

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~PUEBLO
MASTER FILE

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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MEMO FOR: [] M55

The following statement may be used as appropriate in the forthcoming briefing of Mr. Coyne:

The PUEBLO incident resulted in the most comprehensive single compromise of classified material in the history of U.S. intelligence. Moreover, the PUEBLO compromise provided to the "enemy" a complete U.S. SIGINT facility with its associated technical COMINT and ELINT equipment and materials. All but a small percentage of the [] individual SIGINT-related documents, [] non-SIGINT classified documents, [] Operational Intelligence Broadcast messages, and [] Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements aboard the PUEBLO fell into North Korean hands. Nearly all the equipment aboard, including four different types of cryptographic machines, was captured intact or in a condition which could be reconstructed. Two of the four types had previously been considered compromised.

The Operational Intelligence messages contained a complete picture of U.S. SIGINT capabilities in the Pacific and Southeast Asian areas. These messages, together with other documents, provided a broad overview of U.S. SIGINT and other intelligence activities throughout the world, with attendant successes, limitations, relative priorities and liabilities. In addition to translations of individual decrypted messages, there was a wealth of SIGINT product, ranging from all-inclusive daily or weekly summaries to finished intelligence reports.

Since the PUEBLO's capture, NSA has been watching for changes in Russian, Chinese Communist, or North Vietnamese communications, which could reflect those countries' exploitation of the PUEBLO's materials. While there have been some changes, they have not been successfully traced to such exploitation.

The future inviolability of U.S. high-level communications has not been directly affected by the compromise of the cryptographic equipment aboard the PUEBLO. The detailed knowledge of U.S. communications security equipments and procedures, however, may assist and enhance the enemy's development of more secure communications systems, which would have a serious impact on our future SIGINT collection posture.

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(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
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The loss of the PUEBLO has provided North Korea (and, presumably, other communist nations) with a wealth of hitherto unavailable information, and a broad insight into the structure and functioning of U.S. intelligence.

RICHMOND D. SNOW
P/4
PUEBLO Project Officer

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