

QUESTIONS + ANSWERS RE PUEBLO
FOR DIRECTOR TO USE - FEB. 1969

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

Terry - 1200
 Harvey - 1215
 [Redacted Box] BI

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA - ADMINISTRATIVELY SENSITIVE~~

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

ADP

- KI 1. What role did NSA play in reviewing and approving the Pueblo mission, or in ordering it?
 BI 2. Was the mission considered essential in terms of benefits expected to be gained vis-a-vis attendant risks?
 pod 3. Why was a simple trawler used in place of a warship?
 pod 4. How was the ship and its crew trained, briefed and prepared for the mission?
 pod 5. What contingency plans existed to cover attack or accident?
 BI 6. Were the ship's operations monitored constantly or at least daily while it was in radio silence?
 pod 7. Why was the ship allowed to travel undefended in hostile waters without any destroyer escort as was provided on earlier Banner missions?
 pod 8. At what level was it determined that a destroyer escort was not required?
 pod 9. It has been stated that the ship had reams of secret papers aboard - some not apparently even related to its mission. Was there no restriction on what the ship might carry?
 pod 10. Who on the ship was "cleared", and what was the chain of command for the intelligence unit aboard the vessel?
 pod 11. What was the status of the ship's communications? Did it have special emergency channels?
 BI 12. In what time frame was the distress info made available and to whom? Can you provide a complete chronology of message exchanges?
 BI 13. Was the ship clearly outside N. K. waters? How did we know? And do we have any evidence one way or the other that the ship may have entered territorial waters at any time during its patrol?

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

TOP SECRET UMBRA - ADMINISTRATIVELY SENSITIVE

- PO4* 14. Have there been any significant changes to date in the communications or electronic practices of the communist-bloc nations, or of any communist country, that might be associated with the loss of the Pueblo?
- KI* 15. Are spy ship operations still being conducted? And, if so, are they being conducted off North Korea?
- KI* 16. If the spy ship operations are not being conducted off North Korea, what is being done instead to collect the vital intelligence information that it had been considered essential to assign the Pueblo to gather?
- KI* 17. What is our present Cold War strategy for such missions?
- KI* 18. Are we taking a long, hard look at the need for each such mission on a case-by-case basis? How is this accomplished?
- KI* 19. Are authorities and responsibilities for the conduct of such activities adequately clear from your own viewpoint?
- KI* 20. What steps to improve the spy ship business do you think need to be taken which are not presently under active consideration?
- KI* 21. What different types of intercept facilities do we use and what is the reason for each?
- PO4* 22. Did you agree with the concepts contained in JCS-506-67?
- PO4* 23. Were the operations of the Pueblo in accordance with this document?
- PO4* 24. What is NSA's role and authority in direct support missions?
- PO4* 25. What is NSA's role in the Joint Reconnaissance Center?
- PO4* 26. Do you make any contributions to the 303 Committee?
- KI* 27. Who requested and approved the specific mission of the Pueblo?
- PO4* 28. What was NSA's position when the mission of the Pueblo was approved?
- PO4* 29. Was the Liberty incident considered in evaluating the risk of the Pueblo mission?

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~~~TOP SECRET UMBRA - ADMINISTRATIVELY SENSITIVE~~

K1

30. Did you recommend any changes in the use of shipborne platforms as a result of the Liberty incident?

B1

31. Did NSA take any action in the JRC after its 29 December 1967 message warning of North Korean sensitivity?

PO4

32. Do you have veto powers over direct support missions? If not, why not?

PO4

33. Once the mission was approved, what role did you play in the planning and execution of the mission?

B1

34. What action did your Pacific Headquarters take after you forwarded a copy of your 29 December message to the JRC?

K1

35. What provisions are made to provide advisory warning to AGER's in cases where other facilities have information from their intercept?

K1

36. What stations were supposed to furnish warnings to the Pueblo on this mission?

PO4

37. How did you decide what materials to supply to the Pueblo?

PO4

38. Did you make any effort to have material and equipment not directly related to the Pueblo's mission off-loaded before its departure from Sasebo?

K1

39. How was NSA kept informed of the progress of the mission?

PO4

40. Who specifically at NSA was responsible for keeping track of the Pueblo mission?

PO4

41. What actions were taken at NSA immediately after receipt of the first message telling of the Pueblo's distress?

PO4

42. When were you (ADP) informed and what actions did you take?

PO4

43. What procedures do you have for accounting for SIGINT materials?

PO4

44. Where are your rules documented?

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~~~TOP SECRET UMBRA - ADMINISTRATIVELY SENSITIVE~~

45. Why does NSA require receipts, inventories, and destruction reports of CONFIDENTIAL COMSEC material but have no accountability for TOP SECRET SIGINT material?
46. What rules are there for reproducing, extracting, or making further distribution of SIGINT material furnished by NSA? Do you feel that the rules are adequate? If so, why? If not, why not?
47. Did you have any way of determining accurately what NSA-issued classified material was on board?
48. How much of this material was related to signals or areas which the Pueblo could not have intercepted on this mission?
49. What role did NSA play in deciding the SIGINT equipment to be placed on board?
50. How much of this equipment was developed by NSA?
51. What was the classification of the equipment?
52. Do you have any role in the selection of the Commanding Officer, the Chief of the Security Group Detachment, or the Security Group enlisted men aboard AGER's?
53. Have you had any NSA personnel, Navy or civilian, on board any of the AGER missions?
54. Did NSA brief anyone aboard the Pueblo?
55. Were there any men on board who had ever been assigned to NSA?
56. Had any of the crew ever had access to particularly sensitive SIGINT operations?
57. Is there a system to insure that personnel who have knowledge of particularly sensitive operations are not assigned to dangerous missions?
58. What is NSA's role in this system?

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~~~TOP SECRET UMBRA - ADMINISTRATIVELY SENSITIVE~~

- KI 59. What did you expect to gain from this particular mission?
- KI 60. How much of the tasking of the Pueblo duplicated tasking of fixed sites?
- KI 61. Have you used airborne intercept against Korea?
- KI 62. What useful intelligence have you gained from these flights?
- KI 63. How would you compare the usefulness against Korean targets of an airborne platform to an AGER?
- KI 64. What are the comparative costs?
- KI 65. What is the difference between a TRS and an AGER?
- KI 66. What is the cost comparison between a TRS and an AGER?
- KI 67. How much real intelligence have we produced based on shipborne intercept?
- KI 68. Has any of this come from AGER's?
- PO4 69. Do you have any way to compare the costs of getting usable intelligence from fixed sites, ships, planes, and satellites?
- PO4 70. How much could the Russians have learned about our cryptanalytic methods from the materials and equipments that were captured?
- PO4 71. How much could the North Koreans and Chinese Communists have learned?
- PO4 72. What changes in any procedures have you made as a direct result of the Pueblo affair?
- PO4 73. Many people have discussed the strange arrangement which apparently existed on the Pueblo between the research department officer and the commanding officer. Some people have said that there was a large degree of autonomy

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~~~TOP SECRET UMBRA - ADMINISTRATIVELY SENSITIVE~~

on the part of the intelligence detachment. As a member of the military, General, do you feel that the division of responsibility which existed was adequate or inadequate?

P-4 74. Do you think that this type of intelligence collection operation properly belongs to the military? After all, military conduct is a different breed of cat from this type of business, is it not?

P-4 75. Do you feel that the Soviets' practice of using civilians and some military who are treated as civilians has merit?

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

Write the question on a sheet of paper and then answer the question

short - concise -

Action on P04 Questions

- | | |
|----------------------------|---|
| ✓ 3 - Gene | ✓ 40 - Gene |
| ✓ 4 - Gene | ✓ 41 - Snow |
| ✓ 5 - Don (w/S input) | ✓ 42 - Snow |
| ✓ 7 - Harry Don | ✓ 43 - Opby |
| ✓ 8 - Harry Don | ✓ 44 - Opby |
| ✓ 9 - Opby | ✓ 45 - Opby (Snow) |
| ✓ 10 - Snow | ✓ 46 - Opby (Snow) |
| ✓ 11 - Stimus | ✓ 47 - Opby |
| ✓ 14 - Snow | ✓ 48 - Opby |
| ✓ 22 - Gene | ✓ 52 - Gene |
| ✓ 23 - Gene | ✓ 55 - Snow |
| ✓ 24 - Gene | ✓ 56 - Snow |
| ✓ 25 - Gene | ✓ 57 - Snow |
| ✓ 26 - Gene | ✓ 58 - Snow |
| ✓ 28 - Gene | ✓ 69 - Harry Daniels |
| ✓ 29 - Gene | ✓ 70 - Gene Opby |
| ✓ 32 - Gene | ✓ 71 - Opby |
| ✓ 33 - Gene | ✓ 72 - Opby |
| ✓ 37 - Opby | ✓ 73 - ^{Snow} No Comment from P04 |
| ✓ 38 - Opby | ✓ 74 - Gene |
| | ✓ 75 - ^{Snow} No Comment from P04 |

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

1. What role did NSA play in reviewing and approving the Pueblo mission, or in ordering it?

NSA was not involved in the approval process for the USS PUEBLO to conduct this specific SIGINT mission. In early December 1967, NSA requested that CINCPACFLT provide a schedule for operation of the USS PUEBLO and BANNER, including the area of operations and the "mode" (i.e. status of SIGINT operational control) in which the ships would be employed. ^{indicated} CINCPACFLT reply stated that for the next six months, the USS PUEBLO would be employed for "Primary Navy Tasking," and the USS BANNER would be available for NSA SIGINT operations. CINCPACFLT did, however, solicit from NSA secondary tasking for the USS PUEBLO to be accomplished on a not-to-interfere basis with primary tasking.

NSA, beyond the provision of secondary tasking, did nothing to influence the nature, scope or operational area of this particular mission.

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~SECRET SPOKE~~

2. Was the mission considered essential in terms of benefits expected to be gained vis-a-vis attendant risks?

The PUEBLO mission was conducted under primary navy tasking. A 13 December 67 CINCPACFLT message solicited NSA requirements which were secondary. In response to this request, a 29 December message provided our COMINT and ELINT special and general interest collection requirements. All tasking was appropriate for a platform of this type, and a collector operating from a peripheral area could be expected to be reasonably successful. ~~These~~ The signals which we asked be collected were line-of-sight transmissions which could not be ~~properly~~ ^{properly} covered from fixed site locations.


~~SECRET SPOKE~~

AK
 (b)(1)
 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
 (b)(3)-50 USC 403
 (b)(3)-18 USC 798

3. Why was a simple trawler used in place of a warship?

The PUEBLO operation was part of an OSD-sanctioned, three-phase program to provide small ~~single~~ ~~simple~~ non-combatant naval ships possessing graduated capabilities to meet national and naval requirements for surveillance missions. *The program was developed on the premise that U.S. flag ships, even unarmed, operating on the high seas, were immune from seizure.*

Phase I (1 ship - USS BANNER) was to test operational feasibility and



Phase II (3 ships - BANNER, PUEBLO, PALM BEACH) envisioned several modes of operation to permit adequate test and evaluation and follow-on usage. Mode 1 consisted of continuous operation in one area by one ship at a time for an indefinite period of fairly long duration for operational test and evaluation of all sensors, including utilization as a counter irritant to Soviet trawlers. Navy ship operational control. SIGINT tasking: (1) Direct Support, primary: (2) NSA, ^esecondary. Mode 2 was the utilization of any available on station time not required for Mode 1 above, by response to NSA for deployment to some other area for operational test and evaluation. Navy ship operational control responsive to NSA tasking. SIGINT tasking: (1) NSA primary tasking pursuant to national objectives and requirements; (2) Direct support, secondary, unless ship in potentially dangerous situation and safety of ship is paramount.

PUEBLO was dispatched under Mode 1.

4. How was the ship and its crew trained, briefed and prepared for the mission?

^{Navy is}
The ~~Services~~ are responsible for the training and briefing of crews in accordance with applicable ^{Navy and NSA} ~~Command and Manual of U.S. SIGINT Operations~~ documents. In some few cases, special operational training in technical collection and processing subjects is afforded Service cryptologic personnel before their assignment to field units. In the case of the PUEBLE, no special training was deemed necessary.

J. Schuler

OK

5. What contingency plans existed to cover attack or accident?

None. In accordance with Navy rules, the ship would have had prepared plans dealing with emergencies on board the ship, e.g. ^{fire} fire, emergency destruction etc.

~~SECRET SPOKE~~

6. Were the ships operations monitored constantly or at least daily while it was in radio silence?

North Korean communications activity has been examined in detail for the period 10-23 January 68. There was no indication in SIGINT that the PUEBLO was being observed until she arrived off Wo'nsan on 22 January. NSA has no knowledge of whether or not arrangements for monitoring of the PUEBLO by other means were arranged by the Navy.

~~SECRET SPOKE~~

OK

7. Why was the ship allowed to travel undefended in hostile waters without any destroyer escort as was provided on earlier Banner missions?

JCS, C. INCPAC and the US Navy
Presumably the Navy, in judging the risk to be minimal (and therefore the waters not hostile), did not consider an escort necessary.

8. At what level was it determined that a destroyer escort was not required?

JCS and CINCPAC

We defer to the Navy to answer that question.

Date: _____

Subject: _____ *CSK*

To: _____

(9) All classified material is distributed on a strict basis of need-to-know. The ships had TOP SECRET special intelligence security ceilings and therefore could carry anything that was mission-related up to and including that classification. Unfortunately, in the structuring of documents, sometimes some extraneous non-mission material is included, but this is the exception rather than the rule.

~~After the LIBERTY incident, we requested that each ship prepare an inventory of what classified documents were on board. This was 13 July 1967. Our intention was to review each and instruct the ships to destroy, off-load or return those documents not directly pertinent to the mission. Unfortunately, we didn't get the PUEBLO's inventory until 24 January 1968, after it had already been attacked and captured. But in~~

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Date: _____

Subject: _____

To: _____

I might add, that unlike a shore station where there are a lot of extra-circular activities, the ships are limited in this respect. The boys on the ships are dedicated types, constantly striving for perfection as well as advancement of their careers. I wouldn't want to deny them the opportunity to improve themselves by not permitting them to hold documents necessary for pro-pay testing and study. It certainly would be more wholesome for them to study than to spend what spare time they have playing cards or nipping torpedo juice.

9. It has been stated that the ship had reams of secret papers aboard - some not apparently even related to its mission. Was there no restriction on what the ship might carry?

18. Who on the ship was "cleared", and what was the chain of command for the intelligence unit aboard the vessel?

The Commanding Officer, the Executive Officer, the Officer in Charge of the Research Detachment, and the 29 enlisted members of the Research Detachment, were cleared for Special Intelligence.

The Research Detachment was subordinated to ~~the Director, Naval Security Group, Pacific,~~ and through him to ~~the Commander, Naval Security Group Command~~ to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, while the ship itself was part of Service Group No. 3, subordinated to the Commander, Naval Forces, Japan.

11. What was the status of the ship's communications? Did it have special emergency channels?

T1's
PYA
effort
!

A review of the two questions raised in regard to the status and availability of communications to the Pueblo at the time of the incident of its capture has revealed that the CRITICOMM system was not a factor in this matter. General service communications, which is not under the communications of the National Security Agency, is that system used by this ship. On previous occasion when the PUEBLO incident was being investigated, it was noted by the T1 representative of the investigating committee that the information in regard to the status of the ship's communications was brought to light by the reviewing committee with the Naval Security Group element at the Nebraska Avenue station. It is therefore suggested that Lt. Commander E. Koczak, D1, be approached, who is in possession of this information and could provide answers to the aforementioned questions.

The ship had access to General Service communication channels, for contact with Naval installations ashore. It also had access to the CRITICOMM network.

(11)

A review of the two questions raised in regard to the status and availability of communications to the PUEBLO at the time of the incident of its capture has revealed that the CRITICOMM system was not a factor in this matter. General service communications, which is not under the managerial control of the National Security Agency, is the system used by the ship. On ^{the} previous occasion when the PUEBLO incident was being investigated, it was noted by the T1 representative of the investigating committee that information in regard to the status of the ship's communications was determined by this committee to be known by the Naval Security Group element at the Naval Security Station. It is therefore suggested that Lt. Commander E. Koczak, D1, be approached, who is in possession of this information and could provide answers to the aforementioned questions.

Answer to 11:

The PUEBLO had available to it enciphered communications contact with its command and control authorities. ^{However, in} ~~an~~ an emergency situation, I understand that the CO was authorized to use clear contact.

~~SECRET SPOKE~~

6

12. In what time frame was the distress info made available and to whom? Can you provide a complete chronology of message exchanges?

The initial indication of the PUEBLO being circled by a North Korean patrol craft was contained in a flash precedence message DTG 230352Z. The message reported that the NK vessel, P/N 35, had signalled "heave to or I will open fire on you." The full text of this message was received via normal communication circuits by the following commands, hours and minutes after the DTG indicated:

NMCC - 2 hr 32 min
CINCPAC - 2 hr 8 min
CINCPACAF - 2 hr 10 min
CINCPACFLT - 1 hr 38 min
FIFTH AF - 2 hr 12 min

The information on the above message was received by the NMCC via CRITIC relay 54 minutes after the DTG, NMCC notified CINCPAC via telephone of the message 1 hr 18 min after DTG. COMNAVFOR JAPAN received the message 21 min after DTG. The message was transmitted from COMNAVFOR JAPAN to FUCHU relay 1 hr 8 min after DTG.

Beginning with this initial notification, a complete chronology of message exchanges is available.

~~SECRET SPOKE~~

~~TOP SECRET U.S. EYES ONLY~~

13. Was the ship clearly outside N.K. waters? How did we know? And do we have any evidence one way or the other that the ship may have entered territorial waters at any time during its patrol?

The Pueblo was in international waters at the time of seizure.

Intercepted North Korean naval communications clearly indicated from both NKN radar tracking and NKN ship reports that the seizure took place outside the claimed territorial waters of North Korea.

All SIGINT evidence indicates that the Pueblo was in international waters during all periods when the patrol was reflected.

~~TOP SECRET U.S. EYES ONLY~~

14. Have there been any significant changes to date in the communications or electronic practices of the communist-bloc nations, or of any communist country, that might be associated with the loss of the Pueblo?

Except for North Korea itself, no changes in communications practices of other communist countries have been successfully traced to the loss of the PUEBLO. In North Korea, there have been improvements in the communications security practices of Naval nets, and to a lesser extent of Army and Air Force nets. It is suspected that the exploitation of documents captured with the PUEBLO enabled the North Koreans to make those changes.

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

17. What is our present Cold War strategy for such missions?

NSA continues to indicate the technical requirements for fulfillment through such missions. The risk in the conduct of these missions is, however, determined by the CINCS, JCS, DIA and STATE.

Present requirements for intelligence will necessitate continued use of seaborn collection platforms. When considered necessary ^{by competent combat command} for safety of the ship, an armed naval escort vessel is provided.

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

18. Are we taking a long, hard look at the need for each such mission on a case-by-case basis? How is this accomplished?

Yes, NSA proposes AGER missions only when they are necessary and the best or only means to satisfy SIGINT requirements levied on NSA. ~~In~~
~~house procedures require review and release by ADP.~~ If there is any
 indication that a reconnaissance mission will operate in a "crisis" area,
^{in response to NSA requirements}
~~NSA regulation 25-5 requires that the proposal be reviewed by ADP, ADN and~~
~~the proposal.~~
~~D/DIR~~
 a special NSA flag officer-level board must review and approve


The actual risk assessment of the missions is performed by the CINC's, JCS, DIA and STATE Department.

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798

21. What different types of intercept facilities do we use and what is the reason for each?



~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~TOP SECRET UNCLASSIFIED~~

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-1B USC 79B
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36



~~TOP SECRET UNCLASSIFIED~~

OK

22. Did you agree with the concepts contained in JCS-506-67?

Yes, NSA concurred in the publication of the document in November 1967 and considers the concepts therein the most workable so far attained in the area of SIGINT support to military commanders.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "J. Schuman", is written in the right margin of the page.

d

23. Were the operations of the Pueblo in accordance with this document?

No. The plans for deployment of the PUEBLO were far down the road by the time JCSM 506-67 was published and distributed. That is, Navy had already specified the mode of operation, time and area of operation for the PUEBLO. Since it was to be a ~~Mode 1 operation~~ (primarily for direct support), NSA's action in this case, in accordance with the agreed concept of 1965, was to provide SIGINT collection guidance and support to the cryptologic unit aboard.

Since the PUEBLO incident, the USS BANNER and PALM BEACH have been used in purely direct support roles with no cruises dedicated to primary national SIGINT tasking. However, Navy has now offered the ships for primary national tasking this summer.

Staff coordination between NSA and Navy has been underway for some time to attempt the modification of the 1965 agreed concept for employment of these ships to conform with the provisions of JCSM 506-67 and SM 701-68.



24.

NSA's basic authority in this area stems from National Security Council Intelligence Directive ~~number six~~ ^{# 6} which defines the parameters of COMINT and ELINT activities and the responsibilities connected therewith. This document recognizes that the Armed Forces require direct support of various kinds and specifies that in providing this support, operational control of specified COMINT and ELINT facilities and resources will at times be delegated by the Director, NSA, for such periods and for such tasks as are determined by him, to an appropriate agent. JCS Memo-506-67, the Concept of SIGINT Support to Military Commanders, further defines the procedures whereby direct support is implemented.

25.

NSA has no active role in the Joint Reconnaissance Center. It does, however, maintain a liaison officer there whose function is to provide for coordination and interpretation of the SIGINT aspects of the various problems that arise. Under the provisions of JCS SM 700/701-68, NSA does provide a technical assessment to the JRC on those reconnaissance activities with SIGINT capabilities.

OK

26. Do you make any contributions to the 303 Committee?

No. Our comments and recommendations are made to JCS^{JRC} Presumably, these may, at times, be considered by the 303 committee through JCS presentation.



OK

28. What was NSA's position when the mission of the Pueblo was approved?

We supported the mission because of the intelligence information to be obtained was uncollectible by other means.

J. Schuler

29. Was the Liberty incident considered in evaluating the risk of the Pueblo mission?

NSA has no responsibility for assessing the risk of reconnaissance missions. We merely make known our technical collection requirements and desired areas of operations. The operating commands formulate the reconnaissance tracks and the risk assessment is made by the CINC's and JCS.

We do, however, provide to JCS any SIGINT available bearing on the sensitivity of any given area of operations.

J. Schauer

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

30. Did you recommend any changes in the use of shipborne platforms as a result of the Liberty incident?

Since the LIBERTY incident was the result of mistaken identity while conducting operations in international waters, no recommendations for change in the use of shipborne platforms were warranted by the incident.

~~Further,~~ Peripheral intelligence collection platforms operate with a certain degree of risk. This risk can be calculated; although not to the degree that will allow prognostication of irrational acts, mechanical casualties or other unforeseeable events. There are no current collection

techniques which will eliminate risk to seaborne collection platforms.

(Conclusions 5 and 6, An Examination of the Seaborne Intelligence Collection Program, Seaborne Intelligence Collection Platform Study Group Report, 10 May 1968).

~~SECRET~~

B

31. Did NSA take any action in the JRC after its 29 December 1967 message warning of North Korean sensitivity?

No further action was taken.

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

32. Do you have veto powers over direct support missions? If not, why not?

If this question is meant to address the risk factors of direct support missions, the answer is no. If it pertains to SIGINT collection requirements, let me refer to para 18a. of JCSM 506-67 wherein the Director NSA considers and responds to each request (for direct support) on the basis of, among other things, the priority of other requirements. It is theoretically possible that a request for direct support resources for a particular area could be denied because of higher priority need to use the resources in other areas.

H. S. Chuer

A

33. Once the mission was approved, what role did you play in the planning and execution of the mission?

None. Once the mission was approved for implementation, commanders concerned were required only to inform NSA of actions being taken. We were obligated, of course, and did provide SIGINT collection guidance and *technical* support to the cryptologic unit aboard in accordance with the area to be reconnoitered.

H. S. Chace

~~SECRET SPOKE~~

8


34. What action did your Pacific Headquarters take after you forwarded a copy of your 29 December message to the JRC?

No action. The information in my 29 December message was provided to the JRC to assist in its evaluation of CINCPAC's statement of risk. A copy of the 29 December message was passed separately to HQ NSAPAC on 2 January 1968 for information only. It would have been improper for HQ NSAPAC to take ~~any~~ action ~~on~~ on the subject since this would be circumventing the JCS.

~~SECRET SPOKE~~

~~TOP SECRET COMINT~~

36. What stations were supposed to furnish warnings to the Pueblo
on this mission?



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET COMINT~~

Date: _____

Subject: _____ *AK*

To: _____

(37) The decision on what documents to supply

a ship is based ~~strictly on need to know.~~*In addition to the tech support material, other*
~~Not all are supplied by us, of course, and~~*documents*
~~some of those held~~ are required for housekeeping

purposes, pro-pay testing, and study purposes,

and are furnished by the NAVY.

In the case of the PUEBLO, very few documents

were supplied directly from NSA, though they

may have been NSA-originated.

*on an estimate of
what technical support
materials are required
to carry out the mission.*

37. How did you decide what materials to supply to the Pueblo?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Date: _____

Subject: _____

BK

To: _____

(38) My answer to a previous question (9) answers this. We did not get an inventory from the PUEBLO prior to its departure from SASEBO.

No. We considered that existing procedures and controls for scientific material, together with the fact that the ship was to be on international waters, gave us the security necessary for the protection of the documents.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

38. Did you make any effort to have material and equipment not directly related to the Pueblo's mission off-loaded before its departure from Sasebo?

OK

40. Who specifically at NSA was responsible for keeping track of the Pueblo mission?

The NSA Command Center, a 24-hour a day operation, and the NSA Collection Management office, received operational reports from the Navy on the progress of the PUEBLO.

H. Schuman

CF

41. What actions were taken at NSA immediately after receipt of the first message telling of the Pueblo's distress.

OK

42. When were you (ADP) informed and what actions did you take?

43. What procedures do you have for accounting for SIGINT materials?

Date: _____

Subject: _____

OK

To: _____

(44) Our rules for protection of Special Intelligence Material are documented in DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 6/3 (DCID 6/3), NSA Circular 50-8, and TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS (TECHINS) 9003 and 9006. In addition, we have in-house rules in the NSA SECURITY MANUAL. Each Service also has its own security manual. There are also general rules on distribution of ^{Technical Instructions} (TECHINS) in the INTRODUCTION to the MANUAL OF U. S. SIGINT OPERATIONS (MISSO). ~~Certain other~~ ~~TECHINS deal with specifics, such as exchange procedures.~~

44. Where are your rules documented?

Date: _____

Subject: _____

To: _____

(45) One of my predecessors made the decision in September 1963 under his authority (NSCID 6) to exempt Special Intelligence material (SIGINT) from TOP SECRET CONTROL. This does not relieve the holder of responsibility for assuring that the material does not fall into the possession of unauthorized persons, but it does permit necessary flexibility for operational use. In answer to other questions, I have already said that we do get receipts for material, ~~and we had asked for inventories from all the ships.~~

45. Why does NSA require receipts, inventories, and destruction reports of ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ COMSEC material but have no accountability for TOP SECRET SIGINT material?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Date: _____

Subject: _____

To: _____

(46) Generally, unless otherwise stated on

the document, recipients of SIGINT material,

~~particular individuals~~ are authorized to extract

or reproduce locally for operational purposes.

I feel the rules and general policy (need-to-know,

security clearance, adequate storage, and all

that) are adequate and need not be changed. It's

basically a matter of strict interpretation.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

46. What rules are there for reproducing, extracting, or making further distribution of SIGINT material furnished by NSA? Do you feel that the rules are adequate? If so, why? If not, why not?

Date: _____

Subject: _____ *OK*

To: _____

No.

(47) ~~As~~ ^{As} I said, in response to an earlier question, we asked for inventories in July 1967 but we didn't get the PUEBLO's until January 1968. We do know fairly well what was on board and we know what the other ships held.

47. Did you have any way of determining accurately what NSA-issued classified material was on board?

Date: _____

Subject: _____ *OK*

To: _____

(48) There was some material that the PUEBLO held that was not specifically related to its mission. This is mostly, as I said earlier, due to the structuring of the documents and those placed on board for pro-pay testing and study purposes by the Navy.

48. How much of this material was related to signals or areas which the Pueblo could not have intercepted on this mission?

OK

52. Do you have any role in the selection of the Commanding Officer, the Chief of the Security Group Detachment, or the Security Group enlisted men aboard AGER's?

No. That is entirely a Navy matter.

J. Schuer

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

53. Have you had any NSA personnel, Navy or civilian, on board any of the AGER missions?

There is no record of any NSA personnel aboard AGER's during operational missions. The only reason NSA ^{CIVILIAN} personnel would be considered necessary for these missions would be in cases where the assigned Navy SIGINT personnel did not possess the necessary expertise to perform a specific function. This has not been the case to date.

^{There were}
~~This excludes those~~ Navy personnel on board who had prior duty with NSA.

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

OK

55. Were there any men on board who had ever been assigned to NSA?

Two members of the Research Detachment:
CTCS Ralph Boudem from 1957 to 1959, and
CTL Donald Peppard from 1959 to 1963.

OR

56. Had any of the crew ever had access to particularly sensitive SIGINT operations?

In addition to LT Harris (the OIC of the Research Detachment), sixteen members of the Detachment had been granted such access, to varying degrees depending on their particular duties.

OK


(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

57. Is there a system to insure that personnel who have knowledge of particularly sensitive operations are not assigned to dangerous missions?



ek

58. What is NSA's role in this system?



~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36


62. What useful intelligence have you gained from these flights?
(against Korea)



~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~


~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36



~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18, USC 798
(b) (3)-E.O.: 86-36

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~²

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

B

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-1B USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36



~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~


~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~




(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(3)-18 USC 798

~~TOP SECRET² UMBRA~~

"67. How much real intelligence have we produced based on shipborne intercept?"






(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-50 USC 403

69. Do you have any way to compare the costs of getting usable intelligence from fixed sites, ships, planes, and satellites?



~~TOP SECRET~~
~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

70. How much could the Russians have learned about our cryptanalytic methods from the materials and equipments that were captured?

I don't believe the Russians could have gleaned any significant information ~~and~~ on our cryptanalytic methods from the ^{documents} ~~materials~~ ~~and~~ ~~equipment~~ which was captured. They could glean nothing from the captured equipments used for SIGINT collection. We are still working on our detailed assessment as a result of debriefing the ~~POW~~ crew, and I would prefer to defer a more specific reply until we have finished.

Date: _____

Subject: _____ *OK*

To: _____

(71) As for the North Koreans and Chinese Communists, they could have learned quite a bit about our collection efforts and knowledge of their communications systems and ability to collect against certain transmitters. They would know what we consider "norms" and what we consider "significant" from a traffic analytic point of view. As a result, ~~if they really understood the ^{language} ~~language~~~~ they would be expected to make some changes in communications patterns. They would, like the Soviets, get a considerable ^{insight} ~~insight~~ into our whole SIGINT structure.

71. How much could the North Koreans and Chinese Communists have learned?

(2)

Date: _____

Subject: _____ *AK*

To: _____

(72) Since we'd already asked for inventories from the ships, we're making sure they are current. We are instructing originators of documents to notify recipients to immediately delete and destroy those portions of documents not mission-related; and we are setting about a new system of restructuring documents to preclude the necessity of sending any unit more of the document than it needs for its current operations. We'll intensify our already intense program of strict need-to-know on distribution of documents, and we will keep the situation under constant scrutiny. ~~I don't really call these "changes" in procedures as a result of the PUEBLO affair - just intensification of the existing policy.~~

72. What changes in any procedures have you made as a direct result of the Pueblo affair?

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

73. Many people have discussed the strange arrangement which apparently existed on the PUEBLO between the research department officer and the commanding officer. Some people have said that there was a large degree of autonomy on the part of the intelligence detachment. As a member of the military, General, do you feel that the devision of responsibility which existed was adequate or inadequate?

The question of arrangements or autonomy involving a research department are within the purview of the Service concerned, and not the National Security Agency. However, it is my understnading that the research department has a slightly different arrangement than, say - the Engineering Department - because the research department received its specific technical SIGINT tasking from CINCPACFLT rather than from the Captain of the ship. Except for this, I am not aware of any special arrangements to exempt the research department from regular ship administrative regulations.

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

Full text of Question 73:

"73. Many people have discussed the strange arrangement which apparently existed on the PUEBLO between the research department officer and the commanding officer. Some people have said that there was a large degree of autonomy on the part of the intelligence detachment. As a member of the military, General, do you feel that the division of responsibility which existed was adequate or inadequate?"

73. Many people have discussed the strange arrangement which apparently existed on the Pueblo between the research department officer and the commanding officer. Some people have said that there was a large degree of autonomy?

~~The Research Department was not a normal element of the ship's complement, in that the OIC did not receive his instructions from the Commanding Officer. For the regular operations of the Research Department, the OIC did have considerable autonomy; however, he had to acquaint the C.O. with the nature of his mission, so that courses could be charted, and times and positions could be determined for the satisfaction of the mission.~~

The questions of arrangements or autonomy involving a research department are within the purview of the Service concerned, and not the National Security Agency. However, it is my understanding that the research department had a slightly different arrangement than, say - the Engineering Dept - because ~~the~~ the research department received its specific technical SIGINT tasking ~~through~~ ^{from} ~~the~~ ^{CINCPACFLT} ~~rather~~ rather than from the Captain of the ship. Except for this I am not aware of any special arrangements to exempt the research dept from regular ship administrative regulations.

g

74. Do you think that this type of intelligence collection operation properly belongs to the military? After all, military conduct is a different breed of cat from this type of business, is it not?

Certainly. Intelligence collection has been a function of the military since time immemorial.

OK

75. Do you feel that the Soviets' practice of using civilians and some military who are treated as civilians has merit?

Perhaps. But such a practice would create administrative and morale problems for us. For example, we would have military and civilian intercept operators sitting side by side, ~~both~~ doing the same job, but at greatly different rates of pay.