


The Liberty Exhibit



On June 8, 1967, the *Liberty*, a ship of the Naval Security Group, found itself in the middle of the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War. Cruising 25 miles off the Gaza coast, it was attacked by Israeli fighters and torpedo boats at 2 o'clock on a clear and sunny afternoon. There was no apparent provocation, and the reason for the attack has never been fully resolved, although Israel described it as an identification error and sent restitution for the damage and loss of life. The U.S. government accepted the explanation of the Israeli government concerning the identification error. The loss of thirty-four men was the largest loss of life in a single event in American cryptologic history. It occurred, ironically, during a war in which the United States was not a participant.

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REPORT TO THE
DIRECTOR
NSA

USS LIBERTY
(AGTR-5)

23 MAY - 8 JUNE 1967

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION THAT IS UNCLASSIFIED

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INTRODUCTION

On 13 May 1967, NSA requested that the JCS authorize diversion of the USS LIBERTY from ABIDJAN to an operational area off PORT SAID to provide vital SIGINT coverage in the Middle East crisis area. NSA requested JCS approval of specified operational areas in the southeast Mediterranean and proposed that the actual operating areas and the closest point of approach (CPA) should be adjusted as necessary for operational and safety reasons. NSA and US Navy linguists and technical support materials were provided to the USS LIBERTY at ROTA.

The LIBERTY departed ROTA at 1230Z on 2 June. In her last reported position prior to this incident (33°06'N by 28°54'E at 070800Z), she was underway and destined to arrive at 2300Z and remain stationary at a position within 30 nautical miles of 31°45'N by 33°30'E. This position would be within the previously defined NSA OP area 3 (32°00'N - 33°00'N to 34°00'E).

Several JCS actions were taken to restrict progressively the closest point of approach (CPA) of the USS LIBERTY away from the UAR-Israeli coastal area; the last delimiting operations to positions no closer than 100 nautical miles from the UAR and Israel and

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25 nautical miles from Cyprus.

Personnel losses are known. Losses of classified cryptologic materials and equipments will not be known until an inventory is made of materials remaining aboard the LIBERTY.

The following report will demonstrate on the basis of evidence now available that the USS LIBERTY was an essential augmentation to the Middle East SIGINT posture; that SIGINT command, operational and technical control responsibilities were fulfilled according to existing instructions; and that the position of the USS LIBERTY was operationally and technically proper from a SIGINT standpoint except in the hindsight of the rash Israeli act.

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SIGINT POSTURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) coverage of the area was being accomplished through the use of [] land-based intercept positions at U.S. [] facilities. These facilities were tasked with coverage of specific emitters which had the greatest intelligence potential. []

[] Because of their unique capability, certain [] facilities were assigned VHF/UHF targets in the general location of the [] facility. Line of sight limitations, however, precluded extension of this coverage to coastal and other areas where military activity was then underway. Additionally, it had been anticipated that these [] facilities would be lost in the event of an outbreak of hostilities or the breaking of diplomatic relations with certain Arab countries. Subsequent events, did, in fact, cause this loss to occur.

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The major VHF/UHF collection effort was assigned to airborne platforms consisting of daily C-130 flights out of Athens, supplemented by Navy EC-121 collection. The time on station limitations on airborne coverage (i.e., 5 hours on orbit) together with increasing requirements to collect VHF/UHF transmissions in the target area resulted in the determination that a ship platform, properly positioned, would make a significant contribution in collecting VHF/UHF signals on a continuous basis. To determine the most appropriate general operating areas, a wave propagation analysis was conducted against known and suspected targets. A summary of the results of this analysis and a plot of these results on a map of the target area are contained in TAB A.


The SIGINT tasking of the USS LIBERTY was directed at coverage of communications related to United Arab Republic (UAR) Air, Military and Naval Forces activity. The tactical communications of these entities are normally found in the 20-50, 60-70, 100-150 and 300-400 MCS frequency ranges. The UAR is known to use Soviet-provided equipment in these ranges and low-powered HF communications transmitters as well (TAB B). In addition to specific known

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
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Communications entities, the USS LIBERTY was tasked to search and
develop communications entities above 30 MCS emanating from those

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


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The location, capabilities, and targets of the collection resources
available at the time of the incident are contained in TAB C.

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
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DEPLOYMENT OF THE TECHNICAL RESEARCH
SHIP, USS LIBERTY (USN-855)

The USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) is a converted Victory Ship previously known as the SIMMONS VICTORY. (TAB D)

The conversion to an AGTR (Technical Research Ship) was made by the Willamette Iron and Steel Works, Portland, Oregon. The USS LIBERTY was commissioned on 30 December 1964.

The principal characteristics of the ship are as follows:

Length, overall	455' - 0"
Beam	62' - 0"
Full Load Draft (estimated)	24' - 0"
Displacement, light	7,190 tons
Displacement, full load	10,680 tons
Maximum Speed	18 knots
Personnel	
General Service Allowed	9 Officers 151 Enlisted Men
Navy Security Group Allowed	6 Officers 128 Enlisted Men

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The collection and reporting effort assigned to the USS LIBERTY was directed primarily against UAR tactical targets in the high frequency, very high frequency and ultra high frequency ranges. The normal personnel complement of the USS LIBERTY was augmented by six Arabic Linguists for this specialized effort. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


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The proposal to deploy the USS LIBERTY to the Eastern Mediterranean was the result of consumer requirements, the anticipated loss of fixed intercept capability, and technical requirements to develop optimum data for SIGINT units providing direct support to U.S. forces which might have become involved in the Middle East Crisis. Recent consumer requirements stressed the importance of information on UAR Naval and Air movements and division level ground forces communications (CIA). The Defense Intelligence Agency levied a requirement for information on the status of the UAR Air Force and the UAR Air Defense system. Additionally, DIA noted informally that

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a deficiency in the intercept of night-time VHF communications existed. These requirements could have been fully satisfied only with a seaborne platform positioned off the UAR. As noted previously, wave propagation studies corroborate this assessment.

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86-36

The LIBERTY would have contributed substantially toward improving the technical base on VHF, UHF, and low-powered HF tactical communications of very immediate usefulness to a SIGINT support unit.

The rationale for requesting the positioning of the USS LIBERTY in operation area 3 for initial operations was based upon the following factors:

- The major requirement was for coverage of UAR targets in the VHF/UHF ranges; therefore, the platform was

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requested to operate in an area affording the maximum possibility of collection success.

- Wave propagation analysis indicated that operational area 3 would allow for the collection of the greatest number of signals as contrasted with the other specific, approved operating areas.

- Initially, it was considered that the Gaza strip area would be the focal point for significant military action because the ship was not scheduled to arrive at this particular operating area until the morning of 8 June, and as the military activity appeared to be moving from East to West, it was recommended to JCS/JRC that approval be given to authorize diversion of the USS LIBERTY to operating area 2. This would have allowed the ship to collect tactical communications specifically related to the tactical situation.

Communications known to be used by the USS LIBERTY are as follows:

2 High Frequency Morse circuits

2 High Frequency Radio Telephone/Radio Printer circuits

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1 secure Moon Relay system, one channel capability,
100 words per minute

4 secure High Frequency circuits plus two spares
(total of 3 full duplex and 3 half duplex)

2 off-line encryption/decryption devices.

The ship had the capability of using any combinations of
the above but not all simultaneously.

The SIGINT collection was to be processed and reported
within on board capabilities.

The LIBERTY was tasked to provide daily electrical technical
summaries to other collectors and NSA. These summaries would
provide the latest technical information for use by other
collectors and would provide to NSA a means of staying abreast
of the LIBERTY's SIGINT activities.

All plaintext international shipping activity was to be
forwarded electrically to NSA for exploitation.

Upon completion of the deployment, the ship was requested
to provide all on board collection, including unprocessed
tapes, to NSA

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Command and control of a seaborne SIGINT collection platform is exercised in military command channels. Control is delegated from the JCS to the Unified or Specified Commander and thence to the Naval component Fleet or Force Commander. Command control of a technical research ship includes the final determination by military operational commanders that the operation required by NSA is compatible with the safety of the ship.

Operational and technical control of the SIGINT activities on board the platform is exercised by the Director, NSA.

Documentation outlining the responsibilities of NSA, JCS and others is contained in Tabs E., through N., and is summarized as follows:

The Introduction to the Manual of U. S. SIGINT Operations (MUSO), dated 1 March 1966, outlines the means by which the Director, NSA, exercises operational and technical control of the National SIGINT effort in accordance with the authority and provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID 6) and

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Implementing DOD Directives (S3115.2 and S3115.4). This document describes operating instructions (OPINS) as "Orders and directives assigning missions, tasks or functions to SIGINT organizations." (TAB E)

OPINS 2855 provides the specific operating instructions for the SIGINT component aboard the Technical Research Ship USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5). It outlines the command relationships, mission, functions, liaison, communications and special instructions for this component. (TAB F)

A JCS Memorandum of 4 May 1966 outlined the responsibilities of NSA and command elements with regard to the specific procedures for the planning and approval of Technical Research Ship schedules. NSA employs this document as the basis for scheduling actions for TRS platforms. (TAB G)

A JCS Message of 6 June 1967, provides the NSA and command responsibilities for the USS LIBERTY while operating in the USCINCEUR area of responsibility. (TAB H)

On 5 November 1968, the JCS outlined contingency planning for TRS operations to be used in general planning.

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for SIGINT support of contingency operations. This message was a result of correspondence relevant to command/control of SIGINT platforms. Although the message is not specifically related to procedures employed by NSA, it is a JCS statement of command and control responsibilities. (TAB I) Amplification of this statement is provided below.

As a result of experience [redacted]

[redacted] involving the Technical Research Ship (TRS) USS BELMONT, DIRNSA determined the need for guidance to operational commanders regarding the employment of the TRS. On 27 May and 4 June 1965 NSA requested JCS To issue general guidance to inform appropriate commanders of the purpose, nature and concept of TRS operations since the USS OXFORD was being deployed to Southeast Asian waters. The message recommended that such guidance include the following statement:

"Operational and technical control of the SIGINT activities on board the OXFORD is exercised by the Director, NSA."

(TABS J and K)

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In accordance with the NSA request of 26 May 1965,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued guidance on TRS operations
in Southeast Asia on 7 June (JCS 2085-65 071404Z June 1965.)

(TAB L) This message substituted the statement,
"Technical control and signal tasking of SIGINT collection
activities aboard the OXFORD will be as directed by DIRNSA
through DIRNAVSECGRU" for the desired wording in the DIRNSA
suggested guidance: i.e. "Operational and technical
control of the SIGINT activities on board the OXFORD is
exercised by the Director, NSA."

Subsequently, on 12 June 1965, DIRNSA in commenting on
JCS 2085-65, advised the JCS that "these activities include
processing and reporting as well as collection." (TAB M)

On 1 September 1965, NSA requested that JCS consider
issuing general guidance similar to JCS 2085-65 071404Z June 1965
to inform the other unified commanders of the purpose, nature and
concept of TRS operations. (TAB N)

In accordance with the NSA request of 1 September 1965, the
JCS issued the guidance on TRS operations on 5 November 1965.
This message was sent to all unified commanders and the CNO.
The message outlined the purpose, nature and concept of TRS

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operations and was made applicable to all TRSs. The message provides for exercise of "operational and technical control of all SIGINT activities (collection, processing, reporting) on board the ship, by the Director, NSA (via direct communications to ship or through the Director, NSG)." The message further states: "operational control of ship. Military operational control of these ships will be effected by the cognizant unified or specified commander through the Naval component commander to a specific fleet or force commander ... Basis for collection area assignments ... Determination by military operational commanders that the operation required by NSA is compatible with the safety of the ship." (TAB I)

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USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

(USN-355)

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

23 MAY - 8 JUNE

1967

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The situation in the Middle East resulted in NSA declaring a SIGINT Readiness BRAVO. In order to augment coverage in the area, NSA requested JCS/JRC to authorize diversion of the USS LIBERTY from Abidjan, Ivory Coast to Rota, Spain, in preparation for deployment to the Eastern Mediterranean (TAB O) (DIRNSA ADP/224-57 231729Z). Since the LIBERTY possessed an excellent capability for collection, processing and reporting of SIGINT, she was considered a superior platform to the USNS VALDEZ, which was scheduled to return to New York.

25 May

The following action was initiated:

- provision to the LIBERTY of additional linguist capability in Arabic including three NSA civilians:

Mr. Allen M. Blue, GG-7

Mr. Donald L. Billock, GG-7

Mr. Robert L. Wilson, GG-7

(No Hebrew linguists were available) <

- Tasking for both the transit to the operating area and the period while on-station was developed, coordinated and supplied to USN-855 (TAB P) (DIRNSA K12/595 292201Z, DIRNSA K12/606 022333Z, K12/611 022335Z)

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JCS approved the NSA request for diversion of the LIBERTY and requested that CINCLANT change OPCON of the LIBERTY from CINCLANT to CINCEUR upon the ship's arrival at Rota, Spain, on or about 31 May.

Additionally, JCS informed CINCEUR to make the necessary preparations for extended employment of the LIBERTY to the Eastern Mediterranean (TAB Q) (JCS 6499 291002Z).

DIRNSA requested JCS approval of the operational areas for the LIBERTY and proposed Area 3 (TAB A) as the initial area subject to "adjustment as necessary for operational or safety reasons." (TAB R) (DIRNSA ADP/242-67 292013Z).

1 June

JCS requested CINCEUR to deploy the LIBERTY on 2 June from Rota, Spain, to Area 3 and stipulated a closest point of approach (CPA) to Algeria, Libya, and the UAR of 13 nautical miles during the transit. Upon arrival in Area 3 on or about 9 June, the CPA stipulated by JCS was to be 12.5 nautical miles to the UAR and 6.5 nautical miles to Israel (TAB S) (JCS 6724 015452).

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The LIBERTY deployed from Rota, Spain, at 021230Z through the Straits of Gibraltar following a coastal route to Area 3.

5 June

In view of the outbreak of hostilities, representatives of the tasking elements of NSA telephoned JCS/JRC and asked whether or not a change in the employment of the LIBERTY was contemplated. Recollection of the repositioning of the OXFORD during the Cuban crisis in 1962 prompted the telephone call. JRC advised that no action was contemplated at that time.

6 June

CINCUSNAVEUR directed Commander, Sixth Fleet (C)MSIXTHFLT to take OPCON of the LIBERTY in order to "facilitate command and control and possible requirement for protection during Mid-East hostilities" and additionally directed LIBERTY to change operational control to COMSIXTHFLT at 070001Z. The message also authorized modification of the initial JCS plan of operations (TAB 6) should safety reasons so dictate. (TAB T) CINCUSNAVEUR 061357Z. Subsequently COMSIXTHFLT issued his OPCON change message to the LIBERTY (TAB U) COMSIXTHFLT 062343Z.

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Since the UAR target entities were moving westerly, DIRNSA requested JCS for immediate action to change the operating area of the LIBERTY from Area 3 to Area 2 in order to satisfy tasking requirements (TAB V) (DIRNSA K12/631 072104Z).

The LIBERTY reported her position at 070800Z and stated she would remain stationary within 30 nautical miles of a point (31-45N, 33-30E) approximately 63 nautical miles northeast of Port Said upon arrival in Area 3 (TAB W) (USS LIBERTY 070900Z).

On the afternoon of 7 June, the NSA representative at JRC telephoned the NSA tasking representatives to advise of discussions underway between Navy and JCS/JRC concerning the possibility of changing the LIBERTY's CPA: There was concern within JRC since the LIBERTY was 350-400 miles from the closest Sixth Fleet ships. The NSA representative at JRC relayed the concern expressed by a member of JRC that a change in the CPA might have an adverse effect on the ship's SIGINT mission. The NSA tasking representatives pointed out that the effect of any

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change in the line of sight capability was a mathematical computation which could be readily derived; however, they declined to make any statement regarding any specific repositioning of the LIBERTY since changes in the CPA for operational or safety reasons were considered a military command decision, and they felt that any specific statement on their part could be interpreted as a defense for retaining the 12.5 mile CPA.

Prior to close of business 7 June, the NSA representative at JRC saw a message originated by JCS/JRC ordering a change in the LIBERTY's CPA to 20 nautical miles to the UAR and 15 nautical miles to Israel and in the LIBERTY's OP area to Area 2, as requested by DIRNSA on 5 June. However, the message as transmitted by JRC (TAB X) (JCS 6724 072230Z) did not contain the latter change. The JRC member concerned stated that he had decided to do one thing at a time. It later turned out that JRC was overtaken by events in changing the OP area.

Later in the evening the NSA representative at JRC received a call from JRC requesting his concurrence in a

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JCS message changing the CPA to 100 nautical miles.

The reasons for the change were expressed as being, at the outset, primarily political in origin: Since the United States Ambassador to the United Nations had stated to that body that there were no U. S. Navy ships within 350-400 nautical miles of the UAR/Israel area, JCS and Navy felt that they must lend support to that position. During the night a message was received by JCS from the Commander, Sixth Fleet (TAB Y) (COMSIXTHFLT 071503Z) stating that "no operations, either surface or air, were permitted within 100 miles of Israel, Syria, or Egypt or within 25 miles of Cyprus." The message provided a status report on Sixth Fleet operations as of 5 June - at which time the LIBERTY was under the operational control of CINCEUR; transfer of operational control to COMSIXTHFLT was effected at 070001Z. The status report was apparently prompted by the allegation by the Arabs, at the UN, that the U. S. and the British had participated in the Israeli air strikes against the UAR. JCS reacted by sending a message to CINCEUR, Info LIBERTY, cancelling the 20 nautical mile

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message (TAB X) and defining the new CPA as "no closer than 100 nautical miles from Israel, Syria, Egypt and 25 nautical miles to Cyprus." (TAB Z) (JCS 7347 080110Z).

Since the attack on the LIBERTY occurred at 081205Z, it is extremely unlikely that the LIBERTY could have received and taken action on the message in time. Additionally, CINCEUR would be required to send a message implementing the JCS decision.

8 June

COMSIXTHFLT reported that at 1252Z the LIBERTY reported she was under attack at 31-23N, 33-25E - hit by torpedo and listing badly. (TAB AA) (COMSIXTHFLT 081320Z).

A message originated by the LIBERTY was intercepted by USM-4 [REDACTED] reporting the incident and informing CNO that she was clearing the area. (TAB BB) (USM-4 081812Z).

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(b)(3)-50 USC 403

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TAB A


Analysis of Propagation Studies Related to
UAR Communications Networks

Due to the complexity of the intercept problem (VHF/UHF systems and low-HF networks) it was determined that the best overall coverage would be possible by a ship positioned in proximity to the general area of the target activity. This determination was based on the computed values of VHF path loss which serve as good indicators of what signals could be intercepted successfully and continuously. Because loss increases with the log of distance, more reliable intercept would be expected close in to the emitters. The computed values of path loss along the 13 mile track indicate values that are completely reasonable for the NSA intercept equipment and that which was installed aboard USS LIBERTY. The values at the 100 mile track are beyond the scope of intercept equipment employed for general field use. In addition, the low HF frequencies employed by the military networks would be expected to be successfully intercepted via ground wave modes only. Analysis of far field sky wave modes for the low HF area indicate little, if any,

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probability of successful intercept at any distance, while the close in points along the recommended track indicates a high probability of support. This technical theory is best illustrated on a chart of the approved operating area which depicts the signal path and DB loss along tracks of 12.5, 100 and 200 nautical miles from the target activity.




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
TAB B

Since 1960, the UAR has relied primarily on Soviet military radio equipment and continues to negotiate for it. Most of these equipments are in the R-series and are delivered with aircraft, tanks and radars, or separately as tactical equipments. The infantry and artillery use AM and FM radios operated on frequencies from 1 to 4, 2 to 5 and 20 to 50 mc; armored personnel, carriers and tanks, equipped with AM/FM radios, use frequencies from 1 through 4 mc; aircraft ground-to-air service is on frequencies from 100 through 150 mc. (For military air communications, it has been proposed to gradually phase out use of the 100- to 150-mc band and to use the 225- to 399.9-mc band.)




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
TAB C




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TAB E

- Introduction to
MUSSO

See Jamestown
Book for 1st page

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TAB E

INTRODUCTION

1 March 1966

c. Promulgate policy and doctrine governing SIGINT operations within the NSE.

d. Provide information to SIGINT activities not under the control of the Director, National Security Agency, with a view to facilitating standardization and the exchange of technical support.

2. This INTRODUCTION to the Manual prescribes procedures for the preparation, review, publication, dissemination and control of MUSSO documents within the NSE.

SECTION II - DEFINITIONS

For purposes of this document, the following definitions apply:

a. COMINT - Communications Intelligence. Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients. COMINT activities shall be construed to mean those activities which produce COMINT by the interception and processing of foreign communications passed by radio, wire or other electromagnetic means, with specific exceptions stated below, and the processing of foreign encrypted communications, however transmitted. Interception comprises search, intercept, and direction finding. Processing comprises range estimation, transmitter/operator identification, signal analysis, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption, study of plain text, the fusion of these processes, and the reporting of results.

NOTE: COMINT and COMINT activities as defined herein shall not include (a) any intercept and processing of unencrypted written communications, press and propaganda, or (b) censorship.

b. ELINT - Electronics Intelligence. Technical and intelligence information product of ELINT activities. ELINT activities are defined as the collection (observation and recording), and the technical processing for subsequent intelligence purposes, of information derived from foreign, non-communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonation or radioactive sources.

c. SIGINT - Signals Intelligence. The generic term used to apply to both COMINT and ELINT as those terms are defined above, including the specified limitations of those definitions.

d. NSE - National SIGINT Effort. The SIGINT intercept and processing activities of the U.S. Army Security Agency, the Naval Security Group, the U.S. Air Force Security Service, and the National Security Agency.

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SECTION III - NATURE OF DOCUMENTS

1. MUSSO comprises certain unnumbered publications, and four numbered series. The unnumbered series includes this INTRODUCTION, a Letter of Promulgation, a basic Statement of General Operating Policy (SGOP), an Index of MUSSO Publications (BOXSCORE), and such other documents as may be deemed appropriate in the future. The four numbered series and their definitions are:

a. OPDOC - Operating Doctrine. Enunciation of the principles governing the assignment of missions and tasks and the utilization of SIGINT resources.

b. OPINS - Operating Instructions. Orders or directives assigning missions, tasks or functions to SIGINT Organizations.

c. TECHDOC - Technical Doctrine. Enunciation of the principles governing the determination of techniques, methods, and procedures for fulfilling assigned tasks.

d. TECHINS - Technical Instructions. Orders or directives prescribing techniques, methods or procedures to be used in the fulfillment of assigned tasks.

2. The numbered series are thus differentiated according to their concern with operating (OP...) or technical (TECH...) matters and further differentiated according to whether they are instructional (...INS) or doctrinal (...DOC). A good index of the difference between operating doctrine or instructions and technical doctrine or instructions is that the former category is concerned with the question, "Who does what?", the latter with the question, "How is it properly done?"

3. Instructions (...INS) are tantamount to orders of a detailed nature which must be carried out to the fullest possible extent to satisfy the particular requirements on which they are based. Doctrine (...DOC) serves as guidance, embodying the consensus of the best judgment as to the way in which operations should be conducted. It is expected that all SIGINT activities will be governed by such doctrine and, in this respect, doctrine is tantamount to orders of general scope.

4. The NSA Circular is used to promulgate philosophy, policy, objectives, program and technical guidance, and other matters in the fields of research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) and of scientific, technical, production engineering and logistics information management. The MUSSO, therefore, will not be used for these purposes. MUSSO will be used, however, for issuing research and development operational and technical instructions to cryptologic field activities in those areas of NSA responsibility which are directly related to COMINT and ELINT intercept

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and processing activities which are under the operational and technical control of the Director, NSA.

SECTION IV - PREPARATION, REVIEW AND PUBLICATION

1. The preparation, review and publication of all MUSSO documents shall reflect the policy and spirit of the Letter of Promulgation and the general principles of the Statement of General Operating Policy (SGOP). The following MUSSO preparation and publication responsibilities and procedures provide guidance and information for all elements of the NSE:

a. The unnumbered publications referred to in Section III, paragraph 1., will be prepared and published by the National Security Agency. These documents (excepting the BOXSCORE) will be coordinated with the Service Cryptologic Agency Headquarters for appropriate additions, corrections and/or comments.

b. Operating and Technical Doctrine normally will be prepared and published by the National Security Agency; however, SCA Headquarters may initiate operating doctrine by forwarding drafts of proposed OPDOCs to NSA for publication. NSA will undertake all necessary pre-publication coordination with the other SCAs for comments and/or concurrence.

c. Operating Instructions and Production Plans for the Service Cryptologic Agencies and the National Security Agency Production Organization will be prepared and issued by the National Security Agency with active participation of the organizations concerned. These Operating Instructions include:

(1) OPINS No. 1, 2 and 3. Task Chiefs of the Service Cryptologic Agencies of the Army, Navy and Air Force, with their respective SIGINT missions. OPINS No. 1, 2 and 3 are used also to delegate operational control of specified COMINT and ELINT facilities and resources for such periods and such tasks as are determined by the Director, NSA.

(2) OPINS No. 4. Tasks the National Security Agency Production Organization with specific SIGINT responsibilities, analytic, reporting and support functions, and/or other matters as appropriate.

(3) OPINS No. 10, 20, 30 and 40. Levy SIGINT collection, processing, production and machine processing requirements upon the Army, Navy and Air Force SCAs and the NSA Production Organization, respectively.

d. The Service Cryptologic Agency Headquarters, or Intermediate SCA Headquarters as designated by their parent service, will prepare and publish OPINS in the 1000, 2000 and 3000 series, tasking individual SCA units with specific SIGINT collection, processing and production functions and whatever additional instructions as are necessary or desirable to the successful accomplishment of assigned missions. In certain situations where joint activities are to be conducted under provisions of OPDOC 18 or by other special arrangements, and where NSA resources, per se,

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are not involved, an OPINS will be prepared jointly by the SCAs involved and published under a double OPINS number (e.g., OPINS 1799/3799). These documents normally will be subject to pre-publication review and approval by the National Security Agency.

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(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

e. OPINS in the 4000 and 5000 series will be prepared and issued by NSA, as required, to task NSA Production Organization elements, NSA Field elements

Appropriate SCA coordination will be accomplished whenever SCA resources or major divisions of responsibility within the NSE are involved.

f. Technical Instructions (TECHINS). To insure necessary uniformity within the NSE, TECHINS normally will be prepared and published by the National Security Agency with the active participation of the SCAs. SCA Headquarters (and SCA Field Headquarters or field units when authorized by parent SCA Hqs) and Joint Processing Centers may prepare basic TECHINS and supplements or Intra-Service variations to NSA TECHINS, according to the following procedures:

(1) In normal (non-emergency) situations, when necessary instructions are non-existent, or when previously published instructions are inadequate, drafts of proposed TECHINS will be submitted through normal channels to the National Security Agency for review and, if appropriate, publication.

(2) In emergency situations, TECHINS may be prepared and published without prior coordination with the National Security Agency. Such instructions will be limited to unique situations wherein appropriate instructions from NSA and/or SCA Headquarters are lacking, and the time factor is such that normal pre-publication coordination would seriously hamper or delay fulfillment of a local operating requirement. Implementation of such instructions will be on a provisional basis and TECHINS thus published will be given post-publication review by NSA, in conjunction with the SCAs as in normal situations. The originator will be notified of the results of the review and recommended disposition (e.g., conversion to NSA TECHINS with wider applicability; distribution as a Service TECHINS subject to any necessary amendments; rescission; etc.).

(3) Supplements or Intra-Service variations may be required to amplify instructions contained in a basic TECHINS in order to meet some specific Service purpose, area need, or local field requirements, over and above what is required by the basic TECHINS.

(a) SCA Headquarters and Joint Processing Centers may prepare and publish supplements or Intra-Service variations to NSA TECHINS, as required, without pre-publication coordination with the National Security Agency.

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(b) SCA Field Headquarters or field units, when authorized by SCA Headquarters, may prepare and publish supplements to NSA and SCA Headquarters TECHINS. At a minimum, pre-publication coordination should be conducted, if time permits, with the NSA Field Activity or sub-office. (Field unit pre-publication coordination with intermediate Field Headquarters will be as directed by the SCA Headquarters.) Supplements thus published will be given post-publication reviews by NSA and SCA Headquarters.

(c) Supplements will not reiterate or duplicate, alter or change the basic text of the publication they augment.

(d) Supplements or variations are binding on subordinate units of the issuing organization but in no way obviate the requirements expressed in a higher authority supplement and/or basic TECHINS.

(e) When a basic TECHINS is revised, supplements to the previous version will be reviewed by the issuing organization for conformity and applicability to the new version. Such supplements will be up-dated and reissued or cancelled.

2. To achieve uniformity in the system, pre-publication coordination of MUSSO documents, whenever required or appropriate, will be accomplished between and among elements of the NSE as follows:

a. All NSA drafted MUSSO documents and changes thereto normally will be referred formally to the Service Cryptologic Agencies for comments prior to publication. Formal referral normally will be accomplished by providing copies (in the number desired) of draft MUSSO documents to SCA Representatives at Fort Meade for their respective Headquarters and/or SCA headquarters. Deadline dates for the receipt of comments (normally 30-45 calendar days from date of receipt by the SCA) will be established, when appropriate. Non-receipt of comments by dates indicated will be construed as "no comments" and publication will normally follow. In emergency situations, NSA draft TECHINS may be issued directly to SCA field units as interim instructions pending completion of formal coordination. Such issuance will be effected in coordination with SCA Representatives at Ft. Meade.

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b. NSA Field Activities

[redacted] will be provided with a copy of the initial draft of an NSA-originated MUSSO document and subsequent drafts, where appropriate, for review and comment. Deadlines for receipt of comments will be similar to those for internal NSA comments. NSA Field Activities [redacted] comments may be forwarded electrically, if practicable, in order to be received for consideration during internal NSA coordination, or at

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least prior to formal presentation of the draft MUSSO document to the SCAs. SCA Representatives at Fort Meade may be provided copies of initial drafts for informal review, as appropriate.

c. Requests for extensions of deadlines established by NSA for receipt of SCA Headquarters comments will be honored; where possible; however, requests for extensions to permit receipt of comments from subordinate field units will not normally be approved. Comments from such organizations can be considered for amendments or changes.

d. To permit prompt review of all Service-originated MUSSO documents, a minimum of 30 copies of draft OPLNS and 20 copies of draft TECHINS are required by NSA for pre-publication review. Normal deadlines of not less than 30 days from date of receipt by NSA may be established by the SCA Representatives for receipt of NSA comments.

3. Message changes or other operational or technical instructions promulgated by electrical or mail message will be coordinated with SCA Representatives at Fort Meade and will be confirmed in hard-copy MUSSO format within 30 days of transmittal, except where the changes are periodically (quarterly or more often) recapitulated. Changes or instructions not confirmed in hard copy form, except as above, within 90 days will be considered no longer valid.

4. Pre-publication coordination and post-publication review of all MUSSO documents at all levels should have the following objectives:

a. To insure applicability or adaptability, as appropriate, to the world-wide National SIGINT Effort.

b. To eliminate duplication and/or inconsistency with other MUSSO publications.

c. To insure completeness, accuracy, validity and appropriateness of instructions.

5. Comments or suggestions regarding draft MUSSO publications or regarding suggested amendments to existing MUSSO documents will include a rationale:

a. To insure that facts relative to the comment or suggestion are readily apparent.

RATIONALE: Facts concerning a suggestion that are easily

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understood can be collated rapidly to other factors (sometimes unknown or not considered by the suggestor) which may or may not support its adoption or partial adoption.

b. To insure that the purpose or objective intended by the comment or suggestion is not misunderstood.


RATIONALE: The precise point(s) that motivated a comment or suggestion should be made so as not to be overlooked during the decision to accept or reject a suggestion.

6. Comments of an editorial nature or comments which are self-explanatory need not include a rationale.

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
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SECTION VI - CONTENT

1. Normally an OPDOC or TECHDOC will apply to only one subject. A separate TECHINS will be prepared for each individual subject. Each OPDOC, TECHDOC, or TECHINS will have as many sections as necessary, and each section will be given a brief descriptive title. A PURPOSE section should always be included.

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2. OPINS also will have as many sections as necessary and appropriate to the document except that OPINS NO. 10, 20, 30 and 40 will adhere to the format prescribed separately in TECHINS NO. 9002.

3. An OPINS in the 1000, 2000, or 3000 series will be prepared for each individual SIGINT unit having a SIGINT unit designator (TECHINS NO. 1055 refers) and listed in OPINS NO. 10/20/30, and numbered according to the procedures outlined in foregoing sections. An OPINS in the 4000 or 5000 series may be prepared for NSA Production elements and for Joint or Special Units, respectively, as appropriate or desired. OPINS are not required for sub-elements or detachments of major units providing the SIGINT activities of such elements or detachments are adequately covered by the OPINS of the parent unit. In addition, OPINS for SIGINT units (e.g., ERU's, STRAC Support, etc.) not under the operational control of DIRNSA should be prepared only at the discretion of the parent SCA.

4. Implementation of an OPINS at action units (the tasked element as stated in the OPINS) will be effective upon receipt. OPINS will be implemented separately only when it is specifically stated in the OPINS that implementation will be effected at a later date.

5. Under no circumstances will a TECHINS contain an "implementation" statement. A TECHINS is "effective" upon issue, but implementation of a TECHINS at action units is accomplished separately as deemed appropriate by NSA at the time of issuance in consultation with the SCA Representatives at Fort Meade. Under normal procedures:

a. ASA and NSG field units will automatically implement a TECHINS upon receipt, as applicable to their mission, unless otherwise notified by higher headquarters. Normally, applicable TECHINS are reflected in the unit OPINS.

b. AFSS implements TECHINS by message to intermediate field headquarters, information to DIRNSA. Intermediate field headquarters will implement TECHINS by message to subordinate units and reflect such implementation in its quarterly TECHINS IMPLEMENTATION RECORD (U154 Report) or Annex A to the unit OPINS.

6. On occasion, to assure simultaneous implementation of a TECHINS at all affected stations, a specific implementation date will be desired. In such cases, appropriate correspondence to the SCA Headquarters, information to the affected stations, as appropriate, will request implementation on the desired date. This correspondence will be released prior to distribution of the document and/or receipt of the document in the field to permit the normal implementation procedures above.

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7. Preparation of MUSSO documents will be in accordance with Annex A and, within NSA, the MUSSO Typing Instructions. A suggested Unit OPINS format and instructions for completing it are attached as appendix to Annex A. Because of fundamental differences in service organization structure, service operational traditions, and general modus operandi, flexibility has been provided for by making many elements of the format optional. While its use is not mandatory, the format illustrates the preferred order of sections and paragraphs.

SECTION VII - MANUALS

1. SIGINT material considered for manual-tape presentation must qualify as technical support material under the provision of TECHINS NO. 7971, or be selected as suitable for combined instructions for use within the National SIGINT Effort [REDACTED]

2. Material which is considered suitable for issuance as combined instructions may, after appropriate coordination, be produced as a manual and promulgated by all agencies concerned in the publication series used by each agency. For U. S. units, manuals so produced will be promulgated as a MUSSO document. (e.g., the TEXTA Manual, TECHINS NO. 2020). Additionally, material, which would normally be issued as combined instructions but is precluded from such treatment [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] may be produced as a manual for the NSE and promulgated as a MUSSO document (e.g., the SIGINT Publication Manual TECHINS 4010).

3. For convenience of reference, associated OPINS, OPDOCS, TECHINS, TECHDOCS, and technical support material may be compiled by recipients thereof into a single binder to form a comprehensive "Manual" on a given subject. Cross referencing from one MUSSO publication to another in associated subject areas will facilitate such compilation.

SECTION VIII - DISTRIBUTION

1. Distribution of MUSSO documents, or portions thereof or changes thereto, will be made directly to elements of the SIGINT producing community and will be as broad as is consistent with need-to-know, security, and usefulness of the document to the recipient.

2. A number of MUSSO documents have been edited or sanitized to permit less restrictive handling of the document than required by the contents of the basic document.

a. A sanitized version parallels a basic MUSSO document on the


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same subject, normally carries the same number and publication date as the basic document but is identified by a letter suffix in parentheses. The following letter suffixes will be used to identify sanitized MUSSO documents:



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3. Non-SIGINT producing organizations will not routinely receive MUSSO documents or portions thereof or changes thereto. To permit distribution outside the cryptologic community in those circumstances where it is necessary to provide pertinent "need-to-know" information to consumers and certain non-cryptologic activities and organizations, the following exceptions to this Agency policy apply:

a. Technical information may be provided to non-cryptologic organizations, where a valid need-to-know is established and justified, in the form of an INFOCON (Information for Consumers). An INFOCON is the approved vehicle to provide the information contained in a MUSSO document required by a consumer in order to understand the SIGINT product he receives by virtue of the basic MUSSO document.

(1) INFOCONs must be prepared in a manner which will avoid:
(a) being instructional in nature; and (b) any reference to SIGINT techniques or "in-house" analytic procedures.

(2) Numbering of INFOCONs will conform insofar as possible to the numbering of the related MUSSO document (e.g., INFOCON NO. 440 and INFOCON NO. 4301 equate to TECHDOC NO. 440 and TECHINS NO. 4301, respectively). Titles of INFOCONs may be revised where necessary to exclude non-essentials relating to technical preparations and therefore may not always equate to the title of the MUSSO document.

(3) INFOCONs will be prepared in the same format prescribed

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for MUSSO documents except that INFOCONS will not be issued under a MUSSO coversheet (see Annex A).

(4) All INFOCONS will be prepared and published at NSA for release by the Director, National Security Agency, in order to maintain centralized accountability.

b. A copy or reproduction of a TECHINS, per se, may be provided to non-cryptologic or non-SIGINT producing organizations where such instructions are an integral part of an Operations Order, an Operations Plan, or a SIGINT Support Plan, which is accorded security protection at least commensurate with the classification of the TECHINS.

4. All requests received from non-cryptologic or non-SIGINT producing organizations for MUSSO documents, other than those qualifying under provisions of paragraph 3.b. above, and those covered by existing INFOCONS appropriate to the intended purpose, must be submitted to the Director, National Security Agency, for decision on an individual basis. All available information and appropriate comments attendant to such requests should be provided to DIRNSA.

5. Standard distribution of NSA originated MUSSO documents, sanitized MUSSO documents, and INFOCONS, will be as indicated in Annex B and Appendices thereto.

6. Reproduction of NSA originated MUSSO documents by NSA Field Activities, SCA Field Headquarters or subordinate units is authorized to meet local requirements, except where specifically prohibited in the document. This authorization does not extend to reproduction of documents for issue to non-cryptologic organizations except as provided in paragraph 3.b., above.

7. Supplements, Intra-Service variations, or original OPINS or TECHINS issued by SCA Headquarters or field elements will be distributed in accordance with the parent SCA Headquarters directives. Distribution will always include: one (1) copy each for area NSA Field Activities and sub-offices and forty-five (45) copies for NSA.

8. Requests for additional or replacement copies of MUSSO documents or requests for changes to standard distribution will be addressed to the originator of the document(s). Requests from SCA units will be forwarded through their appropriate SCA Headquarters.

9. Changes or amendments or rescission notices to all MUSSO documents will receive the same distribution via the same channels as the basic document.

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SECTION IX - OTHER REMARKS

Suggestions for additions and amendments to the Manual of U.S. SIGINT Operations will be welcome from any member of the SIGINT community. Field elements of the Service Cryptologic Agencies originating such suggestions will forward them through prescribed channels via SCA Headquarters to the Director, National Security Agency, ATTN: PO4.

MARSHALL S. CARTER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Director

OFFICIAL:

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Chief of Administrative Services

2 Incls:

1. ANNEX A - PREPARATION AND MAINTENANCE OF MUSSO DOCUMENTS
2. ANNEX B - NSA DISTRIBUTION OF MUSSO DOCUMENTS

DISTRIBUTION:MUSSO "A" Except: DIRNAVSECGRU (12), ADNSG (12), 

Plus :

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
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~~SECRET~~ANNEX APREPARATION AND MAINTENANCE OF MUSSO DOCUMENTS1. General Instructions

a. MUSSO documents will be typed on letter size paper (8" x 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ "), prepunched to permit insertion in standard three-ring, loose-leaf binders. Typing within paragraphs will be single spaced. (Draft versions should be double-spaced to facilitate reviews.) Both sides of the paper will be used in head-to-head printing, unless operational reasons justify single-side printing only. Other single-side printing exceptions will be pointed up in applicable paragraphs to follow. (The term "MUSSO documents" as used herein refers to all documents except OPINS NO. 1ø, 2ø, 3ø and 4ø).

b. Cover Sheets. Front and back cover sheets on MUSSO documents not only serve to identify the MUSSO series publications but help to preserve and protect them. Numbered NSA-originated MUSSO documents will be issued under two-color (blue and black on white) covers. They will be used only on a basic numbered document. They will not be used on the unnumbered MUSSO documents, changes to documents, Memorandum to Holders, or oversize (8" x 13") attachments, nor will they be used on INFOCONs. Changes to basic documents, oversize attachments, and Memorandum to Holders will be issued with a special MUSSO first page format similar to that used on this INTRODUCTION. Other issuing authorities may use cover sheets if practicable and desired. If not used, however, continued use of the special MUSSO first page format is encouraged.

2. Arrangement

a. MUSSO documents will be prepared in a standard format for the sake of uniformity. The issuing headquarters, effective period, the short title (i.e., OPDOC, OPINS, TECHDOC or TECHINS as applicable) and number, plus the date, full title and table of contents by section will be indicated on the first page of the document.

(1) The classification of the title, as determined by the originator is entered one space after the last word of the title in brief form, in parentheses, as follows: (U) - Unclassified; (C) - Confidential; (C-CCO) - Confidential, Handle Via Comint Channels Only; (S) - Secret; (S-CCO) - Secret, Handle Via Comint Channels Only; (SC) - Secret, Codeword; (TS) - Top Secret; (TS-CCO) - Top Secret, Handle Via Comint Channels Only; (TSC) - Top Secret, Codeword.

(2) RCS number, where applicable, is entered inclosed in parentheses immediately under the title.

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(3) A supersession statement, if applicable, will be entered immediately following the table of contents.

b. Pages following the title page will carry the short title and date as the first line of printing below the top margin. Two spaces will separate the various elements of each document (i.e., between the title and the Table of Contents, between the Table of Contents and the supersession statement (if applicable) or Section I, between each Section title and the first paragraph of the section, and between paragraphs.)

c. Sections. Sections will be numbered consecutively with capital ROMAN numerals throughout the publication. Section titles will be in capital letters, centered and underlined.

d. Paragraphing. Paragraphs, when more than one, will be numbered consecutively within each section with Arabic numbers. Paragraphs will be indented five spaces and subparagraphs will be further indented four spaces. Single paragraphs will not be numbered. Paragraphs and subparagraphs throughout all MUSSO documents and attachments will appear as in this Annex and Appendices.

e. Pagination. All pages within each MUSSO document will be numbered at the bottom center of the page in Arabic numerals, beginning with page two. The first page will not be numbered. Each page of an attachment will be numbered independently, also starting with page two.

f. Authentication. MUSSO documents will be authenticated in accordance with the procedures of the issuing organization.

g. Inclosure Notations. The inclosure notation (if applicable) will appear on the signature page of the basic document, two spaces following the last line of the authentication block.

(1) When there is only one inclosure, type the notation as follows:

"Incl:
ANNEX - INSTALLATION PLANS"

(2) When there is more than one inclosure, number each and type the notation as follows:

"3 Incls:
1. ANNEX A - PROCEDURES
2. ANNEX B - REPORTING
3. ANNEX C - FORMS"

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h. Attachments. Attachments to MUSSO documents will be annexes, lettered consecutively if there are more than one. A single annex normally will not be lettered. Each annex will be identified as ANNEX at the top of the first page, with a letter, if appropriate, and will bear a title. It will also be identified as an annex to the basic document at the lower left corner of even-numbered pages and lower right corner of odd-numbered pages except where a TOP SECRET control block is entered. In the latter case, the annex identification will be placed in the opposite corners. Appendices will be used for attachments to Annexes, Tabs as attachments to Appendices, Inclosures as attachments to Tabs.

(1) Format for an Attachment. The attachment letter or number, as appropriate, should appear at the top, center of the first page. The title of the attachment, underlined, should be centered on the page below the attachment letter or number, with a Table of Contents, if used, centered below the title line. Instructions for the remainder of the first page, second and succeeding pages of an attachment are the same as for a basic MUSSO document.

(2) Attachment Notation. Identify each attachment with the proper notation in the lower right corner of odd-numbered pages and lower left corner of even numbered pages. Examples:

ANNEX A TO
TECHINS 4001
DTD 1 JAN 68

ANNEX A TO
TECHINS 1055
DTD 1 JAN 68
(Cl-JUN 71)

APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX A TO
TECHINS 4020
DTD 1 JAN 57

TAB A TO
APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX B TO
TECHINS 2099
DTD 16 APR 70

i. Distribution. Each MUSSO document will show a distribution notation. The word "DISTRIBUTION" will follow two spaces below the last attachment listed, at the left margin, followed by a distribution list or symbol indented two spaces. If no attachments are listed, the distribution will follow the authentication block. If space is limited, the list may be included as the next page of the document, in which case the words, "List Attached," will be included in the available space. If the document carries a special distribution and is attached to the document, type the words, "Special-Attached." If the document carries a special distribution but is not attached to the document, type only the word "Special." The distribution represented by symbols appearing on NSA-issued MUSSO documents is listed in Annex B.

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j. Exceptions. Exceptions to the foregoing procedures, specifically with respect to control and pagination of Annexes, may be made where split routing is required or where the Annexes are distributed at variance from the basic document. In such cases, affected portions will bear unique control numbers and pagination.

3. Classification and Control.

a. MUSSO documents will be classified according to content.

(1) For purposes of classification marking, all MUSSO documents, except Manuals, will be considered unbound documents. For TOP SECRET Control purposes a document that is bound by staples or fasteners is considered an unbound publication. The appropriate classification will be plainly and conspicuously marked or printed in the top and bottom margins on all pages. Front and back cover pages, title pages (when used) and the first page will bear the over-all classification of the document. Other pages may be marked according to the classification of their own content. A cover will be marked on its outer surface. When both sides of a page are used, both sides will bear the appropriate classification.

(2) When a basic document contains no codeword material but one or more of the annexes contain codeword, the basic will bear the classification of the highest classified information contained in the attachments thereto. The attachments will be classified according to content. The basic will be marked "APPENDED DOCUMENT(S) CONTAIN(S) CODEWORD MATERIAL," on the first page only.

(3) A codeword is not a classification, but signifies a category and requires special handling. Documents that bear a codeword are automatically placed in COMINT channels. Documents containing information related to COMINT or COMINT activities, although not codeword information, will be marked with the caveat "HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY." This caveat will be placed conspicuously on the cover (if used) and at the bottom of each page, normally at the left margin. Placement of this notation on the page is not critical. If necessary, it may be stamped or typed at different places at the bottom of the page to allow room for notations that take precedence.

(4) When a basic document containing SECRET Codeword information is classified TOP SECRET because it or attachments to it contain TOP SECRET information, it will be classified TOP SECRET CODEWORD.

(5) Classified MUSSO documents which do not carry a codeword, codeword warning, downgrading statement, or the HVCCO caveat, must carry an appropriate "Automatic Downgrading or Declassification" statement

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as prescribed in DOD Directive 5200.10. This statement need only appear on the cover.

(6) Classification and categorization of MUSSO documents will be in accordance with appropriate TECHINS.

b. Few MUSSO documents will be TOP SECRET Controlled. Top Secret documents bearing a codeword or the HVCCO notation are exempt from TS Control. Documents that are classified TOP SECRET with no COMINT indicator are controlled. When required, the TS Control blocks will appear at the lower right corner of the MUSSO Cover and each odd-numbered page (face page). Each sheet of an unbound Top Secret document is controlled and not necessarily each page. Annexes will bear the same control number as the basic document and be considered a part of the document. The page numbering in the TOP SECRET control block will be consecutive from cover to cover, disregarding any internal page numbering.

(1) Non-Reproduction Statement. This statement is required on the cover of all TOP SECRET documents. It is not required on the cover of documents which contain codeword material or are marked with the HVCCO notation or contain a downgrading or regrading notation except where sensitivity warrants. This statement, as appropriate, is placed at the left margin as shown below:

"Reproduction of this document in whole or in part is prohibited except with the permission of the issuing office or higher authority."

"Reproduction of paragraph(s) _____ of this document is prohibited except with the permission of the issuing office or higher authority."

c. Reports Control. MUSSO documents requiring submission of reports will normally bear a Reports Control Symbol (RCS). The RCS number should appear under the title of the document on the first textual page. If it is determined that a Reports Control Symbol is not required, an exemption clause will be included stating that the report in question is exempt from assignment of a Reports Control Symbol.

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4. Preparation of INFOCONS. As pointed out in Section VIII, paragraph 3, of this INTRODUCTION, MUSSO documents will not be released, *per se*, to non-cryptologic organizations. The replacement documents, containing only that information which has been determined to be required by non-cryptologic organizations, titled "INFOCONS," are mutually exclusive of the MUSSO system. INFOCONS will be prepared in exactly the same manner as prescribed for MUSSO documents but will not be issued under a MUSSO coversheet.

5. Maintenance of Documents.

a. There are two methods used to change MUSSO publications:

(1) Hard Copy Changes. A printed page or pages containing amendments to a basic publication, published in the same size and format as the publication.

(2) Message Changes. Used only in extreme situations where priority reproduction and distribution of a printed change will not insure receipt of the information by activities concerned in sufficient time to meet mandatory implementation dates. Messages should include a statement that the instructions will be confirmed by a hard copy change to follow. The hard copy change should be submitted for publication and distribution within 30 days of the date of the message and should contain a statement listing the message change or changes it confirms or supersedes. (e.g., "This hard copy change confirms electrical change 1, DTG _____"; "This hard copy change supersedes electrical changes 1, 2, and 3, DTG _____"). Exceptions are permitted only when the document is under constant change and is periodically revised (e.g., TECHINS 1643 - Forwarding Directive).

b. Hard copy changes will be numbered consecutively beginning with No. 1. Message changes may be numbered for accounting and reference purposes but will not be intermingled and numbered consecutively with hard copy changes due to their temporary nature. The number of changes to any one publication should be kept to a minimum. Upon revision of a MUSSO document, change numbers will revert to "1". Changes to MUSSO documents will be of the following types;

(1) Pen-and-Ink Changes. Used to make minor changes of not more than a few words, phrases, sentences, or short paragraphs which can be easily inserted by hand. Lengthy paragraph changes should take advantage of the "scissoring" technique mentioned in paragraph 5.c., following.

(2) Page changes. Used to replace existing pages with new ones. Normally, a page change is used in lieu of pen-and-ink changes when

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use of the latter would involve extensive write-in. Pages which replace complete pages in a document will carry the same date and page number as the superseded page and are further identified by the change notation typed at the bottom of each revised page.

(3) Additional Paragraphs. Changes and additions may require the insertion of new paragraphs in the text. Insertion of a new paragraph(s), if not at the end of a section, can be accomplished in two ways. In sections composed of only a few paragraphs, all paragraphs following the inserted new paragraph can be renumbered accordingly. Or, in the second method, by using the decimal system to number the inserted paragraph(s). (Examples: "Insert following new paragraph 2 and renumber existing paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, as paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively." "Insert new paragraph 2.1, between numbered paragraphs 2 and 3.").

(4) Additional Pages. When changed material requires additional pages, use the number of the original page plus alphabetical suffixes, such as page 2a, 2b, 2c, etcetera.

(5) Removal of Paragraphs and Pages. When necessary, paragraphs may be deleted on a changed page without losing the numerical sequence of the paragraph numbers by placing a parenthetical statement noting the removal of these paragraphs. For example, if a page contains paragraphs 6 through 12, and paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 are to be deleted, type the statement, "(PARAGRAPHS 9, 10 and 11 NOT USED)" in the space between paragraph 8 and paragraph 12. Pages may be removed by using the same method. For example, if pages 6, 7, and 8 of a document are to be removed, a single blank page would be inserted between pages 5 and 9, with the statement "(PAGES 6, 7 AND 8 NOT USED)", typed in the center of the page.

c. Printing of Changes. Changes which involve insertion of revised sentences, paragraphs or portions of pages will be printed single-side to allow addressees to scissor such changes for insertion into the original document. Changes which will replace complete pages of a document will be printed head-to-head or single-side depending on the format of the original publication.

d. Changes to TOP SECRET Documents. When revised pages are to be inserted into TOP SECRET Controlled MUSSO documents, the change sheet and the revised pages which it is transmitting will contain the same new TOP SECRET Control number. Type the control block on each face page and number the pages with the control block in sequence. The page number on the revised pages should agree with the pages they replace in the original document.

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e. Distribution of Changes. Instructions which change MUSSO documents will be published as numbered changes to the pertinent publication and will receive the same distribution as the original document. This does not include distribution of changes to MUSSO documents which are split-routed or where attachments are distributed at variance from the basic document (see paragraph 6.b).

6. In no case will a "MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS" be used to promulgate changes of any kind except as indicated below. A MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS of a MUSSO document may be used for the following purposes:

a. To rescind, cancel or revoke a publication, i.e., a complete document. Recission or cancellation of an attachment is considered to be a change to the document.

b. To transmit certain attachments of a MUSSO publication or changes thereto to specific units when there is a split distribution of the document.

7. To insure uniformity in the maintenance of the Manual, use of the following prescribed correction procedures is encouraged:

a. General Rules for Posting.

(1) Exercise care to insure accuracy and legibility.

(2) In pen and ink changes, draw a single line through changed material, rather than obliterating or blanking it out.

(3) Line out old material consisting of three or more lines of text by drawing single, straight lines through the first and last lines and connecting these lines from top right to bottom left, making a "Z" shaped figure.

(4) Indicate the authority for changing a basic publication in the outside margin of the affected portion (away from the binding).

(5) Place a check mark (✓) by each item of a change as it is posted, to insure posting of all portions of the change.

b. Procedures for Making Minor Additions and Corrections.

(1) Line out the deleted portion and if space on the basic publication permits, enter the added portion into the proper place on the text and add the authority "(C1)" (i.e., Change 1) in the outside margin.

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(2) If the space on the basic publication does not permit, enter "(WORDS ADDED/C1)" or "(SENTENCE ADDED/C1)", as the case may be into the proper place on the text or in the adjacent margin. Enter the added material at the bottom of the page, appropriately identified by the change authority "(C1)". Arrows showing the exact location of an added portion may be used if necessary for clarity.

(3) When numerous additions and deletions occur within a limited space in the basic publication, or when added material cannot be either inserted in its proper place or entered at the bottom of the page, it may be more practical to "Z" out the congested portion (provided the printed change restates that portion in its entirety) and the reader referred to the hard copy change itself, by noting in the outside margin "(SEE/C1)". This action will often prevent "patchwork" entries which confuse the reader.

(4) If a paragraph or subparagraph is to be added, and space does not allow entry in its proper place or elsewhere on the page in the basic document, enter the new paragraph or subparagraph number in its proper numerical sequence in the basic text followed by the words "(ADDED/SEE C1)."

c. Procedures for Rescission and Suspension Changes.

(1) Rescission. Line or "Z" out the rescinded part and enter the notation "(RESC/C1)", in the outside margin.

(2) Suspension. Place brackets around the affected portion and enter the notation "(SUSP/C1)" in the outside margin.

8. Upon completion of the posting required by a change, enter "POSTED", the date, and poster's initials in a conspicuous position on the first page of change. Copies of hard copy changes should be retained with the original publication.

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~~SECRET~~APPENDIX 1SUGGESTED UNIT OPINS FORMAT

OPINS (Number)

OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS FOR (Station Designator) (Classification Symbol)

	<u>SECTION</u>
TASK ELEMENT.	I
MISSION	II
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS.	III
SIGINT CONTROL	IV
ASSIGNED ENTITIES	V
SIGINT PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS	VI
LIAISON	VII
COMMUNICATIONS	VIII

*(Supersession statement, as applicable)

SECTION I - TASK ELEMENT

(Station designator and/or short-title administrative designator, administrative designator, location, classification, if any, of location.)

SECTION II - MISSION

1. Provide and operate intercept facilities allocated for the collection of designated foreign communications and non-communications emissions, and conduct such processing as may be required and authorized herein, or otherwise directed by the Director, NSA (DIRNSA), in general support of the National SIGINT Effort.
2. Provide direct SIGINT service to theater U.S. military commands, within capability, in response to the SIGINT requirements of those commands.
- *3. When authorized, provide direct SIGINT support to (specific command or commands) in accordance with NSA SIGINT Support Plans or other instructions or directives from DIRNSA.
- *4. Provide for operation of (name of operation, e.g. - JDA, JNACC, SHIPWRECK(C), etc.) in accordance with pertinent directives.

*Items so marked may be omitted if not applicable.

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OPINS (Number)

SECTION III - COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

*1. Subordinate SIGINT units of (station designator) are:

(to be listed by appropriate SCA Hqs)

2. (Additional paragraphs to be inserted by SCA Hqs, if desired, relative to administration, logistics, military justice, command subordination, etc.)

SECTION IV - SIGINT CONTROL

1. Operational control of assigned SIGINT collection and production resources and facilities will be exercised by Director, NSA, in accordance with MUSSO procedures and other approved operations orders or plans. (See Appendix 3, Paragraph 3)

2. Technical control of assigned SIGINT collection and production resources and facilities will be exercised by the Director, NSA, in accordance with MUSSO procedures.

3. Management of designated collection positions will be exercised by the appropriate Collection Management Authority (CMA) in accordance with TECHINS 1056 and/or special purpose plans or directives from the Director, NSA (e.g., NSA SIGINT Support Plans, etc.)

SECTION V - ASSIGNED ENTITIES

(List entities from OPINS 10/20/30 assigned for collection and/or processing by the unit and its subordinates, where applicable, or list separately in an Annex, thereby minimizing the need for frequent changes to the basic OPINS.)

SECTION VI - SIGINT PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS1. Collection.

a. Intercept, record, and forward emissions from assigned

*Items may be omitted if not applicable.

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OPINS (Number)

target entities in accordance with pertinent MUSSO directives. Collection will be accomplished in accordance with COLL GRP listings reflected in the current NSA Collection Group requirement publication.

*b. Apply special identification techniques, as available, to assigned target entities in accordance with pertinent MUSSO directives.

*c. Develop and issue TEXTA in accordance with TECHINS 2020.

d. Maintain TEXTA and issue TEXIN, TEMPO, and TEXSIG, as required by TECHINS 2020 and in support of intercept effort.

*e. Maintain ELINEX and other records, as appropriate, in support of assigned ELINEX effort.

2. Processing.

a. Traffic Analysis. Perform traffic analysis, including data reduction, within capabilities, on assigned entities in support of collection, cryptanalytic, and reporting efforts in accordance with pertinent TECHINS and/or Annexes to this OPINS.

(1) Maintain local traffic analysis records as required in support of collection efforts.

*(2) Provide Special Identification Techniques (SIT) effort with timely analytical and technical support as required.

*(3) Integrate SIT results with analytical processing and into analytical reporting media.

*b. Cryptanalysis. Perform cryptanalysis and decryption within capabilities, on low and medium grade cryptosystems on entities as indicated in Annexes to this OPINS.

*(1) Perform cryptanalysis, within capability, on high-grade cryptosystems on entities indicated in Annex (or Annexes) _____ to this OPINS.

*(2) Maintain cryptanalytic records as required in support of the local cryptanalytic effort.

*Items may be omitted if not applicable.

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*c. Signals Analysis. Perform signals analysis of intercepted ELINT signals, within capability, to the extent necessary to determine identification, signal characteristics, and significance of emission.

*d. Linguistics. Perform scanning, transcription, translation, as appropriate, of plain language and decrypted texts on assigned entities in support of collection, analytic, and reporting tasks.

*e. Machine Processing. Utilize authorized machine personnel and equipment resources to perform data processing on assigned entities in support of local collection, analytic, and reporting tasks and in support of related SIGINT activities at higher/lower or lateral echelons in accordance with pertinent directives and Annexes to this OPINS.

*(1) Prepare and forward machine personnel and equipment utilization report in accordance with pertinent directives.

*(2) Units requiring data processing support will so advise higher headquarters.

3. Reportinga. Technical

(1) Issue technical reports required by paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

(2) Issue technical reports indicated on assigned entities in Annex (or Annexes) _____ to this OPINS.

(3) Issue technical supplements to SIGINT product, as required, and in accordance with pertinent TECHINS.

(4) Issue other technical reports required or deemed appropriate, within capability, in accordance with pertinent directives.

(5) (For Units assigned an ELINT mission.) Issue SERF and SEAR reports in accordance with TECHINS 13/2.

b. SIGINT Product. In accordance with appropriate TECHINS, prepare and issue the following reports.

(1) CRITIC Reports

*Items may be omitted if not applicable

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- (2) SIGINT Readiness Reports.
- *(3) Spot Reports and ELECTRIGRAMS
- *(4) Translations, gists, or extracts from plain text and decrypted messages.
- *(5) Summary reports required on entities as indicated in Annexes to this OPINS.
- *(6) Other product reports required in Annexes to this OPINS.
- *(7) (For Units assigned an ELINT mission.) Issue EIT and/or EIO reports in accordance with TECHINS 4301.

4. Training

- a. Conduct, on a continuing basis, a planned and supervised apprenticeship training program designed to qualify enlisted personnel to the level of proficiency required to perform operational duties.
- b. Define and state requirements for Specialized Operational Training (SOT) for personnel enroute to assignment to the unit in accordance with TECHINS 9104.

5. Evaluation. Conduct SIGINT collection and reporting evaluation programs in accordance with pertinent directives.

6. Forwarding and Distribution.

- a. Forward raw traffic and technical material in accordance with TECHINS 1042 and 1043 and other pertinent TECHINS.
- b. Distribute SIGINT product in accordance with TECHINS 4003 and other pertinent TECHINS.

7. Technical Support.

- a. Provide technical support to and exchange of information with subordinate units and other units engaged in similar or related SIGINT tasks in accordance with pertinent directives or as authorized herein.

*Items may be omitted if not applicable.

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
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b. State requirements for technical support through appropriate channels in accordance with pertinent directives.

SECTION VII - LIAISON

1. Conduct liaison and technical exchange with other U.S. SIGINT units in accordance with pertinent directives.



(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

*4. Conduct liaison with local U.S. military intelligence representatives for the purpose of obtaining collateral support. The area NSA Field Activity and area Chief, SCA Field Headquarters, will be kept informed of the nature and scope of such liaison.



(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

SECTION VIII - COMMUNICATIONS

1. Maintain and operate, on a continuous basis, a SIGINT communications facility to provide for the timely transmission of Critical and Signal Intelligence in support of the National SIGINT Effort and designated U.S. Military Commands.

*Items may be omitted if not applicable.

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2. Communications formats and procedures will be in accordance with CRITCOMM Operating Instructions (COI).

*3. Provide and operate communications facilities as tasked, in support of DF net control flashing and tip-off activities, in accordance with pertinent directives.

(Signature)

Incl:

Annex _____

*Items may be omitted if not applicable.

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~~SECRET~~APPENDIX 2SUGGESTED FORMAT FOR ANNEX TO UNIT OPINS

ANNEX _____

(TITLE)

SECTION

TASK	I
FUNCTIONS.	II
LIAISON	III

SECTION I - TASK

The (Administrative designator, SIGINT designator in parentheses) is tasked with the current exploitation and reporting of (entity/entities).

SECTION II - FUNCTIONS1. Collection.

a. The management of intercept facilities will be in accordance with TECHINS 1056.

b. Utilization of Special Identification Techniques (SIT) on assigned entities will be in accordance with instructions contained in TECHINS No. 1025 and 1026; results thereof will be forwarded in accordance with TECHINS No. 1043. All assignments will be in accordance with the SIT priority list as established by the tasking authority in accordance with TECHINS 1056.

2. Traffic Analysis.

a. In addition to the requirements specified in the basic OPINS, develop and maintain as a minimum the following records for, and as a result of, traffic analysis:

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

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b. In accordance with TECHINS 1043 forward, through [] and to appropriate channels, results of traffic analyses to DIRNSA, [] and to any other U.S. SIGINT field unit known to have a need for the results.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

c. Long-term research and analysis is authorized when it can be accomplished without detriment to the basic current analysis and reporting missions.

3. Cryptanalysis.

a. Conduct cryptanalysis, perform code and key recoveries and decryption, and maintain necessary records on low - and medium-grade cryptographic systems, and on undiagnosed systems unless a determination is made by DIRNSA that such systems are high-grade.

b. Develop and maintain as a minimum the following cryptanalytic records for, and as a result of, cryptanalysis:

- (1) System identification information.
- (2) Decrypted message file.
- (3) Undecrypted message file.

c. In accordance with TECHINS No. 1043 forward, through appropriate channels, results of cryptanalysis to DIRNSA, [] and to any other U.S. SIGINT field units known to have a need for the results.

4. Reporting.

a. Technical. In addition to the requirements specified in the basic OPINS, issue the following:

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(1) Situation SAT ONE and SAT TWO Reports, in accordance with TECHINS No. 2010.

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(2) MIAR, in accordance with TECHINS No. 1019.

(3) Technical reports, as required (e.g., TECSUM, MATSUM, TARUS), in accordance with pertinent TECHINS.

(4) Informal Technical Notes (T/A and C/A), in accordance with TECHINS No. 7019.

(5) Temporary Recognition Data (TRD), in accordance with TECHINS No. 3001.

(6) Cryptologic Information Publication (CIP), in accordance with TECHINS No. 7011.

(7) COMINT Technical Reports (CTR).

(8) Working Aids

b. SIGINT Product. In addition to reports required by the basic OPINS, and utilizing materials from all sources available, prepare and issue SIGINT Product on the above designated entities as follows:

(1) SIGINT Readiness Reports, in accordance with TECHINS No. 4002.

(2) Other reports in response to specific theater consumer requirements, including those in accordance with TECHINS No. 4011, which can be undertaken without detriment to the basic timely reporting mission. DIRNSA will be promptly notified, through appropriate channels, of requirements originated by field consumers and of the action taken or proposed in fulfillment of such requirements.

SECTION III - LIAISON



(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

2. Other liaison will be conducted in accordance with Section VII of basic OPINS.

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~~SECRET~~APPENDIX 3INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING SUGGESTED
STANDARD UNIT OPINS FORMAT

1. Items indicated by asterisk (*) may be omitted if not applicable.

2. Items in parentheses to be completed by drafting Hqs.

3. Paragraph 1 of SECTION IV will normally read as indicated in the suggested Unit OPINS format; however, operational control over specific facilities and resources for a specific period of time may be delegated by Director, NSA, to Chiefs of the SCA's. Such delegation of operational control will be documented in OPINS 1, 2, or 3, as appropriate. Operational control may be re-delegated by the SCA Chief to a subordinate SCA element citing the authority granted in OPINS 1, 2, or 3. When operational control has been delegated or re-delegated, per above, paragraph 1 of SECTION IV should contain one of the following additional statements to reflect such delegation or re-delegation:

a. When delegated to SCA Chief, but not re-delegated -

"; except that operational control over SIGINT resources and facilities allocated to the _____ entity (or entities) has been delegated by DIRNSA to and will be exercised by _____ (Chief of the SCA)."

b. When re-delegated to an SCA Field Headquarters or subordinate field unit -

"; except that operational control over SIGINT resources, and facilities allocated to the _____ entity (or entities) has been delegated by DIRNSA to (Chief of SCA) and under authority of OPINS (1, 2, or 3) herewith re-delegated by (Chief of the SCA) to and will be exercised by _____ (Chief SCA Field Hqs or CO of subordinate unit).

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OPINS _____
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4. At the option of SCA Eqs, where "in accordance with pertinent directives" or "in accordance with pertinent TECHINS," etc., is stated in the OPINS, these terms may be replaced by citing actual applicable TECHINS or applicable TECHINS may be listed in an Annex to the OPINS and referenced by footnote where appropriate. Additionally, where training and/or evaluation functions are of such scope to warrant, these functions may be treated in Annexes or as additional Sections to the basic TECHINS in addition to paragraphs of SECTION VI.

5. Annexes may be prepared on entities where unit is engaged in a major effort (i.e., other than collection, T/A in support of collection and CRITIC/READINESS or Spot Reporting) against those entities. Annexes should generally be confined to groups of like entities (e.g., all Soviet, or all Satellite, etc.) of no lower than trigraphic breakdown (Country/Service Area). No Annex would be required if all matters concerned can be covered by standard wording in basic OPINS.

6. The following paragraph should be included in any Annex concerning ELINT:

"Environment Information. The unit will develop and maintain as a minimum, the following information on a non-communication signal environment:

- "a. Bearing or location or emitter.
- "b. Frequency.
- "c. Type emitter.

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~~SECRET~~ANNEX B

STANDARD MUSSO DISTRIBUTION FOR USE ON
NSA-ORIGINATED MUSSO DOCUMENTS AND FOR INTERNAL
NSA DISTRIBUTION OF SCA-ORIGINATED DOCUMENTS

LEGEND:

- A - NSA-ORIGINATED DOCUMENTS (None-controlled).
 B - SAME AS "A" LESS UNITS WITH CAT II CEILING.
 C - SPECIAL (e.g., - OPDOC/TECHDOC) (None-controlled).
 D - SAME AS "C" LESS UNITS WITH CAT II CEILING.
 E - SCA-ORIGINATED UNIT OPINS.
 F - OPINS 10, 20, 30.
 G - SCA-ORIGINATED TECHINS.
 H - SPECIAL (ELINT or ELINT Related).
 I - MUSSO DRAFTS FOR PRE-PUBLICATION COORDINATION.

<u>ORGANIZATION</u> (Internal)	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>I</u>
D1	1		1		0	1	0	1	0
D2	1		1		1	1	0	1	0
D31	1		1		1	1	0	0	0
D32	1		1		1	1	1	1	1
D33	0		1		0	0	0	0	0
D34	0		0		0	3	0	0	0
D4	1		1		1	1	0	1	0
D5	1		1		0	0	0	1	1
P3	0		0		0	1	0	0	0
P02	1		1		1	2	0	1	0
P0211	0		0		0	1	0	0	0
P04	1		1		1	1	1	1	1
P1	1		1		0	0	0	1	0
P2	1		1		0	0	1	1	1
P21	1		1		0	1	0	1	0
P22	5		1		0	1	0	5	0
P22132	50		50		5	25	13	50	0
A02	0		0		0	1	0	0	0
A04	3		2		6	30	5	2	10
A1	6		2		0	2	0	1	0
A2	8		8		0	100	0	2	0
A3	7		2		0	5	0	2	0

NOTE: Exceptions, additions, deletions to standard distributions for individual documents will be specified in the distribution block on the document.
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ANNEX B TO
 INTRODUCTION
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~~SECRET~~

ORGANIZATION (Internal)	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
A4	7		7		0	4	0	7	0
A5	6		1		0	2	1	1	0
A6	2		2		0	2	0	2	0
A7	3		3		0	3	0	0	0
A9	2		2		0	2	0	1	0
B	1		1		6	1	1	1	6
B2	1		1		0	1	3	1	0
B21	1		1		0	1	0	1	0
B22	1		1		0	1	0	1	0
B23	1		1		0	1	0	1	0
B51	1		1		0	1	0	1	0
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B61	1		1		0	1	0	1	0
B62	1		1		0	1	0	0	0
B63	1		1		0	1	1	1	0
B71	1		1		0	1	0	1	0
B8	1		1		0	0	1	0	0
B81	1		1		0	1	0	1	0
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C412	1		0		0	0	0	1	0
C4602	1		1		0	1	0	1	0
E01	1		1		1	1	1	1	0
E	1		1		1	0	1	1	0
E03	1		1		1	1	1	1	2
E1	1		1		1	1	1	1	0
E2	1		1		1	0	1	1	0
E3	1		1		1	0	1	1	0
G	1		1		1	1	1	1	7
G3	3		3		3	3	3	3	0
G44	1		0		0	1	0	1	0
G5	3		3		0	3	0	3	0
G504	1		0		0	0	0	1	0
G6	4		4		0	4	0	4	0
G7	1		1		1	1	0	1	0
G71	1		1		1	1	0	0	0
B82	1		0		0	0	0	0	0

NOTE: \$ - except Annex C (4 copies marked A02; A03-3)

\$\$ - 1 copy of all to A2 plus 1 copy of Annex A and B to OPINS 20 to A21 and A23, 1 copy of Annex A to OPINS 20 to A22, 1 copy of Annex A and B to OPINS 30 to A23.

ANNEX B TO
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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ORGANIZATION
(Internal)

	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>I</u>
G72	1		1		1	1	0	0	0
G73	1		1		1	1	0	0	0
G74	1		1		1	1	0	0	0
K02	0		0		1	2	0	0	0
K04	1		1		0	0	0	1	0
K06	1		0		0	0	0	0	0
K07	1		1		0	0	0	1	0
K1	7		7		2	7	2	0	0
K2	6		6		0	4	0	6	0
K3	1		1		0	3	0	3	0
K4	8		6		1	5	1	8	0
K51	1		1		1	1	1	1	0
L21	2		2		0	1	0	2	0
L2141	1		1		0	0	0	1	0
L2144	2		2		1	2	1	2	0
L222	1		1		0	0	0	1	0
M12	1		1		1	1	1	1	0
M5	2		2		2	2	2	2	0
R02	1		1		1	0	0	1	0
R3	1		1		1	1	0	1	0
S	1		1		1	1	0	1	0
T1	1		1		1	1	1	1	0
NEPIO	0		0		0	0	0	1	0

* 1000 Series TECHINS only plus documents which refer to Research and Development.

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~~SECRET~~

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
1		1		#	1	#	1	1*
2		2		#	2	#	2	2*
1		1		0	1	0	1	3
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2		0		0	0	0	0	0
1		1		#	1	#	0	1*
1		1		0	0	0	0	0
3		3		#	2	#	3	2*
1		1		#	1	#	1	1*
1		1		#	0	#	1	1*
7		7		2	2	2	4	2*
0		0		#	1	#	1	1*
1		1		#	0	#	1	1*
1		0		0	0	0	0	1*
0		0		0	2	0	0	8*
0		0		0	1	0	0	6*
0		0		0	1	0	0	2*
0		0		0	1	0	0	0
0		0		0	0	0	0	0
0		0		0	0	0	1	0
0		0		0	0	0	4	0
0		0		0	0	0	2	0
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--	--


+ - "A" plus sign (+) when appearing as suffix to the standard distribution symbol (e.g., "A+1") or SPECIAL distribution indicator (e.g., "SPECIAL

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~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



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ANNEX B TO
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~~SECRET~~

ORGANIZATION (Internal)	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
	5		4					5	(b)(1)
	1		1					1	(b)(3)-50 USC 403
	1		1					1	(b)(3)-18 USC 798
	2		2					2	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
	4		4					4	
	2		1					2	
	2		2					2	
	2		2					2	
	3		2					3	
	2		1					2	
	2		2					2	
	4		1					4	
	9		3					6	
	4		1					4	
	4		2					4	
	3		2					3	
	1		1					1	
	2		1					2	
	2		1					2	
	2		1					2	
	1		1					1	
	2		1					2	
	2		1					2	
	2		1					2	
	2		1					2	
	5		1					5	
	2		2					2	
	4		1					3	
	5		2					2	
	1		1					1	
	1		1					1	
	2		2					2	
	2		2					2	
	1		4					4	
	7		4					4	
	1		4					4	
	2		1					2	
	4		4					4	
	8		8					8	

NOTE: --- CAT II SIGINT material only.

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~~SECRET~~

ORGANIZATION
(External)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>I</u>
2							5	5
1							1	1
1							1	0
2							0	0
2							0	0
2							0	0
2							0	0
4							0	0
3							0	0
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2							0	0
2							0	0
2							0	0
2							0	0
3							0	0
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4							4	0
1							0	0
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1							1	0
1							1	0
1							1	0
2							1	0
1							0	0
2							0	0
2							0	0
2							0	0
1							0	1
1							1	1

AS SPECIFIED BY ISSUING HEADQUARTERS

AS SPECIFIED BY ISSUING HEADQUARTERS

SEE APPENDIX 6

ANNEX B TO
INTRODUCTION
Dtd 1 Mar 66
(C2 - Oct 66)

~~SECRET~~

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
9		9				3*	4
0		0				0	0
1		1				1*	1
1		1					1
4		4					4
1		1					1
2		2					1
8		8					8
3		3					0
1		1					1
6		6					2
3		3					3
3		3					3
4		4					3
2		2					2
2		2					2
2		2					2
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3		3					3
1		1					1
3		3					3
2		2					2
1		1					1
1		1					1
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1		1					1
3		3					1
4		4					3
10		10				3*	10
2		2					2
2		2					2
0		0					1
1		1					1
1		1					0

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

888 APPENDIX 6

NOTE: * - From issuing Headquarters.

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
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8

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~~SECRET~~APPENDIX 1MUSSO "J" DISTRIBUTION

(One copy unless otherwise indicated)



(b)(1)
 (b)(3)-50 USC 403
 (b)(3)-18 USC 798
 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

#D32
 D33
 #P04
 #P2
 #P22132 (50 - STOCK)
 #A (2)
 #A1 (2)
 #A2 (2)
 #A3 (2)
 #A4 (2)
 #A5 (6)
 #A6
 #A7 (2)
 #A9
 #B
 #C404
 G04
 G3 (2)
 #K04 (3)
 #K1 (2)
 #K2 (4)
 #K4
 #I2144
 #M12
 #M5(2)

- Internal write-in on internal distribution on message form CAG ZIRAV.

APPENDIX 1 TO
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~~SECRET~~APPENDIX 2MUSSO "K" DISTRIBUTION

(One copy unless otherwise indicated)



(b)(1)
 (b)(3)-50 USC 403
 (b)(3)-18 USC 798
 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

#D32
 #P04
 K04 (3)

K1 (2)
 K2 (3)
 K4

#A (2)
 #A1 (2)
 #A2 (2)
 #A3 (2)
 #A4 (2)
 #A5 (6)

#A6
 #A7 (2)
 G (2)

#G3 (3)

#B
 #B2 (2)

#K (6)

P22132 - STOCK (50)

#C404

#I2144

#E12

#M5

#P2

(b)(1)
 (b)(3)-18 USC 798
 (b)(3)-50 USC 403
 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



G

A9

- Internal write-in on internal distribution on message form on CAG ZIRAX.

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APPENDIX 2 TO
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 INTRODUCTION
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 (C2 - Oct 66)

~~SECRET~~APPENDIX 3NUSSO "P"* DISTRIBUTION

(One copy unless otherwise indicated)

D1
 P82
 P84
 P1
 P2 (2)
 P3
 ADP
 A (2)
 A1 (6)
 A2 (8)
 A3 (5)
 A4 (7)
 A5 (6)
 A6 (2)
 A7 (2)
 A9
 B
 B2
 B21
 B22
 B23
 B51
 B6
 B62
 B63
 B71
 B8
 B81
 B61

BDACC
 P22132 (STOCK) (58)
 C484
 C4183
 C4682
 D32
 D5
 E12
 E482



G84
 G15
 G3 (3)
 G5 (2)
 G6 (3)
 G7
 G71
 G72
 G73
 G74

K84 (3)
 K1 (7)
 K2 (4)
 K3
 K4
 L21
 L2141
 L2144
 L2221
 L2222
 L23
 M5 (2)
 NSA/LO NIC
 T1

(b)(1)
 (b)(3)-18 USC 798
 (b)(3)-50 USC 403
 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

NOTE: * - For use NSA-P Supplements to TECHINS.

APPENDIX 3 TO
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3

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~~SECRET~~APPENDIX 4MUSSO BOX SCORE DISTRIBUTION

(One copy unless otherwise indicated)

DIR	A6 (6)	E41	I21
D1	A7 (5)	E412	I2144
D2	A9 (3)	E42 (3)	I22
D31	B (2)	E45	I23
D32	B2 (5)	G	NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER (NIC)
D33	B22	G3 (3)	NSA REP CINCSTRIKE
D4 (3)	B51 (2)	G4	R
D5	B6	G5	R3
P04 (10)	B61	G63	R5
P1	B62	G7	S101
P2 (5)	B63	G71	T1
P3 (2)	B64	G72	
P22132 - STOCK (75)	B71	G73	
A	B8	G74	
A02 (2)	B81	K04 (2)	
A03	C404 (2)	K06	
A04 (2)	C41	K07	
A05 (2)	C42	K1 (8)	
A06	C43	K2 (6)	
A1 (7)	C44	K3 (5)	
A2 (10)	C46	K4 (7)	
A3 (10)		K51	
A4 (7)			
A5 (8)			


(b)(1)
 (b)(3)-50 USC 403
 (b)(3)-18 USC 798
 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

APPENDIX 4 TO
 ANNEX B TO
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MUSSO BOX SCORE DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)



(S)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-18 USC 798

APPENDIX 4 TO
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(C2 - Oct 66)

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~~SECRET~~APPENDIX 5INFOCON "A" DISTRIBUTION

(One copy unless otherwise indicated)

#ADPM
 D1
 D301
 #D32
 #P04
 #P2 (2)
 #P22132 - (STOCK-50)
 #A
 #A1
 #A2 (2)
 #A3
 #A4
 #A5
 #A7 (3)
 #B51
 #B6
 #B71
 #B81
 #P22
 #C404
 #E12
 #G
 #G1 (7)
 #K04
 #K1 (8)
 #K2
 #K4
 #I2144
 #R303
 #T1

(b)(1)
 (b)(3)-50 USC 403
 (b)(3)-18 USC 798
 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
 (b)(3)-50 USC 403
 (b)(3)-18 USC 798
 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

- Internal write-in on internal distribution on message form on CAG IZNAD.


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APPENDIX 5 TO
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INFOCON "A" (Cont'd)



(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

APPENDIX 5 TO
ANNEX B TO
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
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INFOCON "A" (Cont'd)

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



APPENDIX 5 TO
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APPENDIX 6

SPECIAL SCA DISTRIBUTIONMUSO "F"OPINS 10/20/30

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TECHINS 9002	15	2	1	30	2	5	1	10
OPINS 10								
ANNEX A	15	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
APP I	15	2	1	1	1	1	1	2
APP II	15	2	1	1	1	1	1	2
ANNEX B	15	2	1	1	1	1	1	2
ANNEX C	15	2	1	1	1	1	1	2
ANNEX D	15	2	1	1	1	1	1	2
ANNEX E	15	2	1	1	1	1	1	2
OPINS 20								
ANNEX A	1	1	1	30	2	1	1	2
APP I	1	1	1	30	2	1	1	2
APP II	1	1	1	30	2	1	1	2
ANNEX B	1	1	1	30	2	1	1	2
ANNEX C	1	1	1	30	2	1	1	2
ANNEX D	1	1	1	30	2	1	1	2
ANNEX E	1	1	1	30	2	1	1	2
OPINS 30								
ANNEX A	1	1	1	1	1	5	1	10
APP I	1	1	1	1	1	5	1	10
APP II	1	1	1	1	1	5	1	10
ANNEX B	1	1	1	1	1	5	1	5
ANNEX C	1	1	1	1	1	5	1	5
ANNEX D	1	1	1	1	1	5	1	5
ANNEX E	1	1	1	1	1	5	1	5
AIRBORNE SUPPL	1	1	1	1	1	5	1	5


APPENDIX 6 TO
ANNEX B TO
INTRODUCTION
Dtd 1 Mar 66
(C2 - Oct 66)

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TAB F

COMMAND AND CONTROL RESPONSIBILITY

(OPINS 2855)



SIGINT

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~~SECRET~~855
TAB F

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL SECURITY GROUP
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

EFFECTIVE UNTIL RESCINDED OR SUPERSEDED

MUSO

MANUAL OF U.S. SIGINT OPERATIONS

OPINS No. 2855

12 March 1965

USN 855 OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS

	SECTION
TASK ELEMENT.....	I
COMMAND RELATIONSHIP.....	II
MISSION.....	III
FUNCTIONS.....	IV
LIAISON.....	V
COMMUNICATIONS.....	VI
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.....	VII

SECTION I - TASK ELEMENT

U. S. Naval Security Group component (USN 855), aboard the technical research ship USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5).

SECTION II - COMMAND RELATIONSHIP

1. Naval Command and Control Relationships follow:

a. The Chief of Naval Operations will exercise operational control of the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) through normal naval command channels. The ship's operations will be based on tasks expressed by the Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA) to the Director, Naval Security Group (DIRNAVSECGRU).

b. The Naval Security Group component aboard the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) will be organized within the Operations Department with a separately authorized personnel allowance.

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OPINS No. 2855

Management control of this component will be exercised by DIRNAVSECGRU. Military command will be exercised by the Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5).

2. SIGINT control relationships follow: (1)

Operational and technical control of the SIGINT mission will be exercised by DIRNSA in accordance with appropriate MUSSO directives.

SECTION III - MISSION

Conduct SIGINT operations as directed in general support of the national SIGINT effort and, as authorized, in direct support of designated U. S. Military Commanders.

SECTION IV - FUNCTIONS

1. Collection.

a. Intercept, record, transcribe and scan foreign communications and non-communications radiations and forward as directed. (2)

b. Conduct general and directed search for target signals as directed and/or required. (3)

c. Utilize DF capability as required in performance of mission.

d. Participate in Intercept Coverage Analysis as directed. (4)

e. Maintain current TEXTA, TEMPO and TEXIN as required to support intercept of assigned cases. (5)

f. Prepare and issue TEMPO/TEXIN as authorized. (5)



(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

2. Processing.

a. Perform traffic analysis on intercepted material in order to:

(1) Support intercept effort.

(2) Provide assistance to other SIGINT units engaged in the intercept of similar or related targets.

(3) Prepare required technical and SIGINT product reports, as specified in paragraph 3 below.

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

~~SECRET~~~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

OPINS No. 2855

b. Perform processing of designated cipher and plain language material in order to:

(1) Support traffic analysis functions.

(2) Prepare required technical and SIGINT product reports as specified in paragraph 3 below.

c. Perform signal analysis and evaluation in support of intercept and reporting tasks as directed and/or required.

3. Reporting.

a. Perform routine and special SIGINT reporting as directed. (6)

b. Perform routine and special technical reporting as directed. (7)

c. Participate in the SIGINT Readiness Program. (8)

d. Participate in the reporting of Critical Intelligence (CRITIC). (9)

4. Distribution.

Distribution of technical and SIGINT product reports will be accomplished in accordance with pertinent TECHINS and current instructions.(10)

5. Technical Support.

a. Conduct, as necessary and appropriate, a continuing and direct exchange of technical information (including raw traffic, certain SIGINT product reports, etc.) with all elements of the national SIGINT community [redacted] engaged in the intercept of similar or related targets, in accordance with established procedures. (11)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

b. Continuing technical support will be provided by Director, National Security Agency and on occasion by Director, Naval Security Group.

6. Research and Development (R&D).

Participate in national SIGINT R&D effort by conducting Systems Engineering, Signals Research and special research assignments as directed.

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

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OPINS No. 2855

SECTION V - LIAISON

1. Effect liaison with other U. S. SIGINT units as may be required for the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission. Raw traffic and/or technical information may be furnished or may be exchanged with such units in accordance with pertinent directives. (11)



(b)(1)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

SECTION VI - COMMUNICATIONS

1. Maintain and operate SIGINT communications facilities in order to provide timely SIGINT support to designated SIGINT consumers.
2. Conduct SIGINT communications operations in accordance with established procedures.
3. Use on-line cryptographic communications circuits when possible and appropriate using circuits prescribed in communications plans prepared by the Director, Naval Security Group.

SECTION VII - SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Conduct SIGINT operations in accordance with operational and technical directives provided. Such directives include pertinent MUSSO Documents, NSA Circulars, OPNAV Instructions, DNC Instructions, NAVSECGRU Instructions, and Standing Operating Procedures. Conflicting instructions or directives will be immediately brought to the attention of the Director, National Security Agency and/or Director, Naval Security Group.


R. E. COOK

Enclosure:

Appendix - References

Distribution:
DIRNSA (45)
CNO (Op-94G) (10)
DIRNAVSECGRULANT (2)
DIRNAVSECGRUPAC (2)
DIRNAVSECGRUEUR (2)
ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU (2)
USN 855 (2)

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OPINS No. 2855

APPENDIX to OPINS No. 2855

REFERENCES

- (1) Statement of General Operating Policy.
- (2) TECHINS No. 1001, 1002, 1003, 1005, 1024, 1042, 1043, 1056, 1302, 9021.
- (3) Statement of General Operating Policy, TECHINS No. 1007, 1012, 1013, 1014, 1015, 1018, 9021, [REDACTED]
- (4) TECHINS No. 1019, 1046, 2003.
- (5) TECHINS No. 2020.
- (6) TECHINS No. 4001, 4010, 4014, 4016, 4301, 9021, TECHDOC 400.
- (7) TECHINS No. 1302, 1350, 3002, 9021.
- (8) TECHINS No. 4002, 4003.
- (9) TECHINS No. 4019.
- (10) TECHINS No. 1042, 1043, 4001, 4003, 4015.
- (11) TECHINS No. 1043, 7001, 7005, 7006, 7009.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Note: References have been provided to ensure familiarity with documents of particular concern.

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~~~SECRET~~~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

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
THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301JSM 764 68
4 MAY 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Security Agency
Attention: P212
Commander, Military Sea Transport Service
Attention: M-35
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Attention: J382
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
Attention: JRC
Assistant for JCS Matters, OP60B1

Subject: Recommended Actions Resulting from the
Technical Research Ship Conference (U)

1. (U) A conference was held by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint Reconnaissance Center) on 28 April 1966 to discuss scheduling and operational control of Technical Research Ships.
2. (U) As a result of the discussions the conferees recommended that certain actions be taken which are summarized in the attachment.
3. (U) In the interest of improving Technical Research Ship operations, addressees are encouraged to carry out the recommendations of the conferees.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4. (S) This memorandum and attachment is classified SECRET because it associates the National Security Agency with seaborne SIGINT platforms.

Attachment
a/s

Copy to:
CNO (OP-333D)
COMSTSLANT (L-36), Mr. Kyle
COMSERVRON 8 (Cdr Jordan)
CINCLANTFLT (LCdr Olson)
NAVSECGRU HQS (Lt Bragoner)

Ralph D. Steakley

RALPH D STEAKLEY
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Director
for Reconnaissance
Operations Directorate

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ATTACHMENT

RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR PLANNING AND
APPROVAL OF TECHNICAL RESEARCH SHIP SCHEDULES

1. (S) USNS ships (VALDEZ and MULLER) operating in CINCLANT's area of responsibility:

a. The following procedures should be used in the planning and approval of routine schedules:

<u>FROM</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	<u>TO</u>
DIRNSA	States requirements	CINCLANT
CINCLANT	Passes for planning action	CINCLANTFLT
CINCLANTFLT	Passes for planning action	COMSTSLANT
COMSTSLANT	Prepares plan to fulfill requirement including dates/areas of operations, CPA's in transit and passes for approval	CINCLANTFLT
CINCLANTFLT	Requests approval	CINCLANT
CINCLANT	Requests approval	JCS/JRC
JCS/JRC	Obtains CNO concurrence and approves proposal	CINCLANT
CINCLANT	Directs action	CINCLANTFLT
CINCLANTFLT	Passes for action	COMSTSLANT
COMSTSLANT	Issues sailing orders	USNS ships

b. The following procedures should be used in making changes to approved schedules:

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

~~SECRET~~

<u>FROM</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	<u>TO</u>
DIRNSA	States requirement	JCS/JRC
JCS/JRC	Obtains CNO concurrence, approves change and requests action	CINCLANT
CINCLANT	Directs action	CINCLANTFLT
CINCLANTFLT	Passes for action	COMSTSLANT
COMSTSLANT	Issues sailing orders	USNS ships

c. The following commands should be addressees on all messages pertaining to schedules or schedule changes:

JCS/JRC

CNO

CINCLANT

COMSTS

CINCLANTFLT

COMSTSLANT

DIRNSA

DIRNAVSECGRU

ADIRNAVSECGRU

DIRNAVSECGRULANT

NOTE: The ship involved is not an addressee on these messages

d. COMSTSLANT reserves the sole right to issue movement/sailing orders to the ship.

2. (S) USS ships operating in CINCLANT's area of responsibility:

a. The following procedures should be used in the planning and approval of routine schedules:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

<u>FROM</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	<u>TO</u>
DIRNSA	States requirement	CINCLANT
COMSERVRON 8	Prepares plan to fulfill requirement including dates/areas of operations, CFA's in transit and passes for approval	COMSERVLANT
COMSERVLANT	Requests approval	CINCLANTFLT
CINCLANTFLT	Requests approval	CINCLANT
CINCLANT	Requests approval	JCS/JRC
JCS/JRC	Obtains CNO concurrence and approves proposal	CINCLANT
CINCLANT	Directs action	CINCLANTFLT
CINCLANTFLT	Passes for action	COMSERVLANT
COMSERVLANT	Passes for action	COMSERVRON 8
COMSERVRON 8	Issues sailing orders	USS ships

b. The following procedures should be used in making changes to approved schedules:

<u>FROM</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	<u>TO</u>
DIRNSA	States requirement	JCS/JRC
JCS/JRC	Obtains CNO concurrence, approves change and requests action	CINCLANT
CINCLANT	Directs action	CINCLANTFLT
CINCLANTFLT	Passes for action	COMSERVLANT
COMSERVLANT	Passes for action	COMSERVRON 8
COMSERVRON 8	Issues sailing orders	USS ships

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

c. The following commands should be addressees on all messages pertaining to schedules or schedule changes:

JCS/JRC

CNO

CINCLANT

CINCLANTFLT

COMSERVLANT

COMSERVRON 8

DIRNSA

DIRNAVSECGRU

ADIRNAVSECGRU

DIRNAVSECGRULANT

NOTE: The ship involved is not an addressee on these messages.

3. (S) The Director, National Security Agency should state requirements a minimum of 60 days prior to ship sailing.

4. (U) The Joint Reconnaissance Center, Joint Chiefs of Staff, requires that schedules be received on or before the 20th day of the month preceeding the month for which the schedule is submitted for approval.

5. (U) Ships operating in CINCPAC's area of responsibility will continue to be scheduled using procedures in effect.


~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TAB G

APPROVAL PROCEDURES FOR USS SHIPS IN ATLANTIC

J3M 764-66 DTD 4 MAY 66


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APPROVAL PROCEDURES FOR ATLANTIC

J3M 764-66 4 MAY 66

ROUTINE SCHEDULES (VALDEZ/MULLER)

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
DOCID: 3958111

~~SECRET~~

CHANGES TO APPROVED SCHEDULE

J3M 764-66

DTD 4 MAY 66




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CHANGE TO APPROVED SCHEDULE

J3M 764 - 66


DTD 4 MAY 66

~~SECRET~~


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TAB H

JCS TO CINCEUR (JCS 062050Z JUNE)




MODIFICATION OF APPROVED SCHEDULE (JCS 062050Z)


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MODIFICATION LESS THAN 48 HOURS FOR
OPERATIONAL REASONS (JCS #62050Z)



MODIFICATION MORE THAN 48 HOURS



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~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
PRIORITYINFO PRECEDENCE
ROUTINESPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

DISTRIBUTION

FM: JCS

DATE: 7 JUN 67

ACT:

K1

TO: USCINCEUR
DIRNSA

/// SUSP DATE: 09 JUN 67 ///

INFO:

G

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G7

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P02

P04

P2

ADP

DIR

ADNSG

SUSP

INFO: CNO
CINCLANT
CINCLANTFLT
CINCUSNAVEUR
COMSIXTHFLT
CTF 64
USS LIBERTYHQ NSAEUR
NSAEUR OFF GER
DIRNAVSECGRU
ADIRNAVSECORGU
DIRNAVSECGRULANT
DIRNAVSECGRUEUR~~SECRET~~

JCS 7206. J-3 SENDS.

*Action
K122*

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)

REFS: A. JCS 6724 011545Z JUN 67

B. JCS 5838/052235Z NOV 65 (NOTAL)

1. (S) REQUEST PROCEDURES OUTLINED HEREIN BE
FOLLOWED IN DEVELOPING SCHEDULES FOR LIBERTY WHILE
OPERATING IN USCINCEUR'S AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY:

A. PLANNING-APPROVAL OF ROUTINE MONTHLY SKED:

(1) DIRNSA STATE REQUIREMENTS TO CINCUSNAVEUR
INCLUDING RECOMMENDED PORT OF CALL.

(2) CINCUSNAVEUR PREPARE SKED TO FULFILL
REQUIREMENTS INCLUDING DATES/AREAS OF OPS, CPA'S, PORTS
OF CALL FOR LOGISTICS AND PASS PLAN TO USCINCEUR.

(3) USCINCEUR REVIEW AND PASS SKED TO JCS(JRC)

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B/RHG

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RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

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PAGE 1 OF 3

RS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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062050Z

RUCPNSH

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
PRIORITYINFO PRECEDENCE
ROUTINESPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

DISTRIBUTION

OR APPROVAL. PROPOSED SKEDS ARE REQUIRED BY JCS NLT
20TH OF THE MONTH PRECEEDING THE MONTH FOR WHICH THE
SKED IS SUBMITTED.

(4) JCS(JRC) OBTAIN NECESSARY COORDINATION
AND NOTIFY USCINCEUR OF APPROVAL OR MODIFICATIONS.

(5) USCICCEUR PASS FOR ACTION.

(6) CINCUSNAVEUR ISSUE SAILING ORDERS.

B. MODIFICATION OF APPROVED SKED DUE TO CHANGES
IN TECHNICAL TASKING:

(1) DIRNSA STATE REQUIREMENT TO JCS(JRC).

(2) JCS(JRC) OBTAIN NECESSARY COORDINATION
AND NOTIFY USCINCEUR OF MODIFICATION.

(3) USCINCEUR PASS FOR ACTION.

(4) CINCUSNAVEUR ISSUE SAILING ORDERS.

C. MODIFICATION OF APPROVED SKED INVOLVING A
CHANGE OF 48 HOURS OR LESS FOR OPSRATIONAL REASONS:

(1) CINCUSNAVEUR ISSUS SAILING ORDERS AND
INFORM JCS(JRC) AND USCINCEUR OF REASON FOR THE CHANGE.

D. MODIFICATION OF APPROVED SKED INVOLVING A CHANGE
OF MORE THAN 48 HOURS FOR OPERATIONAL REASONS:

(1) CINCUSNAVEUR PASS PROPOSED MODIFICATION
TO USCINCEUR.

(2) USCINCEUR REVIEW AND PASS TO JCS (JRC) FOR

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RELEASED AT (ZULU)

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PAGE

2 OF 3

PAGES

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FORM N3288 REV SEP 65
(Supersedes N3283 REV AUG 65
to be used until depleted)

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
PRIORITYINFO PRECEDENCE
ROUTINESPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

DISTRIBUTION

APPROVAL.

(3) JCS (JRC) OBTAIN NECESSARY COORDINATION AND
NOTIFY USCINCEUR OF APPROVAL.

(4) USCINCEUR PASS FOR ACTION.

(5) CINCUSNAVEUR ISSUE SAILING ORDERS.

2. (U) REF A IS THE EXISTING APPROVED SKED FOR
JUNE 1967.

3. ~~(C)~~ THE FOLLOWING SHOULD BE ADDRESSEES ON ALL
MESSAGES PERTAINING TO SKSDS OR SKED CHANGES:

JCS (JRC)

CNO

USCINCEUR

CINCUSNAVEUR

DIRNSA

DIRNAVSECGRU

HQNSAEUR

DIRNAVSECGRUEUR

NSAEUR OFF FRANKFURT GERMANY

ADIRNAVSECGRU

NOTE: USS LIBERTY IS NOT AN ADDEE ON THESE MSGS.
4. (U) REF B PROVIDES GUIDANCE ON CONTINGENCY
PLANNING FOR IRS OPS.

5. (U) FOR NSA: REQUEST YOU PROVIDE CINCUSNAVEUR
YOUR RECOMMENDED JULY SKED ASAP.

L23 NOTE: REF A IS AGJ 40571

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RELEASED AT (ZULU)

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PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

REFERENCES TO MESSAGE

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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SPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

TAB I

DATE: 06 NOV 65 INFO:

INFO: CNO
USCINCEUR
CINCSOUTH
CINCSTRIKE
CINCPACFLT
CINCLANTFLT
DIRNSA
DIRNAVSECGRU

A
A4
B
C
D31
D32
P02
P04
P2
P3
G1
ADN
ADP
DRF
ADNSG

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PAGE	1	OF	4
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1990

052235Z

LETTERS TO MESSAGE

25

AD1

DTG

EXPENSE

~~TOP SECRET~~

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

OF HIGH PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS.

(1) CLASSIFICATION OF MISSION, AND ANY ASSOCIATION WITH NSA OR THE NAVAL SECURITY GROUP (NSG):
CONFIDENTIAL.

(2) CLASSIFICATION OF DETAILS OF SPECIFIC NATURE OF MISSION: REQUIRES HANDLING THROUGH SPECIAL CHANNELS AND WILL BE CONTAINED IN THE APPLICABLE SIGINT SUPPORT PLAN.

(3) DIVERSION FROM MISSION. THE TRS IS TO BE EMPLOYED FOR SIGINT PURPOSES ONLY. EXCEPTIONS TO THIS POLICY WILL BE MADE ONLY DURING AN EMERGENCY IN WHICH THE PROVISIONS OF JCS PUB 2 (UNIFIED ACTION ARMED FORCES), PARAGRAPHS 30229 AND 30248 APPLY.

C. COVER STORY. THE MISSION OF THE TRS IS TO CONDUCT TECHNICAL RESEARCH OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF US NAVY ELECTRONIC RESEARCH PROJECTS WHICH INCLUDE ELECTRO-MAGNETIC PROPAGATION STUDIES AND ADVANCED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, SUCH AS MOON RELAY AND SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS.

D. CONTROL OF TRS.

(1) OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF SHIP. MILITARY OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THESE SHIPS WILL BE EFFECTED BY THE COGNIZANT UNIFIED OR SPECIFIED COMMANDER THROUGH THE NAVAL COMPONENT COMMANDER TO A SPECIFIC FLEET OF FORCE COMMANDER.

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GP-3

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

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PAGE 2 OF 4

VERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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ASO NR.

DTG

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~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DIST BUTION

(2) OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL CONTROL OF ALL SIGINT ACTIVITIES (COLLECTION, PROCESSING, REPORTING) ON BOARD SHIP. BY DIRECTOR, NSA (VIA DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS TO SHIP OR THROUGH THE DIRECTOR, NSG).

(3) BASIS FOR COLLECTION AREA ASSIGNMENTS:

(A) SIGNAL AUDIBILITY AND OTHER TECHNICAL FACTORS DETERMINED BY NSA TO BE NECESSARY TO MEET STATED REQUIREMENTS, AND

(B) DETERMINATION BY MILITARY OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS THAT THE OPERATION REQUIRED BY NSA IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE SAFETY OF THE SHIP.

(C) CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE MILITARY COMMANDER INVOLVED AND THE SIGINT TASKING AUTHORITY IS REQUIRED TO INSURE MAXIMUM RESPONSE TO INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AND MAXIMUM SECURITY OF THE SHIP.

E. SIGINT SUPPORT OF COMMANDERS.

(1) COMMAND CONTINGENCY AND LIMITED WAR PLANS:

(A) TRS MAY BE UTILIZED BY DIRNSA TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO THE MILITARY COMMANDER, IN ADDITION TO PRIMARY MISSIONS.

B) COMMANDER MAY LEVY IMMEDIATE SIGINT SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES TO BE ESTABLISHED.

(SEE PARA 1E(1)(C) BELOW)

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RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS,
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

PAGE 3 OF 4

VARS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

70183

ABO NR.

OVS

AGO

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DEFINITION

(C) DIRNSA, OR HIS FIELD REPRESENTATIVES WHEN
SO AUTHORIZED, WILL:

1. ESTABLISH PROCEDURES TO RECEIVE AND ACT
LOCALLY ON COMMAND REQUIREMENTS.

2. EFFECT PROMPT TASKING OF SIGINT RE-
SOURCES, INCLUDING THE TRS, WHICH MAY BE ASSIGNED TO AN
AREA TO SUPPORT A GIVEN CONTINGENCY SITUATION.

(D) CONTROL OF TRS:

1. OPERATIONALL CONTROL OF SHIP: SAME AS IN
ROUTINE OPERATIONS (SEE PARAGRAPH D(1) ABOVE).

2. OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL CONTROL OF ALL
SIGINT ACTIVITIES: SAME AS IN ROUTINE OPERATIONS (SEE PARA-
GRAPH D(2) ABOVE).

F. COMMAND OPLANS:

L (1) NSA REPRESENTATIVES ACCREDITED TO COMMANDS:
WORK WITH COMMAND PLANNERS IN DEVELOPMENT OF APPROPRIATE
WORDING FOR INCLUSION IN THE SIGINT APPENDIX TO THE INTEL-
LIGENCE ANNEX OF COMMAND OPLANS IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE NSA
DETERMINES THE TRS WILL BE EMPLOYED.

(2) NSA: INFORM USCINCSOUTH (NO NSA REPRESENTATIVE
ACCREDITED) OF INSTANCES WHERE TRS WILL BE EMPLOYED. ~~GP-3~~

L23 NOTE: DTG 012307Z AGO 09273/01

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RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (2020)

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS,

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DOCUMENT MARKING

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PAGES

4 OF 4

PERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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70183

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SUSPENSE

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR. 247

ACTION PRECEDENCE
ROUTINEINFO PRECEDENCE
ROUTINESPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

TAB J G

FROM: DIRNSA

DATE: 26 MAY 1965

TO: JCS

INFO: CNO
SSO DIA
DIRNSGADIRNSG (COURIER)
HQ NSAPAC
NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (S)~~TOP SECRET~~

DIR/87

SUBJ: TRS OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN WATERS

A. DIRNSA DIR 43-65 DTG 031440Z APR

B. CNO DTG 052308Z APR (NOTAL)

C. CNO DTG 011524Z APR (NOTAL)

D. DIRNAVSECGRU DTG 142300 (NOTAL)

1. REF A CONCURRED IN THE PROPOSAL TO DIVERT ONE TRS TO SOUTHEAST

A.

2. REF B DESIGNATED THE USS OXFORD FOR SUBJ DEPLOYMENT.

3. SINCE THE OXFORD WHICH WILL ARRIVE IN SUBIC BAY O/A 3 JUNE IS
THE FIRST TRS TO OPERATE IN THE CINCPAC AREA, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT
THE JCS CONSIDER ISSUING GENERAL GUIDANCE TO INFORM APPROPRIATE
COMMANDERS OF THE PURPOSE, NATURE AND CONCEPT OF TRS OPERATIONS.4. DIRNSA RECOMMENDS THIS GUIDANCE INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: A. THE
USS OXFORD (AGTR-1) IS ONE OF SEVERAL TECH RESEARCH SHIPS (TRS)WHICH ARE ~~RESEARCHED~~ ^{TASKED} BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY TO COLLECT
COMMUNICATIONS AND
ELECTRONIC SIGNALS FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES. THE TRS ARE UNARMED,DRAFTER *L. R. Schulz*
RADM L. R. SCHULZ, USN/ADN*Louis W. Torrella*
LOUIS W. TORRELLA, A/DIRECTOR

DOCUMENT MARKING

GROUP-1

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULES TO MESSAGE

AGO

AGI

DTG 142300

SUSPENSE

TOP SECRETDISTRIBUTION
DIR
DRF
D3RF
D31
ADN
ADP
PO4
~~B2-B~~
B26
P2
D32
ADIRNSG
DIDIRRAT
RAT

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

2

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

AGI NR.

AGO NR.

DTG

0524767
2720292

NSA FORM 2288 REV AUG 63
(Supersedes N2288 REV JUN 61
to be used until replaced)~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

FROM:

DATE:

TO:
MODIFIED MERCHANT SHIPS ESPECIALLY CONFIGURED FOR THEIR ELECTRONIC MISSION.

B. THE OXFORD IS THE FIRST TRS TO OPERATE IN THE PACIFIC. IT IS BEING REDEPLOYED TO SOUTHEAST ASIA WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD, TO SATISFY CERTAIN HIGH PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON CONTINUING VALIDATED REQUIREMENTS OF THEATER MILITARY COMMANDERS. AN ADDITIONAL TRS WILL BE REDEPLOYED TO THE PACIFIC AT A LATER DATE FOR THE SAME PURPOSE.

C. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE OXFORD WILL BE EXERCISED THROUGH NORMAL COMMAND CHANNELS EXCEPT AS INDICATED HEREINAFTER. OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL CONTROL OF THE SIGINT ACTIVITIES ON BOARD THE OXFORD IS EXERCISED BY THE DIRECTOR, NSA. COMSEVENTHFLT WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT IN THE PACIFIC AREA; DEPLOYMENT WILL BE BASED ON SIGNAL COLLECTION TASKS (WITH DUE CONSIDERATION FOR THE PHYSICAL SAFETY OF THE SHIP) WHICH WILL BE ASSIGNED BY DIRNSA THROUGH THE NAVAL SECURITY GROUP TO THE NSG COMPONENT ABOARD THE SHIP. AT THE SAME TIME, NSA WILL INFORM ITS SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE IN SAIGON (NSAPAC REP VIETNAM(S)) OF THE DESIRED TASKING. NSAPAC REP VIETNAM WILL THEN RECOMMEND THAT COMUSMACV INITIATE A REQUEST TO COMSEVENTHFLT FOR NECESSARY MOVEMENT ORDERS.

D. THE OPERATIONS AREA BLOCK SYSTEM ESTABLISHED BY CNO WILL BE EMPLOYED IN OXFORD SIGINT OPERATIONS. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE OXFORD WILL BE ASSIGNED TO A

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

Z

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

AGI NR.

ADO NR.

DTG

HERE TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGO

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

FROM:

DATE:

TO:

SPECIFIC BLOCK FOR A SPECIFIC TIME, SUCH ASSIGNMENT TO BE BASED UPON:

(A) SIGNAL AUDIBILITY AND OTHER TECHNICAL FACTORS DETERMINED BY NSA TO BE NECESSARY TO MEET STATED REQUIREMENTS, AND (B) DETERMINATION BY COMUSMACV, OR OTHER PACIFIC THEATER MILITARY COMMAND WHEN APPROPRIATE, THAT THE OPERATION REQUIRED BY NSA TASKING IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE SAFETY OF THE SHIP. EXTREMELY CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE U. S. MILITARY AUTHORITIES INVOLVED AND THE SIGINT TASKING AUTHORITY WILL BE NECESSARY TO INSURE MAXIMUM RESPONSE TO INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AND MAXIMUM SECURITY OF THE SHIP. ANY DIVERSION OF THE TRS WHICH DETRACTS FROM ITS SIGINT MISSION RISKS LOSS OF SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE;

FORE, THE OXFORD IS TO BE DEPLOYED FOR SIGINT PURPOSES ONLY.

E. THE FACT THAT THE OXFORD HAS AN INTELLIGENCE MISSION IS CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL AND SHOULD BE MADE KNOWN TO THE MOST LIMITED NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS CONSISTENT WITH OPERATIONAL NECESSITY. ANY ASSOCIATION OF THE OXFORD WITH NSA OR NSG IS CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL. DETAILS OF THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION ARE CLASSIFIED AS HIGH AS TOP SECRET AND REQUIRE HANDLING THROUGH SPECIAL CHANNELS. THE FOLLOWING UNCLASSIFIED MISSION STATEMENT, WHICH IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE ELECTRONIC CONFIGURATION OF THE SHIP, MAY BE USED BY APPROPRIATE COMMANDERS

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (2000)

2

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

AGI NR.

AGO NR.

DYS

AGI TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGO

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~TOP SECRET~~

NSA FORM 1212 REV AUG 64
(Supersedes 1212 REV AUG 63
to be used until depleted)~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

FROM:

DATE:

TO:

COMMANDING OFFICERS, AND OTHER U.S. OFFICIALS AS NECESSARY, TO SATISFY VALID INTERESTS OF PORT AUTHORITIES, LOCAL PRESS, LOCAL NATIONALS, ETC: QUOTE THE MISSION OF THE USS OXFORD IS TO CONDUCT TECHNICAL RESEARCH OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF U.S. NAVY ELECTRONIC RESEARCH PROJECTS WHICH INCLUDE ELECTRO-MAGNETIC PROPAGATION STUDIES AND ADVANCED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS SUCH AS COMMUNICATIONS MOON RELAY AND SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS. UNQUOTE.

P. ANY ADDITIONAL COMMAND REQUIREMENTS FOR SIGINT SUPPORT WHICH THE PRESENCE OF THE OXFORD IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN WATERS MIGHT SUGGEST SHOULD NOT BE LEVIED DIRECTLY ON THE OXFORD, BUT SHOULD BE SUBMITTED

EXISTING PROCEDURES TO JCS/DIA FOR VALIDATION AND PRESENTATION

TO NSA. HOWEVER, NSAPAC REP VIETNAM IS AUTHORIZED TO RECEIVE AND

ACT ON IMMEDIATE SIGINT SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS OF MACV/AND EFFECT

APPROPRIATE TASKING OF APPROPRIATE SIGINT RESOURCES, INCLUDING THE

TRS. IF REDEPLOYMENT IS DETERMINED TO BE REQUIRED, NSAPAC REP

VIETNAM WILL REQUEST MACV TO INFORM CONSEQUENTLY. ~~CP-1~~

CONCUR: D32

P04

P2

R2

Mr. Titus

Mr. Zaslow

SHOWN TO: ADMSG, CDR Addison

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

Z

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE

PAGES

4

OF

5

ATTN TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

AGC

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

ASD NR.

DTG

~~TOP SECRET~~

247/27

NSA FORM 100-10000 FEB AUG 64
(Supersedes N226 REV AUG 63
to be used until depleted)

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

FROM:

DATE:

TO:

M/R: This msg is based on proposals in Para 2c of DIRNAVSECGRU Ref D and is designed to have JCS issue general guidance to Pac commands concerning the operations of TRS in that area. This msg prepared jointly by D32 [] and D31 in response to ADM Memo 65-36 dtd 18 May 65 which requested "take action to have ground rules for TRS operations in a SIGINT Support to Military Operations role incorporated in appropriate Command Operations Plans and NSA and Naval Security Group SIGINT Support Plans."

Robert Schramm

Mr. Robert Schramm/Ch D312/3076/26 May/as

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

DRAFTER		RELEASING OFFICER		RELEASED BY (2010)	
DOCUMENT MARKING				PAGE 5 OF 5	
REMARKS TO MESSAGE		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		AGI NR.	
AGG				AGG NR. 24767	
AGI				DYS	
DTG					
USPENSE		TOP SECRET			

(Supersedes M2288 REV AUG 63
to be used until depleted)~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NR.

D31

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

PRIORITY

PRIORITY

NONE

TAB R

FROM

DIRNSA

DATE: 3 JUNE 65

TO:

JCS

INFO:

CNO

SSO DIA

ADIRNSG (COURIER)

DIENSG

HQ NSAPAC

NSAPAC RFP VIETNAM (b)

DIR

D/DIR

AEN

AIP

DEF

D31

D32

FO4

B

B28

ADIRNSG

NSALO/Pentagon

P2

~~TOP SECRET~~

DIR/ 90

SUBJ: TES OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN WATERS

REF: MY DIR 87 272029Z

REQUEST SECOND SENTENCE PARA 4 FOXROT OF REF BE CHANGED TO READ AS

FOLLOWS QUOTE HOWEVER, NSAPAC RFP VIETNAM IS AUTHORIZED TO RECEIVE

AND ACT ON IMMEDIATE SIGINT SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS OF MACV AND COMMANDS

SUPPORTING SOUTHEAST ASIAN OPERATIONS AND EFFECT APPROPRIATE TASKING

OF APPROPRIATE SIGINT RESOURCES, INCLUDING THE TES UNQUOTE. GROUP-1

CONCUR:

D32

P4, Mr. Titus

P2,

B,

D31

Mr. Zaslav

SHOWN TO: ADIRNSG, CDR Addison

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

M/R: The change proposed is designed to provide for emergency servicing of SIGINT requirements of commanders who are supporting SE Asian operations but who are not subordinate to COMUSMACV. This message has also been discussed with Mr. Connell, NSA RFP at JRC who advises JCS JRC now has action of DIR 87 and is waiting for NSA reply to CINCPACFLT msg to NSA 023316Z before acting on DIR 87. The CINCPACFLT message requested Para 4F of Ref be modified to give COMSEVENTHFLT authority similar to MACV for emergency requirements.

DRAFTER

RELEASED BY

RELEASED BY (EULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

DATE

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PAGES

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AS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

JO 05247/27

AGI

TO 272029Z May

PENSE

AGI NR.

06129/04

DYS

041803.7

~~TOP SECRET~~

ATTENTION

and has access to its contents. Such access must be limited to those individuals having a "need to know" and appropriate Security clearance.

WARNING

amended, its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NSA FORM 3230 REV AUG 64
(Supersedes N2288 REV AUG 63
to be used until depleted)~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR.

File TRS

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PREC NCR
PRIORITYSPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

1 COPY EACH

H

FROM: JCS WASH DC

DATE: 09 JUNE 1965 INFO

TO: CINCPAC

INFO: CNO
CINCPACFLT
COMUSMACV
COMSEVENTHFLT ✓
DIRNSA
SSO DIA
DIRNAVSECGRU ✓
HQ NSA PAC ✓
NSAPACREP VIETNAM (8) ✓

DISTRIBUTION

DIR
ADP
ADN
DRF
D3
D32
D33
P04
P05
P3
A
B
P2

D31

~~TOP SECRET~~

CITE JCS 2085-65

SUBJECT: TRS OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (S)

REFERENCE: A. DIRNSA DIR/87 DTG 272029 MAY 65 (NOTAL)

IN CONSONANCE WITH REFERENCE MSG THE FOLLOWING
GUIDANCE IS PROMULGATED FOR TRS OPERATION IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA:A. THE USS OXFORD (AGTR-1) IS ONE OF SEVERAL
TECHNICAL RESEARCH SHIPS (TRS) WHICH ARE TASKED BY THE
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY TO COLLECT COMMUNICATION AND
ELECTRONIC SIGNALS FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES. THE
OXFORD IS AN UNARMED, MODIFIED MERCHANT SHIP ESPECIALLY
CONFIGURED FOR ELECTRONIC COLLECTION MISSIONS.B. THE OXFORD WAS DEPLOYED TO SOUTHEAST ASIA TO
SATISFY CERTAIN HIGH PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

ED/SLS

DOCUMENT MARKING

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PAGE

PAGES

REMOVED W/O GP CODE PROTECT AS GP 1 DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

RETURN TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION

AGO

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

75

~~TOP SECRET~~

DTG

071404Z

NSA FORM N2286 REV AUG 64
(Supersedes N2286 REV AUG 63
to be used until depleted)~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

REQUIREMENTS, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON SUPPLEMENTAL COLLECTION IN SUPPORT OF THEATER COMMANDERS' VALID REQUIREMENTS. IT IS PLANNED TO DEPLOY AN ADDITIONAL TRS TO THE PACIFIC AT A LATER DATE.

C. TECHNICAL CONTROL AND SIGNAL TASKING OF SIGINT COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ABOARD THE OXFORD WILL BE AS DIRECTED BY DIRNSA THROUGH DIRNAVSECGRU TO THE NAVSECGRU SHIP COMPONENT.

D. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE SHIP SHALL BE THROUGH NORMAL COMMAND CHANNELS. TO ASSURE A CAPABILITY FOR QUICK RESPONSE TO COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS INVOLVING CHANGES IN AREA OF OPERATION, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT ~~TO~~ NSAPACREP VIETNAM ~~(S)~~ ADVISE COMUSMACV OF REQUIREMENTS AND NECESSARY SHIP RELOCATIONS FOR FORWARDING TO YOUR DESIGNATED COMPONENT COMMANDER. NSAPAC REP VIETNAM HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO RECEIVE AND ACT ON IMMEDIATE SIGINT SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS OF USMACV AND COMMANDS SUPPORTING SEA OPERATIONS IN ORDER TO EFFECT APPROPRIATE TASKING OF SIGINT RESOURCES, INCLUDING THE TRS.

E. ANY ADDITIONAL COMMAND REQUIREMENTS FOR SIGINT SUPPORT WHICH THE PRESENCE OF THE OXFORD IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WATERS MIGHT SUGGEST, SHOULD NOT BE LEVIED DIRECTLY

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (2020)

2

DOCUMENT MARKING

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DECLASSIFICATION~~

PAGE

PAGES

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OF

4

AGI NR.

35943

AGO NR.

DTG

071404Z

AGO

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

ON THE OXFORD, BUT SHOULD BE SUBMITTED IAW EXISTING PROCEDURES TO JCS/DIA FOR VALIDATION AND PRESENTATION TO NSA.

F. COLLECTION AREA ASSIGNMENTS WILL BE BASED UPON:

(1) SIGNAL AUDIBILITY AND OTHER TECHNICAL FACTORS DETERMINED BY NSA TO BE NECESSARY TO MEET STATED REQUIREMENTS, AND

(2) DETERMINATION BY THEATER AND OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS, WHEN APPROPRIATE, THAT THE OPERATION REQUIRED BY NSA TASKING IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE SAFETY OF THE SHIP. CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER AND THE SIGINT TASKING AUTHORITY WILL BE NECESSARY TO INSURE MAXIMUM RESPONSE TO INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AND MAXIMUM SECURITY OF THE SHIP. ANY DIVERSION OF THE TRS WHICH DETRACTS FROM ITS SIGINT MISSION RISKS LOSS OF SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE; THEREFORE, THE OXFORD IS TO BE EMPLOYED FOR SIGINT PURPOSES ONLY.

G. THE FACT THAT THE OXFORD HAS AN INTELLIGENCE MISSION IS CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL AND SHOULD BE MADE KNOWN TO THE MOST LIMITED NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS CONSISTENT WITH OPERATIONAL NECESSITY. ANY DETAILS OF THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF THE INTELLIGENCE MISSIONS

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

2

DOCUMENT MARKING

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND

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GP-1 DECLASSIFICATION

3 OF 4

3 TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

35343

AGO NR.

AGO

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DTG

SUSPENSE

~~TOP SECRET~~

DTG

071404Z

NSA FORM N2288 REV AUG 64
(Supersedes N2288 REV AUG 63
to be used until depleted)~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

ARE CLASSIFIED AS HIGH AS TOP SECRET AND REQUIRE HANDLING THROUGH SPECIAL CHANNELS. THE FOLLOWING UNCLASSIFIED MISSION STATEMENT, WHICH IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE ELECTRONIC CONFIGURATION OF THE SHIP, MAY BE USED BY APPROPRIATE COMMANDERS, COMMANDING OFFICERS, AND OTHER US OFFICIALS AS NECESSARY, TO SATISFY VALID INTERESTS OF PORT AUTHORITIES, LOCAL PRESS, LOCAL NATIONALS, ETC.: QUOTE. THE MISSION OF THE USS OXFORD IS TO CONDUCT TECHNICAL RESEARCH OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF US NAVY ELECTRONIC RESEARCH PROJECTS WHICH INCLUDE ELECTRO-MAGNETIC PROPAGATION STUDIES AND ADVANCED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS SUCH AS COMMUNICATIONS, MOON RAY AND SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS. UNQUOTE.

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

3

DOCUMENT MARKING

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PAGE

PAGES

4 of 4

CLASS TO MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

35343

AGG NR.

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OTG

SUSPENSE

~~TOP SECRET~~

SYS

0714047

~~TOP SECRET~~TAB M
D3

FROM DIRNSA

DATE: 17 JUNE 65

TO: JCS

~~TOP SECRET~~

DIR/93

SUBJ: TRS OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN WATERS

A. NY DIR 87-65 DTC 272029Z MAY

B. JCS 2035-65 DTC 071444Z JUNE

1. REF PARAGRAPH 1C REFERENCE B. AS STATED IN REFERENCE A OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL CONTROL OF ALL THE SIGINT ACTIVITIES ON BOARD OFFORD IS EXERCISED BY DIRNSA. THESE ACTIVITIES INCLUDE PROCESSING AND REPORTING AS WELL AS COLLECTION. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR REAPACREP-VIETNAM TO ACT ON IMMEDIATE LOCAL AREA REQUIREMENTS IS OF COURSE A NECESSARY FEATURE AND IS PROVIDED FOR IN PARA 1D OF REF B.

2. PURPOSE OF FOREGOING IS TO ACHIEVE GREATER CLARITY OF UNDERSTANDING AT WASHINGTON LEVEL IN EVENT ANY QUESTION ARISES AS OPERATIONS PROCEED. ALSO AS A RELATED MATTER IT APPEARS THAT SOME SIMILAR HOUSE RULES FOR TRS PARTICIPATION IN CONTINGENCIES SUCH AS COMBAT OPS NEED TO BE INCORPORATED IN CONTINGENCY AND CONCOMITANT SIGINT SUPPORT PLANNING. THIS WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE

USA PROPOSAL IN THE NEAR FUTURE. OF-

D31

EX-101 EX-101 EX-101

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (SULU)

EX-101 EX-101 EX-101

LT GEN MARSHALL B. CARTER, USA/DIR

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APPROVED TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

05247/27

05247/27 MAY

EX-101 EX-101 EX-101

~~TOP SECRET~~

DTN
D/DIR
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D31
ADN (2)
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D32
ADIRNSG

24

2430

PAGE 1 OF 1

AGI NR.

AGC NR.

06294/17

DTC

1721222

NSA FORM 2288 REV AUG 64
(When used with 2288 REV AUG 63
to be used until deleted)

TOP SECRET

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE
ROUTINEINFO PRECEDENCE
ROUTINESPECIAL HANDLING
NONE**TAB N**

FROM: DIRNSA

DATE: 31 AUGUST 1965

TO: JCS

INFO: CNO
SSO DIA
DIRNSG
ADIRNSG (COURIER)
HQ NSAMR
HQ NSAPAC
NSA REPLANT
NSA REPS/RIKE

~~TOP SECRET~~

DIR/ 115

SUBJECT: TRS OPERATIONS

REF: (A) JCS 2085-65 071404Z JUN (NOTAL)

(B) DIR 93 172122Z JUN (NOTAL)

1. REF A PROMULGATED GUIDANCE FOR TRS OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. REF B STATED QUOTE IT APPEARS THAT SOME SIMILAR GROUND RULES FOR TRS PARTICIPATION IN CONTINGENCIES SUCH AS NEED BE INCORPORATED IN CONTINGENCY PLANS AND CONCOMITANT SIGINT SUPPORT PLANNING UNQUOTE.
2. IN FURTHERANCE OF REF B, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT JCS CONSIDER ISSUING GENERAL GUIDANCE TO INFORM THE OTHER UNIFIED COMMANDERS OF THE PURPOSE, NATURE AND CONCEPT OF TRS OPERATIONS.
3. DIRNSA RECOMMENDS THIS GUIDANCE INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

A. AVAILABLE SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES INCLUDE TECHNICAL RESEARCH SHIPS (TRS) WHICH ARE TASKED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY TO COLLECT

DRAFTER *L. R. Schulz*
RADM L. R. SCHULZ, USN / ADM

RELEASED BY *LT GEN MARSHALL S. CARTER*
LT GEN MARSHALL S. CARTER, USA / DIR

RELEASED BY (SOLD)

DOCUMENT MARKING GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

PAGE 1 OF 4

REFS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

071404Z Jun

AGI 172122Z Jun

DTG

USPENSE

AGI NR.

AGC NR.

09273/01

DTG

012307Z

TOP SECRET

DISTRIBUTION
DIR
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ADIRNSG
NSALO PENTAGON

(b)(1)

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

NSA FORM 12886 REV AUG 64
(Supersedes N2286 REV AUG 63
to be used until depleted)**TOP SECRET**
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

ROUTINE

ROUTINE

NONE

FROM

DATE

DISTRIBUTION

TO:
COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONIC SIGNALS FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES.

THEY ARE UNARMED, SPECIALLY-MODIFIED FORMER MERCHANT SHIPS CONFIGURED
TO CARRY OUT THEIR ELECTRONIC MISSION.

B. UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, DIRNSA MAY UTILIZE THESE SHIPS IN
PROVIDING SIGINT IN SUPPORT OF COMMAND CONTINGENCY AND LIMITED WAR
PLANS IN ADDITION TO CONTINUING TO SATISFY HIGH PRIORITY NATIONAL IN-
TELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS. IN THESE INSTANCES, OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF
THESE SHIPS WILL CONTINUE TO BE THROUGH NORMAL COMMAND CHANNELS, ^{and} OP-
ERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL CONTROL OF ^{THE} ~~THE~~ SIGINT ~~REQUIREMENTS~~ ACTIVITIES
(COLLECTION, PROCESSING, REPORTING) ON BOARD ~~REQUIREMENTS~~
SHALL BE EXERCISED BY THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (VIA
DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS TO THE SHIP OR THROUGH THE DIRECTOR NAVAL
SECURITY GROUP).

C. THE DIRECTOR NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, OR HIS FIELD REPRESENTATIVE(S) WHEN SO AUTHORIZED, WILL ESTABLISH PROCEDURES TO RECEIVE
^{LOCALLY} AND ACT ON IMMEDIATE SIGINT SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMMAND IN
ORDER TO EFFECT ^{PROMPT} ~~REQUIREMENTS~~ TASKING OF SIGINT RESOURCES, INCLUDING
THE TECHNICAL RESEARCH SHIPS, WHICH MAY BE ASSIGNED TO AN AREA TO
SUPPORT A GIVEN CONTINGENCY SITUATION. ANY NON-CONTINGENCY COMMAND
REQUIREMENTS FOR SIGINT WHICH THE PRESENCE OF TECHNICAL RESEARCH SHIPS
MIGHT SUGGEST SHOULD NOT BE LEVIED DIRECTLY, BUT SHOULD BE SUBMITTED

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

3

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE

2 OF

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4

REPORT TO HEADQUARTERS

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGE NR.

C-00

AS1

DTG

SUSPENSE

AGE NR.

277/01

DTG

TOP SECRET

NSA FORM 12886 REV AUG 64
(Supersedes N2288 REV AUG 63
to be used until depleted)

TOP SECRET
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

INFO PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

SPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

FROM:

DATE:

DISTRIBUTION

TO:
IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING PROCEDURES TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF/
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR VALIDATION AND PRESENTATION TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.

D. COLLECTION AREA ASSIGNMENTS WILL BE BASED UPON:

(1) SIGNAL AUDIBILITY AND OTHER TECHNICAL FACTORS DETERMINED
BY NSA TO BE NECESSARY TO MEET STATED REQUIREMENTS, AND

(2) DETERMINATION BY ~~RESEARCH~~ OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS, WHEN
APPROPRIATE, THAT THE OPERATION REQUIRED BY NSA TASKING IS COMPATIBLE
WITH THE SAFETY OF THE SHIP. CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE OPERA-
TIONAL COMMANDER INVOLVED AND THE SIGINT TASKING AUTHORITY WILL BE
NECESSARY TO INSURE MAXIMUM RESPONSE TO INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AND
MAXIMUM SECURITY OF THE SHIP. ANY DIVERSION OF THE TRS WHICH DETRACTS
FROM ITS SIGINT MISSION RISKS LOSS OF SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE; THERE-
FORE THE TRS IS TO BE EMPLOYED FOR SIGINT PURPOSES ONLY. EXCEPTIONS
TO THIS POLICY WILL BE MADE ONLY WITH PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE JCS.

E. THE FACT THAT TECHNICAL RESEARCH SHIPS HAVE AN INTELLIGENCE
MISSION IS CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL, AS IS ANY ASSOCIATION WITH THE
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY OR THE NAVAL SECURITY GROUP.

F. THE NSA REPRESENTATIVES ACCREDITED TO COMMANDS WILL WORK WITH
COMMAND PLANNERS IN DEVELOPING APPROPRIATE WORDING FOR INCLUSION IN
THE SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE APPENDIX TO THE INTELLIGENCE ANNEX OF COMMAND

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED BY (SOLU)

2

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ASG NR.

GO

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

ASG NR.

DTG

TOP SECRET

277/01

NSA FORM 12100 REV AUG 64
(Supersedes 72288 REV AUG 63
to be used until depleted)

TOP SECRET
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

ROUTINE

ROUTINE

NONE

FROM

DATE:

DISTRIBUTION

TO:

OPLANS IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE NSA DETERMINES IT WILL EMPLOY TRS (S).

NSA WILL PROVIDE THIS INFO DIRECTLY TO USGINGSOUTH ~~AND~~ SINCE THERE IS ~~not~~NO NSA REPRESENTATIVE AT THAT COMMAND. ~~GP-1~~

M/R: This message prepared by D31 in response to ADM Memo 65-36 dtd 18 May 65 which directed "take action to have ground rules for TRS operations in a SIGINT support to Military Operations Role incorporated in appropriate Command Operations Plans and NSA and Naval Security Group SIGINT Support Plans." This msg required to have JCS promulgate guidance to the other unified commands (CINCEUR, CINCSOUTH, CINCLANT, CINCPAC). Upon issuance by the JCS of a message similar to reference (a), D31 will initiate action with NSA planning representatives in these areas to amend the non-codeword format for the SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE appendix to the Intelligence Annex to the Command OPLANS and the amending of the SSPs in which the TRSs are cited as means of providing support to the command. Negotiations with CINCPAC (thru NSAPAC) based on ref (a) are being handled via separate message.

CONCUR: P2, E. Speck

SHOWN TO:

P2, Mr. [redacted]

ADIRNSG, CER Adkisson

B, [redacted]

G1, [redacted]

A, Col Keller

(b) (3) - P. L. 86-36

P4, [redacted]

D31, [redacted]

D32, [redacted]

ADP, Mr. Mitchell

[redacted]

for R. F. Schramm/D312/3076s/30 Aug 65/bir

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (2020)

Z

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE

PAGE

4

OF

4

REMARKS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ASG NR.

ASG NR.

273/01

BY

SUSPENSE

TOP SECRET

Supersedes HQ 228 SEP 65
to be used until depleted)

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

IMMEDIATE

INFO PRECEDENCE

PRIORITY

SPECIAL HANDLING

NONE

DISTRIBUTION

DIRNSA

23 MAY 1967

TO: JCS/JRC

INFO: CNO
CINCLANT
CINCLANTFLT
COMSERVLANT
COMSERVRON EIGHT

DIRNAVSECGRU
DIRNAVSECGRULANT
NSA REP LANT
ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU (COURIER)
DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
HQ NSAEUR

K
K1
K12
G
G04
G6
G7
ADP
ADN
P02
P04
DIR
ADNSG

~~SECRET~~

ADP/224-67

SUBJ: DIVERSION OF USS LIBERTY

DUE TO PRESENT MIDDLE EAST CRISIS REQUEST USS LIBERTY BE DIRECTED
TO DEPART ABIDJAN IMMEDIATELY AND PROCEED AT BEST POSS SCA TO ROTA
SPAIN TO PICK UP TECH SUPPORT MATERIAL/PERSONNEL, THENCE PROCEED TO
OP AREA OFF PORT SAID. TASKING AND SPECIFIC AREAS WILL BE FWD ASAP

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

CONCUR: G *HR RAVEN*
P04

SHOWN TO: ADNSG *[Signature]*

M/R: THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAS RESULTED IN NSA
DECLARING A SIGINT READINESS BRAVO. IN ORDER TO AUGMENT COVERAGE
IN THE AREA, THE DIVERSION OF THE USS LIBERTY (USN-855) IS CON-
SIDERED A NECESSARY COURSE OF ACTION IN VIEW OF THE LIBERTY'S EX-
CELLENT COLLECTION, PROCESSING AND REPORTING CAPABILITIES AND HER
ABILITY TO REMAIN ON STATION FOR EXTENDED PERIODS. USNS VALDEZ
WILL BE DIRECTED TO LEAVE ALL AVAILABLE ME TECH SUPPORT AT ROTA,
SPAIN WHEN SHE MAKES A SCHEDULED CALL O/A 24/25 MAY.

THE DIVERSION OF THE LIBERTY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
 COVERAGE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE PRESENTLY SCHEDULED
CRUISE DUE TO TERMINATE 25 AUG 67. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THE POTEN-
TIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE ME, THIS MUST BE CONSIDERED AN ACCEPTABLE LOSS.

(b) (1)
(b) (3) - 50 USC 403
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36
(b) (3) - 18 USC 798

K1 *[Signature]*K12 *[Signature]*

RELEASED BY *[Signature]*
OLIVER R. KIRBY/ADP/33336

RELEASED AT (JULY)

PAGE

PAGES

1 of 1

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

AGO NR.

DTG

AGI
DTG

~~SECRET~~

05/13/79

23/72/2

FORM N2288 REV SEP 65
(Supersedes N2288 REV AUG 65
and until updated)~~SECRET SAVIN~~

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

FROM: DIRNSA

29 MAY 67

TO: USN-855

INFO: DIRNAVSECGRU
DIRNAVSECGRULANT
DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
HQ NSAEURNSA OFF GER
NSA REP LANT
ADNSG (COURIER)

DISTRIBUTION

K
K1
K12
G
G5
G6
G604
G7
ADNSG
K2~~SECRET SAVIN~~

K12/585

COMINT CONMSG NR 28

INTERIM TASKING FOR USN-855

I. GENERAL GUIDANCE: THE FOLLOWING CONSTITUTES TASKING FOR USN-855 UPON DEPARTURE ROTA, SPAIN, ON OR ABOUT 01 JUNE 1967. FOR PURPOSES OF THIS DEPLOYMENT, ALL PREVIOUS TASKING ASSIGNMENTS ARE SUSPENDED. THIS ASSIGNMENT IS AN INTERIM TASK AND WILL BE SUPPLEMENTED WHEN PLATFORM IS WITHIN HEARABILITY RANGE OF UAR TARGETS. DESIRE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THIS IS INTERIM TASKING ONLY AND IS NOT TO DELAY OR DIVERT THE PLATFORM FROM ARRIVING ON STATION IN EASTERN MED. DUE TO SOA OF PLATFORM NO ATTEMPT IS MADE TO REGULATE EMPHASIS OF TARGET COUNTRIES, HOWEVER, THE DELEGATED TASKS ARE LISTED IN GEOGRAPHICAL SEQUENCE AND EMPHASIS SHOULD BE BLENDED FROM ONE AREA TO ANOTHER AS HEARABILITY DICTATES.

II. RECAP OF ~~2288~~ TASKS TASKED DURING THIS CRUISE:

6.03 MM

16 AM

5.00 RT

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

RELEASING OFFICER

RICHARD HARVEY/CH K12/3491

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

PAGE

OF 5

MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AQI NR

LGO

AGI

DTG

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

AGD NR

DTG

2 22 2012

TAB P

FORM N228A REV SEP 85
Supersedes N228A REV AUG 81
Use until updated

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

2.00 RP

III. USN-855 [REDACTED]

ALLOCATED POSITIONS: 6.00 MM

-16 AM

5.00 RT

2.00 RP

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

DELEGATED TASKS: SCH [REDACTED]

A. MOROCCAN [REDACTED]

(1) HF: [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(2) VHF: [REDACTED]

(3) UHF (WITHIN STATION CAPABILITY) [REDACTED]

UHF ACTY EMANATING FROM MOROCCO. [REDACTED]

B. ALGERIAN [REDACTED]

(1) HF: [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE

PAGE

2 OF 5

REF MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGF NR.

AGO

AGI

DTG

AGO NR.

DTG

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

FORM NA208 REV SEP 63
Supersedes NA208 REV AUG 63
(to used until replaced)~~SECRET SAVIN~~

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO. PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(3) F:

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE 3 OF 5

REFERENCE MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

AGO

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

AGO NR. 319/27

DTG

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

CTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

2 SUB FOR MULTI-CHANNEL ACTY

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



(A) SHIP'S POSITION

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (2000)

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

VED TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR

AGO NR

DTC

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

319/29

~~SECRET SAVIN~~FORM 12285 REV SEP 85
(Supersedes 12285 NOV 80, AUG 82
and 12285 JAN 84)

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

REYALUTION

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

REQUEST ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT ELECTRICALLY OF THIS MESSAGE AND INDICATE CAPABILITY OF EQUIPMENT RESOURCES TO PERFORM MISSION.

CONCUR: G694 [REDACTED] SHOWN TO ADMSG: CTCS SCHAEFER

M/R: ROUTINE TASKING FOR NSM-855 TRANSIT FROM POTA TO PORT SAID OP AREA. SUBMITTED BY G694 [REDACTED]

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE PAGE

5 CF 5

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

AGC

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

AGC NR.

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

DTG

FORM N2288 REV. SEP-65
(Supersedes N2288 REV. AUG-65
to be used until depleted)

~~SECRET SAVIN~~
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY

INFO PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

SPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

FROM: DIRNSA

2 JUNE 67

DISTRIBUTION

TO: USN-855

INFO: DIRNAVSECGRU
DIRNAVSECGRULANT
DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU (COURIER)
NSAEUR OFF GER

HQ NSAEUR

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

K12/ 606

COMINT CONMSG NR 22

THE FOLL CONSTITUTES COLL GUIDANCE FOR USN-855 DURING OPERATIONS
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

1. ESTAB USN-855 COLL GRP NR 1

A. ALLOCATED POSITS

RT (HF/VHF)

6.08 MM

.16 AM

2.00 HP

C. RMKS: AUTH GRANTED TO UTILIZE POSITS IN MOST PRODUCTIVE
MANNER.

K:

K1

K12

K133

K131

K41

K24

K242

G

G04

G604

G4

G44

G7

G61

G62

G604

G63

ADNSG

T11

P04

D31

(b)(1)

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)

(b)(3)-18 USC 798

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

DRAFTER
JULIE ALGER/K122/5385

RELEASING OFFICER
RICHARD HARVEY/CH K12/3891

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGO

AOI

DTG

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

PAGE

2

AGI NR.

ASG NR.

06447

OTC

022333

TAB P

98-5

FORM 8120 REV 65
(Supersedes 73254 REV AUG 61
No to be used until depleted)~~SECRET SAVIN~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (DATE)

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE

2

OF

PAGE

REF TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

AGO NR.

DTG

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

FORM N2285 REV SEP 85
(Supersedes N2284 REV AUG 85
(through 1990 until replaced))~~SECRET SAVIN~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE
3 OF

RE: MESSAGE

- SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

AGO

AGC NR.

AGI

DTG

DTG

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

FORM N178A REV SEP 65
Supersedes N2288 REV AUG 65
(Use until depleted)~~SECRET SAVIN~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE 4 OF 5

REFER TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

AGO

AGO NR.

AGI

DTG

DTG

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

CONCUR: G64: MCCONAUGHEY

SHOWN TO ADNSG:

G64:

T11:

K13:

MR. PENVOSE

(DEI'S ONLY)

CTC. SCHAEFER

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

M/R ROUTINE TASKING

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE

5

OF

PAGES

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACI NR.

AGC

AGI

O


PENSE

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

ASO NR.

DTG

447/06



(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

FORM 100-101 REV 10-65
(Supersedes N2208 REV AUG 65
to be used until depleted)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
IMMEDIATE

INFO PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY

SPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

FROM: JCS

DATE: 29 MAY 67 INFO:

TO: CINCLANT
USCINCEUR

INFO: CNO
CINCLANTFLT
CINCUSNAVEUR
COMSERVLANT
COMSIXTHFLT
COMSERVRON 8
USS LIBERTY
DIRNSA
DIRNAVSECGRU
ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
DIRNAVSECGRULANT
DIRNAVSECGRUEUR

DISTRIBUTION
K 1
K1 1
G 1
G6 1
G7 1
P2 1
P21 1
ADNSG 1
L21 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JCS 6499 J3 SENDS.

SUBJECT: USS LIBERTY (U)

1. ~~(S)~~ FOR CINCLANT: UPON PASSING SEA BUOY INBOUND
ROTA O/A 31 MAY REQUEST CHOP LIBERTY OPCON USCINCEUR.
2. ~~(S)~~ FOR USCINCEUR: UOPN ASSUMING OPCON REQUEST.
MAKE PREPARATIONS FOR EXTENDED DEPLOYMENT EASTERN MED.
WILL PASS SKED ASAP. ~~GP-4~~

TAB Q

DRAFTER ED/JBH		RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (ZULU)
DOCUMENT MARKING		PAGE	PAGE
DOWNGRADED AT 5 YR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS		1	1
REFERS TO MESSAGE		AGI NR.	39498
AGI		AGO NR.	
TG		DTG	291602Z MAY
PENSE			

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE

FORM N2208 REV SEP 65
(Supersedes N2289 REV AUG 61
to be used until deleted)

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

~~IMMEDIATE~~

PRIORITY

ACNE

DISTRIBUTION

FROM: DIRNSA

29 MAY 67

TO: JCS/JRC

INFO: CNO
CINCLANT
COMSERVLANT
COMSERVRONRIGHT
CINCLANTFLT
CINCUSNAVEUR

NSAEUR OFF GER
CINCEUR
DIRNAVSECGRU
DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
DIRNAVSECGRULANT
NSA REP LANT
ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU (COURIER)
HQ NSAEUR

K
K1
K12
G
G04
G5
G6
G7
ADM
DIR
ADNSG
ADP/
P04

~~SECRET~~

ADP/242-67

REF MY 231729Z ADP/224/67 (NOTAL)

1. REQUEST APPROVAL OF THE FOLLOWING OPERATIONAL AREAS FOR THE
USS LIBERTY OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AS FOLLOWS (COORDINATES
ARE OUTER LIMITS OF OPERATIONAL AREA):

OP AREA NR 1 32:00N - 29:00 TO 31:00 E
OP AREA NR 2 32:00N - 31:00 TO 33:00E
OP AREA NR 3 32:00N - 33:00 TO 34:00E
OP AREA NR 4 32:00N - 34:00E TO A POINT
33:00N - 34:30E
OP AREA NR 5 33:00N - 34:30E TO A POINT
36:00N - 35:00E

2. REQUEST USS LIBERTY OPERATE IN PROPOSED OPERATIONAL AREA NR 3
UNTIL FURTHER NOTIFIED. POINTS ABOVE AND ACTUAL OPERATING AREAS,
INCLUDING CPA SHOULD BE ADJUSTED AS NECESSARY FOR OPERATIONAL AND
SAFETY REASONS

DRAFT

FORMAL BOARDMAN ACT ON 2/27/67

RELEASED BY [Signature]
G. R. KIRBY/ADP/3342

RELEASED AT (DATE)

DOCUMENT HANDLING

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

PAGE

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

AGO

AGI

AGO NR.

IDTS

TAB R

2920132

MESSAGE		FORM 12388 REV SEP 68 (Supersedes N2228 REV AUG 65 to be used until depleted)		SECRET SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
ACTION PRECEDENCE		INFO PRECEDENCE		SPECIAL HANDLING	
DISTRIBUTION					
<p>CONCUR: PO4 [] SHOWN TO ADMSC: CT: SCHAEFER</p> <p>G04 MR. MCCONAUGHEY</p> <p>G604 []</p> <p>M/R: REF REQUESTED JCS/JRC TO DIVERT: USS L/BERTY FROM ABIDJAN AFRICA TO EASTERN MED. MESSAGE INFORMED JCS/JRC SPECIFIC OF AREA WILL BE FORWARDED FOR APPROVAL WHEN DETERMINED BY ANALYTICAL ELEMENTS (G GROUP).</p> <p><i>Joseph J. Patonik</i> J.J. PATONIK/K122/5/65</p>					
DRAFT		RELEASING OFFICER		RELEASED AT (FOUO)	
DOCUMENT MARKING				PAGE	
TO MESSAGE		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		AGI NR	
AGO				AGO NR	
AGI				DTG	
DTG		SECRET			

(3) - P.L. 86-36

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

IMMED

INFO PRECEDENCE

IMMED

SPECIAL HANDLING

NONE

DISTRIBUTION

FROM: JCS

DATE: 02 JUN 67

INFO:

TO: USMCINCEUR

///ADV COPY P21 VIA DDP///

INFO: CNO
CINCLANTFLT
CINCUSNAVEUR
COMSIXTHFLT
CTF 64
USS LIBERTYDIRNSA
NSAEUR
DIRNAVSECGRU
ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
DIRNAVSECGRULANT
DIRNAVSECGRUEURK
G
G5
G6
G7
P02
P04
F2
ADP
DIR
ADN3G~~SECRET~~

JCS 6724 J-3 SENDS

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY SKED (U)

REF DIRNSA G/104/311926Z MAY (NOTAL-BOM)

1. ~~(S)~~ WHEN RFS REQUEST SAIL LIBERTY IAW FOLLOWING:

SKED:

A. JUN DEPART ROTA.

B. 2-8 JUN. ENTRONTE VIA GIBRALTAR STRAIT CPA AS
SAFE NAV PERMITS. THAN VIA NORTHERN AFRICA COASTAL

ROUTE TO POSIT 32-00N 33-00E. CPA MOROCCO MALTA

3 NM CLAIMED DIST 3 NM. CPA SPAIN TUNISIA SARDINIA

SICILY CRETE 7 NM CLAIMED DIST 6 NM. CPA ALGERIA

LIBYA UAR 13 NM CLAIMED DIST 12 NM.

C. 9-30 JUN. CONDUCT OPS SOUTH OF 32-00N AND

BETWEEN 33-00E AND 34-00E. WHILE CONDUCTING OPS CPA UAR

12.5 NM CPA ISRAEL 6.5 NM

DRAFTER

DGY/JFD

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS,
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

PAGE

PAGE

1 OF 2

RE MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

10571

AGI NR.

DTG

011505Z

011505Z

~~SECRET~~

TMS

MESSAGE

FORM N2788 REV. SEP-85
(Supersedes N2788 REV AUG-83
to be used until deleted)~~SECRET~~ACTION PRECEDENCE
IMMEDINFO PRECEDENCE
IMMEDIATESPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

DISTRIBUTION

2. (U) REQUEST JCS (JRC) CNO CINLANT (JRC)
CINLANTFLT BE INCLUDED AS INKO ADDRESSEES ON ALL MOVREPS,
DAILY SITREPS AND INCIDENT REPORTS.
3. (U) ENROUTE TECH TASKING IAW REF.
4. (U) PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING JULY AXED FOLLOW.

~~OP 3~~

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZUL)

DOCUMENT MARKING

~~DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVAL~~

PAGE

2

OF 2

REF ID MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACI NR.

10571

ACQ NR.

AQO

AQI

DTR

MESSAGE

FORM N2286 REV 5/11/65
(Supersedes N2286 REV 4/11/65
to be used until depleted)~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

NONE

DISTRIBUTION

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

DATE 8 JUNE 67

ACT:

A

TO: COMSIXTHFLT
USS LIBERTY

INFO:

A2

PO2

USCINCEUR

A3

PO4

JCS

G

P2

CNO

G5

T1

DIRNSA

G6

ADP

CINCLANTFLT

G7

DIR

DIRNAVSECGRU

K

ADNSO

DIRNAVSECGRUEUR

K1

ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU

DIRNAVSECGRULANT

HQ NSAEUR

COMFAIRMED

COMSERVLANT

COMSERVRON EIGHT

OTF SIX ZERO

OTF SIX FOUR

NFOIO

NAV COMSTA MOROCCO

CINCLANT

COMSEROFORSIXTHFLT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USS LIBERTY OPERATIONAL CONTROL (U)

USCINCEUR FOR JRC, JCS FOR JRC, CINCLANT FOR JRC

A. MY 311750Z MAY 67 (LIBERTY MOVORD 7-67, WITH CH-1)

B. MY 031016Z JUN 67

C. USS LIBERTY 021330Z JUN 67 (MOVREP)

D. JCS 011545Z JUN 67 (USS LIBERTY SKED)

E. USS LIBERTY 022108Z JUN 67

I. FOR COMSIXTHFLT. TO FACILITATE AREA COMMAND AND

CONTROL AND ANY POSSIBLE REQUIREMENT FOR PROTECTION DURING

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

TW/EJH

DOCUMENT MARKING

DOWNGRADED AT 10 YEAR INTERVAL
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

PAGE

1 of 2

RS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR

42476

AGO

AGO NR

AGI

DTG

061357Z

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE

FORM N2288 REV SEP 65
(Supersedes N2288 REV AUG 64
to be used until depleted)~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

PRIORITY

INFO PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

SPECIAL HANDLING

NONE

DISTRIBUTION

MIDEAST HOSTILITIES, USS LIBERTY WILL BE CHOPPED TO COMSIXTHFLT
AT 070001Z JUN 67. OPERATE LIBERTY IAW REF D TO DERIVE MAXIMUM
BENEFIT FROM SPECIAL CAPABILITIES. REF D MAY BE MODIFIED FOR
SAFETY REASONS AS DICTATED BY THE LOCAL SITUATION.

A. REQUEST CHANGE PIM REPORTS (REFS A AND B) TO AS
OF 1800Z, CHANGE PRECEDENCE TO IMMEDIATE AND CHANGE
ADDEE FORIUSCINCEUR TO USCINCEUR FOR JRC.

2. FOR USS LIBERTY. CHOP TO COMSIXTHFLT AT 070001Z
BY MESSAGE.

A. PIM REPORT NOT RECEIVED SINCE REF E.

~~GP-3~~

L23 NOTE: REF "C" IS AGI 41075
REF "D" - UNABLE TO LOCATE L23
REF "E" IS AGI 40957

DRAFTER

TW/EJH

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

~~DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS~~~~NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED~~

PAGE

2 OF

REL TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

40676

AGO

AGO NR.

AGI

DTS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE
FORM N2285 REV 7-67
Supersedes N2288 REV AUG 65
to be used until indicated

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

IMMED

IMMED

NONE

DISTRIBUTION

FROM: COMSIXTHFLT

DATE: 26 JUN 67

INFO:

TO: USS LIBERTY

/ ADV COPY P21 /

INFO: CINCUSNAVEUR
USCINCEUR

JCS

CNO

DIRNSA

CINCLANTFLT

DIRNAVSECERU

DIRNAVSECERUEUR

ASST DIRNAVSECERU

DIRNAVSECERULANT

HQ NSAEUR

COMFAIRD

CONSERVANT

CONSERVON EIGHT

CTF SIX ZERO

CTF SIX FOUR

NKOIO

NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO

CINCLANT

CTF SIX THREE

CTF SIX SEVEN

NAVCOMMSTA GREECE

NAVCAVS MOROCCO

NAVCOMMSTA SPAIN

A P02
A3 P01
B P2
D32 P21
D33 T1
K ADN
K1 ADP
G DIR
G5 ADNSG
G6
G7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USS LIBERTY OPERATIONAL CONTROL

A. CINCUSNAVEUR 061357Z JUN 67 NOTAL

B. JCS 011545Z JUN 67 NOTALB

C. CINCUSNAVEUR 311750Z MAY 67 (MOVORD 7-67) NOTAL

D. CINCUSNAVEUR 011305Z JUN 67 NOTAL

E. COMSIXTHFLT 01041-66 NOTAL

F. CINCUSNAVEURINST P03120.5B NOTAL

1. UPON CHOP TO COMSIXTHFLT AT 070001Z, CONDUCT OPERATIONS IAW REF

B, C AND D.

2. IN VIEW PRESENT ARAB/ISRAELI SITUATION AND UNPREDICTABILITY OF
UAR ACTIONS. MAINTAIN A HIGH STATE OF VIGILANCE AGAINST ATTACK OR
THREAT OF ATTACK. REPORT BY FLASH PRECEDENCE ANY
THREATENING OR SUSPICIOUS ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST YOU OR ANY

DRAFTER

ED/LJH

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE

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1 OF 2

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

H1737

AGO

AGI

110

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOW

0623492

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
IMMEDINFO PRECEDENCE
IMMEDSPECIAL HANDLING
NONEDISTRIBUTION
ADVISE

VERSION FROM SCHEDULE NECESSITATED BY EXTERNAL THREAT. ADVISE
IF LOCAL SITUATION DICTATES CHANGE IN AREA OF OPS ASSIGNED BY REF B.

3. KEEP COMSIXTHFLT AND CTF 63 INFORMED OF LOGISTIC NEEDS SUFFICIENTLY IN ADVANCE TO ENABLE ORDERLY LOGSUP PLANNING. MAIL DELIVERY WILL BE ARRANGED IF FEASIBLE.

4. INCLUDE COMSIXTHFLT AS INFO ADDEE ON REPORTS REQUIRED BY PARA 2 REF B AS MODIFIED BY REF C AND D.

5. SUBMIT REPORTS OF CONTACT WITH SHIPS, AIRCRAFT AND SUBMARINES WHICH ARE UNIDENT, HOSTILE, OF INTELL INTEREST OR ENGAGE IN HARASSMENT, IAW REF F. EMERGENCY PLAN CHARLIE NOW IN EFFECT IN

SIXTHFLT

6. COMSIXTHFLT OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON ALERTS, EMERG ACTIONS AND NUCLEAR RELEASE WILL NOT BE PROVIDED. THEREFORE, ACTION IS NOT REQUIRED ON NATIONAL EXERCISE AND DRILL MSGS IDENTIFIED BY FLAG WORD WHITE OR BLUE DELTA. NO ACTION REQUIRED NATO EXERCISE MSGS. IN EVENT OF ACTUAL ALERT OR OTHER EMERGENCY, COMSIXTHFLT WILL SEPARATELY DIRECT LIBERTY BY CLASSIFIED MSG.

7. COMMUNICATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANNEX CHARLIE REF E.

A. COPY KR BROADCAST. ADVISE IF CARDS AVAILABLE TO COPY KRA BCST.

B. IF PERMANENT TERMINATION REQUIRED WITH MED COMM STA SUBMIT REQUEST IAW APPENDIX XVI TO ANNEX CHARLIE TO REF E.

C. ALTHOUGH NOT ASSIGNED TO TF 60 UTILIZE TF 60 TACTICAL CIRCUITS AS REQUIRED

D. AUTHGRA TO ENTER SIXES ALFA AS REQUIRED.

8. ACKNOWLEDGE.

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (2010)

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS, DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS.

2 OF 2

REFERENCES TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

477

AGO

AGO NR.

AGI

DTG

DTG

16093107

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION PRECEDENCE
IMMEDIATEINFO PRECEDENCE
DISPATCHSPECIAL HANDLING
EOM

FROM: DIRNSA

7 JUNE 1967

TO : JCS/JRC

INFO: CNO

USCINCEUR

CINCUSNAVEUR

COMSERVLANT

CINCLANTFLT

COMSERVRONEIGHT

DIRNAVSECGRU

DIRNAVSECGRUEUR

DIRNAVSECGRULANT

ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU (COURIER)

NSAEUR OFF GER

HQ NSAEUR

NSA REP LANT

DISTRIBUTION

K1
K12
G
GOL
G6
G7
PO4
F2
ADN
DIR
ADP
ADNEG~~SECRET~~

K12/631

USS LIBERTY OPERATIONAL SCHEDULE CHANGE

REF: A. UR 011545Z (NOTAL)

B. MY 292013Z MAY, ADP/242 (NOTAL)

REQUEST INITIATE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO AMEND REF BRAVO TO REFLECT OPERATIONS IN OP AREA 2 AS DEFINED IN REF ALFA TO SATISFY TECH REQUIREMENTS.

~~OP-1~~CONCUR: GOL LT. MCTIGHE
PO4

SHOWN TO ADNEG: CTC MYRRVOLL

M/R G GROUP REQUESTED USS LIBERTY'S OPERATING AREA BE CHANGED FROM OP AREA 3 TO OP AREA 2 TO SATISFY TASKING REQUIREMENTS.

DRAFTER J. J. PATRONIK K122/5385a	RELEASING OFFICER RICHARD HARVEY CH K122/3892e	RELEASED AT
DOCUMENT MARKING OP-1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION		PAGE
REFERS TO MESSAGE		AGI

AGO 05211/29 68-5

AGE

DTG 292013Z MAY

~~SECRET~~

46296/67

0721042

ACTION PRECEDENCE

IMMEDIATE

INFO PRECEDENCE

IMMEDIATE

SPECIAL HANDLING

NONE

FROM: USS LIBERTY

DATE: 8 JUNE 67 INFO:

TO: COMSIXTHFLT

INFO: JCS
CNO
CINCLANT
CINCLANFLT
DIRNSA
DIRNAVSECGRU
ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
CINCUSNAVEUR
DIRNAVSECGRULANT
COMSERVLANT
COMSERVRON EIGHT
USCINCEUR
NFOIO
NSAECUR
DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
COMFAIRMED
CTF SIX ZERO
CTF SIX FOUR
NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO

DISTRIBUTION

A
A3
K
K1
G
G5
G6
G7
P02
P04
P2
ADP
DIR
ADNSG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JCS PASS TO JRC

USCINCEUR PASS TO JRC

CINCLANT PASS TO JRC

SITREP/POSIT

A. USCINCEUR 0614-02 JUN 67 (NOTAL)

1. 070800Z POSIT 33-06N2 28-54E9. PIM 09/16.5 UNTIL
072300Z. THENCE STATIONARY WITHIN 30NM OF 31-45N3 33-30E9.

2. SUBSEQUENT PIM/SITREP WILL BE SUBMITTED AS OF 0800Z

IN REF A. GP-4

DRAFTER

TW/EJH

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

3

DOCUMENT MARKING

~~DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS, DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS.~~

PAGE

1 OF 1

PAGE

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

42085

AGO NR.

DTG

070908Z

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TAB W

FORM N2288 REV 5/67
(Supersedes N2288 REV 4/67)
(To be used until denoted)~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

PRIORITY

INFO PRECEDENCE

PRIORITY

SPECIAL HANDLING

NONE

DISTRIBUTION

FROM: JCS

9 JUN 67

INFO

K A
K1 A2
G A3
G5
G6
G7
P04
P02
P2
D32
D33
K1
ADN
ADP
DIR
ADNSG

TO: US CINCEUR

INFO: CNO

CINCLANT

CINCLANTFLT

CINCUSNAVEUR

COMSIXTHFLT

CTF 67

USS LIBERTY

HQ NASAEUR

NSASAEUR OFF GERMANY

DIRNSA

DIRNAVSECGRU

ADIRNAVSECGRU

DIRNAVSECGRULANT

DIRNAVSECGRUTESR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JCS 7337

J-3 SENDS

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)

JCS 6724/011545Z JUN 67

1. IN VIEW PRESENT SITUATION EAST MED, OPERATING AREA SPECIFIED REF FOR GUIDANCE ONLY AND MAY BE VAIED AS LOCAL CONDITIONS DICTATE.

2. CHANGE CPA UA TO 20 NM, ISRAEL 15 NM.

~~GP 4~~

L23 NOTE: DTG 011545Z IS AGI 40571

DRAFTER ED/SS		RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (ZUL)
DOCUMENT MARKING DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS		PAGE 1 OF	
REF TO MESSAGE	95	AGI NR 62451	AGO NR
AGI	DTG	CONFIDENTIAL TAB X 0722202	

MESSAGE

FORM N2288 REV SEP 65
(Supersedes N2288 REV AUG 63
to be used until depleted)~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

FLASH

INFO PRECEDENCE

IMMEDIATE

SPECIAL HANDLING

NONE

DISTRIBUTION

FROM: COMSIXTHFLT

DATE: 7 JUNE 67

TO: JCS

DIR

INFO: CNO
CINCUSNAVEUR
USCINCEUR
CINCUSAFE
DIA
DIRNSA~~SECRET~~

A. COMSIXTHFLT 070626Z JUN 67

1. THIS AMPLIFIES REF A.

2. PRIOR TO 052015Z JUN 67 SIXTHFLT AIRCRAFT WERE ENGAGED IN NORMAL TRAINING OPERATIONS IN THE SEA OF CRETE AND SOUTH OF THE WESTERN END OF CRETE. NO AIR OPERATIONS WERE AUTHORIZED EAST OF LAT 30E OR WITHIN 100 MILES OF THE EGYPTIAN COAST. THESE RESTRICTIONS PROVIDED A MINIMUM APPROACH DISTANCE FOR AIRCRAFT TO THE COASTS OF ISRAEL AND SYRIA OF NO LESS THAN 240 MILES AND TO THE COAST OF EGYPT FROM ALEXANDRIA WEST OF NO LESS THAN 100 MILES. AT 052015Z JUN 67 THE OPERATING AREA FOR SIXTHFLT UNITS WAS EXPANDED TO INCLUDE ALL OF THE EASTERN MED EXCEPT THAT NO OPERATIONS, EITHER SURFACE OR AIR, WERE PERMITTED WITHIN 1; MILES OF ISRAEL, SYRIA, OR EGYPT OR WITHIN 25 MILES OF CYPRUS.

3. ON 5 MAY BOTH CARRIERS WERE OPERATING IN POSITIONS WHICH WERE IN EXCESS OF 400 MILES FROM ISRAEL OR SINAI. FLIGHT OPERATIONS

DRAFTSMAN

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

~~DOWNGRADED AT 12 YR INTERVALS; NOT AUTO. DECLASSIFIED~~

PAGE

1 OF 3

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

43119

AGO NR.

DTG

071503Z

AGO

AGI

DTG

~~SECRET~~ **tns Y**

MESSAGE

FORM N2288 REV SEP 61
(Supersedes N2288 REV AUG 61
to be used until depleted)~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

FLASH

INFO PRECEDENCE

IMMEDIATE

SPECIAL HANDLING

NONE

DISTRIBUTION

ON AMERICA WERE CONDUCTED FROM 0915Z UNTIL 1235Z AND ON SARATOGA FROM 0828Z UNTIL 1313Z. FLIGHT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED FOR TRAINING PURPOSES AND WERE ROUTINE IN ALL ASPECTS. ON 6 JUN LIMITED UR OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED DURING THE DAY FOR ROUTINE PURPOSES. NO NIGHT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED BY EITHER CARRIER.

4. ALL SIXTHFLT CVA PILOTS WHO PARTICIPATED IN AIR OPERATIONS ON 5 AND 6 JUN HAVE BEEN QUERIED CONCERNING THEIR TRACK LINES AND ANY VOICE COMMUNICATIONS EITHER TRANSMITTED OR RECEIVED. AT NO REPEAT NO TIME WERE THE AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS SET FORTH IN PARA 1. ABOVE VIOLATED, I.E., ON 5 JUN NO SIXTHFLT CVA AIRCRAFT APPROACHED THE ISRAEL OR SINAI COASTLINE CLOSER THAN 240 MILES AND ON 6 JUN NO SIXTHFLT CVA AIRCRAFT APPROACHED THE ISRAEL, SYRIA OR EGYPT COASTLINES CLOSER THAN 100 MILES. TRACKS FLOWN WERE ACTUALLY FARTHER FROM ISRAEL/SYRIA/EGYPT THAN THE ABOVE LIMITING FIGURES. DURING THESE FLIGHTS NO REPEAT NO SIXTHFLT PILOT EITHER TRANSMITTED OR RECEIVED ANY RADIO TRANSMISSIONS FROM STATIONS EITHER IN OR UNDER THE CONTROL OF ANY COUNTRY IN THE MIDEAST ENGAGED IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT, EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY BY RELAY. IN SHORT, ON 5 AND 6 JUN NO SIXTHFLT AIRCRAFT OVERFLEW ISRAEL, SYRIA, OR EGYPT AND NO COMMUNICATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED BY SIXTHFLT PILOTS WITH ANY RADIO STATIONS CONTROLLED OR UTILIZED BY ANY OF THESE COUNTRIES.

5. NO FLIGHT OPERATIONS ARE SCHEDULED FOR 7 JUN FOR EITHER

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YR INTERVALS; NOT AUTO. DECLASSIFIED.

PAGE

2 OF 3

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

43719

AGO NR.

AGO

AGI

DTG

DTG

071503Z

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE

FORM N2288 REV SEP 65
(Supersedes N2288 REV AUG 63
to be used until depleted)~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

FLASH

INFO PRECEDENCE

IMMEDIATE

SPECIAL HANDLING

NONE

DISTRIBUTION

SARATOGA OR AMERICA. THE LIMITATIONS SET FORTH IN PARA
ABOVE CONTINUE IN EFFECT.

~~GP-3~~

L23 NOTE: THIS MSG HANDLED BY P21; MAT RUN OFF FOR D1.

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE

PAG

~~DOWNGRADED AT 12 YR INTERVALS, NOT AUTO. DECLASSIFIED.~~

3 of 3

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

43119

AGO NR.

AGO

AGI

DTG

~~SECRET~~

DTS

071503Z

TOP SECRET(unclassified until filled)
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and has access to its contents. Such access must be limited to those individuals having a "need to know" and appropriate Security clearance.

FROM <i>JCS</i>	TO	RECEIVED	REG. NUMBER	INCLOSURES
SUBJECT OR BRIEF <i>DTG 080411Z</i>		COPY NUMBER	TS CONTROL NUMBER <i>42787</i>	R/S NUMBER
SIGNATURE		ORGANIZATION		DATE

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FORM 03513 JUL 57

TOP SECRET

(over)

AGO	NONE	42925
AGI		ASO NR
DTG		DTG
SUSPENSE		081320Z

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

<p>TO MESSAGE</p> <p>AGO 110</p> <p><i>A. M. A.</i></p>	<p>SECURITY CLASSIFICATION</p> <p>TAB BB</p> <p>CONFIDENTIAL</p>	<p>AGI NH.</p> <p>42303</p> <p>AGE NR.</p> <p>DTG</p> <p>081812Z</p>
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EDM U MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGC

AGI

DTG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

42303

AGC NR

DTG

081812Z