Serial: N 0287, 8 March 1976

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: The Functions of the Intelligence Board

- 1. At the 716th Meeting of the United States Intelligence Board on 19 Febraury 1976, you invited comment and recommendations with regard to a restructuring of the Board in order to continue essential functions under the Executive Order. I appreciate the opportunity to make a few personal comments which primarily relate to the role of NSA.
- First, with regard to your responsibility for the production of national intelligence: Among the Community members, NSA is considered not to be a producer of finished intelligence. However, for a large class of timely reporting, NSA "finished SIGINT" is the only or major input and is, in fact, delivered directly to national level consumers. Therefore, I am convinced that the Director, NSA must be held responsible for the quality of that reporting and must represent it in the senior Community forum. This is especially pertinent to estimative intelligence. In October 1973, I believe I made a serious mistake in considering that I had fulfilled my responsibilities by insuring that the pertinent SIGINT had been fully considered by the Agencies charged with intelligence production. I resolved that in the future I would ensure that a separate view be presented when the judgment of SIGINT analysts differs from the common view even though that dissent be caveated, "SIGINT indicates that Thus, I am led to believe that, however you restructure the mechanisms formerly provided by USIB, in order to coordinate and review finished intelligence and offer counsel to the DCI, DIRNSA should be a full member of the senior group.
- 3. NSA (along with the NRO) has been directed to operate in accordance with objectives, requirements, and priorities established by the DCI. In the past we looked to USIB as the mechanism through which the DCI performed this role. Although it appears that this function setting the substantive intelligence effort on its course was given less attention than other functions by the DCI and USIB in years past, I believe it deserves special attention. Procedural improvements have been made in the last three years. This function, done right, should drive the operations, plans and resource decisions of NSA. It requires a formulation

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of substantive intelligence needs in terms of target what we want to know, a knowledge of collection capabilities
on potential - what we have that can contribute answers,
and the ability to mesh those factors in such a way as to
produce the most economical, effective results from our
effort. We have seen the source - oriented approach, such
as the SIGINT Committee's efforts and the family of
"national plans." We have seen some cross-source, targetoriented efforts, inconsistently treated by the NIO's,
the CCPC and the KIQ strategy reports, but pointing the way.
I commend to your serious attention the requirements
function, in its broadest sense, and suggest emphasis in the
restructured mechanism on a target-oriented approach.

4. Finally, there is a long history, the tradition of the United States Intelligence Board, which is perhaps most important to a large body of people who make the day to day coordination of intelligence activities work. The underlying structure of USIB, the committees and subcommittees and activities wedded to them, may be far less than optimum, but it is a viable mechanism. It offers a base on which to constitute support for the DCI, the CFI and a reconstituted Board.

LEW ALLEN, JR.

Lieutenant General, USAF Director

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M/R: Responds to invitation by Mr. Bush at USIB
19 Feb that Principals submit their views on the
restructuring of the Board. Text based on holographic
draft by the Director.

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