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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

28 May 1969

SUBJECT: "Lessons Learned" - PUEBLO and EC-121 Incidents

CHECK

1. The second meeting on the above subject took place in the A Conference Room on 28 May 1969 at 0900 hours.

2. The following people were present:

Mr. R. D. Snow, Chairman, PO4

[Redacted]

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Mr. C. R. Lord, A05

[Redacted]

Mr. R. Scobey, CO4

Mr. R. McConaughey, G04

Mr. J. J. Monroe, P1

[Redacted]



Absent: [Redacted]

3. The papers requested at the previous meeting were not presented, the main reason appearing to be a lack of a logical approach to the preparation of the papers. Thus ensued a lengthy discussion of several aspects, some of which are listed below:

a. Necessity of obtaining information on platform activity, identifying responsible authority and general control of the recon problem.

b. Problems in management areas when "incident" happens indicates general lack of overall control.

c. Necessity of diverting manpower to respond to "flaps".

d. Problems attendant to inter-office coordination and cooperation on recon matters.

e. Lack of control of provision of technical or product material to platforms. PO4 efforts in inventory mentioned but noted that solution rests in centralizing the issuance of all material.

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f. Seaborne platforms crew briefings at NSAW may not be necessary. Present disjointed briefings permit the collection of various "T/A" aids which never get on an inventory. Perhaps if briefings are necessary then they need to be conducted in a more restricted/controlled atmosphere.

g. Necessity of establishing central group to review tasking. A long discussion on this then took place.

(1). Tasking should dictate technical or product material on board the platform.

(2). Localize all responsibility for provision of technical support material.

4. The chairman mentioned two papers, one in-being, the other in early state of preparation.

a. An N paper on destruct systems is coming out soon. P2 queried if destruct systems were regarded as a cure-all, and pointed out that several actions in this regard have already taken place. It was felt generally that a destruct system is not the total answer. P04 mentioned that destruct systems appear to change with the SCA whim, this prompted A to suggest the formation of an NSA/SCA team to standardize destruct procedures.

b. The second paper was a memorandum from P2 to ADP on the general topic of the desirability of a central recon authority in NSA. This approach agreed with some of the committee's previous discussions on 21 May and was noted.

5. A and P1 noted that the recon problem did not start on 27 Jan 1968, and that we required some system to evaluate the individual recon platforms. The basic differences of air vs. seaborne platforms permitted a "library" of sorts to be carried on a seaborne platform, whereas the weight limitations of the airborne platform dictated some control of the number of documents carried.

6. This led to a presentation by G and A of an approach to documenting problems encountered in these two incidents. It was agreed that P04 and K would formulate a "PROBLEM GRID" and forward to each committee representative for completion.

2

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7. The date, time and location of the next meeting will be announced upon completion of the "PROBLEM GRID" and after sufficient time has lapsed for completion of the "GRID" by the committee members.

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Recorder
ADP Ad Hoc Committee

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