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SPECIAL HANDLING

*FROM: DIRNSA

DATE: 2 FEB 68

TO:

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INFO:

CHAIRMAN JCS

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SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF PUEBLO LOSS

MY DIR-21-68 AND DIR-22-68 REFER.

FURTHER NSA ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE COMPROMISE OF COMSEC AND SIGINT ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE PUEBLO INCIDENT HAS RESULTED IN THE FOLLOWING UPDATED REPORT WHICH WAS PRESENTED TO THE POLICY SUB-COMMITTE OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON 1 FEBRUARY BY THE DIRECTOR OF NSA.

QUOTE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY ACTIVITIES ARE CENTERED ABOUT TWO MAJOR PURPOSES: ONE IS TO MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS, AND SECOND IS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE COMMUNICATIONS OF TARGET NATIONS. THE "BILL OF DESTRUCTION" COVERING THE EQUIPMENT OF THE PUEBLO PROVIDED FOR DESTRUCTION OF DIR ADPP2 Α В G K M5 D32 ADN B1 P04 ADNSG

DISTRIBUTION

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

DOCUMENT MARKING SHALL S. CARTER, LTGEN, USAGE DIRECTOR REFERS TO MESSAGE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Approved for Release by NSA on 05-28-2013, FOIA Case # 63391

AGO NR.

DIOCTO: 4053049
NSA FORM N2208 REV SEP SE
(Supersedes N2288 REV 4UG 65

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SECRET TRINE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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KEY CARDS AND KEY LISTS, THEN OF THE EQUIPMENT, THEN
CODES AND AUTHENTICATION MATERIALS, AND FINALLY MAINTENANCE AND OPERATING MANUALS. WHILE IT IS THEORETICALLY
POSSIBLE TO HAVE ELECTRONIC AUTOMATIC DETONATION GEAR,
THE PUEBLO WAS NOT SO EQUIPPED. THE HAZARDS OF AUTOMATIC
DETONATION EQUIPMENT ON BOARD A SHIP ARE WEIGHED
AGAINST OTHER METHODS OF DESTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBLE
DAMAGE FROM COMPROMISE, AND ARE GENERALLY CONSIDERED
UNACCEPTABLE.

FOR THE PAST 30 YEARS IT HAS BEEN THE GENERAL U.S.

PRACTICE THAT, WHERE POSSIBLE, SECURITY OF U.S. COMMUNICATIONS WILL NOT DEPEND SOLELY ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION

OF THE EQUIPMENT USED TO ENCIPHER AND DECIPHER THE

MESSAGES. DURING THE PAST 20 YEARS NO EQUIPMENT HAS

BEEN PRODUCED WITHOUT VARIABLES WHICH DEPEND UPON

KEYING ELEMENTS, USUALLY KEY LISTS OR KEY CARDS, FOR

THEIR PRIMARY SECURITY. IN PARTICULAR, ALL THE COMMUNICATION SECURITY EQUIPMENTS WHICH THE PUEBLO CARRIED

DEPENDED UPON EITHER KEY LISTS OR KEY CARDS. LOSS OF A

PARTICULAR EQUIPMENT WITH THE KEYING ELEMENT WOULD NOT

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TEOPARDIZE ANY OTHER TRAFFIC ENCIPHERED BY SIMILAR EQUIPMENTS USING DIFFERENT KEYING ELEMENTS. AS SOON AS NOTIFICATION OF THE CAPTURE OF THE PUEBLO WAS RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON, STEPS WERE TAKEN TO SUPERSEDE ALL KEYING ELEMENTS WHICH SHE CARRIED AND NEW ONES WERE PRESCRIBED.

THE KEY LIST ENABLES THE USER TO ESTABLISH A UNIOUE

MACHINE SET-UP FOR A CRYPTO PERIOD WHICH IS NOT LONGER
THAN 24 HOURS. THE KEY CARD IS A CARD PUNCHED WITH A
SPECIFIED PATTERN AND IS INSERTED INTO THE MACHINE BY
MEANS OF A CARD HOLDER. THE KEY CARD AND HOLDER PERMIT
FEELER PINS TO MAKE CONTACT THROUGH RANDOMLY POSITIONED
HOLES AND EFFECTIVELY REWIRE THE CIPHER MACHINES, AGAIN
NOT LESS OFTEN THAN EACH 24 HOURS. THE NUMBER OF
COMBINATIONS RESULTING FROM A CARD SYSTEM IS ASTRONOMICAL
AND A MESSAGE WHICH IS TRANSMITTED THROUGH A MACHINE
USING A PARTICULAR KEYING ELEMENT CAN ONLY BE READ AT THE
OTHER END BY A MACHINE WITH AN IDENTICAL KEYING ELEMENT.

IT IS THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY'S JUDGMENT THAT
NO DEGRADATION TO THE SECURITY OF OTHER U.S. COMMUNICAJUDGMENT THIS COMPROMISE EVEN IF THE EQUIPMENT

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AND THE KEY LISTS WERE CAPTURED INTACT, SINCE STEPS WERE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY TO SUPERSEDE ALL OF THE KEYING MATERIALS. IN THE WORST POSSIBLE CASE, THE FEW MESSAGES TO AND FROM THE PUEBLO COULD BE READ IF ALL MATERIALS AND EQUIPMEN WERE CAPTURED INTACT.

MESSAGE TRAFFIC FROM THE PUEBLO, AS WELL AS FROM THE NORTH KOREANS, INDICATED A DESTRUCTION EFFORT ON BOARD THE VESSEL BY FIRE AS WELL AS JETTISONING. FROM HER COMMUNICATIONS, IT MAY BE INFERRED THAT THE BULK OF HER KEY MATERIAL, PERHAPS ALL, AND AS MUCH EQUIPMENT AS POSSIBLE WAS DESTROYED, BUT THAT SEVERAL PUBLICATIONS WERE PROBABLY COMPROMISED. WE WILL NOT KNOW WHAT UNTIL THE CREW IS RELEASED AND DEBRIEFED.

ON THE INTELLIGENCE SIDE, THE PUEBLO CARRIED A SUFFICIENT AMOUNT OF COLLECTION GEAR TO ENABLE HER TO MONITOR NORTH KOREAN COMMUNICATIONS AND RADAR FACILITIES ON THE EAST COAST EQUIPMENT WAS GENERALLY UNCLASSIFIED (FOUR PIECES

CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL) BUT THE USE TO WHICH THE EQUIPMENT

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COULD BE PUT AND THE RESULTS DERIVED THEREFROM ARE CLASSIFIED. IT IS VERY POSSIBLE THAT IF THE EQUIPMENT WAS UNDA MAGED A REASONABLY PRECISE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE PUEBLO'S INTELLIGENCE MISSION COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED.

IN ADDITION TO THE EQUIPMENT REFERRED TO ABOVE THE PUEBLO CARRIED A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF TECHNICAL PUBLICATIONS AND ANALYTICAL AIDS REQUIRED TO ENABLE HER TO DISCHARGE THE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION MISSION. ITEMS WERE CAPTURED INTACT, THEY WOULD GIVE THE NORTH KOREANS PRECISE INFORMATION ON THE EXTENT OF U.S. KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR COMMUNICATIONS TECHNIQUES, USAGE AND RADAR EQUIPMENTS. THE PUBLICATIONS ALSO REVEAL A MORE LIMITED U.S. KNOWLEDGE OF THE GENERAL SOVIET COM MUNICATIONS PRACTICES THIS INFORMATION, IF COMPROMISED, WOULD STIMULATE EITHER OF THE TWO NATIONS TO CHANGE THEIR COMMUNICATIONS PRACTICES, SUPERSEDE THEIR CALL SIGN

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ALTHOUGH THE POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE COMMUNICATIONS

SYSTEMS AND/OR MODIFY THEIR OPERATIONAL CODES.

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and the second second	MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS MAN	
COULD STIMULATE O	ONE OR OTHER OF THESE COUNTRIES (OR
POSSIBLY COMMUNIS	ST CHINA) TO MAKE MAJOR CHANGES	IN
	IONS SECURITY EQUIPMENT AND PRAC	5. 3 5.
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SIGNALS INTELLIGEN	CE PRODUCTION ON THESE NATIONS	IN
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THERE WERE	THIRTY (TWENTY-NINE ENLISTED AND	ONE
	RITY PERSONNEL ON BOARD THE SHIP	· امو سر
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MOST OF THESE MEN	I AND OFFICERS WERE HIGHLY SKILLE	D
AND REPRESENTED SE	EVERAL YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN THE	
BUSINESS. SOME OF	F THEM HAD INTIMATE KNOWLEDGE C	OF A
NUMBER OF SENSITI	VE NAVY COLLECTION AND ANALYTIC	reading and
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EFFORTS AND A FEW OF THEM HAD SOME KNOWLEDGE OF ONE OR TWO SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY PROJECTS.

DEPENDING ON THE DURESS TO WHICH THEY MAY BE SUBJECTED AND THE AMOUNT THEY MAY RECALL, SERIOUS COMPROMISE OF SEVERAL HIGHLY CLASSIFIED PROJECTS COULD ENSUE FROM THEIR INVOLUNTARY REVELATION OF THE SCOPE OF THE U.S.

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE EFFORT. THIS COULD RESULT IN DEFENSIVE MEASURES BY THE SOVIETS TO DENY THE U.S.

FURTHER INFORMATION.

HOWEVER, NO DAMAGE TO OUR OWN COMMUNICATIONS
SECURITY WOULD FOLLOW EVEN FROM THE FORCEFUL EXTRACTION
OF INFORMATION FROM CAPTURED PERSONNEL. UNQUOTE.

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