

Oral History Interview**NSA OH-15-88****with****LGEN Marshall S. CARTER****3 October 1988****Colorado Springs, Colorado****by****Robert D. Farley****INTRO:**

Today is 3 October 1988. Our interviewee, Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, United States Army, Retired. General Carter, a former Director of the National Security Agency from 1965 to 1969, joined the Agency after serving as Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. His 42 year military career included special assignments to high level positions in the diplomatic and intelligence services. He spent three tours as special assistant for the Director of the Executive Office under General Marshall in the late 1940s, when General Marshall was in China, was Secretary of State and was Secretary of Defense. As DIRNSA, General Carter, among his many achievements, General Carter established the National Cryptologic School and the Cryptologic Career Professionalization program. General Carter discusses his military career in these tapes with special emphasis on his

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time as DIRNSA. This interview is taking place in General Carter's mountain retreat in the Pike National Forest area, Colorado Springs, Colorado. Interviewer is Bob Farley. General Carter desires that the classification of these eight tapes be FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY, and this is NSA Oral History Number 15-88.

CARTER: Stafford or somebody.

FARLEY: Is Maggie still around?

CARTER: As far as I know she is. She's not working at the Agency anymore.

FARLEY: No. She's retired. But I thought you might like to read that.

CARTER: Yeah. Well you brought this to me to read then.

FARLEY: Yes, at your leisure, Sir.

CARTER: Do you want it back when you leave?

FARLEY: No, no, no. Throw it away.

CARTER: Okay.

FARLEY: I guess we're plugged in and the needles look good and everything's fine.

CARTER: Do you want it played back to see how it sounds or don't you need to.

FARLEY: No, I don't need it, Sir.

CARTER: You have faith in the instrument.

FARLEY: Yes, Sir. It's a good instrument.

CARTER: Are the wheels going around? That's the way I check it.

FARLEY: The lights are blinking. (chuckles) General Carter, you don't know how long it's been that we've tried to get you

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on tape. I think I wrote you two or three letters through Vince Wilson and I don't know whether he ever mailed them or not. You probably never even received them. So I'm delighted that things worked out. Incidentally, the little girl who changed the format of the *Newsletter* has been fired.

CARTER:

Oh, really?

FARLEY:

Not fired literally, but transferred to another element in the Agency.

CARTER:

I think her name was.

FARLEY:

yes. So don't be surprised if they go back to the old format.

CARTER:

I owe her a letter, because I got excited, maybe she told you.

FARLEY:

Yes.

CARTER:

I got excited because I missed the seal there and I wrote her a letter. I got a very nice letter from her.

FARLEY:

Oh, did you. She's a nice young lady.

CARTER:

I'll show it to you when I get some time. But she mentioned in the last sentence, she said that you had been trying to or would possibly get in touch with me, and this is the first I have heard that NSA had any interest *whatsoever* in my experiences at NSA.

FARLEY:

Is that right?

CARTER:

I have told them to other people, but not in any detail. And I suppose Bamford was the only one who really zeroed in on anything and that was an unfortunate thing

which I can give you the background on anytime you want it.

FARLEY: It was. We'll talk about that, yes. I told you before that Colonel Kullback experienced the same difficulties with Bamford. He didn't even talk to the fellow except on the phone. But in the book he quoted Kullback, after researching at the Archives and reading some committee reports and then saying that they were a result of an interview. So Kullback was flaming mad.

CARTER: I don't blame him.

FARLEY: So this guy is weird. General, we can talk at any level you want. Any sensitive area. If you think it's too sensitive clean it up or talk about it. I have all the clearances and you have all the clearances and it would be a shame that something that you think should be on the record is ignored. So talk at any level you want.

CARTER: Well, before we get too deeply into it, what happens to this?

FARLEY: All right, Sir. It goes into the archives and it will be used as a basis for an NSA classified history. We're doing a history of the Agency, 1952 forward. And we have two people working on this. It will be transcribed. It will be kept in the archives available to nobody unless you say they can. I have a dispensation form, I have an accessibility form that says "Anybody who's interested can hear this," and the other end of the spread is, "only those people who I give permission to, legitimate researchers, legitimate

historians, military troops," so the spread is your decision.

CARTER: Well, sooner or later I'll be out of the picture.

FARLEY: Yes.

CARTER: I hope all of us will.

FARLEY: We're going to protect that though, Sir.

CARTER: Are you?

FARLEY: Well, again, I say that. I'll be gone, too, and we have some of these eager young people who say everything should be privy to the public. And I dislike that. I've been fighting the declassification, but that's neither here nor there. We're overwhelmed. Jimmy Carter started it and...

CARTER: I think I mentioned casually, in that tape I gave you yesterday, my distaste for the total access, what do they call it? Freedom of Information Act.

FARLEY: Right, and we have a lot of problems with that.

CARTER: I'm sure you do and I think we didn't handle it right at the time it happened.

FARLEY: Bamford was the fellow who requested all the NSA *Newsletters* since the beginning of time and we had to review and excise some of the names and some of the offices. And we sent him a bale of that material which he incorporated into his book.

CARTER: Some of it, yes, he did. Of course, the fallacy in that whole argument was in distributing the *Newsletter* with the caveat down there that since this will be going to families who may have access to them, or something like that,

better not pass it around. Which means nothing, of course.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: So it was in fact a public document and I can understand.

FARLEY: And we didn't fight it, we just said, take it.

CARTER: No, I guess not. I think long before we got involved to that extent, I'm not talking now about NSA I'm talking about the intelligence community. Had they gone directly to the President, which I don't think they ever did,...

FARLEY: I don't think so.

CARTER: ...and said hey, you're killing us. This is as much national security as guided missiles or anything else.

FARLEY: Yes, it's ridiculous.

CARTER: But anyway that's water over the dam.

FARLEY: Sir, I told you last night I listened to all your tapes.

CARTER: I only gave you one, but both sides.

FARLEY: Both sides, yes, Sir, right. The summer cruises, which was interesting, with the Navy, the Academy. One thing I was talking about with General Collins. I asked him how he used intelligence, and just before the invasion did you ever sit in a conference with Eisenhower and the top level and prepare for OVERLORD? And the poor old guy, 92 years old said, "What the hell was OVERLORD?" (chuckles) You forget these things.

CARTER: Sure.

FARLEY: "What the hell was OVERLORD?" But one of the best, and again, I'm talking about Collins, the best bit was about Mac Arthur being fired. And I said, "Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree on whether he should be fired?" And he said, "You're damned right." He said, "The little guy did a good job in firing him." I said, "Who's the 'little guy'?" "Harry Truman." He said, "Mac Arthur was too big for his britches and he couldn't take orders anymore and he should have been fired." I thought that was interesting.

CARTER: Well, it is interesting that Joe Collins nor any of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, except Omar Bradley, sat in on the committee that General Marshall, who was the Secretary of Defense, formed at the direction of President Truman to recommend what action if any should be taken in regards to MacArthur.

FARLEY: I see.

CARTER: I was holding General Marshall's horse at the time as the Director of the Executive Office of the Secretary of Defense and I sat in on these several meetings. Because Truman had called General Marshall and said, "I need some advice." Of course General Marshall was fully aware of all of the things that had been going on. Because as far as I recall there was no direct Mac Arthur to White House communications. They had all come through the War Department message center, and of course General Marshall was fully aware of it all.

FARLEY: I see.

CARTER: And so they, I don't know if this is germane at all, but General Marshall, Bob Lovett, Averill Harriman, Snyder sat in on some. He was Truman's crony and Secretary of the Treasury, and Omar Bradley, and Omar Bradley was the only active military officer sitting in this meeting. And then when the word came out generally from the President, after he had gotten the report from Marshall, that Mac Arthur was to be relieved, then Bradley had Collins prepare the messages.

FARLEY: Okay.

CARTER: And that's where it started hitting the fan, because Pace was in Korea and he was supposed to get the messages and go and deliver them to Mac Arthur, which said, "Buster, you've had it," or words to that effect in Armyese.

FARLEY: I see.

CARTER: Along about that time, people knew that things were brewing with Mac Arthur because there had been publicity on the Martin letter and stuff like that. I'm not sure exactly whether it was this occasion or a prior occasion in which Bradley got the word that the press was about to break something. There were two occasions when this happened. And it may have been the Mac Arthur case, it may have been a prior case which has slipped my mind. But Bradley went to the White House — I'm talking about Omar, General Omar Bradley — went to

the White House and talked to the President and the White House decided that they had to make a release now which was late at night, probably around midnight or something like that. And they made the release to the news media and Pace still had not gotten the message. So according to Pace, too, it was news to him. In any event, those things happen all the time in Washington. The press will get together and if they have any affinity for each other they'll decide to go down certain channels. And I remember several times when I was with General Marshall we'd get a phone call and the guy would say, "I have incontrovertible evidence that," such and such and such and so and so, "is going to happen" or "has happened." And our only answer was, "We have no comment, we don't know anything about that." The usual. But they would send their probes out and pretty soon they would get some guy like Ben Cohen, who was Truman's legal counsel, he panicked, whenever the media got involved he panicked and he would say things that he really shouldn't say thinking he was trying to cover up what had happened. That's Washington, that's the news media.

FARLEY: It hasn't changed even though they're amateurs now compared to the old timers.

CARTER: Probably, I don't know.

FARLEY: General, as I say, I listened to your tape. I don't see anything that we should expand on. I made a couple of

notes there. Went to the South Pacific with Sutherland and met Marshall down there. Some of those are significant.

CARTER: I don't think that...I think that my last few sentences explained to you on the tape why I was bringing these things up because they might well have had some influence, and I'm sure they did, on the manner in which I made certain decisions or took certain actions when I was in CIA or Director of NSA. And it was based on the experiences I had had as a younger officer along similar circumstances. I think I covered that. And that's the only reason I went into the hysteric or historical part of this.

FARLEY: Well the only reason, and I don't know whether I should have ^{appended?} offended that career bit, because this was in our *Newsletter* years ago and I just pretty much paraphrased that. Plus the bit in...I've forgotten the name of this book...that spelled out when you were DDCI Six and succeeded Cabell, so I just tried to amalgamate all that information.

CARTER: This is all wrong.

FARLEY: I know it is. There are some dates in there..

CARTER: Here's a book put out by guys who are supposed to be pros in CIA and they've got the date wrong when I retired and everything else.

FARLEY: I did a double take when I read some of those dates.

CARTER: Yes, those are stupid. They make me eight years older than I am. Some of this was probably taken from *Who's Who*.

FARLEY: Yes.

CARTER: Because I've been immortalized in *Who's Who* for about the last 20 years anyway. But, interesting in that connection...

FARLEY: I thought you'd get a kick out of that.

CARTER: When I took no action.

FARLEY: That was pretty detailed and I appreciated that.

CARTER: I think this was put out by Gerry Burke's shop.

FARLEY: It is excellent. It helped me a lot in fabricating some of these questions.

CARTER: Yes. This is only one page. There was another page to that.

FARLEY: Was there? I'll have to go back and check.

CARTER: 1960. Oh, wait, this is *assuming* duties as NSA Director.

FARLEY: Yes.

CARTER: Okay, they put out a special *Newsletter* when I retired from NSA.

FARLEY: Oh, I didn't see that one. I'll have to dig that one out then.

CARTER: Yes. I retired on the 1st of August and somewhere along in there they put out a special *Newsletter* announcing my retirement with a picture and all this stuff and going into much more detail. I may have a copy of it at home.

FARLEY: Okay, well, I'll double check it then. Sir, I think we can go up to CIA time period. But let me just ask four or five questions to sort of bring us up to date. Again, at West Point, I asked this question in here, "Did they teach any intelligence courses at all?"

CARTER: Well, you're going back 55 years, 57 years.

FARLEY: Right. HUMINT, was HUMINT probably the only thing that they taught in the way of intelligence? Certainly no communications intelligence.

CARTER: No. I think it would be a little fatuous for me to try to answer. I have no memory whatsoever of being at that time indoctrinated in the need for intelligence or anything else. Maybe in a squad deployment or something it might have come up. Now if you know what the other guy wants to do it's pretty important because you can outflank him or something like that. But no.

FARLEY: I agree. General Blake, I asked him the same question, he said he never recalled any courses in intelligence.

CARTER: But you are asking a couple of old goats to go back a hell of a long way you see. (chuckles)

FARLEY: Okay. Let me ask another one, too, about when you were at the Operations Division War Department, were you aware of the SIS, the Signal Intelligence headed by William Friedman at the Munitions Building at that time?

CARTER: No. I had no knowledge of it to my memory, nor did I have access to any COMINT.

FARLEY: Okay. All right. You covered the rest pretty well.

CARTER: I knew there was a guy running around with a satchel, because I'd seen him sitting outside somebody's office waiting. I knew that, so I knew something was going on, but what it was I didn't know. In fact I didn't even know about the Manhattan Project. I knew that there was a codeword, which I have forgotten, – I think it may have been MANHATTAN.

FARLEY: It is.

CARTER: When I turned down several requests for personnel when I was head of the Troop Section, because the Troop Section established the kind of forces that we would have two years from now so that the production chain could be adjusted accordingly. I don't know whether I covered that in this tape or not.

FARLEY: Yes, you did.

CARTER: So that we were able to phase out antiaircraft fairly early on in Europe, as deployable units and shift those over to tank destroyers or something like that. This is people now. And based on those people plus a 20 percent give or take the Services of Supply, (General) Somervell, were the ones who established the procurement necessary to support these kinds of units. So that was my job.

FARLEY: Okay.

CARTER: Variations, adjustments, and cancellations and additions to the Victory Program troop basis.

FARLEY: Was there any need, again, for intelligence in your job? Were you fed any kind of information that would be useful in performing your duty?

CARTER: Not for that specific purpose, no. We followed the events surrounding the war and we were fairly familiar with what the next move was going to be but not at the division level or anything like that. It was at the whole battlefield area.

FARLEY: How about in '45 when you went to China. The intelligence community had almost collapsed by then. People, civilians, went back to their old jobs and the reservists got out of the service and hung up the uniform. Do you remember anything about any kind of intelligence when you were in China?

CARTER: I remember very vividly when I went to China, and this would have been in probably July, mid-July, yes, I would say around mid-July of 1945. It was after the war and ^{in?} Europe had ended and I went into Wedemeyer's headquarters and as the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff G-5, (are you hearing me all right?)

FARLEY: Yes, Sir.

CARTER: That was lend-lease, and procurement, and indigenous production of the Chinese, and civil aid, and everything not involving combat. We did support logistically four agencies of the U.S. Government all involved in intelligence. One was an outfit called AGAS, Air Ground Aid Service. It was to take care of downed pilots. One

was the U.S. Army G-2. One was an outfit called the Navy Group, as I recall, under an Admiral Mary Miles, that was a clandestine quote/unquote operation. And there was one more that the name escapes me. I'd have to go back in history to remember.

FARLEY: Was it ATIS? No it couldn't have been. Army Translators and Interpreters Service?

CARTER: No, I don't think so. It was a semiclandestine organization and they were all going off in different directions. The necessity for trying to pull them together was beyond G-2's competence, because they'd pay no attention to him. They were taking their orders from somebody else. Especially the Navy Group, even though Wedemeyer was the Supreme U.S. Commander. He was the Chief of Staff to the GIMO, too, of course so he had a two-hat job. But nobody was paying attention to anybody else, they were all going off in directions. And Wedemeyer finally asked G-5 to try to pull these intelligence elements together.

FARLEY: Oh.

CARTER: And they just weren't talking. It was one of those usual things where, "Hey, you're moving in on my turf; hey, I've got my agents and I don't want anybody screwing them up." This sort of thing. The fact was that they were all paying the same agent for the kind of information that they asked for whether or not it was valid.

FARLEY: Was the CBI Signal Corps, or it would be the Army Security Agency in the CBI, active at all? Did you ever see anything from those people?

CARTER: I don't remember. Army Security Agency may have been the fourth agency that we were trying to pull together.

FARLEY: It could have been.

CARTER: But the war ended and all of our efforts in G-5 now were concentrated on getting humanitarian aid teams into the prisoner of war camps in China and Korea that were run by the Japanese. Because the Japanese commanders and their staff had been living high on the hog. The Chinese weren't bothering them particularly; the Koreans weren't bothering, they were subjugated by the Japanese already. They had not been in a fighting war for a couple of years. So we were concerned as to when the Emperor announced that the war was over, that Japan had been defeated, these guys might take retribution against the prisoners that they had. Because they couldn't accept the concept of having been defeated when they had been living high on the hog. That was the point. I've covered this in some detail in another tape, but not for NSA. But G-5, indigenous production and things like that came to a screaming halt, lend-lease and so forth. We saw the need for doing something about this and we organized either 21 or 23 humanitarian aid teams to be flown or dropped into each of the 21 or 23, I've forgotten the figure, prisoner of war camps that we knew and we had located,

and in some cases had been in some contact with them. And that was a beautiful operation which has never really been surfaced.

FARLEY: I didn't know about it.

CARTER: Because with two exceptions. We had to land C-47s in some fairly remote areas and we had to drop in a few teams. These were six man teams. They were unarmed. We had an aid man, a supply man, communications man, I guess maybe five man teams, a commander, anywhere from a lieutenant up to a major, with credentials from the Generalissimo, from Ambassador Hurley, and from General Wedemeyer certifying to their validity and saying that they were there on a humanitarian basis and urging the Japanese camp commanders to give them every possible assistance to carry forward the ~~Emperer's~~^{Emperor's} commands. Stuff like that. All real fancy and everything.

FARLEY: One of the people I interviewed was in that same type of operation and he gave me his jacket on the back showing the American and the Chinese flags saying that "I am an American. Help me get" so and so and so.

CARTER: All of our fliers used those.

FARLEY: Same thing. I see.

CARTER: During the war they used those, too. Chenault's outfit, the Flying Tigers, and then our own U.S. forces when we got them in there. Anyway we had one guy who was roughed up a little bit by a Japanese guard. He dislocated his shoulder so he had to be evacuated, in one case.

case. Everything else went smoothly except in Shanghai where the Jap commander had also been the "mayor" of Shanghai and running the whole goddamned country. So he rejected the team and would have no part of them and made them get back on the plane. They were commanded by a Britisher but this has no particular bearing on it. We thought British access would be much better with the local community than ours, because of the situation with Hong Kong. And British/Chinese relationships were much better than the U.S. relationships. Anyway, they had to come back and I was running this outfit and having a fight with G-3 of China Theater to get enough gas to put one of these little puddle jumpers 300 miles in here when they were trying to move Chinese armies all around to accept the surrender of the Japanese troops. It was pretty exciting, because we had our own pissing match going on within the headquarters. Where all I wanted was a little bit of gas, maybe an eyedropper full compared to the barrels and barrels, and all of our gas was coming in by air of course over the hump. So it was a half-assed operation but it worked out beautifully. We had no problems. As an aside, and I have told this to Paul (?) Gaddis(?) or somebody. The need for supplies for these prisoner of war camps became so acute that we asked Mac Arthur, in the Philippines, if he could possibly give us help. Well he had B-17s and B-29s and everything else running out of

his ears, of course. They rigged up all these pallets with supplies, cigarettes and food and C rations and everything else, and they started to plan to drop these supplies since they couldn't land, parachute drop, in or near the prisoner of war camps. About the second or third day we had to call it off because the bombing was so accurate that at one camp the first pallet hit this great big limousine that belonged to the Jap commander and promptly destroyed it, you see. Nobody was hurt, but anyway that was a piece of equipment that no other Jap commander had. It was a British Rolls or something like that. And another drop went in and hit the power plant and wiped out the whole communications and the power for the thing and we decided it would be better to wait.

FARLEY:

You couldn't have done better if you'd planned it.

CARTER:

That's right. It was better to wait until we got a little better organized. When we started moving these people. You know, there are a lot of civilians in these prisoner of war camps, too. The Dutch and English particularly. And the Doolittle fliers. We got two of them who had been in individual solitary confinement ever since the raid in '42, and they were as tragic a couple of people as I've ever seen in my life. And we got Wainwright out. The Russians took over the area in Manchuria. Wainwright was up there, but they gave Wainwright and his staff to us about the second week or third week of the operation, turned them over to us and we brought them and they were in

pretty poor shape, too. It was an interesting operation. I've forgotten how we happened to get on this. Oh, it was in the attempts to coordinate the intelligence activities of these four agencies. Of course when the war ended then most of them were shut up and ready to go home right now. Everybody was. Then the riots started with the troops, you know, with this "Momism" business. And Wedemeyer handled it pretty well considering, in China. Because we didn't have that many troops actually, and they weren't organized. In the Philippines they had a hell of a time.

FARLEY:

I know. They marched down the streets of Manila. I was a postal officer with the unit up in Clark Field and some clerk had a stamp that said NO BOATS, NO VOTES, and on every letter that went out back to the U.S., this kid would stamp it until I caught him and all but court martialed the little so and so. These guys were marching down in formation with signs, SEND US HOME. And I thought cripes they all could be court martialed. Babies, cry babies.

CARTER:

It's hard, because built into me is everything. Who's the first person responsible, and my mind automatically goes to the Soviet Union, or Communism, or international Communism if you will. It's difficult for me to wipe out *them* as a factor. Underground particularly and fomenting most of these things that occurred to us.

FARLEY: We found out that two first lieutenants were card carrying Communists and they were they guys who were stirring up the kids. That's another story.

CARTER: Well I sat six weeks in Moscow at the Council of Foreign Ministers and watched this parade of falsehood. It was laughable in some areas. Vichynski(?) and...Khru....

FARLEY: Gromyko?

CARTER: No. Khrushchev relieved Vichynski. Khrushchev was the foreign minister. (The wheels aren't turning right.) But I know Vichynski was the deputy foreign minister, because General Marshall caught them with their pants down on one absolutely false statement and had a paper right there which he passed over to them. When Vichynski saw it he couldn't resist bursting out laughing because they caught them dead cold. Molotov was the guy not Khrushchev, Molotov. Molotov just looked at him and just about swatted him. (chuckles) But I sat through six weeks of that and it was perfectly apparent that the Soviets were intractable. They had no reason whatsoever nor did they want to come to any reasonable agreements. This was on the efforts to get a peace treaty with Austria and Germany, and reparations was the big problem. So I always look under the woodpile to see if it's a Russian.

FARLEY: I agree.

CARTER: Or a Soviet agent of some sort.

FARLEY: Oh, I agree. Let's see, let's bring you back to the U.S. in '46 as Executive to Assistant Secretary of State and special rep

for Marshall in D.C. The question was, how did you receive your intelligence, your COMINT? Did you get a daily briefing, a black book, a read file, or the INR office people brief you on a daily basis? And I talked about Brewer Merriam. Did you know Brewer at all? He was signal officer in Hawaii during World War II.

CARTER: The name doesn't strike a bell.

FARLEY: And he was in charge of the INR.

CARTER: No, the name doesn't strike a bell with me.

FARLEY: Do you remember that?

CARTER: Somewhere in here you've got to separate my functions as a venturi tube. A source in and out from an analysis substantively of what the hell is going on and what should my boss be doing about it. I wasn't in that act to this extent. I had a fleeting knowledge. I followed the situation in China based on General Marshall's reports back the year he was in China because I had to brief President Truman every three or four weeks. So I'd follow that what the situation was. But as far as sitting down and analyzing the COMINT from the source, I didn't do that.

FARLEY: I knew it was incidental, the intelligence you received was incidental to the big project, the major mission.

CARTER: Yes.

FARLEY: Your major responsibility. But I just thought maybe on occasion you'd sit in on a briefing that somebody might have given you the status as of this week.

CARTER: Well I may have from State. It would have been from State, but I don't recall anything saying, "Hey that's pretty hot stuff."

FARLEY: Understand. Understand. Sir, you've made some notes on your questions. Do you want to refer to those of ^{or?} shall we just move on?

CARTER: I made notes on almost every question for a while. Maybe we can handle many of them by just one sentence.

FARLEY: All right, we're up to about number 10 or 11. National War College. There might have been something that we missed.

CARTER: Nine. ("In 1947 as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, did the intelligence flow improve? Quality?") You asked me qualitative questions which I'm not in a position to answer. I simply don't know, did the intelligence flow improve? This is question nine now. I was too busy doing my job, which was not to analyze the capability of the intelligence community.

FARLEY: No, I knew intelligence was not of prime importance, but as I say it was incidental to your responsibility.

CARTER: Yes. So in question nine and the rest of that, it really wasn't my job and I have no knowledge of the effect of COMINT on senior State Department personnel.

FARLEY: Sure.

CARTER: Turn to the next page on 10. ("How much or what type intelligence, if any, was provided to the Military Assistance Group for Europe where you were assigned in

That was my job for only three months and I didn't need that form of intelligence. We were negotiating with the representatives of the Brussels Pact nations in that European Correlation Committee and this was on a classified basis. And it was laying the ground work for military assistance which in turn laid the ground work for NATO. And this was in probably April, May and June, I think were the three months of '49 when I was working as Ambassador Douglas' Deputy. I had the rank of Minister but I was not in the flow of State Department normal activities. There was a Minister for that, a guy named Holmes who was the State Department foreign service officer. He was the Minister who ran the Embassy and stuff like that for the Ambassador. Ambassador Douglas, of course, was at the Court of St. James and I was his deputy *only* for the military assistance program developments. I was there when he lost his eye, in case you've ever heard of that. Are you a trout fisherman by any chance?

FARLEY: No, I haven't in years. I used to be just a plain lake fisherman.

CARTER: Yeah, that was a pretty exciting period. No I did not feel that I needed any kind of intelligence to accomplish what I was supposed to do.

FARLEY: Okay you can move probably to 13 then. Chief of Staff of 8th Army in Korea. ("As Chief of Staff of the U.S. 8th Army

in Korea you must have sat in on many intelligence briefings. Type COMINT? etc.”)

CARTER: Let's see. No, I don't have any knowledge on 11. You skipped my Alaska tour.

FARLEY: Yes, let's talk about that. I didn't know exactly how much detail you wanted to get into on that.

CARTER: I don't need to get into much detail there at all. It lasted two and a half years. On November '52 to May of '55 I was a Deputy Commanding General and for several periods I was acting Commanding General of the U.S. Army contingent. It was a joint headquarters of course. And in addition I was the joint maneuver director for the Unified Command, Army-Navy-Air Force. And that was only to authorize my going with General Atkinson to hunt and fish in his airplane looking for maneuver sites, because it was relatively quiet up there. So my job as Deputy Commanding General was really to inactivate the Alaskan depot which had been the big, one of the big buildups for the assault on Japan, which was scheduled for 1949. And we had materials all over the whole chain of Alaska and into the Pacific islands and all the way in through Guam.

FARLEY: Was that OLYMPIC, Project OLYMPIC?

CARTER: Yeah, I think that was the name, I'm not sure.

FARLEY: I think it was, right.

CARTER: This was the assault.

FARLEY: Yes.

- CARTER: Yeah. It's interesting, isn't it?
- FARLEY: It is. Because I remember we were planning, too, and it was a little frightening when the people were briefed about what to expect, sending a signal team in almost with the first combat landing.
- CARTER: Yeah. It was pretty interesting in a way, what we found there. We had 25,000 adzes. Now an adz is a form of axe, a chopping axe by which you make rugged stringers for a roof that show through a night club, okay? And you swing it between your legs like this. It's a sideways axe, okay, and you get there and you make these big indentations and you buy the stuff now in plastic to put over this stuff if you want to. Anyway we had 25,000 of them in the Alaskan depot. The only possible use could be to make something out of a coconut tree, or something you know, for an officers' or NCO club. I can't think of anything else. But anyway, we had enough to give each man in Alaska one of them, and we had to dispose of some.
- FARLEY: Let me switch tapes.
- TAPE ONE, SIDE TWO
- CARTER: (Some of this may not be useful.)
- FARLEY: No, Sir, this is just what I want. Nothing exciting at Fort Sheridan, I guess.
- CARTER: No, very little excitement there.
- FARLEY: It was close to Chicago, that's the only reason I liked that.

CARTER: Well, my headquarters were there but I had units from Sault Ste. Marie. I was responsible for the antiaircraft defense of Sault Ste. Marie, of Milwaukee putting them in. They weren't there then. Chicago and Detroit, they were pretty well in, and Gary, Indiana. So it was a big area around there, the industrial complex. These were Nike sites, except that the Sault Ste. Marie I had automatic weapons to protect the canal. That was about all I had there. The big thing was convincing the City Council of Milwaukee which was headed by a socialist mayor that they needed Nike sites. And some of the Nike sites are by a proper deployment of them had to be in some very wealthy areas. It was very interesting.

FRLEY: I'll bet it was.

CARTER: Difficult to acquire the real estate you see. But I know that five years later my brother said, "I ran into a fellow in Milwaukee and when we got to talking he found out that you were the Marshall Carter that took over part of his land to put in a Nike site." I said, "Yeah."..He said, "Well, he said that he hated your guts. And he could hardly tolerate the thought of the Army until his barns caught on fire and he said your unit went over there and saved 27 polo ponies and race horses that he had in his barn. From that point on he thought you were the co-runner with the Holy Ghost."

FARLEY: So it balanced out then, sure as the devil.

CARTER: That was in Milwaukee, so it changed his attitude in a hell of a hurry. Out in the country like that nothing could have been there except us.

FARLEY: That guy must have been pretty wealthy, that many polo ponies.

CARTER: Yeah, he was extremely wealthy. Probably a Florsheim or a Spiegel or somebody like that.

FARLEY: Yeah, that's right.

CARTER: Let's see. Going down to...I was Chief of Staff at CONAD and NORAD for three years. I'm on question 12.

FARLEY: Okay. Was that your first trip to Colorado Springs? You learned to love it from that first assignment?

CARTER: My very first trip I was here, yes. Well there's so many things, circumstances that make you decide to retire into that place. We had families in Savannah, Georgia and I should preface that by saying my wife's father was a retired brigadier general, my father was a retired brigadier general, both Army. My wife's father went to VMI and my dad went to West Point, and by the time it came for us to retire we had no mothers and fathers left. They had all died.

FARLEY: What class was your father? I looked through the West Point...

CARTER: '99.

FARLEY: Okay, because they don't go that far back in the current listing.

CARTER: No, the Stud Book...every ten years they put out a permanent Stud Book that goes back to 1802.

FARLEY: Okay. I was trying to balance him out with the numbers and the dates and the classes, and I thought it must be a while back.

CARTER: No, he was the class of '99. And the annual Stud Book cuts off with the class that has no remaining survivors.

FARLEY: Okay, good. I just wanted that clarified.

CARTER: So when we came out here in '59 we still had family and had no particular plans but when we retired in '69 our basic family, mothers and fathers, had all died. In fact my brother died, too. My older brother. He was the class of '26 at the Military Academy.

FARLEY: I see. Do you have a son who graduated at West Point?

CARTER: Yes, my son graduated in '62 and he joined the Marines. He figured the Army had suffered enough from the Carters.

FARLEY: I saw that and, my gosh, Marine? It doesn't make sense, but it was junior, Marshall Carter Jr., with the middle initial different.

CARTER: Marshall N. Carter. Yes, he joined the Marines and got himself overeducated. He got a master's degree in operational analysis at the Navy post-graduate school. And then on his own time when he was in headquarters Marine Corps he got a master's degree in international relations at George Washington in the District.

FARLEY: He lives here, too, doesn't he?

CARTER: No, no, he doesn't live here. After Fort Benning he was a White House Fellow, which is a pretty high distinction as you know.

FARLEY: It sure is.

CARTER: So when that tour was ended he was 36 years old and he was getting to the crest of the power curve if he wanted to change occupations. When you get over the hill, around 40, they're not reaching out and grabbing you from the military services to take you into their organization as a general rule. So he decided that after 14 years he'd done his duty. He had two tours in Vietnam, he had the Purple Heart, he had the Navy Cross, he had a number of other gallantry, Bronze Star type operations, and some Vietnamese decorations. From a military point of view things were going down hill as far as activities were concerned, so he got out.

FARLEY: I saw that.

CARTER: And went to Chase Manhattan and he's now a senior vice president of Chase Manhattan. He's doing remarkably well. He's in the top 50 of the organization of Chase Manhattan. Now he has the international section and he's on the road all the time. In fact they left yesterday for Amsterdam, and he can take his wife with him, you know.

FARLEY: Oh, sure. That's great.

CARTER: So it was a good move for him and his family. He has two children.

FARLEY: Well if you decide that you just can't go through with the military career you're better off getting out.

CARTER: Well, he loved the Marines and everything else, but it's a long row ahead when you're raising two children, when your wife is not acclimated to the military services particularly, when about 60 percent of your time has been without your family. You're either on a carrier or on an unaccompanied tour or two tours in Vietnam, and you look down the road and you see all the horse shit that the top commanders have to take from two-bit assistants to the Secretary of Defense. I'm a little wild about this. Because I've seen it build up over the years.

FARLEY: And you've gone through it.

CARTER: And these half-assed Congressmen who don't know their tail from third base, not all of them but a fair number of them who fancy themselves as Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense or having this unlimited authority and the administration accepts the fact that this is the case. Historically I know it didn't have to be that way. Because when I was working for General Marshall he was very respectful. But he worked through Vandenburg and Russell and Tom Connelly and Stennis and Carl Vincent and those people who were the leadership in the Congress and they were calling the shots. And the minute somebody got out of line in Congress they'd call him in and straighten him out. And that same thing applied

when I was in CIA. And I have several accounts that might be of interest as to how that applied.

FARLEY: Good.

CARTER: In which there was a leadership in the Congress and they weren't taking anything from any of these pipsqueaks, for lack of a better term, who may have been brilliant and maybe had every good thought in mind but they had reached their level of incompetence, as a statesman.

FARLEY: Peter's Principle.

CARTER: Yeah, as a statesman. Well, anyway, my son decided for a family and he got out of the Marines. And as I say, he's doing beautifully and he's a colonel, retired now on the inactive reserve. He stayed with the reserves and he's now a colonel in the inactive reserves.

FARLEY: That's good. It's paid off, I stayed there and made bird, too, so I'm drawing my retirement. Which helps.

CARTER: Yeah, you've got to be 60 though I think, don't you?

FARLEY: Yes.

CARTER: How old are you?

FARLEY: Sixty-nine.

CARTER: Sixty-nine. See you've got me by 10 years. (chuckles)

FARLEY: Sixty-nine in three or four days. Korea we pretty well covered?

CARTER: I think so. The point there is that the commander in chief had three hats: he was the Commander of the UN Forces and he had a staff for that; he was the Commander of U.S. Army Korea, or U.S. Forces Korea, and he had a staff for

that; and he Commander of the 8th Army which was the only operational element in all of this except for the forces put in by the Allies. The 8th Army was the big operational force and that was what I was Chief of Staff of, the 8th Army. But the SIGINT, as I recall, I would occasionally get a briefing from the J-2, not the G-2, the J-2.

FARLEY: Or the SSO.

CARTER: Yeah.

FARLEY: Okay, good.

CARTER: Occasionally, but normally just on – no high level stuff. There may not have been any high level stuff.

FARLEY: Sir, the bottom part of 13. If you can evaluate this or assess it in some way, what was the attitude of the senior military commanders toward COMINT. Did they think it valuable? How did they rate it as compared to other types of collateral intelligence? Could you recall anything?

CARTER: I don't have any knowledge of that, no. The higher up you get in these jobs the more you have to rely on the competence of your staff.

FARLEY: I understand.

CARTER: So I'm really not qualified to answer that.

FARLEY: Just like old Lightning Joe says, he said, "Hell, that wasn't my job. I had a lot of people doing that. They came and told me." (chuckles)

CARTER: Exactly right. So I don't know anything about that.

FARLEY: Did you ever visit ASA Headquarters in Korea during your tour there?

CARTER: I must have if I was giving them support, but I don't recall. It would have just been a casual visit.

FARLEY: Of course.

CARTER: It wasn't until I got into CIA. I think I covered Fort Bliss in the tape that that was just a training establishment and had no operational or command activities with any of the units that was under the Army Air Defense Command which was headquartered here at Colorado Springs. But the training of the units, the basic training of the units and the equipment and a fair amount of research and development and the training of Belgium and German and Japanese troops to whom we were turning over Nike units, that was all done at Fort Bliss and that was my responsibility.

FARLEY: I see. When did Fort Bliss become the Nuclear and Special Weapons Headquarters? That must have been later in the '50s?

CARTER: It was after my time.

FARLEY: It must have been in the mid-'50s.

CARTER: After my time. I didn't know that it was.

FARLEY: I took a course there in '57, Nuclear and Special Weapons.

CARTER: Well, you must have gone up to White Sands.

FARLEY: Well, yes. There were a couple of days of it up there and most of it was classroom in Fort Bliss where they showed

you the "Fat Boy" and the big bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima.

CARTER: Oh, that was at White Sands.

FARLEY: Yeah.

CARTER: When I was there in '61 and '62, I was there just for a year and four months of that I was off in Washington on a special study group, which I think I covered in this tape. I went to establish a command organization for hostilities for the military.

FARLEY: Yes.

CARTER: Yeah, I was vice chairman of that group. And incidentally, in hindsight, I think that Ellsberg was one of the staff officers, staff civilians given to us, and another one was Brockway McMillan, who was an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, later. But at that time he was another civilian whiz kid brought in there as was Ellsberg.

FARLEY: My gosh.

CARTER: I've got some fascinating stories about the Ellsberg business, too.

FARLEY: Okay, good.

CARTER: That was after I retired however. Okay. So I'm down to 15, which is DDCI Number 6. I have no way of confirming that I'll just have to take your word for it.

FARLEY: April '62. I just used this erroneous bit of information that was in that book "*The Rise and Decline of the CIA.*"

CARTER: It's my fault that broke for some reason or other.

I remember Cabell, who was a chairman of the Watch Committee periodically. What was he, four-star Air Force?

Campbell?

Cabell.

Cabell, yeah.

He was a four-star Air?

Yeah.

And was he of the family of the "7-11" Southland Organization? Somebody used to say that he was a millionaire in his own right.

I didn't know that.

Southland, I guess was...

Poor soul is dead now. I had no knowledge of that.

My first acquaintance with you was when you were Chairman of the Watch Committee and periodically you'd come when Ting Sheldon was tied up someplace else. Now this goes back to 1962?

I'd quite often go with Ting. We depended on Ting to be the actual Chairman.

Right. But I remember during the Cuban crisis you were active almost daily, because I guess you were briefing President Kennedy.

The first three or four days of the missile crisis, yes, I was. And I remember you saying that "If anybody has any doubts about Kennedy being in charge, forget 'em." You said, "This guy's in charge." And you said he could absorb

what you briefed and he could make decisions. So you were pretty pleased with him, as I gathered.

CARTER: I was very high on him the whole time. I had good relationships with him.

FARLEY: Sir, I have one question on that. Any thoughts on how you happened to be chosen as DDCI. Was the appointment a surprise or a shock?

CARTER: Well, it developed to where it was not a surprise, but initially it was. If you've got time or are interested in how the hell I ever got to be DDCI...

FARLEY: Absolutely.

CARTER: ...having had no experience in intelligence. They must never have conducted a background investigation on me. This is partly in jest. But I was in command at Fort Bliss and we were very happy with the assignment. I was and so was Mrs. Carter, and we had two children living at home. And General Edelman, who was the Vice Chief of Staff for the Army, came down on an inspection trip. Periodically they'd go into Juarez and buy stuff, you know, Mexican stuff, and come on out and inspect. So he said, "Don't think you're frozen down here because we've got plans to send you to command 5th Army when a decent time has gone by here." So knowing enough about the Army, I just paid no particular attention to that. And then I guess it was November or December of '61, I got a call from Edelman and he said, "Come to Washington. Mr. McCone wants to see you." So I said,

"Who the hell is Mr. McCone?" He said, "Well, he's the new Director of Central Intelligence Agency." You see, after the Bay of Pigs Kennedy felt he had to clean out the top level. And he got rid of Allen Dulles and General Cabell --

FARLEY:

Yes.

CARTER:

...and Bill Bissell, who had been Director of Plans, or DPO or whatever you want to call it. So I went and I had lunch with McCone and talked to him for a couple of hours. He said, "I'm looking for a deputy. I've been looking now six months for a deputy and I can't find anybody I'm interested in," or whatever. I didn't get involved in any of that. I personally didn't get involved in that. Quite frankly, I wasn't interested in it either. But when we got all through, he said, "Don't call me, I'll call you, if I'm interested." So they were having the world's ice hockey championships here in Colorado Springs in February and March and I had been appointed an interim director of the International Ice Hockey Federation. That has been my sport through college and one year of semi-pro, and then always an interest in the intercollegiate ice hockey and interscholastics. So I took leave of absence from Fort Bliss and came on up here and was ensconced at the Broadmoor Hotel. I had a suite with my big Siamese cat and my wife and my younger daughter and living high on the hog. I had been involved in the planning of it. I don't want to drag this out too much.

FARLEY:

No, no, that's fine.

CARTER:

But it's sort of interesting in a way. The East Germans could not get visas from the Allied Control Council to come to play hockey and they would have no part of joining with the West Germans for a combined German team. Somewhat like South and North Korea. So they couldn't get out so the Soviets withdrew and took with them all their satellites. So instead of having 17 teams we had 10 teams. And we went ahead and held them anyway. But meeting of the International Ice Hockey Federation included the principle representatives from the countries that had withdrawn, so the Soviet was there, but no team. So I was asked by the people here to give the denunciatory attack against the Soviets, you see, which I did. Very convincingly, I thought. The next day I got a call from General Edelman and he said, "Come to Washington. The President wants to see you." Well then I knew the fat was in the fire. So I went beating it on in to Washington and spent about 20 minutes to half an hour with President Kennedy *and* with John McCone. And I made it quite clear to them that I had *no* experience in intelligence collection, analysis, or anything like that. I was at heart an administrator and I knew a little bit about management,. I knew something about command of troops. Basically, I was a cheer leader and a Boy Scout Master. This is substantially what I told the President. He looked at McCone and he said, "Maybe that's just what

you need over there." So I didn't even come back here. But the next day it hit the papers "General Carter Appointed Deputy Director CIA." This was in the local newspaper and they say the Soviet was carrying this newspaper around shaking his head all day long. (chuckles)

FARLEY: And he had been dealing with you.

CARTER: Yeah, and he had had no advance information from the KGB that I was even a suspect. That's pretty interesting.

FARLEY: That is, it is.

CARTER: So I went in there around March the 15th and started work right away because there was no question in my mind of my confirmation.

FARLEY: What was the attitude within CIA about the Bay of Pigs fiasco? Was the morale pretty low, people said, "Geez, have we goofed?" Do you recall that at all?

CARTER: Well I came in afterwards.

FARLEY: I understand, but I mean was it prevalent?

CARTER: It was March when I got into there and the Inspector General had completed his report and it had all been blown to hell and gone all over the newspapers and everything. No, the real blame was on the White House staff and President Kennedy as far as CIA was concerned, because Dean Rusk was much at fault. Cabell was much at fault in my opinion because he did not follow through on what he should have done at the time the President called off the air attack. Stevenson was the one who, Adlai

Stevenson our rep at the UN. He was the one who started all the big fuss. It was just an insensitivity to the military requirement that once you make a plan and you get that far committed you'd better by God go all the way through with it, otherwise you've had it. And *that* the President did not realize, and I think he got some bad advice.

FARLEY: Was it the inexperience of his advisors that sort of led him down the wrong path?

CARTER: I think probably some of it was inexperience. Or a feeling that good God we'd better capture what we've got and save our skins and not go any deeper because we're liable to lose a carrier or something like that. I don't know what it was. I did not get involved in the Inspector General's report. I had my own work to do when I got into to CIA.

FARLEY: I understand.

CARTER: So I really don't know. But there's been enough written about the Bay of Pigs.

FARLEY: I know.

CARTER: The crux of it was written in *Fortune Magazine* by one of my dearest friends, who died last year, Charles J.V. Murphy.

FARLEY: Oh, yes.

CARTER: Who was a wonderful guy. He and Jim Angleton and Jim Hunt and I, the four of us would go up into the Adirondacks over the Memorial Day weekend every year. This went on for at least a half-dozen or so years, when I was in NSA and even after I retired.

FARLEY: For trout fishing.

CARTER: And we'd camp out on these little hovels up along the Little Moose River and had a wonderful time.

FARLEY: Great, sounds wonderful.

CARTER: Murphy was...

FARLEY: I don't know the name Murphy.

CARTER: Well, no, he was not a government official.

FARLEY: Oh, I see.

CARTER: He was a colonel, Air Force Reserve. He wrote most of Norstadt's speeches and he was the one who really penetrated what the problem was with the Bay of Pigs and published it. And from that point on he was *persona non grata* with the White House and the whole administrative staff.

FARLEY: I see.

CARTER: He was an associated editor or senior editor of *Time-Life Fortune* for a number of years. A wonderful guy. As a matter of fact, he and Jim Angleton and Jim Hunt have all died, so I'm the sole remaining survivor of that particular safari. have a bottle of brandy from the Prince of Wales' private cellar, the Duke of Windsor, that Charlie Murphy gave me. And I was to pass it on. It was part of the agreement that, if I died first that went to the survivor. Well I've had that the whole time so maybe it's a survival instrument, (chuckles), that I'm not aware of. I haven't uncorked it or anything.

FARLEY: I was just thinking, when you talk about the old Irish joke, remember the old Irish joke, "Don't pour it out of the bottle onto the grave, but filter it a little " (chuckles)

CARTER: Yeah, that's right. Well there's an episode of M*A*S*H. We watch M*A*S*H religiously, and there's an episode there where Colonel Potter is the last survivor of this group from World War I and he gets the message that, and the lawyers have mailed him the bottle of brandy. You may have seen it.

FARLEY: Yes, I have.

CARTER: That was a wonderful episode where he puts on his World War I uniform, calls in his clerk.

FARLEY: "Radar", the Corporal?

CARTER: That's really a tear jerker. I get very sentimental about these things now. I think it's old age or senility.

FARLEY: Yeah. I enjoy them, but some of them seem a little over done. Exaggerated.

CARTER: Oh, sure.

FARLEY: Because I don't remember any of the hospital people acting like that, but then I wasn't in combat with them.

CARTER: Well, I've never been wounded so I don't know. I've been wounded by surgeons, but that was because of something I might have had.

FARLEY: Had General Cabell left by the time you came in? Or did you get a chance to side-saddle with him at all?

CARTER: No, I had no chance to side-saddle. I don't even remember whether he retired, he must have retired then

as a four-star general, but I really don't know. It's probably in that half-assed book, but you'd better check the dates.

FARLEY: Yes, yes.

CARTER: I don't remember any turnover at all.

FARLEY: Let's see what it says. Cabell was relieved. It said resigned as Deputy Director and retired from Air Force effective 31 January '62. So that was three or four months before you came in.

CARTER: Yeah, a couple of months before I came in.

FARLEY: And he died in '71.

CARTER: So McCone was operating obviously without a deputy and he must have been sorely put for some help in order to get me, because as I say, I was not an intelligence officer of any kind. I used the product.

FARLEY: Of course. Was he pretty cordial the first few weeks there? McCone?

CARTER: Yeah. Yeah, he's always cordial. He's always a perfect gentleman. He always does everything that is exactly right in a graceful manner. But quite frankly, I admired the guy. I just have a tremendous admiration for his intellect and his foresight and things like that. But he was not one to delegate. He was not one to handle his staff and staff meetings. There was no rapport, in my view. Now it could well have been my fault. But he was not the kind of guy you could make close friends with. Hell, there's probably 10 years difference there between me

and McCone, too, I don't know. I played golf with him once at Burning Tree. And as soon as he found out that I didn't take the game seriously, I was a pretty fair golfer, I had an eight handicap, but I did not take the game seriously. I never did. I had just gotten recently back from Korea where Orville Moody was our pro and he had trained me for a year, so I had an eight handicap. But when he found out I didn't give a goddamn whether I hit it right or not why I was never invited back. So he's intense, he's a very intense man.

FARLEY: I enjoyed the incident of the "severed hand" bit. How soon after you became Deputy did he board up that door between your office and his office? A couple months was it?

CARTER: I really don't remember. I really don't remember.

FARLEY: I don't have the details.

CARTER: When I got there in CIA the first thing I was confronted with was actions that had been taken by Dulles and Cabell and Bill Bissell to reduce the number of people predominantly in the clandestine services, but across the board. It was a budget cut operation. And they brought in these papers for me to sign. I think there was something like 90 people, and they just wanted me to sign them, because a committee had already decided these were the guys who were going to go. And I said, "Well, I'm sorry. I don't do business that way. I want to see the personal files on all of these and the basis on

which these people are reduced." And the first thing I looked at was the clandestine services and they had to reduce by seven people, as I recall, and all seven of those people came from the training establishment. And I thought, there's something screwy here. And then I found out that, going through the records, the bulk of these people they'd just been forgotten as far as clandestine operations were concerned. They were trainers and they were training at our training establishment, but that was the first cut they made, and that doesn't make sense to me.

FARLEY:

Yes.

CARTER:

So that's when I sent for all of the files. And I'd say for about three weeks I did nothing but analytically review in my own mind the entire records of these personnel, and made up my own determination as to which ones had proven their incompetence, had reached their level of incompetence or had exceeded it probably, and which ones were just sloughed off because they had to make a quota. And I think that let a lot of the people know that I was not going to be merely the military representative in CIA, which Cabell had in large measure been and prior military deputies, too. But I had a background that none of the prior deputies had. I'd been in the State Department for three years dealing 90 per cent with civilian people and that in itself was an experience, but working for General Marshall was still another

experience. Because there was no military camouflage or perslifage, or whatever you want to call it, in General Marshall. And you learn an awful lot by osmosis in working for someone like that. And another one was Carter B. McGruder, who was the Commander in Chief in Korea when I was his Chief of Staff. A very unusual fellow. Enough character to match anybody you could mention and yet a very difficult man to get along with.

FARLEY: My goodness. You don't hear much about him.

CARTER: Well, he died in March. But he was four-star, and he had the happy faculty of scaring the bejesus out of anybody who worked for him. And I had worked for General Marshall and I wasn't scared of anybody.

FARLEY: Number one boy, right.

CARTER: Yes, so we very soon reached an understanding as to whose staff it was. Whether it was his staff or my staff. I convinced him that it was my staff that I was the Chief of Staff, and that if he had any chewing out to do he was to chew me out and not these individual members of the staff who had to present briefings. And anything that comes to you has already been through me, so I'm the guy to chew out. And I got some pretty damn good chewing outs. But at least the staff had an opportunity to do what they were supposed to do and not exert effort trying to figure out what he wanted and then please him. These were youngsters most of them. Young brigadier generals. But he's a hell of a fine officer. I'm very, very high on him.

But he's a hell of a fine officer. I'm very, very high on him. But he just frightened the ass off them.

FARLEY: When you went into the CIA early, were the section chiefs or the high level pretty free with the information? They briefed you thoroughly on what they did and what went on within their respective sections? Did you get a lot of briefings?

CARTER: Who knows?

FARLEY: I guess that's right.

CARTER: McCone had been Director for a fairly long time, I'd say at least six months, before he got me as Deputy. I don't remember exactly when he came in but it was not long after the Bay of Pigs. I have that book at home if it's important. So he had been without a Deputy for some time. And we had staff meetings almost every morning, at least two or three times a week, with senior department heads or office heads, and the only thing you can do is presume that they were laying it on the line to you as the word of Isaiah. I have no knowledge or concern that this was not so. I had total confidence in all of the head people. They had a burden to bear, there was no question about that. And the Inspector General's report was not very favorable, their own Inspector General. The one thing I did do very early on was to convince McCone that he needed a Chief of Staff and if he was going to be off doing something and I had responsibilities at the Congress or at the White House or

Pentagon or wherever as his Deputy or as his acting, that we had to have somebody in control of the agency operating as a Chief of Staff. So the logical one in my mind was [REDACTED] who had been the Inspector General, who had made the Bay of Pigs report. As Inspector General he had visited every one of our overseas installations. He was crippled from the waist down. He had been Bradley's briefing officer during World War II. Outstanding man. Just absolutely superb.

FARLEY:

He talked at the Agency a couple of times in Security Week or one of those events.

CARTER:

Yeah, I guess he did. So McCone went along with that and I talked to Kirk about it and he said, "Well, yes, I'd be happy to do the job, but you've got to have a testicular grip on the activities that they can and cannot do and the only way you can do that is to control the funds." "So," he said, "it would make my job a hell of a lot easier if I were Executive Director and Comptroller." So we did that and it took a hell of a burden off of McCone and me to where we could think much more about the substantive problems that we were faced with rather than operating a big factory like CIA was. In addition, President Kennedy had put out a Directive to McCone, a memorandum to McCone, shortly after I took over saying that he wanted the Deputy to be the General Manager of the Central Intelligence Agency in addition to being DDCI, so that

McCone could spend more time in pulling the community together. I don't think I have a copy of the letter. It went down to the Marshall Foundation, but it's bound to be readily available.

FARLEY:

So that's how you split your responsibility then?

CARTER:

Yeah. McCone was the guy who worked with the President and with Bobby Kennedy and with some of the leadership on the Hill. He was inclined to be intolerant of shabby dealings, and you can't blame him a hell of a lot, because he got more than his fair share of them from politicians and other people. He kept his cool.

FARLEY:

Let me change tapes. We've got one cassette.

TAPE TWO, SIDE ONE

CARTER: I don't want to bore you and I'm being repetitious of some of the interviews I've had.

FARLEY: That's fine. That's better, that's much better that way.

CARTER: Particularly in the early part about General Marshall and the State Department and everything else.

FARLEY: Please do. It's a lot better to check it that way, General Carter, because sometimes we miscue and our transcriber hears something and if you say something later on to confirm or refute the statement it makes it a lot easier. So we're still talking about McCone and the early days at CIA and you're talking about the training...

CARTER: You had asked me about when they put the partition up.

FARLEY: Yes. Right.

CARTER: Well, I don't remember the date. It was fairly early on in my tour. Bear in mind that McCone had been operating without a deputy for at least five or six months. Bear in mind also that I knew absolutely nothing about McCone and he knew nothing about me, except hearsay. So this was not a relationship that had any background. So I came in as Deputy. I had been with General Marshall for three years, I had worked for Dean Acheson, I had worked for Ambassador Louis Douglas, I had worked for McGruder, and I always had total access to them. The geographical configuration of our offices was such that McCone, on the south side of his office, had a secretary

and a special assistant, then his office. Then a little room where you could have lunch if you wanted it brought in. I think adjacent to that was a small sitting room and then there was my office, and then there was my staff of a couple of secretaries and a special assistant. Okay? So his office and my office were separated only by a reception room and a small sitting room. So having worked for these other people where I had direct access anytime I wanted to, directly in to them, usually checking with their secretary to make sure that nobody was already in there. If something came up and I'd go directly into McCone's office this way rather than going out through the hall and through his personal staff. This apparently was the trigger that upset somebody. Now I don't know whether it was McCone, I don't know whether it was Walt Elder, who was his Special Assistant, I don't know whether I did something wrong. I didn't worry about it because I had too goddamned much else to do. But I went out to lunch, I think it was lunch, for a couple of hours and when I came back my door was gone and it was boarded up with a piece of beautiful matching plywood and everything else and the door was no longer there. It may have happened overnight, but depending upon who tells the story. So I thought, well that's pretty evident that...(chuckles)

FARLEY: Not wanted, huh?

CARTER: Certainly not wanted intimately. I didn't waste much time rationalizing it. It was there. I didn't give a goddamn

who did it, whether it was Elder or McCone, the message was quite clear. It was either a breakdown in communications between McCone and Elder. I'm just supposing now I spent maybe half an hour wondering what the hell this was all about. I never could come to any rationalization and I saw no point in pursuing it any further because I had no concerns about it. If he didn't want me as his Deputy all he had to was say, "Hey, Buster, back to the Army." It wouldn't have affected my career at all. So I didn't worry about how it happened or why. But it was fairly early on in my tour there.

FARLEY: And he never explained why?

CARTER: He never mentioned it at all, Elder never mentioned it at all. And as I say, I don't know why. I didn't go out and buy Listerine or anything like that either.

FARLEY: I like the bit about the severed hand. Where you put a plastic hand on where the door used to be.

CARTER: I don't know where I got that, but it was rubber. And it was very, very natural looking with fingernails and so forth and it was just this part of the hand. And there was a little ridge right across the top of the door there and it just sort of stuck there. So as you looked at where the door had been here was this hand sticking out. And I left that there the whole three years I was at CIA. It was right there.

FARLEY: I'll be darned. Did he ever come to your office?

CARTER: He never came to my office except a couple of days before we were closing our shop and he had already resigned. I was wondering what the hell they were going to do to me. And he did come into my office for a minute and he saw that hand, and he did a double take, like that, and didn't say anything. As I recall he didn't say anything at all. (chuckles) But everybody got a big kick out of that.

FARLEY: That's a great story.

CARTER: But as I say somewhere, I think somewhere there was a breakdown in communication and McCone said see if you can't tell General Carter that I'm more interested in having him come in through my front office rather than my back door. That's a possibility. And that Elder, not wanted to tangle with me or start a pissing match between me and McCone or anything else, decided well that was the best way to do it, and then didn't know how to tell me.

FARLEY: Oh, boy.

CARTER: Possibly. But I really don't know. Actually I don't give a damn because it gave me a greater degree of privacy.

FARLEY: But that was the easy way out for him to get off the hook. It's a shame.

CARTER: He could have said, "Look, I've never worked with a Deputy. I've worked through Vice Presidents and I like to know what they want before they come in to see me," and stuff like that, so why don't we do it my way. It never happened.

FARLEY: Did you have to be announced then? The secretary would say, "General Carter is here, Sir," and, "Please come in General Carter."

CARTER: No, I would have my secretary call their secretary and find out if he was busy and if it was pretty hot then I'd just, and there was nobody in there with him or he didn't want to be disturbed for some reason or other, then they'd just say, "Sure, he's waiting for you."

FARLEY: Did he ever mellow at all, become semi-friendly, or pat on the back, this type thing?

CARTER: No, not really. There was never any hostility. There was never any antagonism that I felt. It was just a cold, cold relationship. But it was cold with everybody. He was not a warm "hail-fellow-well-met" or anything like that. He was very much like General Marshall in that regard. General Marshall had a pretty cold front.

FARLEY: I've always heard that it was because General Marshall was a shy person basically and this was his way of sort of holding people off. You know him 20 times better than anybody else.

CARTER: Well, he had very few intimate friends. Most people were scared to death of him. In some regard I was unique, I think, as an assistant, because I'd been raised in the atmosphere of generals, and had been born and raised in the military and I had a perfectly beautiful, charming, very compassionate wife who had been raised the same way

and rank didn't frighten us. It has a tendency to frighten some people, a lot of people.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: General Marshall and I were very close, but it was purely an assistant relationship to a fellow who had tremendous burdens and I was there to try to relieve some of them, some of the details and things. We fished together and we hunted together with the President of France on one of his big pheasant hunts, two of his big pheasant hunts. We fished together out at Harriman's place in Sun Valley, Idaho, General Marshall and I. You pass a certain stage in fly fishing where you think you're an expert and anybody who doesn't do it your way isn't really with it.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: General Marshall and I had a lot of fun kidding each other, because he was not a good fisherman. He was enthusiastic, but he didn't have the techniques down. Once you get the technique down you think you're a goddamn expert. Not realizing that the fish is the one that has the first option. He's the one who has to make up his mind.

FARLEY: I only had one experience with General Marshall and I was a code clerk, as I told you, at War Munitions Building working the SIGABA. He came in one day with a message and handed it to me and I was working the SIGABA and I set up the rotors and started typing it and it's in cipher and you type each letter and it comes out in English. And

I was typing away and I looked over to see what it said to make sure it was coming in clear and he said, "Type, don't read." (chuckles)

CARTER: Yeah, that's General Marshall.

FARLEY: "Yes, Sir." "Type, don't read."

CARTER: No, I had as good a relationship with McCone as anybody in the agency, I think. With the possible exception of Walt Elder who was his special assistant who was sitting outside his office and doing all of the things that I had done for General Marshall, and trying to relieve McCone of many of the burdens of being DCI.

FARLEY: What was McCone's attitude toward COMINT, NSA, ELINT, that kind of intelligence as compared with the intelligence that you people at CIA were developing? Did he have any respect for NSA at all?

CARTER: He had tremendous respect for their product and he read it avidly and I'm sure it had a very real effect on his judgments in the intelligence analysis operation. In fact, most of the people that I ran into in CIA who had access to this had the same relationship toward NSA on the *product*. I had a feeling that developed while I was in CIA, particularly about the last year, that NSA had a capacity for providing intelligence which we in the intelligence community were not utilizing properly. Now this may be self-serving and in fact it is quite self-serving. I felt very little force in the attitude of the Director of NSA as to getting NSA involved in the actual development of

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finished product. They would provide the stuff and say, here it is, this is what we have. But there must have been behind that somebody saying, "Hey, this is pretty goddamned important because of this and that and this and that that I happen to know and this had better get into US IB, U.S. intelligence board, right now!" Now that judgment came from the analysts who were reading the product and I felt, somewhere I felt or maybe this is just abundant hindsight now to justify what I did after I got to NSA. I felt there was an asset there in the intelligence community that we weren't utilizing. And that it was probably caused, and here I am really Monday morning quarterbacking, probably caused by a feeling on the part of CIA that they had their hands on everything and therefore this was one input to their analytical process, but they had so much else, that it was their field of operations.

FARLEY:

Sir, there was an involvement on the part of General Carroll from DIA who said, "NSA, you're a producer of raw material, we are the analysts and we prepare the finished product," the final product. You remember that, too?

CARTER:

That is true, but they also, they pulled a blooper on that one, too. It was DIA. You mentioned CIA. The only one I remember was DIA. DIA started out behind the eightball. I don't think they ever got out from behind it. I'm not sure how they stand now, but when I was there --How do you put it? I'm not thinking about the machine now I'm

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thinking about what my relationships were. The DIA tendency seemed to be more oriented toward military aspects without the depth on the political international aspects of the product, the finished product. That's understandable because they didn't have, when I was there, the continuity that CIA had. You had military people coming in and out for two or three years, probably unhappy for being there in the first place. They did not have the depth of *civilian* continuity that I was used to in State Department and also in the Department of Defense, to some extent. So I felt DIA did not have the competence to really put an input into anything other than the military side of it. Now this could have been dead wrong. But there were constant faceoffs, because CIA analytical processes did not agree with DIA in a number of instances.

FARLEY:

Right.

CARTER:

Particularly when you got down to the level and the nitty gritty of how many of what you have where and when. That sort of thing. That was my gut feeling. I could barely tolerate Roger Hillsman who was the State Department representative. I'm reverting now to US IB. I felt he had only Roger Hillsman's interests at heart. I had great admiration for the Atomic Energy rep and the FBI rep. These were in my days on US IB and of course, you remember when I went to NSA I was still on USIB.

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FARLEY:

Yes.

CARTER: So I had seven and a half years of sitting on US IB. The Bureau fellow was Sullivan, the one I remember best and I was very high on him. I think he was the one who finally tangled with J. Edgar. And Sullivan was later killed in a hunting accident.

FARLEY: Oh, my.

CARTER: Hillsman was total anathema to me and I just don't know why. It may have been his attitude more than anything else.

FARLEY: He was a peculiar individual .

CARTER: Yeah. And it turned out later of course he was the guy who drafted the message that was sent to Lodge over that weekend and which I raised hell about. I was Acting Director at the time. I raised pluperfect hell about that. And I telephoned McCone, who was on the west coast I think for the funeral of his stepson who was an automobile race driver and was killed, but he was out there, and said, "For God's sake come home. You won't believe what has happened."

FARLEY: Is that when Lodge made it public, too? Made the message public?

CARTER: No, this was later. This was when Lodge, when the message was sent to Lodge and we were only given an info copy.

FARLEY: Oh, gosh.

CARTER: And it was never coordinated with anybody in CIA. It was Roger Hillsman, Harriman I think signed off on it, and I

think Mike Forrestal. Mike Forrestal who was working in the White House. It was never cleared with the President until after-the-fact and it, in effect, told Lodge, "We're prepared to go ahead and support a military coup."

FARLEY: In Vietnam?

CARTER: In Vietnam. In Vietnam.

FARLEY: That was one question somebody asked me to ask you. To discuss the preparation, the discussion in the Agency on the assassination of Diem. How involved was that? Was it a long involved discussion as to whether the answer would be 'get him' or 'let him live.'

CARTER: No, no, the assassination part of it came strictly unbeknownst to anybody that we were that aware of. This was handled indigenously by the troops who had him in custody.

FARLEY: Okay.

CARTER: The South Vietmanese troops.

FARLEY: I see.

CARTER: Now, it could well have been directed by Big Minh, who was the guy who they were trying to take over. We had a guy over there named [redacted] CIA [redacted] He was intimate. He spoke the language and he knew Diem and Chou and Big Minh and all the rest of them. He was a CIA type. I think a lieutenant colonel undercover. And he was terribly upset when this thing happened and Lodge was just acting on what he interpreted as instructions. McGeorge Bundy was one of the guys who was behind

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this, I'm quite sure. Because McCone called him up after getting my frantic call, from *me*, saying, "For God's sake come back, they really screwed it up this time." McCone called McGeorge Bundy and McGeorge Bundy said, "No, we've talked to Dean Rusk and he says there's nothing to get upset about. These are just messages to Lodge and you can take care of it when you get back." Well, that wasn't the way it worked in Vietnam. They started acting on that immediately.

FARLEY: Okay. There's a new book out on CIA, and I don't have the title right now, that somebody was reading and there was a reference to "blessing by CIA" for the assassination of Diem. Again, I can't give you anymore detail, General Carter, but it looked curious to me.

CARTER: No, that doesn't make sense to me.

FARLEY: No, good.

CARTER: No, because Big Minh and Nhu, I mean Diem and Nhu. We're talking about Diem and Nhu, they were in custody. They had left the palace. They were supposed to be taken into protective custody. Now from that point on I'm absolutely certain the U.S.A. was not involved. But it's possible. I say I'm certain, but I don't know.

FARLEY: Okay.

CARTER: I know Lodge would not be. I know our people would not be. It's possible that Big Minh, who would be the takeover chief. See there were two attempts. One fell flat early on and then the second one. It's possible that

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this fellow Coseen or something like that might have said something to Big Minh, but I know of nothing in the record that would indicate in any way that we were involved in their assassination. But their mere overthrow was the tragedy. That was a sad day for the United States.

FARLEY: Absolutely.

CARTER: When they went down that road. And I say I think Roger Hillsman was really the culprit on the whole damn thing. Because it sure switched our relationships around almost immediately with the South Vietmanese and you had something. When you have something that's in control, reasonably in control, rather than go "balls out "and change it you'd better try to make the best of what you've got, is my feeling, until it gets to the point of no return at which time natural forces other than your own will take care of the situation. That's a sort of philosophy that I've developed.

FARLEY: Absolutely.

CARTER: If you can't do something about it -- Well that's the philosophy I use right now when I read the newspaper, if you can't do something about it forget it. (chuckles) Life's too short to be going around worrying about things.

FARLEY: That's bloody well right.

CARTER: There's a couple of groups, one group in this club who meets once a week to discuss the world situation. A retarded, a fully retarded four-star Air Force General, a

retarded allergist (I say retarded in lieu of retired). They're over age in grade. They've already passed their level of incompetence. They sit there and they worry all throughout lunch and for hours after about, "God what the hell are we going to do about the Persian Gulf?" Well, there's not a goddamned thing they can do about the Persian Gulf, so why not worry about what fly you're going to put on your trout rod the next time you're out there and what the weather conditions are going to be.

FARLEY: Something over which you have some control. Right?

CARTER: That's my philosophy, yeah.

FARLEY: Well, let's see. There was some controversy, and I don't know whether this was during your time at CIA or not, where CIA wanted NSA to put a certain indicator on product that they produced that was generated from Third Party. Some sort of an identifier so that you people could recognize who was producing the most and where the money was being profitably used. And I think you were involved in some correspondence between NSA and CIA. And I know [redacted] was. I saw a couple of memos, and I think NSA never did do what the CIA wanted. Do you remember anything at all about this?

CARTER: I remember two things along that line. In addition to the day to day heckling from O'Gara, who fancied himself, I felt, as the Director of NSA, and we shouldn't do anything without clearing it with him. Forget about that, I handled that all right. There were two cases which border on what

you said. I felt there was an effort. I'm now in NSA, you understand.

FARLEY:

Yes, Sir.

CARTER:

It was an effort on CIA to do our targeting for us, and I felt that we had greater competence in determining the degree of effort to put on any particular target than they had, in telling us the degree of effort or the kind of effort within our competence. I felt that it was not in their province. I felt that we should get our guidance from US IB and not from the lower levels in CIA. I think

was probably involved in this as a result of the Watch Committee. I don't recall the business of putting a special designator, but it would be logical for us to raise our hackles at NSA as that being a part of our business and not theirs. And I can well understand and I would have gone along with a staff recommendation against that. Even now I would go along with that. I don't remember the specific incidents.

FARLEY:

I think that's what happened. CIA was turned down and the identifier was not incorporated into the heading of the product.

CARTER:

Well, that would be my reaction right now based on how I was running it 20 years ago.

FARLEY:

Yes, right.

CARTER:

Another thing that arose at that time was, I think this was the time when Fubini was trying to make a lot of moves to get control of NSA and do this same thing. Get involved

in the targeting. I couldn't trust him as far as I could throw this whole goddamned club. I had absolutely no faith or confidence in him and it's just possible he might have gone through a CIA contact to see if he couldn't accomplish his ends by their means.

FARLEY:

I see.

CARTER:

That's still talking about this special designator. There was an instance where we had put out some excellent analytical intelligence on a product that we had developed. We put that out through our normal channels without NSA heading or anything like that or any way of identifying this as a total analytical thing. But the job was done so well in NSA that DIA, I'm quite sure, the DIA published that under their own coversheet...

FARLEY:

They did that.

CARTER:

...without any designation whatsoever where the product came from. And as I remember, I had a staff meeting of a few guys and said "What the hell are we going to do. Are we going to start a pissing match and maybe have Fubini and everybody get into the act? Or are we going to ignore it?" Well, rather than ignore it, there was a ---? Humphrey was Vice President and he had a Special Assistant who was a hell of a good friend of mine. I've forgotten his name now, he's since dead. But I told him that we had produced this thing and the Vice President really ought to see it. So he got a copy of it and he showed it to Humphrey and in a few days we got a letter

from Humphrey to me, which did not identify the document, but he said "I just want you to know" (there's a record and it's bound to be in the file) "I just want you to know that I greatly admire the activities that your Agency is doing and the manner in which they're being produced. And while you may not get credit for such things from a lot of people I want you to know that I know the source and am proud of you guys." This sort of thing.

FARLEY: That's great.

CARTER: That's all in the record someplace.

FARLEY: Good. DIA was notorious for taking somebody else's report and putting their coversheet on it.

CARTER: Well they sure did it on this one and it pissed me off quite frankly.

FARLEY: Yeah, they've done that frequently.

CARTER: Well this one really got to me, because it was a hell of a good job on a very critical thing.

FARLEY: Sir, do you remember your first few months at CIA? What was the immediate crisis that faced you? International crisis or agency crisis?

CARTER: Well, I went in there in March. I started working on the 15th of March, I was confirmed on the 2nd of April. I keep going back to the funny things.

FARLEY: No, that's fine. That's great.

CARTER: I was appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee for confirmation and in my opening

statement, which was very short, just biographical, I had a final sentence. "Anticipating the desires of the committee, I have divested myself of all stocks in companies which could possibly have any bearing among governmental activities," words to that effect put in by [redacted] who was our legal advisor. So I read that off and Senator Saltonstall said, "General," he said, "what kind of stock did you have to divest yourself of?" And I said, "General Electric, Mr. Senator." And he said, "Oh, yes, I can understand that. How many shares did you have?" I said, "Five." (laughter)

FARLEY: Broke them up, huh?

CARTER: This was a closed session and it just broke them all up. And Senator Saltonstall said, "Well, I think that's overdoing the cooking." He said, "I doubt if your holdings in General Electric would have any bearing on your activities with regards to General Electric." I said, "Well, I think so, too." (laughter) But I'd already sold them.

FARLEY: Great.

CARTER: But it just about broke up the goddamned meeting. And with that my confirmation went through.

FARLEY: Big shareholder.

CARTER: Crises, crises, February, or March, April.

FARLEY: It was before the Cuban crisis.

CARTER: Yeah. I was thinking, most of my crises were internal and they weren't crises. There was some distaste for putting

[redacted] in as Executive Director Comptroller with the clandestine services, because he had been the Inspector General and had written the report which was derogatory primarily because of the lack of communication between the intelligence side of CIA and the operational side of CIA. And the operational side which was conducting the Bay of Pigs was writing their own intelligence estimates. Now that was the crunch in not going to the intelligence side and getting the analytical interpretation of what the situation really was in Cuba. That was a CIA mistake, big mistake I think, that was made at the time. So the clandestine services were not very happy about [redacted] in. However, we pushed it through.

FARLEY:

Did he work out?

CARTER:

Oh, yeah, worked out beautifully, worked out beautifully. Being Comptroller was one of the things. There was no crisis involved in the rubber hand or the replacement of the door.

FARLEY:

Problems with State during that period or with your background and your former assignment?

CARTER:

No, I don't remember any problems. Oh, the usual arguments and things that went on in USIB.

FARLEY:

Oh, yeah.

CARTER:

And I think Roger Hillsman was the guy who was the State INR type when I started out in CIA. He was later replaced. My timing may be wrong this may be after I was in NSA. State Department INR fellow was replaced by Tom

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Hughes who was much more of an intellectual, much nicer guy to operate with. Smooth operator.

FARLEY: I remember him. Were you on USIB when Admiral Frost sat in? When he was Director before General Blake?

CARTER: If I was I don't recall it.

FARLEY: I was just curious about his participation.

CARTER: I notice in the book the *Puzzle Palace* he is mentioned as having commented something about NSA being a turner-outer of raw information, or something like and not being analytical.

FARLEY: He was a nice fellow, but he could be kind of mean.

CARTER: He was?

FARLEY: He was, right. He used to chew me out every Monday. I knew I was going to get chewed out on one item I was briefing on, and I knew, one of these he'll hit me on. One time I briefed on a penetration flight of the Soviet into Turkey and my coverslide slipped down and it looked like it was a complete penetration. And he jumped up and he started running and I said, "Wait, wait, Admiral, wait, wait." (chuckles) Anyway, that's an aside. Shall we talk about the Cuban crisis? Are we up to that point now?

CARTER: I guess so. I haven't looked at this sheet. I may have some notes here on CIA.

FARLEY: I'm up to about 23. ((#23- Shall we discuss the Cuban crisis?))

CARTER: Where are we down to?

FARLEY: Twenty-three.

CARTER:

Fifteen. I told you how I got to be appointed. "Was the appointment a surprise?" I'm on 15 now. I have a few notes here. "Was the appointment a surprise or a shock?" Not after the initial call in to talk to McCone. I didn't expect it but it didn't scare me. Now I can say unequivocally that in no way did I seek or want the appointment. Because I could see it was down an entirely different chain of command and career management for which I felt myself ill-equipped. But I had operated at that cabinet level having to brief Truman and everything like that. I brought some assets into CIA that Cabell and other people had not had and that was the associations at that level of government and particularly on the Hill. So I wasn't afraid of the job. "Was this your first total immersion?" It sure as hell was. I got my ass whipped from the first day on. Did not have a chance to work with Cabell at all. "Relationship with McCone?" As far as I know throughout the three years were adequate. Adequate is about the good word. But he wasn't the type that made close friends or buddies or anything like that. Door incident, we covered. I haven't the slightest idea why he didn't want me in there, except it wasn't the way he operated. So there was a breakdown somewhere in communication. I never heard of John Ranelagh's book *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA*. I've never seen that book, and that's the one that mentions the severed hand incident?

FARLEY: Yes, Sir.

CARTER: I wonder where he got that from because he never interviewed me.

FARLEY: I don't know. I don't know. But it was described in there.

CARTER: Was it really? I'll have to see if that book's available. "Did McCone ever mellow?" No, not to my knowledge. He had an unfortunate life. He had lost his wife in December of '61 and subsequently three or four months after I had come on board, probably six months after he lost his wife, he remarried, an old schoolmate. I can't think of her name right now, but the two families have been intimate friends for many many years. And he married the widow of his very close friend. He being a widower, of course. They were off on their honeymoon in Europe for part of the time when the Cuban missile crisis was developing. This was in '62.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: We kept him advised of the general situation, not alone on Cuba but on international affairs, as I recall, by periodic message. And it's absolutely amazing. We were reporting the development of the SA2 anti-aircraft missiles that were being placed in Cuba.

FARLEY: Oh, yeah.

CARTER: And that was part of the intelligence problems that I was faced with. I was looking to the National Estimates Operations under for my guidance. But I probably should have known better myself, if I'd had the

time to sit down and analyze it being an anti-aircraft officer at heart, but it completely missed me. It completely missed everybody in the agency. And McCone sent a message just saying, "Look, you guys, these things are hiding something." The SA2s. "They're preventing intrusion to protect something. Now what the hell is it?" I didn't see it. Nobody in Sherm Kent's office, National Estimates, picked this up, although we were having all kinds of agent reports. Do you want to change it?

FARLEY: Yes, please.

TAPE TWO, SIDE TWO

FARLEY: Good. There were a lot of agent reports?

CARTER: Oh, a lot of agent reports coming in about missiles of various types. But not accurate enough for us to make any judgments. The weather had been lousy for about three weeks and our U2 coverage was very, very sporadic. In addition, the SA2 sites were becoming more and more operational and Dean Rusk and McGeorge Bundy got this very deep concern -- "Well suppose Cuba shoots down one of our U2s. What are we going to do about it?" Now there was a National Reconnaissance Office under a Colonel or Brigadier General Lansdale, I think, who had killed a Huk or something in the Philippines long before and built a reputation around the way he had handled it. But it was either monthly or weekly that they came up

with their proposed coverage for overhead surveillance and that had to be cleared with Rusk and McGeorge Bundy. And they got this deep concern that a U2 might be shot down and then what would they do. The net result being, here are Dean Rusk and McGeorge Bundy sitting with a map tracing these U2 flights, scheduled flights, to avoid any possibility of being shot down by the SA2s. In other words, out of range of SA2s which was an impossible situation. And the weather being lousy. We went for quite a while, I'd say two or three weeks, without any overhead coverage at all. We finally scheduled a flight and had it approved. I think this is all a matter of record, because CIA was flying these U2s. And this flight was approved and the internal political machinations between CIA, running the U2s, and the Air Forces wanting to get into the act were such that Gilpatrick, who was Under Secretary of the Air Force I believe, went to McGeorge Bundy and said, "You're not going to get anything." I'm presuming now, I'm assuming now, he said, "CIA isn't delivering the stuff. You'd better let the Air Forces fly the mission." So the first word I got was, from Gilpatrick, that they'd changed the operators and Air Force would fly this U2 mission. And I said, "Wait a minute, Mac, these are clandestine operations. They are designed for deniability. These pilots are sheppardipped." This was long after Gary Powers, you know.

FARLEY:

Yes.

CARTER: Everybody knew we had the U2. There wasn't anything really to be excited about. But if you want to maintain deniability you'd better not get involved with the Air Forces. Because these pilots are civilian pilots and they're off course on weather missions. You know, the same old crap, pure crap. But for the great unwashed Saudi Arabian or somebody that made sense. Geez, the poor bastard got lost in his aircraft and they shot him down. (chuckles) You know, that's the thing. Same thing we went through with Powers. I said, if you're prepared to admit that this is overt reconnaissance over a nation then that's the President's decision, but I think the President ought to know about it. He said, "Well, I'll call you back." I don't know whether he took any action or not, but he called back in a little while and said, "Well the Air Forces will fly that mission." The mission was scheduled for the next day flying out of a field in Florida. I've forgotten the name of the field, Patrick or something, but a well known field.

FARLEY: It's farther south than that. It's near Pensacola.

CARTER: Yeah, somewhere around there.

FARLEY: Homestead?

CARTER: Maybe it was Homestead. Anyway, so geez, right away six senior officers of the Air Force get in their jets and fly into the field. We turned over the charts and the airplane and everything else to them. Bear in mind, the Air Force had some U2s. They were the U2A, the first model. We then

were flying U2Hs which we had improved throughout the years. Nevertheless the Air Force flew the mission. They did not follow the courses that had been approved by NRO and Bundy or anything. They got well off course and got lost but their photography clearly showed the signature of a Soviet medium ballistic missile site in a fair state of communication. I'm sure this has all been made public. But in any event, it was interesting to me and that's when the President was at Hyannisport and Art Lundahl was our Director of NPIC, National Photo Interpretation Center. He called me up right away and said they spotted these things. Now somewhere along here I've lost sight. I don't know whether Art came to my house or whether he came to General Taylor's house. General Max Taylor lived at Fort McNair and I lived at Fort McNair. And we were having dinner there that night. This was, I think, a Sunday night, may have been a Monday. Sunday, I guess. And somehow we got together with Art Lundahl at General Taylor's house, and Alexis Johnson was there. He was Assistant Secretary of State or Under Secretary. And we looked at the pornography and everything. Obviously the President had to get involved. And I'm not quite sure about it, but I think that's the night that I called McGeorge Bundy to set up an appointment with the President.

FARLEY:

Now McCone was gone during this time, wasn't he?

CARTER: McCone was gone. He was still over in Europe, yes. I had quite a discussion with McGeorge Bundy in that sort of stupid language that we used which didn't cover anything at all. Like the "bearded man" from that island on the south of us. We intercepted that in NSA if you remember.

FARLEY: I do. I do.

CARTER: That was an airplane discussion. Anyway, I talked to Bundy at least 10 minutes on the phone and said we set up a meeting and so forth and so forth, as soon as possible. And the next morning I called up Bundy and said, "When's the meeting set up for?" And he said, "What meeting?"

FARLEY: Oh, boy.

CARTER: And he had totally failed either to understand it or comprehend it or make a note of it. And he said, "You didn't talk to me last night." I said, "You'd better check the White House." I made all my calls through the White House operator. Here it was all right down there in black and white.

FARLEY: That had a memory or just wasn't paying attention?

CARTER: Well, something else was on his mind I suppose, I have no knowledge of what it might have been. Sometimes it's a blonde, sometimes it's liquor, sometimes it's just plain sleep. Anyway, he set the meeting up but the President had to come down from Hyannisport. So, as I recall, it wasn't until Tuesday. At least it was quite a delay there before the meeting could be set up. And McCone was still

overseas. It was unmistakably a direct image of the Soviet installations that we already knew. The same signatures on the photographs that we already had verified other places. I put on a short briefing, as I recall, and Lundahl put the comparative photographs up there. This was a very special meeting. There couldn't have been more than 10 or 12 people at the most in there.

FARLEY: At the White House?

CARTER: At the White House, in the Oval Room, and the President was there. Johnson was there, Vice President Johnson; McNamara; Dean Rusk; McGeorge Bundy; three or four other guys; probably Bobby was there. And they talked and they talked about it. I won't get involved in all of that because about two days later I dropped out of the picture because McCone came back, you see.

FARLEY: Was there some difference? Somewhere they said you had a double problem during McCone's absence on his honeymoon, because he had already provided information to Kennedy and you were stuck with running the agency, keeping abreast of new developments and briefing the President on the critical situation in Cuba.

CARTER: Yeah.

FARLEY: Was there any difference of opinion on the part of McCone telling the President something and then you giving the President the real facts?

CARTER: I don't know what McCone said to the President.

FARLEY: Okay, that was your double problem.

CARTER: I have absolutely no idea. When I read this I said, "Christ I don't know a damn thing about this." See, McCone was a pretty taciturn type and he kept a lot of things to himself. If it was something critical I should think he would have told me about it.

FARLEY: It was something to do with the scheduling of U2s, as I remember. That he wanted more of them and somebody else said we don't want to send one and he persisted and eventually three weeks later was able to get a U2 flight in there. Do you remember anything like that?

CARTER: No, because the critical U2 flight was the one that showed the signature. The one I told you about, and the ones which Gilpatrick had worked on McGeorge Bundy, and that was an overt operation. I mean they were prepared to accept the fact. McCone wasn't in that act at all unless he some sort of an agreement with Gilpatrick before he went overseas. Because the weather was stinking.

FARLEY: Yes.

CARTER: There's no use taking a risk unless you can get some pornography out of it. No use flying above the clouds.

FARLEY: Correct.

CARTER: Anyway, I had one very interesting thing, if you've got time.

FARLEY: Lots of time, Sir.

CARTER: I've never seen this surfaced anywhere. After this discussion at the opening meeting, President Kennedy turned to me and he said, "I want you to continue all of

your technical operations to verify and improve the intelligence on this." But he said, "Don't make any reports except to me and I will call a meeting when necessary." Words to this effect. As I recall. And then he turned to everybody and he said, "Now I don't want a word of this breathed outside of this room to anybody, because if it once leaks we'll have everybody in the world telling us what to do about it. And I can't risk the chance of being influenced by outside pressures this way, that way. I'll get enough of them from you guys. Until I've made the decision of what we're going to do about it and how we go about doing something about it." Everybody nodded their heads and went on out. So I'm going home in the car, my car, back to the agency at Langley, and when I get there my secretary says, "Senator Russell wants you to call him." So I called Senator Russell and he said, "Carter, I haven't seen much of you lately and neither has the Committee, but I wonder if you could come up and talk to me this afternoon and tell me what's going on around the world. Just me alone." So I said, "Yes, Sir, I'd be happy to be there. What time?" And he said, "Two o'clock would be fine." I said, "I'll be there." So I called McGeorge Bundy and said, "Hey, you heard what the President said, now I've got this problem with Senator Russell, he wants a briefing around the world." Bundy said, "Well, you heard what the President said. Now you're going have to punt." And I said, "Well, wait just a

goddamned minute. He's Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, he's on the Foreign Relations Committee, he controls my budget, and there's just no way I can go up there and punt *if this subject comes up*. I might be able to hint around, but there's just no way." And he said, "Well, you'd better by god do what the President told us or your ass is in a first class jam." And I said, "Well, that's not good enough for me Mac, you get it directly from the President." He said, "No, I'm not going to bother the President." And I said, "Okay, suit yourself." So I go up there and I take the pornography with me, and I go into Russell's office and he said, "Sit down General." He said, "Tell me. Are there any offensive Soviet missiles in Cuba?" Just like that.

FARLEY: I'll be darned.

CARTER: I said, "Yes, Sir, there are and I briefed the President on them this morning." I showed him exactly what we did and I started to give him the short briefing that I had given the President. But here's the photographs right here, you see. So the secretary buzzes Russell and says, "Sir, the President wants to talk to you." And all I hear is Russell. He says, "Yes, Sir. Yes, Mr. President. Yes. Oh that's very thoughtful of you. Yes. Thank you so much. Yes, he's here right now and Carter's briefing me on the problem. Thank you so much."

FARLEY: Oh, boy.

CARTER: And he hung up. Then I finished my briefing and he said, "Thank you very much." And I said, I did say, "I know it's not necessary to tell you, Mr. Senator, but I think I must that this information is being held very very closely." He said, "Yes, I understand. The President told me."

FARLEY: Well, good.

CARTER: So I go back. We're now much later. President Kennedy's been assassinated. Okay, another whole year, and I find out that immediately after that meeting Vice President Johnson got in his car, went directly up to the Hill, and briefed Russell on the whole operation.

FARLEY: Is that right?

CARTER: Now can you imagine punting?

FARLEY: No. With a situation like that?

CARTER: On the tenth down and 40 yards to go?

FARLEY: Oh, gad.

CARTER: But that's why I had no confidence in McGeorge Bundy.

FARLEY: You were right on the spot. Really.

CARTER: Oh, yeah, right in the middle.

FARLEY: The bull's eye.

CARTER: But I'll tell you. It paid off. It paid off, because about two months later, three months later, Senator Fulbright — this is after the Cuban missile crisis — Senator Fulbright, he's Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, calls up and he said, "General," — McCone again was out of town. About 23 percent of the time, according to my secretary who kept a log for some reason, I was the Acting

Director. Again, I was the Acting Director. Fulbright called up and said, "General, I'd like to start a series of briefings with CIA so that the Foreign Relations Committee will know what's going on." And I said, "Yes, Sir." And he said, "When would be convenient?" And I said, "Whatever suits your pleasure, Mr. Senator." And he said, "Well how about about two o'clock tomorrow afternoon." I said, "Yes, Sir, that will be fine." I immediately called up Russell's office and I said, "Senator Russell, I just want you to know as a matter of information I've had a call from Senator Fulbright and he wants to set up some briefings between CIA and his Foreign Relations Committee on the world situation." And Russell says, "Boy," (he always said 'boy') "Boy, I wouldn't worry about that if I were you. I don't think you're going to hear another word about it." And I said, "Thank you, Sir." About half an hour later I get a call from Fulbright's special assistant or chief clerk or something, who said, "Well about that meeting that Senator Fulbright set up for tomorrow afternoon, something much more important has come up and we've had to postpone that. We'll get back at you later on." And I said, "Thank you very much." Now I tell that as an example of how in those days there was leadership in the Congress. They not only protected their own turf, but they made damned sure that other people weren't infringing on their responsibilities for no purpose. The State Department

was responsible for giving intelligence briefings to the Foreign Affairs Committees through their INR.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: Not CIA. And Russell wasn't about to let the Foreign Relations Committees get in on his turf. He was Armed Services Committee and Appropriations Committee, those two. So I think I may have mentioned him as on the Foreign Affairs Committee, but he wasn't he was Appropriations and Armed Services. Which were the two Committees of each side that were supposed to over look our activities. But that's how close you can come to major disaster if you try to mess around. You don't manipulate. You can't manipulate the leadership of the Congress by obfuscating issues or not leveling with them.

FARLEY: There's a pecking order there, too, for sure.

CARTER: You're damned right there is, there was I don't whether there is any more. I think the outfit's gone hogwild on both sides. And when you think that Senator Wright is just two breaths away from being President of the United States, you've got something to worry about, boy, I'm telling you.

FARLEY: I know. It's tragic, tragic.

CARTER: What time's it getting to be?

FARLEY: I've got a quarter after 11. Let's see, we're talking about the first indication of the Soviet activity in Cuba preliminary to the arrival of missiles in the country. Do you remember receiving, way back when, a message

indicating the presence of a Soviet general from the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces? This is one of the first indications that we had at NSA that something was amiss in the country. Do you remember seeing that?

CARTER: I would hope I had seen it if it came into NSA and they showed it to me. But I would have been in CIA at the time, obviously, but it didn't light up any lights.

FARLEY: Okay. Do you remember the shutdown of Major Anderson?

CARTER: Yeah.

FARLEY: Do you remember that one? Do you have any thoughts or recollections of that incident? Or maybe there's something else we should cover before that. Later intelligence contradict or confirm what McCone had earlier, or told the President?

CARTER: I have no idea whether he told the President or not, so I don't know. I don't know of any reaction from President Kennedy on the SIGINT. His source for that would have been from Bundy rather than from us, and whether Bundy talked to him about it or not I don't know. There's been a very dangerous precedent established by having, I think a dangerous precedent, by having a National Security Advisor to the President.

FARLEY: Oh, yes.

CARTER: With the powers that he has and the day-to-day contact. It's extremely dangerous. It was never intended to have a National Security Advisor of that form.

FARLEY: Very powerful man.

CARTER: The National Security Advisor was supposed to be a sort of an Executive Secretary for the National Security Council to ensure that before they settled in on discussing something everybody had had an input like an Executive Secretariat. That was the basic concept initially of the National Security Advisor. They didn't even call him an advisor. And the staff of the National Security Council, and the Council with a very small operation. But it's expanded here to where you not only have a Chief of Staff of the White House you've got a National Security Advisor. And you didn't have either of those, President Truman didn't have anything like this.

FARLEY: He didn't need one. (chuckles)

CARTER: He didn't need one. He had Matt Connelly as his Appointments Secretary. He had General Vaughn, who was playing around the fringes at everything without having a very good idea of what the hell he was doing. He had Clark Clifford, yeah, Clark Clifford.

FARLEY: Who is still around.

CARTER: Yeah, still around and still a phony, playing around the edges. But when he wanted the word of Isaiah he called his cabinet officers in. He used his cabinet officers, General Marshall, Dean Acheson, Stimpson, during the war, those people. There wasn't any Harry Hopkins around then.

FARLEY: No.

CARTER: And it's gradually expanded to where the President's up here in a hollow globe no matter who it is depending upon two or three people giving him the final word of Isaiah.

FARLEY: Yeah. It's a shame.

CARTER: It's dangerous. To me it's extremely dangerous.

FARLEY: Was Bundy a son-in-law of Acheson? Or what was the relationship there?

CARTER: I think Bill Bundy, his brother, who's okay, was married to Acheson's daughter. I'm not sure.

FARLEY: I think that's true.

CARTER: Wait. Drew Pearson gets into the act, too. I think Drew Pearson was married to Acheson's sister or something. Some relationship like that. (chuckles)

FARLEY: They had some good channels. A question on how valuable was SIGINT during the Cuban crisis? Was it of use at all? I remember, again, the Watch Committee and you used to say, "Well this is a good paragraph but sex it up a little bit so the President will understand it."

CARTER: I did used to say that? (chuckles)

FARLEY: "Sex it up."

CARTER: Thanks. Yeah, that was a phrase of mine.

FARLEY: "Sex it up."

CARTER: I don't know. Are you down to 26? ((#26-Did your relationship with McNamara improve or worsen during and following the missile crisis?))

FARLEY: Yes, Sir.

CARTER: I never had any real direct relationship with McNamara. He tolerated me as a lieutenant general not as the Deputy Director of CIA. So I never had a real relationship. I had to tangle with him two or three times and straighten him out because he was using DIA as his source of information and I was getting it straight from NSA. So he was about eight hours behind the times, you see. Several times he was saying something at one of these meetings and I would have to say, "Well, I'm sorry, Sir, but the most recent information we have from NSA is"

FARLEY: Good. I have a note that I made where we talked about McCone's problems. The overflight was delayed for three weeks and the U2 flight finally took place in October. So McCone was involved in either trying to hurry that up or postpone it. I think it was to make it go a little bit earlier than October to confirm the presence of the SA2s in Cuba.

CARTER: No, we knew the SA2s were there. We'd known, that's the antiaircraft missile, the SA2.

FARLEY: Yes.

CARTER: We knew they'd been there for a long time. They were building them up. That was common knowledge.

FARLEY: But was it a confirmatory?

CARTER: It was the IRBM, Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, that we didn't have the signature of, we weren't sure.

FARLEY: Maybe that was it.

CARTER: It was the agents' report, said there was a lot of stuff about construction and missiles being moved at night and

everything else, but nothing you could hang your hat on to do anything about until we got the final picture that was unmistakable. And that's when everything went into action. McCone was on his honeymoon.

FARLEY: Yeah, that's the same time period.

CARTER: Yeah. So I don't know what was meant by...McCone was unhappy about the inadequate coverage we were getting, but he was just commenting on that from his honeymoon.

FARLEY: That might have been it.

CARTER: May have been even before he went on his honeymoon. We did have real weather problems. This I know of and this everybody admits. And we did have this concern of McGeorge Bundy and Dean Rusk, as I saw it from where I sat on the NRO chartings for the flights of the U2, if and when we ever got the weather.

FARLEY: Again, I said a little bit earlier about Major Anderson's shutdown. There was some question as to who pulled the trigger, whether the Soviets did or the Cubans did. And we could never figure out who was responsible. Do you ever remember any briefing or any information as to who was the guy who said "go?"

CARTER: No, I don't. I don't have any recollection of that.

FARLEY: Do you remember that situation?

CARTER: No. There's another facet of our operations with McCone is that when it was a major problem involving the White House McCone took command and he handled the whole

matter. And whether or not he cut me in or somebody else in on what went on or anything is entirely a matter of speculation. When he came back my relationships with the White House stopped immediately and he took them over. Which is logical. I wasn't complaining. I was still staying in the act as much as I could, but I had the whole rest of the agency to run also, as I'd been running while he was gone. In this case he was calling the shots after he got back, he was calling the shots. So I don't recall as to who pulled the trigger.

FARLEY: Okay.

CARTER: Those things can all be opened again 20 years from now for conjecture.

FARLEY: Were you in on any discussions about the decision to set up the blockade when the ships were coming in with the "crateology" decisions and the missiles on top of them?

CARTER: Only at the early stages when that was one of the options that were discussed in the first couple of days. And you had doves and you had hawks and you had English sparrows and had starlings and you had every imaginable kind of attitude being taken at the time. The President was very calm. He listened to everything and I thought he was superb the way he handled that. It really got off the track when they decided on the blockade, then McNamara was sending personal messages from the Secretary of Defense to the ship's captain or the destroyer captain telling him what to do and etc., etc. And Navy in

some cases not even getting info copies of the messages he sent.

FARLEY: That's unusual.

CARTER: It was unusual but that's the way he operated.

FARLEY: It seems to be prevalent, not so much now, but during the Johnson administration and some of the other administrations, but everything comes from the White House. To heck with the military, the Joint Chiefs, the people who know the business are ignored or bypassed.

CARTER: There's a lot to that, a lot to that.

FARLEY: It's a shame. Is there anything else we should talk about on the Cuban crisis? Anything that comes to mind?

CARTER: I told you I never really had a relationship with McNamara?

FARLEY: Yes.

CARTER: I had a closer relationship with Vance, particularly when I was in NSA because Vance was the guy who put me in NSA. Yeah, McCone did assume command as soon as he got back. Correcting McNamara. Gulf of Tonkin, I was not involved in that in any way, shape or form. McCone was the guy who developed that whole thing, as far as the intelligence community was concerned. You have a sentence here which I never heard of which says, "Early in the spring of 1965," this is Number 31, "or late in '64, you were being considered for appointment as the next Director of NSA." That's total news to me.

FARLEY: Is it?

CARTER: Yeah.

FARLEY: I don't know where it could have come from.

CARTER: I don't know where could come from.

FARLEY: Could it have been out of the *Puzzle Palace*?

CARTER: No, I don't see how it could've. Because I told Barnum, Burnam, whatever the hell his name was, Bamford. I told Bamford exactly what the circumstances were. Do you want to try another chair?

FARLEY: No, this is fine.

CARTER: Is it?

FARLEY: Good. I'll stretch out a little bit.

CARTER: Okay. If that's a matter of interest I can tell you now.

FARLEY: Yes, please. Yes, please, if you would. The second section of that question I think says "When you learned you were being considered and selected, what was your reaction?"

CARTER: Well, under 31, I had had no knowledge at any time that I was being considered to become DIRNSA and therefore I had no reaction. "Any qualms and concerns?" None. I'm talking now about the early spring of '65 and late in '64.

FARLEY: Yes, Sir.

CARTER: And "How were you informed of your selection and by whom?" "Had you solicited the position or dropped hints that you were interested?" No way. No way. "What comments did McCone have when he was informed that you were the choice for the next DIRNSA?" None. He had already resigned and had left town. Okay?

FARLEY: Okay. He didn't give you a telephone call and say "congratulations"?

CARTER: I don't think so. I don't remember. Okay, here's what happened. McCone said he was going to...Well let's go back just a little bit. It may be of interest.

FARLEY: All right, please.

CARTER: Kennedy was assassinated in 1963.

FARLEY: November. Right.

CARTER: McCone was immediately latched onto by Johnson who had no faith whatsoever in Kennedy's staff and didn't like Bobby and he trusted McCone. And there was not a move that Johnson made for at least two to three weeks without his consulting McCone. This was domestic as well as international. And McCone was getting tired of being called down to the White House. Johnson was assembling his own staff, you see. And he finally came to me and said, "I can't be rushing down to the White House two or three times a day to talk to the President," because we were at Langley. And I said, "As an alternative, move your office down to the old Navy hospital." We had that place there, right by the State Department.

FARLEY: Seventeenth and G or in that area?

CARTER: Somewhere, yeah. And we had offices down there which we very seldom used because our technical operations were down in that area, too. And he said, "No, that won't do, then it will be three times a day instead of twice a day," or something like that. And he said, "I just can't

hack it. I've got work to do." And I said, "Boss, this is the first chance the agency has ever had a real penetration into the White House and I think it's essential to the national interest that you stick in there, stick with it." He said, "No, I don't think so. I can't put up with it." Well that's a prelude then to what develops later on. He had gradually cut off his relationships with Johnson to the extent that by this time Johnson's own staff was taking over. Then we went through the elections, which was I guess in '65, '64?

FARLEY: '65, yeah.

CARTER: '65, well, no, he'd left town then. Okay. McCone said, "I'm resigning in April of '65." Now Johnson had been reelected I guess by this time. Yeah, I think we had been through an election in '64. Yeah. "I'm leaving in April, so we've got to make a recommendation to the President as to who should succeed me." And I said, "Well, quite frankly, I think [redacted] is a natural for the job." And McCone brushed it aside because [redacted] was in a wheelchair, for life, you know. He said, "No, I can't see him doing that." We wanted an in-house person. I said, "The next one would be Helms," and he said, "Yeah, I'll go for Helms." And I said, "If it's of any interest to you, I'm perfectly happy to continue here as Deputy Director under Helms, because I think it should be a civilian job." So he went with the recommendation to the President to make Helms the Director. Whether or not he said

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anything about me remaining as Deputy Director, I don't know. But the President chose not to take Helms as Director. He chose Admiral Red Rayburn, from Texas, a buddy, to be the new Director. That automatically defrocked me, see. So on April the 26th of 1965 I was unemployed when he appointed Rayburn. By law the two top people cannot both be military. So I'm unemployed. So I called up Johnnie Johnson, who was chief of staff of the Army, and said, "I'm unemployed now. I ain't got no job. What are you going to do with me?" And he said, "Geez, I don't know, we make our"...Do you want to change now? This is pretty interesting.

FARLEY:

I'll change tapes.

TAPE THREE, SIDE ONE

FARLEY:

All right, Sir.

CARTER:

He said, "I don't know. We make our slates up on general officers especially three-star at least six months in advance and I don't know what to do with you." And I said, "Well you'd better figure out something because I'll take a month's leave while you're working on it." So I had several calls from him, and he said, "Would you like to head up a special study group on Army personnel?" I said, "No, that doesn't interest me." And he said, "Would you like to go to Turkey to be the SEATO, SEATO or some outfit over there?" He said, "I'm trying to protect your three-star status because you've got to revert to two-star otherwise." I said, "No, that doesn't appeal to me. You've got to realize I could be an asset to the military in some assignment connected in the Washington arena because of all my contacts." He said, "Well, we don't have anything like that." I said, "Well, how about going to Korea as the UN Commander?" He said, "No, we've already nominated a General Beach to do that. However, the position of Deputy is open." And I said, "Look, Johnnie, I was Chief of Staff over there for 14 months when Syngman Rhee was run out of the country when the revolutions occurred. I know where all the bodies are buried from being Chief of Staff and also from CIA the last three years. And if I go over there as Deputy it's going to

make Beach a figurehead because they'll all be coming to me, and it's not fair to him and that's a hazardous occupation in the first place. And that doesn't seem to make sense." So they ruled that one out. Somewhere along in there Gordon Blake decided to retire. And in the meantime I had got pneumonia and I was sicker than a pup. I was on leave and everything. So I got a letter from the Chief of Staff of the Army, no from Assistant G-1, that said, "Since you are no longer filling a slot for three stars we will have to revert you to two stars. However this is an administrative financial operation and therefore you can wear your three stars until we find a three star slot for you." Which I thought was friendly. (chuckles) But it still reduced my pay.

FARLEY: That's what I was going to say. They did take money away from you?

CARTER: Oh, yeah, oh, yeah.

FARLEY: Dirty.

CARTER: But that was not a real hazard because as the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence I was Number Three Executive Scale, you see, and I was entitled to the pay of the Number Three Executive Scale. So the Army paid me as a lieutenant general and CIA made up the difference between what my Army pay was and what I would have gotten had I been a civilian. That's the way the law was written.

FARLEY: I see.

CARTER: So I lost that and I then was reduced to major general. And then I got a call from a friend in the Army and he said, "Why the hell don't you retire?" I said, "Christ, I'm only 55 years old why the hell should I retire?"

FARLEY: Just a youngster.

CARTER: I still think I've got assets that could be used by the government. So after a while Vance called me up and said, "Would you come over and see me?" And he said, "Would you be Director of NSA?" Gordon apparently had put in his request. I don't know what the timing was but I assume Vance knew that Gordon was retiring. Certainly if he had made any other arrangements I didn't know about them. So Vance said this and I said, "Well, yes, but let me think it over for a day." He said, "Okay." So I went over the next day and I said, "Yes, I'll accept that job as Director of NSA providing, providing I am not controlled by Fubini," who was Assistant Secretary of Defense for R & E.

FARLEY: Oh, yeah.

CARTER: And Vance said, "Well, I think that can be arranged, but you'd better give me a month or so." And I said, "Well, on your guarantee that I will not be under Fubini, then I'd be happy to take the job." There were some disadvantages to it, but at least I was staying in a racket that I was learning, in the intelligence community. I had a situation in Washington, family wise, orientation fine, the pay was nowhere near the same, but I am allergic to what they call

"double dippers." I could not see at 55 going out and taking a job with industry either to run a plant, which I had been doing for three years, or because of the contacts that I had in government. And as an aside, the same thing applied when I was retired from NSA. I decided this was it. I was not feeling well anyway. I was not about to take a job with a plant which, they ain't any better or bigger than NSA, and I was not about to take a job with industry because of my contacts on the Hill. The same reasoning applied. So I called up Johnnie Johnson, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and I said, "Vance has just asked me to be Director of NSA." And he said, "Oh, no, we've already nominated Johnnie Davis to be that, and it's the Army's time for a slot." And I said, "Well I don't know a damned thing about that."

FARLEY: Who?

CARTER: John Davis was a classmate of mine. A dear friend. His wife, of course, was with NSA for a long long time.

FARLEY: Wilma.

CARTER: Wilma. And they're great friends of ours. I said, "Well that's the first I ever heard of that." And he said, "Well, the name's on the way up." And I said, "Well, Vance has offered me this job and I told him I'd take it, on the guarantee that Fubini would not be in my chain of command. Vance said, "No, you will report directly to me." So on the one of June I was reassigned, repromoted to three star general. I've been a brigadier general twice,

I was a major general in command as a brigadier general by direction of the President, because they moved in a my replacement ahead of me who was senior to me. And I said, "You can't do that to this little boy." So they retained me as a major general by direction of the President, which made me rank this guy, until I could be reassigned, and then I was twice a three star general. (chuckles)

FARLEY:

Up and down, up and down.

CARTER:

Yeah. So then on the First of June I went in as Director of NSA. And there are a couple of things that I did that might be of interest historically. I knew Tordella, but only casually. I called up the Aide to Gordon Blake and I talked to Maggie Stafford, as I recall. And I said, "I know I'm coming over there and nobody knows me or much about me or anything like that, and I just want you to reassure the staff that I do not have a retinue of people to come along with me. I'm coming just as bare naked as the day I was born without an aide or a secretary or anything. So relieve the minds of the people who are working there that I am coming in to be Director and I'll look to them for my advice and guidance and any personnel I need to assist me." And that apparently took the heat right off from the working people right around in the immediate operation.

FARLEY:

Who was Blake's Aide? Was that Hal Callahan, Major Callahan?

CARTER: I don't remember. I don't think I ever met him.

FARLEY: Oh, okay. I think he probably retired.

CARTER: I think I probably talked to Maggie Stafford, because that's where the uneasiness first starts, you know. The guys who are entrenched in GS, high grades, don't worry because their flanks are already covered by their positions. But it's the working people right there that get goosey right away, and that can permeate over a whole agency in very short order.

FARLEY: Sure. You said you only had half a day with Blake?

CARTER: I'm not sure I had a half a day, but I had seen him everytime we had a USIB meeting. And we were classmates at West Point, and we knew each other. The thing is, I think I was the first guy who ever came in to NSA from CIA or who had ever had any experience at the intelligence analysis and reporting level. Now I may be wrong there.

FARLEY: I think you're right.

CARTER: But certainly from the top level, I was the first guy that had ever held those two jobs like that.

FARLEY: I don't think Blake had any background in intelligence reporting.

CARTER: No, I think he was a communicator.

FARLEY: That's right.

CARTER: And the only intelligence background I had was in CIA. But you can learn a hell of a lot when you're operating at that level.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: You can learn not to bluff in the first place.

FARLEY: Gayler was, I don't know if he was ONI-er. I don't know.

CARTER: I don't think he even had communication experience.

FARLEY: I doubt it.

CARTER: I guess Turner was the example of bringing along a retinue of assistants and placing them here, there and everywhere else, in CIA.

FARLEY: Right. So we're in NSA. How are you doing?

CARTER: I'm doing fine. I'm getting a little hungry and thirsty.

FARLEY: Whenever you say, whenever you say.

CARTER: Anyway, the business about my being appointed. That came directly from a telephone call from Vance. And I told you the caveats that I placed on that. McCone said nothing. Okay, I think this is as good a place as any to stop probably.

FARLEY: Thirty-two. All right, let's stop at 32 and take a break. So let's switch her off and come back later.

FARLEY: Switch her back on and thank you very much for the lunch. I really enjoyed it. That hit the spot. That was good.

CARTER: It was just about enough and the atmosphere was good.

FARLEY: It'll keep us going.

CARTER: Anytime you get food like that in a British pub you're damned lucky.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: If my experience in British pubs is any criteria.

FARLEY: I'm going to switch mikes with you. This is a little stronger. All right, Sir.

CARTER: Looking at 32, you say how much did I know about the organization and it's activities. Of course, I knew very well what they were doing and why they were doing it, and what the product was and how valuable the product was. I was not familiar with the actual organization or any of the senior personnel in NSA, nor did I have any knowledge of operations of SIGINT or COMSEC or any of that business. I don't ever recall examining the charter for NSA. I looked it up in the Congressional Directory and it didn't tell me what they did. I figured that the less I knew about what their charter was the more freedom of action I would have in doing what I thought ought to be done. So I don't recall looking at any NSC documents or anything like that. I must have. They must have waved them by me at least. So I have no details on whether or not the specifications were too broad and too far reaching, or inadequate.

FARLEY: That's fine. You probably learned later on.

CARTER: I probably did. I wasn't too familiar with the manner in which General Blake operated NSA. Except I think I had previously mentioned that the Director NSA appearances at USIB seemed to be almost entirely technically oriented and they did not really seem to be a part of the analytical estimating process that I was used to in my three years in CIA. After being in NSA for a while it was perfectly

apparent to me that we could not produce what we were producing without having analysts who knew at least as much, or damned near as much, as the people who were doing the analyzing in CIA. I felt then that one of the things we must do was to capitalize on that for the overall benefit. Capitalize of ^{on?} our internal capabilities in NSA for doing more than just the interception and analysis and cryptology involved and its main responsibilities, that we could be an asset to the intelligence community.

FARLEY: Did you come up with the suggestion that the analysts, the reporters, could add a COMMENT or at least speculate as to what the information meant or what it would mean to the people preparing a final finished intelligence report?

CARTER: I can't claim that because I don't know when it happened.

FARLEY: I don't recall either.

CARTER: If it happened on my watch, then obviously I'm privileged to take credit for it.

FARLEY: I think you had something to do with it.

CARTER: I may well have. I do remember spreading the word down that I did not want them to limit themselves to the automatic machine operated technology, but to expand in their emphasis and analysis of what was going on, what effect this had on other things, and what effect other things had on this, and what their interpretation was. I knew that, I did that. But what the "comment" whatever it was you called, because I don't remember what that

was. I did elevate the stature within the Agency of the people who represented us on various community committees and organizations. I made a conscious effort to do that. I'm not sure what you mean by management, by hands on management, consensus management, or "getting the job done."

FARLEY:

Your management technique, your style. Whether you liked to gather a lot of your braintrusts together and say, "Come up with a pro and a con and I'll make the decision, or one or two or three alternatives and I'll make the decision." Or do you make the decision and say, "Fellows, go with it." I don't know what your management technique has been throughout your military and your later career.

CARTER:

Well, I don't think you have a technique that's limited to one form of operation or another. If you see something going wrong in a hurry and you know what the solution is you'd better by ^{God} get on it no matter how you do it. If you're not sure what to do then you might say, "Hey, what's the background on this? Let me study what's happened before," and make your decision. Or you might call in two or three people and say, "Hey, come in and tell me what the story is and tell me what my options are."

FARLEY:

Right.

CARTER:

I think each type of management procedure depends on what the problem is and how you go about it, at least in

my own operations. I'm not used to making flash judgments. I don't ever recall losing my temper or flailing away with a broom or anything like that, or cleaning house. I don't operate that way.

FARLEY: Good. General Faurer preferred the consensus management technique. He'd gather all the experts together and listen to them and then he'd make the decision. He didn't like to get involved in the dirty, way down to the working level. He liked to listen to the people supposedly who knew what was going on.

CARTER: Well, sometimes you can assemble a group of people none of whom know exactly what's going on and you have to get down into the burrows and find the guy who really knows what the word is.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: I'm talking about the word of Isaiah obviously.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: So I think it depends on what the problem is.

FARLEY: Okay. Well you answered 35 already then. ((#35-What is your decision-making process?))

CARTER: I think so, yeah.

FARLEY: Did you have an initial and most reliable advisor and confidante?

CARTER: No, nobody in NSA. I depended on the Deputy initially when I got in there. And then I found a number of things in the management of NSA that I did not like. I had a feeling that it would be better to start new in trying to

correct these things rather than to go back down through the chain of command to correct them, not knowing myself what needed to be corrected. There did not seem to be any attempt to have career management of people at the various grades. There did not seem to be a procedure by which a person could move along in his career into this step or that step or even change careers, in particular, techniques. There did not seem to be a system by which a board or a committee could look at the various assets of individuals and select the one who had the greatest potential for continuing impetus of the mission of NSA. In other words, I could not find a promotion system existent except in the individual operating divisions as distinct from across the board. And then I could not find a system by which the allocation of vacancies, any system by which the allocation of vacancies was distributed across to the various operating divisions. I had a very uneasy feeling about this. And that was about the time I organized the Executive Secretariat, or whatever they called it. And I've been trying to recall how I got to I'm really not sure. would no doubt know what our first association was.

FARLEY: Okay. Was he in the military when you first met him?

CARTER: No.

FARLEY: He was out of the service then.

CARTER: Oh, yeah.

FARLEY: He was a Navy lieutenant or lieutenant commander, I don't know, for a while.

CARTER: I don't know. He had a brother Joe, who died.

FARLEY: Yes.

CARTER: There were two military people in NSA when I came in. One was Brigadier General Morrison,...

FARLEY: John Morrison.

CARTER: ...and the other one was Admiral Schulz.

FARLEY: Oh, yes.

CARTER: But they were both subordinate to civilians in their divisions, as I recall.

FARLEY: Yes.

CARTER: Morrison was subordinate to Kirby, as I recall, and Schulz, I'm not even quite sure what his job was but he was as honest as the day is long. There were no angles to anything he created or proposed. He was a real solid citizen. He appeared to be slow and ponderous at times but that was just because I was at time impatient to get an answer and he would take the time to think it out. So I had a great deal of confidence in Admiral Schulz.

FARLEY: I still don't remember what job, I know he was NSAPAC for a while but I don't know what period that was. But he was back at headquarters when you were there, I guess.

CARTER: I'm quite sure he was in headquarters when I was there, yeah. I mean when I came in.

FARLEY: Yes.

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CARTER: So I really didn't have any initial and most reliable advisor and confidante until I had established the Executive Director office. I forgot what I even called it now.

FARLEY: Secretariat was it? Executive Secretariat.

CARTER: Maybe Secretariat. I looked to them and I had
 organize it. I looked to them to ensure that whatever came to me had been thoroughly coordinated with those divisions of NSA, and if necessary the outside community, so that any people who might have a capability of an input or were entitled to an input because of their charter had it before it got to me. In other words, an extenuation of what we call in the military a completed staff action.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: And Gerry got in some very fine people to do this kind of work. They were right across the hall from me and had direct access to me at all times. When I first got there there was a Lieutenant Colonel Anderson, a young fellow. I'm pretty sure it was Anderson. Andy Anderson, but he died a month or so after I was there from a heart attack.

FARLEY: I don't remember him.

CARTER: I think he had been with Blake as sort of an Executive Secretary but just by himself. And Miss Margaret was there the whole time I was there. I had a naval lieutenant as a sort of an assistant executive of some sort. I've forgotten his name. Frazee.

FARLEY: Jim Frazee.

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CARTER:

Lieutenant Frazee. But he was not in the substantive end of operations. And then Lou Tordella had a secretary. He didn't have a personal assistant. He had a secretary who was very helpful. Dorothy somebody or other. I've forgotten her last name. But she and Maggie, Miss Margaret, were the continuity and knew where all the records and files and things were, until I was able to get to set up this Executive Secretariat, which I think I told you was a small replica of what we set up in the State Department under General Marshall and in the Defense Department under General Marshall. I think we've already covered that haven't we?

FARLEY:

Yes, we have. I think the next one, 36 and the second part of that "Worldwide operations of NSA and the need to pacify the three SCEs were major considerations in troublesome areas not faced in any of your earlier assignments." Would you care to comment on that? You mentioned something at lunch about problems with the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy.

CARTER:

Well, I don't remember having any real problems with the Naval group or with ^{AFSS?} AFSCC, General Coira whom I had taught at West Point, Captain Cooke whom I had had no prior relations with, and General Denholm was ASA, who I think had been a Boy Scout in a troop that I organized at Fort Monroe.

FARLEY:

I'll be darned.

CARTER:

His father was the dentist on the Garrison at Fort Monroe, as I remember. I'm having that checked out right now because I had a letter from a Colonel Farnsworth, Retired, who is working on a history of the Boy Scout troop at Fort Monroe. Farnsworth had played shortstop on the West Point baseball team which I was manager of. So he wrote not too long ago and said what can you tell me about the troop, and I'm getting a check back on Denholm. Because I vaguely recall he was in the troop. I had no particular problems. The problems I did have were generated by the intelligence elements of the three services and by the command elements of the three services in an effort, I felt, to take over the operations of NSA. At least to the extent of having greater inputs and more control over their assets to provide the kind of intelligence they wanted for their purposes as distinct from my concept of NSA as being a national organization. Now that generates quite naturally from my position as Deputy Director of CIA and the need that I felt for NSA competence and major role in intelligence development and the feeling that NSA had competence far beyond what was being used at the USIB level. And the attempt on the part of the military, and I go right on up to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this, to gain a greater control of the assets to meet their needs as distinct from the national needs. And you asked me somewhere in here,

"What do you think is your greatest thing you ever did since the good Lord was a corporal or whatever?"

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: I've given that considerable thought and from my viewpoint at the time I thought I did a great job. It may be in hindsight it may have been the ruination of NSA. I really don't know, but I felt this continual pressure to either take assets away or take over control of assets which I felt, based on recommendation of my staff, I felt were needed to accomplish the overall NSA mission.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: I'm not trying to confuse you.

FARLEY: No, no. I understand.

CARTER: I'm trying to get a feel of how I felt about those things.

FARLEY: Because I read a message when I was doing some research. It was sort of a message chastising Ralph Cooke for him assuming that you were taking too much of his mission, his responsibility away. And you set him straight saying, "The national mission is first and incidentally the Navy mission or the Security Group mission is next." And you spelled it out in a very nice manner. I didn't see his response, but I'm sure he said, "Yes, Sir."

CARTER: I don't remember that at all.

FARLEY: I read it a couple of days ago.

CARTER: I remember that the way to get things done is not to exacerbate somebody nor get your teats in an uproar. Pardon me, get your mammary glands in an uproar.

Because of just starting something that's pretty difficult to stop once it gets started.

FARLEY: But you gave him the 'there there' pat on the head.

CARTER: Yeah. Well, we had a couple of pretty horrendous incidents or acts or articles, not articles but occasions of what I would call war in which the Naval assets were under the control of the Navy Group or CINCPAC. And the *Liberty* was one and the *Pueblo* was one. And we had one with the Air Forces on the EC-121 that was shot down over North Korea, waters of North Korea.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: Now none of those three incidents occurred while those carriers, while the machinery was under our operational control. They had been delegated to the services. And in each of those three cases NSA had *warned* them, had warned them, "Hey buster, what the hell are you doing that close to shore?" Do you remember that one?

FARLEY: Yes, I do.

CARTER: And with the *Pueblo*, "Hey you're getting awful close." Remember the EC-121? That sort of thing. We had sent warnings to them. So they were far from being pure in their operations insofar as safety of the vessel was concerned.

FARLEY: The North Koreans are 'unpredictable' I think is one of the words you used.

CARTER: Exactly. Exactly. That was on the case of the *Pueblo*.

FARLEY: Yes.

CARTER: And I think it was Admiral Schulz who signed off on that message. I know it made NSA look awful good in hindsight. And then the breakdown of the normal communication systems in both the Navy, predominantly in the Navy, but including the Army was just horrendous. Both in the *Liberty* and the *Pueblo*.

FARLEY: That was a real tragedy.

CARTER: Yeah, both of those. I'm in correspondence, you know, with the alumni association of the USS *Liberty*.

FARLEY: Oh.

CARTER: I'm on their mailing list and they send me letters and they invite me to all their reunions and everything else.

FARLEY: Is that right.

CARTER: It's quite an organization.

FARLEY: We've interviewed about 15 of those people who were involved either on board the *Pueblo* or back at NSA supporting the operation. And the poor fellow O'Connor, Jim O'Connor, the guy who was shot in the back and lost a kidney and he went into, not Lou Gehrig's disease but one of these diseases. He was wearing two canes the last time I saw him and he's dead. He died about a year ago.

CARTER: Was he on the *Liberty*?

FARLEY: Yes, Sir. He was one of the Ops officers. But he told the story about getting shot in the back. And the whole side of his back was ripped out and one of the sailors took off his tee shirt and stuck it in there to cut off the blood. And

he said, "This guy keeps calling and says, 'When are you going to buy me a new tee shirt?'" (chuckles)

CARTER: That's pretty good.

FARLEY: Yeah, but a real tragedy. Some of these kids.

CARTER: Yeah, it really was. But had they gotten the word they might well have gotten out in time. Had they not gone in there in the first place. Now that was tactical ELINT and SIGINT they were working on. I say they were under the operational control of, I suppose CINCMED or whoever it was. But they never got the word until it much too late. That was where I first parted company with Vance.

FARLEY: Oh?

CARTER: Because we were at a Congressional hearing and I think this was in open session, but somehow I can't believe it was in open session. But I'm told it was an open session, in which I was asked, as DIRNSA, whether or not I thought the attack was deliberate. And I said, "It couldn't be anything else but deliberate. There's just no way you could have a series of circumstances that would justify it being an accident." Now this was within a day or so after the event. And Vance came on shortly after and said, "I think it's premature to make a judgment like that." Now that's somewhere in the records, because the *Liberty* picked it up. There was a Sykes Committee, Sykes of Florida, who was appointed to look into this from the Congressional side to view. And it may well have been

that committee before which I was appearing and Vance was.

FARLEY: He wouldn't agree then that it was deliberate.

CARTER: He said that it was premature.

FARLEY: Yes.

CARTER: I don't know what he said since then.

FARLEY: Later on, okay.

CARTER: I don't know any since then. Rusk, Dean Rusk has been quoted as saying, "It had to be deliberate."

FARLEY: There's so much evidence that says it was deliberate.

CARTER: Oh, yeah, yeah. I don't ever recall anything where I had to pacify the three SCEs.

FARLEY: All right.

CARTER: I suppose you've got all the records on the Giap forgeries?

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: I did have to be pretty hard on Denholm.

FARLEY: Okay.

CARTER: You're familiar with that I gather, a record on that?

FARLEY: Yes, Sir, someplace. It's in a hundred thousand boxes someplace.

CARTER: Yeah. Because that's interesting, because that's where our analysts were so far ahead of the ASA analysts who were carried away with this 'absolutely marvelous' communication network they had unearthed with the battalion commander communicating directly with Giap. And it all turned out to be this intercept operator who was bored. Do you remember that?

FARLEY: I sure do.

CARTER: Yeah, I had to straighten this out.

FARLEY: I don't know if they court martialed the kid. They did something to him I know.

CARTER: Well first they put him in for the Legion of Merit. (chuckles) And as soon as I heard about that...This was an argument between analysts actually, but we were so right, NSA, and so early on that I had them order the guy back and we put him on the polygraph. And this was when it came out that, well, he was just bored and there wasn't much going on and this seemed like something to do. That sort of thing.

FARLEY: There was a lot of, not a lot. There was some fabrication of traffic throughout just about every war or every incident in the world. Guys do get bored.

CARTER: Well I presume so but this got to the point where he had Commander ASA arguing with Commander NSA and there's no way in which you could lose that argument under the circumstances then and there. I don't know what ever happened to the kid. He was probably later commended or something, I don't know.

FARLEY: Given a direct commission. I don't know. (chuckles)

CARTER: I think I've already discussed at some length my fear that the Joint Chiefs and the military establishment were trying to take over the NSA operation. Going over to page five. I have no recollection, I really don't, of that nude director business. I have no reason to doubt it

because it's a half-assed business as I'm very likely to have done. So I can't deny it, but I don't remember it.

FARLEY: I have three or four people who remember seeing the Playboy centerfold over your portrait saying, "Meet Your New Director" and then you said, "Meet Your Nude Director." (laughter)

CARTER: That's funny.

FARLEY: Yeah. As I said, it was the first realization that you had a sense of humor, so some of them could kid with you, I guess. Did you think of reorganization or restructuring the Agency immediately, or did you want to live with it for a few months before making any changes?

CARTER: I always live with what I inherit until it gets to where I can't stand it any more, or it doesn't fit into my operational concepts. There were some things I started very early on. I think when we were at the pit stop I commented on the National Cryptologic School.

FARLEY: Yes.

CARTER: And we started on that quite early on. And Frank Rowlett wasn't doing anything as my Special Assistant, because I was not a cryptologist. I didn't want to get involved in cryptology quite frankly, it was beyond my competence. So I asked him to be the first Commandant. And I wrote him a note in my own hand that said, "We either go first class or we don't go at all," something like that, and they decided to go first class. And it was a long haul. But I find when you have authority to do something the thing to do

is to get started balls out and get such an impetus behind it that very few people are going to come along and say, "Hey that isn't what we wanted," or, "you're exceeding your authority," or something like that. Get it going and keep it going and keep it rolling, like a snowball coming downhill. And that's why I say we either go first class or we don't at all. And he went right into it.

FARLEY: Was he enthusiastic about that, Rowlett?

CARTER: Well, as much as Frank is enthusiastic about anything. He's a different breed of cat you know, he's a West Virginia mountaineer or maybe it's Virginia.

FARLEY: "Ole country boy," as he always said.

CARTER: Or maybe North Carolina. But you've got to be careful of these old country boys because most of them are just as sharp as a tack.

FARLEY: Well, he tried to use that for as long as I've ever known him. "I'm just an ole country boy."

CARTER: But he picked it up and then when he finally decided to retire Dr. Jacobs took over.

FARLEY: Walt Jacobs, right.

CARTER: Walt Jacobs. And I kept the needle in the whole time. And it was a long haul because we had an old decrepit wooden barracks building from World War I, I guess, maybe World War II, and eventually went down to FANX III as I recall.

FARLEY: That's a big operation now.

CARTER: Yeah.

FARLEY: Real fine.

CARTER: Well, we had the authority to do it so we went ahead and did it. I don't know whether it was necessary, but somebody seemed to think it was.

FARLEY: Let me switch, Sir.

TAPE III, SIDE TWO

CARTER: Looking at 38 you say, when I had settled down in the chair did I have any immediate thoughts of some type of restructuring or reorganization of NSA. No I did not. I'm used to going in and riding with the herd until I see what's wrong. Subsequent to that, I appointed a committee, and I think maybe Walt Deeley was on that committee, I'm not sure. I know Gerry Burke and some others were. Maybe Dick Burn.

FARLEY: Oh, yes.

CARTER: I'm not sure, but there were about a half a dozen of them and I asked them to look into what needed changing in the organization. And I made a number of substantive changes which I can't right now recall.

FARLEY: Okay.

CARTER: But as a result of the recommendations they made to me. I think by this time Tordella had realized there was no use fighting the problem, that he should probably go along with whatever I came up with that wouldn't unduly disturb our operations. Would not transcend his

authorities as Deputy Director and the civilian head of the Agency really.

FARLEY: Right. Did you feel that the senior hierarchy were pretty well entrenched there and you couldn't bend them or sway them either way? It was just the way that they had been doing things for 20 years and they didn't want to change?

CARTER: Well, I think that's probably right. I think now in hindsight I could think that way. At the time it didn't occur to me that it was a problem because I was the Director and if I wanted something done I just assumed that it would be done. It wasn't always done and there was at times reluctance. But, no, there ^{were?} one or two of the top people who I had very little confidence in. In fact one of them quit just before I fired him.

FARLEY: Oh?

CARTER: And one of them died. Mitt Matthews, in whom I had tremendous confidence, just a great guy, he died unfortunately in Rochester.

FARLEY: What a gentleman he was. Fine, fine man.

CARTER: Yeah, and he knew what he was doing, too. He was able to tell me in nickel and dime language what the problem was and how to go about solving it.

FARLEY: I see. How did you get along with Oliver Kirby?

CARTER: I got along all right with him until the crunch came and I found out he was disloyal, but that's a long story involving Fubini and to some extent Morrison. And I think

we might just as well not go on the record. It's all done. Kirby left as soon as he was uncovered. He left and went to Texas Instruments I think. I don't even know what's happened to him now.

FARLEY:

LTV for a while. He was with Ling Temco ^{Voight} Voight.

CARTER:

Wherever he was I think sometime after I left they brought him back as a consultant or something.

FARLEY:

Right. I haven't seen him around the Agency in years. I don't know if he's still with the successor to LTV or whatever organization he's with.

CARTER:

I don't know, but I found that he was personally disloyal to me and to the Agency, in his own interests. So, I say he got out just before I was about to lower the boom on him.

FARLEY:

Let's see. You talked about, no problems really passed on from General Blake, and that you had no overlap time.

CARTER:

I don't remember him passing on any problems.

FARLEY:

Okay.

CARTER:

I don't remember receiving any from General Blake. I don't remember any overlap either. See, we had both been on USIB for the three years before and I think he felt I was thoroughly familiar. I don't remember any dead kittens left lying around there that I was supposed to resuscitate. (chuckles) If there had been I'm sure that he would have brought them to my attention.

FARLEY:

Right. Now 41 is sort of misleading. ((#41--Was your first visit to a Congressional Committee an unnerving one since you had been Director for only a few months?)) This

your first visit to a Congressional committee, but only as DIRNSA is the way I tried to phrase it. As I see you've been through these dozens and dozens of times. But based on the fact that there are probably more, or maybe not, more security restrictions upon you at NSA than at CIA? Or not?

CARTER: I quite frankly don't remember going before any Congressional committees on NSA matters.

FARLEY: Oh, don't you.

CARTER: I remember very vividly pulling a fast one on McNamara and Horowitz on super grades , because I had a survey conducted in-house and compared it with a survey I had had made in CIA and was still available to me. And it showed quite clearly that we were on the short end of the deal on super grades in NSA for the work we were doing. And compared to a number of the agencies within DoD we were even farther down the totem pole on the number of super grades. So I went to Horowitz, who administered super grades for DoD, and brought the subject up with him. Well first I had put somebody in for a super grade for which I had a vacancy and it came back, "We do not consider this man qualified for this grade." Bear in mind that all of the super grades were allocated from the Department of Defense, okay. So it was apparent to me, since the guy was over qualified for the grade in my opinion, they had somebody else in mind, not necessarily in NSA. But they had a use for that super

grade. So they were retaining it in their own pool from which I had to draw my super grades. So I went over to see Sol Horowitz, whom I had known. He had been hired when General Marshall was Secretary of Defense, and I explained to him, "Look, I can't operate NSA unless I've got some control over my senior grades. And if you're going to have some GS-10 over here telling me that somebody I've selected isn't qualified then to hell with it, you can have the job." An unlikely threat that I would bring forward, but in any event it shook him up a little bit. And he said, "Well I'll see what I can do. Send the papers back." So I sent them back for reconsideration and it came back endorsed "Approved in light of additional information provided by General Carter." (chuckles) So they approved it. Okay, so that's the beginning of my wedding with Sol Horowitz. Then after the survey that I had mentioned I said, "I've got to get more super grades, there's no question about that. We're stultified," across the top. So I went to Vance first and said, "I need more super grades." And he said, "Well we're having a time with Congress and I don't think we can give you any more." And I said, "Well suppose I am able to go before the committee and justify additional super grades. Would you accept them into your DoD pool?" And he said, "Oh yes, by all means." And then I said, "Well would you allocate them to me?" And he said, "Well that would depend on your need." Nevertheless I got permission

from him to go ahead and try it and I told Horowitz about it and he said that would be a big help. I've forgotten how many there were. Somewhere the figure 75 sticks with me.

FARLEY: That many? Was it?

CARTER: But that seems much too many.

FARLEY: Yeah, I was thinking 25.

CARTER: Maybe 25, but whatever it was it was a sizeable addition to our super grades. So I think it was the Civil Service Committee that I had to go to. I think Ervin, Ervin?, was the chairman of the committee? Anyway, a hell of a nice guy. Great big guy who later chaired a committee. It was too long ago. But anyway he was South Carolina type, hell of a nice guy. I think his name was Ervin. Anyway I went to him and told him what my problem was and he said, "Well I'll have a subcommittee look at this to see what we have to do about it." And they came up with a favorable report as a result of my testimony before them. And then as I was talking to the chairman later, he said, "Will this meet your requirements?" And I said, "Yes Sir, this will meet my requirements if the super grades are allocated to NSA, but that's up to the Department of Defense since it goes into their pool." And he said, "Well would it help you General if we specified that these were specifically for NSA and no other unit?" And I said, "Well Mr. Chairman, that's a little bit of an embarrassing question for me. I'll leave that up to your judgment."

FARLEY: Great.

CARTER: And so they put it right in there that these super grades were approved specifically and only for the National Security Agency.

FARLEY: Great.

CARTER> And it went on through and that was a big boost in my morale and a big boost in NSA morale.

FARLEY: You made a lot of people happy out at NSA.

CARTER: Well I don't know who it was, but I worked hard on it. But that's the only Congressional committee that I recall appearing before. The only advantage that I could see to the CCP, Combined Cryptologic Program, and to O'Gara and Gallegos was the fact that we were part of the Defense Department budget. And there was nobody except those two guys who knew enough to question the NSA budget. And if it was in the CCP, and that of course you recall included the three cryptologic services, that I was perfectly happy to ride along with whatever they came up with as my budget. I don't recall ever appearing before a budget committee, or an Armed Services Committee or anything like that as Director NSA to justify my decisions. I really don't recall it.

FARLEY: I can't recall. I was just thinking of some of the various committees, but I guess that was not during your tenure.

CARTER: All of this thing about Intelligence Oversight Committee, none of that occurred on my watch, you see. I got out just in time. (chuckles)

FARLEY: Okay. All right. Let's see, budget hearings, so we're almost down to 43. I guess General Blake was the one who took a lot of abuse from the Congressional committees, because this was the time of the watch lists, the BNDD (Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs) watch list, and the SHAMROCK, and all of these.

CARTER: Well it was right after Martin and Mitchell, too.

FARLEY: That's right. He and Bella Abzug and some of those other Congressmen and women who were on the committee I guess really worked him over. Both he and Buffham.

CARTER: Yeah. Well, I wasn't subjected to any of those indignities. At that time. Nor was I in CIA. And I think much of it came from the fact that the leadership in the Congress had been exposed to me even as far back as when General Marshall was in China. Because when he said, "See if you can get me 500 thousand dollars as an immediate loan to the Generalissimo." We didn't have any DoD, then it was...

FARLEY: War Department.

CARTER: Well, we had it but -- that was '56. As I recall I went to the Army and they said, "Well you go on up to the Hill and cover it yourself." And I just covered it with the leadership and they made the arrangements. This was right after the war and we weren't too budget conscious at that time. That exposure, and then the exposure for the two years when I was in the State Department, and quite often accompanied General Marshall when he was

attending a Congressional Committee and later Dean Acheson, that was very helpful. And then when he was Secretary of Defense and we went through the MacArthur business and Korean War and that stuff, I was in the middle of that and was often up on the Hill seeing the leadership, such as Russell and Connelly and Vinson and those fellows with something, Vandenburg, directly from General Marshall. The Marshall Plan and all of that stuff. So I think maybe they were light on me or the fact that I had access to the chairmen of these committees gave whatever I needed an impetus to go from the top down rather than work up through the clerical monstrosity Congress has established around itself. So I really don't recall any real problems.

FARLEY:

That's probably true. It sounds like a good explanation.

CARTER:

I tell you the super grade business because that was a pretty close crunch with the DoD bureaucrats as distinct from the Congress and I'm pretty proud of that. But as I told in my first tape, there's nothing more subjective or self-serving than a memorandum for record or an oral interview after 20 years and you look back on your successes. It's sort of like your sex life – you try to push your failures under the rug so that they don't bring back unfortunate memories. (chuckles)

FARLEY:

That's right. That's pretty good.

CARTER:

So that's the way I look at it. So this business about the Intelligence Oversight Committee, I wasn't involved.

FARLEY: Okay, good.

CARTER: I think it was a dirty disgrace. I think when Frank Church used a phrase, a quote you can have I made it up myself one night when I was horrified, "When Frank Church took unto himself the unholy bonds of sanctimony." (chuckles) Now that's pure Carter.

FARLEY: That's good, that's good.

CARTER: That's pure Carter and I love it.

FARLEY: That's great.

CARTER: I use it every chance I get.

FARLEY: That was one of the committees I had in mind. I couldn't think of the name of it.

CARTER: Yeah the Church Committee.

FARLEY: And then there was one more almost within months after that.

CARTER: Well there was the Pike Committee which was on the House side.

FARLEY: That's the one, that's the one.

CARTER: The Church Committee was on the Senate side.

FARLEY: Dave Lowman. Do you remember Dave Lowman at all? He was one of the backup troops for whoever, whether it was Blake, who had to appear before those committees, or whether it was Gayler, I don't know.

CARTER: I don't know. I'll tell you, you got a minute?

FARLEY: Yes.

CARTER: I'll tell you about the Church Committee.

FARLEY: Please.

CARTER:

I had retired. As I have said previously I was the only man who had been at the top levels of CIA and NSA consecutively or otherwise. So I was one of the first witnesses before the Church Committee. And I went in. I'm retired now, okay, I went in, I'm in civilian clothes. I wasn't subpoenaed, they asked me to come in so I came on in. Reported to the chief clerk of the Committee by telephone and he said, "Meet me here tomorrow" sometime. So I went over there. They had no room that was secure, to meet in. They didn't know who was going to be there to swear me in. It had to be a Senator. And they did not have a list of questions of any kind that they were going to talk to me about. So that set the atmosphere. So the next day I reported. They finally found a room under the Atomic Energy Commission that was cleared, that was an entirely different building. We had to take the subway and go on over there. They finally found one Senator who was on the Committee who could swear me in, which he did. He stayed long enough for the opening question which they had planted on him and then he had to leave and left the whole thing up to the clerks. By clerks I mean you know, chief clerk or whatever they call him, Chief of Staff, whatever. They were friendly, but they were interested in only two things: what did I know about assassination attempts, and what did I know about a report that had been issued after I retired. I've forgotten the guy's name. Some report

which was an administration concept of how to do business. The name is very familiar, but at the moment my memory escapes me.

FARLEY: Houston? Not Houston.

CARTER: I can't think of it. But it was a report that was made out and published and had a lot to do about crime as well as counterintelligence. And Hoover blew his top and they subsequently rescinded it. What did I know about it? I knew absolutely nothing about that. Assassinations, I knew nothing first hand about that. But I spent four hours there and was never called back. And I think the reason it stuck in my mind, I think my feelings are hurt more than anything else, because they never called me back. (chuckles) And I was really loaded for bear to tell them what they were doing to the Intelligence Community and the national security of the country by opening up all of these things at this time.

FARLEY: But the indignity of being subjected to interrogation by a bunch of clerks rather than some of the high paid help.

CARTER: Yeah. Well, there wasn't anybody there.

FARLEY: That's terrible.

CARTER: Anyway, as I say, I think my feelings were hurt that I was never called back. While we're on that subject, let me tell you, again, I'm still retired. I'm still the only guy who's been in the two top jobs, so they're trying Ellsberg...

FARLEY: Old Daniel.

CARTER: ...out in Los Angeles for the "Pentagon Papers." So they ask me if I will be a surprise government witness. I said, "Sure." So they said, "Well come on out to Los Angeles and we'll bring you up to speed on it." So I went out there and I read the "Pentagon Papers" from top to bottom, I've forgotten how many chapters there were. But there were only 18 chapters, as I recall that had the fingerprints on the reproduced papers. My chore was to point out the national security violations.

FARLEY: The impact?

CARTER: And impact by this action of Ellsberg. And I knew the thing inside and out and boy, I was really loaded for bear. I had a private room up in the top of the big Hilton hotel there in Los Angeles, and meals brought up if I wanted them. First class, you know. Night club down in the basement where I could watch the show. TV and everything. And I'd check in with the prosecuting attorney every day, new information, and this and that, and I was really geared. I guess it was on a Wednesday when the plumbers broke into Ellsberg's psychiatrist's place, and that hit the fan all over, of course. So I went to the guy and says, "I'm going home." He said, "What do you mean you're going home?" And I said, "Well hell there's no use hanging around here. You'd better get yourself a mistrial just as fast as you can and don't delay a minute." He said, "Oh, no, this will all blow over." I said, "Never happen." So the next day they decided they

would get a mistrial and they were able to get one. In the meantime I had to wait a whole day for an airplane to get home to Colorado Springs.

FARLEY: You didn't get a chance to testify?

CARTER: I didn't get a chance to testify. In fact, I was so mad at the preparations I had made and all this information, I had nobody to spew it out to now, you know. (chuckles) That I went out and bought two suits that I still have and I've only worn them once or twice.

FARLEY: Oh, boy.

CARTER: This was in '70 or '71. The kind of suits I don't wear anymore. And then I bought a set of walkie-talkies, Sony walkie-talkies, figuring that Mrs. Carter and I could talk back and forth on the trout stream, you see. What fly are you using? Or when we're duck shooting - "Duck, here they come," or something like that. I spent about 500 hundred bucks of my money.

FARLEY: A waste of time.

CARTER: From disappointment more than anything else.

FARLEY: I remember the "Pentagon Papers" fiasco. We had to send three people downtown to work with the people in preparing for this trial reviewing, you remember that, reviewing all of this material. And I guess most of it was for naught.

CARTER: Yeah, it was. Well, they could still try the bastard. They could still try him because they got a mistrial.

FARLEY: The statute of limitations is still in force?

CARTER: I don't know about the statute of limitations. Maybe that's worn out. But he's a no good so and so. And then looking back to that Partridge Committee that I told you about, when I came in here from Fort Bliss, and as I recall Ellsburg was one of the junior think tank types who was assigned to the staff. I'm getting loquacious now.

FARLEY: No, no, that's great.

CARTER: But you get these things unloaded then I can forget about them for a while.

FARLEY: Let's see, 44. ((#44-Did you have any significant confrontations with the CIA, DIA or State Department in your first few months as DIRNSA?)) You talked about some of those.

CARTER: Forty-four, let's see. I told you about the super grades. I think I told you about my decision to upgrade the participation of NSA in community activities.

FARLEY: Yes.

CARTER: That is the stature of the people.

FARLEY: Yes. I have a note under 44, Dr. Fubini and the DoD. Problems, question mark. Did you have any knock down drag outs with Fubini? Or was he just miserable to deal with?

CARTER: The day I was to go to NSA, the day before, somewhere along in there, he sent for me. He was DDR&E. And I had this agreement with Vance that I would work under him for a month or two until Vance was able to get rid of him. I don't think Vance liked him very much either. I detested

line missing?

him up as a very competent, radar technician who had gotten promoted far beyond his competence to manage anything.

FARLEY: Blake said that he was a brain but he was difficult to work with. He just couldn't get along with him.

CARTER: Well, I couldn't get along with him either. He's so damned opinionated. Anyway he got me over there, called me up or something, and said, "The first thing you've got to do when you take over NSA is arrange an educational course for yourself, and you ought to spend at least two hours a day on learning the art of cryptology."

FARLEY: Ohhh.

CARTER: And I said, "Is that all?" He said, "Well, it may take you three hours a day." I said, "For how long?" He said, "Oh, probably indefinitely."

FARLEY: Oh, gad.

CARTER: And so I said, "Well, thank you very much," Gene we called him - "Jusa calla me Gene." (chuckles) "Thank you very much, Gene, but I'm afraid I'm going to have other things to do when I'm in NSA. I'm going to have to depend on the cryptologists who are there and who know what they're doing." And he said, "Well you'll never be able to run the place unless you know more than they do."

FARLEY: Not true.

CARTER: And I said, "Well thank you very much." And I shelved that. I forgot about that immediately.

FARLEY: Oh that's ridiculous.

CARTER: We were saddled with the CCP and that was a disaster. Really the amount of work we put into the CCP would have taken, it would have given us at least three more intercept satellites anyway.

FARLEY: Right. I was just looking for that bit where you hired a jockey to pose behind a stack of material.

CARTER: Yeah, I did that.

FARLEY: And dumped it on somebody's desk.

CARTER: Well, that was two incidents. I was trying to discourage these constant additions to the CCP. Whenever you get a CPA involved in something he wants to know more and he wants to break it down into smaller and smaller elements. And I was tangling mainly with O'Gara and Gallegos who seemed to be getting some support from Vance or Vance's people even though Fubini was no longer there. Talking about these two incidents. Yes, I did take the CCP and I had it all piled up in a great big GI blanket and like in Korea tied the four corners together in the center and got a couple of big security officers who could hardly carry the damn thing, the two of them, and took it up and put it in Vance's office. I had an appointment with him, dumped it there. And he said, "What the hell is that?" And I said, "Well that's the Combined Cryptologic Program. I thought you'd be

interested in what we crank out on demand of your subordinates. Information which we can use a third of for our own purposes, but I don't know what happens to the other two-thirds." We had quite a little conversation. All he could say was, "Well I'll be damned," or something like that.

FARLEY: Did it change his attitude?

CARTER: Well, I don't think so. I think O'Gara started running scared along about that time and was letting up on us, I'm not sure.

FARLEY: Yeah, that was a fiasco.

CARTER: And the other incident was taking the CCP and putting it on one of these ramps that they pushed the waste back and forth you know and all the documentary. Wheelbarrows they were, and piling that up with the CCP and then putting this jockey behind it and having – what was that fellow's name, our photographer, he'd been there for twenty years, a hell of a good guy –

FARLEY: Oh, yeah, Phil Kurtz?

CARTER: Phil Kurtz, yeah, Phil Kurtz taking pictures of it. And I spread those around pretty well. This is your CCP, you know. I was trying to shock them into embarrassment and I think it eventually worked.

FARLEY: It probably did.

CARTER: But going back to Fubini. Fubini kept working on me and I don't know how he got to me. He was on some other committee of some sort. He was still connected with DoD.

And he came over and he insisted that we were putting entirely too much effort on the Soviet problem. He said, "That's a road there's no sense in going down. They're too smart for us. You ought to take that stuff and do something else with it." This is collection. And I tried to explain to him that from my knowledge the art of cryptology is progressive one. That you might come through with a breakthrough that has nothing to do with what you've been doing in the past but the chances are over the long haul there will be a step relationship just like Darwin's theory of evolution. And if you don't collect the stuff when it's alive you're never going to get it.

FARLEY: That's right.

CARTER: And that's why we are doing all of this. And he said, "It's a waste of time and money and everything else. You ought to do away with it." He kept the heat on so much that somehow he got established the Eaton Committee.

FARLEY: Okay, that's another one.

CARTER: And Eaton is a hell of a nice guy. He didn't know what it was all about. I mean he was a nice guy and he was a thorough gentleman and was Chairman of this Committee. And there were staff people assigned from CIA. And Fubini was on the Committee and he tried to control the Committee. I think maybe Norstad was on that, I'm not quite sure. But there was some senior Air Force or Army general on it. We finally got to the point where nobody was listening to anybody. And I got to

Eaton and penetrated him through a cutout. My cutout being another member of the Committee. But I think he was either Army or Air Force, and convince him that this would go on indefinitely. That the thing to do was to leave the responsibility up to the Director NSA and not try to have outside people telling him how to run his business. And that was the way, as I recall, that the report finally ended. And that was a major victory for NSA, I felt.

FARLEY: Yes. Yeah, the report was favorable to NSA.

CARTER: Yeah, as I recall it was. You asked me if I had tangled with Fubini. This was one of the things. And then there was another event involving Kirby which I had previously mentioned which I see no particular point in dragging it out now, but it was a question of distinct disloyalty. I don't mean disloyalty to the United States, but disloyalty to the Director, to me as Director, and to NSA and what NSA stood for. And could very likely, had we pursued it, become a case of disloyalty to the country.

FARLEY: Oh, boy.

CARTER: But there come times when you have to make a judgment on what to do about these things, in the light of other related activities that are going on.

FARLEY: Right, right. Just let it lie then, we won't continue the discussion.

CARTER: Undoubtedly there's something in the records.

FARLEY: I'm sure there is. Okay, how about your relationship with the Deputy Director of CIA, Mr. Helms during your first

year at NSA? You had worked with him before and you knew him pretty well.

CARTER:

He had been one ^{of} my deputies the three years I was in CIA. I don't recall having any problems at all, with Dick Helms or any of the CIA people

FARLEY:

How about Admiral Rayburn? Did you get along with him pretty well?

CARTER:

I never had any contacts with him.

FARLEY:

Not even when you were DIRNSA?

CARTER:

No, he was over with the Navy missile outfit or something or had already retired.

FARLEY:

Oh, had he?

CARTER:

You see he succeeded...No wait, no. He succeeded McCone and I had a year under him as a member of USIB.

FARLEY:

Okay.

CARTER:

But I don't remember having any problems with him. And I don't think he knew what was going on, quite frankly. He was there just a year.

FARLEY:

All right, good. I think you've answered 46, General. "Did you have any problem with resolving problems, difficulties with the Army, and you wearing a green suit like everybody else in the ASA?"

CARTER:

No, I had absolutely no problems there because my experience has been so broad in dealing with civilians and with other services that I didn't think I had on a green suit. I was a purple suiter as far as that was concerned. Remember, I organized NORAD and we made that a

going organization and that was a purple suited outfit where your service affiliations were taken care of by NORAD. And I got the people together early on in the organization of NORAD and I said, "Look this is a brand new concept, a brand new type of organization, it's a tri-service, we're purple suited. There will not be an efficiency report go out of this headquarters on the three top noncommissioned officers and all officers that I have not personally approved. And if it isn't a high rating I'll ask you to move along and be transferred back to your service. So make up your mind now and these efficiency reports will have the same bearing as they do in your service. And if you don't think you can hack it, if you don't think you can be a purple suiter just come to me and I'll arrange for your transfer without disfavor or anything like that. Of course it may be to Greenland, but that's not my problem that's your problem." I talked to them like that and I had a fair number of people come and say I'd like to stick with my service. Fine, no problem. Not big numbers but enough to indicate that service affiliation is a characteristic that in those days it was essential to maintain your service affiliation, if you expected to get anyplace. And we were the first headquarters to try to overcome this. And I think we did it. It got to be a badge of honor to be with NORAD. But it was pretty difficult for some of those people to tackle, to have to take a position against what they knew their service position was. And in

fact, I was a major general and a lieutenant general who was in command of the Army Air Defense, Army Air Defense now, here, and was under my bosses operational control, wrote a letter in to the Chief of the Staff of the Army and said I was a disgrace to the service. I should be retired at once, and get him out of any activities. And the Chief of Staff sent this down to the Director of Personnel in the Army and said, "This doesn't sound like the Pat Carter that I've always known." And it came back with a note, he says, "Pat Carter is *paid* to wear a purple suit. That's what he's doing and that's what we are fostering." And that killed the whole thing.

FARLEY: What kind of a small individual would do something like that?

CARTER: A lieutenant general in the Army. (chuckles) No, I had no problems because you've got to be nonaffiliated. You've got to be a political eunuch.

FARLEY: Yeah.

CARTER: And at my age then, I don't know why I put in the word political. (chuckles) You've got to be totally nonservice oriented if you're going to work in a community of three different suits plus a large civilian community. You've got to be mission oriented, I'm lecturing in the wrong church, but, I like to get it off my chest.

FARLEY: No, no, I understand.

CARTER: You've got to be mission oriented and you've got to forget about the service political implications of decisions that you have to make. It's as simple as that.

FARLEY: Well, you had a lot of experience with joint operations though. You were brought up that way, so to speak.

CARTER: Yeah.

FARLEY: I think we've answered 47. We talked about the request from CIA asking NSA to identify certain traffic.

CARTER: Yeah, I don't remember that, I don't remember that at all.

FARLEY: January of '68. Well this was Rufe Taylor as I remember now. Rufe Taylor was asking why NSA couldn't do this, why we couldn't put an identifier on there. And I think you wrote a very polite letter back saying why.

CARTER: I don't recall that at all, but I was an admirer of Admiral Taylor, I liked him very much. I thought he was a fine fellow.

FARLEY: He was. I remember him at the Watch Committee. He might have been Navy rep and then went to CIA.

CARTER: I think he was Navy rep when I knew him on USIB and then I think he may have been Deputy CIA under Helms, I'm not sure.

FARLEY: Could have been.

CARTER: I'll have to check it out.

FARLEY: Let me switch please Sir.

TAPE IV, SIDE I

FARLEY: Let's see, we're on the top of 48. Whenever you want to break, Sir.

CARTER: I'm good until four o'clock if you are.

FARLEY: Excellent, excellent. Now, as I say, in 48, we could discuss some of the crises that happened during your tenure. And there are about eight of those. Do you want to start and go down the list? How should we handle this? What's the best way to handle these, Sir? I didn't write any specific questions, because I thought they might be classified and I thought we could play it by ear. There are some that you might want to talk about and others just pass off. Like the Czech crises, there's not much to say about that.

CARTER: No. You're getting into operational matters now which don't give me a problem as far as security is concerned, but they give me a problem as to my knowledge of what was done to meet certain situations. Obviously in the Vietnam War, it was the only war we had at the time. We had to move positions and targets and things like that over to accommodate the needs of the field commander. At the same time we had to take care of our national interests as much as we could. And I left that up to the technicians really. I didn't know enough quite frankly to get involved in those things whether you concentrate on this or that.

FARLEY: I understand. I was thinking at the Directorship level. That anything that you had related to decisions made by the White House or State or JCS. Anything that you might have been involved in in discussions with these people during the Vietnam War, the Tet Offensive, and all of this. Like the briefing by the UN Rep on the movement of the 325th North Vietnam Division South. Things like that. You might have said, I bless you, go ahead and give the briefing. Something like that. Not the operations.

CARTER: No, I don't recall too much of that.

FARLEY: Remember Lodge when he briefed on the movement of this unit which was the first move of the North Vietnamese troops southward. The infamous 325th Division.

CARTER: I briefed Lodge?

FARLEY: No, Lodge briefed the UN, but you were in charge at DIRNSA.

CARTER: No, I don't recall.

FARLEY: I've forgotten who our rep was at the UN at that time.

CARTER: I don't recall that.

FARLEY: All right.

CARTER: I had a very personal interest in the Vietnam War because my son was over there twice, and his name was Marshall N. Carter and my name was Marshall S. Carter. And he was a lieutenant commanding a reinforced company of Marines way the hell out on the beach someplace on one assignment. And the other assignment, second

assignment, he was a U.S. advisor to a Vietnamese division commander, actually a Corps Commander, who was operating in Laos and Cambodia. And I had a very personal concern there because of the name similarity, in case he was captured.

FARLEY: Oh, yes.

CARTER: That was a deep worry to me. Because I had known from prior sources that I had been on the KGB list almost ever since the ice hockey fiasco here. (chuckles) I was over there three or four times. Only once to see him, the rest of the time I was over there to see if they were getting what they thought they needed in the way of active tactical intercept.

FARLEY: Okay. Well that's one thing that you might want to talk about. Something, as I say, that's at top level.

CARTER: Well I talked to Westmoreland and I talked to Harkins, they were the two commanders. I've forgotten who the ambassador was at the time. It may have been Lodge.

FARLEY: Sullivan?

CARTER: A little bit of everybody. Lodge was there for awhile. Taylor. General Taylor was there for a while.

FARLEY: I've forgotten. Sullivan was Laos, I guess.

CARTER: I don't know, but I always talked to the ambassador when I went to those places. Then of course I visited Thailand and places like that.

FARLEY: Were the commanders fairly pleased with the support they were getting?

CARTER: As far as I could make out they had no complaints. At least none that they voiced to me. We had turned over most of the operational control of our elements in those areas that had a tactical capability to the ASA or AFSS operations. And as well as in the Navy. It was a localized war. And our national interests could be met from sources outside of the tactical needs. As I recall being briefed on and agreeing that that, yes, give the tactical commander as much as he could possibly use in the way of stuff who's half life was maybe a week or something like that, that was of immediate use to him. And not get so carried away with the broad gauge stuff that he was short changed. That was my general position and beyond that I didn't have the competence to say where or what to concentrate on.

FARLEY: Was there any problem with security relating to certain type low-level intercept? Wherein I remember years ago that the commanders in the field couldn't receive certain intelligence intercept, because the people back in Washington said, oh, that is too highly classified, and these poor bums were sitting there looking across the line at the enemy shooting at them.

CARTER: No, I don't remember that. I don't remember any problem there. Matter of fact, probably you'll find that we transferred production capability out to the arena to get closer to the source of the need.

FARLEY: Yes. Right.

CARTER: I think. I could be wrong, but that's the way I remember it.

FARLEY: And on certain types of intelligence there was a speed up of the turn around time. If something did have to come back to Fort Meade it was turned around and sent back in we're talking about second now. Less than minutes.

CARTER: Yeah. We did that. Course we had a much greater stable base at NSA than we could possibly have established over there and our security here was fine. We had good communications. But we produced a hell of a lot of stuff, I believe, of great tactical value right there.

FARLEY: Oh, yeah. Right. Was Tom Glenn out there when you visited? Do you remember Tom Glenn?

CARTER: No, I don't remember.

FARLEY: He was one of the last evacuated with the generals and some of the Republic of Vietnam troops.

CARTER: No, I don't remember him.

FARLEY: Okay. That's enough I think on Vietnam. Don't you, Sir?

CARTER: Yeah that's plenty.

FARLEY: *Liberty*. You covered that.

CARTER: I think I covered the *Liberty* enough for this purpose without going into documentation which I don't have any access to. Six Day War, that doesn't excite me. I don't remember much about that. Czech crisis doesn't excite me. Tet Offensive.

FARLEY: That was a surprise really to not very many people.

CARTER: It was a surprise, but it was a big surprise to us the way the media handled it. That just burned my ass. It was about that time I said, "What are we fighting for?" you know. Because according to our operational reports it was a great victory, from our side, once we realized what was happening.

FARLEY: We alerted the field in time. They were anticipating something.

CARTER: Yeah.

FARLEY: So we weren't remiss at all.

CARTER: We being NSA.

FARLEY: NSA, yes, Sir.

CARTER: USS *Pueblo* I think we've covered that. Shootdown of the 121, yeah. I can't think of any other kinds of military crises that happened during that period.

FARLEY: I thought I'd covered most of them but I guess all the others came later.

CARTER: Generally I always had the feeling that NSA was ahead of the alert warning game from our own analytical capabilities. That the people who were doing this they had more of a sense of impending problems in NSA rather than the entire intelligence community who may be being held back cautiously for other purposes, I don't know. I just had that sense that if I wanted an immediate reaction to something I'd get it from my own people in NSA before anywhere else. But again this is a self-serving sort of analysis.

FARLEY: Did you spend much time down in the Command Center or the NSOC getting daily briefings?

CARTER: No.

FARLEY: The morning briefing was adequate? I guess you had a daily Director's briefing didn't you? Remember that?

CARTER: I don't think I did.

FARLEY: Didn't you?

CARTER: I can't remember having staff meetings for example of all the top people. I believe in delegation and I believe in holding the delegatee responsible for keeping me informed of what I ought to know to do my job. He ought to know what my job is as much as I ought to know what his job is. I don't remember having a morning staff meeting or anything like that in NSA. Maybe I should have.

FARLEY: I don't remember either. I really don't. As you said, that's a long time ago.

CARTER: We've been through the CCP pretty well I think.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: What's the IGCP?

FARLEY: That's the Intelligence Guidance for COMINT Programming. This was the requirements guidance.

CARTER: From USIB?

FARLEY: Yes, Sir.

CARTER: I don't think we paid a whole lot of attention to it.

FARLEY: Probably not. No, I think that you adjusted it pretty much to your own needs and if you didn't like something you ignored it.

CARTER: That's quite possible. I was getting pretty old and crotchety by this time. The Eaton Committee I pretty well covered that.

FARLEY: Right. Do you remember this Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Watch List?

CARTER: I do remember something about that but not substantively.

FARLEY: Now this was a more detailed listing of U.S. citizens involved in drugs. I mean peddling and protecting. It was a follow up to the general Watch List on people suspected of doing business with foreign countries. Where we were tapping their phones and reading their mail and getting a feedback from Western Union and McKay radio and all these places, so that we could follow these people. SHAMROCK. Remember the SHAMROCK and this type operation. Do you any thoughts or any comments on whether we did wrong?

CARTER: No, if something like came up to me for decision I felt qualified enough in my own mind to make the decision whether or not we would do it. Even if I was aware that we might be breaking the law or that we might be violating regulations. General Marshall once told me, he said, "If you see a need that something has to done and you in your judgment have the capability to do it unless

you are actually breaking a law that you're familiar with, or unless you are financially unable to pick up the culpability in case they catch you soon enough, then make your own judgment as to whether or not you're going to do it." He said, "Don't start asking people. The easiest thing to get is a turndown."

FARLEY:

Yes.

CARTER:

And he said, "That is purely self-protective in the other guy's bailiwick. So if you see a need to do something go ahead and do it." And he was applying that more to how I behaved in acting for him in a number of areas, I think. But generally it's pretty damned good advice.

FARLEY:

Yeah, it is good advice.

CARTER:

Which kept me from worrying about the ACLU or Congressional Committee edicts or things like that, or some directive put out by the Secretary of Defense. It was a hell of a lot easier to ignore it or get it lost if it somehow didn't fit in with your concept of what your responsibilities were. Because the genesis of regulations starts at the bottom and by the time it gets up to a Secretary he not only doesn't know what the problem is he doesn't know what the solution is. I'm talking about general regulations.

FARLEY:

Yes.

CARTER:

He knows what his staff wants him to do and in the interest of getting along to some other business he'll sign off on it. This has been my experience. So if you're

holding the bag on something then the best thing to do is to act in what you think is the best national interest. Okay?

FARLEY: Makes sense.

CARTER: Be prepared to take the circumstances whatever they might be. By the time they catch up with you you're either dead or they're out of office or the event has occurred and it's all over with anyway.

FARLEY: Yeah. People have forgotten.

CARTER: If you want to rationalize.

FARLEY: Yeah, that makes sense. Absolutely.

CARTER: Well, that's the way I tried to conduct myself and so far I haven't been in jail.

FARLEY: The FBI and the black bags job. You were involved with a request that you had to take to J. Edgar Hoover and he turned you down. That's the reason I put that statement in there. Do you remember that?

CARTER: Yeah. Yeah. There were two instances. He turned me down on that, I think, because I wasn't properly prepared before going to see him and was unable to convince him of the need for this. I've forgotten exactly what it was. But I was turned down. I remember going back to him later on and getting an operation of this sort approved. Somewhere along in there we had a change in administration. I had agreed with Hoover that I would brief President Johnson, which I did. Then there was a change in administration and Nixon came in with

Haldeman and Erlichmann and that crowd. And I got in touch with Mr. Hoover and told him I thought it was essential that the new President be briefed and he said, "Will you take care of it?" And I said, "Yes, I will take care of it." So I went to see President Nixon. This was impossible. It was just like getting into the Kremlin. There was no way I could get by Haldeman without his knowing exactly what I had in mind, what I was going to tell the President in detail. So I said, "Well, I'm calling on behalf of myself and J. Edgar and we have a project going that President Johnson had approved, President Kennedy was aware of it." This stems back all the way to when I was in CIA. "And I think President Nixon should know about it." He said, "Well what is it?" And I said, "Well it's very sensitive and you've got enough to do." I had the wrong approach obviously. "You've got enough to do without having to carry this on your shoulders, too," which apparently did nothing but whet his appetite. And I realized then that that was the wrong approach and I was dealing with a first class son-of-a-bitch. (chuckles) I thought he was manageable. First and only contact I ever had with him. So he said, "Well there's no way you can get in to see the President without I know exactly what it is and what you're going to tell him." I said, "Well in that case forget it." So I went right to the telephone and called up J. Edgar and told him, "I'm sorry I can't get through Haldeman and as far as I'm concerned let's knock

this whole thing off lock stock and barrel." He said, "That suits me." So Haldeman then called up Hoover after I had left and he said, "Carter was over here with a proposal. He wanted to see President Nixon to brief him on it and you'd better tell me what it's all about." And Hoover said, "Oh, yeah, we cancelled that. You can forget about it. You don't have to worry it." So I jumped the gun by about a minute and a half, you see, so it left Hoover in the clear. We cancelled the operation. It wasn't very productive anyway quite frankly and it had just about worn out its usefulness. So we cancelled that one and that's the only black job thing that I'm familiar with. I know that I was there at NSA for a year or so before I even knew, before Tordella briefed me.

FARLEY: Yeah, there was one that you and somebody else from NSA went down to talk to him about, and at first he approved it and then he sort of backed off, and I was trying to recall what it was.

CARTER: I don't know. I don't know. I don't know where you got the information on question 50. ((#54(?) Accomplishments at NSA))

FARLEY: Oh, these are people I've talked to.

CARTER: You mean like telephone operators.

FARLEY: No, no, no.

CARTER: I always went down and visited the telephone operators.

FARLEY: No.

CARTER: Of all the people in the Agency they are the least recognized.

FARLEY: That's right.

CARTER: And I'd visit them about once a week or so.

FARLEY: No, these are people that are in high level positions now. And I told them that I was coming out to talk with you and they said, "Tell him and make sure that General Carter knows that he took us out of the woods and made us an Agency that's appreciated, recognized and respected." And talking about the Seal and talking about trying to become an individual separate agency and respect within the community. That's what they said. And they said, "Thank him."

CARTER: Well, thank you.

FARLEY: That's great.

CARTER: I won't argue with that. That sounds real good to me.

FARLEY: All right. Let's see what else. Okay, DEFSMAC, you talked about DEFSMAC. No, that comes later.

CARTER: We're on page 6, the bottom of page 6. All of that I think comes from where? The development of the NSA seal is covered pretty well by Bamford. I couldn't add to that at all.

FARLEY: Let me see.

CARTER: This is 50 we're on now, right?

FARLEY: Yeah. Let me just a read a bit from Bamford on that black bag. He had talked about a midnight break in at the offices of the Syrian Legation in New York City or the Iraqi

Embassy in Washington to get a codebook that would be a valuable assist to the cryptanalysts and a scrambler phone. And it says, "With a brief stroke of the pen former gang buster Hoover ended it all on July 19, 1966." And he talked with William Sullivan and said, "No more such techniques must be used." And then you and Tordella went down in '67 and talked with him and you came away empty handed. It says, "In his note to Tordella and Carter Hoover indicated that he would conduct black bag jobs for the NSA only if so ordered by the President or Attorney General." That's what I had reference to. Do you remember that?

CARTER: No, quite frankly I don't. It there was a note though it ought to be in the file someplace. And I somehow can't see Hoover putting this in a note. I can see the possibility of Tordella or me writing a memorandum for record just to close something like that out.

FARLEY: Maybe so. But Hoover wrote something and he stamped or had somebody say, the stamp on the outside say, DO NOT FILE. So it could have been burned with many of those other files.

CARTER: I don't know.

FARLEY: Let's see. Yeah, "brought us into the real world. Gave us status, recognition and prestige." These are quotes from some of these people. Okay. You remember the picture on the front of the NEW YORK TIMES magazine section of Bundy, McGeorge Bundy?

CARTER: Yeah. Very much, because that occurred just about as I told Bamford.

FARLEY: Yeah, I read that. Okay, the establishment of DEFSMAC. I've interviewed five of the directors of DEFSMAC. Goes back to Charlie Tevis. Remember Charlie Tevis?

CARTER: Yeah.

FARLEY: He was the first.

CARTER: Yeah, very well and favorably.

FARLEY: Yeah, very fine fellow. Nervous like a waterbug.

CARTER: Sure.

FARLEY: Did you recognize the need for such an organization as DEFSMAC? That there were two or three separate organizations working on the same targets and projects?

CARTER: Yeah. I don't know whether I recognized it, but I was aware of because somebody told me. And that's why I recall saying, "Well hell let's get this ballpark on the same lot and do it all together."

FARLEY: It's a going concern now, believe me.

CARTER: Well I think I had Dick Helms come over and cut the ribbon or something.

FARLEY: That's right. I have pictures of you and General Carroll I think was also there from DIA since it was combined.

CARTER: Yeah, yeah. And they were perfectly willing, as I recall, because I apparently had the funds to do it. What was required, and they didn't have to contribute too much.

FARLEY: That's right.

CARTER: I think that's the way we convinced them.

FARLEY: That might have been it. I didn't know that part of it.

CARTER: Of course we were closer to the source, too. I mean communications wise we were closer to the source.

FARLEY: Right. Was there any trouble with the split responsibility, that is the Chief being a DIA man and the Deputy being an NSA man or alternating every three years or so. Did DIA and Helms accept that pretty much. Did they say that's the way to go? Do you remember that?

CARTER: I don't remember that, no.

FARLEY: Okay.

CARTER: I don't know how long I was there. You've got to realize I left on the 1st of August '69.

FARLEY: '69, right. That was before. I don't know the date of that. All right, the Crypt School, you talked about that, in November '65.

CARTER: Yeah, I take pride in that to the extent that it had been on the books and authorized and nobody had done anything about it when I got there.

FARLEY: Yeah. And they have courses for the entire representation throughout the intelligence community. Periodic CY-600s, CY-400s, and all the others from the top level to the junior officers.

CARTER: And somewhere you will find emblazoned in black and white in heavy pencil "We go first class or we don't go at all." Frank Rowlett had that blown up.

FARLEY: Oh, did he?

CARTER: Yeah, and stuck around in various places.

FARLEY: I'll have to look around to see if that's still there.

CARTER: That was a long time ago.

FARLEY: I know.

CARTER: They might think you're talking about the new toilet system to be put in or something. (chuckles)

FARLEY: Could be. The audio/video center. You said you set that up with Hannah?

CARTER: Hannah, yeah. I don't know where the idea came from except that everywhere I've been, in all organizations the establishment of a unit to assist briefers in doing their job with an expert in presentation helping him I found was essential. And I set it up. Some of the State Department briefings were so poor you fell asleep before the guy had unravelled the first sheet. And then they stand up there and they read what is already up there. Well I'd seen General Marshall get up and leave the room.

FARLEY: Oh, is that right.

CARTER: Oh, five, ten seconds after a guy started reading what he had printed in these big letters. Just get up and leave.

FARLEY: Oh, yeah.

CARTER: So that impressed me.

FARLEY: I can believe it.

CARTER: So I established one in 8th Army, Chief of Staff 8th Army, I established one there. And I had had a lot of problems with the Commanding General as his Chief of Staff, I think I've covered that.

FARLEY: Yes.

CARTER: But the manner of presentation when I got this outfit organized, and I personally got in down there and showed them what I wanted and how it was to be done. And the first time I caught a guy reading off what was printed up there in print he was canned. To hell with it, I wasn't going to put up with that sort of stuff. If they couldn't visualize what they were going to say and say it, eyeball it, to the guy they were briefing, and use charts only as a secondary assistance because of a map or growth chart or something like that. You make your impact on people by looking them in the eye and talking to them and letting them know what you know and what you want them to know.

FARLEY: Absolutely.

CARTER: Not by reading off an alphabet chart. I call them idiot charts.

FARLEY: That's all they are.

CARTER: That's all they are. So, yes, I established that. She expanded it to television recording and things like that. It was very low key when I was there because she was just getting off on it. I did have Sammy Sam ~~ford~~ Admiral Frost, Gordon Blake, I may even have had General Canine.

FARLEY: You did.

CARTER: I did have General Canine?

FARLEY: You have either audios or videos of Canine, Blake, Frost Steve David, Captain Greeley, Paul Neff, Pat Coyne, Frank Austin, Zaslow, and General Morrison.

CARTER: I had them?

FARLEY: Yes, Sir.

CARTER: I didn't realize that.

FARLEY: And I've listened to most of them, most of the audios. So you were the interrogator, the interviewer.

CARTER: Well I'll be damned. I didn't remember that much.

FARLEY: Yeah.

CARTER: A lot of those were in-house, Milt Zaslow and Morrison.

FARLEY: Yeah, yeah, but I have the date period April, May 1970 in some cases. Apparently you came back and did some of these.

CARTER: Yeah, I think I did come back. Maybe I came back for hysterical or historical purposes.

FARLEY: Could be. Some of them are beautiful, beautiful. And as I say, I've listened to most of them.

CARTER: I was pretty active the first three or four years after I retired, in coming back.

FARLEY: Yeah, that's what I said. I copied those down because I knew you'd be interested.

CARTER: But they're still in business?

FARLEY: Yes, Sir, and they'll do justice to a city of a 100 thousand people for the type studio they have.

CARTER: Oh really.

FARLEY: They can do training films, they can do lectures, briefings.

CARTER: Oh, neat. It was sort of fly-by-night when we started.

FARLEY: Yeah, I remember some of them were pretty amateurish in the beginning. But you know the worst thing, General

Carter, there are some old kinescopes, remember the old kinescope days they did some of Canine and some of the people who were around in the 1951s. These are the big slip in projector and so many of them have deteriorated. The audio magnetic tape has peeled off and all they have is some of the video. But we can't get them reproduced. We can't get them put on a VCR or a VHS type format now. And it's tragic that this is gone and that they don't have the techniques now to do this.

CARTER: Yeah. You're not talking about 16 mm sound or anything like that.

FARLEY: No Sir, no Sir. We have some of those, but these are the old, bigger than 35s, almost bigger than 35 mm.

CARTER: I don't remember.

FARLEY: And we have two dozen of those on the racks plus the descending miniaturization of some of those.

CARTER: I have a couple of 16 mm sound, professionally produced movies, in which Mrs. Carter and my younger daughter were parts of this. They had to keep their amateur standing out in Sun Valley. These were advertising, promotional 28 minute TV documentaries about Sun Valley; Sun Valley in Winter and Sun Valley in Summer. And since Mrs. Carter, that's my roommate, and our younger daughter were in the summer pictures the hero and the heroine were, or the love interest were in there.

FARLEY: Sort of a travel type travelogue?

CARTER: Just advertising Sun Valley, Idaho.

FARLEY: Oh I see.

CARTER: But not saying how much it costs or anything like that. It was a whole production, a documentary on what goes on at Sun Valley in the summertime and then what goes on in the wintertime, and they're beautifully done, the skiing and ice skating and everything. But they gave me a copy of each of them and I recently had them put on VCR and sent them to my son and he made a copy of them on a double VCR but by the time it got back to me the double one was no good. So I put them down with a professional outfit here in town, and had them put on a VCR again.

FARLEY: Good.

CARTER: Hopefully they'll come out because the color is spectacular.

FARLEY: Oh I'll bet it is.

CARTER: The plot is ^{not} very sexy or anything. But I'm waiting to see how they come out. Now that was 1955 they were made.

FARLEY: We're trying to get into video, video oral history interviews or documentaries. We're doing a documentary on Yardley, a documentary on Arlington Hall, and a documentary on the path of a document. So it'll be interesting.

CARTER: Yeah.

FARLEY: But the video taping of oral history, I have one and I did four hours and it's exhausting. Harry Daniels, remember

the name Harry Daniels? He was a Chief of COMSEC, he just retired. But I did four hours.

CARTER: He was after my time. I am trying to think of the name of who was Chief of COMSEC when I was there.

FARLEY: Howard Barlow?

CARTER: Barlow. Barlow. The whole time. In fact I dedicated the new building for COMSEC there.

FARLEY: Right. They call that the Carter Building.

CARTER: Oh do they? (chuckles) You mean I'm immortalized?

FARLEY: You're immortalized.

CARTER: Mortar and concrete, in addition to magnetic tape.

FARLEY: Establishment of the Executive for Staff Services, you talked about that. With

CARTER: What number are we on?

FARLEY: We're on 50, all the way down.

CARTER: Fifty. I'd already wiped that one out. Yeah, I think we talked about that.

FARLEY: I wrote in one question, "Compartmentation?" Now this is one of Lou Tordella's pet projects. Compartment everything. That way you protect it. Do you have any thoughts as to whether that was overdone or was it necessary? I'm talking about information. CIA wanted to make it across the board if you had a TS clearance you could view it without an additional clearance? Things like that. Do you think there's a need for that tight compartmentation? Do you remember some of these tight compartments?

CARTER: Yeah, I do. Yeah, we had 12 or 14 of them in NSA when I was there.

FARLEY: Yes, right.

CARTER: I think I'm too far removed from the scene of the action to have a substantive recommendation of any kind. I think the concern should be not so much on in-house access as the possibility of lacking compartmentation outside access. So a guy with a TSC clearance, for example, can come in and have access for a lot of things for which there is no need to know, just because he's one of two million people who have a TS clearance in the United States. That figure I pull out of a hat, but I don't think it's unreasonable.

FARLEY: No, I believe that.

CARTER: I'm talking about industry and everything else.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: I'd have to think about that before I could really - - I'm getting too old to figure out all the nuances. It's the same things with moles. My friend was absolutely convinced there were moles in CIA. There's no reason not to suspect it, no reason not to think there's moles in NSA, too.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: You can live by the mistakes made by the surfacing of a mole, because that then is all after the fact. It's the in-place mole that is the serious hazard to national security I

think. And I still think you ought to crucify the guys who blow things for a monetary or even ideological reasons.

FARLEY: Like the Walkers and the others.

CARTER: Yeah. Howard Dunbars or something like that.

FARLEY: The most recent one...the Peltons and all of those.

CARTER: I really don't have the confidence. I told Gerry Burke, asked me a question like that not too long ago. I'm on an advisory committee of his.

FARLEY: That's what he said.

CARTER: The ISI, and I asked him about that, something about that, and I claimed to him that I really didn't have up to date competence to add anything substantive to what people were now thinking. He said, "On the contrary. I think you should say what you think about some of these things when you're asked."

FARLEY: Well it takes a little recollection, so to speak, that it's been a while and you have to try to look in the deep recesses of your memory to think what your thoughts were then.

CARTER: And they keep getting filled up from the bottom with trivia, like what fly to use on the next trout you're going to fish for.

FARLEY: Right. Sir, we're up to question 50. Why don't we knock it off. I'm getting tired. You're getting tired.

CARTER: I think so, too. We're beginning to lose time now.

FARLEY: I think we'd be better off. And we can pick it up later on.

CARTER: Yeah, I think we're getting into those areas where I...I've already discussed with you at lunch I think the professionalization.

FARLEY: Yes.

CARTER: I think that's important. I think that was something that I did in NSA that I hope they've carried on.

FARLEY: They have.

CARTER: We can discuss that tomorrow.

FARLEY: That's fine, that's fine. So why don't we close her down for today and relax.

CARTER: That would suit me fine.

NEXT DAY

FARLEY: Let's see how we're doing. Coming through loud and clear.

CARTER: You can hear me all right, can you?

FARLEY: Yes, Sir, you've got a good needle there. Good needle.

CARTER: Did you go to the Officers' Club last night?

FARLEY: I went over to Carson and wandered around and it started to rain so I thought well, I'll get back.

CARTER: Oh, it did start to rain?

FARLEY: Yeah. So I came back early and went over to a little Chinese restaurant over on Academy. Had a nice quiet meal, and went back and thought, gee, I'll watch the football game, and I've got a TV that doesn't work

properly and I couldn't see them play. It kept rotating and rotating.

CARTER: That's a shame.

FARLEY: So I just left the sound on.

CARTER: And nobody there obviously to take care of it.

FARLEY: No, they don't care. Sir, I was asking myself questions that I should ask you, and for many, many a year, we've thought at NSA that we should interview characters like Bob McNamara and McGeorge Bundy and the people who were involved closely with Kennedy to see how they used SIGINT at all. And I'd just like your impression. Should we pursue interviews with these characters, could they contribute anything, would they know anything? I know they could talk about the politics and the goings on in the White House, but I was just concerned with what SIGINT contributed to any major decisions the President made or any of these people made. And there are about five or six of these individuals, as you know better than I.

CARTER: Yeah. Well, I don't know at this stage of the game. We're talking about 25 years ago.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: And McNamara has become pretty well discredited in the eyes of the professionals as to his capabilities exhibited while he was Secretary of Defense. I know he's an anathema to the military establishment.

FARLEY: Sir, we've got a red light. I didn't realize...I'm going to turn it off a minute.

TAPE IV, SIDE II

FARLEY: All right, Sir, sorry.

CARTER: That's all right. McGeorge Bundy, both of those people are totally self-centered. In my opinion, they are looking out first for their image and their reputations.

FARLEY: I see.

CARTER: And as you know, McNamara has switched 180 degrees on a number of problems that he was handling for Kennedy.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: Then he went to the World Bank. He was Secretary of Defense for a long, long time, there's no question about that. But his relationships with the senior military were very poor throughout his entire time there. He was basically a quiz kid that had overreached his level of competence, I think. That's my judgment.

FARLEY: Of course.

CARTER: And when people can go back to when I was a captain and say he's already, he Pat Carter, has already exceeded his level of incompetence, so my judgment is purely personal and I think quite introspective, on those people.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: The same way for Brown, who was later Secretary of Defense. He came in I think as one of McNamara's whiz kids.

FARLEY: Yeah, he brought in six or eight of those people, from GM, I think it was.

CARTER: Yeah, Ford, I think.

FARLEY: Ford, you're right.

CARTER: So I don't know, it's hard to tell what you might get. I don't think either one of those two understood the intricacies of SIGINT. They could understand ELINT, okay, but when you got into SIGINT they thought you could fool it. I think. The way they acted. Well that message intercept that we have on McGeorge Bundy to the White House from the airplane?

FARLEY: Um, hummm.

CARTER: I forgot who he was talking to, but whoever it was, he was saying, "You know, the bearded man on that island in the south." That sort of crap. (chuckles)

FARLEY: Great, great. But we have people at the Agency who are eager to have us interview people like Clark Clifford and Henry Kissinger and they go right down the list. I say, no way, no way.

CARTER: I quite agree with you, that as far as substantive historical facts are concerned it would be a dead end, I think.

FARLEY: I think so, too.

CARTER: I really do. You might get a piece here and a piece there that they would recall, but at this late date...Clark Clifford? No he's another of the same group as McNamara and as McGeorge Bundy, who have always aspired to be elder statesmen but never had the

intellectual capacity to do it. Or else were so self-centered that it interfered with their real operations. I'm being very critical you understand,

FARLEY: I understand.

CARTER: because I don't have any admiration for any of the three of them. And why the hell I should sit here as a retarded lieutenant general and say, hey, they weren't worth their salt, doesn't make sense historically and it doesn't make sense intellectually. But I just get these feelings about people.

FARLEY: Right. I just wanted you to confirm my feelings, and you did precisely.

CARTER: I think it would be a waste of time.

FARLEY: I do, too.

CARTER: They've all written books. I don't know about Clark Clifford, but he is a great poseur of our generation.

FARLEY: Right. It's just like the retired brigadier, I've forgotten his last name, he lives in Florida, and he was in Indo-China before and during World War II and he's the one, he claims, that the Dutch intercepted a message that the Japanese were going to attack. We never did intercept it in any of our stations. But we wrote a letter asking him to submit to an interview, participate, and he wrote back and said, "Read my book." Why bother wasting my time. Well, shall we move on, Sir. We talked Career Professionalization Program, you pretty well covered.

CARTER: I think we have covered it. I think that the Career Professionalization , the Career Management Program, the promotion system that were installed during my regime, I think were extremely important.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: Because they first had a tendency to cut down the 'whither thou goest without my permission' type of operation that at times I felt I was subjected to. I'm talking about the second echelon.

FARLEY: But that professionalization program is still in effect and still active and hasn't changed much from the time you started it.

CARTER: This is over and above our cryptologic school.

FARLEY: Yes.

CARTER: It's an in-house professionalization, as I recall.

FARLEY: Right, right.

CARTER: And also took care of intradivision transfers for additional indoctrination. To bring along the bright leaders was my intent and give them something they could look forward to as, "Hey, that's the next step in my career development. Hey, I'm going to be a professional. I'm going to dedicate my career to NSA and the U.S. government." This is the type of thing that I had in mind as motivation.

FARLEY: Yeah. It's a struggle for some of these people to get enough points in order to get professionalized. And they're struggling, they're going to school sometimes a

year and a half taking a variety of courses and getting experience on the job.

CARTER: Yeah. There was one question in here that comes to mind right now. I believe, and I'm quite sure, that we put into effect an in-house regulation that was unenforceable but was somewhat persuasive that when we sent a guy off to school at our expense by god he was committing himself to two or three, or whatever the time was, years back at NSA.

FARLEY: Good. That has been relaxed.

CARTER: Now I don't know whether that's still in existence. And I say, we had no way of enforcing it really. Except somehow to sequester his pay in advance or something like that and make him come back. I think we had one or two violations.

FARLEY: He didn't have to sign a statement?

CARTER: Yes, sure, but what does that mean in our government?

FARLEY: I guess.

CARTER: Even in those days you know.

FARLEY: Well there were two or three instances, and I guess this was after your time, that some of these kids went off and got masters degrees or PhDs and they came back for a year and then went to industry at twice or three times the salary.

CARTER: Sure.

FARLEY: With no remorse and no consideration for what NSA did.

CARTER: Well we were trying to avoid that by requiring some sort of a certificate or something that they would commit themselves. But it's the same thing with the military services. At the three military academies they make a commitment at the end of their second year. For example at the Air Force Academy. Now they can leave anytime during the first two years. But at the end of two years they must make a commitment to go all the way or get out right now and not sign up.

FARLEY: I see.

CARTER: And even then, you figure a couple hundred thousand bucks a year to educate one of these characters. And then when they go all the way from that point on they are committed for five or six more years as an officer.

FARLEY: I would say you have to do it because nowadays life is so relaxed and the generation, they call it the Now Generation, the Me Generation. Tragic.

CARTER: Exactly. What's in it for me?

FARLEY: It's really tragic.

CARTER: A lot of that I guess was inherited from some of the leaders that they had when they were early on.

FARLEY: I guess.

CARTER: But that's a philosophical viewpoint into which I'm not competent to roam.

FARLEY: Let's see. Do you remember the background investigation, the termination of security risks? This was Public Law 8829 1964 where it apparently gave you, as

Director, authority to terminate anybody who was a security risk. Do you remember any incidents where you had to enact this?

CARTER: Did it require a Director's personal decision?

FARLEY: Yes, Sir.

CARTER: I don't recall any. It might have been a cut and dried proposition. Bienvenu was my police officer.

FARLEY: Len is on the Phoenix Society Directorship, too. He's on the board. He's a fine fellow.

CARTER: Yeah, I thought he was a very solid citizen.

FARLEY: Last week or two weeks ago he was pleading his first case before the Supreme Court. He was a little nervous, a little jumpy about it.

CARTER: Was he? I don't recall anything like that.

FARLEY: I was thinking of people of sexual deviation or people who might have been accused of socializing with foreign nationals. Things like that. So you could terminate them?

CARTER: I could terminate them, but I don't recall any case. There could well have been, don't misunderstand me. If there were it was in the records. But I don't recall. It's an interesting thing. The seven and a half years that I was in the intelligence community, both the CIA and NSA there was not a single case of defection or apprehension of suspected espionage activities.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: Now that's not any credit to me or the regime or anything else.

FARLEY: Not, it's just coincidental.

CARTER: It just circumstantially worked out that there was none.

FARLEY: They made up for it later on.

CARTER: Oh, they sure did. I think probably the Martin-Mitchell case put the quietus on any attempts later during that period that I was there. But it's just a matter of interest, that's all. Nothing that I did to prevent it. It might have even been encouraged by my attitude. I used to wander all around NSA. If it got boring in my office or I had something on my mind I'd go down and visit a couple of blonds that were good looking and well endowed and just wander around. And then I'd always drop in and see the telephone operators, and I'd go down to the printing plant, and go over to the place where they were assembling items.

FARLEY: The rotors?

CARTER: No, in-house construction panels and things like that, and just watch the guys work.

FARLEY: I think it was two or three weeks after you arrived I was in the Command Center and you walked in there and I remembered you from the USIB Watch Committee. Nobody jumped up, nobody reacted, and then finally I think I got up and took you in to meet the chief who was astonished. Shook up. Because you were the first Director who ever wandered in like that.

CARTER: I didn't know that.

FARLEY: Except for General Canine.

CARTER: Oh, yeah, well he's a breed of his own. They don't make them like him anymore, I don't think.

FARLEY: I was just reading Wilma Davises interview the other day and she was talking about some of her people and how she indoctrinated people on security. She said, "I had one little old lady who is older than I, who sat out in front of the entry to a certain bay area. And Canine used to have the habit of sneaking up on these people and say, 'What are you doing?' So he came to this bay and started to walk in and the little old lady said, 'Stop. Stop." And he said, "I'm General Canine.' She said, "I don't care if you're a colonel, you're not going in there.'" (Laughter)

CARTER: That's good.

FARLEY: So he respected her and I guess he did get in, but he was great. But he used to wander. Terrorism. Was this fairly early in the game when we had the incidents of terrorism? And my question was, how was this international problem met during your tour as DIRNSA? Was a special organization established? Do you remember anything about this?

CARTER: No I don't. I don't recall anything like happening during my watch in either CIA or NSA.

FARLEY: That's what I was thinking. I think it came subsequent to your tour.

CARTER: It could have, but it wasn't impressed on my mind enough to program it.

FARLEY: If so, it was an isolated incident that we didn't brand as a first incident of terrorism, as I recall.

CARTER: Well that depends on what you mean by terrorism, too. It's got so many definitions.

FARLEY: I guess, yeah.

CARTER: If you've got time.

FARLEY: We have time, Sir.

CARTER: This has nothing to do with CIA or NSA. It does deal with the Bureau.

FARLEY: Oh, yeah.

CARTER: When I was in command at Fort Bliss down in Texas at the Army Antiaircraft Training Command, you know. I got a call fairly early in the morning. I was the Commanding General, probably around midnight I would say, and I had a call from the Director of Aviation at the civilian airport at El Paso, and he said, "We have a Continental airplane hijacked and it is here now and I'd like to have you send over a couple hundred men and six tanks." So I thought, "Look, before I do anything I'm coming on over. In the meantime put a truck in front of that airplane," because they don't back up worth a goddamned. You know, a jet. So I then called up Frank Crosby, who was the local FBI representative and a good friend of mine and we had been through the ^{Bogota} Bogota revolution together earlier on. So I told him and I said, "Come on over to the airport and we'll see what the hell is going on." So we went over there and people were frantic, of course. The plane was

full of passengers and the pilot and the front cockpit area were under control of apparently a man and his son, or at least two males, demanding refueling and taking off for Cuba. That was their destination. And this, I think, was either the second, probably the second hijacking now. We're talking hijacking.

FARLEY:

Yes Sir.

CARTER:

And these people were armed. And Frank and I talked it over. As I said we had been through the ^{Bogota} Bogata revolution together and had learned not to panic under these things. He probably was trained that way. Anyway we decided that the first thing that we had to do was to get the passengers off the airplane. So we established communications with the pilot and were able to get the passengers off the airplane. But in the process, as I recall, in the process Frank and an assistant he had went on the airplane. Meantime we had to decide what to do. We couldn't get any response from the Bureau, any command response from the Bureau. I couldn't get any command response from the War Department, from the Department of the Army. Of course we did not have two hundred men and six tanks out there. No way. We decided that early on. So the pilot was getting very very edgy and rightfully so. As you're aware, we got the passengers off. Frank was not on board yet. So we refueled the airplane. In the meantime the communications between us and the pilot on board and

so forth, were in the clear and crowds started coming around, you see. In the meantime, the airport manager, even before I got there, had called the sheriff's office. So there were a lot of cars around and lights flashing and all this crap, so we got the airplane refueled, as I recall. Then the question was what do we do now? We were under the impression that since these guys wanted to go to Cuba the chances are they were Cuban operators of some sort. As I recall, the pilot sort of dissuaded us by saying under his voice, "These guys are kooks," or something like that. (chuckles) The next thing we do is we call up Big (Bob) Six. Big (Bob) Six owns Continental Airlines, see.

FARLEY: Oh, okay.

CARTER: And we get him out of bed and we said, "Look, your airplane is hijacked here and we've got all the passengers off and they want to go to Cuba. What do you want to do about it? We can't get any response from anybody else." He said, "Well, yeah, it is my airplane. Don't let them off the ground." Okay, that's good enough for us. So we gave the guy clearance to take off. Meanwhile, Frank had gotten on board. So we gave the guy clearance to take off. I'm getting confused because it was so long ago and I just recalled it.

FARLEY: That's all right, that's all right.

CARTER: I don't know whether Frank was on board or not at this point in time. Anyway, so he starts rolling down the taxiway to get out on the runway and Frank gave him the

signal and they started shooting the wheels off this airplane, see, from outside. And they flattened those wheels in a hell of a hurry. In addition, they had a ricochet go through one engine, too, which pretty effectively stopped the airplane from going anywhere, wheels or not. So then the problem was what do we do. By now it's eight o'clock in the morning and there must be two thousand people all around. The airport was built in sort of a sump just like Kansas City. You ever been to Kansas City?

FARLEY: Yes.

CARTER: With big embankments all around, and here are people all around on the embankments watching. Somehow Frank talked himself onto the airplane and I've forgotten just how that was. But he went up and had enough of an eye contact with the pilot to indicate that the things to do was to jump these two guys.

FARLEY: Hmmm.

CARTER: Which they did, and they disarmed them and got them down. And it turned out to be an ^{itinerate} iterant farmer from somewhere in Oklahoma and his son who were both off their rockers. Just didn't know what they were doing really. I don't know what ever happened to them but they were disarmed and taken off, and here was poor old Big (Bob) Six' airplane all shot to hell, you know, from keeping it from taking off. (chuckles)

FARLEY: That's the gamble, I suppose.

CARTER: I think that was either the first or second hijack. The second or third hijacking in this country.

FARLEY: Yeah. But that was probably one of the few that was kept on the ground. Most of them subsequent to that were permitted to fly to Cuba and dump off the hijackers and come back.

CARTER: Yeah. Well, I don't know, that's the way we handled it down there. As far as terrorism is concerned this turned out to be a dud. It was purely a couple of kooky people thinking they could improve their way of life I suppose by going to Cuba.

FARLEY: Yeah. Most of them are fanatics or kooks, whatever.

CARTER: Yeah. But I don't remember anything in CIA or NSA that was of any concern. When I was travelling with General Marshall all over the world we had no security guards with us. We were going through the battlefields of World War I in France at the second session of the United Nations and there was General and Mrs. Marshall – we did have two cars – and me and Vernon Walters who was a major or a lieutenant colonel at that time as our interpreter, translator, wonderful guy, and Sergeant George who was General Marshall's enlisted aide. And there were the five of us plus the French driver. And we stopped at sort of a small chateau to spend the night and I had a phone call from the Embassy that Bernadotte had been assassinated.

FARLEY: Oh yes.

CARTER: Count Bernadotte. And that they had information indicating that General Marshall would be the second one. So here we were looking all around. We were in this French hotel, Charmand, whatever it was, and we had one pistol amongst us. Sergeant George had that in his suitcase. There wasn't much we could do. We had inspected the room beforehand just automatically to make sure if there was a fire, because they were on the second floor. If there was a fire that was my main concern in all of these old places fire, that General and Mrs. Marshall could get out. And there was just one window there, a small window and everything else was out into the hall. So we took turns sitting outside General and Mrs. Marshall's door.

FARLEY: All night?

CARTER: All night, with this one pistol you see. Well it was all we could do.

FARLEY: I guess. Right.

CARTER: At least all we could do of our own capabilities. In those days you didn't worry about these things. Nowadays you'd call in the whole French army to surround the place to surround the place, or something. That was how lax, if you want, or rather how the threat had not developed to anything beyond a simple disturbance or something in crowds. But that did lead to my going to the FBI School at Quantico. As soon as we got back I went down there and took a course in quick draw and how to spot these guys in

crowds. There is a distinct system for spotting these people, the threat people. So I went through that course and qualified. I didn't go into the microscopic fingerprinting or anything like that. Purely in the reaction-to-threat proposition.

FARLEY: I shouldn't add my experiences to this too because this is your interview. But between 1951, '52, '53 I lived in an apartment right across from the west side of the old Statler Hotel. And I remember one time when General Eisenhower was coming there for a speech, maybe it was his inauguration, I don't know, but anyway my windows faced the open door on the Statler. And I remember sitting there myself watching Eisenhower coming out by himself and a few others, people drifting around and getting into the car. And I thought, just like happened later on.

CARTER: Yeah, sure.

FARLEY: Could have been knocked off right there. But nobody cared. Just as you said it was so bloody relaxed.

CARTER: Eisenhower wasn't President then. Eisenhower came in in '53.

FARLEY: Well it was '53 then.

CARTER: Yeah, '53, because I had gone to Alaska in November of '52 when Bob Lovett told me to get out of town. I think I've covered this.

FARLEY: It was '53 Sir yes.

CARTER: Not that I wasn't a political eunuch or politically unsexed whatever you want to call it. But just the association over a long period of time with the Truman administration.

FARLEY: It was '53 because I remember shortly thereafter I went over to Germany which was in December of '53, so it was a couple of months before that. But we have a pretty involved organization now taking care of terrorism, in the old G Group.

CARTER: Yeah, well I think you need it and you should have it and I would hope it would be productive.

FARLEY: Yeah. A lot of good people there.

CARTER: An organization now. You're talking about a SIGINT organization?

FARLEY: Yes Sir.

CARTER: Okay. You're not talking about the Bienvenu type.

FARLEY: No, no, no, no, just a SIGINT type.

CARTER: When I was Deputy CIA and when I was NSA I went all over the world. Well now that's an exaggeration, but I went to a lot of places where I had to go, Vietnam, Thailand and all those places, and I just took with me either or early on I took Ollie Kirby on one trip. And when I was in CIA I just took my Special Assistant. Nobody else, no advance notification or anything else, and we always went commercially. I never took my own airplane outside of the country. By my own airplane, I mean we didn't hire one from the Air Forces or anything like that. We went commercially. No sweat.

Later on I'm retired and my former Special Assistant in CIA is now the Deputy Director of CIA. Now we're talking about present times, maybe 15 years ago. He's from Craig, Colorado.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: So he was coming out here and I asked him to be my guest at the cooking club. He accepted, came into the Broadmoor, stayed in the Broadmoor, had two bodyguards.

FARLEY: My gosh.

CARTER: Now believe it. Two bodyguards, when we went up to the cooking club which is a club of 40 people that meets nine times a year. A small lovely place, maybe we'll have a chance to look at it, and the boys had to come along with him. And they had to be out in a separate room getting some supper while we were there. That's how far we had gone. I retired in '69 and this is like probably, well it was during the period George Bush was DCI. Because Hank Knoche was his Deputy, so you see it would be in that period. But that's how far it had gone. Two bodyguards on the Deputy Director of CIA and here I'm up in the front lines actually in Vietnam at one time visiting my son.

FARLEY: Things have changed for the worst.

CARTER: That's how things have changed. Yeah.

FARLEY: For the worst.

CARTER: I've got some fascinating stories about General Marshall, under these circumstances.

FARLEY: Did he have protection like that other than yourself and his enlisted aide?

CARTER: No, no, the whole time he was Secretary of State the whole time he was Secretary of Defense. He and I went to Korea in June of '51 and we went under cover. But the only reason we went under cover was that we didn't want the press to be conjecturing about things. It was under cover against the press and the media as distinct from protecting General Marshall. And it was just the two of us, there wasn't anybody else. We were on a government airplane and flew into Tokyo and transferred to General Ridgeway's airplane on the end of the runway. It was a very simple deception cover plan in that we went to Washington University outside of St. Louis to get General Marshall a degree and he gave a speech there. This was June of '51. And McCauliffe the G-1 of the Army at that time had been coming back from Korea, okay, so we changed airplanes in St. Louis on the end of the runway and it was just a question of getting out of one airplane and getting into the other. And so the plane returning was ostensibly McCauliffe.

FARLEY: Was that the "Bastogne" McCauliffe?

CARTER: Yeah, yeah. You know, "nuts."

FARLEY: "Nuts," right. Okay.

CARTER: And then we went all the way out to Tokyo and nobody knew where we were, publicly. Transferred to Ridgeway's airplane, went over to Korea, spent the day over there

flying all around in these goddamned little puddle jumpers, the L5s.

FARLEY:

Oh, boy.

CARTER:

Miserable flying and storming and gusty clouds and everything else. And General Ridgeway said to General Marshall and I was right. We had five of these little airplanes. He said, "It's pretty bad weather," General Ridgeway did to General Marshall, and Marshall said, "Yeah. I've seen worse." That was always his answer, "I've seen worse." No matter what it is. And Ridgeway said, "Well perhaps we'd better not go." We were going to fly along the DMZ area. I don't think the DMZ at that point had been settled, but we were flying along the front lines to see how the troops were deployed, and General Marshall looked down and said, "Well Ridgeway, if I wasn't here would you go?" And Ridgeway said, "Yes Sir." He said, "Well let's get loaded."

FARLEY:

Good.

CARTER:

And off we went. I've had some frightening rides, but this was one of the worst.

FARLEY:

Oh, I can believe it in those damned light planes.

CARTER:

Yeah, very light, bouncing all over the place through little cloud clusters and everything. But there was no protection there. We spent three days with Ridgeway in Tokyo. MacArthur had been relieved, Ridgeway had taken over there. Van ^{Fleet}Vleet was in command in Korea.

Spent three days with Ridgeway in Tokyo, drove around the city and everything.

FARLEY: Was it just to bolster the morale of the troops? Just to tell them "We're behind you."

CARTER: I suppose so, but that was really Ridgeway's job and Van ^{Fleet's} Vleet's job and they did it. The whole atmosphere changed when Ridgeway came in and took over over there. That was while MacArthur was still in command, and when he went into Japan, Van ^{Fleet} Vleet came in and took over. They're both hell for leather. Field commanders. And the morale went right up. I don't know how we got started on this except they say old soldiers never die they just get more loquacious.

FARLEY: Let's see. Relationship with the ...

CARTER: For your transcriber loquacious is l-o-q-u-a-c-i-o-u-s.
(chuckles)

FARLEY: Some of them can't spell it, right. Relationship with the NRO. As Director of NSA did you have any conflicts or any friction with the people at NRO?

CARTER: No, I don't recall any at all. Most of those conflicts had been ironed out when I was Deputy CIA. Because I tangled with McMillan, Brockway McMillan. The Air Force, again it was inter-service problems. The Air Force were at that point I felt trying to gather in to their cover, into their bed, all of the satellite activities no matter whether it was collection, photography, SIGINT, ELINT. No matter what it was, and including overhead

reconnaissance from aircraft, they wanted to control the whole thing. We in CIA had the competence to work with industry to develop the satellite instrumentation not to launch the satellites but what they did after they got up there. The machinery, the guts, that were in the animal. We were working very closely with several major manufacturers in the CIA, particularly Eastman Kodak and I've forgotten, one or two others. And of course, we were at the same time developing the SR-71 which was my major project in the CIA. We called it the A-12 then and improving the U-2. But the SR-71 was under deep wraps and the Air Forces wanted no part of it.

FARLEY: I wonder why?

CARTER: They wanted no part of the U-2 because it wasn't strategic bombing. It was intelligence collection. I'm simplifying this whole operation you understand.

FARLEY: Understand, understand.

CARTER: And they wanted no part of the A-12 which was a supersonic. Oh my God how very high altitude airplane. (chuckles) We called it the A-12. We were developing that. They didn't want to get involved in that until we had finished all of them. Of course we were using Air Force facilities. We were using Air Force pilots sheepdipped, and then we were using or had planned to use Air Force, we were training them in the A-12. And we were working directly with Lockheed on that aircraft.

And it wasn't until we had test flown it and everything was going great that the Air Force became interested.

FARLEY: Naturally.

CARTER: It's just interesting how those things take place.

FARLEY: Was CIA involved at all in the development of the drones? Remember the drones? They used a lot of those in Vietnam.

CARTER: No, I don't...no that was...

FARLEY: That came later I guess.

CARTER: No, it came before. These were radio controlled.

FARLEY: Yes.

CARTER: Or perhaps they had instrumentation to flight control them, but we had the small models 12 foot wing span for target use back in the '50s, I'm reasonably certain, in the anti-aircraft.

FARLEY: Oh, did they?

CARTER: So it was just a question of developing those into drone aircraft.

FARLEY: I've forgotten the code names, the identification of some of these drones that were communication intercept type drones that we used a lot of.

CARTER: Yeah. I don't recall being involved in that in CIA at all. That had much more of a military application because they were low-level and low-speed. No, I think that would have been purely military.

FARLEY: Let's see. DoD Inspection, DINS, 1965. I think you had some responsibility for bringing the DoD team out to NSA

and setting them up to wander around and observe what some of our people were doing and getting their money's worth, the best boom for the buck.

CARTER: That name is familiar, but I don't recall.

FARLEY: DINS, yeah. DoD Inspection System or Service.

CARTER: What were they supposed to be doing?

FARLEY: Just to see that the monies delegated to NSA were being spent properly. And they had a young fellow in charge, Dick somebody, who was in charge of about a three or four man team who would go in and sit down with certain people in various elements of NSA and just watch what they were doing and prepare a report. But I think you suggested that this would probably be worthwhile to have such a unit out there.

CARTER: I may have but it certainly was not designed to give me any help other than to keep guys like Fubini and O'Gara out of the act.

FARLEY: That could have been it.

CARTER: If I generate anything like that it would have been altruistic, I think that's the proper word. (chuckles)

FARLEY: Yeah, right, for you.

CARTER: Self-centered for the good of NSA. If it had been generated from DoD as an inspection team to come over and see what we were doing I probably would have fought it. Because I really had problems.

FARLEY: No, I think you invited it, from what I've read and seen a lot of the memos and the M/Rs that you sort of welcomed it.

CARTER: I don't recall enough about it, Bob, to really zero in on the genesis.

FARLEY: Beautiful.

TAPE IV/B and TAPE V/A

FARLEY: ((A note to the transcriber: This insert follows cassette number IV and precedes cassette number V because of a bad cassette that twisted the tape for about three minutes of interview. Since part of the interview was lost, the general discussion is repeated at the end of cassette number VII. The tape on this damaged set recovered and corrected itself and a portion of the interview is useful. It is that portion that follows. Now this is the end of the note to the transcriber.)) We'll continue with the remainder of the interview.

FARLEY: General Carter, a question on Second and Third Parties. You mentioned a little bit earlier. The question is Sir, what was NSA's relationship with Second and Third Party organizations during your tenure? And, second part, were you pleased with the agreements between the Agency and the Second Party organizations? Was the division of effort mutually beneficial?

CARTER: (Portion inaudible) I was made a member of the Maryland Club which is one of the oldest in the country. They made me an honorary member during my tour of duty _____ (?). It so happened that the president of the Maryland club at that time was

when I was in CIA and he had retired. Anyway, that is a wonderful place to entertain, private room and

everything was well done. So Joe always looked forward to that. In the correspondence, I guess somewhere, in the Marshall Foundation correspondence I believe letters to me and responses by me to Joe talking about a couple of big radar stations that he wanted to put in there. This came out in the *Puzzle Palace*. I'm not helping you much on the question

FARLEY: Yes, you are.

CARTER: I'm trying to figure out just where I did fit in at the social level, of meeting the people and having the proper guards of honor and stuff for [redacted] all those things. And making all the social arrangements. I say I did know Sir Roger Macons who I think was Ambassador to the United States at that time. I had known him when I was over with the European Correlation Committee in London. I guess my relationships with Second Party people were mostly at that upper level and I did not get involved in the technical aspects of whether it was a worthwhile operation.

FARLEY: When you were in London did you have any association with GCHQ, the people at GCHQ?

CARTER: Not to my knowledge. Not that I remember. No. Most of my relationships there with the British were also purely social except working with Sir Roger Macons on the initial discussions with the Brussels Pact Nations on the European Correlation Committee. But that was so long ago I really don't remember what the hell we were doing.


It was the beginnings of NATO, but it was on a classified basis.

FARLEY:

Do you think the monies we've spent with the GCHQ people and the Britishers has paid off? Have we received enough in return for that investment?

CARTER:

Well I don't know how much of an investment we have in there. I think one of the primary advantages we have in our relationships with GCHQ is first we are talking the same language.



I fought that initially with McNamara.

McNamara's concept of the military budget was to civilianize everything that he possibly could. The two moves that disturbed me most was Cheltenham and taking away the Marines.

FARLEY:

Guards?

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CARTER: The guards from NSA. Those both disturbed the hell out of me. ((Portion inaudible.))

FARLEY: ((Second note to transcriber: This ends the insert. Please proceed to cassette number V for transcribing.))

TAPE V, SIDE ONE

FARLEY: All right let's pick it up on this one, Sir, and see what happens.

CARTER: Okay.

FARLEY: I can get the rest of this. It's been recorded and the tape sort of bent a little bit, but I can redo that.

CARTER: Well I couldn't possibly recall what I've already said because I shoot from the hip anyway.

FARLEY: It's on, it's on. And we were talking about?

CARTER: We're talking about McNamara's view that the way to save on the military budget was to civilianize things and I didn't believe in that. Particularly in areas where the living conditions were reasonable for military people but unreasonable for civilians.

FARLEY: Oh, yeah.

CARTER: Cheltenham was one of the things that I felt we were better off leaving alone and leaving it as a military operation. And I say, I fought that but I was overruled as I recall. So there again I said we go first class or we don't go at all. Which was whistling in the dark because we'd already been told to do it. I selected Hugh Erskine after

personal eyeballing and talking to him, and as I recall he had a very attractive wife, too.

FARLEY: Yes, she is a nice lady.

CARTER: These are things that sometimes you lose sight of if you get immersed in the technical aspects of it. Which generated my problem with Lou Tordella on sending over as SUSLO. But it's that sort of thing that I felt I had some competence in.

FARLEY: You knew people for sure.

CARTER: In sizing up people and will they fit into the atmosphere in which we have thrust them. That's the point. Regardless of how competent they might be. I didn't want to send incompetence, but when you're operating at the level of SUSLO you don't have to be a technical SIGINT man, in my opinion. I wanted a presence, okay? That's why I chose Conley after unfortunately Lou had already notified without my knowing anything about it, that he was going over. And I think that may have been one of the things that upset what was a continuing closer relationship with Lou. As time went on I think that probably set that back a sizeable amount. I don't know, I'm just guessing. You'll have to ask Tordella that surmountable problem. (chuckles)

FARLEY: Whether he'll answer it or not is something else.

CARTER: So we went ahead with Cheltenham and the same way with the Marine guards. I think they were both mistakes generated by McNamara's great desire to cut down on

the number of military people in service and civilianize those things that should be civilianized.

FARLEY: Yeah.

CARTER: Much to my glory I did put in the Marine Detachment for the Meritorious Award and we really worked on that and got it approved and that's the only continental Marine unit that has ever received that award. Normally it's a battlefield or an unusual type of award.

FARLEY: They were grateful I'm sure. We have an NSA guard operation now. It's not Federal Protective Association out of GSA. They're assigned and members of the National Security Agency.

CARTER: Oh, well that's a great improvement. Bound to be a great improvement over the GSA operation.

FARLEY: Yes. We can hire and we can fire. And we have what they call a CONFIRM now with the mechanical/electronic bit where you put in your ID card and push four identifying numbers before you're permitted to go in.

CARTER: Oh.

FARLEY: So we have double security, except that in the morning where there are people lined up for 35 blocks waiting to get in to push their four numbers in there. The guards just wave them in en masse. Wave them in now. So if somebody wants to penetrate that's the time to do it. (chuckles) We miss the Marine guards believe me.

CARTER: That's where you come back to some advantages on compartmentation.

FARLEY: Right. That's right. What a shame. Those Marine guards, they were good kids.

CARTER: Yeah, I was very high on them and we organized a fife and drum corps.

FARLEY: Oh, did you?

CARTER: Oh, yeah it was the pride and joy.

FARLEY: They played for ceremonies?

CARTER: They would handle the Fort McHenry operation, too, you see.

FARLEY: Oh, I see. Yeah, they're good guys. Do you think that about covers that area. Well let me ask this one. "What were the most controversial subject areas with the three Second Parties, individually and collectively, and how were they resolved? First of all, were there any real problems?"

CARTER: I don't know of any. I don't know of any.

FARLEY: I don't either. We seem to get along pretty well.

CARTER: had somewhat of a supplicant viewpoint an apologetic viewpoint when I first started working with him. Because of his feel that the British really weren't putting into it anything on the order of magnitude that we were, and admittedly he was right. But on the other hand I was able to convince him that without them we were helpless in a large number of areas and we needed them, and this was part of my discussion with him as we went along. We were all in bed together. This was truly a joint operation between the U.S. and the British and the

magnitude of effort isn't something that we could measure by number of people or amount of money. And I think he accepted this as my viewpoint and operated on that basis that we were coequal. Now the Third Party is a little different type of operation when you get into that.

FARLEY: The only problem, not only, it's just a slight problem with the British. In the history department we know that there are many documents available in GCHQ that would help us to sort of flesh out certain historical documentation.

CARTER: Sure.

FARLEY: And they are reluctant, they're very possessive about keeping that in wraps within the GCHQ. And just recently we have persuaded them to try and declassify or at least pass to us some of the documents and they're doing it gradually.

CARTER: Sure. Well, they have an official secret act. We don't.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: They have been very badly burned by our Congress and all the investigative committees and Frank Church and Pike and all of these oversight committees and everything else. I don't blame them a goddamned bit quite frankly for being in-house as much as they possibly can.

FARLEY: Right. But still a lot of their people write exposes.

CARTER: Again you're dealing with an element of the British government that doesn't have the authority to violate or to even bend the official secrets act in order to accommodate your requests you see. They've got to go to

a higher level I'm sure of the bureaucracy. And they are saddled by bureaucracy just as much if not more than we are. So I think that's one of the problems that you're probably running into and how you beat it I'll be damned if I know. I often wrote [redacted] I said, "Oh, you jokers, when you got run out of this country in 1776 if you had only left us the official secrets act we'd all be a hell of a lot better off."

FARLEY: We'd be better off. Absolutely.

CARTER: But they apparently took that with them if they even had it beforehand.

FARLEY: I wonder why we in the U.S. have never enacted such an official secrets act.

CARTER: Well we probably could have in 1918, '17, '18, or maybe in '42 to '45 or something like that. It's too late for that now.

FARLEY: Oh, yeah. Freedom.

CARTER: The Freedom of Information Act was antithesis of the official secrets act.

FARLEY: That's right. That's so true. Third Party relationships. Generally satisfactory? This I'm sure you can go into much detail. There are so many of them, some are very hush hush. [redacted]

[redacted] Do you have any thoughts or comments on that, Sir?

CARTER: They are not germane to the technical issues, but when I got there, when I took over there, I was appalled to find


out that Third Party representatives were not allowed in the building.

FARLEY:

Great.

CARTER:

Okay? Now here I've been Chief of Staff 8th Army. I was there when they ran Syngman Rhee out. I knew where all the bodies were buried. I knew who was underground.



FARLEY:

Yeah. We have visitors out there and I think they do come into the building. It's interesting, the German, with general what's his name, I've forgotten, the brigadier who started the West German intelligence agency. I want to say Gingold, Gehlen.

CARTER: I don't know.

FARLEY: It doesn't matter. Anyway you know him. But when we entertain German visitors for instance we have to be careful of what they see. We have an exhibit hall right in the old Gate House 1 as you come in Gate House 1, and immediately on the left. And we've had displays. One was the U-boat war and the people in the security have insisted that we cover up this display because it might be embarrassing to the Germans.

CARTER: Oh, Christ. (chuckles)

FARLEY: Can you believe that?

CARTER: No, that's hard to believe.

FARLEY: That's true, that's true. Because it's embarrassing. And somebody said, "Well who the hell won the war?" (more chuckles)


CARTER: That's like going to the cemetery and covering up all the Star of David things. When you take them to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier or something like that.

FARLEY: That's so true.

CARTER: To me that doesn't make sense. That's not very realistic.

FARLEY:




CARTER: I don't know, I really don't know. And I don't recall any relationships on a personal basis with any of those countries. I don't recall  or anything ever being entertained by me or met

anywhere by me. I have a feeling that those things were probably taken over by DIA on our behalf or by one of the service cryptologic agencies. I have a feeling, but I don't know. I really don't know.

FARLEY:

Would they have to go through their embassy like the British?



CARTER:

I really don't know, I really don't know.

FARLEY:

Okay. I don't either.

CARTER:

I went to Korea, I took one trip with Kirby as I told you. We went to Korea and we were wined and dined a couple of days there. You know, hot floor dinners, the low tables, and dancing girls and all this stuff. And we had a lot of fun. It was very cordial. In fact I had been given a set of cuff links and so had Kirby by Vice President Humphrey.

FARLEY:

My gosh.

CARTER:

And the Koreans came out with gifts and of course lacking foresight we had not taken anything over with us at the time. So I gave Kirby the nod and we each took out one of our Vice Presidential cuff links and gave it to the two generals who were entertaining us.

FARLEY:

Oh, boy.

CARTER: That made a big hit.
FARLEY: I'll bet it did. Who was the SUSLAK or the NSA Rep in Korea then? [redacted] Jim Harris? Remember?

CARTE: Jim Harris' name is familiar.

FARLEY: [redacted] Did you happen to happen to meet [redacted] [redacted]? He was one of our integrated people there working with the DSA.

CARTER: I probably met him but it doesn't program it.

FARLEY: I'm sure you did.

CARTER: The Harris name rings a bell.

FARLEY: Yeah. He was around for quite a while.

CARTER: But I was back in my own stomping grounds then you see.

FARLEY: Well you'd been there before.

CARTER: So I knew a lot of the people and I had a lot of people to look up and everything.

FARLEY: Again, you say you were on a social level, higher level. Let me ask this. Is or was our Third Party association across the board worth the investment? And the risk of possible loss of intelligence as a result of a security breach or a compromise. Did this ever enter the minds of any of our people do you think?

CARTER: It may have entered the minds of some people but compromise concerns and compromises themselves were beginning to build up about the time I left. But not Third Party. My concerns were within the Congress and within our own administration and not with...I have much

greater faith in British security of GCHQ operations than I did in the proliferation of people that we had to keep informed of our activities. It got worse and worse and it must have gotten a lot worse after I retired, access to our information. Well, hell it was just like publishing it in the *New York Times*. After I'd been out five years I would read something and think good God that can't be happening. And yet as a result of these investigative committees.

FARLEY:

I can remember an incident like that, a security compromise, where we were told to investigate it at NSA. We did then we traced it through people who had access to the document on the way up and to the White House. It concerned the Chinese missile program and what they were doing, and it got up as high as the White House and Secretary Laird, when he was in office. A message came back "Forget it. Ignore it. Don't worry about it." And it was a deliberate leak before the Budget Committee when they needed a little more gelt.

CARTER:

Well you know I ran into that same thing under McNamara. And there had been a leak. I've forgotten what it was, but it really hit the fan. And the directive from the White House said, "I want everybody who had access put on the polygraph." Just like that. So we had a fair suspicion of where the hell the leak had come and it was inadvertent, but I knew absolutely nothing about it. So I called up the CIA, who had received this directive, and

said I'm on my way, get that machine cranked up. I wanted to be there because I had a gut feeling that McNamara was going to go to the White House and get the order rescinded. And I wanted personally to be on record that the Director of NSA had already complied. And I went tearing over there from NSA and got on the machine and everything else. By the time I got back in a couple of hours, the order had been rescinded. And it was eventually traced down. I can't guarantee it, but I think my memory jogs me that it was Gilpatrick who was Deputy Secretary of Defense and had made an inadvertent comment to something that busted this thing open. It embarrassed the White House but it wasn't a major security breach. It was just one of those things where Johnson or somebody said, "Who the hell did that. Find out. Put them on the polygraph."

FARLEY:

You know that's one of the problems with people like yourself and the high level having access to so much sensitive information that you just can't recall where you heard it, and you may blurt out some information that's very high classified.

CARTER:

Yeah. That's like Tooley Spaatz, when they were having the big argument up on the Hill, and the staff officer who was going to appear for the Air Forces went into Tooley and they said, "I've got a problem here and I don't know to handle it." And Tooley said, "Yeah, I know what your

problem is. Just go up there and tell them anything but for God's sake don't blurt out the truth." (chuckles)

FARLEY: Very good.

CARTER: I thought that was very good advice. Particularly after I retired, when you read *Time* magazine and some of it reads like an intelligence report. So the best things to do is keep your mouth shut.

FARLEY: That's right. People think you're dumb.

CARTER: You're allowing me to reminisce.

FARLEY: Please, please.

CARTER: Even though it has no bearing on your problem. Shortly after I was in CIA I had to have a thyroid operation and they had to put me under anesthesia. So I went down to see who was our CIA doctor. And in the meantime security had already gone down to Teachin and said, "We've got to be in at the operation because he's been here just a year," or something like that. So they get a couple of security guys and they're all dressed up like surgeons. They're in there while I'm under anesthesia. And just watching the operation and waiting for me to blurt out something, you see. And they're in the recovery room, too, for a couple of hours until I obviously am back to normal. I had one-half of my thyroid removed. So about in '67 I had to have a laminectomy on my back. Okay, so that required anesthesia. And I called up CIA and said, "Hey, I'm going to be under anesthesia for about five or six hours. You guys better send somebody over

there if you're really sweating this out." They said, "No, you've been in long enough. You'll either say whatever it is you say wrong and it won't be any harm, or else you'll keep your mouth so shut that they won't be able to check your tonsils."

FARLEY: Did NSA send anybody to the hospital to watch over you?

CARTER: No I don't think so. By this time, you know, five years, you're pretty well indoctrinated. You're not going to blurt out truth or untruth. But it was pretty interesting that they all ganged up on me for the first operation which probably took a half-an-hour.

FARLEY: You probably didn't say anything.

CARTER: I don't think I said anything during either one.

FARLEY: That's the old truth serum they were playing with.
(chuckles)

CARTER: One more, Bob, to get it off my mind. This back operation, I had nursed it along and trying to live with it. It was a slipped disk and it was getting worse and worse and for about six weeks I was going to therapy at NSA. Everyday. And it got to the point where I had to be in a wheelchair and I'd be wheeled around. I had this beautiful protocol girl pushing me around. Finally the therapist said, "We're not getting anywhere at all, General, it's just getting worse. You'd better go out to Walter Reed." So I went out there and then I got into the middle of a pissing match between the orthopaedic surgeon and the neuro surgeon as to who was going to

do the operation. So they left the decision up to me after giving me all the pros and cons. Because it's one of those things where you may not walk away from it you know, in those days. I'm talking about '67 now, that's 21 years ago. And I had a friend who will spend the rest of his life in a wheelchair as a result of an operation. Anyway, I go out there and we argued back and forth and back and forth and finally I decided Colonel Moltke(?) the neuro surgeon, who's an Austrian, probably knew more about what he was doing and would be less likely to cut a nerve or spinal cord than the orthopod. (chuckles) Okay? So I said, "Okay, I'll go with Moltke." So we had the operation and I'm in recovery and somebody's holding my hand and I'm coming to and this voice says, "Oh, General, I'm PFC Turner. I'm the technician on your case here and I'm just watching your pressures and things like that. Is there anything you want?" And I said, "No." A little while later her hand would squeeze. "Oh, General, everything's going fine now. Is there anything I can do for you?" "No, no." A little while later she said, "General, everything's going fine. I've never been this close to a general before in all my life. I've never even seen a general."

FARLEY: Overwhelmed, huh?

CARTER: Yeah, overwhelmed. And I said, "No, nothing. If there's anything I want I'll let you know." So I woke up a little while later and I said, "Turner." "Yes, Sir general, what

would you like general?" "I want you to call up Colonel Moltke." "Yes, Sir." "He's on extension 6472." "Yes, Sir, yes, Sir general, what will I tell him?" "Turner," I said, "you tell Colonel Moltke that I've given this a great deal of thought and I've decided not to have the operation."

FARLEY: (chuckle) What did she say?

CARTER: She said, "Yes, Sir, yes, Sir. Wait a minute. Jesus, brother, you've had the operation." (laughter) I lost my rank in a hell of a hurry.

FARLEY: She called you "brother."

CARTER: "Jesus, brother, you've had the operation." (laughter) I'll never get over that. One of those amusing things you know that you have to program.

FARLEY: Right. The protocol gal's name was Do you remember ?

CARTER: Sure, very well.

FARLEY: Young, blond.

CARTER: Very attractive blond. Well she's the one when I was so unhappy about the Travis Trophy award and no ceremony, no nothing, maybe a hundred people there. And she was the one that I found out that they hadn't planned it or this wasn't the way they did it, or something like that. And that's when I issued the instructions and boy, she went balls out from that point on.

FARLEY: She was always in charge. I've seen her drag generals by the arm and say "You stand here," and then "You,

general, stand here." and push them in place, then smile,
"Pull your sleeve down!"

CARTER:

Maybe you ought to see the book they gave me when I
left, of all these pictures and things and here's [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] presenting me Orchid of the Year or something like
that. An award you see.

FARLEY:

She's retired but she came back as a retired annuitant.
She's teaching a course at the school in protocol.

CARTER:

Oh, neat.

FARLEY:

Two days a week or three days a week, whatever.

CARTE:

She was a good gal. I was devoted to her.

FARLEY:

She's been around a long time. But I remember how she
used to drag these generals into place. She's a great gal.

CARTER:

Well, we're not making much headway toward SIGINT.

FARLEY:

No, this is great. I don't think we need to talk anymore
about Second and *Third Party* do you? Unless you have
some afterthoughts.

CARTER:

I really don't. I don't know enough about our
relationships with them except at the social level and that
was limited entirely to Second Parties except for the

[REDACTED] And I was very sympatico and had a good
charisma [REDACTED]

FARLEY:

I'm sure they're grateful for that. Let's move on to
something else. As DIRNSA did you encounter any
personnel problems, shortage of talent, individuals who
weren't really team players, or who were foot draggers,
or fought the problem? I know there were some of those

CARTER: people. But do you recall any *major* personnel problems? I think we touched briefly on one I didn't chose to go into deeply with Fubini and Kirby.

FARLEY: Right. I'm thinking of some of the high level chiefs who say, "You can't do that, General."

CARTER: I never penetrated Raven. I could understand the motivations in Zaslow and Buffham and Kirby and Morrison and Tordella. As personalities I found out how to relate to them. For some reason or other I could never bust through Raven. I felt I was being tolerated and in some cases I think that feeling is generic when you bring in a military man for an unknown length of time two years three years something like that and superimpose him on a predominately civilian echelon who are making a life career ^{of?} or this particular type of operation, I think there's a resentment. And I felt pretty strongly that there should be - I'm jumping ahead a little bit now - there should be a civilian Director of NSA. And in fact upon my retirement I recommended this to Laird, but this was orally.

FARLEY: I see.

CARTER: I had written a letter which I gave to Laird the day of my retirement, a two or three page letter. and his people had prepared the bulk of it and I just made a few grammatical changes and maybe an idea here and an idea there. That's never seen the light of day and I think you might well dig it out.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: It would be dated probably either 30 or 31 July.

FARLEY: Okay.

CARTER: And it's a letter to the Secretary of Defense. I handed the original of it to him at the time of my retirement. Because I was supposed to retire statutorially in '67, okay?

FARLEY: Oh.

CARTER: That's five years in grade and you retire automatically. But the Secretary of Defense has certain limitations, certain authorities to extend a certain number of people. I think the number was five at the time, if he chose to. And they asked when '67 came along, they asked me if I would stay on at the pleasure of the Secretary and I said yes I would. I had no other plans, so that's how I happened to have been there for four years. I think I'm probably the only Director that was there for four years.

FARLEY: Yes, Sir, that's true.

CARTER: But by this time my health was deteriorating from pressures both internal and job pressures. I was going stale. I had a few family problems with children. Things like that that were just getting to me. And the doctors at NSA were working on me. They had diagnosed me as having diabetes.

FARLEY: I didn't know that.

CARTER: Yeah. I had several other problems but I think diabetes was the one that was rapidly going downhill in their view. So when the four years was up, plus two months, my

retirement was confirmed that I would retire. Then they didn't have a replacement. So I sat around. I'm on my terminal period okay, say a month to six weeks, and no replacement has been selected. So I'm wondering what the hell. At this time in a conversation with Laird I suggested that they not bother about a military replacement that they just move Tordella up as the Director.

FARLEY:

Oooh.

CARTER:

And he said, "I don't think that will fly with the military." But that's as far as I went. I did not put anything in writing about it.

FARLEY:

Did Tordella serve any time as Acting Director? Or did Gayler come in soon thereafter?

CARTER:

Oh, no, well, Tordella was Acting Director while I was in the hospital and things like that or when I was on trips. I don't know whether he published any orders or anything but he was obviously in charge.

FARLEY:

But I mean, when you were getting ready to retire.

CARTER:

No, Gayler came in very shortly before my retirement.

FARLEY:

Okay, good.

CARTER:

I'm pretty sure. In any event, in view of some of the things I had started in opposing what I felt was a threat by the military to try to take over the operations of NSA. We discussed this yesterday at some length.

FARLEY:

Yes, Sir.

CARTER: In view of those things and some other things that I had started that I hadn't really finished yet or that weren't buttoned up, I felt it necessary to alert the Secretary of Defense as to what the problems were that I was leaving and what I thought should be done about it. I think I learned this because Mr. Lovett, when he left as Secretary of Defense in 1953. He left on Inauguration Day of 1953, he may have left earlier, but after Eisenhower was elected in '52. And Lovett had already told me to get the hell out of town so I'm not going to stay he said. He wrote a letter to the President. It's a fascinating letter. It's well worth reading. It's been published.

FARLEY: Okay.

CARTER: Did I say classified?

FARLEY: No, no, you didn't mention it.

CARTER: No. It's well worth reading because it's typical Lovett. Pointing out some of the problems he said, "The Army must reorganize the service organizations such as Ordnance, Quartermaster, etcetera, etcetera." He said, "The entrenched bureaucracy of the military establishment, " words to this effect, "and this should be no more painful than backing into a buzz saw." (chuckles) This is the Secretary of Defense writing to the President. And then Lovett was really a character. He had a favorite phrase when he was getting briefings, when the guy would wander off too far. He'd say, "Well just a

minute. To hell with the cheese get me out of this trap.”
You know, this sort of thing.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: You ought to read that letter. There are four places, I may have a copy of it at home, four places where he just made comments that had me rolling in the aisle.

FARLEY: I'll have to dig that out. You say on 31 July of '69.

CARTER: No, my letter was July, my letter would be July of '69.

FARLEY: Oh, yeah, right. And the Lovett letter is a little earlier than that.

CARTER: The Lovett letter would have been in either December of '52 or January of '53.

FARLEY: Okay. Okay, right.

CARTER: To get back. My health was going downhill and it was obvious that I should retire. I was 59, yeah 59 plus. And no replacement had been selected almost up to my retirement.

FARLEY: Was it because they couldn't find a suitable Navy Admiral?

CARTER: I really don't know. I was so involved in my own machinations of closing out things and trying to give guidance to people that I have great affection for.

you may have known her.

FARLEY: Yes,

CARTER: Yeah She was a Godsend to me. There was no point in trying to advise any of the senior people because they had all been there when I came in.

FARLEY: They were warlords for sure. They were so firmly entrenched.

CARTER: Annie Corpuschristi. (chuckles)

FARLEY: Poor Annie.

CARTER: I gave her that name. It brings to mind another thing that I insisted on our trying to get nationally recognized awards for our people and not be so entrenched. And Annie Corpuschristi won the Federal Women's Award one year. They had a big banquet and I went over there in my mess kit and everything to be with her. I have a picture of it in that magazine and there was a portly Division Chief whose name escapes me right now.

FARLEY: John Connelly?

CARTER: No, this was a woman.

FARLEY: Oh, I beg you pardon.

CARTER: I'm on girls now.

FARLEY:

CARTER: Yeah, [REDACTED] I could pretty generally establish a rapport with the lady members of the hierarchy. As I say, Raven was one I was never able to understand just what angle he came from.

FARLEY: Annie Corpuschristi was the keynote speaker at the ceremony calling it "Goodbye to Arlington Hall" which was about two months ago.

CARTER: Oh, really.

FARLEY: Where they closed down the operation, gave it to the State Department for the Foreign Service Institute. The

INSCOM is moving to Fort Belvoir, Virginia. All the old ASA the Signal Corps, everything is moving down.

CARTER: Oh, oh. I heard that somewhere or else I may have read it in the *Newsletter*. I asked to be kept on the *Newsletter* circulation and they made me an honorary member of Phoenix when I retired. So I keep informed to some extent on that. I don't get any of the classified publications because I have no need for them.

FARLEY: Right. But that was an impressive ceremony and she was a little emotional talking about her early days.

CARTER: She was a good gal.

FARLEY: Yes, a sharp cryppie.

CARTER: I was very high on her.

FARLEY: Sharp cryppie.

CARTER: About four days before I was to retire I got a letter from I guess the Protocol Officer or the Secretary of Defense and said, "Secretary Laird is going to have a reception for you at your retirement ceremony. Please send us a list of your guests. Try to limit it to 150." This was about four days before I was to retire. Try to limit it to 150. I'd already sent my wife out here where we had a home to get the house organized, because it had been rented. So she was out here doing some remodeling and stuff like that, with our dogs and our cat. Anyway I gave that some thought and I said I'll be goddamned if I'm going to harass even close friends to come over there to watch me retire. It's one of these proforma things you know.

FARLEY: Sure.

CARTER: So I called him up and I said, "There'll be three of us. There'll be me and my Protocol Officer, and Master Sergeant Paul Kelly." And they said, "Is that all?" I said, "Yeah, that's all. We'll drive over in our car and we'll come on up to the office." So I went up there, the three of us – my driver, my Protocol Officer and me – for my retirement ceremony. But I had this letter, see. So Laird gives me the usual song and dance about the work of NSA and my work and so forth. Here are all four of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, here's Maxwell Taylor and Pat Coyne. You remember Pat Coyne?

FARLEY: Oh, yeah. Right.

CARTER: So here are me and Penny and Paul Kelly, and he said, "Have you got anything you'd like to say?" And I said, "No, I very much appreciate my military service," etcetera, etcetera. The usual you know, but I said, "I do have this letter for you Mr. Secretary and I think it might be well worth your time to see what I'm leaving you, as loose ends to pick up."

FARLEY: Let me switch, please, Sir.

TAPE V, SIDE TWO

CARTER: I said absolutely nothing.

FARLEY: Oh, that's a shame that you didn't have a military review.

CARTER: I didn't want that. I've been to too damn many and I'd given too many. When I was at Fort Bliss hardly a week went by that I wasn't putting on a full guard of honor for some German general or Japanese general or a Prime Minister or Foreign Minister or Secretary of Defense or something like that of foreign nations. And you've got to realize I was born and raised in the Army. And for 26 years I used to watch the cadets at parades at West Point. So there was no magic involved in anything like that. And we used to give reviews right there at NSA with Marines and our elements of military units.

FARLEY: Right out at the front gate.

CARTER: I've forgotten, I think the first one I went to, it was probably given for me.

FARLEY: I think so.

CARTER: I think the first one I went to was given to me as welcome and here I see General Canine sitting down there on the front row. And I went down and got him up, brought him right up and it was *his* review not mine.

FARLEY: Oh, good.

CARTER: He was on the right taking the salutes. But I'd been reared that way. This is self-serving again like any memorandum for record or any oral interview. You bring out those things that make you look good.

FARLEY: Sure. Well the Joint Chiefs were they just standing there and saying "Great job."?

CARTER: They were just standing there and they shook hands and everything. The usual. It lasted about 10 minutes probably at the most.

FARLEY: You know, that's a shame really. Something like...

CARTER: No it's not. (chuckles) No it's not really. Oh he gave me my DSM, but that's just like getting your VD shot. When you retire if you're general officer it's automatic.

FARLEY: Okay. But I'm thinking of 30 years and, "It's nice seeing you, Auf Wiedersehen!"

CARTER: No, that wasn't for me.

FARLEY: It's just like when I see this in the civilian world at NSA, you have some character who's been around for 40 years and then some young kid is a chief who's giving him his certificate and saying, "Nice work," and he reads all this garbage. And the guy's standing there and saying, "Cripes, why do I have to put up with this?" Most of them say, "Mail it to me." (chuckles) Because it's distressing. I've sat in on some of these. To think that this guy is maybe the prime cryptanalyst or linguist and this is the kind of a farewell he gets. Some kid reading words that don't mean a thing to him. But that's neither here nor there.

CARTER: Well we gave a lot of decorations when I was there in NSA. At least I thought that hardly a week went by that we weren't pinning something on somebody.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: Including the military. We had a Meritorious Civilian something, I've forgotten what they were. But in those days I was authorized to give the Commendation Ribbon on my own to military.

FARLEY: I see.

CARTER: I think anything else had to go over to the Pentagon for approval, like the Legion of Merit or the DSM. I did get a DSM for Admiral Schulz.

FARLEY: Oh did you?

CARTER: Yeah. Which was a major victory because the Navy doesn't give those things out for communicators or staff officers, things like that. But it's interesting, I reversed the protocol, too. We had a review for Admiral Schulz when he retired. And at the end I announced to the assembled troops, "I have an award here for Admiral Schulz," without mentioning what it was. And then I read the citation to the troops and then I said, "And this is for the Distinguished Service Medal." And you could just hear this flutter of comment go through the troops, because it's most unusual, in the Navy, to do something like that.

FARLEY: Right. I'll bet he was quite emotional to get that.

CARTER: I thought that it came as a distinct surprise. I think he was expecting the Legion of Merit or something. When the war ended in China, about these, you mentioned citations reading all this stuff, I had run the operation to rescue the prisoners of war. I think we mentioned it before.

FARLEY: Right, Sir.

CARTER: Yesterday. And I had been in charge of that and they put me in for the Legion of Merit in the China Theater which General Wedemeyer could award. I was a colonel. I'd already gotten the Distinguished Service Medal as a lieutenant colonel on the War Department General Staff, which was very unusual. But anyway, again, I'm being very self-serving, introspective. General Wedemeyer read this long commendation or whatever they call it, citation, for the Legion of Merit. I had known him since he was a cadet at West Point. And here's the whole staff, maybe a hundred people around, and he's reading the citation and it's about this long. So when he gets through, before he pins it on, he turned to me and he said, "Pat, I wonder what the United Nations were doing all this time." (chuckles) It just about broke up the party.

FARLEY: You were involved in everything.

CARTER: Yes, everything.

FARLEY: Well, at least he had a good sense of humor.

CARTER: Well, I think we pretty well covered my retirement.

FARLEY: Okay. We're talking about personnel problems, team players. You handled the situation very well, I guess.

CARTER: I don't know. You asked the question, how did you handle the situation, and I made a note here. I made a note, you said, "If so, how did you handle the situation?" And I just wrote down, "probably poorly." That's all.

FARLEY: No, you didn't. I know you struck terror in the hearts of many of those top level civilians. They thought their

tenure was shaky. I know of this among some of them because as I say they knew that you were in command and they were sort of sweating it out. What you were going to do to them.

CARTER: Oh, to them instead of for them.

FARLEY: To them. Maybe transfer them out to the weeds someplace.

CARTER: Well, they must have been pretty unsteady then.

FARLEY: Yes.

CARTER: I'd like to get a word in that has nothing directly about NSA. Over the years of my service the civilian hierarchy that was brought in to manage the services – the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Defense, things like that – were proponents of the job that they were given to do. They were the head of the agency. When things went wrong, and I'm talking people like Marshall and Lovett and Stimpson and McCloy and those people, when something went wrong they took the blame. It was their problem and they called the staff together and said, "Now how do we correct this? What went wrong? What should I be doing to make the situation better? I'm looking to you for guidance and advice." In the McNamara era, when he started and with his whiz kids, the whole thing went 180 degrees out of phase. They were making names for themselves. They did not feel that they were a part of this vast quasi-military organization. That they had a responsibility. When

criticism came their attitude was, who do I blame? Who do I blame? Let's seek out the so-and-so and send him to the boondocks. Let's keep us in the clear.

FARLEY:

Oh, no.

CARTER:

Now I'm exaggerating some, but this happened so much that it became a disease inherent, I think, after McNamara. It may have started before that. It may have started with Engine Charlie Wilson. It certainly was not under General Marshall, of being a separate adjunct to the organization, supervising and looking for errors and who to put the finger on. And I'm very much afraid that in some measure, though I *know* it happened all during the McNamara regime. I'm hopeful that perhaps there's a switch back to the Stimpson feeling and that the Director...Now let's zero in on Director NSA. It's his outfit. When something goes wrong it's his fault. He can't blame it on any of the subordinates. No way. This is Carter's fixed opinion. And that's the only way you can maintain the integrity of the organization as a national organization.

FARLEY:

Right.

CARTER:

You can't go around blaming your own people. There's just no way. If they don't measure up, yeah, okay, but do it internally, do it internally.

FARLEY:

It's interesting that you talk this way, too. Because our most recent Director, General William Odom?

CARTER:

Yeah, yeah.

FARLEY: He didn't take the responsibility for a situation involving Lieutenant Colonel North and one of our people

CARTER: I noticed some comments that he had made. Yeah.

FARLEY: He sacrificed one young kid and blamed him. And to answer your question, it has not reverted to the top man taking the blame anymore.

CARTER: Well it sure as hell should.

FARLEY: It should.

CARTER: Sure as hell should. And I don't care whether the guy is military or civilian. My concern is, you're taught loyalty in the military, loyalty down, that's where it starts. Loyalty down.

FARLEY: Absolutely.

CARTER: You get your loyalty down and spread over the troops your loyalty automatically comes back up to you.

FARLEY: That's right. That is so true.

CARTER: Civilians aren't trained that way.

FARLEY: No.

CARTER: And they have to learn it the hard way I think.

FARLEY: Well I think the civilians who had any military experience...

CARTER: Oh, yeah, yeah, I'm not...

FARLEY: I know. But people who, and there are many of the kids here now who never had any military experience and they don't understand this loyalty bit. "Me first, me first."

CARTER: Yeah. Well I just wanted to get that off my chest.

FARLEY: You're right, Sir, we're not moving very fast.

CARTER: What time is it? Oh, half past 10.

FARLEY: I've got 25 to 11. Let's see. ((#54 Were there problems or difficulties that faced your days as the DIRNSA that forever plagued you and you were unable to permanently dispose of or resolve?))

CARTER: What number are we on?

FARLEY: We're on number 54.

CARTER: No, I don't recall anything. I don't recall leaving NSA with the feeling that either I had screwed it up for four years or that I had left insurmountable problems.

FARLEY: Good.

CARTER: I knew there were relationships that could probably be handled better by somebody else, but no.

FARLEY: Okay, let's go on to the R&D effort. Your opinion of the R&D effort in NSA? Did you think at that time that the engineers were keeping up with the state of the art in the field?

CARTER: I must only presume so.

FARLEY: Good. That's fine.

CARTER: That's what they were paid for.

FARLEY: Yeah, right. Were you involved in the outside contracting by the Agency either for developing of equipments or concepts or doing research projects? Were you involved at all in that?

CARTER: No, only when something got off the track and then they might come to me and say, what do we do about it?

FARLEY: Ninety percent of the effort now is contracted out and we're talking about fabrication of equipments and the studies and the surveys and all of that. Would you speculate whether this modus operandi would weaken the effectiveness of the Agency engineers or analysts or linguists or researchers? Do you think it does something to somebody else to say that, you're not competent we're going to let somebody do the job at 10 times the price?

CARTER: Well I think you've got to distinguish between a research and development and production.

FARLEY: Yes.

CARTER: I see no point in NSA going into the production business of say COMSEC equipment to be dished out to every Tom, Dick and Harry, and actually making it there. I see no point in NSA doing that. I don't think that's their business nor should we be in the business of hiring machinists and electricians and running a factory to produce stuff for the armed services or for the government.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: I think we have to have a testicular grip – and notice the visual aid that goes along with this.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: On the research and development and the final approval and the testing of product.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: I think we must keep that an NSA activity. I think we should have gone a lot farther but we're totally unable to

bust through the other agencies. In the intelligence security of communications equipment and computer equipment across the boards we are in, I think...When I left we were in terrible state where we had a committee under a guy named McCloskey or Croskery?

FARLEY: Dale Croskery?

CARTER: Dale Croskery, yeah. And he worked hard. I don't whether he was the one most technically competent for the job but he worked hard at it and would brief me about once every two weeks about his difficulties. But everybody said, yeah it's a great idea except include me out or I'm not going to give you access to my machinery, and stuff like that. As a result I think we are in deep trouble in this country now from what I read. And one reason why I'm on the board of the outfit that [redacted]

[redacted] has started, ISI, (Information Security International, Inc.). Because this is what we should have been doing in government a long time ago. Now here we've got a civilian outfit trying to even get started along those lines.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: I don't think I answered your question.

FARLEY: Yes, you did. I think we can move on to, the one you talked about loss of young engineers to private industry after they receive education and training at the Agency's expense. Was proselytizing by industry a major problem in the R&D field while you were at NSA? Do you recall, Sir?

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CARTER: I don't recall, I don't recall.

FARLEY: All right. Number 57, in the COMSEC field. "Did you have any problem with that organization insofar as maintaining control of it or keeping it under the Agency umbrella?" It seems that for years they wanted to separate themselves. They are the only unit that will not be called a Group. They have to be the COMSEC Organization. Everybody else is W Group and A Group and B Group.

CARTER: Well they probably thought they were improving their batting order or their position in the field by maintaining a separate name and not being included as a Group. They probably thought that but chances are they ended up on the short end of it by maintaining the position of Organization, in the way of super grades and personnel and things like that. I'm not sure, I don't know enough about it. But I had no problems, that I'm aware of, of their trying to break out at all.

FARLEY: Good.

CARTER: I got along fine with Howard Barlow. He was COMSEC the whole time I was there as far as I remember.

FARLEY: Yes.

CARTER: He may have been working like hell to become a separate organization but it never came to my attention that I'm aware of.

FARLEY: Yeah. Rosenblum, Howie Rosenblum came in later on and then Walt Deeley became Chief of COMSEC and later

into the computer security business, operational security business and communications security. So he expanded the responsibility. He brought back people from the Research and Development element to work within the COMSEC complex rather than being over at the airport and communicating via secure telephone. He wanted his people right there where they could work with the analysts, the engineers side by side and that worked out very well.

CARTER: I was just going to say, I didn't know whether you were being critical or not.

FARLEY: Oh, no.

CARTER: But it makes a whole lot of sense to me to do it that way.

FARLEY: Yeah.

CARTER: I was told that when COMSEC developed something the first thing they did was put it through the organization to make sure there weren't some unknown glitches or things that the system could very simply be broken into. I was assured that no matter what it was we did it went through that system. I have doubts that it actually did.

FARLEY: Yeah. I don't think so.

CARTER: But I was told, you don't have to worry about it, when COMSEC turns out something we immediately go to work on it and try to break it down and penetrate it and break into it and this and that. If we do then we reject that whole concept. But I say, I don't know whether that in fact occurred.

FARLEY: They did that with some equipments. They said, this is foolproof, nobody will ever get into it. They passed traffic to some of the cryppies in the Agency and within three days they were into it.

CARTER: Yeah. The only case I know is when they developed a small box which was to be airborne. It would go in an airplane and a truck and all sorts of things. And they kept getting about 80 per cent rejection from the Marines and the other services were quite satisfied. A normal may be two or three or four per cent rejection, something like that, failures. And they went over and they found the Marines were doing everything that the services were except at the end they were dropping it from 20 foot tower onto a concrete base. That was their final test. (chuckles) Now I don't whether that's true or not, but that's an apocryphal story that was told me and that's the reason the Marines were rejecting 80 per cent of them or something. (laughter) This was like the fuse on an atom bomb or something like that.

FARLEY: Oh, boy. I can believe that the Marines would do something like that.

CARTER: I can believe it too. My son was one for 14 years.

FARLEY: Yeah. He knew. No, part of the mission of the COMSEC people, as you know, is to try to provide to the military, the high level commanders, information about being security conscious. Don't talk in the clear. Don't say "the bearded guy down in the south." Try to use some of these

equipments and the pamphlets and they used to call them Division Level Codes. Use some of these. Try to abide by them. But a lot of the troops...some of them are convinced for a while but then they rotate, they get new commanders in and you have to reeducate.

CARTER: Yeah.

FARLEY: It's a real problem, as you know better than I.

CARTER: Well a lot depends on the time/space interval in what you're trying to communicate. And you can get something so damned sophisticated that by the time it gets from one guy to another the action's over. So we have to have gradations of security type equipment. And I was always concerned that the stuff - - Remember in the old days where you had the SIGABA or whatever it was and you were sitting there and by the time you got the word out the action was over.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: I was always concerned that the stuff at the lowest echelon could be made secure but you could throw it away two days later and forget about it. Whereas the big stuff we were working on had to be thoroughly protected and over a long period of time, and I'm talking 20/30 years.

FARLEY: They're coming to miniaturization now in the chips and all that and I guess they have equipments that are almost dollar-sized now. I don't know, but they're still working on them.

CARTER: You haven't brought up the Scientific Advisory Board that I had.

FARLEY: No, Sir. You established that?

CARTER: No, I had it. But I had a beautiful rapport with them. And they didn't meet very often. At the lower levels people drew on their individual's capabilities.

FARLEY: That was the NSASAB. You called it the NSASAB?

CARTER: NSASAB, yeah, Advisory Board. I depended on them a great deal for guidance, both individually and as a Board periodically. But I've gotten several very fine letters from the members of the Board and said, for the first time we thought we were being helpful and were not just a cover to put the grace of the Pope on your head. You know, that sort of stuff.

FARLEY: Weren't you talking about taking this group on tours of various installations around the Washington Vint Hill area? Did you mention something about that earlier?

CARTER: I didn't here, but I may have. I don't remember doing it. I may have turned it over to somebody to do.

FARLEY: Okay. But you thought that some of the members didn't really fully understand what they were supposed to do and how the Agency operated and you did set up some guided tours for these people and they were sort of impressed with what they saw, and they were better able to contribute.

CARTER: I don't know. I don't remember that.

FARLEY: Okay. I heard it someplace here.

CARTER: Anything you hear good you can credit to me.

FARLEY: Okay. Good. (chuckles)

CARTER: Don't try to verify it with me.

FARLEY: I don't know the membership now, but some of them have been around for 10/15 years. Same people.

CARTER: Yeah. I've got a picture of them with their names on it at home in that book. One fellow I leaned on very heavily was [REDACTED] I don't remember whether he was on my Board or not but he was on boards before which I have appeared. I made a number of appearances before the Presidential Intelligence Advisory Board, PFIAB, when I was in CIA, and occasionally when I was in NSA. [REDACTED] and people like that were on that Board. It was a hell of a good outfit until they brought in a retired Admiral Anderson who pretty well busted it up for a while. And I think at one time they had Clark Clifford chairing the board. I'm not sure.

FARLEY: I'm sitting here thinking and I apologize for what I just said. You didn't make the statement, but we have a fellow in the office who was the Executive Secretary to that SAB, Julius Gallo. He was the Executive Secretary for a while. And he was talking about leading the group on the tour to Vint Hill and some of the naval installations and around the local area. In fact they took a trip to California or something in a group.

CARTER: A hell of a good idea.

FARLEY: But he was the fellow who mentioned that, so it wasn't you. I'm sorry.

CARTER: Hell of a good idea.

FARLEY: Right. The OPSEC element of the communications security. You remember when you were DIRNSA we had the Purple Dragon Operation where this was "foreknowledge and forewarning" of the bombing in Vietnam. The Air Force would put out rendezvous location points and pass notams, notice to airmen that the aircraft were going to penetrate or come in over a certain area and the Vietnamese were able to abandon villages, set up their antiaircraft artillery, and all of this. And this was out of CINCPAC and these people made the tours briefing the commanders to be careful. Don't talk, realign your procedures, and this was somewhat helpful. but I talked to somebody who was on that board for years. He said it's back to the same routine. There's no war on now, but the pilots are still talking in the clear. So, how do you fight it?

CARTER: Yeah.

FARLEY: Okay. Support to the military by NSA. I guess we talked about that. Was it difficult to persuade the military commanders that NSA and the SCEs could assist them and provide valuable operational security. I guess we talked about that.

CARTER: I think we did, yeah. I don't recall having any real major problems with any of the military security organizations.

FARLEY: Good.

CARTER: Well we mentioned Giap forgeries and a couple of other things. And that business about Admiral Cooke and I think something about Rufe Taylor.

FARLEY: Yes, right.

CARTER: No, I don't remember having any knock down drag outs. I do remember one where I had to go all the way to Hawaii to tangle with a General McChristian.

FARLEY: Oooh, yeah.

CARTER: And I got him straightened out.

FARLEY: He was a J-2 was he?

CARTER: I think he was Westmoreland's G-2 or maybe J-2. Anyway, I met him in Hawaii but I had the Commanding General, who was my best friend, John Waters, four-star in Hawaii. He was there and I asked him to come to this meeting we had. And he sat in on it and we got brother McChristian straightened out in a hurry. He had established an autonomous operation, as I recall.

FARLEY: Right. He absorbed your support group, I forgot what they called that.

CARTER: Something like that. I've forgotten what the hell it was, but it was a nasty situation where I went all the way to Hawaii. I don't recall whether it was in CIA or NSA. I think it was NSA.

FARLEY: NSA, right.

CARTER: I think so.

FARLEY: But I've forgotten what they called that. It was a support group of about six to 10 SIGINTers who would interpret or help the analysts. And McChristian apparently said, okay anything that happens you do not have direct access to NSA. You come through my people and we'll do that.

CARTER: Something like that.

FARLEY: I remember the Chief, I've forgotten who he was, said that he had to walk down to a pay phone and call somebody someplace to send a message back, maybe to you, to NSA to tell you what was going on with McChristian. That way the message had to go through a round about way.

CARTER: I remember it was a pretty ticklish situation. Senior rank has some help occasionally. Particularly if you're dealing with a guy who's bucking for himself.

FARLEY: That's right. There was a Larson, Brigadier General Larson, I've forgotten his first name, who succeeded McChristian and he apparently had absorbed a little bit of McChristian's personality re NSA. But he mellowed later on and is a good friend of us now. He's retired. Larsen.

CARTER: That's not Swede Larsen?

FARLEY: Could be. He's Air Force?

CARTER: No, no, this is Army.

FARLEY: I want to say Dan but it's not Dan ((Doyle)). Well it doesn't matter. Okay. Intelligence Requirements Systems. You remember the SIRVES Committee, SIGINT Intelligence Requirement Evaluation Committee.

Systems. You remember the SIRVES Committee, SIGINT Intelligence Requirement Evaluation Committee.

CARTER: I remember vaguely a committee that was formed to try to tell me how to run my business.

FARLEY: That's the one.

CARTER: I don't know what ever happened about it. They probably came up with reports and things that we didn't pay any attention to, I don't know. I dare say that's what happened.

FARLEY: That's true. Yeah, we adjusted it to our own liking as I recall. Do you believe these committees are effective or are they just committees?

CARTER: Well, they're probably effective if you can penetrate them and use them to your ends.

FARLEY: Yeah. This is the one I think they put a numerical evaluation on certain intelligence targets, Soviet Number One and China Number Two, North Korea either Two or Three and we had to sort of report according to that priority.

CARTER: I don't recall that.

FARLEY: Okay. Number 60. ((#60, What projects and programs that were developed or completed during your term as DIRNSA are the ones of which you are most proud?)) I think you've talked about a lot of those, the one of which you are most proud. Do you want to reiterate that or have we pretty well covered that?

FARLEY: Yeah, I want to stop and see Gerry.

CARTER: Because that's a self-evaluation that is just bound to be warped. You can take as gospel anything that makes me look good I'm agreeable to. Anything that makes me look bad I'll take the blame for if it's in NSA. If it's from outside sources then I'm ready to fight.

FARLEY: General Carter, and I'm not just saying this and I don't want to just gild the lily and all that, but I have never heard of anything derogatory about your tenure as DIRNSA and I'm sincere.

CARTER: Well you didn't go down to the 20 year old blondes did you in your interviews?

FARLEY: Well, you chasing some of them through the hallways. No, I didn't. (chuckles) No, I did not.

CARTER: You haven't seen the pictures of my covey?

FARLEY: No.

CARTER: Oh, you don't have real history on this.

FARLEY: I heard about them but I never saw the pictures. (chuckles) I heard how you directed that you wanted the most attractive retinue on the 9th floor.

CARTER: Yeah. We damned near got the cream of the crop, too.

FARLEY: Did you? Now these are the incoming kids, too. The kids out of Glen Burnie High and the college graduates.

CARTER: Yeah, sure. Oh, yeah.

FARLEY: They had to pass in review and say "that one", "that one." (chuckles) No, I'm exaggerating.

CARTER: It wasn't quite that way. I would have like to have done that but I'm afraid it would have been a spectacle. I did mine under the cover. Singular cover.

FARLEY: That's great. Well let's see. Let's talk about the publication of information by NSA to refute expose-type authors.

CARTER: I think we've already covered those of which I'm particularly proud. One's a cryptologic thing, one's fighting the military intrusion, tampering, one's the professionalization program, and the in-house promotion system and getting the additional GS ratings and stuff like that which I really worked hard at. I did the same thing for CIA when I was in there on promoting the stature of the individual people who were carrying the responsibility. And I worked my tail off on that in CIA as well as NSA. Those are the things in which I thought I had some competence and which I could mentally assemble the argumentation for and against in which I could be persuasive in my discussion. When I got down to the technocrat aspects I was floundering around well outside my competence so I avoided that. And anyway I didn't think that was what I was paid for. I had to depend on delegation to the people who knew what they were doing and hope that they knew what they were doing, too.

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CARTER: Sure, you never know. And establishing a feeling of morale and nationalizing the National Security Agency. I think those were some of the things that contributed to the overall improvement of NSA while I was there.

FARLEY: Absolutely. And as I told you before, when I heard people say this that you raised us out of the depths that they meant it, too. They could throw their shoulders back, ride high and all of that.

CARTER: I'll take credit for anything good. Sure, what the hell.

FARLEY: Okay. Do you want to talk about the publication. You talked about this slightly.

CARTER: What the polygraph?

FARLEY: No, the next one, your belief regarding the publication of NSA of information in the archives since pre-World War II days and later to clarify, correct and set straight the historical record and refute the many misleading books written by authors with a profit motive as their prime purpose. There are so many errors in these books that have hit the stands, that people in the Agency say, why don't we publish something to prove that these people are wrong. And others say, why should we lend credence to what these characters say.

CARTER: That's a pretty iffy question.

FARLEY: Of course.

CARTER: If you could foretell the results in advance why then I think you could go into and analyze it. But if do those things official I'm inclined to think it would open some

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flood gates of people who know a lot of stuff that has not been declassified but has a bearing on things that we have declassified. Maybe to talk or maybe to try to refute. I don't know. You're never going to win. That's the thing that bothers me. I believe in historical documentation or otherwise I wouldn't be sitting here. My training at the Marshall Foundation indicates that it's essential. But getting into the official publication, documentation published by the Superintendent of Documents or something like that, God I don't know.

FARLEY: I agree. Thumbs down. Right.

CARTER: Well, I've got my grave doubts as to whether you'd accomplish anything. You'd probably open up a Pandora's Box of things that would get far out of control. Possibly. I just don't know.

FARLEY: Sir, it's almost routine at the Agency, if there's a spy case or a new publication or a new book or something in the newspaper about the Agency we get a letter. Every person in the Agency gets a letter signed by the Director "Do not comment on this. Do not confirm anything. Do not make any statement whatsoever to *anybody*. Your family, an author, anybody who phones you, ignore it. You know nothing about it." So they're still trying to control it.

CARTER: Yeah.

FARLEY: This was on the *Pelton Case* recently and on the Ultra American book and some of the more recent publications. Just, "No comment."

CARTER: Yeah. Well, somebody at the top level should have a comment to make of some sort, I think. But the Agency should be informed that if *any* comment of any kind is made by anybody it's going to be made by the Director and nobody else. Something like that. That kind of warning I think would have some effect.

FARLEY: I think General Odom made some sort of a comment at the trial, the Pelton trial, too. And he might have gone overboard a little bit from what I've heard. Said a little bit too much. Neither here nor there.

CARTER: No matter what you do you're dealing with individuals when you get up to that point. And the individuals have got to have a high degree of, what's the word, perspicacity, something like that?

FARLEY: Right, that's good.

CARTER: I think it's an old word, probably outworn by now, but something along those lines. You've got to have consummate judgment to be able to handle on your feet, quickly, a response that will meet your requirements and still quiet down whatever the problem is.

FARLEY: It's a situation where you're damned if you do and damned if you don't.

CARTER: Yeah, I think so.

FARLEY: Either way, yes or no, you're going to get criticism on both sides. Either side. Let me just ask this one. Should NSA increase their release of documents recently declassified? And this is a continuing process. After 30 years we have to review documents in our holdings to decide to release.

CARTER: Well, so does everybody, not just NSA.

FARLEY: No, we're not unique. But I guess we can't deny it. But we still are able to control some of them by deleting sensitive classified information and releasing part, not en toto.

CARTER: Are you talking now requests under the Freedom of Information Act...

FARLEY: That's part of it.

CARTER: ...or on the 30 year part?

FARLEY: On the 30 year it's first and then secondarily Freedom of Information.

CARTER: Well, if the judgment is left to NSA, if you're the final arbiter on the judgment as to whether or not it should be released then you're sitting in the driver's seat and you can control it. If your judgment is subject to override by some higher authority, unless it's the courts, then to me, I would pass the buck, probably, to a higher level. This is our judgment of what can be released and what cannot be released. Okay?

FARLEY: I think we've used that. That's a good technique.

CARTER: Yeah, just a technique of operation, but I think we go all the way back to the beginning. Why are we collecting

stuff that we won't even get at for 12 or 15 years. You want a pit stop?

FARLEY

Let's do. I've got a red light here anyway.

TAPE VI, SIDE ONE

FARLEY: So we'll continue then, General Carter. Number 62, "The use of the polygraph." Obviously you think it's worthwhile and useful.

CARTER: Yes, I do, very much so. Not by itself.

FARLEY: Of course not.

CARTER: Nor do I believe that you can say anything like, "Yes, he passed the polygraph test or no, he failed the polygraph test." To me that's inadequate operator training or something like that. But as an adjunct to a total security, particularly security, investigation I think it's very helpful. If only to disquiet the guy that you're talking to, and perhaps give you other leads that could be helpful. I would not say it's the end all of security investigations in any way.

FARLEY: Did you make any changes in the techniques used by the operators during your tenure? Early in the game, as you know, there used to be such sensitive questions about your sexual preferences and how you got along with your wife and all of that.

CARTER: Yeah. I don't know whether I made any, whether I initiated any, but I think it was in CIA where they started getting off the deep end. We realized that it was not a matter that was necessary for the public record or anything like that. As I recall we had just four questions

and they involved relationships with Soviet or Communist activities in the main.

FARLEY:

Yes.

CARTER:

As I remember.

FARLEY:

That's pretty much what they use now. Your association with foreign nationals and your loyalty and patriotism.

CARTER:

Yeah. But nothing about, are you a homo, or this or that or anything else. I don't remember making a decision in that regard so I think it must have already been adopted before I came to NSA.

FARLEY:

It's not so terrifying to undergo this as it used to be. And I'm talking to people who every five years have to go through this thing. Years ago people would be just trembling going into this test, because they knew they were going to ask questions like that and you didn't know how to answer them. You could only say "yes" or "no."

CARTER:

Sure. There's no way of saying, that's beyond the purview of your investigation. There's no way of saying, what has this got to do with my life. No matter what your answer is you seem to be avoiding a response to the question.

FARLEY:

You can never explain your answer.

CARTER:

So it's a difficult one.

FARLEY:

Yeah, I've got caught a couple of times. The guy said, "What's my name," or "Do you know my name?" and I said "No," and he said, "Well, I told it to you before we talked." And I started to say I've forgotten, and he cut it

off. He said "Answer yes or no." Then I said, all right let's start again. (chuckles)

CARTER: Yeah.

FARLEY: What were we talking about.

CARTER: Well it never bothered me particularly. But I was not subjected to it periodically.

FARLEY: Right. They're still doing it every five years but they're so far behind. The way they're hiring it's sometimes two years before they can get around to it.

CARTER: Oh, really.

FARLEY: Too bad. I'm surprised, well I'm not surprised at the military. Do they ever use the polygraph at all? Other than incidents or situations where military people had to be quizzed?

CARTER: I don't know. I really don't know.

FARLEY: I don't think they've used it.

CARTER: I never had the polygraph until I got to CIA.

FARLEY: I didn't either.

CARTER: And I think that was the early on, just those four questions. And then I told you of the incident when I had a feeling that McNamara was going to have the polygraph business changed and I immediately went over and had mine in a hurry so I was on already. It was really a little bit of stagecraft involved there in that it was just another step indicating that I was a National Security Agency, a national organization, and I wasn't taking orders from the Secretary of Defense. This mentally was

generating part of my desire to get the hell over there and have it done already, you see. Response to a White House Directive to CIA as distinct from a McNamara directive, so I probably was trying to be cute, too, knowing I didn't know a goddamned thing about it. If I'd known anything about it I'd have been off in the boondocks hiding someplace. (chuckles)

FARLEY: Good, very good.

CARTER: I did tell you about the case using the polygraph on that military guy who was writing the Giap message.

FARLEY: Yes, Sir, we have that down.

CARTER: I see no reason why if we have military men over there on permanent assignment in extremely sensitive operations in NSA – I'm looking at the next page now – why we should not subject the military to the polygraph. I don't think you can go out into the field and take every ASA individual, you know, and subject them to the polygraph or anything like that.

FARLEY: That's true.

CARTER: I'm way the hell and gone now over on page nine.

FARLEY: Page nine, number 63?

CARTER: The top question is what I just answered.

FARLEY: Yes, Sir.

CARTER: Now you're getting into a bunch of subjective questions which I've tried to avoid and yet I've given every possible hint for you to find out from other sources.

FARLEY: All right. Was your tour as DIRNSA a pleasant experience? Can you say something generally?

CARTER: I would have to say so, Bob. I've never had an unpleasant tour, in the Army or in civilian life.

FARLEY: Great.

CARTER: And I think a lot of that is self-generated by the fact that Mrs. Carter and I were both born into the Army. I was born into the Army. Her father was VMI 1906. His whole career was in the military. And we were raised in the atmosphere of military. So you went where you were told, you did what they expected you to do in your job, you made do with whatever was necessary. There was no point in bitching because that was the job that you were to do. So you made the best of everything that you could possibly find that pleased you, and you trod on unhappiness. Now to us that was a very simple thing. We had been bred that way. As a matter of interest we have been married 54 years.

FARLEY: My gosh.

CARTER: Which is a pretty good stretch for a couple of amateurs who had never been married before. (chuckles)

FARLEY: Stick with the same one, right?

CARTER: As a matter of fact I got my first spanking when I was four years old for throwing sand in Preot's baby carriage on the beach at Fort Monroe.

FARLEY: My gosh. Boy that goes back.

CARTER: Yeah. That was in 19 - - well I was four years old so that was in 1913 and she was a year old. Yeah, a year and a half old. Now I didn't know this until 1932 when I was ordered to Hawaii and I met this girl who was at the Officers' Club that first night. If I can just take a minute to give you the romantic side of this thing.

FARLEY: Please.

CARTER: I was met by an escort officer, contemporary, who had to take me to an apartment that I had to rent for a while. And he said, "Come to the Officers' Club tonight. I'm dating my tennis partner and would be delighted to have you join us." So I went and I danced with this girl four or five times and boy, that was it. So I wrote a letter to my Mother that night and I said, "I know you think I'm crazy, but I met the girl at the dance tonight that I'm going to marry."

FARLEY: My gosh.

CARTER: I said, "I've got to cut out some competition. There's a fly boy and an ensign messing around." So she wrote me back and she said, "You're not crazy at all." I had identified her, of course. "You got your first spanking for throwing sand in her baby carriage at Fort Monroe on the beach."

FARLEY: Were you able to recall that when you two got together, about the days at Monroe, or did you realize that?

CARTER: I didn't have the slightest idea, no. This was just news to both of us. And then I started in some pretty heavy

courting and her Father was a Lieutenant Colonel in command at Fort DeRussy.

FARLEY: Oh, Hawaii – on the beach.

CARTER: Under the big banyan tree. Then after about two months they were ordered to Fort Levenworth. But I was a pretty cute letter writer and I kept this thing going. And a year later I went to visit my parents at West Point. My father was a professor there, and on the way back I stopped at Fort Levenworth and reinforced the comments in my letters. Then I went back to Hawaii. Then I guess sometime in December she came to Hawaii to visit friends. I had run a clandestine operation on the girl that she was visiting, a colonel's daughter, because Preot was very popular. And I said, "They're going to call you and say 'We're going to have a party for Preot. Who should we get to bring her?'" And this girl friend of mine, I wasn't dating her or anything, but a real good friend, I told her I said, "The only answer you could possibly give them is Pat Carter." So I had that thing all sewed up. And so during the month that she was visiting there I really got the operation going. So we were married at West Point on Bastille Day, July the 14th of 1934. So it's been 54 years plus that we've been married.

FARLEY: That's tremendous.

CARTER: Just an aside. Going back again to how we were raised in the military to accept what you are handed and that was

why she accepted me. I guess she had no choice - - the pressure was so great from me that she...

FARLEY: Couldn't get away, huh?

CARTER: ...that she couldn't get away. I cut out the fly boy and the ensign in pretty short order by clandestine moves that I had generated myself. Anyway, that's the way it happened. And that reflects on all of our assignments that we've ever had. I've been overseas a lot, I've been off on a lot of trips and things like that, but nothing of the order or magnitude of spending three years in Europe or something like that.

FARLEY: Talking about the military people and I know people who were military people retired who came back to NSA as a civilian and their prime complaint is, I, as a former military realize that when I was I gave an order and it was done like that. As a civilian chief or supervisor I give an order to a civilian worker and I'll be damned, sometimes it gets done sometimes it will not get done. So they see that difference. In the military, "Yes, Sir, I'll do it." But in civilian life, and they keep thinking of themselves as a lieutenant colonel or the colonel when somebody would jump when they said something. So it's quite a comedown to a lot of the former military who are civilian supervisors.

CARTER: I can understand that.

FARLEY: Well it's happened to me, too.

CARTER: It's a question of leadership I think.

FARLEY: I think.

CARTER: And that's something that if you're born and raised in the military a lot of it is ingrained in you. If you have parents who raise you properly so that you don't get any exalted opinion of being the son of a colonel or something else, son of a lieutenant colonel, daughter or something like that that you don't think by any means that any of that brushes off on you. It's a great asset.

FARLEY: Oh sure.

CARTER: Rank can go to your head in a hell of a big hurry if you don't realize that the rank is because of the work that you're supposed to be doing and not because of any inherent intellectual extra capacity beyond the people who are working with you, and things like that. I have difficulty expressing myself now because it's a pretty difficult thing to rationalize on. But in our own particular case we have never had any pretensions, nor have we felt that anybody was entitled to any pretensions.

FARLEY: I can think back to when I was a second lieutenant and another fellow was a second lieutenant and he ranked me by two or three weeks and this bum was always pulling rank on me. (chuckles) Have you gone through this?

CARTER: Yes.

FARLEY: "You do it. I'm senior to you by two weeks."

CARTER: No, I felt so strongly about that as an instance when I was in command of the 5th Region at Fort Sheridan, Illinois, antiaircraft region. I was a brigadier general. I was

entitled to a deputy. My rank was supposed to be a major general, okay, but I was a brigadier general and I was in command. The table of organization called for a major general in the job and a brigadier general as Deputy. So they ordered this guy in, who's a brigadier general, and I said, "Hey, that's neat, boy, there's my Deputy. It may also mean I'm getting promoted." So I called up headquarters here in Colorado Springs and I said, "What's going on?" And he said, "Well you're going to come in here in about three months to be the deputy commander and be promoted to major general and this guy's going to take your place." And I said, "You mean he's not my deputy?" He said, "Gee, we hadn't thought about that." I said, "He's senior to me." He's a National Guard officer, regular. "He's senior to me on the promotion list and he automatically assumes command when he gets here." "Gee, we hadn't thought about that." And I said, "Well you'd better start thinking about it because I've got this command organized now the way I want it and I'm not going to hold the bag." So pretty soon I got a wire saying, "By direction of the President," I think I covered this yesterday...

FARLEY: I believe you mentioned it.

CARTER: ...or maybe in the car talking.

FARLEY: When you were promoted.

CARTER: Yeah. "By direction of the President you will retain command of the 5th AA Region." So here's this guy, who

on the tables is senior to me, okay. He's not my deputy, he's just sitting there for a couple of months. So I took him around with me all the time and everything else but he was not in the chain of command.

FARLEY: Sort of an embarrassing situation for both of you.

CARTER: Yeah, it was, but we worked it out. But rank has no privileges.

FARLEY: No. Even though they keep saying it does.

CARTER: So to get back to the point, no, I've never had a bad assignment. I've never had an assignment that I felt was degrading in any way. I've never had an assignment, even at West Point as a cadet, I've never felt degraded by quote hazing unquote and all that stuff, because I knew what I was getting into. I've never had an assignment that in some way or another didn't prove profitable to us, not from a fiscal viewpoint but as career development. What I call "career manglement." So I felt I did a lot for the country and NSA. I felt I made improvements in NSA that should have been made.

FARLEY: That's right.

CARTER: I would hate to try to establish a precedent of all the various jobs because they're different kinds of jobs.

FARLEY: Oh, no. Of course you can't compare them. Number 64 you talked about I think. "What do you consider your greatest contribution to the ^{country} ~~country~~ during your career?"

CARTER: Yeah that was covered. You could almost go back to where I was holding General Marshall's horse, you know,

know, as perhaps being one of the keys that nationally had an effect. Who knows? I can't think of anything I did that was any particularly unusual contribution to the country. I was doing the job that I was paid for. That's the way I felt.

FARLEY: Sixty-five. I think you covered that, too. Your "finest hour," as Winston said.

CARTER: God. During the DIRNSA days.

FARLEY: Professionalization, would you say that is?

CARTER: Well there are five or six things that I felt that I was responsible for initiating that have continued, you know, have continued. I guess probably was one other fact we haven't mentioned. Up until that time NSA was a terminal assignment, okay?

FARLEY: Okay.

CARTER: Now you're three-star, that's as far as you're going. That's a terminal assignment, you know that, everybody knows that, what they don't know is how long you're going to be there. So you have a freedom of action which totally inhibits any desire on your part to do things that would aggrandize your position. You're a total captive of the organization. You're dedicated to that organization until you retire. So you're not bucking for anything. Quite frankly I can't think of a single time I ever bucked for anything in the way of improving my pay or my rank or anything like that. You just do what you're expected to do and more and whatever follows is up to somebody else

not up to you. So up to the appointment of Gayler it had always been a terminal assignment. So I had no fear of any kind that anything that I did that displeased people would have any effect on my career or promotion. Now when Gayler came in that was different. Because he was young enough, you see, and was not on a terminal tour. He was young and fairly junior.

FARLEY: Was that what would determine whether it was a terminal tour, his age?

CARTER: I don't know. In the Army it was five years in grade and you were out.

FARLEY: Umm hmm. Right.

CARTER: And McCone had tried to get me promoted in CIA and McNamara had turned it down, according to the story. I don't know where Bamford got that. He sure as hell didn't get it from me. According to Bamford so he must have gotten it from some source. But McCone was a queer breed of cat anyway, and as I've told you, intellectually extremely intelligent but didn't know how to handle people. So I knew it was a terminal assignment. So did Gordon Blake, so did Frost, so did everybody. But I think when Gayler came in it began to change the atmosphere. Getting back to why. This gave me a period of quietude where I could tackle any goddamned problem that was there and I did not have to be concerned about what effect it would have on my future. The same way in CIA, it was the same way. So I felt I was

in a unique position and I could talk back to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a little. Particularly bearing in mind that I have been Deputy Director of CIA which is number three on the totem pole. And when you go down the totem pole if 81 people had died or been killed I'd have been President. (laughter)

FARLEY: Is it that far down?

CARTER: Oh, that was high up for me.

FARLEY: Oh, I see.

CARTER: Number 82 or 83 you see. One of my special assistants figured that out one day. I said, "Well suppose a balloon goes up and the Soviets bomb Washintgon?" He said, "Well if the first 82 people get killed you'll be President." (chuckles)

FARLEY: Something to look forward to.

CARTER: So there are a lot of factors that led to a sort of freedom of action that I felt that I had. But I think subsequent Directors would not have felt.

FARLEY: All of them got their four stars, Gayler, Allen, Inman.

CARTER: Sure. Phillips, I don't know about Phillips.

FARLEY: Phillips, he's a four-star.

CARTER: I think he was Air Force.

FARLEY: Right. He's four-star because he corrected us one time. In the Phoenix Society we sent a letter to him "Lieutenant General." He sent it back and crossed it off and said "General." So he is a four-star.

FARLEY: But Inman and...

CARTER: I may have helped in that by impressing on people, hey this National Security Agency isn't a half-assed cryptologic outfit stuck over there under the DoD. This is big stuff. To that extent I may have been responsible in some measure.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: By nationalizing it and getting it out from under DoD as far as I could.

FARLEY: Could be.

CARTER: I don't think it should be a national agency supporting its own budget and everything else like the CIA. I think that would kill it because you'd lose your ASAs. You'd lose your service security organizations.

FARLEY: Yeah, you need those.

CARTER: I think it's about as good a position as it'll ever be right now. But they ought to maintain that, "Hey wait a minute we're something special over here."

FARLEY: Yeah. We don't know too much about the current Director. Studemann.

CARTER: He's a Navy type.

FARLEY: Yeah, Admiral.

CARTER: Yeah. I don't know a thing about him.

FARLEY: He's about five foot two, very slight individual, very polite.

CARTER: He must be at least five feet four if he went to the Naval Academy.

FARLEY: Well he could be, I don't know, Sir. I have not seen him but people say that the 'little guy' was over here. Gee, I

shouldn't put that on the tape. But anyway, he is making the rounds already just checking out who does what where and people are impressed. They said, gee he sat down in the cafeteria and had lunch with the troops. Now that's impressive. People like that to happen. As I say, like you used to do, wander around. But we don't know what his technique is, what he's going to do. But he just tells everybody to stay in place and continue for a while.

CARTER:

Yeah.

FARLEY:

How are we doing time-wise?

CARTER:

There's a ladies luncheon going to be going on in here, probably around 12, and if it's all right with you we can stay right here and have lunch at the men's luncheon.

FARLEY:

Excellent.

CARTER:

You'll meet a lot of people.

FARLEY:

That's fine.

CARTER:

You mentioned the DoD several times. Are you using that as light cover or what?

FARLEY:

No. Department of Defense you mean?

CARTER:

Yeah.

FARLEY:

No, no.

CARTER:

So it's all right to say...

FARLEY:

Of course.

CARTER:

To say you're...

FARLEY:

From NSA.

CARTER:

...NSA historian.

FARLEY: Right. No, even though the trend in the last few months seems to go back to when somebody in the credit office says, where do you work, I work for the Department of Defense at Fort Meade. Oh, you mean NSA?

CARTER: Yeah, sure.

FARLEY: Because for years we've been able to say I'm with the National Security Agency. But now it's easier to say DoD.

CARTER: Do they still light up the building on Christmas with PAX and NOEL? It was interesting that we figured out NOEL and then the next Director was Noel Gayler.

FARLEY: You know why? He was born on Christmas Day.

CARTER: Oh, is that why?

FARLEY: I mean it's coincidental. But I was looking over his biography and here he was born on the 25th of December, and I always accused him of overdoing this bit of honoring the current Director. But they do the Christmas tree or XMAS or something.

CARTER: Yeah. Well we started that when I was there on the big building.

FARLEY: I don't know what they'll do now because they've got a new eight story building and a new 11 story building, plus the old nine story building.

CARTER: God. I don't know what they're doing with all those people. The budget must be tremendous. The CCP must fill this room.

FARLEY: I wouldn't doubt it, if they're still using it. I've been away from that so long that I don't even know what they're

doing. Well, personal recollections, fond memories. You've talked about a lot of them.

CARTER: Yeah.

FARLEY: Intelligence successes.

CARTER: You see Gayler was the one, you talk about a military Director or a civilian Director. I fought the intrusion of any military command within the NSA organization. I don't know what they call it now is it CSC?

FARLEY: CSS.

CARTER: CSS.

FARLEY: Cryptologic Security Service.

CARTER: Yeah, whatever it was. I fought that the whole time I was there. I wouldn't have any part of it. So I think as soon as Gayler came in he realized that, "Hey I'm fighting the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this thing, and there must be coming a time when I've got to give." I presume this is what went through his mind, I don't know.

FARLEY: I don't know either.

CARTER: But I fought and I didn't want any part of it. I thought it was a third teat where even two is even more than you need.

FARLEY: Right. It has never become a viable organization.

CARTER: Well I had anticipated that that it was a facade. A facade placed in there to satisfy some people who thought something ought to be over there to take care of the military.

FARLEY: That's what it was.

CARTER: That's what I felt and I didn't want any part of it.

FARLEY: Pacified the ASA and the NSG and the Air Force Security Group.

CARTER: I should think they would not like the idea.

FARLEY: I wouldn't either because it's another echelon, another layer.

CARTER: Sure, sure.

FARLEY: But somebody went along with it. Right.

CARTER: That business about downgrading operators and computer systems, I'm not qualified to answer that. I'll tell you one thing, in spite of every goddamned computer in the world you're going to get down sooner or later to a warm blooded person who's got to have the rapport. And I haven't found a computer yet that could develop a rapport with me. It did what I told it to do, and if it kicked out something I didn't like I'd send it back to start over again. Things like that. You can overdo this computer business as far as I'm concerned. It's a great asset, sure. It saves a tremendous amount of time to collate and assemble information in any particular form that you want it. But you had to put it in there in the first place, so that's the first possibility of error. And then your second possibility of error is when you ask it to tell you something and you haven't given it all the parameters that you wanted considered.

FARLEY: Yeah.

CARTER: I think those two basic things about a computer are what turn me off on it. And that's why I still hand type my letters and I use a little adding machine to balance my check book.

FARLEY: I don't own a computer.

CARTER: So do I. So do I don't own one.

FARLEY: But I'm thinking about, you say it's helpful it is very helpful, and I'm thinking of the cripplies. The frequency counts and all the things that they used to do by hand.

CARTER: Oh, sure. Well that's why we've got those in-house designed computers. That's why we had, when I left, five and a half acres of computers in NSA. And a large number of them were designed in-house for a specific purpose. And that's why over in CIA we had Walnut, I think was the name of it, one of the first big retrievable systems. And that's why when Kennedy was assassinated we were able to turn out in about 36 hours a beautifully bound volume for the President showing a picture of say of Queen Fredrika, a little bit about Greece, what her relationships were genealogically, what the present condition of the country was, and what our policy was as of that date. And so when they came to call on President Johnson he had the book and he just flipped it open, or his aide did, to who the next person was who was coming in to pay their respects as the new President, and here he had the whole thing on two pages.

FARLEY: Great. That was helpful.

CARTER: It's a State Department function but it would have taken them three months to do that you see. I was in the agency for 72 hours after Kennedy died.

FARLEY: I can believe that.

CARTER: Without even leaving, doing these things because McCone was fairly close to the Kennedys and he was busy on family matters.

FARLEY: I'll bet that's a story in itself, those 72 hours. I'll bet you could talk for hours on that.

CARTER: I could, I could.

FARLEY: It was a shock at the Agency.

CARTER: Hum?

FARLEY: It was really a shock at the Agency when it happened.

CARTER: Yeah. Well, Mrs. Carter and I were down shooting quail at ISO. ISO is a CIA conclave...

FARLEY: The farm down there?

CARTER: The farm, yeah, outside of Williamsburg. Very light cover which Frank Church blew just as fast as he could. Well we had our own airplanes and everything like that. The point I was trying to make, we were out shooting quail, but it was the military cover so the MPs knew where I was all the time. And they came and found us and I got on the phone right away to my special assistant in Washington and he told me the President was dead. And that was within 10 minutes, well maybe 20 minutes of the assassination, which has no bearing on anything except that,...I don't even know how we got started on the assassination.

Those things live with you forever you know. And we loaded up and took off.

FARLEY: Did you ever speculate whether there was any involvement on the part of the Cubans in the assassination? I know I've read ...

CARTER: Well there have been stories about that. There have been books out and everything else.

FARLEY: Do you think it was a conspiracy?

CARTER: You can't deny that there was a connection between the Cubans and the Soviets and whoever the guy was who killed the President, Oswald, and his peculiar characteristics. And he'd been in Moscow, he's been trained for something or other. He had made visits to the Mexican Embassy, Cuban Embassy, Cuban Embassy in Mexico, and that the guy who shot him...

FARLEY: Ruby.

CARTER: ...was a Mafia type. You can't deny those facts. But when you put them all together then you're conjecturing. Because I don't know of any hard intelligence such as we might have had at NSA that would ever support any of this.

FARLEY: I've asked this question many times and nobody seems to know. But my thought was, it's peculiar. The President was shot by this character Oswald whose "Free Cuba" organization or whatever, and then Jack Ruby shot him, and then coincidentally Jack Ruby developed cancer.

CARTER: Sure.

FARLEY: Well. We could for hours and days on this. All right Sir. What did you see as the NSA role in the intelligence community in the 1990s and later? Is it over-expanding? Is the abundance of funds more of a detriment than a benefit? And we're seeing the over-building now, I think personally over-building.

CARTER: Yeah, but you're with it, you're with it. You're there. You see it. Presumably you have some concept of what they're doing now. I don't. I've been out much too long. I don't know what control if any they have over the collection assets of satellite operations. I just don't know. I don't know whether they have any access to any of the photography that comes from the satellites.

FARLEY: Yes, they still do.

CARTER: I should think they would because after all interception takes ground installations of some sort at some stage of the game and we ought to be able to recognize those.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: Now things like that I have no knowledge of. I'm just not equipped to answer it.

FARLEY: Okay, are there areas, subjects, or topics we have overlooked that you would care to comment on? And I'm thinking of your interview with Bamford. You wanted to talk about that in some detail.

CARTER: Yes, I did. But I think we'd better get out of here.

FARLEY: Do you want to wait until after lunch?

CARTER: Yeah, I think we'd better wait until after lunch because there is a cohesive chain of events that I would like to get on record.

FARLEY: All right, Sir. Let me throw this. I'll leave our power line there and put everything else on the...

CARTER: I don't think it will be disturbed in here.

(LUNCH BREAK BEFORE INTERVIEW RESUMES.)

FARLEY: All right Sir, let's put her on there. Looks good. What we want to do is pick up a few things that we omitted or I goofed up on one cassette and it's not useful. But when we stopped yesterday...

CARTER: That was just a stretch of it though wasn't it?

FARLEY: Yes Sir, just a small section of it. But when we stopped yesterday we said we would continue and talk about the Bamford case and your many mentions in the *Puzzle Palace*. You said that you wanted to go into some detail about that. After that we'll try and pick the one section on Second Party that was goofed up on the cassette.

CARTER: Okay. The whole Bamford case occurred after I had retired.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: But prior to my leaving NSA, since I had a large number of personal files and personal materials which were not classified stamped, not stamped classified, but in retrospect some were sensitive. In any event, before I left

NSA, incidently when I left CIA I took only personal correspondence. When I left NSA I took only personal correspondence, and I had left with the agencies, as General Marshall always left wherever he was everything except his personal business. He collected no papers is what I'm trying to say. Nor did I. So when I left NSA my files were supposed to have been vetted to take out anything that had a classification stamp on it. Which was done. Then I told you or have told you about opening an office for the Marshall Foundation here in town, in Colorado Springs, and my files from NSA were sent out there. I think they probably came with my household goods, maybe they came out later, I'm not sure. I had sent a lot of stuff down to the Marshall Foundation already as the respository for my papers. A lot of it was bills from the nursing home for my mother-in-law and my mother. All sorts of stuff like that. Legal stuff that I didn't need. When I finally hired an executive director for the Marshall Foundation I no longer needed that office here in town so I bundled up everything there without vetting it at all, without going through it and seeing it, and sent it on down to the Marshall Foundation. So that's where my papers were. I had nothing here. I don't know the years or anything. I may have a copy of it around somewhere. I never heard of Bamford, I was not aware of him until I got a letter from him saying that he would like to interview me he was trying to write a substantive history of NSA,

words to that effect. So I didn't reply to that but I sent it in to NSA. Now this must have been four or five years after I was retired. At least, because I didn't know who to send it to. Roy Banner I think had already left. That would have been my normal guy to send it to just because I leaned on him for a lot of extracurricular stuff. So I just sent it in and said, "What do you want me to do about this?" And I never got an answer of any kind from it, okay. So I gave it no further thought. Then I got a telephone call from Bamford in Denver now, and he said, "I'm out here conducting some interviews on the book I wrote you about and I'd like to come down and spend a few hours talking to you." I said, "Well let me find out."

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So I called NSA and I was referred to I think it was [redacted] office, [redacted] office.

FARLEY:

[redacted]

CARTER:

I don't think I talked to [redacted] but I talked to somebody in that office.

FARLEY:

He was in charge of that element, yes.

CARTER:

Was he? And I told him what my problem was and I needed some guidance and he said, "Well we are not cooperating with him." And that was the answer I got. Or we are not being cooperative with him. Which didn't give me a hell of a lot of guidance.

FARLEY:

Right.

CARTER:

So I may have been talking to the wrong guy. In any event I called Bamford back and told him "Okay come on

down I'll talk to you. I'll see what your problems are, and see if I can be helpful." Because the impression I had was he wanted to write a truly substantive story about NSA to overcome some of the bad press it had been getting, stuff like that. The usual. I've had that routine before. But not knowing Bamford I take anybody at their face value until I've had a chance to size them up.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: So he came down. I don't even know where the hell he stayed.

FARLEY: I've got a red light Sir, let me switch tapes.

TAPE VI, SIDE TWO

FARLEY: All right Sir, please continue.

CARTER: (chuckles) Reminds me of that card I have "I say, I'm somewhat of a bull shitter myself, but I like to hear a professional. Please continue." (laughter) Anyway, he came down and I took him to lunch and he sounded perfectly kosher like he was really trying to do something helpful. And I said, "Well have you been to NSA?" And he said, "Yes I have some documents here." And he had, he had the - what the hell do you call it, not an index, not a phone book, it was the Tables of Organization of NSA of everyone of the divisions and groups in NSA showing the names and the telephone numbers and the areas of their responsibility.

FARLEY: Amazing.

CARTER: And he had all these duplicated, duplicated. And I said, "Where did you get those?" He said, "Freedom of Information Act." He said, "I got a lot of stuff from NSA from the Freedom of Information Act." And I thought well gee, if they're passing that stuff out freely like this this guy must be kosher, they must have looked into him. He started asking me questions and I said, "What are those questions based on?" "Oh, I've been through your papers down at the Marshall Foundation." And that was somewhat of a shock because he said, "Tell me about this business of McCone not getting McNamara to make you a four-star general." And I vaguely recalled then I had written a memorandum at McCone's direction giving the history of Cabel's having been a four-star and that's what started it. And then I said, "What else have you got?" And he had a fair number of things that he had had copied at the Marshall Foundation.

FARLEY: Personal papers.

CARTER: Personal papers from the Marshall Foundation. A letter I had written to a girl I knew in Korea, who worked for the government, and she was a real smart gal. She was with the U.S. government but with Public Health Service or something like that, and she ran with our bunch over there. And the Chosen Hotel, what we called the "Frozen Chosen," was nothing but a glorified whore house, you see. It was an absolute disgrace. And it was run by the

U.S. military. So I was talking to her one day -- I was Chief of Staff 8th Army -- and said, "How in the hell am I going to clean that up?" I said, "It's a national disgrace." An article had appeared in *Time* magazine about the one that the Koreans had opened up at a hill outside of town someplace, where they had gambling and the babes and everything else. And that is what brought it to my mind at the moment because we were doing the same damn thing in a U.S. compound. We weren't having the gambling, we did have slot machines, but the babes were waiting outside of the gate because they couldn't get in unless they were accompanied by a military person. They were running a mess and everything else. Except I say it was nothing but a glorified whore house. House of ill repute if you're having trouble with the transcript. She said, "I've over here four years. The only way you're ever going to clean that place up is to get out of there and turn it back to the Koreans and start over again someplace else. That's the only way." So that made a hell of a lot of sense to me. This is how I started admiring this girl's perspicacity. (chuckles) If that's the word.

FARLEY:

Yes that is.

CARTER:

Both of them. (laughter) Anyway after I got in CIA I kept in contact with her. Every three or four months something like that to see what she was doing. At that time I wrote to her and said, "If you ever feel the need for an overseas trip, we're always asking people who go

overseas to keep their eyes open on this or that or something else, and I could probably find something for you to do." And I said, "And I don't mean running around bare ass naked like Mata Hari or shooting spies or anything like that." And Bamford had that letter.

FARLEY: I remember that.

CARTER: Yeah. Then he had a letter from to me, which I think was the final item in the book.

FARLEY: Reproduced, right.

CARTER: He had that, a full page letter. Yeah fully reproduced which he had gotten down at the Marshall Foundation. So that put me in an embarrassing situation because he had these things. They were given to him by an organization of which I was president. Even though I had personally sequestered my papers and we had other papers that were sequestered in there, too, in the same way, but not on NSA. So I thought, well the best way out of this is to let him know what went on while I was there that had some amusing parts that had nothing to do with any classification or any targets or anything like that. Just keep it absolutely unclassified. Stuff which you could just easily read in a newspaper as well as anyplace else or hear at a cocktail party. And that's where I got to telling him some of these anecdotes. Or he had gotten to somebody else before me, because there was nothing in my papers about Cec Corry, nothing at all.

FARLEY: Did he talk to Tordella at all do you know?

CARTER: I don't know whether he talked to Tordella or not. He may have. But he talked to somebody who knew that there had been a slight difference of opinion between Tordella and me as to who should be SUSLO. And as I say he had a lot of documentation which he had acquired through the Freedom of Information Act. Some associated directly with NSA and some from other sources but referring to NSA. I don't think I saw anything that had a classification stamp on it.

FARLEY: Not even any that had been obliterated?

CARTER: It may well have had some sort of a stamp over a stamp but nothing codeword.

FARLEY: Okay.

CARTER: I saw nothing at all codeword. I may have seen some Confidentials or something like that, but I didn't pay a hell of a lot of attention to it because Confidential and Secret didn't mean anything anymore you know. Probably still doesn't mean anything. So I talked to him and chatted and he was taping some of it not taping others. And I asked him to send copies of the tape down to the Marshall Foundation and if he had any questions to come back at me as to sensitivity or as to embarrassing things that might hurt somebody's feelings or anything like that to come back to me. And we left it at that. Then the book is published see so meanwhile I had forgotten all about it. The book is published and I noticed in the Foreword he gives remarkable credit to me and the

Marshall Foundation and all of this stuff with which I was directly associated. This was after the publication. He never came back to me about anything. In the meantime I had changed archivists at the Marshall Foundation.

FARLEY: Tell me, how did he manage to get those documents that were supposedly sealed? How did he manage to get his hands on those?

CARTER: Well, that's where the embarrassment occurred to me personally, not with Bamford. Because I had to make the decision, I had a new director in there, I had the same archivist, I had the staff people, and I had to make the decision whether to hire an Inspector General to come in there and find out how Bamford had been given free access. And he was quite frank. He said, "I couldn't have been given more help by the people down there." And here I was in Colorado Springs and I made the decision I was going to let the damn thing die and not hire somebody, a private investigator or something. We were broke anyway in the Marshall Foundation. I think I told you I had to borrow money from the bank to meet the payroll one month. So I decided to let the whole damn thing die. I continue to probe even now. I say, who the hell ever did this, and I get sort of blank stares from even close friends so somewhere, somehow Bamford either talked his way in or had given the impression that I had already okayed something like this. Because I never went through any of these papers, or screened them or

anything like that. I did tell Bamford, and I may have done this in writing, I said, "There is no way you can use that letter that Joe Hooper wrote to me without getting Joe's approval." And he said, "Well I've already got the letter." And I said, "I don't give a goddamned whether you've got the letter or not. That's a personal letter that Joe wrote to me and even though it's not classified or anything like that ethics alone would require you to go to Joe and get his approval." And obviously he paid no attention to that.

FARLEY: But he didn't get Hooper's approval?

CARTER: No. Not to my knowledge, not to my knowledge. And I've been to embarrassed about that aspect of it. There was another letter in there from Joe which actually should have been vetted out at NSA when I had my files vetted. It should have been vetted out and that was mentioning the two radar stations, one should be called "Lou" and one should be called "Pat." I was somewhat shocked, not only that Bamford had it but that it was in my files although there was no classification on the letter at all. Then I harked back myself to the time when I had gone up to try to get changes made I guess in *The Codebreakers*.

FARLEY: David Kahn.

CARTER: David Kahn. I had up to talk to the publishers, Doubleday I think it was, whoever it was, and they did make some changes in that. When I had finally gotten the people on *The Codebreakers* to say look cut this down to our people,

our Levin type people, cut this down to the absolute necessity of what you have to have taken out. When you looked at it it was all about the fact that we were in bed with GCHQ.

FARLEY: Yes.

CARTER: And I have never understood what the big secrecy was on this. And consequently when it was in, when he had these letters that supported this relationship with GCHQ, and had already been blown long since by David Kahn, I thought to myself well to hell with it.

FARLEY: Yeah.

CARTER: The one thing I did not at the time analyze and that was the fact that Bamford could go to somebody like Frank Raven and say, "Hey I've been all through General Carter's files. I've got these charts through the Freedom of Information Act and I've spent a day and a half with General Carter." I did not even think at that time that somebody like Frank Raven, or somebody else that he went to, would buy that or would even be approached on that level. So that I think was a gross error on my part, to have talked to him in the first place, without considering just one factor. But I had not thought of that at the time and the fellow who brought it to my attention was Faurer.

FARLEY: General Faurer, right.

CARTER: Yeah, General Faurer. So I got the book, my son sent it to me. He was with Chase then in New York, still is. He sent

it to me. He said, "You don't look so hot in this but you don't look too bad." (chuckles) So then I read it word for word and I annotated every single page of where I thought the source might be if it had any bearing on me. And I could trace a large amount of it. And there weren't too many references to me, it was pretty evenly scattered through all the previous Directors.

FARLEY: Did you feel that you had a personal responsibility to alert people like Raven and Tate and some of the other people who quote were interviewed?

CARTER: No I didn't.

FARLEY: Okay.

CARTER: I didn't. I'd been out five or six years, I'd sent the letter to NSA. I'd called them on the phone.

FARLEY: You called it that you probably make a mistake and I don't see where you made a mistake at all.

CARTER: I think I made a mistake in not considering all of the angles before even talking to Bamford.

FARLEY: Okay.

CARTER: I think that was my mistake. And zeroing in on the mistake Faurer was the one who pointed out to me "Well the fact that you did this could very easily mislead people who had been working for you to think that this was really a kosher operation and everything was clean as a whistle." I had not considered that angle. That's why I say I think it was a mistake.

FARLEY: I understand.

CARTER: I very soon realized that it was a mistake. At least I made up my mind after reading the book that if anything else came up, no way from anybody. And that's when also Bamford had a British girl who I don't know whether she was a girlfriend or what but she was a cute little bug and smart as a whip. She came over from London. She asked if she could talk to me. She was out here and I bought her lunch and that was about it. She got absolutely nothing from me except that I thought Bamford was carrying it too goddamned far when he called me "balding" "stocky" and some other phrase. And she immediately got that back to Bamford, you see. And that's when Bamford sent the thing in on our fifty year book.

FARLEY: Was she supposedly doing a follow up interview on what Bamford had done with you?

CARTER: No. No, she had read *The Puzzle Palace*.

FARLEY: Oh, it was published already.

CARTER: It was already published. She had another question which she was trying to get the answers out of me and fortunately it had happened after my watch was over and I didn't know a damned thing about it so I could just be as pure and simple as I should have been in the first place. But I've read *The Puzzle Palace*, as far as it involves me, about three or four different times and I can find absolutely no violation of security of any kind in my participation.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: So the error, if anybody wants to call it an error, it was an error in my judgment and not analyzing the whole problem. But in the face of what he had acquired from the Freedom of Information Act.

FARLEY: And he tabbed this as a result of the interview with you? I mean some of the extracts that he had used from various memos and various papers he had got at the library, did he say that this was as a result of talking with you? Or did he identify them?

CARTER: Oh, no. In the footnotes, you'll find in the footnotes the things he got from the Marshall Foundation are identified as coming from the Marshall Foundation. But they involved me personally.

FARLEY: Oh, I see.

CARTER: And then throughout he's got word for word things that I told him about this girl running around bare ass naked, like, not Mona Lisa, but Mata Hari, that sort of stuff. Those are direct quotes because I remember making those because that's my language. It's not as bad as Carter Clarke. (chuckles) It's typical Pat Carter is what I'm trying to say. No those are right out of that hog caller that you've got us wired up to right now. So then, just to wind this up, that's how I got involved. In hindsight it wasn't a very good operation. Then Faurer called me up and asked me if I was coming to town at any time to drop in and see him and I said I had no plans. This was still before my heart operation. He said, "Well I'd like to come out and

see you. Is anytime convenient?" And I said, "Sure, anytime." We have or did have an NSA Rep at NORAD.

FARLEY: Still there. The Space Comm.

CARTER: I had kept contact with him because every once in a while I'd get a call from NSA or from CIA and say, "Could you get on a secure line and call us." And I would go to his shop. And somewhere, as I recall they had a secure line or maybe it was just a secure cable.

FARLEY: No, no, they have a secure line. A gray phone.

CARTER: ...And talk to whoever had called me. So they laid on a meeting. Faurer was to come to Colorado Springs and he would stay at such and such a hotel and we would have a meeting in Colorado Springs, maybe in my house or maybe in the hotel or whatever. And then I got to thinking about that and I said, "Well that's pretty goddamned presumptuous of me to be sitting back here like the Sultan's Queen or something and having people come to me." So I got in touch with the NSA Rep and said, "What would be the easiest thing for Faurer to do?" And he said, "Well the easiest thing would be to come in to Denver and we meet at Buckley Air Force Base.

FARLEY: Not Lowry.

CARTER: Not Lowry, no, Buckley. So I said, "Well hell why don't you and I drive on up and we'll meet Faurer there?" "Fine." So we changed the plans and we met there. And I really don't remember whether there was anybody else with us, but I think it was Faurer and me alone in a small

room. And I told him generally what I told you, along those lines. He didn't chew me out. He didn't threaten to take away my consultant status, which I hadn't used anyway, or my clearances or anything like that.

FARLEY: Right.

CARTER: But he did point out the one thing that I said I had overlooked. That was the fact that I had talked to Bamford would appear be legitimatizing him for people like Raven and Tate and others who did talk to him and *apparently* blew some pretty sensitive stuff. Now that's the story. I have reason to *think* that the chances are my conversation with Faurer was taped, but there's no way I could verify that. If I were Faurer I would be taping the conversation, but I don't know whether he did or not.

FARLEY: Do you think the NSA Rep might have had a tape recorder? Was it evident?

CARTER: I don't remember any sign of a tape recorder or anything like that.

FARLEY: Well Faurer is a pretty sharp fellow and he's a responsible, respectable individual.

CARTER: Yeah, but if I were in CIA and in the same place I'd have had that place bugged.

FARLEY: Was that the end of the story then when you Faurer shook hands and said, "Nice talking to you." Was that the end of any letters?

CARTER: As far as I was concerned I never had any more contact.

FARLEY: You had no correspondence from NSA at all after that?

CARTER: I don't think so, no. I don't remember having any conversation. I don't have any correspondence. I think I got a report back telephonically that they had been all through their files and could not find what I had alleged I had sent them, which was the letter from Bamford. And I think Faurer told me that. Yeah, he told me that in our conversation.

FARLEY: Yeah, this what's interesting.

CARTER: That they hadn't seen the letter or anything.

FARLEY: Because they were in default by not reacting to that letter.

CARTER: But things do happen. Things do get lost in the mail. Things do get lost in the bureaucracy. But it's just when it happens to be something that's possibly as sensitive as it is that people get concerned about it.

FARLEY: That's it. Because that office is so concerned about information being released to the public that shouldn't be relating to NSA that they almost demand if somebody is writing an article for a newspaper or magazine or contributing to a book that they route it through

shop, whoever is there now I don't know.

CARTER: I don't know.

FARLEY: Like Frank Rowlett. He's been writing a book for 12 or 14 years and his manuscript is still there. They haven't given it the blessing at all.

CARTER: Oh, really?

FARLEY: It's still there. They're slow movers.

CARTER: Well I went balls out to promote Frank Rowlett's governmental prize. You know he was given a hundred thousand dollars.

FARLEY: Oh, yeah.

CARTER: That had been in the act a long long time ago, but it actually occurred, the event occurred during my watch there. I was very high on Frank, I think he was a solid, solid country boy, solid country boy, sharp as a tack.

FARLEY: Yeah, he's been riding that a long time.

CARTER: I'm trying to think. Oh, the possible follow up to the Bamford business and my Marshall files was that and his people then said, "We'd better have a look at those papers down at the Marshall Foundation." Now that's the follow up.

FARLEY: Good.

CARTER: It had nothing to do with Faurer's visit, well maybe it did, I don't know. But anyway a dialogue was immediately started. I said, "Hell go on down. Have access to anything you want down there. Take the whole Friedman collection and go through it paper by paper." It had already been done by Vince Wilson and somebody else helping Vince. So they went all through my papers again and they went through the Friedman papers. And believe it or not there were some papers that they wanted classified. And in the record is a letter from me to Hadsel. Hadsel writes to me and tells me what the problem is, because I had told him, "NSA is coming down to look at

the Friedman papers, to look at my papers, give them carte blanche. Don't allow a single paper to leave the Marshall Foundation, don't let them take anything with them. They can have copies if they want, but not to delete our files in any way shape or form, to keep me fully informed and you if have any problems call me before you take any action." And it was at this point that they came up and said, "We want to classify this, we want to classify that." And they came to me, I'd already written to Hadsel what I just told you. The stupidity of that, from my viewpoint, since they had never been classified, since the papers had already been all gone through by NSA already didn't make any sense. But I said, "Set those papers aside and don't keep them in the accessible files until we've got this thing ironed out." I remember that was the directive I sent. I think that's all been settled, as I recall, and that the papers may have, I think the papers were all put back in the file.

FARLEY: Were they?

CARTER: I know nothing went back to NSA. There's some background here involved I think is important.

FARLEY: Please.

CARTER: I was Director NSA when Friedman wanted to get rid of his papers. Dr. Pogue found out about it, told me about it. General Bradley was told about it. Okay? I'm Director NSA now. General Bradley was told about it. So I said talk to NSA people, I think Tordella. There weren't too good

relations I don't think between Friedman and Tordella. I didn't know, but I got that impression. And I had asked, "Why doesn't he give the papers to NSA?" And they said, "No way. Friedman doesn't like NSA." So then I said, "Well as Director NSA and as a trustee of the Marshall Foundation I will guarantee that we will maintain those Friedman papers inviolate in perpetuity." Now that is something that the archives cannot guarantee.

FARLEY:

Correct.

CARTER:

Nobody in government will guarantee anything like that and this is what convinced Friedman, who had a very high regard for General Marshall. General Marshall long since dead of course, had a very high regard for Pogue, convinced him that the Marshall Foundation was the place to put them. And I'll be damned if we didn't almost blow that thing open because when it was all signed, sealed and delivered and we'd made -- I'm still Director NSA -- Marshall Foundation says, "Gee how are we going to get these things down there?" I said, "That's all right, I'll have our security people pick them up and bring them down on a truck." So they go over to Friedman's place. Apparently somebody dropped the ball and didn't tell Friedman that this was going to be NSA picking these things up, that it was the Marshall Foundation. And when they showed up with their guns and cover truck and accompanying car and everything it just scared the hell

out of Friedman. And we had quite a little go around there in a hurry. Now I was not involved.

FARLEY:

This is interesting. Because there was a similar situation to that earlier at NSA, and this is probably why it left a bad taste with Friedman. Somebody heard that Friedman had a lot of classified material at his home that shouldn't have been there. They had given him a three combination safe and he kept his papers there. And then there was some negotiation where NSA said, "Mr. Friedman, we want all those papers back." So the same situation. They sent security people down with a truck and Friedman said, "There they are take them." And I interviewed one of the people who went down there and I said, "How highly classified were these papers?" "Unclassified." I said, "Any Confidential?" "Unclassified." So they took all the papers and it was really an insult to this old timer for them to come down and demand everything that he had. They took them back and they put them in the archives. So this is probably before the incident that you're talking about.

CARTER:

Oh, this was long before. Because I heard about this at the time when it hit the fan.

FARLEY:

Oh, did you?

CARTER:

Only it was much more grotesque than you say. They waited until Friedman was out of the house and they clandestinely went into the house and did this and that. It was a real cloak and dagger operation by the time it got to me, after the fact.

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FARLEY: Okay.

CARTER: Ours was perfectly clear-cut. The guys were not supposed to identify themselves except as working for the Marshall Foundation to pick up his papers and go on down. Friedman was fully alert and here they turn up identifying themselves and everything else. Anyway, it almost hit the fan, but we got all the papers.

FARLEY: Good.

CARTER: In the meantime I had made a commitment to Friedman through Pogue that I would get everything that I possibly could that was presently in the NSA files that he knew about, and get them or copies of them down to the Marshall Foundation providing they were Unclassified. Because apparently there was some stuff in NSA, a sizeable amount of stuff that they had retained or that they were aware of that should have been a part of the Friedman papers.

FARLEY: Well he had been around since the mid-30s so he was bound to accumulate a lot of papers.

CARTER: Sure, sure. But anyway that started the other business and even though Vince and another fellow had gone down and gone through all these papers and indicated no there was nothing sensitive, nothing classified at all.

[redacted] and his people had to do it again and they pulled out things. I don't think I looked at any of the papers that they pulled out. I left the judgment entirely down there. But as I recall through correspondence about the

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problems of subsequent classification of something that had been unclassified and things like that that we got it all ameliorated through correspondence. But it then opened up the ACLU business you see which is the next step in this whole fiasco.

FARLEY: That's what I was going to say, that this suddenly classifying unclassified material precipitated an uproar among the researchers, historians. People who had already looked at those papers.

CARTER: That's right. Exactly right. And the ACLU got their mammary glands in an uproar and started working on this and hell, I've got a file this thick at home right now. I don't know what to do with it. Don't know whether to send it to the Marshall Foundation, back to NSA or what. Most of it is copies keeping me informed of what was going on between ACLU who was my executive director.

FARLEY: Didn't they institute a law suit too?

CARTER: Yeah, there was a law suit. Sure. A guy came around in the middle of the night while I was in Colorado Springs and rapped on the door. He was a deputy sheriff or something. He was issuing a subpoena on me.

FARLEY: Oh, no.

CARTER: Well the same thing had happened on the 45 billion dollar suit that I was in as a result of ACLU having what they call a group suit or...

FARLEY: Class action.

CARTER: Class action suit against 40 of us. McNamara and Dean Rusk and me and McCone and Vance, you name it. Everybody who could possibly have been in the act, the alleged act quote unquote, of opening mail or reading cables that we weren't supposed to and so forth. They estimated the number of instances this had occurred and then they put a dollar number on each one, maybe 10 thousand, maybe 100 thousand. Whatever it was it added up in the initial thing, 45 billion dollars ACLU was suing the U.S. government.

FARLEY: Outrageous.

CARTER: Well that's a sizeable amount for 40 people to split. Subsequently it turned out to be, I may have told you this. Subsequently it turned out to be a mistake in computation and it was only four and a half billion dollars.

FARLEY: That eases it.

CARTER: So we breathed easier. But then the problem was Levi was the Attorney General, and he said, "This is not a governmental problem, this is a suit against these individuals, and we won't get involved in any way shape or form."

FARLEY: Oh, great.

CARTER: And we actually got a letter, each of us, saying that "This is a problem for you to solve." Four and a half billion bucks. "Hire yourself a lawyer."

FARLEY: Oh, no.

CARTER: Well that really hit the fan because I think probably the PFIAB or somebody got involved in it. Somebody with some judgmental competence as distinct from Levi.

FARLEY: They were able to squelch it then?

CARTER: No. Got to the President and said, "Yes, this is a governmental problem and we will provide the attorneys. And then the Department of Justice got into the act, the Attorney General. Department of Justice got into the act and they ran ACLU out of town. I mean they won the case so that was all clean. But I hired my lawyer to keep track of it just for the hell of it. He got a stack of stuff like this you know. I have that stuff in my closet at home, too. He's died since. He was the guy who wrote my will and codicil to my will, stuff like that. He got a big kick out of it. He said, "I've never been involved in a four and a half billion dollar suit before."

FARLEY: Was there ever any monies paid at all? Or did they throw it out?

CARTER: No, there wasn't a nickel. The judge threw it out.

FARLEY: Good. Great. That's ridiculous.

CARTER: Of course this was after the Church Committee hearings and the Pike Committee hearings and all of that. This was all CIA now, the whole Intelligence Community had been blown wide open. And it was a matter of common knowledge that yes, there had been intercepts and other forms of acquiring intelligence information. And that's when I was called in before the -- It was after this but I

told you about being called in before the Church Committee and being so insulted because they never asked me back. (chuckles) As soon as they found out that I was a hostile witness...

FARLEY: They didn't want to hear you.

CARTER: ...they didn't want to hear me at all.

FARLEY: Is that the one where the clerks interrogated you?

CARTER: Yeah. The clerks or chiefs of staff or whatever you call them. They were not Senators. The law required them to have a Senator present when the Committee hearings opened and to be a Senator to swear me in. And he stayed about five minutes to find out that I was in fact the guy that he had sworn in and so forth and a few biographical things then he got up and left. And from that point on it was these clerks interrogating me.

FARLEY: That's terrible.

CARTER: But I say, the only thing they were interested in was...Oh, Houston...

FARLEY: Tom Houston, right.

CARTER: There was a Houston Report which occurred after I had left, see, that was under Nixon. And I had already tangled with Haldemann and had no contact with Nixon or the White House in any way shape or form and I wanted no part of it and they sure as hell didn't want to see me I'm sure. But all of the Houston business reported after I left so I was totally non compos about that and that disappointed them. And I didn't know enough about

attempted assassinations to put on the record for them because it was all conjecture, you know. "I don't remember too well. It might have happened. It could have happened." Because the attitude of the Kennedy administration and particularly by Bobby Kennedy was "We've got to do something about that son-of-a-bitch down there in Cuba."

FARLEY: Oh, yeah.

CARTER: So from that point on that's counterinsurgency and that's freedom of action. Not freedom of information but freedom of action. But I didn't have enough for them to really clue in onto me. The fact ^{they?} the didn't call me back really hurt my feelings. (chuckles)

FARLEY: Too bad. Just another question about Bamford. After *The Puzzle Palace* was published he became the expert on NSA. Anybody in the media would go to him instead of coming to our PR people to ask him about NSA and he's made a career of this. Did he ever call you after *The Puzzle Palace* or ask for any more information?

CARTER: Never. He sent me a copy of the book.

FARLEY: Autographed to you?

CARTER: Autographed it to "General Carter" or "Marshall S. Carter" or something, "The man who put the word national,"...no, "The man who really made National count in the title National Security Agency." I'll show it to you when we get home.

FARLEY: Okay.

CARTER: Something like that. And I never wrote to him to thank him for it. I never mentioned word one of any kind. The only conversation that I've had on an official nature was with Faurer and then now with you. I have seen him as the columnist in some editorials that people have sent me.

FARLEY: You've seen him on TV, too. He's been interrogated on TV, some of the talk shows and he's an "expert."

CARTER: Oh, he has been?

FARLEY: I've got a red light here, Sir.

CARTER: I wonder what happened to David Kahn.

FARLEY: We see him occasionally. We go over to the Naval Academy in Annapolis for periodic history seminars and he's always present.

CARTER: Oh.

TAPE VII, SIDE ONE

CARTER: I really was not thoroughly briefed or really knew what I was doing when I went up to Doubleday to try to get them to make those changes in the David Kahn book. See we had the proofs of *The Codebreakers* and I had already tried it with *The Invisible Government* in CIA and we got absolutely no place. And I should have anticipated that I'd get the same effect at Doubleday. Fortunately they were fairly easy on me. They did in fact call David Kahn in Paris and tell him, "These are the areas that give NSA a problem and would you please take them out," and by this time we had reduced them to the point where it didn't bother him at all to take them out. Subsequently it turns out that there was enough information in the footnotes that our people hadn't even paid any attention to that you could rebuild what we had asked to be taken out by referring to the footnotes.

FARLEY: Oh, yeah. Has anybody else interrogated you like Tom, not Kruh, Louie Kruh. He's also a writer on intelligence. Sort of like David Kahn. He's part of a group that publishes the *Cryptologia*, a quarterly magazine where they talk about cryptography, cryptanalysis, intelligence.

CARTER: No, I don't remember anybody at all ever coming out here. Certainly not with an instant blackmail operation like this. (chuckles)

FARLEY: Like we have right now.

CARTER: Yeah.

FARLEY: Okay. Sir, do you mind if we take a break?

CARTER: No. (Break) This is turkey, swiss cheese, tomatoes and mayonnaise.

FARLEY: Looks good.

CARTER: Cheers.

FARLEY: Cheers is right. I can't think of anything else we should pursue in regard to the Bamford case. Unless there's something that comes to mind. So maybe we go in, as we're eating, and talk about the question I asked that was on the cassette that was goofed up. The Second Party. So between bites, well let's postpone.

(BREAK)

FARLEY: All right, Sir, let's sort of wrap this up. As I told you probably three times, I goofed up on one of the cassettes. When we started talking the last subject was DINS which you talked about, that was the Defense Inspection team at NSA. Then the question was, Second and Third Party associations with NSA. You started to talk about that and then, as I say, the tape went bad. Would you run through your recollections, your association with the British and what you remember about the Second Party association with NSA. You were talking about when you were at CIA your first association and then in London, as I remember how you said it before.

CARTER: Well, I was in London in 1949. I had of course had had contact with British before, because they gave me

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amoebic dysentery in Cairo during the Cairo Conference when I was stupid enough to eat in a British mess. A field mess with a British unit.

FARLEY:

My gosh.

CARTER:

And their ideas of kitchen sanitation are entirely different from what we were taught in our Army.

FARLEY:

They didn't use hot water to wash the mess kits.

CARTER:

No, but I didn't know any better. I did know better but I went anyway because this was a very attractive British officer counterpart, male, that I was working with at the Cairo Conference. Anyway, that was my first close association working with the British and that was in '43. I don't remember having any wartime contacts with the British, except casually. In 1949, I don't remember having any contacts while I was in the State Department with the British either. There were some British in that prisoner of war rescue exercise that I have mentioned to you previously. And that's really never been truly written about well. There were some contacts there because we had some British prisoners taken over. What I'm leading up to is yes, you mentioned Anglophobia. I didn't quite have a virulent case of that but I felt I had a rapport with the British and understood them, and vice versa. So I had direct dealings with them very closely when I was in 1949 as Deputy to the Ambassador, Vice Chairman of the European Correlation Committee. I don't know whether

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we've discussed this or whether this was on the dead tape or what.

FARLEY: Could be.

CARTER: But in any event, it was a classified negotiations. The beginning of negotiations with the Brussels Pact Nations on military assistance programs which resulted very soon thereafter in discussion about organizations of NATO. You realize the Marshall Plan was brought up in '47, was legislated in '48. We're now talking about the spring and summer of '49. So because of my association with General Marshall and Dean Acheson and my title there, I had had a number of associations with British officers of fairly high rank. Sir Roger Macon being probably the top. I was invited by Lady Astor for a weekend out at her place, but this was before Profumo and so I didn't know what I was missing and I didn't go. (chuckles) I also had lunch with the owners of the *LONDON TIMES*, I guess who were all Astors and who were trying to find out what the hell I was doing over there and why, and why I was a Brigadier General and a Minister of the Embassy at the same time. But they didn't get very far then because I was more security conscious then than I was when I was talking to Bamford, quote unquote. Anyway, I don't recall any working relationship of any kind in CIA with British.

FARLEY: Okay.

CARTER: I just don't recall it. I may have had some but it didn't impinge on my computer at all.

FARLEY: But your association with them in the early days did you well when you became Director of NSA and working with the people as Second Party.

CARTER: Yes.

FARLEY: So you knew the Brits pretty well.

CARTER: I felt I did, yes. And I had had a British driver when I was briefing Eisenhower's headquarters on the redeployment plans. And she was a very attractive young lady and knew her way around Paris. So I knew the British pretty well. Anyway, as far as I was concerned I considered the British as co-equal in our efforts without any analysis of comparative value of input or output. I just figured of all of our efforts with other nations, the British were the ones that we were most closely associated with. And the ones that I got along fine with. [REDACTED] had total access to me anytime he wanted to day or night and his successor, whose name escapes me but another very attractive guy, did. Pat Dean was the British Ambassador to the United States, as I recall, and he had somehow been in GCHQ or was thoroughly familiar with their operations. And I got along fine with him, a great big red headed Welshman type. And I was on the British protocol list for invitations and things like that. And I had a real fondness for [REDACTED] As a couple they were very amusing and entertaining and they found us the same way. So I had no inhibitions about dealing directly and totally without any "U.S. Eyes Only" kind of

stuff in any way shape or form. I've already indicated, I don't know whether on tape, that my technical competence was not at a level to discuss with the British where to put a radar site or any of that stuff, or to in any way evaluate our comparative worth to each other.

FARLEY: During your tenure were you ever aware of any controversy or any friction between U.S. people and the Brit people, at a lower level than the Directorship?

CARTER: I don't recall any. There could well have been. I don't recall any. There was a Brigadier...

FARLEY:

CARTER:

[redacted] yeah, very nice guy. I liked him. I didn't ever know whether he was on NSA's payroll or whether he was on the British payroll.

FARLEY: Is that right?

CARTER: Yeah, I never knew that. I still don't know.

FARLEY: I've been trying to find out an answer to that, too.

CARTER: Really?

FARLEY: Really.

CARTER: I don't think I ever knew. I don't even know whether he was paid by anybody. But he was there.

FARLEY: He was paid, yeah, he was paid. But nobody will ever say anything whether when he retired and wanted to come to the U.S. that his pension was not adequate, from the Brits, and he negotiated the job at NSA through, whoever -- I won't even mention names, but he stayed there, he retired and got an NSA pension. Moved to Hawaii and

lasted two or three years there and died. His wife died about a year ago, too. So they're long gone.

CARTER: It just happened to occur to me sure.

FARLEY: He was an old timer. He was in the '30s late '20s, I think he was in the British Army. Fine fellow.

CARTER: There must have been some competitive feeling between the GCHQ people and the British, because as you read back in the books that have recently been written about World War II and Pearl Harbor and Magic and those things, you find a tendency for some people say the British did everything and we were just along for the ride. Over here the U.S. did everything and the British were just along for the ride. So somewhere, somehow there must have been the problem with this marriage.

FARLEY: Right. Ronald Lewin was one of the writers who said that everything was done by the British. They won the war in the Pacific, they won the war in Europe. It irritates me because in his book there's only about a page and a half talking about Central Bureau Australia. General Akin's outfit where I was, that that's all we did, was just put stamps on British produced material and send it on and claim it as our own. But he did that in two or three books. But you are right. Some of the British authors are British forever.

CARTER: Yeah. Well anyway, I felt my job was to be the, not social director but the top level representative of NSA to maintain appropriate relations with the British and to

keep everything on an even keel, to do everything I could to keep them happy and vice versa and not have us put unusual demands on them that they might not be able to meet. They were going through a fairly stressful period as you know and we were beginning to start riding high on the hog.

FARLEY: Yeah, there was a very austere period for them during those days.

CARTER: So that controlled all of my activities as regards the British. I must say, I've got a stack of correspondence that thick with [redacted] We were quite close personally. Enjoyed each other's company and so forth. I really don't know what else I did to cement relationships. I visited Cheltenham, spent two or three days there. I don't think I ever went to Menwith Hills, or what was the name of that place?

FARLEY: Cheltenham, Menwith Hill.

CARTER: Well what was GCHQ's place. Was that Cheltenham?

FARLEY: Cheltenham, right.

CARTER: But what was our place that we civilianized? With [redacted]

FARLEY: [redacted] It was Menwith Hill and then I guess, we always called it Cheltenham, ^(sic; Harrogate) but I guess in the early days it was called Menwith Hill.

CARTER: Well what did they call [redacted] place? Was that called Cheltenham, too?

FARLEY: Yes, Sir.

CARTER: Okay.

FARLEY: Sir, I think you filled in the gap on that bad tape and I'll work that in so it's in a chronological order, so it's fine. What do you think. Were you going to say something?

CARTER: I'm not anxious to do anything unless you are.

FARLEY: I'm worried about the weather there, whether we'll be able to get down out of the mountains or not.

CARTER: Oh, I wouldn't worry about that. We'll always get down.

FARLEY: Is there anything else that you would like to put on tape, Sir, that we may have overlooked? That I didn't research deeply enough?

CARTER: Did I cover the part about the [redacted] not being allowed in the building?

FARLEY: Yes, Sir.

CARTER: You have that then.

FARLEY: I do.

CARTER: And my distaste for that?

FARLEY: Yes, Sir.

CARTER: Okay. So I changed that policy.

FARLEY: Third Party. We talked about that in detail and I have that on tape. But the one section that we missed was the Second Party, and I think you've covered that pretty well.

CARTER: Well I had very little relationship with the Canadians. I don't recall. Nor with the Australians, except to talk with them and welcome them and meet them. I never went to Australia.

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FARLEY: I was going to ask you if you ever went to Melbourne. Never did, huh?

CARTER: No. Coming back from Cairo, which you have on tape, I spent the night at Brisbane, but we landed at Northwest Cape and spent the night there. That's where General Marshall and I were picking up sea shells off the seashore to take back to Mrs. Marshall. That's the first direct, intimate, personal contact I had with General Marshall, on the beach at Northwest Cape. Then we flew into Brisbane. As I say, we had two airplanes. That's in a story all by itself. Why we had two airplanes.

FARLEY: Yeah, you talked about that.

CARTER: Did I? Flying by Java and Sumatra. And flew into Brisbane, then we flew over to Port Moresby where MacArthur's headquarters were on New Guinea. And General Marshall had an audience (chuckles) with General MacArthur.

FARLEY: That's an unusual choice of language there.

CARTER: Yeah. With "Dugout Doug!" I'm getting back at you now. Then I had an audience with General MacArthur. And as I mentioned at lunch, he and Patton both had dual personalities. It was clearly brought out. General MacArthur was sent into West Point as a very young General right after the war to be superintendent, and my father had been the junior professor for about three years. And General MacArthur was the class of 1901, I think, from West Point. My father was the class of '99. So

they were close as far as age was concerned. And they had a pretty good rapport back and forth between them. And that's when I first knew General Marshall ((MacArthur, ed.)) when I was a little runny nose kid running around West Point. This would be 1920/'21 along in there. I was about nine or ten years old. I stole Mrs. MacArthur's cat, but that's another story, and I got caught. General MacArthur was not married and his mother had controlled his life throughout since his father's death, and his mother and my mother were quite close. We called her Aunt Pinky, but she was considerably older than my mother. Anyway, they were quite close so General MacArthur always knew me as Pat Carter, as a kid. So when I went to have my audience with him after General Marshall had, he always liked to visit and I happened to be a lieutenant colonel, so, I was on the list to drop in and genuflect and kiss the ring. So he told me to sit down and he said, "Marshall Carter. How do you like being in the Army?" He didn't know me from "Adam's off ox." He had not related Marshall Carter at all. So I said, "I like it very much, Sir." And he said, "How long do you expect to be in? For the duration?" And I said, "I certainly hope so, Sir." And he said, "Well how long have you been in?" And I said, "Well I've been in since I graduated in 1931." Then I said, "Incidentally General my mother and father sent their warmest regards

to you." And he said, "Are you Pat Carter?" And I said, "Yes, Sir." And he said, "Well, let's talk."

FARLEY: I'll be darned.

CARTER: An entirely different personality just like that. Right out of a clear sky. Here he's talking very formally to a guy he never saw in his life before, doesn't know anything about him, and is just making conversation. Then here, all of a sudden when he finds out my association all the way back, 22 years, then he wants to talk about West Point and my father and my mother and his mother and everything.

FARLEY: That's great.

CARTER: And we talked for 15 or 20 minutes about that.

FARLEY: No wonder you have such fond remembrances.

CARTER: That's why I say dual personality.

FARLEY: Right. And fond remembrances.

CARTER: And fond remembrances, sure. I don't think I saw him again after that at all. I had no connection with him later.

FARLEY: You weren't in D.C. when he returned from Korea?

CARTER: Oh, yes, I was Director of the Executive Office of General Marshall, Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense. And I think we were on tape on this. I sat there with Harriman and Lovett and Bradley and Snyder and General Marshall discussing, at Truman's request, what they would recommend to President Truman as to how to handle MacArthur, what should be done with him. This was after the fourth gross violation of protocol as distinct between a President of the United States and a

subordinate. I sat in, made notes, drafted cables, and stuff like that. There is in the archives a short file about this, but has nothing to do with NSA. Where were we? Did I bring up something new?

FARLEY: No, no, that's great. I think we ought to wrap it up, Sir.

CARTER: You're getting goosey, are you? Okay.

FARLEY: Well, you have schedules and a lot to do.

CARTER: It's one-fifteen. Close up the cabin, we'll be down by two-fifteen or so.

FARLEY: All right. Anything else that you'd like to recall before I turn it off?

CARTER: I can't really think of anything, providing you get the concept that I was not a cryptologist. I was not technically oriented to what the task was. I felt that I was the manager of a relatively large agency. That when I got there it did not have the stature that I felt it deserved and I wanted to build that up. That I work through people and confidence in people. I always leveled with the Congress and I always leveled with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the civilians in the Department of Defense. I think I mentioned before I thought I was a Boy Scout Master and a cheerleader something like that.

FARLEY: Yeah, you were.

CARTER: That was about the role that I felt I had.

FARLEY: But civilians at NSA are forever grateful. And I'm talking about the people who have already retired and the

youngsters who are coming along, that you made us a national agency.

CARTER: That's what I intended to do.

FARLEY: I know. I passed it on the words that he brought us out of the woods and let the light shine on us. All of these people say that you did it.

CARTER: Bush's "a thousand lights?" (chuckles) It was a charity operation.

FARLEY: I want to hear that debate tonight. The Vice Presidential debate.

CARTER: Did you ever get your TV fixed down there?

FARLEY: No, I didn't. I should call them.

CARTER: What kind of a Colonel are you? (chuckles)

FARLEY: I had four newspapers that I was reading anyway, and I watched part of the first game of the series.

CARTER: The tariff you're paying down there and all the TVs and all the many other rooms.

FARLEY: I could have moved to the next room. But I watched the game last night and I thought the Dodgers had it.

CARTER: You could get a picture?

FARLEY: Oh, yeah. It's only on two channels that it rolls.

CARTER: The TV?

FARLEY: Yeah. It rolls on only two channels.

CARTER: Yeah. Eleven and thirteen.

FARLEY: Is that typical for this area?

CARTER: Well they're the two that have the repeaters on top of the mountain that looks right down your throat. See Channel

5 and 8 are repeaters from Pueblo, through repeaters. But yours, 11 and 13, so you're not on cablevision then.

FARLEY: I don't know.

CARTER: No, you're only on the aerial that's inside there.

FARLEY: So that's probably what it is. But I got by. I hate to rush you off, but before I go, you don't know how much I appreciate these three days, how enjoyable it has been. Aside from the tapes...

CARTER: Well, I've enjoyed it.

FARLEY: ...it has been very, very pleasurable. Forever grateful.

CARTER: You take an old man who loves to talk, loves to reminisce, get him cranked up and you're a captive audience, you see.

FARLEY: I can hardly wait to have this transcribed and see what we said.

CARTER: Tell the girls that I've used as hard language as I ever used, not to be upset about it.

FARLEY: How shall we classify these seven tapes?

CARTER: I can't think of anything that requires a security classification.

FARLEY: Confidential?

CARTER: Do you have Sensitivity? You wrote me Official Use Only.

FARLEY: Yeah. Shall we keep it that way?

CARTER: I think certainly until I've had a chance to vet it.

FARLEY: All right.

CARTER: Because I get rambling off into the wild blue yonder and I don't want somebody's feelings hurt or anything like that.

FARLEY: I can't recall you being abusive to anybody or extremely critical. You can't hurt anybody.

CARTER: Let's keep it as low as possible so it's sequestered between NSA and me until I've had a chance to look at the transcript. Does that suit you?

FARLEY: That's fine. Let's keep it OFFICIAL USE ONLY then.

CARTER: Okay.

FARLEY: And we have some beautiful material.

CARTER: Well that means no access however until I've had a chance to go through it.

FARLEY: True. Oh, yes. No access. I'll send you the form that says "I want these people to hear it or nobody to hear it." I'll send that so you can get your signature on that, put it in your file.

CARTER: Yeah, okay, that's all right.

FARLEY: Sir, let me help you close up here and as I say, beat the rains. Thanks again.