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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (if any)

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# DISPOSITION FORM

FILE NO.	SUBJECT Meeting of the Advisory Panel for Classification and Control of Information
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TO DC/S	FROM AG	DATE 30 April 1958	COMMENT NO. 1
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The attached material will be discussed at the Classification Advisory Panel meeting, 8 May 1958, 1330 hours, room 1C191. Please bring the material to the meeting. *0930*

FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

*A. J. Vinci*  
 A. J. VINCI  
 Lt Col, AGC  
 Deputy Adj. Gen.

Incl  
Interim Rpt re  
Class & Release  
of Info

*Kelley*  
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Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-03-2012 pursuant to E.O. 13526

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DECLASSIFY UPON REMOVAL  
OF ENCLOSURES

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INTERIM REPORT TO THE NSA CLASSIFICATION ADVISORY  
PANEL BY THE AD HOC COMMITTEE REGARDING CLASSI-  
FICATION AND RELEASE OF INFORMATION

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INTRODUCTION

1. The ad hoc Committee was constituted at the 13 March 1958 meeting of the NSA Classification Advisory Panel. The ad hoc Committee was established pursuant to a request made by the Chief of Staff to the Panel that they recommend policy, procedures and guidance, for NSA, regarding the classification and release of information. The ad hoc Committee, hereinafter referred to as the Committee, is comprised of nominated representatives from PROD, AG, PERS, and SEC.

2. During the initial phase, the Committee limited its consideration to the scope of release of unclassified material and to those peripheral areas of "information about COMINT" that are argumentative as to their classification, but believed to be germane to the problem.

BACKGROUND

1. USCIB Directive Number 16 is the basic document used within the COMINT Community to determine the classification and handling of "information about COMINT". The Directive is broad and general in its policy guidelines and approaches the problem by prescribing, in annex form, the procedures for handling and the criteria for classifying:

- a. Information about COMINT that must be handled within COMINT Channels only,
- b. Information about COMINT that may be handled outside of COMINT

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

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channels, if necessary, and

c. Documents containing information about COMINT activities with a classification from UNCLASSIFIED to TOP SECRET.

2. As the Directive is broad and general in its policy guidelines, it is subject to interpretation by the reader, and past experience has made it obvious that reasonable men can arrive at different conclusions when applying the broad policy to specific problems.

3. The cryptologic services, through their parent organizations, have equal representation on USCIB, and, therefore, it is within their prerogative to interpret USCIB Directive No. 16 as a matter of command prerogative. Only when the Director, NSA, issues instructions, in Circular form, to the cryptologic services under his operational and technical control is their discretion limited.

#### APPROACH

The approach adopted by the Committee is to remain within the letter and spirit of USCIB Directive No. 16 by developing a classification policy which is legally supportable, yet realistic and by developing a policy regarding the release of information where such release would accrue a benefit to NSA.

#### DISCUSSION

1. "USCIB Directive No. 16 defines Information about COMINT Activities as" that information which reveals, directly or by implication, the existence of any activity directed toward the extraction of intelligence from the communications of a foreign government but does not reveal actual success,

progress, or processes in the production of COMINT."

2. Information about COMINT activities may be classified or unclassified. This is verified by the fact that Annex III, USCIB Directive No. 16, which provides Classification Guides for documents containing information about COMINT activities has a range from UNCLASSIFIED to TOP SECRET.

3. Classification is determined by content, including the extent of revelation of COMINT activities. The extent of revelation will be determined in each instance by a judgement as to:

- a. the sensitivity of the COMINT activity revealed or the category of COMINT involved
- b. whether the information is general or specific, and
- c. whether the revelation concerns past activities only or would affect current activities.

4. Annex III of USCIB Directive No. 16 is the classification guide for documents containing information about COMINT activities. The Committee believes that several of the illustrative guides themselves are in need of clarification prior to evolving a policy regarding the problem area. From a discussion of the terms used in several of the guides the Committee developed some basic conclusions.

5. The first guide which the Committee considered was paragraph (j), Section III, Annex III under the heading CONFIDENTIAL; "Association of broad COMINT functions with specific activities and persons by name other than with the National Security Agency as a whole, Navy Security Group as a whole, Army Security Agency as a whole and Air Force Security Service as a whole (which

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may be considered UNCLASSIFIED, however such association in unclassified correspondence should be discouraged)."

6. By discussing the above terms the Committee determined that:

a. "broad COMINT functions" may be defined as:

- (1) interception of communications of a foreign government
- (2) traffic analysis of communications of a foreign government
- (3) cryptanalysis of communications of a foreign government and
- (4) extraction of intelligence from communications of a foreign government.

b. "specific activities" may be defined as

- (1) subordinate elements of NSA excluding the NSA Field Activities
- (2) subordinate elements of the U. S. Army Security Agency excluding intermediate field headquarters.
- (3) subordinate elements of the Navy Security Group excluding intermediate field headquarters
- (4) subordinate elements of the Air Force Security Service.

c. "persons by name"

- (1) named civilian employees and
- (2) named military assignees

7. Since the only prohibition against association of "broad COMINT

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functions" is with "specific activities and persons by name" (which is CONFIDENTIAL) and since it is affirmatively stated the association of those functions with NSA, etc. as a whole is UNCLASSIFIED, the following is a legal, unclassified statement of part of the mission of NSA:

"The COMINT mission of the National Security Agency is the interception, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis and extraction of intelligence from communications of a foreign government."

8. The Committee maintains that the above statement of part of the mission of NSA would be unclassified until the words "a foreign government" are replaced by the name of a specific country (e.g. Netherlands, etc.). At such time the mission statement would be classified at least CONFIDENTIAL when the country involved is a recognized potential enemy (e.g. countries in the Soviet Bloc) and at least SECRET when any other country is involved.

9. However, the Committee does not recommend the adoption of the mission statement in paragraph 7 above, because, again in the words of paragraph (j), (see para. 5, supra), "such association in unclassified correspondence should be discouraged." It is noted that the association of the COMINT functions in official unclassified correspondence is only discouraged and not prohibited; therefore, such association may be revealed when required.

10. The Committee does recommend that the following be adopted as the unclassified mission of NSA:

"The Mission of the National Security Agency is communications intelligence, communications security and research and development in the general field of

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communications." This statement is less specific but will suffice for most needs. It is completely supportable for the following reasons:

a. The words communications intelligence or their abbreviation COMINT is not a statement of a "broad COMINT function". Thus, its unclassified use is neither discouraged nor prohibited by the Directive.

b. Under para (h), Section IV, Annex III the terms communications intelligence and COMINT are cited as UNCLASSIFIED.

11. Confining itself to the application of the above conclusions and recommendations to some of the problems immediately at hand, the Committee discussed:

a. Problems relating to PERS Activities which are manifest in two major areas:

(1) What a recruiter can discuss with prospective employees. What PERS can include in the contents of brochures, pamphlets, etc. to be distributed to colleges and universities. (See Appendix "A")

(2) What PERS can indicate on individual job titles and job descriptions which are forwarded to the Civil Service Commission pursuant to the Classification Act of 1949, without violating either para (j), Section III, Annex III of USCIB Directive No. 16 nor violating the statutory requirements of the 1949 Classification Act. (See Appendix "B")

b. Problems relating to TNG Activities which are manifested in at least the following areas:

(1) Can TNG provide unclassified certificates of completion of courses dealing with "broad COMINT functions" (e.g. traffic analysis and

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cryptanalysis) particularly when this associates "persons by name" with "broad COMINT functions"?

(2) What can TNG relate in correspondence to national and foreign institutions of higher learning when seeking to make arrangements for language and/or area orientation courses, etc. for NSA employees?

c. Problems relating to AG Activities on what type of orders (NSA, DOD, etc.) should an NSA employee travel overseas to either a foreign university or for TDY visits to the cryptologic units.

d. Problems of General Applicability

(1) What may an individual say about his association or employment with NSA to his immediate family, to social contacts, to professional contacts?

(2) When the employee writes an unclassified article for publication in a professional or technical journal may he indicate that he is employed by NSA? May he relate the article to an unclassified NSA operation?

(3) What may the employee tell a prospective future employer about his position and duties while employed with NSA?

(4) What limitations must be observed by NSA employees who are attending meetings or conferences of professional or technical organizations?

(5) What types of written information may be released to a profession or technical organization of which the Agency or an employee is a member?

(6) What should be the cover, if any, for cryptologic



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activities located on foreign soil?

(7) What are the criteria for the application of the legend "HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY".

12. These are merely some of the surface problems that are readily recognizable to the members of the Committee as being in need of solution. There are many more problems which are present and should be resolved while the Committee is constituted. In order to accumulate this information, it is respectfully requested that each element represented on the Panel be queried and that problems developed be communicated to the Committee.

13. The next task of the Committee will be to formulate and recommend to the Advisory Panel broad policies governing the release of information in the situations listed in paragraph 11. To provide for implementing those policies, the Committee will prepare and submit to the Advisory Panel draft statements of guidance. These statements will apprise NSA personnel of the nature of the information which can be released and the criteria which must be met prior to releasing this information. The Committee will then recommend what procedures must be established for those situations in which strict control over the release of information is warranted. It will recommend the types of media in which policy, guidance and regulatory provisions should be published. In addition, the Committee will recommend the means by which the monitoring of new directives, regulations and agreements can be effected, and establish a policy for maintaining Agency publications on a current basis. It will suggest the office which should be made responsible for these functions and will be assigned supervision for the program as a whole. Finally, the

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Committee will determine the extent to which coordination of Agency policy with the Service cryptologic agencies is necessary and also the means by which such coordination should be accomplished.

14. It is not possible at this time to calculate accurately the period of time which the Committee will require for carrying out all of its objectives; however, it is estimated that the activities set forth above will consume a minimum of six months.

*Thomas J. McKeon*  
CHAIRMAN: Thomas J. McKeon (SEC)

*A. C. Franklin*  
MEMBER: A. C. Franklin (PROD)

*J. L. Kelley*  
MEMBER: J. L. Kelley (PERS)

*P. E. Gilliam*  
MEMBER: P. E. Gilliam (AG)

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## DISCUSSION:

1. In order to recruit personnel in needed quantity and of the quality required by the Agency, it is essential that as far as is possible and prudent, sufficient information be furnished job applicants so that either:

a. The desirable applicant of good NSA potential can be induced to join NSA, or

b. The applicant with interests which are inappropriate to NSA will not apply.

2. Agency recruiters conduct their interviews with job applicants under at least two broad, differing sets of conditions:

a. Under a set of conditions where the college is in control of the place and length of interview and where the recruiter must conform to whatever conditions, however, limiting, are imposed on him in an interview situation.

b. Under a set of conditions which are, in general, controlled by the recruiter in such aspects as selecting the place of interview, the length of time the interview takes, and the amount of corollary material he has available regarding the specifics of the varied jobs available.

3. Where the recruiter must operate under conditions controlled by the colleges, he usually has such a short time available to him with an applicant that he motivates his entire interview toward obtaining information about the applicant rather than in imparting any information about NSA. The latter job is done in toto by the brochures which are distributed to selected colleges early in each academic year. These are the Educational Testing Service announcement of

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the NSA Professional Qualification Test, and the "Careers Unlimited" and "Opportunities Unlimited" brochures prepared by NSA and previously approved by the Advisory Panel.

a. The brochures are designed to acquaint the prospective employee generally concerning the mission of NSA and its personnel needs, the opportunities and benefits which employment at NSA would afford him, and the environment in which he would work and live. The effectiveness of the brochures depends upon their affording enough information about the Agency and its work to attract the interest of persons who, as a result of their academic backgrounds, possess the skills or the aptitudes which the Agency's operations require.

b. Matters such as leave and insurance benefits, personnel policies, and a superficial description of the NSA Operations Building and its facilities are set forth in specific terms. The brochures outline the general qualifications prerequisite to employment at NSA and the testing programs administered to prospective employees. They discuss the several training programs available to NSA personnel in more or less detailed terms, the degree of detail depending upon whether or not the discussion reveals that the program involved is cryptologic in nature. The descriptions of training programs relating to the sciences or to supervisory development contain outlines of curricula. Those concerning languages are quite general. Courses in cryptanalysis and traffic analysis are not discussed.

c. The brochures outline the types of careers available to engineers, mathematicians, and physicists, describing in specific terms the various fields of technical and scientific study of primary application to NSA operations. They describe in general terms the careers available to language and liberal arts majors. In the discussions of career opportunities, the brochures reveal the types of skills which are of greatest value to the Agency.

d. It is with regard to the discussions of careers and skills that security considerations impose restrictions upon the degree of detail of information that can be released. Many of the engineering, mathematical, and scientific skills are required for other than COMINT activities. Even in those cases in which they are part of or related to COMINT activities, the Agency's needs can be and are described fairly specifically without revealing that relationship. On the other hand, the needs of the Agency for language majors and minors and liberal arts graduates are set forth in very general terms. For example, needs with regard to specific languages are not identified but are only suggested by the use of broad geographic terms. Language aptitude is stressed instead. The descriptions of the types of positions in the linguistic and research analytic fields are couched in very general terms.

e. In interviews in which the conditions are imposed by the college, the only information about the Agency, in addition to that contained in the brochures, which the applicant is told is that which concerns conditions of employment, training agreements and the security clearance requirements.

4. Where the recruiter controls the conditions under which the interview is conducted, he usually has time to both acquire the necessary information about the applicant and to discuss in unclassified terms the work of the Agency for which that applicant is being considered. The applicant will already have had access to the brochures. Although the general information about the Agency contained in the brochures is useful to an applicant, he is usually most interested in finding out where in the Agency's operations he, with his background and skills, would fit. Consequently, in dealing with those applicants the recruiter particularly wants to attract, the recruiter finds it necessary to describe in the greatest detail possible, commensurate with security policies, the types of jobs available and to answer satisfactorily the questions which his remarks

prompt. At present, the recruiter is governed by policies established by the AG for PERS in December, 1953.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The committee, after apprising itself of the factors and circumstances which make necessary the release of information about the Agency to prospective employees and applying the restrictions upon the release of information set forth in USCIB Directive No. 16, as interpreted by the Committee, recommends that the following guidelines be adopted to govern the release of information to prospective employees. These guidelines appear to be exhaustive with respect to current needs as evidenced by the brochures presently in use.

a. Brochures, pamphlets and other forms of recruitment literature:

(1) May reveal that the mission of the National Security Agency is communications intelligence, communications security and research and development in the general field of communications.

(2) May discuss fully such matters as leave benefits and policies, insurance and retirement programs, personnel policies with regard to working hours, types of appointments, salaries and promotions.

(3) May reveal the location of the NSA <sup>✓ CSEC</sup> describe generally the NSA Operations Building, facilities and equipment, and discuss fully the community life in areas surrounding Ft. Meade and recreational activities sponsored by the Agency.

(4) May state any general qualifications which all Agency employees must meet, including the fact that applicants are subject to a character and loyalty investigation and a polygraph interview and must be cleared prior to being granted access to classified information.

(5) May describe fully career opportunities with respect to administrative functions.

(6) May reveal the types of skills required by the Agency together with descriptions in general terms of the kinds of duties which employees having those skills perform, except that no skill which is exclusively cryptologic in nature may be mentioned and descriptions of duties may not reveal their application to COMINT activities. Interest in specific languages may not be revealed but requirements for linguists may be stated in terms of broad geographic areas. The Agency's need for non-linguist liberal arts majors for research analytic and report writing positions may be revealed.

(7) May describe the duties performed by linguists and research analysts in general terms, except that there may be no indication that those skills are employed for, or in support of, the production of COMINT.

(8) May describe technical career opportunities fully, including therein identification of the specific fields of study and research which are of primary application to the Agency's functions except where such a description would reveal interests which are relevant peculiarly to COMINT activities.

(9) May reveal the types of equipment available to engineers and scientists for research, testing, and data processing purposes, except for types of equipment which can be used only in COMINT or COMINT related operations. Figures concerning the extent of the holdings of various types of equipment may not be revealed, even approximately.

(10) Must adhere, with regard to training matters, to the following standards:

(a) Courses in science, mathematics, and engineering including computer engineering, may be described fully except where such description would reveal <sup>the specific</sup> ~~explicitly or implicitly~~ the application of the ~~application of the~~ subject matter by NSA to COMINT operations.



(b) Courses in supervisory and executive development may be discussed fully.

(c) College training programs may be discussed fully.

(d) Courses in cryptanalysis and traffic analysis may not be mentioned.

(e) The fact that NSA conducts language courses may be revealed. The languages involved may not be identified specifically but may be suggested by the use of broad geographic or other terms which do not imply an interest in a given country. Information regarding teaching methods and aids used may be included.

b. A recruiter, when it is apparent that a promising applicant's interest in the Agency can be sustained only by amplification of the information furnished him in the brochures, may reveal in further discussion the following information, if appropriate:

(1) The general field of the work for which applicants are sought is cryptanalysis, including the production of intelligence from foreign communications.

(2) Although NSA linguists are concerned primarily with the translation of written materials, they must have an excellent understanding of a language in order to support cryptologic activities effectively.

(3) (Further study is being made as to what may be said about jobs regarding mathematicians. PERS, PROD and R/D are now working on this problem. The committee is temporarily deferring recommendations in this area pending completion of the PERS study.) Mathematicians would apply their knowledge of mathematics to cryptologic problems, utilizing not only appropriate technical devices but also considerable originality and analytic imagination.

PROBLEM: What individual job titles and job descriptions can PERS use on documents which are forwarded to the Civil Service Commission pursuant to the Classification Act of 1949, without violating paragraph (j), Section III, Annex III of USCIB Directive No. 16 nor violating the statutory requirements of the 1949 Classification Act.

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## DISCUSSION:

1. The requirements of the Classification Act of 1949 and the requirements of USCIB 16, with respect to the use of certain job titles (e.g. Cryptanalyst (FL), Supervisory Cryptologic Linguist, etc.) are in apparent conflict.

2. Under the provisions of the Classification Act of 1949 the Agency is required to use - where they apply - the occupational codes and titles as contained in Civil Service Commission Position Classification Standards. Changing the job title from one which may be considered classified to one which is covert and innocuous does not solve the conflict: the appropriate series code numbers for such titles as Cryptanalyst remain whether the job title be listed as Cryptanalyst or Research Specialist or whatever title may be invented. On the other hand, the USCIB Directive does not permit the unclassified association of an individual with a major COMINT function. Such an association is made when John Jones, NSA employee, is listed on a request for (or notification of) Personnel Action, as being - for instance - a Cryptanalyst.

3. Under the Classification Act of 1949 and Public Law 313, NSA is required to forward job descriptions for its "super grade" and PL 313 positions to the Civil Service Commission for their approval. Recently a question arose whether these job descriptions, because of their content, should bear the legend "HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS". The above job descriptions are personally handled by the Director of the Civil Service Commission who is not indoctrinated.

APPENDIX "B"

There are several methods of approaching this problem.

- a. Require PERS to prepare the job descriptions so that they will not contain 'information about COMINT'.
- b. Indoctrinate the Director of the Civil Service Commission and forward the job descriptions marked "HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS".
- c. Do not indoctrinate the CSC Director and exercise the authority provided in Section III, paragraph 1b, of USCIB Directive No. 16 and remove to "HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS" legend from the job description prior to forwarding.

PERS advises that (a) is impractical, as they must provide sufficient details in order to justify the establishment of the position. At first blush, the approach suggested in (b) above, would seem appropriate; however, the clearance and indoctrination procedure would not justify the marginal gain to be achieved. The CSC Director, in receiving only job descriptions, is receiving far less sensitive information than many DOD and Congressional Officials who are recipients of documents much more deserving of having the "HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS" legend. In these latter instances the Agency exercises the authority cited in paragraph (c), supra, and the Committee recommends this approach insofar as job descriptions are concerned. It should be kept in mind that these job descriptions are not leaving NSA unclassified but are leaving with the national classification appropriate to their contents, are handcarried by the Assistant Director of PERS, and are returned to NSA for retention.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. Job Titles. The current Agency policy of using job titles as specified by the CSC is apparently the result of a decision taken in accordance with paragraph 1b, Section III, of USCIB Directive No. 16. The Committee feels that the current Agency policy with respect to using these job titles

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on Form 50s be continued. Pending legislation to exempt NSA from the Classification Act of 1949 will, if passed, tend to solve these problems of classification.

2. Job Descriptions. The Committee recommends that the authority of Section III, para 1b, USCIB Directive No. 16, be exercised in that PERS be authorized to provide the CSC with the information required by the Classification Act of 1949 with the condition that the job description be personally handled by the Director of PERS or his representative and returned to NSA for permanent retention.

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