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MEMO ROUTING SLIP		NEVER USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS, CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS		ACTION	
1 TO	Mr. Price	INITIALS	CIRCULATE		
		DATE	COORDINATION		
2			FILE		
			INFORMATION		
3			NOTE AND RETURN		
			PER CONVERSATION		
4			SEE ME		
			SIGNATURE		
REMARKS <p>Attached was provided to LCDR Koczak, DL, on 5 Feb in response to the Director's request for a short paper for Mr. Coyne on tasking and operational control of the PUEBLO.</p> <p>Tab A, of which we have no more copies, was DIRNSA DTG 292017Z Dec 67 (AGO 12194/29). It was the secondary tasking message.</p> <p>Approved for release by NSA on 05-27-2014, Transparency Case# 63391</p>					
FROM		[Redacted]		DATE	
[Redacted]		Acting Chief, D32		35734 Feb 68	
				PHONE	

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

DD FORM 1 OCT 60 95

REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION

* GPO : 1963 O-692-593

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DOCID: 4121757

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
Paper for DIRECTOR
(Coyne) 12 Feb 68

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Provided to LEON KOCOSK, OZ,
for General Carter to give to
Mr. Byrne. Reported by Gen Carter.



12 Feb 68

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~CONTROL OF THE SIGINT ACTIVITIES OF USS PUEBLO

1. The USS PUEBLO (AGER-2) is one of three environmental research ships (AGER) which serve as multi-sensor intelligence collection platforms. The other two are the USS HANNER (AGER-1), operating in the Pacific, and the USS PALM BEACH (AGER-3), which is scheduled to operate [redacted]. They are small, trawler-type ships. They all have [redacted] aboard.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-E.O. 86-36

2. The SIGINT mission of the Naval Security Group Detachment aboard the USS PUEBLO is to intercept, exploit and report on foreign electromagnetic emissions for SIGINT purposes. The detachment provides SIGINT direct support to the commanding officer and satisfies specified fleet and national SIGINT collection requirements.

3. The non-SIGINT intelligence collection efforts aboard the USS PUEBLO, such as photography, radar and [redacted] intelligence, do not involve NSA in any way. NSA involvement in the SIGINT mission, in relation to the authority and responsibility for operational and technical control of SIGINT activities which are assigned to NSA in NSCID No. 6., is summarized as follows:

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

a. Operational Control

The Naval Security Group Detachment in the USS PUEBLO is under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT). It is one of [redacted], all of which are direct support units for which operational control has been delegated by the Director, NSA, to the Chief of Naval Operations, who has redelegated it to the appropriate fleet commanders. (This is in accordance with paragraph 7.c. of NSCID No. 6., which provides for delegation of operational control for direct support purposes.)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

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~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

Thus CINCPACFLT is responsible for the assignment of SIGINT tasks, designation of specific targets and allocation of SIGINT effort. He accomplishes this through the Naval Security Group. In the case of the AGERS, the Naval Security Group has provided for secondary tasking by NSA.

The Director, Naval Security Group Pacific (DIRNAVSECGRUPAC) who is attached to the CINCPACFLT staff, coordinates the utilization, operation and administration of the [] in the Pacific. The SIGINT detachment in the USS PUEBLO operates under DIRNAVSECGRUPAC SIGINT Letter of Instruction 1-68, dated 2 January 1968.

b. Secondary Tasking

The concept of operations of the environmental research ships (AGERS) (contained in DIRNAVSECGRUPAC Letter of Instruction 1-68, dated 2 January 1968) provides for primary tasking by the Navy and secondary tasking by NSA. Primary tasking by the Navy is for the purpose of meeting Fleet and other Navy requirements as well as the direct support requirements of the commanding officer of the ship. Secondary tasking by NSA is for the purpose of meeting other national requirements on an opportunity basis in those cases where the ship would be operating for a fairly long period of time in waters contiguous to Soviet, [] and North Korean territory.

Secondary tasking was requested by CINCPACFLT for the USS PUEBLO, and it was provided by NSA to the Director, Naval Security Group on 29 December 1967. It covered special interest North Korean COMINT and ELINT requirements which

[]

(b) (1)
(b) (3) - 50 USC 403
(b) (3) - 18 USC 798
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

The determination of whether and when to perform the secondary tasks would have been made by naval authorities. The extent to which those tasks were performed has not been determined.

c. Technical Control

In accordance with NSCID No. 6., the Director, NSA, continues to exercise technical control and provide technical support to all SIGINT operations, even when operational control has been delegated. By this means, all collectors and processors are required to perform the SIGINT mission in accordance with uniform techniques and standards for collection, processing and reporting, as prescribed by NSA. Generally, the exercise of technical control is accomplished by the issuance of Technical Instructions (TECHINS) in the Manual of U.S. SIGINT Operations which is published by NSA and available to all Service Cryptologic Agency headquarters. In addition, specialized technical support or technical guidance is provided by NSA as necessary in support of specific tasks assigned by the operational control authority or in support of NSA secondary tasking.

In the case of the USS PUEBLO, a basic SIGINT technical package [redacted]

[redacted] was carried by the SIGINT detachment. Such packages contain basic NSA Technical Instructions (TECHINS) necessary to conduct any SIGINT mission, usually without regard to specific areas or tasks. As both the primary and secondary tasks were being developed, additional technical support materials were provided to supplement the basic package. The [redacted] provided certain supplementary materials, largely on Russian targets in support of SIGINT tasks to be performed in the Sea of Japan. NSA provided additional technical materials directly from NSA Headquarters in support of tasks to be performed against Korean targets.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

C. Green
12 Feb 68
Revised by D/R
to Mr. Byrne -

~~TOP SECRET~~~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~CONTROL OF THE SIGINT ACTIVITIES OF USS PUEBLO

1. The USS PUEBLO (AGER-2) is one of three environmental research ships (AGER) which serve as multi-sensor intelligence collection platforms. The other two are the USS BANNER (AGER-1), operating in the Pacific, and the USS PALM BEACH (AGER-3), which is scheduled to operate [redacted]. They are small, trawler-type ships. They all have Naval Security Group Detachments aboard.

2. The non-SIGINT intelligence collection effort included photography, radar, acoustic and [redacted] intelligence. None of these involved NSA in any way.

(b) (1)
 (b) (3) -50 USC 403
 (b) (3) -18 USC 798
 (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

3. The SIGINT mission of the Naval Security Group Detachment aboard the USS PUEBLO was to intercept, exploit and report on foreign electromagnetic emissions for SIGINT purposes. The primary function of the detachment was to provide SIGINT direct support to the Commanding Officer. The secondary function was to satisfy specified fleet and national SIGINT collection requirements.

4. NSA involvement in the SIGINT mission of the USS PUEBLO, in relation to the authority and responsibility for operational and technical control of SIGINT activities which are assigned to NSA in NSCID-6, are summarized as follows:

a. Operational control:

The Naval Security Group Detachment in the USS PUEBLO is [redacted], all of which are direct support units under the operational control of the appropriate Fleet Commander. The detachment in the USS PUEBLO is under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT). This means that CINCPACFLT is responsible for the assignment of tasks, designation of specified targets and allocation of effort -- in other words, he prescribes what to do. Operational control was delegated to CINCPACFLT by the Chief of Naval Operations, to whom the Director, NSA, delegated operational control of [redacted] several years ago. This was done in accordance with paragraph 7.c. of NSCID-6 which provides for delegation of operational control for direct support purposes. The Director, Naval Security Group, tasks the [redacted] on behalf of CNO. In the Pacific area, the

(b) (1)
 (b) (3) -50 USC 403
 (b) (3) -18 USC 798
 (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)
 (b) (3) -50 USC 403
 (b) (3) -18 USC 798
 (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS~~
~~CODEWORD MATERIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

the [] on behalf of CNO. In the Pacific area, the Director, Naval Security Group Pacific (DIRNAVSECGRPAC) attached to the staff of the CINCPACFLT, is responsible to the CINCPACFLT for coordinating the utilization, operation and administration of the []. The detachment is the USS PUEBLO operates under DIRNAVSECGRPAC SIGINT Letter of Instruction 1-68, dated 2 January 1968.

(b) (1)
 (b) (3)-50 USC 403
 (b) (3)-18 USC 798
 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

b. Supplementary Tasking.

Although operational control is exercised by CINCPACFLT, or by the Naval Security Group on his behalf, there is provision for SIGINT tasking (which normally is an element of operational control) to be provided by NSA. Such tasking is provided through the Naval Security Group, to be used when the SIGINT resources in the ship were not engaged in the primary task of direct support, which consists of supporting the Commanding Officer of the ship and satisfying specified fleet collection requirements. Secondary tasking was provided by NSA to the Director, Naval Security Group, for the SIGINT resources in the USS PUEBLO on 29 December 1967. Such supplementary tasking had been requested by CINCPACFLT on []. The determination of whether and when to perform the secondary tasks was the responsibility of the Officer-in-charge of the Naval Security Group detachment in the USSO PUEBLO. It is not known whether secondary tasks were undertaken. (TAB B)

c. Technical control.

The Director, NSA continues to exercise technical control and provide technical support to all SIGINT operations, even when operational control has been delegated. By this means, NSA prescribes the uniform techniques and standards by which SIGINT information is collected, processed and reported. NSA continues to tell the collectors and processors how to perform the SIGINT mission, even when the supported authority determines what the mission shall be.

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ TRINE~~TOP SECRET~~TECHNICAL CONTROL/SUPPORT

The exercise of technical control over resources which are not under the operational control of the Director, NSA, is not a clearcut function. The extent to which it is necessary or desirable to tell a [] or a direct support unit how to do the job when some other authority has specified what to do, beyond certain very basic technical instructions applicable to all SIGINT operations, is dependent largely upon request from the SIGINT unit involved or its parent Service Cryptologic Agency, or the operational control authority.

(b) (1)
(b) (3) - 50 USC 403
(b) (3) - 18 USC 798
(b) (3) - F.L. 86-36

Technical support, however, was furnished as follows:

In the case of the PUEBLO, the basic SIGINT technical package, selected and put aboard USN-467Y by the Naval Security Group, shortly after commissioning at Bremerton, Washington, contained NSA Technical Instructions (TECHINS) in the MUS80 series related to collection, processing, and reporting tasks. This basic technical support package was supplemented at Sasebo prior to the PUEBLO going on station. This latter supplement contained further current instructions and working aid materials necessary to the fulfillment of assigned collection tasks. The total technical support package aboard PUEBLO would have consisted of materials classified up to TOP SECRET Codeword. Among those materials were Soviet and Korean Communist []

[]

[] plus dictionaries, charts and maps, and assorted working aids.

(b) (1)
(b) (3) - 50 USC 403
(b) (3) - 18 USC 798
(b) (3) - F.L. 86-36

[]

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Paper for DIRECTOR
(Coyne)
5 Feb 68

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Approved by ADW.

Provided to KOC KOCZAK, OI,
 ST-6 for D/OIR to deliver to
 1st. Coyne, per D/OIR request,
 CGJew

~~TOP SECRET~~~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~CONTROL OF THE SIGINT ACTIVITIES OF USS PUEBLO

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(b) (1)
 (b) (3) - 50 USC 403
 (b) (3) - 18 USC 798
 (b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

2. The non-SIGINT intelligence collection effort included photography, radar, acoustic and [redacted] intelligence. None of these involved NSA in anyway.

3. The SIGINT mission of the Naval Security Group Detachment aboard the USS PUEBLO was to intercept, exploit and report on foreign electromagnetic emissions for SIGINT purposes. The primary function of the detachment was to provide SIGINT direct support to the Commanding Officer. The secondary function was to satisfy specified fleet and national SIGINT collection requirements.

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(b) (1)
 (b) (3) - 50 USC 403
 (b) (3) - 18 USC 798
 (b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

~~APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS~~
~~CODEWORD MATERIAL~~

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Director, Naval Security Group Pacific (DIRNAVSECGRUPAC), attached to the staff of the CINCPACFLT, is responsible to the CINCPACFLT for coordinating the utilization, operation and administration of the [redacted]. The detachment in the USS PUEBLO operates under DIRNAVSECGRUPAC SIGINT Letter of Instruction 1-68, dated 2 January 1968.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

b. Supplementary Tasking.

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c. Technical Control.

The Director, NSA, continues to exercise technical control and provide technical support to all SIGINT operations, even when operational control has been delegated. By this means, NSA continues to tell the collectors and processors how to perform the SIGINT mission, prescribing uniform techniques and standards by which SIGINT is to be collected, processed and reported. (TAB B).

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A

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY

INFO PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

SPECIAL HANDLING
NONE *RN*

DISTRIBUTION

FROM: DIRNSA

29 DEC 67

TO: DIRNAVSECGRU

INFO: ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU(COURIER)
DIRNAVSECGRUPAC
HQ NSAPAC

USN-467Y

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

KL2/1266

Supplementary Tasking

PINKROOT OPERATIONS (C)

REF: CINCPACFLT 130406Z DEC 67

IAW ABOVE REF PARA 2, THE FOL COLL RQMNTS ARE SUBMITTED FOR USS

PUEBLO OPS IN KORCOM AREA 05 JAN - 04 FEB 68:

PART I COMINT

A. SPECIAL INTEREST

1. SCH FOR AND RECORD ANY SIGS EMANATING FROM NORTH KOREA THAT

MAY BE ASSOC WITH

A
A4
A5
A65
A7
A73
A8
B
B1
B11
B2
B3
B5
D31
D34
D5
K
K1
K12
K3
P02
P04
ADN
ADP
ADNSG

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

2. THERE IS NO FIRM EVIDENCE OF [] IN NORTH KOREA.

HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF NORTH KOREA'S CONTINUING MODERNIZATION OF ITS
COMMS SYSTEMS AND THE STEADY DECLINE OF COMMS IN THE VHF RANGE
AND BELOW, IT IS EVIDENT THAT OTHER SYSTEMS ARE AVAILABLE. LENGTHY
PERIODS OF ADVERSE WEATHER, OFTEN RESULTING IN SEVERE FLOODING AND

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

DR

RELEASING OFFICER

RICHARD HARVEY/Ch KL2/3891s

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE 1 OF 4

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

AGO

AGI 24552

DTG 120406Z

SUSPENSE

AGO NR.

DTG

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

12194/29
292017Z

~~SECRET SAVIN~~
 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

VERY RUGGED TERRAIN FEATURES MAKE TOTAL RELIANCE UPON LANDLINE
 UNLIKELY. THEREFORE, SPECIAL EFFORTS TO INTCP COMMS SIGS IN THE
 [REDACTED] SHOULD BE MADE. IF SIGS IN THIS
 RANGE ARE INTCPD, ATTEMPTS TO FIX ACCURATELY THE LOCATION (S) OF
 THE EMITTER (S) SHOULD BE MADE.

(b)(1)
 (b)(3)-50 USC 403
 (b)(3)-18 USC 798
 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

B. GENERAL

1. NORTH KOREAN AIR FORCE

COVERAGE FOR CASE OF NKAF COMMS IS DESIRED: KCAS U5021. THESE
 FREQS HAVE BEEN SEEN IN CONJUNCTION W/THIS ENTITY: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)
 (b)(3)-50 USC 403
 (b)(3)-18 USC 798
 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

2. NORTH KOREAN ARMY

(A) NKA VOICE- [REDACTED] - INTCP ALL NKA SINGLE CHANNEL VOICE
 COMMS TO INCLUDE COASTAL ARTILLERY ACTY (R-105, R-108, 702, 308).

[REDACTED]

3. NORTH KOREAN NAVY

(A) NKN VOICE - [REDACTED] - INTCP ALL NKN SINGLE CHANNEL VOICE
 COMMS TO INCLUDE SHIP TO SHIP AND SHIP TO SHORE COMMS (R-105, R-108,
 702, AND 308).

[REDACTED]

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

AGO

AGO NR.

AGI

DTG

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

194/29

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

GENERAL SCH ASSIGNMENT IS DESIRED [REDACTED]

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36PART II ELINT

A. DURING NORMAL SCH OPS COVERAGE OF ELINT EMISSIONS SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN IN ACCORDANCE W/THE FOL SIGNAL - CLASS PRIORITIES:

1. NEW/UNUSUAL/UNIDENTIFIED SIGS
2. UNCONFIRMED (TEMPORARY NOTATIONS) SIGS
3. LANDBASED/SHIPBORNE/AIRBORNE RADARS

B. SCH FOR THE FOL SPECIAL INTEREST SIGS WHEN IN APPROX INTCP AREAS:

1. CRUISE MISSILE ASSOC EMITTERS B323I, B330Z, G302Z EMANATING FROM WITHIN A 10 NM RADIUS OF 38-42N/128-17E.
 2. C306A [REDACTED] SIGS ASSOCIATED WITH NORTH KOREAN NAVY SUBS BERTHED AT MAYANG-DO (40-00N/128-38E) AND CH'AHU (40-12N/128-38E)
 3. C314Z [REDACTED] SIGS ASSOCIATED W/KOMAR CLASS VESSELS BERTHED AT WO'NSAN (39-10N/127-26E).
 4. F309Z [REDACTED] ALL COASTAL AREAS TO DETERMINE LOCATIONS.
 5. A312Z [REDACTED] ALL AREAS.
- C. ATTEMPT TO VISUALLY CORRELATE AIRBORNE/SHIPBORNE SIGS W/EMITTER PLATFORM. OBTAIN D/F BEARINGS AND ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE LOCATIONS OF ALL LANDBASED EMITTERS HEARD.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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OF

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REF'S TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

ACC

AGO NR.

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

DTG

194/29

FORM N2288 REV SEP 65
(Supersedes N2288 REV AUG 65
to be used until depleted)~~SECRET SAVIN~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

D. FOL RECORDING/REPORTING/FORWARDING PROCEDURES AS CONTAINED

IN T-1302

.....

CONCUR:

K41 Mr. Lee

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

M/R: Reference message solicited DIRNSA collection requirements
for PINKROOT (C) operations conducted under primary Navy
tasking.

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REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

AGO

AGO NR.

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

DTG

194/29

B

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~~~TOP SECRET~~TECHNICAL CONTROL/SUPPORT

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Technical support, however, was furnished as follows:

In the case of the PUEBLO, the basic SIGINT technical package, selected and put aboard USN-467Y by the Naval Security Group, shortly after commissioning at Bremerton, Washington, contained NSA Technical Instructions (TECHINS) in the MUSSO series related to collection, processing, and reporting tasks. This basic technical support package was supplemented at Sasebo prior to the PUEBLO going on station. This latter supplement contained further current instructions and working aid materials necessary to the fulfillment of assigned collection tasks. The total technical support package aboard PUEBLO would have consisted of materials classified up to TOP SECRET Codeword. Among those materials were [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] plus dictionaries, charts and maps, and assorted working aids.

[REDACTED]

(b) (1)
(b) (3) - 50 USC 403
(b) (3) - 15 USC 798
(b) (3) - E.O. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : D32 *APV*
D32 ←DATE: 5 February 1968
ADN-68-8

FROM : ADN

SUBJECT: Statement re PUEBLO

1. For Mr. Pat Coyne on Tuesday, the Director wants a short factual account of tasking and operational control arrangements of the "PUEBLO" mission.

2. Please take for action.

3. Note: LCDR Kozak says the second half of paper done ~~this~~ *last* week, perhaps with some input from Mr. Scheck on the tasking, might suffice.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

L. R. Schulz

L. R. SCHULZ
Rear Admiral, USN
Assistant Director, NSA
for
The National Cryptologic Staff

cc: Mr. Price

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Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

D32

5 February 1968

ADN-68-8

ADN

Statement re PUEBLO

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(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

L. R. SCHULZ
Rear Admiral, USN
Assistant Director, NSA
for
The National Cryptologic Staff

cc: Mr. Price

DOCID: 4121757

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Paper for DIRECTOR
1 Feb 68

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~~TOP SECRET~~

D321/ [] 31Jan68

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

DIRNSA AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

1. The national COMINT and ELINT mission assigned to NSA by the National Security Council is to provide an effective, unified organization and control of the COMINT and ELINT intercept and processing activities of the United States, to provide for integrated policies and procedures pertaining thereto and to produce COMINT and ELINT information in accordance with objectives, requirements and priorities established by the United States Intelligence Board.

2. For purposes of accomplishing that mission, all COMINT and ELINT intercept and processing activities of the United States have been placed under the operational and technical control of the Director, NSA, by the National Security Council.

3. That sounds as though any COMINT or ELINT operation is either under the complete control of the Director, NSA, or it is being performed illegally. Actually, that is not the case at all.

4. The National Security Council has provided for certain exclusions and exceptions for specific purposes, including the exclusion of COMINT and ELINT activities performed in support of [] [] the exclusion of ELINT activities which the Secretary of Defense has identified as essential to direct support of military commanders, and the exclusion of certain COMINT and ELINT processes when they are being performed in support of electronic warfare or rescue operations instead of for intelligence purposes.

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5. In addition, the National Security Council has provided that the Director, NSA, in order to provide SIGINT direct support to the Armed Forces, at times will delegate operational control (but not technical control) of specified COMINT or ELINT facilities and resources to an appropriate agency.

6. This means that the Director, NSA, normally is responsible for the authoritative direction of SIGINT collection and processing activities by the assignment of tasks, designation of specific targets and allocation of effort--in other words he prescribed what to do. By virtue of his technical control authority, he also prescribed those uniform techniques and standards by which SIGINT information is collected, processed, and reported--in other words, he tells the collectors and processors how to do the SIGINT job.

7. When the Director, NSA, delegates SIGINT operational control to some other authority for direct support purposes it normally is for the purpose of meeting an important military requirement for mobile close support to provide information for immediate use by the supported authority. In those cases, responsibility and authority for what the SIGINT unit does, or operational control, is passed to the military commander or other supported authority. Technical control, or responsibility for whatever technical direction may be needed on how to do the SIGINT collection and processing, remains with the Director, NSA.

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8. SIGINT operational control does not mean that the Director, NSA, exercises command or administrative control over the personnel or facilities employed in collection and processing SIGINT information. The same National Security Council directive that placed SIGINT collection and processing activities under the operational and technical control of the Director, NSA, made the Secretary of Defense the Executive Agent of the Government for SIGINT production and specified that the Military Departments would establish, maintain, operate and administer SIGINT intercept and processing facilities as authorized by the Secretary of Defense. Ultimate control over personnel and facilities matters is the responsibility of the Commanding Officer who reports through the command channels of his own Military Service, whether operational control has been delegated or remains with the Director, NSA.

9. In the case of the USS PUEBLO, COMINT collection was only one of the several intelligence collection modes involved. The COMINT collection unit aboard the ship was operating under the operational control of CINCPACFLT, by authority of the Chief of Naval Operations, to whom operational control of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] has been delegated by the Director, NSA. (See Tab A.) This delegation was made in accordance with the direct support provisions of NSCID No. 6 and appropriate Department of Defense implementing

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directives. Technical control was being exercised by the Director, NSA. (See Tab B.) The operation of the ship in a sensitive area for military reconnaissance and data gathering purposes was subject to JCS approval, and the provisions of SM-676-66, 19 August 1966, Subject: Reconnaissance Operations and Responsibilities in Sensitive Areas.

10. The USS PUEBLO (AGER-2) is one of three environmental research ships (AGER) which are serving now as multi-sensor intelligence collection platforms under the JCS reconnaissance plan. The other two ships are the USS BANNER (AGER-1), operating in the Pacific and the USS PALM BEACH (AGER-3), which is scheduled for operation [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] They are all small trawler type ships and all multi-sensor platforms. They all have [REDACTED] under the operational control of the appropriate Fleet Commander.

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11. The Naval Security Group Detachment aboard the PUEBLO had the mission of intercepting, exploiting and reporting on foreign electromagnetic emissions for SIGINT purposes. In the accomplishment of its mission the Detachment had as its paramount function "the provision of SIGINT direct support to the Commanding Officer," and, as a subordinate function, "to satisfy specified fleet and national SIGINT collection requirements."¹ The subordinate function was accomplished by the Naval Security Group on behalf of the operational control authority--CINCPACFLT.

1. DIRNAVSECGRUPAC SIGINT Ltr of Instruction #1-68, 2 Jan 68, (S/HVCCO)

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12. In contrast, the SIGINT activities conducted by the [redacted]

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[redacted] aboard the Technical

Research Ships (TRSs) operate under the operational and technical control of the Director, NSA, in general support of the national SIGINT effort for the purpose of meeting national SIGINT requirements which are impossible or nearly impossible to satisfy from fixed, ground-based facilities.

13. Cryptologic resources for the TRSs are programmed in Sub-element 44 whereas the AGERS are programmed in Sub-element 43 (Direct Support).

14. Although operational control is vested in CINCPACFLT and exercised on his behalf by the Naval Security Group, there is provision for SIGINT tasking (which normally is an element of operational control) to be provided by NSA; however, such tasking was to be provided only through the Naval Security Group and only as secondary tasking to be used when the SIGINT resources in the ship were not engaged in the primary task of direct support, which consisted of supporting the commanding officer of the ship and satisfying specified fleet collection requirements.¹ Secondary tasking for the PUEBLO was provided by NSA to DIRNAVSECGRU on 29 December 1967, as requested by CINCPACFLT. The determination of whether to perform the secondary tasks within the areas of operation was the responsibility of the Officer-in-Charge of the Naval Security Group Detachment in the USS PUEBLO.

¹. DIRNAVSECGRUPAC Ltr of Instruction 1-68, 2 January 1968, (S/HVCCO)

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OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE SIGINT DETACHMENT ABOARD USS PUEBLO

The SIGINT resources (USN-467Y) embarked in USS PUEBLO are direct support resources over which operational control was delegated by the Director, NSA. In its primary role of providing SIGINT direct support to the Commanding Officer, USS PUEBLO, USN-467Y is [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Operational control over all [REDACTED] has been delegated by the Director, NSA to the Chief of Naval Operations as provided in the Operating Instructions for the Naval Security Group (OPINS No. 2, dated 3 February 1959).

The specific delegation of operational control to CNO is contained in Appendix B to OPINS No. 2. The Director, Naval Security Group administers this control in behalf of the CNO.

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CNO has redelegated operational control of [REDACTED] to CINCPACFLT, CINCLANTFLT or CINCUSNAVEUR, as appropriate, in OPNAV Instruction 02501.1E, dated 7 April 1965. DIRNAVSECGRU, in turn, looks to his subordinate area directors, attached to the staff of the fleet commanders, as responsible to the fleet CINC for coordinating the utilization, operation, and administration of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] operate under letters of instruction issued by the NAVSECGRU area director. USN-467Y in USS PUEBLO operates under DIRNAVSECGRUPAC SIGINT Letter of Instruction 1-68, dated 2 January 1968. That Letter of Instruction is applicable to the [REDACTED] in both the BANNER and PUEBLO during AGER deployments in the Pacific area.

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TECHNICAL CONTROL/SUPPORT

The exercise of technical control over resources which are not under the operational control of the Director, NSA, is not a clearcut function. The extent to which it is necessary or desirable to tell a SIGINT detachment or a direct support unit how to do the job when some other authority has specified what to do, beyond certain very basic technical instructions applicable to all SIGINT operations, is dependent largely upon request from the SIGINT action involved or its parent Service Cryptologic Agency.

Technical support, however, was furnished as follows:

In the case of the PUEBLO the basic SIGINT technical package, selected and put aboard USN-467Y by the Naval Security Group, shortly after commissioning at Bremerton, Washington, contained essential NSA Technical Instructions (TECHINS) in the MUSSO series related to collection, processing and reporting ~~tasks~~. This basic technical support package was supplemented at Sasebo prior to the PUEBLO going on station. This latter supplement contained further current instructions and working aid materials necessary to the fulfillment of assigned collection tasks. The total technical support package aboard PUEBLO would have consisted of materials classified up to TOP SECRET CODEWORD, such as the following: []

[] plus dictionaries, charts and maps, and assorted working aids.

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