

## Chapter IX

# Post Incident Reviews and Damage Assessment (U)

### Congressional Inquiries Indicated (U)

~~(C)~~ Approximately two weeks after the return of the *Pueblo's* crew and at the close of the Christmas-New Year's holiday period, the first indicators of probable, new Congressional inquiries appeared. An old friend of General Carter on the staff of the Legislative Liaison in the CIA called him on 3 January 1969 at the request of the Chief Counsel, House Armed Services Committee, John R. Blandford. The chairman of the CIA subcommittee had called a meeting of that subcommittee for 1015 on the following Monday, 6 January. The Chief Counsel wanted General Carter to discuss the assessment of damages resulting from cryptologic compromise. The Director told his CIA friend that the committee chairman should be alerted to the fact that the total picture on compromise had not been put together and would not be for a considerable period of time. General Carter also said that he would be at the meeting "with suitable supporting staff" to answer questions.<sup>1</sup>

~~(C)~~ Thus, the Director appeared before the subcommittee in Executive Session on the 6th and 7th of January 1969. The hearings were designed to bring the ranking members up to date on the *Pueblo* incident. Also present were Mr. Blandford, Chief Counsel of the House Armed Services Committee, and Mr. Frank Slatinshek, Assistant Counsel of the Committee. On the morning of January 7th, General Carter gave testimony in two primary areas: first, the handling of communications concerning the seizure of the *Pueblo* by the North Koreans and, second, the damage to the signals intelligence and communications security activities of the U.S. resulting from the capture of the men and materiel by the North Koreans. A summary of the Director's testimony appears at pp. .

### Concern over Navy Court of Inquiry (U)

~~(C)~~ As we have seen, the Navy Court of Inquiry had been directed to convene following the intelligence debriefing of the crew. When that concluded, plans were made to begin the Court of Inquiry proceedings on 20 January. Early in January, however, efforts were instituted by COMNAVAIRPAC to declassify or downgrade certain NSA documentation for probable use by the Court of Inquiry. B1 reviewed the classification and categorization of the documentation and determined that declassification was not justifiable due to the need for protection

of Comint commensurate with the codeword assigned. A copy of DIRNSA's message about this decision appears at p. .

~~(C)~~ Because of concern about inadvertent disclosure of cryptologic information, NSA General Counsel Roy R. Banner, accompanied by Frank Bartimo, Assistant General Counsel for DoD, met with Rear Admiral Donald D. Chapman, Acting Judge Advocate General, on 16 January 1969. The purpose of the meeting was to offer the Navy the support and assistance, if needed, of NSA and OSD in preventing the unauthorized disclosure of signals intelligence sources and methods during the conduct of the Navy Court of Inquiry concerning the *Pueblo*.

~~(C)~~ Admiral Chapman advised his visitors that counsel for the court, attorneys for the parties involved, and the president of the court had all been cleared. Further, he stated that if, to be responsive, a witness had to disclose classified information, then the court would operate in closed session to hear such testimony. NSA and OSD recommended that the Navy consider appointing a Sigint advisor to the court as a further precautionary measure to prevent the inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information. Admiral Chapman said that he would pass this on to the president of the court noting that the president had an intelligence background.<sup>2</sup>

~~(C)~~ On 20 January, the Navy Court of Inquiry began its deliberations. Particular pains were taken to point out that the court was a fact-finding body only; it had no punitive power and its proceedings were not to be construed as a trial in any sense. The president of the court compared the Court of Inquiry to a Grand Jury as the closest civilian legal proceeding.<sup>3</sup>

### Recovery of Material from SSO New York (U)

~~(C)~~ At about this same time, plans were being made at NSA to retrieve the Comint material that had been delivered to SSO New York at the time of the *Pueblo* incident. This material consisted of tapes containing intercepts of North Korean navy voice collected during the seizure. The tapes were dubs of selected items in the originals and had been prepared at the request of Ambassador Goldberg for possible use in future UN Security Council meetings. The passage of time and succeeding events in the *Pueblo* chronology made it highly unlikely that the tapes would ever be used for the purpose intended. In a note to Dr. Tordella about this situation, the Assistant Director, NSA for the National Cryptologic Staff (ADN) said, ". . . I don't believe (if we can help it) that we should 'chance' disclosures at the UN that are being denied in open hearings to the Court of Inquiry (and the press)." ADN went on to suggest that an informal approach be made to the State Department as an initial move to recover the tapes. Dr. Tordella concurred in this action.<sup>4</sup>

### DDR&E Inquiries (U)

~~(C)~~ During the first days of February 1969, the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) made two inquiries of NSA. Howard C. Barlow, Assistant Director, NSA for Communications Security, was asked if NSA planned any acceleration of Comsec R/D as a result of the *Pueblo* loss. Mr. Barlow replied that NSA's standard planning documents emphasized

that tactical Comsec equipment should be expected to be physically compromised occasionally, and the security of communications should be maintained by the daily changing variables. Thus, he said that the NSA standard assessment always concluded no emergency change of the basic Comsec hardware was required or desired, even though the loss of the technology involved was greatly regretted.<sup>5</sup>

~~(C)~~ On 7 February 1969, Dr. Tordella sent a memorandum to DDR&E in response to that element's request for information concerning NSA actions taken as a result of the *Pueblo's* capture. Tordella's reply explained NSA's precautionary supersession of certain Comsec items and the suspension and curtailed use of others. In addition, the memorandum told of actions initiated to review the inventories of all Sigint documents for all mobile platforms in order to limit technical material carried on board a ship to that considered absolutely essential to the accomplishment of a particular Sigint mission.<sup>6</sup>

### DIRNSA Views on Investigations ~~(C)~~

~~(C)~~ At this staff meeting of 7 February 1969, the Director, NSA expressed his concern over the *Pueblo* investigations and how he desired that NSA respond whenever necessary. The Director informed his officials that Lieutenant Commander Edward J. Koczak, Jr. of D1 was designated as his "chief of staff" on all matters relating to the *Pueblo* and was the person to whom he looked for all information on that subject. General Carter stressed that it was imperative that NSA speak with one voice about the *Pueblo*. He said that the *Pueblo* problem was the number one priority problem of NSA and the government as a whole in the domestic policy area. The Director noted that for obvious reasons people were looking for a scapegoat and that NSA was not an unlikely target; hence it was imperative that all answers be approved by the Director through Mr. Koczak. He indicated that as of then the Agency was doing all right in the testimony and documentation areas, but that NSA would be dead if it ever got trapped by concealing information or by providing misinformation. General Carter said that he habitually made it a practice, when in his view it was necessary, to provide fairly sensitive and accurate information to representatives of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees — and he said that no member of either committee had ever let him down.<sup>7</sup>

### Deputy SECDEF Briefed (U)

~~(C)~~ Knowing that a task force had been established to brief the new Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard, about the *Pueblo*, General Carter wrote to him about the damage assessment. The Director described the damage as most serious and probably would reach the "worst case circumstance" as predicted in the initial assessment provided to USIB in May 1968.<sup>8</sup>

~~(C)~~ On 14 February 1969, the Navy briefed Mr. Packard on the *Pueblo* incident. Also present were Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Clarey. The Navy briefing consisted of an outline of the command and control relationships which existed at the time, the actual incident, and a brief statement on damage assessment in which the briefer stated that "my quick and dirty assessment" is that there was an eighty percent

compromise of documents and other information which was on board. Subsequently, both Laird and Packard stated that it was NSA's job and not the Navy's to give the damage assessment. As a result, the Navy tried to bail itself out, but it was not altogether successful.<sup>9</sup>

~~(C)~~ Approximately two weeks after the Navy briefing, Deputy Secretary Packard visited NSA and heard from General Carter that the damage to the cryptologic effort might be even greater than Carter's earlier statement to Packard in his letter of 13 February.

### Congressional Inquiry Begins (U)

(U) Tuesday, 18 February 1969 saw the chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, Mendel Rivers, appoint a special subcommittee to conduct a full and thorough inquiry into the capture and internment of the USS *Pueblo* and her crew by North Korean forces. Rivers charged the subcommittee with the responsibility of reviewing the national security implications resulting from the loss of the *Pueblo*, and ascertaining whether deficiencies existed in the command response to emergencies of that kind. Otis G. Pike was named chairman of the special subcommittee.<sup>10</sup> The subcommittee was directed to proceed as soon as practicable to initiate its inquiry and, ultimately, the formal hearings began on 4 March 1969 in open session.

~~(C)~~ Before the hearings began, NSA's General Counsel spent an hour on 26 February with Admiral Johnston, Chief, Legislative Affairs, Office of the Secretary of the Navy, to advise him on the position that he and Admiral Moorer should assume when they appeared before the special subcommittee on the following Tuesday. The thrust of Mr. Banner's advice was that the Navy should not admit that anyone was at fault, but rather that some very logical assumptions had been made on the basis of a long history of international law practices which were not honored. At that point no date had been set for NSA to testify before the subcommittee.<sup>11</sup>

### DIRNSA Testifies Before Congress ~~(C)~~

~~(S CCO)~~ A week after the subcommittee hearings began, the Director, NSA was called to testify on 10 March 1969. During the first hour and a half, General Carter briefed the subcommittee on the mission of NSA. He stated that in the Sigint area the Director, NSA was responsible for the direction and control of almost all U.S. resources necessary to produce Comint and Elint information in response to the intelligence requirements of national policy-makers and military commanders. While he noted that it is NSA's responsibility to produce Sigint information in accordance with the objectives, requirements and priorities established by the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB), he pointed out that about ninety-eight percent of the intercept of signals was done by the military services. General Carter also explained that NSA operated a special communications systems to assure the direct and instant handling of signals intelligence and that, there resided within the system the capability of carrying critical intelligence from any part of the world to Washington in a few minutes once a critic message was introduced into this special system. On the Comsec side of the house, he declared that NSA was responsible for producing equipment and material, as well

as establishing policies and procedures for the protection of classified government communications from the signals intelligence activities of foreign governments. He discussed the relationship of the U.S. entities concerned with providing Comsec and said that NSA does not have direct operational responsibility for Comsec, given that the military departments are charged with organizing their own Comsec activities. He noted, however, that they are bound by the communications security rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the Director, NSA. General Carter then pointed out that, in the operation of Comsec equipment, the U.S. assumed that such equipment is subject to compromise. NSA's design effort was based on that premise, and the security of U.S. communications was guaranteed by the daily changing variables that NSA supplied to all users of cryptographic equipment. These variables produced a completely different cryptographic cipher for each period of use and these periods never extended beyond twenty-four hours. General Carter showed the subcommittee members pictures of the cryptographic equipment and samples of the kind of daily changing variables that were on board the *Pueblo*. He explained how the keying variables (the key cards, rotors) could be changed so as to control the encipherment and decipherment processes.<sup>12</sup>

~~(C-CCO)~~ In the next part of his briefing, General Carter pointed out that most U.S. Comint and Elint collection and processing activities had been placed under NSA operational and technical control, but that there were exceptions. He explained that operational control involved "what" to do, while technical control involved essentially "how" to do it. He stressed that command control does not rest with NSA, noting that this remains the responsibility of the authorities owning the collection platform or facilities. The Director pointed out that excepted from NSA operational control are those Comint facilities and resources required to satisfy, by direct and immediate support to the commander in the field, the tactical intelligence requirements of the unified and specified commanders. However, NSA did maintain technical control over those operations. He then explained the other types of Comint activities that are excepted from NSA's control (early warning, rescue, clandestine). In the Elint area, he explained that, while NSA exercised technical control of Elint collection and processing, it had operational control over all Elint activities except those which are essential to provide immediate support to commanders who plan and conduct military operations.<sup>13</sup>

~~(SC)~~ With respect to the *Pueblo* operation itself, General Carter pointed out that the patrol was conducted in response to U.S. Navy direct support requirements and that the platform was under the operational control of CINCPACFLT. He stated that the *Pueblo* was a multisensor platform and that Sigint was one important aspect of the mission. NSA's general role, he explained, was to provide Sigint technical guidance and assistance upon the request of the Navy. He reported that NSA was advised of the scheduled patrol by the Navy at the time of the Navy's proposal to the JCS in early December 1967, and that CINCPACFLT had solicited from NSA secondary tasking assignments for the mission. In late December 1967, he said, NSA supplied the Navy with secondary tasking collection requirements and separately commented to JCS on Sigint reflections of actions taken by the North Koreans in response to past reconnaissance efforts. He indicated that a further action of NSA was to give notice of the *Pueblo's* mission to those U.S. Sigint field stations in the Pacific area associated with JCS approved Korean targets and request that they report any reflections of North Korean reaction to the *Pueblo*. General Carter pointed out

that the Sigint collected at the time of the capture indicated clearly that the *Pueblo* was in international waters, adding that there was no Sigint evidence to indicate that the ship had ever penetrated North Korean territorial waters.

~~(S)~~ The committee members questioned General Carter on the nature of the messages transmitted by NSA concerning the *Pueblo* and had the Director read into the record the message sent by NSA to the Navy in which it supplied the secondary tasking requirements for the *Pueblo*. He was also asked to read into the record the message that NSA sent to the JCS on the North Korean reactions to past reconnaissance efforts, as well as the message NSA sent to the U.S. field stations requesting them to report reflections of North Korean reactions to the *Pueblo*. In response to the chairman's question on whether there was any documentation to cover the secondary tasking by NSA of the *Pueblo*, General Carter quoted from the message of CINCPACFLT requesting such tasking.<sup>14</sup>

~~(S)~~ Committee members were interested in the nature of the command and control exercised by the Navy over both the commander of the *Pueblo* and the officer in charge of the Sigint detachment. The members wanted to know if the messages from NSA were actually received by the commanding officer of the vessel as well as by the commander of the Sigint detachment. The Director said this information could be provided by the Navy.

~~(S)~~ General Carter was questioned about his assessment of the Sigint/Comsec damage resulting from the capture of the men and material of the *Pueblo*. He pointed out that the North Koreans obtained extensive information on U.S. Sigint efforts against the North Koreans, the Soviet Union, Communist China and North Vietnam. It was reasonable to assume he said, that some of the documents and material captured from the *Pueblo* had been turned over to the Soviets and possibly to the Chicoms, and that the great danger was that the Soviets and Chicoms could also improve their communications security as a result of obtaining direct knowledge of the extent of U.S. penetration of their respective communications.

~~(S)~~ With respect to the cryptographic damage assessment, General Carter said that the *Pueblo* carried four types of cryptographic equipment, associated keying materials, maintenance manuals, operating instructions, and the general Comsec publications necessary to support a cryptographic operation. General Carter stated that while communications security depends essentially upon keying variables, the compromise of U.S. cryptographic logic could be of benefit to Communist cryptologists in forecasting future U.S. developments. Moreover, he noted, some of the engineering technology incorporated into U.S. crypto-equipments could well be appropriated to increase the operations and the overall communications security of the Communist bloc's next generation of cryptographic hardware. No doubt, he said, the North Koreans have acquired some advanced technological data.<sup>15</sup>

~~(S-CCO)~~ Shortly after the Director's appearance before the Special Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, Mr. Frank M. Slatinshek, counsel for the subcommittee, requested that NSA provide the following additional information by the close of business on 14 March:

a. A chronology of the procedures involved in NSA's participation in the planning and review of JRC reconnaissance operations.

b. Aside from the 13 December letter, did NSA have any informal communications from the JRC at around that time concerning the *Pueblo* operation and, if so, how was such communication processed?

c. When they captured the *Pueblo*, what documents were obtained by the North Koreans that concerned the sailing orders and the various phases of the operational orders and plans of the *Pueblo*?

d. Was there anything in signals intelligence before or after the seizure to lend weight to the thesis that the capture of the *Pueblo* was accidental and not planned and that the North Koreans might have given up the ship and personnel had the U.S. delivered an ultimatum?

~~(C)~~ A copy of NSA's reply to this request for information appears at p. .

### **DIRNSA Corresponds with SECDEF ~~(C)~~**

~~(C)~~ On Friday, 14 March, Representative Pike, Chairman of the Special *Pueblo* Subcommittee, made public certain portions of General Carter's testimony which had been given in Executive Session. This development prompted the Director to write to the Secretary of Defense in order to "set the record straight" and comment on Pike's statements. (A copy of this letter to Mr. Laird appears at p. .) At the same time, General Carter also informed General Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, about Representative Pike's statements and provided him with a copy of his letter (see p. ) to the Secretary of Defense in the hope that it would "serve to clarify the situation and place the matter in proper context."

### **Navy Court of Inquiry Ends (U)**

~~(FOUO)~~ In San Diego, the Navy Court of Inquiry finally concluded its sessions on 13 March 1969. Thereafter, the court members would deliberate over the testimony presented and prepare the recommendations of the court for submission to CINCPACFLT.

### **Damage Report Made to USIB (U)**

~~(C)~~ Toward the end of March 1969, General Carter provided the USIB membership with a copy of the final NSA cryptologic and cryptographic damage assessment report based upon the compromise of Comint/Comsec material and equipment, the results of the detailed intelligence debriefing of the crewmen, and the analysis of the acquired information.<sup>16</sup>

~~(S-CCO)~~ Approximately ten days later, CNO sent to USIB damage assessments of the compromise of Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICRs) and of Operational Intelligence Broadcast (GOPI) messages on board the *Pueblo*.<sup>17</sup> A review of the GOPI traffic revealed that Sigint technical data, field and national Sigint reports, and operational intelligence had all been included on the same broadcast. The existence, technical capabilities, manning, and areas of coverage of many Sigint sites and detachments had been disclosed through transmission of technical information, personnel clearance, and intelligence reports. Further, a comprehensive analysis of the GOPI traffic would reveal extensive command and control information of the Sigint community.<sup>18</sup> Compromise of the Comint SICRs pertaining to North Korean, Chicom, and

Soviet targets provided insights into U.S. intelligence requirements and U.S. and allied intelligence capabilities, and identified gaps in U.S. knowledge.

(U) The USIB Ad Hoc Intelligence Damage Assessment Group (IDAG), meanwhile, was struggling to compile an overall damage assessment report. By the end of April, it appeared that a version acceptable to all members would be ready by mid-May.<sup>19</sup>

### NBC Documentary Planned (U)

~~(C)~~ While official, governmental investigations were taking place, NBC began preparing a documentary news program on the background of the *Pueblo* mission, the circumstances of its seizure, and subsequent events. In this regard, NBC requested DoD cooperation and assistance to permit NBC to interview certain personnel and film selected locations.<sup>20</sup> On Thursday, 3 April, Walter Sheridan of NBC called Gerard P. Burke, Executive Assistant to the Director, NSA, in an attempt to arrange a video tape interview with General Carter. Burke told him that he felt the Director would decline such an invitation, but that he would convey Sheridan's request to General Carter.<sup>21</sup> Sheridan called back on the following Tuesday, to find out the General's decision. When told that the Director declined, Sheridan then asked if General Carter would go along with such an interview provided DoD gave its approval for NBC to interview the Director. The NSA Public Information Officer (PIO) told Sheridan that he would check into this possibility.<sup>22</sup> In a handwritten note, General Carter told the PIO that he had ". . . no intention of being interviewed, TV'd, off-the-record or otherwise — they can forget me — if directed by SECDEF, will reconsider!<sup>23</sup> On 14 April, NSA's Public Information Officer phoned Mr. Sheridan and advised him of General Carter's decision.

### Navy Court of Inquiry Recommendations (U)

(U) In Hawaii, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral Hyland, finished reviewing the recommendations of the Navy's Court of Inquiry and forwarded them, with his own comments, to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington. CNO concurred with the views of CINCPACFLT and sent the record to the Secretary of the Navy. The Court of Inquiry had recommended that both Commander Bucher and Lieutenant Harris be brought to trial by general court-martial, but CINCPACFLT did not accept that and recommended instead that each be given a letter of reprimand for alleged dereliction of duty. CINCPACFLT did, however, concur in the recommendation of the Court of Inquiry that Lieutenant Murphy be issued a letter of admonition and also concurred in the recommendation that Admiral Johnson be given a letter of reprimand. CINCPACFLT recommended against issuing a letter of reprimand to Captain Gladding. CNO accepted CINCPACFLT's recommendations. On 6 May, SECNAV released a statement concerning his actions on the disciplinary aspects of the findings, opinions, and recommendations of the Court of Inquiry as well as recommendations of the subsequent reviewing authorities. The Secretary of the Navy, John H. Chaffee, said:

. . . I have reviewed the record of the Court of Inquiry and the recommendations of the convening authority and the Chief of Naval Operations. I make no judgment regarding the guilt or innocence of any of the officers of the offenses alleged against them. Such judgment

could legitimately be reached by duly constituted authority only after further legal proceedings, such as trial by court-martial or the hearing required prior to issuance of a letter of reprimand or admonition.

I am convinced, however, that neither individual discipline, nor the state of discipline or morale in the Navy, nor any other interest requires further legal proceedings with respect to any personnel involved in the *Pueblo* incident.

In reviewing the court's recommendations with respect to Commander Bucher, Lieutenant Murphy, and Lieutenant Harris, it is my opinion that . . . they have suffered enough, and further punishment would not be justified. . . .

The charges against Rear Admiral Johnson and Captain Gladding relate to the failure to anticipate the emergency that subsequently developed. This basic, general accusation, however, could be leveled in various degrees at responsible superior authorities in the chain of command and control and in the collateral support structure.

The major factor which led to the *Pueblo's* lonely confrontation by unanticipatedly bold and hostile forces was the sudden collapse of a premise which had been assumed at every level of responsibility and upon which every other aspect of the mission had been based — freedom of the high seas, at that particular point in history, the common confidence in the historic inviolability of a sovereign ship on the high seas in peacetime was shown to have been misplaced. The consequences must in fairness be borne by all, rather than by one or two individuals whom circumstances had placed closer to the crucial event.

In light of the considerations set out above, I have determined that the charges against all of the officers concerned will be dismissed, and I have directed the Chief of Naval Operations to take appropriate action to that end.<sup>24</sup>

(U) With this pronouncement, the official, formal investigation by the Navy Department of the *Pueblo* incident was concluded.

## Other DoD Interest (U)

~~(C)~~ As other DoD components happened to learn more details about the compromise of classified information aboard the *Pueblo*, they sometimes made specific inquiries about their particular vested interest. Thus it was that Dr. Carl Walske, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), asked NSA if any possibility existed that nuclear related information had been compromised incident to the capture of the cryptographic equipment aboard the *Pueblo*. In reply, the Agency informed Dr. Walske that no information pertinent to U.S. nuclear capabilities was contained in the GOPI traffic that was compromised. Further, NSA had not been an addressee on any messages containing Restricted Data, Formerly Restricted Data, or operations plans involving U.S. nuclear strike forces that were passed in cryptographic systems aboard the *Pueblo* when it was captured.<sup>25</sup>

## Congress Releases Report (U)

(U) By the end of June 1969, the Special Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services had submitted its report on the capture and internment of the *Pueblo* to the chairman of the parent committee. After some slight sanitizing, the report, dated 28 July 1969, was released to the public. In the report's summary of findings and recommendations the following appears:

The reluctant but inescapable conclusion finally reached by the subcommittee is that because of the vastness of the military structure, with its complex division into multiple layers of command, and the failure of responsible authorities at the seat of government to either delegate responsibility or in the alternative provide clear and unequivocal guidelines governing policy in emergency situations — our military command structure is now simply

unable to meet the emergency criterion outlined and suggested by the President himself. . . The subcommittee inquiry was not of sufficient scope to permit it to offer a proposed solution to the problem. It is evident, however, that the problem exists and it has frightful implications.<sup>26</sup>

## NBC Documentary Released (U)

~~(S)~~ By mid-August 1969, NBC had completed its preparation of the TV production, "*Pueblo: A Question of Intelligence*" and the Department of Defense arranged a review-screening limited to changes that might be necessary for security and accuracy in those portions of the documentary made possible by DoD assistance. NSA was among the DoD components that viewed the screening on Friday, 15 August 1969, at the Pentagon.<sup>27</sup>

(U) The following exact references to NSA appeared in the narrative text of the NBC documentary:

*Frank McGee* [NBC commentator]: . . . But the National Security Agency suggested that the risk assessment was too low. On December 29th, NSA sent a radiogram to the Joint Chiefs.

[Congressman] *Pike*: No member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ever got that message. It was received at a lower level within the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and re-directed out to the Commander in Chief, Pacific. The Commander in Chief, Pacific never got that message at all. It was received at his staff level.

*McGee*: None of the top commanders saw the National Security Agency message.

*Commander, Pacific Fleet*: It was not addressed to me, not even for information, and I didn't see it until after the whole affair was over and the *Pueblo* was captured.

I've seen the message later, as I said, and — and I looked at it with all the people who help me to make the decision here at this level, and we don't think that it would have — if we had seen it, that it would have made any difference in — what we decide to — to recommend with respect to that mission.<sup>28</sup>

After reviewing the documentary, the NSA General Counsel, Mr. Roy Banner, decided that it would be unwise to ask NBC to make any changes in the text.<sup>29</sup>

## USIB Recommendations (U)

~~(FOUO)~~ At the USIB level, the Intelligence Damage Assessment Group rendered its report recommending that procedures, criteria and appropriate regulations be developed to minimize the intelligence losses that might occur as a result of possible future incidents comparable to the capture of the *Pueblo*. Several specific areas of concern were: (1) minimizing the amount of sensitive intelligence materials held by activities in exposed areas, (2) insuring that procedures for destruction of those materials were adequate, and (3) training intelligence personnel assigned to exposed areas on how to endure enemy detention.<sup>30</sup> By 8 September, the USIB Special Ad Hoc Group had concluded that, from the standpoint of general guidance, no change was required in that portion of DCID No. 6/3 dealing with exposed areas. The group was unanimous, however, in its belief that the provisions of the directive had not been strictly followed and that it was necessary to tighten implementation controls.<sup>31</sup>

(U) We have seen that the *Pueblo* incident was investigated by a great many organizations. What resulted from this plethora of investigative efforts? In the next chapter, we will look at deficiencies that were identified and what, if any, corrective actions were initiated.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> (U) NSA, Director's Memorandum for the Record, 3 January 1969. ~~(S-Sensitive/Privacy)~~
- <sup>2</sup> (U) NSA, General Counsel Memorandum for the Record, 16 January 1969. ~~(C)~~
- <sup>3</sup> (U) CINCPACFLT REP SDIEGO message, 170030Z Jan 69. ~~(C)~~
- <sup>4</sup> (U) NSA, ADN handwritten note to Deputy Director, NSA, 31 January 1969. ~~(S-CCO)~~
- <sup>5</sup> ~~(C)~~ NSA, ADC Memorandum for the Record, "DDR&E Inquiry Re *Pueblo* COMSEC," 5 February 1969. ~~(S)~~
- <sup>6</sup> ~~(C)~~ NSA, Director's memorandum to DDR&E, Serial: N0119, "National Security Agency (NSA) Actions as a Result of the Capture of the *USS Pueblo*," 7 February 1969. ~~(S-CCO)~~
- <sup>7</sup> (U) NSA, Minutes of Director's Staff Meeting, 7 February 1969. ~~(TS-CCO)~~
- <sup>8</sup> (U) Director, NSA, letter to Deputy SECDEF, 13 February 1969. ~~(S-CCO)~~
- <sup>9</sup> ~~(C)~~ NSA, EAD (LCDR Kozak) Memorandum for the Record, "*Pueblo* Briefing to Secretary of Defense," 19 February 1969. ~~(S-CCO)~~ Sensitive)
- <sup>10</sup> (U) Congressman L. Mendell Rivers (Democrat - S.C.), press release, 19 February 1969. (U)
- <sup>11</sup> ~~(U)~~ NSA, EAD  Memorandum for the Record, 27 February 1969. (U)
- <sup>12</sup> (U) NSA, General Counsel Memorandum for the Record, 11 March 1969. ~~(C)~~
- <sup>13</sup> (U) Ibid.
- <sup>14</sup> (U) Ibid.
- <sup>15</sup> (U) Ibid.
- <sup>16</sup> ~~(C)~~ NSA, Director's memorandum to USIB Principals, Serial: N0282, "NSA Damage Assessment Report Concerning the Loss of the *USS Pueblo*," 26 March 1969. ~~(TS-CCO/NF-Special LIMDIS)~~
- <sup>17</sup> (U) CNO memorandum for Chairman, USIB, Serial: SSO-3-00067-69, 4 April 1969. ~~(TS-CCO)~~
- <sup>18</sup> ~~(C)~~ Joint Ad Hoc Team (members from CIA, DIA, NIC, AFNIN, and ACSI). "Damage Assessment of Compromise of Operational Intelligence Broadcast Messages on Board *USS Pueblo* (AGER-2)," 17 March 1969, p.IV-1. ~~(TS-CCO)~~
- <sup>19</sup> ~~(C)~~ NSA Member, IDAG memorandum to D/DIR, NSA, "Status Report on Activities of the USIB Ad Hoc *Pueblo* Damage Assessment Group," 30 April 1969. ~~(TS-CCO)~~
- <sup>20</sup> (U) NBC News Bureau (Fred Freed) letter to Norman T. Hatch, Directorate for Defense Information, 31 March 1969. (U)
- <sup>21</sup> (U) NSA, EAD Memorandum for the Record, 3 April 1969. (ADMIN. SENSITIVE)
- <sup>22</sup> (U) NSA, PIO Memorandum for the Record, 8 April 1969. (ADMIN. SENSITIVE)
- <sup>23</sup> ~~(C)~~ NSA, Director's handwritten notation on Public Information Officer memorandum, "NBC-TV Documentary on the *USS Pueblo*," 14 April 1969. (U)
- <sup>24</sup> (U) SECNAV message, 061454Z May 69. (U)
- <sup>25</sup> (C) NSA, Deputy Director's memorandum to Assistant SECDEF (Atomic Energy), Serial: N04473, "Intelligence Assessment on *USS Pueblo* (U)," 19 May 1969. ~~(TS-CCO/NF/CRYPTO)~~
- <sup>26</sup> (U) Cong. Report, pp.1619-20. (U)
- <sup>27</sup> ~~(C)~~ Chief, Audio-Visual Division, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) memorandum for Public Affairs Office, NSA, "Review of NBC White Paper Report on *Pueblo*," 14 August 1969. (U)
- <sup>28</sup> (U) Radio TV Reports, Inc., text of NBC-TV network broadcast, "*Pueblo*: A Question of Intelligence," 7:30 P.M, 25 August 1969. pp. 17-18. (U)
- <sup>29</sup> (U) NSA, Public Information Officer Memorandum for the Record, 21 August 1969. (U)
- <sup>30</sup> (U) USIB memorandum, USIB-S-13.5/56, 3 June 1969. ~~(TS-CCO)~~
- <sup>31</sup> (U) USIB memorandum, USIB-S-13.5/58, 8 September 1969. ~~(TS-CCO)~~

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