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INAME: McFARLAND, Terry L.

Text w/Tape:

IPLACE: NSA, SAB2, Ft. Meade, MD; M62 Area

IVIEWER: GERHARD, William; SCHORRECK, Henry; FARLEY, R. D.

[Tape 1, Side 1; Classification of the tape is ~~TOP SECRET//COMINT~~]

Farley: This is the 23rd of June, 1980. Our interviewee CTCR (believe it to be CTCR-Cryptologic Technician "R" (collection) Chief Terry L. McFarland, who was aboard the *Liberty* in June of 1967 when the Israeli military forces attacked the ship. Terry was an intercept operator during this period. The interview is taking place in the M62 area, SAB II, NSA. Interviewers: Mr. Henry Shorreck, Mr. Bill Gerhard, Bob Farley. Terry will discuss his experience during the period of June 1967 when he was aboard the *Liberty*. Terry, we might as well get underway. What we are trying to do is get all information that we can from many individuals who were aboard the *Liberty*. Bill I guess has talked to you about the SIGINT history that he and Henry Millington are writing.

McFarland: Right.

Farley: So, if anything that you can remember, don't hold back. Put it on paper. We'll classify it any way you like and it will be just used to help Bill.

McFarland: Fine. Needless to say some thirteen years after the fact my recall is very vague. And it seems to be highlighted on certain segments of my deployment. Some of the specific details which I know you need I may not be able to provide those, provide the fillers for those gaps. Well, we'll give it a shot.

Farley: Okay good. The best you can do, we appreciate it. Terry, what was your position or assignment during the critical period of May/June 1967?

McFarland: I was a intercept collection operator. With very limited experience I might add. An E-4 at the time. My first deployment at sea and only my second deployment since entry into the United States Navy.

Farley: You were aboard the *Liberty*?

McFarland: That is correct.

Farley: Did you make that Ivory Coast run on the *Liberty* or did you pick it up in Rota, when did you get aboard the *Liberty*?

McFarland: I picked up the *Liberty* in Little Creek, Virginia, when it set sail in April. I accompanied the vessel all the way to the Ivory Coast when we pulled into Abidjan I was aboard the *Liberty* and from then on.

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- Farley:** Okay. You were one of the few who made that run. A lot of them came aboard at Rota.
- McFarland:** No, I made the run all the way.
- Farley:** Terry, do you have any idea why they decided to deploy the *Liberty* to the Mediterranean?
- McFarland:** I suspect for good intelligence reasons. It was a collection platform and as such had the capability to intercept HF and VHF communications. So, your talking, if your standing off from a distance you are talking HF long-haul communications which we could easily collect. Given the equipment performance was up to speed. And if necessary, close in support, we could collect rather, data from close in, in the VHF and HF spectrum. This would primarily be oriented toward voice communications. So, I feel we were an ideal platform for the job, for the mission. And more than likely this is why we were detailed to the Eastern Med[iterranean] to perform primarily short range collection in the upper VHF spectrum.
- Farley:** Terry were you aware of any official requirements or as an operator did you see any paper that said this is what we want you to intercept?
- McFarland:** Now, this is where my database of knowledge is very limited. Because as a collection operator I was not in on message preparation or forwarding. I was not a part of P and R shop. Or I would have been privy to a lot of the incoming and perhaps outgoing message traffic. Most of the message traffic I saw was from a cursory standpoint. Had to do directly with my job. Case notations, technical data, frequencies, operator notes, things that I needed to do my job as a collection... as an intercept operator.
- Farley:** Terry would you describe the SIGINT compliment aboard the *Liberty* when it left Virginia, the Ivory Coast and then the additional people or the changes in the compliment at Rota.
- McFarland:** Okay, I am a little bit foggy in that area. I know that when we pulled into Rota, SPAIN, we were there for I believe two days. We took on stores, provisions. There were some personnel that we took on. I am not aware of those specific individuals. I know there was at least one I brancher we brought aboard because I met him. He was a marine that I met there aboard the *Liberty*, only in a casual way. The voice intercept operators, they worked around the corner from the main intercept line. There was this, as a matter a fact, a bay of equipment that separated the manual morse operators from the voice intercept operators. They kind of worked around the corner. Once aboard, contact with those individuals, with the linguists, was pretty limited really, for us collection operators. You assumed your position when you came on the watch and you copied code. You had very little time to socialize you might say or become more acquainted with the other aspects of the collection effort and research division down there. So, my association with the linguists... was very very limited. I could not even tell you, apart from their language, what their

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mission was, what their collection efforts were. I have no recall at all of that knowledge.

Farley: Would you know whether there were any Hebrew linguists aboard?

McFarland: I don't know if there was any Hebrew. I knew there was at least one Arab linguist. Hebrew linguist I am not aware of.

Schorreck: Did you collect any Israeli communications? If I might interject?

McFarland: Right. My memory does not serve me very well in that area. When I was on the west coast of Africa we were copying Algerian. We some ground force, low-level ground force activity. Once we got on station off the Israeli coastline there, the intercept that I was doing at that particular time was primarily [redacted] as I recall. And apart from that I really don't know what else was being collected. It has just been that long, that long ago.

Farley: Can you tell us a little bit of the types of equipment that were aboard, the equipment, the radios that you used?

McFarland: I used an R-390 receiver, for most of my work. There was a TNH-11 tape recorders being utilized by primarily linguists which were doing recording. I know that because there bays were constricted so they had tape recorders above them and they had another receiver below. I am not sure if was an R-390 or not. But I could see their bay, from where I sat the linguists were stationed to my immediate left, down the line and around the corner. But their bays were such that I could see those bays and I knew the equipment they had in them. And we used standard typewriters for collecting on. Other equipment in the immediate area of my work space, I don't know, I really can't recall any other significant equipment. Primarily the TNH-11s and the R-390s were in our immediate area.

Farley: Terry, do you remember the name of your supervisor?

McFarland: Addington, was my supervisor. Matter of fact... (interrupted)

Farley: He was Chief?

McFarland: No, at that time, at that time I think he was a First Class. And the only reason that he really stands out in my mind is the fact that he was the probably the first individual to make us formally aware that an attack was ongoing. And the reason I say that is because he had been topside for a time, I don't know what he was doing but he had come down the ladder. And when he came down the ladder, there were some guys milling around and they said, "Hi Red" you know and a couple exchanges were made. We turned around and we could see that there was blood coming down from his knee and we asked him what was wrong with his knee. What did he do bump his knee coming down the ladder or what? And he wasn't aware of it because he didn't feel it. And then he looked, we called it to his attention, he looked at his knee and made a comment and pulled his pant leg up and examined it and could see there was some sort of wound there. Then shortly thereafter Captain McGonagle made a formal announcement over the 1MC that we were under attack. But leading up to

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that point, as I was sitting at my position like this, I could see light, little lights that seem to kind of come to my right side and it caught my eye. I couldn't figure out what this light was, this little flickers of light that were traveling at high speeds coming across. And later on I found out that they were tracer bullets that had penetrated the skin of the hull of the ship. Because our bays were on the starboard side, or portside rather and our bays were up against the wall, the bulkhead. So, we were right close to the side of the ship. So, the bullets were coming through, penetrating the skin because the skin was not very thick and they were armor piercing bullets and they could easily penetrate the skin. And so these initial flickers of light that I was seeing and no one else, at that point, nobody knew what was going on, called to my attention I examined them. I was looking over here and I could see them shooting through, coming through. Then I heard a sound and I pulled the headphones down because at that time I still had my headphones on I was copying code. Out of the corner of my eye I am looking over here seeing these flickers of light come in. Then I took my headphones off for a second and what I heard was kinda strange, it sounded like an object, a chain being pulled underneath the hull. Back and forth, a metallic sound and it sounded just like somebody was moving a chain back and forth underneath the hull, like that. That was the only two things that really stand out, the flickers of light coming through the hull. At which time I didn't know what they were, and later found out they were tracer bullets. And this chain moving underneath the hull, which I am not quite sure what accounted for that. It may have been bullets that were hitting the hull at an angle were not penetrating but being diverted down, perhaps. A diversion of the bullets around the hull. I can only guess on that but it made a metallic sound. It wasn't a thud or a thunk. It was a metallic sound like a moving back and forth along the bottom of the vessel.

Farley: Terry, let's go back to Rota.

McFarland: Okay.

Farley: What sort of documentation did you people pick up at Rota? What did you carry over from the Ivory Coast run before you went to the Med?

McFarland: Some of the material and I have no exact knowledge of what it was. Was probably working aids. Materials that were brought aboard by the linguists, I would suspect. That could consist of any number of things, frequency plans, whatever. But I am not aware specifically of what packages were brought aboard.

Farley: You as an intercept operator, did you ever get any new material.

McFarland: No not that I am aware of, except... Well new material being moved over to the Mediterranean, the Eastern Med[iterranean] and we did pick up new cases and new frequencies.

Farley: But you were advised of what to watch for?

McFarland: The supervisor kept us aware of any changes in our coverage, in our

collection. And he may have very well may have drawn upon new material that was brought aboard but I don't you know, at Rota, but I am not specifically aware of it.

Farley: Terry, were you and your group given any special orientation or briefing as to what was going to happen?

McFarland: Um... I don't know. I don't recall any formal get together. Where the supervisor or perhaps the communications officer or the division officer got together with us and sat down and said okay we are heading into an area which, you know there is a lot of tension and so forth going on. I don't recall any specific get together of that nature. Where it was laid down, that why were over here, what were doing, what our mission is and so forth. Just an increased posture on our part. There was numerous discussions all along the way as far as what we were headed for but we already knew what that, you know, what was going on in the Eastern Med[iterranean]. So, it didn't take to much to put together the picture that we were going over there because of Israeli/Egyptian conflict. We knew that. The rest we could pretty much make an assumption as to our mission and so forth.

Farley: Terry, do you recall what your collection tasking was? When you moved out of Rota toward your on station position?

McFarland: No, I don't. Not the specifics.

Farley: Could you recall whether there was any ELINT tasking?

McFarland: No, because the "T" branchers worked above us.

Farley: Which are?

McFarland: The technical communications technicians. They are the ones that have to do with the, with copying non-morse communications. And they worked the floor above us. They may have been very collecting ELINT. I am not aware.

Farley: Did you have any effort against the Soviet Navy presence in the Mediterranean?

McFarland: Not me but there were other operators [redacted]

[redacted] So, we were, our collection effort was multi-purpose. Part of it against the [redacted] and part of it against the Egyptian and the [redacted]

Farley: I think you've answered this Bill, but I'll ask, again. Was the SIGINT group tasked with intercepting Israeli communications as well as Arab communications?

McFarland: That's the part that I am not aware of. I know that I wasn't and I know that most of our manual morse operators were not. I could pretty much account for that. The linguists may have but I am not aware of it.

Farley: Okay Bill, do you have anything more on Rota and before they departed for the Med?

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Gerhard: Do you remember anything about the TRSSCOM repairs at Rota?

McFarland: I know it was always a problem. I only know about it because of the conversations amongst the crew and amongst the CTs. But the TRSSCOM was not a, did not seem to be a very reliable system and there were constantly problems with it. I wasn't aware then of the specific problems except hydraulics was mentioned several times. That's my extent of mechanical knowledge of the what the the problems were.

Farley: Okay, Terry, we've departed Rota. Were there any incidents that you noted enroute to your on-post station?

McFarland: Incidents of what nature?

Farley: Unusual vessels passing or any periscopes sighted or any contact noted?

McFarland: No, none that I aware of.

Farley: Did you see the *Valdez*?

McFarland: Yes, I did. We passed in the night. (Farley: Passed in the night, simultaneous with McFarland) We pass the *Valdez*. I'll have to take that back I didn't see the *Valdez* but I knew the *Valdez* was in our area and that we were gonna pass it. We were going to pass her in the night. But we were not gonna see, she did not pass in the day time.

Farley: Terry, there is a submarine anchored alongside the *Liberty* in Rota. Did you notice whether that submarine might have followed you out?

McFarland: No, I didn't because when we left Rota we were standing on the in formation on the main deck. Looking across, you know, I do not recall it, no. I've got pictures of a submarine, at home, tied up next to a barge, not a barge I am sorry, a transport. I don't know if that's the specific submarine in question or not. But I've got a picture at home that I took while I was aboard the ship in Rota. Several pictures of the Rota in-port period. And of those there is a picture of a submarine tied up along side a sub-tender.

Farley: Bob Wilson has color pictures like that. You will have to talk to him, I think.

Gerhard: Do you have a picture of *Liberty* after Rota?

McFarland: Uh huh. Yes, I do.

Gerhard: It would be nice to get a print of it.

McFarland: I will a... I did some research about getting caught up on a couple things. My wife has kept all the letters that transpired from the time I left Virginia until I got back to Virginia and there may be things in those letters that could, you know, spark my memory a little bit. And I intend to go through those letters and if I can come across anything of any consequence at all I will take some notes. She's got a whole box full of letters that we wrote back and forth during that deployment. So, that I am sure there is things there that perhaps would spark my memory a little bit more. But I do have a few pictures of in-port Rota time.

Gerhard: We'll talk about that later afterward.

Farley: Terry, you mentioned that you were not in the reporting element but do you remember idea, do you have any idea what type reporting might have been produced by the SIGINT people?

McFarland: I am fairly certain that they were sending some STRUMs in to NSA. And I believe these were probably voice's STRUMs. I don't think that the stuff that I was collecting, the HF stuff that I was collecting, was being forwarded in STRUM format on a regular bases. I think most of the information we were collecting was staying with the vessel and be boxed up at the end of the deployment and brought back.

Farley: Terry, I think in Ennes' book he mentioned, no I am sorry, this is in the postmortem report, there is a mention of a U.S. Army Warrant Officer. Did you ever see an Army Warrant Officer aboard?

McFarland: I have no recollection of an Army Warrant Officer. If he was aboard he was not in uniform.

Farley: He supposedly was picked up at Rota with the linguists. Did you know any of the civilian linguists? Later on, did you meet Blaclock and Allen Blue, and Bob Wilson? EO 1.4.(c)

McFarland: I met Blue and Wilson. Here again, my association with the linguists was very cursory in nature.

Farley: You mentioned this already. What type of material or data was forwarded to NSA? Was it raw data and how come it was not processed aboard, if it was raw data? You mentioned the STRUMs.

McFarland: I think that the, there was an effort in the P and R shop in preparation of some STRUMs. Because I recall the word being used a number of times. Problems with the STRUMs or information about the STRUMs. The word STRUM is familiar to my memory as far as that particular part of the operation. The only thing I can't recall is if they were voice STRUMs or morse STRUMs. And that is what I am not, I am not sure about. I know we collected an awful lot of data, manual morse wise. I don't know if only a portion of that or any of it was being forwarded back. Because we copied so many different countries and different cases. I think if any, it was the special interest cases. The [redacted] in the Med, [redacted] [redacted] and perhaps there was some other high interest [redacted] cases that we were copying and the information my have been extracted and STRUMs before we were gone.

Farley: Terry, when the *Liberty* moved into the Med, was there any noticeable tension among the crew regarding the warming up of the Israeli/Arab War. Or any concern on our part?

McFarland: Well, we knew when we were in Abidjan we were setting sail a little bit earlier than normal. Matter of fact our leave was cut short. I was on the beach, when I got the word that we were making preparations to leave. It was a, very much an interest in getting everybody back to the ship as

quickly as possible. We set sail within a matter of hours after everyone got the word and was aboard. We were gone almost immediately. Within just about 6 hours I think we had set sail and were gone. I came aboard, late afternoon I recall, it was late afternoon the sun was going down. So, I know we set sail sometime in the evening. That evening we left.

Gerhard: Is this from Abidjan?

McFarland: And... Abidjan, right. As far as noticeable tension at that point? No. There were some, there was a lot of questions as there always is. Where are we going now, wonder what our mission is? At that point nobody, no one aboard had any knowledge and if they did they weren't passing information along. As to why we set sail so quickly and where we were going. Now, once we got, once we knew we were going to the Med, then it kinda made sense. But in Abidjan, I personally was not aware of the impending U.S./Israeli/Egyptian conflict. I don't think we had any information onboard that told us something was gonna happen. Because we weren't collecting anything off the west coast, off the Ivory Coast that I can be aware of that would have told us, foretold rather, that there was a conflict developing. Those communications, that information must have been available from, by some other. From other SIGINT sources.

Farley: Couldn't the ship intercept any Armed Forces radio or any commercial English broadcast, news casts from any place out there?

McFarland: Seems like we used to have music. I am pretty sure music was played throughout the ship.

Farley: Maybe you had MUZAK aboard?

McFarland: Um, and I think...

Gerhard: You also had the television right?

McFarland: Nah, I don't recall a television.

Gerhard: You had a television antenna.

McFarland: Yeah, I don't recall a television... (laughter). No I think if we were, yeah, we were copying, we were tuning in rather. The comms center or the radio shack was tuning in to some of the music stations that we could pick up HF wise. And every now and, again, they would broadcast some special thing through the ships communications, internal communications. But not on a regular basis.

Farley: How did you hear about the Israeli/Arab War?

McFarland: Well, I heard about it just before we got into Rota. Once we found out we were gonna pull into Rota, information became more readily available, it seemed. We started out from Abidjan with no knowledge at all of what we were gonna do or where we were going. What bearing we were on? What course we were on? We didn't have that kind of information. At least we, meaning my group of assoc... my associated group. People in my section, CTs. Maybe some of the crew members, the general crew have

some knowledge, of course, and bearing because they would be in contact with the bridge people more than we would, the Quartermaster. They may very well have had knowledge before we did of where we were going and what course and heading we had. But information I know became more available as we got closer to Rota, Spain. And then once we were getting ready to pull into port, we were aware at that point that it had started. That there was a conflict developing and so forth. I don't think that we had started putting all the pieces together at that point though. I know I hadn't. I hadn't made the association at that point that we were really going into the Med and going to the deep, eastern most portion of the Mediterranean. That knowledge, that conclusion rather was not made by me at that point.

Farley: Terry, was there ever any discussion in the mess halls or lounge areas about the concern over being out there on your own without any protection at all during a war?

McFarland: Yeah, there was... Once it became very evident to us that we were going into the Eastern Med[iterranean]. There was a lot of concern. We had been doing an awful lot of drilling, training. Almost everyday, or every other day as far as GQ went, General Quarters. Our awareness was at that point that we weren't doing this just for drill. We hadn't done that much before. So, why were we doing it all now? And so we started putting, you know the facts together. We could only ascertain that we were trying to attain a high state of readiness. And that would be only because we were going into an area where there would be suspected problems. Conflicts that may involve our ship. I wasn't aware until almost half way across the Med that we were going to be on our own. Okay, once the realization that we were gonna be on our own was there, present in everyone's mind. Then the concern mounted, tremendously. We could only hope and we didn't know, how close we were gonna be to the coastline. We could only hope that we were gonna be standing off. Once we came within 15 20 miles of the coastline, boy you could see, firing in the distance and this type of thing. That I think, once we got on station, that is when the realization I think hit most of the crew. That, "hey we are right here in the middle of all of this and we are the only ones here." So, I don't think anybody really put it all together until they, until we got on station. There may have been a few rumblings here and there, a few concerns expressed, but they were casual up until the point we got on station. Then I think everybody was pretty well, geared in to the fact that hey, we are right here, in a good location to get attacked.

Farley: Terry, what was the relationship between the SIGINT group and the ships crew?

McFarland: I think one of mutual understanding. Historically, CTs and general Navy personnel do not maintain a close, working... well, they maintain a close working relationship but not a close social relationship. You tell each other what you have to do to get your job done, you cooperate with each other

as much as you have to, to make your time more or less easier. But there is not one of buddy-buddy. You tend to be kinda cliquish. If you are a CT you tend to work with CTs and socialize with CTs. If you are a deck hand, or you are an electrician, or a plumber, whatever, if you have something to do with the general operation of the ship then you are looked upon by those who maintain the ship the ship as your group. CTs which are communicators and generally don't have jobs that require knowledge of shipboard procedure, you usually to do with them.

Farley: Terry, was the ships crew aware of the mission of the SIGINT group?

McFarland: The ship's crew at one point in time, I am not sure when it was, was aware of our mission, of our posture off the coastline. I am not sure, I know an announcement was made. But I can't recall the specifics of what was said. And all hands announcement was made sometime just before we arrived on station. It may have been a day, it may have two, but it was just before we arrived on station. Captain McGonagle did make a statement assessing the seriousness of a Israeli/Egyptian War. The fact that we were gonna be there, by ourselves and that a reference was made that if any situation develops, that aircraft off the America would be within five minutes of our aid. This was done, I am sure for a morale factor. Now, that I look back on it. Back then you know, you are listening to an announcement and you are having a cup of coffee and you are really not paying that much attention. You are listening but you are not absorbing. Right. And, so I know he did make an announcement to the entire compliment, CTs and the rest of the people aboard as to what our situation was and that we would have aid in the event that something happen by aircraft off the America. And this I am pretty sure is what kept most of us going during the attack. This recollection that hey, "Captain McGonagle said the aircraft would be deployed as soon as there were indications of an attack on the *Liberty*. And minutes passed and minutes passed, we kept hanging on to those words. That we would be getting aid. And so the fact that we were there by ourselves was paramount and we knew that we were in danger but we knew that help was on the way, even though it wasn't.

Farley: Terry, was it during this time or later when somebody made the announcement that the purpose of the mission was to intercept communications from U.S. civilians who may have wanted to evacuate the area? Or to pick up U.S. civilians who wanted t return to the U.S?

McFarland: I don't recall that. There may have been something to that...

Schorreck: That was part of the cover story.

McFarland: Oh, was it? Yeah I don't recall any reference to our presence there as a contingency to evacuate U.S. civilian personnel.

Farley: Terry, on your way from Rota to your on-station post, what type material was you collecting or was there a collection effort underway?

McFarland: We did a lot of drilling going across. A lot of training. Our collection effort

was broken up a lot by training, general maintenance of the ship, getting things kind of tuned up, you might say. As I recall we had a very limited collection effort going across from the western Med to the Eastern Med[iterranean].

Farley: Terry was NSA providing any support to the *Liberty*? I mean other than which was given to you in Rota? But, through radio or any guidance any other way?

McFarland: I am not aware of any, if there was?

Farley: Was there a direct channel between NSA and the ship?

McFarland: No. We had TRSSCOM, which was designed to perform that function. To provide ship-to-shore. Uninterrupted ship-to-shore communications, two way. The problems that plagued that TRSSCOM were such that I don't think the system was ever used to any degree. To allow for that capability. The capability existed, but, I don't think the equipment was... was operating satisfactorily enough to accommodate that. Which may have been a problem, may have been one of the reasons why a lot of the information that we were collecting did not get to NSA. There may have been some instructions sometime along the way that said hey, "due to equipment problems just box up your data."

Schorreck: Terry, would you like a cup of coffee?

McFarland: Yes, please.

Farley: I'll take a cup. Was the ship's captain frequently apprised of the ongoing military situation as might have been reflected in SIGINT?

McFarland: I would say, generally, so yes. He was probably provided, although I can not confirm this, with a morning intelligence briefing by either the division officer or some other, perhaps, the senior enlisted member. On the activities that were ongoing in our area of the Mediterranean. Yes, I would say he was definitely kept apprised.

Farley: Okay, good. And the next one. Did you (sic) happen to see any copies of the message from NSA on the 6th of June which directed the *Liberty* to maintain a high state of readiness because of the unpredictability of UAR actions and to report by FLASH any threatening or suspicious movements?

McFarland: I vaguely recall seeing such a message on a clipboard that was available in the ops spaces the day that I had the watch... I had my day watch. There seems to me to be something that was routed around to all the operators, setting the positions to pay particular attention to the nets, to the circuitry, for possible indications of significant COMINT that may be of value to us in our mission. But here again, I have to qualify it as being vaguely aware.

Farley: Terry was there any reaction or any comments that you heard from anybody when they read that message?

McFarland: If there were comments, which I am sure there were at the time. They would have been side comments and I couldn't, I would, I am sure I would be taking them completely out of context if I was to attempt to quote possible comments.

Farley: Terry what was the general procedure when the ship had to change its position, did the SIGINT group direct the change or a captain or was it a cooperate effort from NSA and the ship and the SIGINT group. What was the procedure do you remember?

McFarland: Here again, I will have to underscore the question with the fact that being an operator sitting the line I was not as a general rule, apprised of our SIGINT information which may have caused movement by the ship. I would think that any course change, primarily would have been a result of a necessary change due to problems in our collection. In our ability to collect data. Or by direction of the fleet CINC to affect a course change. Or, perhaps, even an emergency course change would be authorized, the C.O. would be himself authorized to make. As he perceived the situation at the time. So, I think in regards to any course change there would probably be a number of factors involved. But if it did pertain to enhancing our collection effort, enabling us to do a better job, in regards to our mission, the SIGINT people aboard would be able to direct or influence that ultimate movement.

Farley: Terry, in line with that, too. If the Captain... if the SIGINT group intercepted any information indicating that hostile action was imminent, would he just automatically move the ship?

McFarland: I would think so, yes. I believe that he would not, if aware of imminent hostile action or immediate threat to the ship, jeopardize that ship or its crew unnecessarily. If he was forewarned of an attack, or had prior knowledge that an attack was imminent by onboard sensors or perhaps by message, that he would surely take appropriate action to remove the vessel from the hostile zone. Especially in leu of the fact that we were, at that time, unescorted and did not really have capable means to protect the ship and its crew.

Farley: Right. Terry, how many times did the *Liberty* receive orders to move? Do you know of any or to change position, their on station position?

McFarland: I really, I don't really have any specifics on the course changes or what days or event, time event wise. These course changes occurred. I really don't know.

Farley: Were you sailing quite a bit or were you at anchor or...

McFarland: I believe that once we got to our station, our op area, we pretty much drifted about. On a relative course at a very slow rate of speed just enough to keep the vessel moving.

Farley: The engines are usually on, if you are on a post or on station? The engines are still...

McFarland: Yes, the boilers are still up. We are not DIW.

Farley: Dead In the Water, yeah, right. Okay. Terry, I doubt if you have any thoughts on this, but would you have any comments on the lost critical message which directed the ship to move but it was, the message was not received in time? Would you see any reason why that would happen?

McFarland: Well, I can only say that it happened as result of, a combination of errors made by, made along the way, along the route, the message would have taken to get to us. And in retrospect it is sad that the message did not arrive in time. To try to pinpoint the exact time along the path of the message that it became misplaced or was not acted upon properly, I sure it has been attempted somewhere along the line, of the investigation. The routing, the arduous routing necessary for us to receive a message, in that part of the world is tremendous in itself. And one like myself could easily understand how a message could get misrouted and not received due to various relay points and have to be manually acted upon by an individual at each junction you might say.

Farley: Terry, when the Navy talks a direct channel from point-to-point, does that mean that the message written by the originator was received eventually by the recipient even though it has to go through numerous relay channels and stations?

McFarland: Well, my understanding of point-to-point would be a direct uninterrupted circuit. And so to use point-to-point in conjunction with necessary relay functions which were to my estimation, primarily manually routed, would be using the term in an out of context, out of its normal definition.

Farley: Okay, thank you Terry, have to switch the tape.

[End of Tape 1, Side 1?]

[Tape 1, Side 2?]

Farley: Okay, Terry carry-on.

McFarland: In other words, there may very well have been some requests for course and maneuvering changes by the research department to enhance their collection effort. And these changes I feel would have passed through Lt. Bennett to Captain McGonagle or the X.O. and would have been granted perhaps. If a need was determined. Line of sight communications are fairly critical, but not so critical if you are 15 miles off the coast line, 5 miles I don't feel unless you are in skip zone, 5 miles either way is not gonna make a big difference. I don't even think 10 miles would make a big difference. It depends on the penetration. How far into land are you trying to collect from? We weren't talking about a Navy effort, a Navy target, the target was inland. Army and air, those were the targets. In that case, you could be talking 100, 150, 200 miles in land. So, if you are 15 miles off the coastline, you can't get any closer. You are as close as you are gonna get. Now, you can go up and down the coastline and depending on where your target is, you may effect a slight, you may accomplish or gain a slight

advantage by maneuvering a couple either way. But I feel it would be very limited. And the need to constantly change positions, a mile or two, I don't think you would have that.

Schorreck: Terry a part of the rationale, for your being where you were, was the presence of low powered HF communications.

McFarland: There were some, some of the frequencies, I recall, we were, I was copying from 6 to 8 megs. Your low power HF was around 6 and below. We could have very well copied some low power HF. I was in the 6 to 8 meg range when I was copying [redacted] I was copying some [redacted]

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Farley: Why is that, because you could hear it?

McFarland: Well, I am not sure why. I know that I was given a freq to roll up on, and given a case to copy and being a faithful intercept operator, I rolled up on the frequency and began collecting. And when you are very young and inexperienced and only a couple years associated with that type of work you don't ask a lot of questions. They give you a frequency and they give you a target and say collect. So, you roll up and start collecting. But yes, we were copying some low HF communications.

Farley: You were copying Egyptian Army and Egyptian Air Force?

McFarland: Yeah. Egyptian Army/Egyptian Air Force. A lot of this, also some African cases we were copying. We were copying some Moroccan as I recall. And some Algerian. We were copying a lot of, what we would call, low level material.

Schorreck: Would this have been on the transit to the operational area? Port Said? (Northern Entrance to the Suez Canal)

McFarland: Uh Huh, right. We were copying this kind of stuff all the way from Abidjan, to Abidjan and from Abidjan into the Med. We were copying quite a bit of the low level cases, African cases. Algerian, Moroccan, that type of stuff.

Farley: Terry, let's talk about the ship. What type of armament was aboard the *Liberty*?

McFarland: All we had was .50 caliber machine guns. We had two up on the fo'c'sle, two midship and two aft. Just had six of them.

Farley: Did they practice? Did they have firing drill practices?

McFarland: I don't recall any actual firing drill but they could have been conducted seaward. A lot of our time was spent below decks. And when you are below decks you hardly hear anything. Unless somebody says I saw their .50 calibers. You won't know, you'd never know. Unless you pick it up on a item of conversation or you just happen to be topside at the time they are doing it. I know at one point in time, and I am not sure where it was, off the fantail there was some target practice. We were throwing cans in the water, and some of the people were trying to get qualified on the BAR, it was automatic machine gun type thing. The way they were doing it, they

would rest it on the railing and fire it because it was so erratic. You had to have something to rest it on. I fired that myself a couple times. They had some M-16s aboard, they had one BAR and some M-16s, I don't know how many we had. And some small arms, .45s, they had some .45s (pistols). At one point in time, I am not sure when it occurred but it was off Abidjan or in transit from Abidjan to Rota, or from Rota to the Eastern Med[iterranean], we had some target practice off the fantail and I recall that. Because a lot of us were back on the fantail, and we were asked, we were inquisitive, now the deck hands were using it. The one guy who was in charge of the armory, I don't know what his name was, but he was the one that was back there either conducting training or just testing out the weapons. A lot of us CTs being curious and unfamiliar with weapons and he allowed a few of us to fire the BAR and M-16 at some of the cans floating in the water. At which we had limited success. (laughter) We fired at the thing with, you know, fired several feet ahead or behind.

Schorreck: At least you hit the Mediterranean.

McFarland: Yeah, we hit the water and that was as much as we hit. So, that training or whatever was being conducted there in the way of firing the weapons, may have been a directed type of training to alert the gun crew, go practice there to kinda bone'em up a little bit. Kinda increase their accuracy and generally checking out their weapons. This may have been directed by the Captain down through the chain-of-command. I am sure, the gun mounts themselves, usually they had the unit, the machine gun off its pedestal and down in the armory. And then they would, they had a covering over it, just a piece of canvas over it. And as I recall, when we were in Rota, I believe, and I am a little bit foggy on this but I believe the guns were put on their mounts in Rota, on the pedestals in Rota, and the canvas put over the entire unit so it was ready. As a general rule they were not our there. They were not on their mounts. The pedestal was there but the machine gun was not on its mounts. But I believe in Rota they were put on their mount and the canvas placed over it for protection for the transit across the Med.

Farley: Terry, when you left Rota, were you flying an American flag?

McFarland: We flew American flag all the time. We were without, we never were without an American flag. We always had one flying. And I can easily substantiate our flag flying at the time of the incident. Because I helped fight a fire in the life boat and the flag in the lifeboat along with some other survival equipment was burning at the time. I had made my way up to the bridge. And there was a fire in the boat, several of us were up there. We saw the flag. I think everyone of us looked up, instinctively. To see if the flag fell down. It was burning the boat.

Farley: It was a different flag?

McFarland: It was a different flag. It was the small flag they keep, it was in a survival boat. It was small flag they keep in with the equipment, the survival

equipment and the whole thing was aflame. We happened to see part of the flag burning.

Farley: Terry we are going to discuss the attack. But before the attack took place, did the Israeli's give you any warning at all?

McFarland: I am not aware of any. At all. I am not aware of any warning at all. And that would include warnings to move out of the area. Anything of that nature. I am not aware of any. If there were, I was not privy to it.

Farley: Terry, you've already discussed part of what you remember. Would you go back and discuss what you remember immediately before, during, and immediately after the attack as you recall?

McFarland: Well I had the day watch. So, I was on duty in the research division. I was sitting the position. I was collecting at the time. And it was around 2:00. Around 1400 in the afternoon give or take 5 minutes. I am not sure of the exact time. There was a clock on the wall, as I sat in this position facing the bulkhead, there was a clock on the wall and it was sometime after 1400. It was either 1403, 5 or 7. It was a few minutes after 1400 when the attack, when we became aware down there that the attack was ongoing. Some few minutes after. But in my initial recollection there was something amiss, was these flickers of light coming through the bulkhead as I described earlier. It caught my eyes, I was intercepting. Then I removed my headphones off to my cheek. I could still hear my code, but then I could, you know listening if there was anything. Right. And that is when I heard this noise. It sounded like a chain moving underneath the ship. I made mention to the guy next to me. And I can't recall that man. I am not sure if it was Bill (B% Grong) or not. Petty Officer (B% Grong) had come aboard with me from Bremerhaven, Germany. There was four of us and he was one of my shipmates that came aboard with me. But anyhow, I mentioned to the operator sitting immediately to my left. Pretty soon a discussion ensued as to what these flickers of light were. And then the noise, then we started describing the noise, "what the heck is this, what the heck is that". And then shortly thereafter, and shortly would mean... within 5, maybe 10 minutes is when Red Addington came down from the ladder. We recognized there was a problem with his leg. We asked him what it was. And then he realized there was something wrong with it. He had just came down from the topside and getting fired upon and was no aware of it. Now, he may have just came in, been coming into the hatch from the outside as the planes made a pass. He may have caught a stray bullet and gotten his leg. And numbed or whatever and he wasn't aware of it, except his knee hurt. He said, "Well I felt something kind of", I recall him saying some... like "I bumped my knee somewhere but I couldn't figure out where I was so I just ignored it". Then he said "I just came on down". So, from that point on, he came over to his desk. His supervisor desk was between the ladder and our positions. He sat down, examined his knee and within a few minutes, Captain McGonagle came up on the 1MC and made the announcement that we were under attack by unidentified

aircraft. And that they were striking the ship fore and aft. He made that mention, meaning front, they were going back and forth down the ship.

Farley: Lengthwise, right?

McFarland: Lengthwise. At that point everybody was scared. For the first time they were, you could see the panic on everybody's faces. Not much was said. But the panic was starting to take over and we were all very much concerned about it. And for a minute, two, maybe three minutes there was no direction coming from anybody down there in the research department. Like, you know, do this do that, do this, do that. People were just kinda stunned and then we, you know, somebody, and I don't even know who it was said, we've just received the word, to perform emergency destruction. So, that word did not come over the 1MC. As I recall it, it must have been passed by some other means, a telephone, ships telephone or something. And at that point in time, we started scurrying around gathering up classified material and placing it in weighted bags to be dumped over the side. There weren't many bags that were filled. I don't think that there was more than a dozen that were filled and I don't think more than six ever got up topside. I think maybe at the most there was three maybe four that actually got carried up to the main deck and thrown over. They were so tremendously heavy.

Farley: They did throw some overboard?

McFarland: Some were thrown overboard. There was weights, there was a lead weight in the bottom that weighed probably 10/15 pounds by itself. And these bags were about the size of a, little larger than a sea bag. So, naturally when you filled the thing up, you were talking about 200 pounds maybe more, depending on what you had in there. And they were just to big and bulky to man-handle up the ladders. In any type of reasonable time frame. And without too much inconvenience. Of course I am sure once the first people got up there on the main deck, see there was some protection because if you came up out of the, out of the vessel, and you got to the main deck, you were right, there was a door, a hatchway right there by the bulwark. There was some protection there and they were probably able to take and toss one of them over but there was probably firing going on around them. So, I am sure there was reluctance to continue with that effort. You know, much longer than about three or four bags. And then I think, I think that somewhere along the line somebody passed the word to forget it. In other words, don't jeopardize your life, up there to throw those bags over.

Farley: Did you go topside at all?

McFarland: I went topside after the explosion. But during the timeframe of the emergency destruction I was down in the research department. We were accomplishing emergency destruction to the best of our ability. Which was very very limited. We managed to bag up 15 maybe 20, most of which remained in the space that they were bagged up in. They were just

standing around. This was only accomplished for maybe... at the very most, 10, 12, maybe 13 minutes. I don't feel that it was that long cause things were going along rather quickly. The events were transpiring very rapidly. Although there was a couple pauses in between orders and so forth. The thing moved along pretty quick. Things just picked right up from the time we started emergency destruction. We hadn't been doing it very long and Captain McGonagle came up once again on the 1MC and he was only source of information. Once the attack, once we were aware of the attack, he was our only source of information as to what was going on as far as our group down there in the spaces went. And the next announcement he made was, to the ship's crew was to stand-by for a torpedo attack on the starboard side. And when we got that announcement, somebody there in the area, said tuck your pant legs into your socks. Like you do in boot-camp, you are trained right. Get rid of all your loose material, loose clothing material, button your, make sure your buttons are buttoned on your sleeves, button your top collar. These are procedures that you learn in boot camp for water survival. And so, we all just followed suit and started doing this. The next thing somebody mentioned was, everybody lay flat. No one stands, everybody lay flat on the deck. And so we all laid down on the deck, either on our back or our side or our bellies, we all laid down. Most of us as I recall, laid down... on our bellies with our heads in our hands like this... crossed. The object was to protect your face. Somebody said, lay face down, and put your head in your face, that's what it was, put your head in your face. So, we did that, we laid down and waited. It was very quite. Everybody was down on the floor. The wait may have only been, I feel it was, I feel it was at least five minutes. I think we were laying down at least five minutes when the torpedo hit. I can not tell you when the torpedo hit, because I did not hear the explosion. My next recollection after it hit... was that everything was black, it was dark. The water was coming in, oil was coming in and debris everywhere. But I have no recollection of the explosion. I did not hear the explosion.

Farley: Was that right next door? It hit right next door to where you were?

McFarland: The explosion hit in front of me. It hit on the opposite side of the ship. And I was kind of in the middle, where I was. I was in the middle on the floor by the supervisor's desk, not under it, but by it. And there was a bay of equipment in front of that. And I was laying down in front of a bay of equipment. There was some more tape recorders and R-390s in those bays. When the explosion hit the opposite side, it blew everything around and out and just leveled everything. And when it did that, the equipment, of course, fell on me. That is how I sustained my injuries. But luckily the equipment when it fell, when the bay was blown, it toppled over on the supervisor's desk in back of me. So, the bottom of it only trapped me for just a few minutes. I was able to push it away enough, the bottom of it, to get out from under it. And then make my way, I had to go around this metal panel that was separating our little area, had to go around that to

the ladder to try to make my escape. There was not more than a minute, maybe a minute and a half, transpired from the time I realized we had just been hit until I made my way, until I got out from under the debris and made my way around and up to the ladder. I have some problem remembering if the ladder was there. I know that by the time I got there, there was only about a foot and a half of air space left. I know that the hole filled very rapidly and that by the time I got over there, which was not more than about a 25 or 30 foot course around the debris and to it. We were all hanging from the light fixtures. Up there, and there was not more than a foot of air space. At which time we didn't realize that it had almost reached its peak level. We had no real, we had no reason to think that it wasn't gonna continue to rise at that point. There was some problem with getting the scuttle open. The explosion had probably... sprung it a little bit. There was some degree of problem, I know we couldn't get it open right away. I know there was some pounding on the hatch. Somebody topside, that was up, the next floor above, was successful in dogging, undogging the hatch, and instead of only undoing the scuttle they undid the whole hatch, and lifted it open, which you are not supposed to do. But I feel the only reason they did that was because they could not get the wheel to turn, on the scuttle. In panic and in frustration to open it, realizing people were down there, the people topside just undogged the hatch and lifted the whole thing up. Then, those of us that were alive still came out of it and, then sometime later the hatch was dropped back down, matter a fact the hatch was pulled out immediately. Once everybody was out, that was right there in the immediate vicinity of the ladder, part of it or all of it that was hanging, I am not sure. Once everybody was out of the immediate area then the hatch was immediately dropped back down and dogged right back down. I know that. And then this marine insisted on going back down. He was the one, as I recall that got the scuttle undone. He got the wheel to turn. He got it out, at least that is the way it seems to me. That he was the one that got the scuttle undone and went back down in there and. In the book, Ennes says that he was successful in bringing back... I think one person from the water. As I recall he went down and never came back.

Farley: The water was up too high?

McFarland: No, he just went down and got trapped and never came back. I don't recall that he brought back anybody. But then, what most of us did once we got out and we got the hatch dogged down, somebody in the group said let's get these injured to the mess decks or get them topside or something. And Paddy Rhodes, I was with Paddy, and he had hurt his leg somehow. I don't know if he broke his leg or his ankle or how. But he was, limping and said "Mac, let me use your shoulder". And so, I helped Paddy up topside and we got our life preservers at the end of the hallway there and we put our life preservers on. They were in with a big bin. At the end of the research space hallway. They were in a bin, just reached into the bin and got your life preserver and put it on. And then we started making our way

on up to the main deck. We got up to the main deck and we didn't realize so much of a list until we got to the main deck. I didn't even realize the ship was listing that much. In the confusion I guess I just didn't feel that, being that much of a problem to maneuver up the ladders. But we got topside and could see that we couldn't walk. We couldn't walk along the main deck. We had to kinda crawl, or tilt our bodies to walk. It was an effort to get up. What I did, I got Paddy up the ladder and somebody, here again, I never know who these somebodies are, but somebody said take him to the mess decks. That is where they are setting up first aid. So, we took them back down to the mess decks. Because we went passed, we had went, passed the mess decks on the other side, we were on the other side of the mess decks. We went up through the boiler room and up that way. So, we had to go back down onto the mess decks. So, I took Paddy back down and then I went back up topside. And it was when I went back up topside, I came a different route, which took me by the bridge and that is when I walked over, and I didn't know who it was at the time. Somebody who was laying face down on the 01 level... and they were dead. I didn't know who they were, they were face down and I didn't bother to turn them over. I just knew that they were dead and I walked over. Stopped and looked at him. He looked blown apart so I walked over. I didn't even... I didn't want to see it for one thing... I saw it and I didn't want to stick around I just kept on moving. I knew if I thought about it much I would be gone myself, so I didn't start, I didn't thing about anything I just kept on going. And somebody said hey we need help up here on the bridge, "We got fires". Then that kind of stunned me back into realization where we were and I went back up to the bridge and fought this fire in the boat. That is when I recall seeing that part of that flag burning. We put the fire out and sometime, during the time we were putting the fire out, and I don't think that we got all the fire put out... Another announcement was made that the torpedo boats were coming back. Now, we saw them when we first came up cause we looked off to the side and we saw the torpedo boats off to our side. They were just out there, they weren't very close, they were probably... well, they were close enough where we could see them. I know that they were less than 100 yards away. They had to be less than 100 yards. I don't know whether it was 50 or 75 yards but it was less than 100 yards because I could see them real clear.

Farley: Could you see any insignia?

McFarland: I didn't see any insignia at all.

Farley: Any flags?

McFarland: No. and... an announcement was made to go to general quarters. Well, when I wasn't in my research space one of my assignments was, my general quarters station was up on the fo'c'sle, in repair, one of the repair parties. So, I stopped fighting the fire when the announcement was made, as did everybody else and went to their GQ stations. Somebody said leave the fire alone it is down enough now. Just get out of here and go to

your GQ station. What was burning was just the boat anyhow. But the boat was burning outside. It wasn't gonna interfere with the operation of the ship or anything. So, we stopped putting out the fire and we went to our GQ stations. Mine was up on the fo'c'sle in the front part of the vessel and... (TR NOTE: unknown missed due to segment change). It was up there that we stood by for another torpedo attack. Waiting for one more torpedo just to kind of finish us off. Which we thought more than likely they would accomplish. During the time on the fo'c'sle, it was pretty quiet as I recall. I don't believe too much was said by anybody. We simply went into the hatch, went in the door. Closed the door and just kind of fell to the floor and sat around the floor, laying down or sitting up. Not too many words were discussed except... when we heard the torpedo boats coming around the front part of the ship... we could hear them. We could hear their motors. It seemed like they were just like, right next to the ship. They couldn't have been more than 50 feet away. It didn't seem to us. Now, we couldn't see from inside there, but it seemed like they were very very close to the ship and they just kinda chugged around. I think what they were doing was examining, probably the ship. They'd come in, and then just kind of went around to examine it. We could hear their motors and they went on around. We could hear them make their pass around and then it was quiet. And we didn't hear anything else... and... the Captain made an announcement, and I think what he said was, "the torpedo boats are going away but remain at your stations." I think what he did was anticipate the fact that they made a close examination of us, were taking off, again, to come back and make another run. That is why he told us to remain at our GQ stations even though the torpedo boats were going away. They may have made one more run, I don't know. But I know that we finally terminated our general quarters, we came out of the hatch... and we watched the boats go. We watched them go off the horizon. Backing up a little bit, when we first came up the hatch and on to the main deck, there were ropes all over the place. Draping off the side, apparently, and I only gained this from the book, apparently, well, not only but, it substantiates some of the things about what was going on topside when we were down below. Some of the details about the fact that he had ordered some measures taken to abandon ship. If the need was, if it was necessary. So, I know there were... there were lines over the side because we were tripping over them coming up. So, once the boats had disappeared we all started aiding the rest of the injured to take them down to the mess decks. And that seemed to be the center, the next center of activity, major center of activity and that is where everybody went. They went down to the mess decks, took the wounded and we were down there for some time, at least I was. While we were down there, they were tending to the wounded and so forth, somebody, I was not aware of any booze problem on the ship. There was some mention about "alcoholism abounds" and this kind of stuff. I think it must have been to a very, very limited extent. Among only maybe a portion of the ships crew. I didn't hear of any, any mention of the "XO's got

a drinking problem". I didn't hear any mention of, "hey he's got his own booze locker". There was some mention in the book that he had his own booze locker. He may very well had, I did not know and I did not hear any discussions about it. But anyhow, there was booze on the mess decks. Somebody had gotten some rum, I remember seeing rum, bottles of rum. Matter of fact, one of the guys that the Doc was operating on had a neck wound and he was given some rum cause he didn't have any medication to numb the, to numb him. So, he was given some rum, he was given a couple shots of rum. Somebody held him while they took a bullet out of his neck area here. Apparently the bullet was shallow enough that the Doc could pull it out without to much major surgery. But I am sure it still hurt. But anyhow the guy was given a little bit of rum to kind numb it. Some other people were given some rum for one reason or another. So, after that, after 15 minutes, a half hour, I am not sure, now time becomes, now I can't really, break down much in time order. There was a lot of activity going on after the attack. I know that I went up on the bridge. I was called upon to stand bridge watch. Because although I had a few injuries, stomach injuries, I was still able to get around. They wanted two, they wanted two bridge watches in effect in case the boats came back or the aircraft came back. When I went up there, Captain McGonagle was not on the bridge. He had been taken off the bridge or he had went away from the bridge. He wasn't on the bridge when I went up there but later on when the helicopters came back then he was called back to the bridge. As I recall he came out of his area and came over to the bridge and was there when the helicopters hovered next to us. There was several people on the bridge at the time, I am not sure who they were, but I know he was there. Several efforts were made to communicate with these people in the helicopter to find out what they wanted.

Farley: What type helicopters were they? Israeli helicopters? U.S?

McFarland: It was an Israeli helicopter.

Farley: Were they marked?

McFarland: Yes, they were marked, but we couldn't understand them. There was a communication problem. They couldn't understand us and we couldn't understand them. Several efforts were made, flashing light, hand signals, you name it, we tried to converse, tried to make contact with them to find out what they wanted. A couple of guys had M-16s and they were holding them at the ready.

Farley: Who?

McFarland: On our... on the bridge. They were not, they were not observably armed. In other words, they didn't have any guns or anything. They had the door open, they had the side of the helicopter open. There were two men, and they were trying to talk back and forth with us. But, we were unsuccessful and finally Captain McGonagle became so frustrated that he just waved them off.

Farley: Were there two helicopters or one?

McFarland: I only saw one. I only recall the one. I may have been, if there was two, I may have been... some other part of the ship when the other one showed up. I only recall one and I don't recall anything being dropped on the ship. Like a message or anything. If that involved a second helicopter, then I was off the bridge when that happened. I was back down in the inside of the ship doing something.

Farley: I think all we saw Bill, all reports indicated just a single helicopter. Which supposedly carried the U.S Naval Attache, Commander Castle, from Israel.

McFarland: I was not aware of who he was or who the people were in the helicopter that came to us.

Gerhard: Was this the first that you had identified the hostile force as being Israeli?

McFarland: Well, as I recall, we still didn't know. There was guessing going on the whole time.

Gerhard: As to who the attackers were?

McFarland: As to who the attackers were, and even when I went up on the bridge to stand bridge watch with my binoculars, I was still searching for enemy... for the enemy who was not perceived at the time to be Israeli. The enemy was perceived to be the Egyptians. That was from what I can recall was on everybody's mind that they were Egyptian, not Israeli. Maybe the Captain had some knowledge because he was up there through most of this, through just about all the entire attack. Maybe he had made some conclusion that they were Israeli and that is why he became so irate and upset and frustrated with this helicopter. Maybe he knew they were Israeli and they were our attackers. And that is why he went ahead and waved them off. But I don't know, you know, I was kind of confused at the time. I can see why we were all confused because we couldn't talk with them. Then, when he waved them off... told them to get the hell away, in English, and started waving them off, you know, I asked myself at the time, "why is he chasing them away?" Because I thought, I looked at the situation as him chasing them away. Not as, becoming frustrated with them and just telling them to go. It looked like he was actually trying to chase them away. His frantic wave motions, his hand motions he was making and the tone and his voice and the words of his language told me that he was very upset with them and very irritated to the fact that they were even there. So, then I found out, that, by some of the other people on the bridge that our attackers were Israeli. That is when I went "what"? You are kidding. (Mr. Farley laughing) That can not be, there is something wrong. But it was after that, that we found out that they were Israeli, that our attackers were Israeli. It was sometime after that helicopter.

Farley: Terry, at any time were there any international distress signals displayed or shown or transmitted by the *Liberty*?

McFarland: Well, during the time that we were in the mess decks, after the attackers had left, a lot of questions were being asked all the time. What about this, what about that? Then, why didn't our... the big question being asked was, "where in the heck is our planes?" After it was all over, the ones of us that were alive and still breathing, and had that sigh of relief, we were asking "what happened to the aircraft?" They were supposed to be here, matter a fact we were mad. And we said, "where in the hell is the aircraft that were supposed to be here within 5 or 10 minutes of the time we got attacked?" We started cussing out our own Navy. And our own leaders! And you know how you can get caught up in that type of momentum, right? We were very distraught, very confused at that point at to why nobody came to our aid. Then somebody made the statement that a message was sent. A message had been sent and probably didn't get through. Or that our equipment, because the antennas were all knocked out, that maybe our message didn't get through. It had been sent but may not have gotten through. So... We still didn't know if the message got through, but somebody on the mess decks said that we had sent a message.

Farley: So, you didn't know whether you had any acknowledgement at all?

McFarland: We still didn't know. You know, here again, these are statements, people were making and nobody knew who to believe or who had the right information or... there was just to much confusion. To really know what was going on. Only the people in the comm center or in the radio room or up on the bridge with the Captain, I think, really knew what was going on. Because all the rest of us were just, playing a strictly survival role, primarily. So, if he directed a message to be sent, then the people, that person who was in the radio room at the time would be knowledgeable about "yes, we did send a message". Or "yes, we did send an S.O.S. call". Those people, if you could identify those people that were on the watch during that time frame and in the radio shack, and then you'd probably be able to close the loop on those particular details.

Farley: Terry, talking about the destruction on board, was the entire intercept capability wiped out?

McFarland: From what I could tell, it was, because as the pictures bear out later on, there was one maybe two missile holes right through the... well, each antenna, the red and the blues, transmit and receive antennas, were all knocked out, except for one whip. There was one antenna, and I think it was blue, I think it was a transmit antenna on the port side, it was still in intact. But everything else was knocked out. The TRSSCOM wasn't knocked out though. From what I could tell. There was no damage to the TRSSCOM.

Farley: Was the red light on?

McFarland: No.

Gerhard: So, it wasn't transmitting?

McFarland: I don't... I'm sure that there may have been some small arms fire damage

to it, but there was no missile that knocked it out or anything. It's like they just ignored it, you know.

Farley: Terry, let me switch the tape.

[End of Tape 1, Side 2?]

[Tape 2, Side 1?]

Farley: OK, let's see... we talked about burning or destruction of secret documents and all of that material. What crypto equipment was destroyed by the torpedoes, any idea?

McFarland: Well, the crypto center was completely wiped out. So, whatever types of equipment and cryptographics and so forth that were in there were wiped out. Which refreshes my mind... memory a little bit. One of the big things that we were told at the time of the emergency destruction was to get the crypto keys. Somebody from the comm center came out with us with a bag of crypto cards to throw in one of the weighted bags. So, an effort was made by those in the crypto center to get the crypto cards out. I know that for sure.

Farley: Terry, I think we have covered the attack pretty much. What do you remember about any assistance or offer of aid from anybody? What was the first instance that you saw?

McFarland: I know that after I got off the bridge watch, which was toward evening, toward early evening that same day, I was relieved. I went back down to my compartment. Mattresses and everything had been pulled off a lot of different racks to be used in the mess hall. Everything was just so tore up... so messy... there was no place to flop, except wherever you could find. You couldn't go to your bunk because your bunk may not be there. Somebody may have taken the mattress off. So, we were just thoroughly exhausted and everybody was pretty much gathered around the mess deck, still with the wounded and injured. Some of the... some preparations for food were being made. Some of the people were making some sandwiches. I recall... they managed to put together some sandwiches and stuff like that to eat. They made a big batch of Kool-aid and stuff like that. And just something as a morale factor to get things back to normal. But a period of time elapsed, and the following day we rendezvoused with the *Davis* and the *America* and there was another ship there too, but I'm not sure. I recall the *Davis* because I got a picture, looking aft at the *Davis* and another destroyer. I got a picture of them, at our... aft of us and they were steaming with us. And then I've got a couple of pictures of us when we were close... when we were transferring supplies and stuff back and forth. We pulled up near another ship that was with us. I don't recall the name but I've got pictures of that. We rendezvoused the next day with the *America* and the *Davis* and the other ship that was with her. Of course helicopters off the *America* came over, and off-lifted some of the seriously wounded off the fo'c'sle. I've got pictures of that when the helicopter was on the fo'c'sle taking some of the injured off. And, of course, the Admiral

came aboard to examine the ship and talk with Captain McGonagle and to see to the general condition of the ship and crew.

Farley: Terry, in the book, I think it's Ennes' book, mentions that a submarine recorded on film the entire attack. Did you ever hear any discussion of that aboard the *Liberty*?

McFarland: No, that's my first recollection of that, if it's valid, was in the book. I had no knowledge of any submarine with us at any time while the *Liberty* was deployed.

Farley: Terry, would you know when NSA became aware of the attack on the *Liberty*, and if so, how?

McFarland: No, I would not be aware of the specific time.

Farley: Did you go aboard the *Liberty*... were you evacuated to the *Liberty*... I mean to the America?

McFarland: No, to the America? No, I stayed aboard. My injuries were not such that it required me to be evacuated, I didn't have any critical injuries and the people that were critically ill... I mean if you had a broken leg or something, you may very well have been medivaced off or if your life was weighing in the balance, you may very well have been lift we did not receive priority for lifting off to the America.

Farley: Among the people who came aboard the *Liberty* after the attack, were there any OM9 people there who might have told you not to discuss the incident or told you what to talk about?

McFarland: No, there was no direct effort made to suppress information or not talk to so-and-so. There was no mention of any VIPs aboard that we should be careful with in our dealings or be tactful. Nothing of this nature was made known, as far as I can recall.

Farley: Good. How were moving the *Liberty* back toward Malta, what measures were taken to protect the remaining classified materials aboard the ship?

McFarland: Well, we locked up the research spaces, and we established a watch posture on a rotating basis. There was a big effort, a large-scale effort made to ensure our ship's integrity to examine the ship on a 24-hour basis till we got to Malta to make sure that we weren't gonna sink in transit. The spaces above the waterline were continually examined and... all the way down to the keel, all parts of the ship were being patrolled by on-watch people, examining for leaks, additional breaks, and this type of thing. A major cleanup operation was ongoing during the transit, trying to clear as much stuff out of the way, and make living conditions a little more habitable for the most part. So, there was a lot of activity during our transit to Malta.

Farley: Terry, were there any foreign vessels, foreign ships around, trailing you while you were on the way back?

McFarland: Yes, there was a Soviet trawler, maybe following us some five or ten

miles, aft of us, that at one point had a net. It had a net on a boom that it dropped over to the side and appeared to be recovering something it looked like from a distance. It was hard to describe, it was a net with a boom and one of the guys happened to spot it with binoculars. And so, the other guys fishing up our classified material which it could be easily done because it was floating everywhere. You could look over the side and read... SECRET SPOKE this and SECRET SPOKE that... so, a lot of debris was continually floating out from the hole for the entire transit. We made some attempts to recover some of the paper and the traffic but we didn't have anybody right there, through the entire transit, trying to recover all this classified material. We didn't have the means to do it for one thing. We didn't have any devices that we could adequately try to recover the paper.

Farley: Was there a tug, an American tug, following behind, chopping up some of the material?

McFarland: No.

Gerhard: You couldn't see one?

McFarland: No, I didn't see one. If it was it was somewhere in the distance and I was not aware of it.

Farley: Bill, do you have something on that?

Gerhard: Well, Terry, it was my understanding there was an American ship with a net over the side...

McFarland: Oh, was there?

Gerhard: And it's just possible what your friends saw through the binoculars was the American ship.

McFarland: Maybe it was... the American ship? That's possible. Like I say, things were kinda foggy. But I do recall one of the crew members making mention of "Hey, that guy is" and he referred to the ship as a guy, "that guy has a net over the side and it's on a boom". So, if it was confirmed that there was an American ship in the area, that was attempting to...

Gerhard: I would like to think that the United States Navy destroyers which were accompanying you back would have judiciously bumped the trawler if it was trying something like that.

McFarland: There was some maneuvering, I understand, there was some maneuvering to place the *Davis* or one of the other destroyers between us and the trawler. I know that. There was some maneuvering to do that. I'm not sure to what success.

Farley: Bill, do you have another questions before we go back to Malta?

Gerhard: No, I think he's doing... he's covered most of what I'm interested in.

Farley: OK, Terry, back to Malta... not back to, but to Malta. During the time the *Liberty* was docked there, do you recall how extensive the reviews were of

the ship and personnel by NSA and NAVSECGRU representatives?

McFarland: I know they were aboard and there was a lot of people coming and going all the time. Once we got into dry dock the big effort initially was to get into dry dock and to protect the hole as much as possible from items floating out, and that included everything from paper to bodies. So, there was a big effort to take and put a piece of canvass around the belly of the ship as much as could be while the water was being drained out to keep things from coming out. Once that was accomplished, and there was a tremendous amount of spectators around initially when we got into dry dock and so forth, they were standing around all the time for the first part of letting the water out. A lot of interested gawkers wanting to see the damage and this type of thing. We were fairly successful, as I recall, at protecting the hole as far as a lot of stuff coming out. I think the canvass eventually ripped and tore and some of the debris fell out. But we were somewhat successful in protecting the hole. After that was done, a major clean-up operation began, because we could not allow the Maltese workmen aboard or into the research spaces until we went down and sanitized the area. To sanitize the area was a tremendous effort, because for one thing, only those who were cleared could go down into the spaces and the general ships crew could not help us in that endeavor. That was something we would have to do... us CTs would have to do that. Initially the doctors were brought aboard to complete documentation, and so forth, to identify those remaining bodies in the hold. I was one of the group that volunteered to go down into the hold to recover what bodies that were down there. And we accomplished that. We got the bodies recovered, and so forth, and then we began our cleanup operation. It was a scoop shovel type operation, and so forth, where you were just scooping things up and as I recall we just shoved them right out the hole onto the bottom of the dry dock and down there was another group of people who were disposing of it. There was some sort of chute or something, somehow we were taking in the... readily getting rid of the debris. Seems like we shoveled it out through the open hole into a container or something. So, while we were in route to Malta we did some... no that came later, didn't it? Somewhere along the line, we threw a lot of equipment overboard.

Farley: Crypto equipment?

McFarland: It must have been after... enroute to Little Creek. That's where it was. I'll back up here. Back at Malta... we got the space sanitized, got all the classified equipment out. We left R390s and things like that in the bays. They weren't classified. But, mainly we wanted to get all the debris, paper, so, we had to use scoop shovels. And we got in there and cleaned the floors, opened desk drawers and made sure there was no classified information in there and sanitized the area, so the Maltese workmen could go in there with their cutting torches and cut out all the bad metal and put new panels on, and so forth. After we'd accomplished that job, after we'd removed the bodies, got the debris out, then us CTs that were still aboard,

of which there weren't many because we'd gotten together... Lt Boone got us all together and said this is the plan. Now, that we got the cleanup operation taken care of, our part is basically done. We only want to retain a few CTs aboard and the rest of the crew, most of the crew and the remaining CTs aboard were gonna fly them back to the States. And he said, "I got you all together here today because I want to seek out volunteers to remain with the *Liberty* until her repairs are accomplished and her disposition is made as to what will occur next". Being as I was one of the junior crew members of the *Liberty*, and I had no family. I wasn't married. My folks were already aware that I was alive, so there wasn't any problem there. So, myself, and Jim Brong... who I originally came onboard with, and a few others. I think there was about six of us. A couple of maintenance types, couple of R Branchers and... all totalled there were six. And Lt. Bennett, we remained... us CTs remained aboard for the entire repair operation and transit back to Little Creek.

Farley: Terry, did you participate in the Naval board of inquiry held at (C% Veleta) on the 15th of June?

McFarland: No, I did not. I was not called upon.

Farley: Not asked to testify at all?

McFarland: No.

Farley: Did you participate in any investigation, NSA, JCS, Congressional?

McFarland: No, I did not.

Farley: Isn't that interesting!

Gerhard: That's right. Interesting!

Farley: Did you participate in the preparation of a postmortem report... by NSA?

McFarland: No, I didn't.

Farley: Would you have any comment Terry, on why there was so much confusion? Why the formal board of inquiry... regarding what actually happened? Apparently some of the officers were a little confused about what happened when and there was a lot of confusion on the final report.

McFarland: Well, personally, I wasn't even aware... even while I was in Malta... I knew an investigation was going on, to a limited extent. Because, naturally you ask "Who's that?". You see a new face on board and you see him with some of the officers and you wonder who this guy is? We were made aware that an investigation was on going. But that was it. That was the extent of it. We were just made aware that an investigation was on going and it was perceived as a documentation type thing. What happened from 1400 on that day, no CTs, to my knowledge, were ever interviewed personally or called into the interviewing room to be present for questions or answers or anything.

Farley: Did you talk to Admiral Kidd when he was aboard, right after the *Liberty*, I mean after the incident?

McFarland: No, I didn't have any personal contact with Admiral Kidd. I took pictures of him as he came aboard. But I had no personal contact with him.

Farley: I'll ask you this... that pretty much wraps up what we wanted to know, now we want some personal comments. What is your opinion concerning the allegation on the part of the Israeli, that they didn't realize that the *Liberty* was an American vessel?

McFarland: Well, I'm sure that was a cop out on their part. It is pretty hard to cover-up an error made by an ally, which should have adequate documentation on all allied naval vessels. So, I feel it's a pretty weak story that they put together in trying to explain their errors.

Farley: Were you aware of any communications at all, on the part of the Israeli, after the attack, or would you have been able to intercept them?

McFarland: No, I wasn't aware of any communications at all that would have prompted us to take any sort of evasive action against an impending attack. I feel that if we had collected information and we were aware of their plans to attack *Liberty*, that Capt. McGonagle would have been sufficiently justified to remove *Liberty* from the area. Realizing that we would not be in a position to counter such an attack. So, this is why I feel that our (B% flesh and efforts) in that regard were not successful.

Farley: Terry, when you were on station in the Mediterranean, what do you think about the quality of the intelligence that was provided the Community? How good was your intercept, how good was the reporting?

McFarland: Well, I know what I was copying was static, a lot of static on frequencies. I recall static, and there was a mention in Ennes's book about jamming. That may not be too far off. There may be something to that. Because I know we had severe, we had some significant hearability problems when we were off the west coast of Africa. I know that. Some of the cases... some of the target countries we were copying... you could barely hear them. Their operators were very poor. The circuit conditions were very poor. When we got stationed on the Eastern Med[iterranean], I know there was a lot of static on the frequencies. So, I don't know whether we were just experiencing general hearability problems, with all of our cases or the majority of our cases, or whether it was the normal static, QRM, and so forth, that you'd experience. We had a very difficult time in hearing and copying the cases on the west coast of Africa prior to going into the Med and once we got on station. The stuff on the west coast, I'm sure, was not related to anything to do with the Egyptian/Israeli War, and I couldn't honestly say that the problems we had out in the Eastern Med[iterranean] were directly related to any jamming, but I know we did have some hearability problems out there.

Farley: Terry, what lessons do you think we should have we learned from the incident and what recommendations would you have made to prevent another incident like the *Pueblo*?

McFarland: Well, I think, in as much as we have been taken over by events as a result

of the *Liberty* and then the *Pueblo*, that the lessons learned... it took a second time to learn the lesson. We didn't learn it very well with the *Liberty* and if it hadn't been for the capture of the *Pueblo*, I doubt seriously if we would have, even today, have changed our attitudes about the AGTRs, as far as their usefulness. I think we would have continued to have them and we would have just ignored the *Liberty* incident as being an error. But it is pretty hard to ignore the *Pueblo* incident... when men are captured. Then demands are made for "hey, we are gonna have to do something." These vessels evidently are too susceptible and they cannot go into areas by themselves any longer without some form of protection and now we need to access... do we still find those vessels performing a viable function or can we do without them? Can we afford to support them while they are on their missions, or not? So, following the *Pueblo*, I'm sure, launched an area... launched a... major... looking into the usefulness and utility of the communications vessels.

Farley: Do you think they contributed something? You were only aboard a short time.

McFarland: I was only aboard a short time. If I only knew... It's one of these "if you knew this and if you knew that"... but if I only knew what we would have been providing...

Farley: You got no feedback at all?

McFarland: No, I personally had no feedback on the results of our efforts for the short time that I was aboard. So, I don't know, really in all honesty, what our successes were on that particular collection platform. And without that knowledge, I can't really make a statement.

Farley: Do you think that the information that we collected or planned to collect on the *Liberty* could have been collected by a field site, a land site?

McFarland: No, not the short range stuff. I'm sure that would have necessitated a mobile unit or an airborne unit, like a VQ-2 mission, orbiting back and forth or something like this along the coast line. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] You have got to go in there to get that tactical type stuff. You are not going to get it any other way.

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Farley: Terry, I notice you have some notes there. Is there anything you would like to comment on or put on the record which we have overlooked or glossed over at the moment?

McFarland: Well, let me take a moment here. (Pause). You got through to question number 40 before I came to the interview. (Pause).

Farley: Question number 40 was "Was the *Liberty* flying the American flag. How large was the flag. Was it ever obscured by smoke when the ship was under steam?"

McFarland: I don't recall any problem with identifying the flag. There was not so much smoke as there was fire. The napalm didn't seem to burn smokish... it seemed to burn clean, hot and clean. I don't recall a lot of smoke in the

area. I just don't recall that. (Pause) I know those drums were on fire over on the other side by the radio room. Those may have been emitting some smoke because of the oil in those barrels. I just don't recall it. I know there was a lot of fire, but I don't recall how much smoke there was.

Farley: I skipped over some of those questions because I knew that you hadn't been exposed enough to be able to answer them. Unless there's somewhere that I should have asked.

McFarland: Oh, OK.

Farley: Terry, if the individuals aboard the *Liberty* are still around local area, who do you think would be most knowledgeable and willing to talk with us?

McFarland: Well, you have already talked to Paddy Rhoads and the only the other person, and I'm not sure if he is in the area, would be Larry (B% Bowen). But that can be easily determined if he is or not. I know he transferred from Misawa, Japan in the last six months. I'm just not sure where he went... where he got orders to. He is the only person I can recall. Now, Brong... I'm not sure what the status of Jim Brong is, I don't know whether he is still in the Navy or not. I've lost contact with him since years ago.

Farley: Terry, did you read Pearson's book on the *Liberty*?

McFarland: No, I did not. I haven't seen that book yet.

Farley: And you said that you had read Ennes' book.

McFarland: That's correct.

Farley: Is Ennes in a position to accurately report the story and would you say his version is factual?

McFarland: Well, I'm not... I feel the information he has depicted in the book is factual. I know that he could not have documented such a book without knowledge from other crew members as far as the events that transpired. Because one man could not keep up with that much ship's activity and be in that many places in one time and know what was going on during this point, and so forth, and so on... But all the information combined and put together in a chronology seems to be fairly accurate from what I can remember from these many years later. So, yes, I would conclude that it was a fairly accurate story.

Farley: Why do you think he waited so long to publish it? Maybe it took him so long to write it. I don't know.

McFarland: I don't know either. The thought had crossed my mind years ago, too. When you look into the *Readers' Digest* you see these little short stories. And it seems like it'd be a very exciting story to lay down to pen and paper if one was so inclined. But, of course, I never did do much with it. But I can understand why the story would be told, and someone who could make contact with enough people to put together enough information to make it a meaningful story would probably do it justice. And I think he did pursue this for a long time, as I'm sure it would take, to

contact people and get this kind of documentation. So, I think his intentions were very much positive in that regard. I feel he was a very concerned individual. He may reap some financial benefit from this book, but I think the intent to tell the story as clearly and accurately as possible is conveyed in the book.

Farley: Terry, did you receive any commendation or recognition for what you did?

McFarland: Well, I received the similar awards as the others aboard the ship did as far as the Purple Heart for injuries sustained (B% or concurred) rather. And the Combat Action ribbon and a Presidential Unit Citation which most everyone got... everyone got... on board the ship that got injured or was a part of the crew. No specific citations for anything though.

Farley: Terry, do you have any comment or reaction to the obvious slight to Capt. McGonagle, when he was presented his medal by an underling rather than the President, it was all very low key.

McFarland: Now, I didn't really take that to heart too much. Now, I think that you would have to be in a position... perhaps Mr. Ennes or... be a part of the officer ranks to recognize such a slight, if that's what it was. I did not personally feel that he had to necessarily receive it from the President of the United States.

Farley: Do you think there was any reason to protect the... our US Government's relationship with Israel?

McFarland: Considering that politics seemed to play a very important part of our day-to-day life, I can understand why that particular issue was probably tried to be resolved as quickly as possible and basically be forgotten and put into the archives you might say. And just left to rest. And with the *Pueblo* incident that followed shortly after, it was pretty hard to ignore all that.

Farley: Terry, were you asked to sign any statement or oath to restrict any discussion concerning the incident?

McFarland: No, I was not.

Farley: Never at all?

McFarland: No, not that I can recall. I was never requested to sign any statement or oath.

Farley: Terry, we have had you here for two hours. Is there anything else you want to put on the record?

McFarland: No, I can't think of anything right now. Nothing that readily crosses my mind. I know that when we left Malta to transit across to Little Creek, we were still pretty much concerned about the ship. The patches had been accomplished. But we had to take and make periodic checks of that area. We donned the oxygen breathing apparatus and went down with flashlights and continually checked the inside of the vessel as it steamed along. Once we got to Little Creek... well enroute... we did throw alot... we started doing an inventory of some of the equipment that had been in our

spaceabove... in the T brancher's space. We had performed a survey... we did a lot of surveying of equipment that was blown up and destroyed and just getting rid of a lot of stuff that was basically in the way and of no value to anyone. And that was when I recall that we had thrown some equipment overboard. And that was during the transit from Malta to Little Creek that we actually threw these equipment overboard. Blown up typewriters and things like that. R-390s that were a mess. Once we got to Little Creek, a few weeks later... I'm not sure how long... a few weeks... but maybe only a few days... we loaded up all the classified material we had stored in the T Branch spaces on a truck and took it to an incinerator and burned it all. All the remaining bags of classified material. And that seemed to be the last act we performed as far as taking care of the debris that remained. Doing equipment inventory and taking the classified stuff to the incinerator that was in those weighted bags.

Farley: OK. So, that sort of wraps it up?

McFarland: I think that kinda wraps up the details of anything associated with the... prior to the attack and after the attack.

Farley: Terry, what classification do you think we should put on the tape?

McFarland: I think SECRET probably is sufficient. SECRET HVCCO [SECRET//COMINT], I don't think that we revealed anything on the tape much more sensitive than that.

Farley: Bill, do you have any final questions?

Gerhard: We would be interested in pictures. We may be able to select one or two of them.

McFarland: I have quite a few pictures, including the time...

Gerhard: We have a way of reproducing them.

McFarland: OK.

Gerhard: So, that you'd get them back.

McFarland: As long as you don't lose them.

Gerhard: Oh, no. You'd get them back.

Farley: Terry, thank you much for your time. We really appreciate it. And think we were able to fill in some of the gaps.

McFarland: Well, I hope so. I wish I had more details about our collection effort, and so forth.

Gerhard: I'm surprised how well you remember after 13 years.

McFarland: Well, you can back. it's amazing... you can go back when something like that occurs, happens to you. You can put yourself back into that time and place, and you can develop a time line pretty close.

Farley: But your memory must be triggered.

McFarland: Yes, that's right. It has to be triggered.

Farley: We may get back to you. I may need a little supplementary information.

McFarland: Well, I'll keep these and maybe I can fill in more blanks as I think more about this. And I want to go through my... the letters I wrote to my wife and I can fill in some of the emotional aspects of our transit from Abidjan to Rota and from there to the Med. Some of the parts... point in time, dates of awareness that you mentioned earlier. There may be something there I can fill in. I may have said something to her about "well, we are headed for what maybe our last trip". You know when your young you try to put a lot of sensationalism into your love letters and I may very well have, off the cuff, mentioned something to her, how you might do when you are out to sea, and so forth. So, I will go through those letters and see what I can extract that might be of some value for documentation purposes.

Farley: That would be very helpful, Terry.

McFarland: OK.

Farley: Thanks much, again.

McFarland: You're welcome.

[ADDENDUM TO MCFARLAND INTERVIEW:]

Farley: You had a couple of changes to make in the tape concerning earlier mis-statements or loss of memory type statements. Shall we fill those in and then the transcriber can add them later on.

McFarland: I think the two areas that are erroneous, to my knowledge now that I look back on what I said at the time, deal with the armament that was aboard the *Liberty* I think I quoted a figure of six 50 cal's when there was only four, two up by the fo'c'sle and two admidship. I think I quoted that there were two aft. That was a misquote. The other statement had to deal with who I assisted upon exiting the ops bases subsequent to the torpedo attack. The Petty Officer I assisted was as I recall now was Cavanaugh, Petty Officer Third Class Cavanaugh, rather than Petty Officer Dusty Rhoads who at that time had been on a damage control party and was therefore not in the area... not in the area of ops research base.

Farley: Terry, did you get a chance to look at your old love letters to see if there was anything that you would like to put on tape... dates, and places, and people?

McFarland: I'm still in the process of going through those letters. I have several hundred letters to go over and it's a slow process as I'm sure you can understand. So, as soon as I do make some head way with those letters I will definitely come back and we will put that information on tape if it is pertinent at all to the research you are doing.

Farley: Good, thanks very much Terry.

[END OF INTERVIEW]