practices at joint bases.
- d. Conduct a review of all joint bases, to include the memorandum of agreement to identify potential command authority and organizational conflicts, and assess the effectiveness of support systems to joint bases.
- e. Establish training or direct joint base commanders to issue local guidance to ensure installation personnel comply with established processes to update the memorandum of agreement and implement its current provisions.

DoD Response:

Partially Concur:

- a. Each Joint Base MOA includes a priority of governing documents section that shows the joint base policy order of precedence. The Senior Installations Management Group (SIMG) Charter also requires the Services to ensure compliance by their respective Components with DoD policies outlined in the Joint Base Implementation Guidance, supplemental guidance and MOAs.
- b. Joint Base policy requires the supporting Component to resource and deliver installation support functions at levels agreed to in each MOA. The ASD(S) welcomes efforts by the Senior Installations Management Group (SIMG) to improve or develop new procedures to ensure joint base needs are considered in Service specific processes and decisions.
- c. The SIMG and Senior Joint Base Working Group (SJBWG) levels of the Joint Management Oversight Structure's (JMOS), include representatives from each Service and OSD to resolve disputes, review MOAs and develop Joint Base policy. The ASD(S) as the chair of the Senior Joint Base Working Group (SJBWG) encourages new efforts by the Services to identify and implement best practices on joint bases.
- d. Joint Base policy requires an annual review of each MOA for mission, manpower and financial impacts and a triennial review of the entire MOA. Additionally, the SIMG charter highlights Service responsibilities to review MOAs, ensure Component compliance with DoD policies, JB Supplemental Guidance and JB MOAs.
- e. Annually, the DASD(RP) conducts the New Joint Base Commander (JBC) Orientation to provide new Commanders and Deputies with information on joint base policies, procedures and command authorities; and Joint Base Commander's Day which focus on joint base issues and collaboration on potential solutions. The ASD(S) welcomes efforts by the Services to provide additional joint base training and comply with their joint base MOAs.

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (cont'd)

Recommendation 4

We recommend that the **Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment** issue updated guidance to clarify:

- a. Existing processes, roles, and responsibilities pertaining to joint base governance and operations.
- b. Roles of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Service Vice Chiefs of Staff within the Joint Management Oversight Structure for handling unresolved issues.
- c. When Service decisions directly impact a joint base and the support provided by the Lead component should be documented in the memorandum of agreement, and what actions require concurrence from the Joint Management Oversight Structure.
- d. The extent that dual-hatting is permitted in the joint base command structure.

DoD Response:

Partially Concur: The ASD(S) introduced or implemented the following initiatives to clarify joint base decision authority and update joint base policy and guidance after identifying unresolved joint base issues.

- a. The DASD(RP) initiated the development the Joint Base Operations Guidance (JBOG) in 2019 to focus on sustained operations on joint bases and clarify roles and responsibilities within a revised the Joint Management Oversight Structure.
- b. The Deputy Secretary of Defense delegated policy-making and oversight responsibility for DoD Joint Bases to the ASD(S) in September 2020 to streamline the development and updating of Joint Base policy and resolution of JMOS issues. The forthcoming JBOG will include an updated JMOS structure that clarifies roles and responsibilities by February 2022.
- c. Current Joint Base guidance requires the Supporting Component of a Joint Base provide joint base installation support functions, acknowledged in each JB MOA, to the Supported Component. The 2013 “Operating Joint Bases in a Reduced Funding Environment” Memo recognized that each Service was operating at reduced installation funding levels and should work with their Supported Components to collaboratively determine installation priorities. Service actions that remove an installation support function (variance) capability or drastically change the level of installation support (deviation) require SJBWG approval.
- d. Joint Base Policy on “dual hatting” of the joint base commander or deputy commander has consistently segregated installation support from mission commander roles. The “Joint Basing Implementation Review Conference (IRC) Action Items” Memo dated July 14, 2008, documented the JB Langley-Eustis MOA was returned to eliminate “dual hatting” of the joint base commander position. Joint Region Marianas’s Region construct includes several variances to Joint Base policy and is the only Joint installation with a dual hatted Joint Region Commander and Deputy Region Commander positions.

Department of the Army



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-9
 600 ARMY PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0600

DAIN-ZA

MEMORANDUM FOR Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

SUBJECT: Army Response to DOD Joint Bases Draft Report (Project No. D2018-D000RH-0167.000)

1. REFERENCE: Pre-Decisional Inspector General Department of Defense Report/Purple Top Tasker, Subject: Audit of Department of Defense Joint Bases, Project No. D2018-D000RH-0167.00 (HQDA-210205-DDT9 / D2018RH-0167), dated February 4, 2021.
2. Concur with audit recommendations in paragraphs 1 and 3 with comments as enclosed.
3. The Army looks forward to working collaboratively on the Joint Base Operations Guidance (JBOG) with the Services and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Sustainment) in addressing our concerns regarding command roles and responsibilities and the Joint Management Oversight Structure (JMOS) framework.
4. Point of contract for this action is [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED].

Encl

EVANS.JASON.TER
 RENCE [REDACTED]
 JASON T. EVANS
 Lieutenant General, GS
 Deputy Chief of Staff, G-9

CF:
 CG, AMC
 Army ICS/IMCOM (AMIM-ED)

Department of the Army (cont'd)

Headquarters Department of the Army, DCS, G9
Comments to the Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG) Audit Report Titled:
Audit of Department of Defense Joint Bases (Project: D2018-D000RH-0167.000)

Project #: D2018-D000RH-0167.000

Requirement: For the recommendations review, we (DoDIG) will attach your response to the final report. In your response, please state whether you agree or disagree with each of the recommendations. If you agree with our recommendations, describe what actions you have taken or plan to take to accomplish the recommendations and include the actual or planned completion dates of your actions. If you disagree that the recommendations can be implemented, please provide the reasons why you disagree and propose alternative corrective actions in your response for our consideration. DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly

Project Title: DOD Joint Bases

Objective: Determine whether Service Components met the terms outlined in the joint base memorandums of agreement (MOAs) and whether processes are in place to report and address joint base related concerns.

Recommendation 1: We recommend that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, take appropriate action to resolve the disagreements at Joint Base Lewis-McChord surrounding the:

- a. Designation and authority of the joint base commander.
- b. Transfer and delivery of logistics support functions.

Army Response - Actions Taken or Planned:

Concur: Army supports a collaborative effort among the Services and the ASD(S) to address the unresolved command authority and delivery of logistics support functions at JBLM.

a. The Army will address our concerns with command relationships and roles and responsibilities during the ASD(S) chaired Senior Joint Base Working Group (SJBWG) tentatively schedule for 20/21 April 2021.

b. The Joint Base Lewis McChord (JBLM) Joint Base Partnership Council (JBPC) recommended a realignment of JBLM logistics functions through a MOA change request on 7 December 2020. The Intermediate Command Summit (ICS) concurred with the JBLM JBPC to submit a MOA change in support of the Army Field Support Battalion remaining merged with the Logistics Readiness Center as implemented under the Army Sustainment Command Futures and to return TOA resources supporting USAF Mission Readiness to USAF control. Estimated completion date for Joint Management Oversight Structure (JMOS) decision of the MOA Change 8 with variance is 31 December 2021.

Recommendation 3: We recommend that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in coordination with the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment:

Department of the Army (cont'd)

Headquarters Department of the Army, DCS, G9
 Comments to the Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG) Audit Report Titled:
 Audit of Department of Defense Joint Bases (Project: D2018-D000RH-0167.000)

- a. Establish clear order of precedence between the memorandum of agreement, joint base policy, and Service policies for joint bases.
- b. Develop internal procedures to ensure joint base needs are considered in Service-specific processes and decisions.
- c. Develop collaborative processes between the Services to identify and implement best practices at joint bases.
- d. Conduct a review of all joint bases, to include the memorandum of agreement to identify potential command authority and organizational conflicts, and assess the effectiveness of support systems to joint bases.
- e. Establish training or direct joint base commanders to issue local guidance to ensure installation personnel comply with established processes to update the memorandum of agreement and implement its current provisions.

Army Response Actions Taken or Planned:

Concur: Army supports a collaborative effort among the Services and the ASD(S) to resolve these findings. The Army, in coordination with ASD(S) and other services, has provided recommendations and revisions to the Facility Investment Guidance (FIG) and draft Joint Base Operations Guidance (JBOG). The targeted implementation date of a signed JBOG is dependent on ASD(S) driven timeline as well as the revised Joint Basing DoDD and DoDI – which are anticipated in December 2021.

- a. Establish clear order of precedence between the memorandum of agreement, joint base policy, and Service policies for joint bases.

Army Response: ASD(S), in collaboration with the Services, should include language clarifying Joint Basing policy order of precedence in the Joint Base Operational Guidance (JBOG).

- b. Develop internal procedures to ensure joint base needs are considered in Service-specific processes and decisions.

Army Response: Secretary of the Army signed Army Directive 2020-11 (10 October 2020) clearly defining roles and responsibilities for Military Installation Operations and established the Army installation strategy (AIS) signed 14 December 2020.

- c. Develop collaborative processes between the Services to identify and implement best practices at joint bases.

Army Response: ASD(S) with Service input should revise language capturing collaborative and best practice sharing processes in drafting the Joint Base Operational Guidance (JBOG). Army has successfully engaged with Air Force counterparts on

Department of the Army (cont'd)

Headquarters Department of the Army, DCS, G9
Comments to the Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG) Audit Report Titled:
Audit of Department of Defense Joint Bases (Project: D2018-D000RH-0167.000)

multiple occasions. The tri-service tiger team, under the purview of the Services Assistant Secretaries for Installations, to assess issues at all Joint Base locations was established in 2018. Additionally, during the summer of 2019 IMCOM ICS and HQDA (Army) and Air Force Installation Senior Leaders developed mutually agreeable solutions during the collaborative staffing and reconciliation efforts addressing JBSA Center for Army Analysis (CAA) reform recommendations.

Army and Air Force ICS Chairs hosted a semi-annual "Super ICS" Summit with Service ICS Leads (Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps) to discuss opportunities for enterprise consistency and standardization at the ICS level for all Joint Bases. This Summit enabled the services to collaborate and share common issues/themes/best practices in order to streamline processes, reduce repetitive issues across the enterprise, and to adopt business rules to be more effective in solving ICS-level issues. Of note, both the Army and Air Force have one person designated as ICS lead for all installations/bases. The ICS Chairs determined this was a best practice and recommend the Navy do the same.

The IMCOM ICS Chair will continue to schedule semi-annual "Super ICS" and Monthly ICS Meetings with IMCOM Directorate and Joint Base leads to further share best practices and develop solutions across the enterprise. The estimated completion date of this action is 1 April 2022.

d. Conduct a review of all joint bases, to include the memorandum of agreement to identify potential command authority and organizational conflicts, and assess the effectiveness of support systems to joint bases.

Army Response: The Army continues to support ASD(S) Joint Basing policy and guidance of ensuring MOAs are processed and packaged for signature within the JMOS approved timeline. Army continues to support the JBIG guidance requiring all Joint Bases to conduct a triennial MOA review if no changes were submitted within prescribed timeframe. Army is reviewing ASD(S) recommended Common Levels of Service/Cost & Performance Visibility framework (COLS/CPVF) reduced reporting frequency to once per year and reduced number of COLS focusing on high frequency "not met" COLS. Estimated completion date is 1 April 2023

e. Establish training or direct joint base commanders to issue local guidance to ensure installation personnel comply with established processes to update the memorandum of agreement and implement its current provisions.

Army Response: The Army supports ASD(S) Commander's day and Joint Base orientation training and recommends inclusion in the JBOG. All new Army installation leaders attend the Garrison pre-Command Course at the IMCOM Training Facility located at JBSA-Fort Sam Houston. HQDA, DCS G9 provides instruction during the Senior Commanders Course (SCC), with emphasis on Joint Base MOAs and Command Authority relationships.

Department of the Army (cont'd)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND
4400 MARTIN ROAD
REDSTONE ARSENAL, AL 35898-5000

AMIR

22 Mar 21

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G9 INSTALLATIONS

SUBJECT: Command Comments on Department of Defense Inspector General Draft Report: Audit of Department of Defense Joint Bases, Project D2018-D000RH-0167.000

1. The U.S. Army Materiel Command has reviewed the subject draft report and concurs with all recommendations. Our formal response is attached and will be submitted in accordance with HQDA guidance. AMC remains in full support of the Joint Basing construct and guidance. That being said, we believe a full review of the Joint Basing construct is warranted in order to better align both Service and command roles and responsibilities.

2. Specific to the DoDIG report on Joint Bases, we offer the following:

a. With regard to Recommendations 1 and 3, we agree that the Services should work collaboratively to better define roles and responsibilities at echelon and by Service. We believe that the Senior Ranking Officer (for the Service lead) at the installation should be designated the installation commander. Flag Officers and their staffs are much better equipped to provide oversight of installation operations and have the ability to rapidly marshal resources in time of crisis. I am confident that the Senior Ranking Officer, regardless of Service, will ensure equitable distribution of installation resources and support.

b. With regard to Recommendation 4, we concur that OSD and the Services need to review the Joint Basing Governance construct. While the Joint Management Oversight Structure (JMOS) process provides a pathway for issue resolution, it has become inefficient and lacks agility; the JMOS process should be reformed to become more responsive to emerging challenges. Furthermore, as the report stated, there is too much variance in process at different Joint Bases, often as a result of Service unique cultures and, sometimes, leader personalities. **To address this lack of uniform governance, we believe the Joint Basing Implementation Guidance (JBIG), signed by OSD, should supersede all installation specific MOAs. Additionally, Joint Base MOAs should be approved and signed by the Service Vice Chiefs of Staff, not by individual commanders at echelon.**

Department of the Army (cont'd)

AMIR

SUBJECT: Command Comments on Department of Defense Inspector General Draft Report: Audit of Department of Defense Joint Bases, Project D2018-D000RH-0167.000

3. As the Army Command responsible for Active Component installation operations, we look forward to follow on discussions to solve these problems. Joint Basing is the right thing for our Nation and AMC remains in full support. We want to make it better.

4. The U.S. Army Materiel Command point of contact for our response to the DoDIG Report on Joint Bases is [REDACTED], Director, U.S. Army Materiel Command Internal Review and Audit Compliance, [REDACTED] or email: [REDACTED].

Encl
Command Comments

 Digitally signed by
HARTER, ROBERT DONALD [REDACTED]

ROBERT D. HARTER
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

Department of the Army (cont'd)

Army Materiel Command
 Comments to the Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG)
 Audit Report Titled: Audit of Department of Defense Joint Bases
 (Project: D2018-D000RH-0167.000)

DODIG OBJECTIVE: The objective of this audit was to determine whether Service Components met the terms outlined in the joint base memorandums of agreement (MOAs) and whether processes are in place to report and address joint base–related concerns.

DODIG CONCLUSION: Lead components at JB Lewis–McChord, JB Anacostia–Bolling, and JB Elmendorf–Richardson did not always meet minimum performance standards or other terms specified in the MOA. In addition, while the DoD had processes to maintain the MOA, and report and address joint base concerns, these processes were not always followed or effective. Joint base personnel often identified Service-based decisions, operational differences, and a DoD-wide lack of joint base knowledge and operational guidance as reasons why MOA terms were not met and as overall program challenges. Also, joint bases did not always have the resources to meet the performance standards that they were evaluated against.

Lack of relevant operating guidance and processes; exclusion of joint base consideration in Service processes and decisions; and non-adherence to MOA terms can break down the joint construct, reducing efficiencies that can be gained from joint basing. These factors can also hamper relations on the installation and potentially marginalize the input, needs, and mission of the supported Components.

Command Reply for Recommendations 1 and 3

Recommendation 1

DODIG recommends that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, take appropriate action to resolve the disagreements at Joint Base Lewis–McChord (JBLM) surrounding the:

- a. Designation and authority of the joint base commander.
- b. Transfer and delivery of logistics support functions

1.a. AMC INPUT. JBLM Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) Change 9 (Command Authority) was submitted to HQDA in November 2018 requesting designation and authority of the Joint Base Commander (JBC) be given to the Senior Army Commander (I Corps Commanding General). The Senior Installation Management Group (SIMG – HQDA G-9 [REDACTED]) responded in June 2020 that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) directed the Army not to seek a change to command authority relationships at JBLM. This was presented at the 22 January 2021 JBLM Intermediate Command Summit (ICS) with the understanding MOA Change 9 would be retracted. However, follow on visits from Army Senior Leaders resulted in an Army position that

Department of the Army (cont'd)

Army Materiel Command
Comments to the Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG)
Audit Report Titled: Audit of Department of Defense Joint Bases
(Project: D2018-D000RH-0167.000)

the Senior Army Commander on JBLM should be the Joint Base Commander given he is ultimately responsible for all actions occurring on JBLM.

Of note, the Department of Defense (DOD) originally established Joint Base Implementation Guidance in July 2010 to ensure equitable command oversight of all joint bases, regardless of Service lead. We have come a long way since then and believe it is now time to relook command authorities.

DOD has a well-established and respectable adjudication process with the Joint Management Oversight Structure (JMOS) which was created to ensure fairness, provide oversight of MOA compliance, dispute resolution, and equitable allocation of funding requirements to the responsible entities; and resolve other issues as required. Designating the Senior Army Commander as the JBLM Joint Base Commander will place inherent command authorities where they belong and will not impact the effectiveness of the JMOS. Additionally, the Army recognizes the importance of joint basing responsibilities and believes it is in the best interest of all to place Command designation and associated responsibilities under the Senior Army Commander.

Recommendation 1.a will require adjudication at HQDA and a review of AR 600-20 (Army Command Policy), dated 24 July 2020, Section 2-6 which covers policy for command of installations, activities and units on Joint Bases. Additionally, the DRAFT DOD Joint Base Operations Guidance (JBOG) will also require changes to reflect this change.

A new MOA Change will be required for the command authority decision to be reversed.

1.b. AMC INPUT. MOA Change 8 (Transfer and Delivery of Logistics Support Functions) was previously deferred pending outcome of MOA Change 9. The 7 December 2020 Joint Base Partnership (JBPB) (voting members: I Corps, 62d Air Wing, JB Garrison, and 627th Air Base Group) voted and all concurred with COA 1 to submit MOA Change 8 and seek variance and partial reverse Total Obligation Authority (TOA). With CG, I Corps, and CG, Army Sustainment Command's (ASC) support, the ICS, conducted on 22 January 2021, voted and concurred with COA 1 for JBLM to submit an MOA change in support of the Army Field Support Battalion remaining merged with the Logistics Readiness Center as implemented under Army Sustainment Command Futures and to return TOA resources supporting USAF Mission Readiness to USAF control. JBLM will work with ASC, IMCOM and Air Force Installation Mission Support Command (AFIMSC) to ensure the transfer of resources are synchronized prior to formal submittal of MOA Change 8.

Estimated completion date for Joint Management Oversight Structure (JMOS) decision of the MOA Change 8 with variance is 31 December 2021.

Department of the Army (cont'd)

Army Materiel Command
Comments to the Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG)
Audit Report Titled: Audit of Department of Defense Joint Bases
(Project: D2018-D000RH-0167.000)

Recommendation 3

DODIG recommends that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; Vice Chief of Naval Operations; and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in coordination with the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment:

- a. Establish clear order of precedence between the memorandum of agreement, joint base policy, and Service policies for joint bases.
- b. Develop internal procedures to ensure joint base needs are considered in Service-specific processes and decisions.
- c. Develop collaborative processes between the Services to identify and implement best practices at joint bases.
- d. Conduct a review of all joint bases, to include the memorandum of agreement to identify potential command authority and organizational conflicts, and assess the effectiveness of support systems to joint bases.
- e. Establish training or direct joint base commanders to issue local guidance to ensure installation personnel comply with established processes to update the memorandum of agreement and implement its current provisions.

Concur with Recommendation 3. The Army has implemented several initiatives and revised regulations supporting Joint Basing since this audit began and continues to support the Joint Management Oversight Structure (JMOS) process. The Army Installation Management Community actively participates in all levels of the JMOS framework and attends the OSD Joint Base Working Group scheduled twice a month. The Army has provided recommendations and revisions to the Facility Investment Guidance (FIG) and draft Joint Base Operations Guidance (JBOG). The targeted implementation date of a signed JBOG is dependent on ASD(S) driven timeline as well as the revised Joint Basing DoDD and DoDI - anticipated December 2021.

3.a. DA G-9 INPUT. Army Regulation (AR) 600-20 revision (24 July 2020) section 2-6 included ASD(S) Joint Basing guidance and JMOS adjudication processes which address a clear order of precedence between the memorandum of agreement, joint base policy, and Service policies for joint bases. Army has provided O6/COL level feedback on the draft JBOG to ASD(S) twice in the past 18 months and provided recommendations to the ASD(S) staffing of the JMOS framework revision. We expect higher level staffing soon.

Department of the Army (cont'd)

Army Materiel Command
Comments to the Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG)
Audit Report Titled: Audit of Department of Defense Joint Bases
(Project: D2018-D000RH-0167.000)

Recommendation 3.a is work in progress.

3.b. DA G-9 INPUT. Secretary of the Army signed Army Directive 2020-11 (10 October 2020) clearly defining roles and responsibilities for Military Installation Operations and established the Army Installation Strategy (AIS) signed 14 December 2020. Both documents ensured joint base needs are considered during Army specific processes such Total Army Analysis (TAA), and the Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM).

Recommendation 3.b is complete.

3.c. DA G9 INPUT. On 20 July 2018, the Secretary of the Army directed an assessment of Joint Bases San Antonio (JBSA), Langley-Eustis (JBLE) and Lewis-McChord (JBLM). This was in response to common issues raised by the commanders during his travels to Joint Bases. On 27 July 2018, at a Service Secretaries' meeting, the topic of joint basing was raised and a common thread of issues across the Services was noted. An agreement was made to initiate a tri-service tiger team, under the purview of the Services Assistant Secretaries for Installations, to assess issues at all Joint Base locations. The desired end state was a tri-service alignment of service positions on Joint Base issues before discussing with OSD. The tiger team surveyed and interviewed the Joint Base Commanders and Senior Commander at all joint bases; and the findings were briefed to the Service Secretaries on 14 September 2018.

AMC INPUT. During the summer of 2019 IMCOM ICS and HQDA (Army) and Air Force Installation Senior Leaders developed mutually agreeable solutions during the collaborative staffing and reconciliation efforts addressing JBSA and JBLE Center for Army Analysis (CAA) reform recommendations. CAA identified 20 reform action recommendations for JBSA and 17 reform recommendations for JBLE. As of the 7 December 2020 JBSA ICS, four reforms actions are closed, six reform actions are at Senior Installation Management Group (SIMG) level for adjudication, and 11 reform actions remain open at ICS and below level. Additionally, a joint Air Force and Army-led Facility, Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (FSRM) execution study at JBSA identified 12 additional recommendations and courses of action to supplement the CAA report. Six of these actions are closed. As of the 15 December 2020 JBLE ICS, six reforms are closed with 11 at the SIMG level for adjudication. Service solutions and agreements were codified by a DCS, G9 and A4 signed memorandum of agreement 20 July 2020.

Army and Air Force ICS Chairs hosted a semi-annual "Super ICS" Summit with Service ICS Leads (Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps) to discuss opportunities for enterprise consistency and standardization at the ICS level for all Joint Bases. Topics

Department of the Army (cont'd)

Army Materiel Command
Comments to the Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG)
Audit Report Titled: Audit of Department of Defense Joint Bases
(Project: D2018-D000RH-0167.000)

included discussion on how the ICS can improve the overall Joint Management Oversight Structure (JMOS) process based on the recent draft OSD Joint Base Operations Guidance (JBOG) and an overview of the Restoration and Maintenance Facilities Investment Supplemental Guidance. This Summit enabled the services to collaborate and share common issues/themes/best practices in order to streamline processes, reduce repetitive issues across the enterprise, and to adopt business rules to be more effective in solving ICS-level issues. Of note, both the Army and Air Force have one person designated as ICS lead for all installations/bases. The ICS Chairs determined this was a best practice and recommend the Navy do the same.

The Executive Deputy to the Commanding General (EDCG), IMCOM (Army ICS Chair) conducts monthly meetings with Joint Base Leads (IMCOM Directorate representatives and Joint Base Commanders/Deputies) to share ideas and best practices. Examples included successful streamlining of the process for range projects at non-Army led Joint Bases, and for the Services to develop procedures to facilitate jointly funded Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (SRM) projects.

Recommendation 3.c is complete from a process standpoint. The IMCOM ICS Chair will continue to schedule semi-annual "Super ICS" and Monthly ICS Meetings with IMCOM Directorate and Joint Base leads to further share best practices and develop solutions across the enterprise.

3.d. DA G-9 INPUT. Army continues to support ASD(S) Joint Basing policy and guidance of ensuring MOAs are processed and packaged for signature within the JMOS approved timeline. Army continues to support the JBIG guidance requiring all Joint Bases to conduct a triannual MOA review if no changes were submitted within prescribed timeframe. Army is reviewing ASD(S) recommended COLS/CPVF reduced reporting frequency to once per year and reduced number of COLS focusing on high frequency "not met" COLS.

Recommendation 3.d is complete.

3.e. DA G-9 INPUT. HQDA, DCS, G-9 Operations Directorate (DAIN ODP) supports ASD(S) Commander's Day and Joint Base Orientation Training within the Pentagon. All new Army installation leaders attend the Garrison Pre-Command Course at the IMCOM Training Facility located at JBSA-Fort Sam Houston, TX. AMC is also developing an Executive-level Joint Basing Briefing for Senior Army Commanders who will be assigned to Joint Bases.

The estimated completion date for Recommendation 3.e is 30 June 2021.

Department of the Navy



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER, NAVY INSTALLATIONS COMMAND
716 SICARD STREET, SE, SUITE 100
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD, DC 20374-5140

3020
Ser N5/21U003
28 Apr 2021

From: Commander, Navy Installations Command
To: Inspector General, Department of Defense


Subj: CNIC RESPONSE TO DOD OIG DRAFT REPORT PROJECT NO.
D2018-D000RH-0167.000, AUDIT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT BASES

Ref: (a) DoD OIG Draft Report Project No. D2018-D000RH-0167.000 of 4 Feb 21

Encl: (1) CNIC N5 Review Comments on DoD OIG Draft Report, Audit of Department of
Defense Joint Bases (Project No. D2018-D000RH-0167.000)

1. Per reference (a), Commander, Navy Installations Command's (CNIC) management review comments to Department of Defense Inspector General is provided in enclosure (1).

2. CNIC N5 Director, Strategy and Future Shore Integrated Requirements, maintains oversight of the Navy's joint basing program on behalf of OPNAV N4. CNIC N5's technical point of contact is [REDACTED], CNIC N52B, Integrated Strategic Planning at [REDACTED], or email: [REDACTED]. The audit liaison point of contact is [REDACTED], CNIC OIG, at [REDACTED], or email: [REDACTED].



R. E. THOMPSON
By direction

Copy to:
CNIC (OIG)
NAVAUDSVC

Department of the Navy (cont'd)

Enclosure (1)

**CNIC (N5) Review Comments on DoD OIG Draft Report Audit of Department Of
Defense Joint Bases (Project No. D2018-D000RH-0167.000)**

The Navy has no critical comments regarding the discussion draft, but requests DODIG assess/consider changes to Page 28, para 3. Specifically:

- a. In June 2020, the Vice Chiefs of the Air Force and Naval Operations signed a new MOA for JB Anacostia-Bolling that addresses the relationship of the Air Force, as supporting component, and the Marine Corps. For example, the MOA defines facility investment for the Marine Corps detachment and clearly identifies the items within airfield operations and facilities, among others, that are considered installation support or mission support. It also clarifies whether the supporting component or the Marine Corps Installation Command has the responsibility to sustain those items.

Navy comment: Wording in paragraph was hard to follow.

Recommendation: Modify to read: In June 2020, the Vice Chiefs of the Air Force and Naval Operations signed a new MOA for JB Anacostia-Bolling that addressed the relationship between the Air Force, as the supporting component, and the Marine Corps. For example, the MOA defines facility investment for the Marine Corps, which clearly identifies the items within airfield operations and facilities, among others, that are considered installation support or mission support in Attachment 1, Annex D. It also clarifies whether the Air Force or the Marine Corps have the responsibility to sustain those items.

Per the Joint Base Implementation Guidance (JBIG), the Navy Joint Basing Team will continue participation in the Joint Base Working Group (JBWG) to address and resolve joint basing issues. As such, the Navy defers to the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Sustainment (DASD) (S) as the JBWG oversight authority for input on proposed recommendations 2 and 4. The Navy defers to the Army and Air Force for a response to recommendation 1.

Commander Navy Installations Command's (CNIC) response to recommendation 3 as follows:

The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; Vice Chief of Naval Operations; and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in coordination with the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment:

- a. Establish clear order of precedence between the memorandum of agreement, joint base policy, and Service policies for joint bases.
 - a. Response: This protocol is currently established per the JBIG, which is under revision by the DASD (S) in coordination with the Services. The replacement policy is the Joint Base Operational Guidance (JBOG) with a projected completion date of Apr 2022, whereas clarity on this item may be incorporated as needed.
- b. Develop internal procedures to ensure joint base needs are considered in Service-specific processes and decisions.
 - a. Response: These procedures are contained in the JBIG, which reflects: "The Joint Management Oversight Structure (JMOS) is comprised of representatives from each Component for each Joint Base. The JMOS reviews the MOA, to ensure fairness; provides oversight of MOA compliance, disputes resolution, and equitable allocation of funding

Department of the Navy (cont'd)

Enclosure (1)

requirements to the responsible entities; and resolve other issues as required. Unresolved issues may be elevated in the JMOS for Service coordination as needed". As such, OPNAV N4 represents the Navy in the Senior Installation Management Group (SIMG) and the Senior Joint Base Working Group (SJBWG) by coordinating with Service Leads on all joint base issues that impacts Navy-specific processes and decisions. Issues generally occur when a Service lead at the base or installation-level elects to resolve a joint basing-related issue outside the JMOS. In such cases, the CNIC (N5) coordinates directly with the Navy Region that has oversight authority of the specified Joint Base. The Team's objective is facilitation of an equitable solution with the affected Services.

- c. Develop collaborative processes between the Services to identify and implement best practices at joint bases.
 - a. Response: This process is addressed on an annual basis as led by the DASD (S) with Joint Base Commanders during the annual Joint Base Commander's Day seminars. The next session is tentatively scheduled during the spring of 2021. Afterwards, the DASD (S) provides the seminar results to joint basing personnel.
- d. Conduct a review of all joint bases, to include the memorandum of agreement to identify potential command authority and organizational conflicts, and assess the effectiveness of support systems to joint bases.
 - a. Response: This initiative was completed by the Tri-Service Tiger Team for five joint bases that were considered "challenged" by the Service Secretaries, thereby resulting in revised MOAs for Joint Region Marianas and Joint Base Anacostia Bolling. Additionally, this is an ongoing initiative for all joint bases, which is coordinated via the JBWG as led by DASD (S). Additionally, joint basing leadership is required to conduct a tri-annual review of the MOA in its entirety, which accommodates identification of relative conflicts. If the review results in recommended changes in the MOA, they are processed via the JMOS.
- e. Establish training or direct joint base commanders to issue local guidance to ensure installation personnel comply with established processes to update the memorandum of agreement and implement its current provisions.
 - a. Response: Navy Region Commanders coordinate this effort with their Service counterparts on Navy-equity joint bases. However, there are examples where this effort is futile, because Services policies and or protocols for specified installation support functions are incompatible. Examples of these are the Drug Demand Reduction Programs, Military Personnel Services, Financial Management, and Equal Opportunity programs. These are examples where joint basing leadership exhausted all efforts in attempts to train personnel on functions that are unique to a specific Service. In such cases a variance is required to resolve the issue.

Department of the Air Force



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, DC

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: HQ USAF/A4
1030 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1030

SUBJECT: Department of the Air Force Response to the DoD Office of Inspector General Draft Report, Project No. D2018-D000RH-0167.000

This is the Department of the Air Force (DAF) response to the DoDIG Draft Report, "Audit of Department of Defense Joint Bases" (Project No. D2018-D000RH-0167.000). DAF concurs with the report as written and welcomes the opportunity to clarify and develop Joint Basing policy and operations in coordination with OSD and the other services.

AF/A4, as the DAF senior representative to the OSD-run Senior Joint Base Working Group (SJBWG), in coordination with Air Mobility Command (AMC), Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Department of the Army, and the Department of the Navy, will address issues identified in this report. As stated, we concur with the recommendations attributed to the U.S. Air Force [1.a., 1.b., 3.a, 3.b, 3.c, 3.d, and 3.e.]. Since these recommendations cannot be solved by the DAF alone, we will officially address the issues through the Joint Basing governance structure (JMOS), which is chaired by OSD.

The AF/A4 point of contact is [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], or via email at [REDACTED].

BERRY WARRE
N.D. [REDACTED]

WARREN D. BERRY
Lieutenant General, USAF
DCS/Logistics, Engineering & Force Protection

U.S. Marine Corps



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
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WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000

IN REPLY REFER TO
11000
L
26 Feb 21

From: Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics
To: Office of Inspector General, Department of Defense

Subj: DODIG DRAFT REPORT ON AUDIT OF DOD JOINT BASES (Project
NUMBER D2018-D000RH-0167.000)

Encl: (1) USMC Response
(2) JB Draft Report Security Marking Review

1. I concur with Recommendations 3.a through 3.e. (Encl (1))
2. After a review of the appropriate marking for the draft, I concur with the DODIG that the information is not sensitive. (Encl (2))
3. Point of contact for this matter, [REDACTED] can be reached at [REDACTED], [REDACTED].


C. G. CHIAROTTI

U.S. Marine Corps (cont'd)

**DODIG DRAFT REPORT DATED FEBRUARY 4, 2021
PROJECT NO. D2018-D000RH-0167.000**

“AUDIT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT BASES”

**UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS COMMENTS
TO THE DODIG RECOMMENDATIONS**

RECOMMENDATION 3.a: DODIG recommends that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; Vice Chief of Naval Operations; and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in coordination with the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment:

a. Establish clear order of precedence between the memorandum of agreement, joint base policy, and Service policies for joint bases.

USMC RESPONSE: Concur without comment.

RECOMMENDATION 3.b: DODIG recommends that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; Vice Chief of Naval Operations; and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in coordination with the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment:

b. Develop internal procedures to ensure joint base needs are considered in Service-specific processes and decisions.

USMC RESPONSE: Concur without comment.

RECOMMENDATION 3.c: DODIG recommends that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; Vice Chief of Naval Operations; and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in coordination with the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment:

c. Develop collaborative processes between the Services to identify and implement best practices at joint bases.

USMC RESPONSE: Concur without comment.

U.S. Marine Corps (cont'd)

RECOMMENDATION 3.d: DODIG recommends that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; Vice Chief of Naval Operations; and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in coordination with the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment:

d. Conduct a review of all joint bases, to include the memorandum of agreement to identify potential command authority and organizational conflicts, and assess the effectiveness of support systems to joint bases.

USMC RESPONSE: Concur without comment.

RECOMMENDATION 3.e: DODIG recommends that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; Vice Chief of Naval Operations; and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in coordination with the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment:

e. Establish training or direct joint base commanders to issue local guidance to ensure installation personnel comply with established processes to update the memorandum of agreement and implement its current provisions.

USMC RESPONSE: Concur without comment.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure
CPVF	Cost and Performance Visibility Framework
DASD (Real Property)	Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Real Property
JB	Joint Base
JB-COLS	Joint Base Common Output Level Standards
JBIG	Joint Base Implementation Guidance
JMOS	Joint Management Oversight Structure
MILPERS	Military Personnel Services
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense



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