TOP SECRET TRINE/NOTFOR
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

MEMORANDUM FOR USIB PRINCIPALS

SUBJECT: Assessment of the Loss of the USS PUEBLO (C)

1. This report is being provided to the Members of USIB for their information.

2. Attached is an impact assessment statement concerning the capture of the USS PUEBLO (AGER-2) on 23 January 1968 and the loss which may result from the compromise of an unknown amount of SIGINT technical support material, communications equipment and SIGINT collection equipment carried aboard the vessel.

3. In NSA's judgment, based on "worst case circumstance", which is normally part of the evaluative procedures surrounding cryptographic and COMINT compromises, the overall loss and long term effect on the U.S. SIGINT effort is assessed to be very severe. If the technology and doctrine which may have been made available through the capture of the PUEBLO were to be applied to Soviet, KORCOM and CHICOM communications there is little doubt that the U.S. would suffer a serious and costly loss of intelligence. The recent revelation by the North Koreans that they possess TOP SECRET codeword, SECRET codeword and Handle Via COMINT Channels documents dramatically points up the possible severity of our loss. With regard to this latter development, NSA has recently received sufficiently legible copies of some of the photographs taken by the North Koreans of these codeword documents. These photographs show a display of serialized NSA product, several loose pages and a number of sheets.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

Approved for release by NSA on 01-13-2014, Transparency Case# 6339
MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USIB

SUBJECT: PUEBLO Report (U)

1. Reference is made to USIB-D-13.5/45, dated 10 June 1968, Subject: Assessment of the Loss of the USS PUEBLO.

2. Forwarded herewith are copies of a revised page 2 of the subject report as agreed at the 511th USIB Meeting, 6 June 1968.

Incl:

a/s (22 copies)

Appended Documents Contain Codeword Material

Downgrade to Confidential Group-1 Upon Removal of Inclosures

Chief, Boards and Estimates Division
Executive Office of the Director

Changp pasted 26 June 68 eff
MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USIB

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Incl:
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APPENDED DOCUMENTS CONTAIN
CODEWORD MATERIAL

DOWNGRADE TO CONFIDENTIAL GROUP-1
UPON REMOVAL OF INCLOSURES
of paper containing Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICRs). The serialized product could not be identified because document arrangement covered the serial numbers. The loose pages were entitled: "Chinese Communist [][ ] and "The North Vietnamese Air Force". These pages are believed to be updating sheets from the CINCPACFLT Special Intelligence Manual; how many pages of that three inch thick manual were seized, is of course unknown. The SICRs which can be identified were entitled: [][ ][ ] North Korea", "North Korean [ ][ ], "Soviet Missile Operations, (one word obscured), Launches and Related Activities", [][ ][ ] "CHICOM Communications Systems (C)"

"Chinese Communist [][ ] Activity". The outline of most of the SICRs identified contained two main categories of information: first, the nature of the desired information on the subject mentioned in the title; and second, a summary of the information available on the subject. These summaries were a compendium of data from several sources [][ ][ ] but in some cases they were very brief. In addition to revelations of specific areas of interest, the method of generating and addressing SICRs affords a clear insight into the relationships and capabilities of various member agencies of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

4. There were 30 Navy Security Group personnel on board the ship (29 enlisted and 1 officer), all of whom were cleared and indoctrinated for Category III COMINT. The Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Operations Officer and Communications Officer were also COMINT indoctrinated. Several of the NSG personnel were also knowledgeable in various compartmented problem areas. For example, 4 personnel held [][ ] clearances, one of whom also held a [ ] clearance, and 3 held SPO TALENT/KEYHOLE clearances. In general it can be stated that the NSG personnel on the PUEBLO were fully qualified signals intelligence technicians and that their past assignments have covered a wide range of geographic [][ ]
cc:  DIR (3)  PO4
    L2     M55
Reading File  M501
D12 (5)  S13
ADN     GC
ADP     IG
ADPM    A/SSO
ADC     B/SSO
D32     G/SSO
D33     K/SSO

M/R:  Self-explanatory.

Serial: N 0865

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36