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1 TO	Mr. Snow, Pod	INITIALS	CIRCULATE		
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REMARKS Don - Returned - Thanks very much					
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36					
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ADP

VIII

DL2

31 May 1968

ADP

USIB Agenda Item (Executive Session), 6 June 1968, NSA Interim Report on Impact of Loss of the PUEBLO

REFERENCES: (a) CIA Memo to DIRNSA, dtd 17 May 68, same subject as above

(b) DL2 Memo to ADM, ADP, dtd 23 May 68, same subject as above

1. The following information is provided for possible use by the Director at the forthcoming Board meeting. It is arranged in two parts: first, observations on the specific documents mentioned in the D/DCI letter; and second, responses to the points contained in paragraph 3 of the DL2 memo.

2. Specific Documents Mentioned in the D/DCI Letter: The documents mentioned are SICK's (Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements). [ ] ("Soviet Missile Operations, Launches, and Related Activities", "CHICOM Communications Systems", and "CHICOM [ ] Activity"); [ ] None of the SICK's were given to the PUEBLO by NSA or its field offices. We feel that there is reason to question their provision to any collection facility, since they are useless to a collection effort until after they have been translated into technical specifics.

3. Responses to Points in the DL2 Memo:

a. Materials and Equipments Provided by NSA or its Components:

The selection of reference materials for the PUEBLO was made by analytic elements of NSA, and by [ ], on the basis of the six-month schedule of the PUEBLO's activities. That was announced by CINCPACFLT in December 1967; however, it had been known here earlier, and a collection was made of Working Aids, COMINT Technical Reports and manuals which would be useful to the members of the SIGINT detachment aboard. These materials, as in the past, were given to the Assistant Director, Naval Security Group, for forwarding to the PUEBLO's point of embarkation. As a basis for selecting specific reference materials, the analysts drew on their past experience in working on the results of shipborne collection, their knowledge of desired targets, and their discussions with SIGINT detachment personnel.

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-50 USC 403  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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## b. Corrective Measures Being Taken to Limit Future Damages:

On 31 January 1968, DIRNSA sent a message to the three SCA's and their respective field headquarters, requesting an immediate inventory of all SIGINT documents for all Mobile Platforms. The message said, in part: "Request you insure that technical material carried on board a SIGINT platform continue to be limited to that considered absolutely essential to the accomplishment of the particular SIGINT mission. Documents not essential to mission, but which might be useful on subsequent missions, should be retained for issue to platforms as required." The SCA's were quick to comply.

## c. Procedures Applicable to Exposed Platforms or Units Which Hold SIGINT Materials:

In March of this year, NSA expressed concern (to the three SCA's and CMC) over SIGINT holdings in exposed areas, and asked for information on "... inventory controls in effect at DSU's".

NSC and CMC responded on 24 April with positive information. They stated that the unit in Da Nang, South Vietnam, held a minimum amount of Category II material, and was complying with pertinent directives.

NSA responded on 17 May, but did not provide positive information. They reviewed general security procedures, but did state that DSU's held a minimum amount of Category II material, and destroyed items as soon as their usefulness was over; thus, their holdings did not grow.

AFES is awaiting a reply from their Pacific headquarters, before answering our request.

## d. Planning Actions to Lessen Future Losses:

Two draft changes to pertinent MISSO documents<sup>1</sup> are now being coordinated with the SCA's. These will require the forwarding of inventories from all SCA sites; the information will be in machineable form, and will be processed at NSA. Thus, NSA should be in a position to know, at any time, what SIGINT and SIGINT-related materials are held by a site (exposed or not).

4. The past concept for AGER operations has allowed for diversion of any mission to cover short-notice, higher-priority requirements. To ensure proper technical support for such eventualities, which would very likely preclude a return to port, support materials had to be available at the commencement of a

<sup>1</sup> OPDOC No. 21, "SIGINT Technical Support"  
TECHINS No. 7001, "Provision of Technical Support" (new Annex requiring inventory information)

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long schedule. It is apparent that such diversion of a shipborne platform will, from now on, be greatly curtailed by adherence to NSA's guidance to the SCA's on limiting SIGINT holdings aboard such a platform.

5. Perhaps a fact not generally known, is that the Navy has provided armed escort ships for some of the more sensitive TRS operations since the PUEBLO incident. The MULLER, for instance, has a destroyer escort while [redacted] The GEORGETOWN also had a destroyer escort during its recent cruise [redacted] These escort actions are in addition to the Navy's action in increasing the modest armament to the TRS's and AGEK's themselves.

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-50 USC 403  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

JOHN E. MORRISON, JR.  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Assistant Director, NSA  
for  
Production

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cc: ADP  
PO4  
AO5  
BO4  
KL2

M/R: DL2, in a memo of 23 May 68 to ADH and ADP, referred to NSA's report to USIB containing an assessment of the loss of the USS PUEBLO. That report, presented to the Board on 13 May, prompted the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to request that the matter of the PUEBLO be considered by the Board at its 23 May meeting. (The meeting was subsequently rescheduled to 6 June.) In addition, the D/DCI sent a personal letter to the Director, NSA, in which he posed several questions. The DL2 memo of 23 May asked for information which the Director felt he would need in order to answer those questions, and to use in discussing the matter at the 6 June USIB meeting.

Statements were solicited from AO5, BO4, and KL2; they were incorporated into an answering memo from ADP to DL2.

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R. D. Snow, PO4, 31 May 68, 5821s

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