UNCLASSIFIED//FOR DOCID: 4062834 HEMO ROU NEVER USE POR APPROVALS, DISAPP CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTI G SLIP 1 TO INITIALS CIRCULATE (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36'. DATE COORDINATION INFORMATION DIA STON PER-CON-SEE ME SIGNATURE REMARKS 1 M & COMM Owen: Would appreciate your comments on attached final draft. We are asking for ADPconcurrence so that we can sit with the Ad Hod Group about Wednesday of this week. sections dealing with emergency destruction and enduring detention are new, but appear be acceptable. FROM D321 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION - # GPO: 1968-0-312-139 Approved for Release by NSA on 07-08-2013, FOIA Case # 63391

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SUBJECT: Draft Report of USIB Addice Group on FUEBLO

- 1. Attached draft is report of USIB AdNoc Group from the SIGINT and Security Sub-Committee of USIB. and Len Bienvenu are the MEA reps. This is the companion report to the Mavy Report read earlier this week and INR discussed with you.
- 2. My general impression of the report is that the Special Addice Group did little more than take the Recommendations of the AIM Showers IDAG and reword them in directive language for attachment to DCID 5/3. It would appear very little review of actual practices did take place.
- 3. There are some serious problems/interpretations involved which should be brought to your attention:

PAGE 2, PARA 4

The Addicc Group, for some reason, limited their consideration to COMIMT. The IDAG charge was for all Special Intelligence. COMIMT was not the only "culprit" that needed tightening up on the FURMA. I think the group moved toward COMIMT since it is specifically covered in directives and rather well understood. If they took on all Special Intelligence, they would have to do some original research (my personal opinion). I think a comment on why just "COMIMT" is necessary in the paper.

PAGE 2, PARA (b) of the

DRAFT Policy statement "by message" should not be specified. Some of original inventories to MSA will be thousands of items. If left open, MSA can then set up procedure as done for ships and get lists by mail. Requirement for quarterly inventory statement will require increased manpower to handle at least on initial inputs. Quarterly requirement should eventually work down to only "changes" to besic inventory being forwarded.

PAGE 2, PARA d.

P2 raised some objection to annual inspection, but I feel this is OK since this is part of regular military IG Inspection procedure that just needs increased emphasis, not large expenditure of new resources.

PAGE 3

"Levying of Requirements" -- Remove (a) (b) (c); (a) is statement of problem; (b) is rationale for change and (c) is the change required. In (c) renumber (1) and (2) to (a) and (b).

APPENDED DOCUMENTS CONTAIN

CODEWORD MATERIAL

DOWNGRADE TO
WHEN HACLOSURE(S) ARE REMOVED

MOST EXPLOYED BY BUILDING

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Saver - Althought german in an

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In first pare (a) "unmodified" should be deleted and (SICR's) added after intelligence requirements; this is specific problems identified. Also, in same sentence delete "useful" since it is not a useful practice and leave it as a potentially dangerous practice.

PAGE 5, PARA (8)

Disagree with inference in second sentence that when SIGINT operational control is delegated that some portions of technical control, such as risk to intelligence sources and documents, are also delegated to field commander. I do not feel that the field commander can weigh his intelligence advantage against loss of TOP SECRET information, for example, without having advantage of MSA judgement. Consultation with MSA when SIGINT sources, methods, and documents are endangered should be manulatory.

PAGE 6, PABA (d)

Priority destruction of documents should conform to classification, i.e., TOP SECRET first etc.

EXEC/PV4

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Incl: