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D6 (ATTN: Mr. Roy Banner)

8 September 1970

C/TCOM

Information for the Congressional Subcommittee on the
Pueblo and EC-121 Incidents

The inclosed material has been prepared in response to the questions raised by the Congressional Subcommittee on DOD World-Wide Communications. Regretably, we are unable to provide all the information desired on the EC-121 incident; however, we are available to assist in any way possible and to provide any additional data available to us which might be deemed necessary.

/s/ Albert F. Arant

ALBERT A. ARANT

Colonel USAF

Chief of Telecommunications

B1
2 Incls:

1. B1 Memorandum, Subject: Response to Queries Regarding the EC-121 and USS Pueblo Incidents, Serial B1/342/70, dated 3 September 1970.
2. T1 Narrative, Subject: T1 Response to Queries Regarding Spot Reports and Follow-ups concerning the EC-121 Incident, dated 4 September 1970.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TO : T14 []

DATE: 3 September 1970

FROM : B1

In reply refer to:
B1/342/70 hffSUBJECT: Response to Queries Regarding the
EC-121 and USS Pueblo Incidents(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Copies of the [] message cited in the first page of subject questions have been forwarded to you. The comments below pertain to the USS Pueblo seizure as addressed in the second page of questions. These comments are listed below the specific questions being addressed.

Was such a message intercepted? If so, by whom?
Was USS Pueblo informed of that intercepted message?
If so, at what time was USS Pueblo informed?
If not, what, if anything, was done with that intercepted message?

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 793
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

1. A [] SIGINT report issued at 230605Z or 15051 (approximately 3 hours after time of intercept) contained the information quoted as a "message" by the Washington Star. The description of the ship was reflected in plaintext voice while the SO-1 position was derived from a position report passed by the North Korean vessel.

2. The [] report constituted the initial product reporting of North Korean communications related to the Pueblo seizure. The Pueblo would have received the above report had shore to ship communications been functioning routinely. However, the Pueblo had been boarded by 0540Z and had ceased

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communicating at 0532Z. Therefore, the Pueblo could not have received the information in question or any other subsequent SIGINT reflections of 23 January North Korean communications. In fact, the ship was at that time being escorted toward W'onsan.

3. The report in question was, of course, automatically forwarded via established communications channels to the normal recipients of product, including 5 Air Force, SSO Korea, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, COMNAVFORJAPAN, DIA, JCS and DIRNSA. (See Attachment for complete list)

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Fact #224, page 37, Court of Inquiry -

Was the position report the only information in that message

Were any other messages of the North Korean ships inter-

cepted on January 23 prior to seizure of the USS Pueblo?

If so, what was the text of those messages?

Was anybody informed of those messages?

- - - - -

4. The position report passed by SC-35 at 230310Z was the only information contained in that particular message.

5. There were other messages passed by North Korean ships on 23 January prior to the Pueblo seizure at 0540Z. These messages consisted of position reports and plaintext voice conversations reflecting: (1) the SC-35 approach to the Pueblo; (2) descriptions of the Pueblo; (3) relay of


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(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 793
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

instructions to the boarding party; (4) firing orders and
(5) description of crew and gear after boarding.

6. The Pueblo was not informed of the above messages
for reasons cited in para 2 above.

7. The information contained in these messages was
disseminated to normal recipients of [] product reporting
on North Korean Navy activity. Since [] was the only source
of this intercept, the processing and reporting cycle obviously
had to be completed prior to any reporting of subject activity.



JAMES R. HARRIS
Deputy Chief, B1

cc: Chief, B

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
(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36



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Non - Responsive



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INCLOSURE

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Non - Responsive




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Attachment