1. Final papers agreed between the British and U.S. are listed below and copies of each are attached.

(a) (i) Appendix B entitled "Principles of Security and Dissemination".

(ii) Annexure B1 to Appendix B entitled "The assignment of COMINT to Categories and Sub-Categories".

(iii) Annexure B2 to Appendix B entitled "Security Principles governing the Conduct of COMINT Activities in Exposed Areas".

(b) (i) Appendix H entitled "Communications".

(ii) Annexure H1 to Appendix H entitled "Working arrangements reached at the 1953 Conference for the Implementation of Appendix H (Communications)".

(c) (i) Appendix N entitled "Arrangements for Emergency Re-location of COMINT Units".

(ii) Annexure N1 to Appendix N entitled "Re-location of US and UK COMINT Units. Provision of Equipment".

(iii) Annexure N2 to Appendix N entitled "Note on US and UK COMINT Units already located in Territory controlled by the other Party or already scheduled to be so located".

(iv) Exhibit 1 to Annexure N1 entitled "Details affecting relocation of stations and units".

(d) (i) The addition to Appendix P of a footnote defining "releasable equipment".

(ii) Annexure P1 to Appendix P entitled "COMINT Arrangements for SACEUR".

(iii) Exhibit 2 to Annexure P1 entitled "Principles for the Handling of Y".

(iv) Annexure P2 to Appendix P (adapted from SAC/E/3/7 (revised)).
(v) Exhibit 2 to Annexure P2 (adapted from SAC/5/R/7 (revised)).

(d) (i) Changes in Phraseology in Appendix Q

(ii) Annexure Q1 to Appendix Q entitled "Collaboration between US and UK National COMINT Centers".

(iii) Exhibit 1 to Annexure Q1 entitled "Operational and statistical requirements for the wartime augmentation of GCHQ".

(iv) Annexure Q2 entitled "Principles of Wartime Collaboration among COMINT Centers of the US and the UK and other British Commonwealth Countries".

(v) Exhibit 1 to Annexure Q2 entitled "Establishment of Overseas COMINT Centers".

2. Also attached are copies of the Minutes of the Plenary Committee meeting held at the beginning of the Conference and a record of all the proceedings of the Executive Committee.
4. Item 1(d)(iii) above is subject to tripartite agreement between US, UK, and Canada.

5. Ratification of Appendix B and its annexures by LSIB will be subject to the comment of Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand COMINT authorities.

6. Final adoption of parts of Annexure H1, Annexures Q1 and Q2 and BPC53/D Final will be subject to discussion and agreement with the appropriate Canadian and/or Australian and New Zealand COMINT authorities at the earliest possible opportunity.

7. Informal discussions took place between US and UK COMINT authorities on the following subjects and the records of these discussions are attached.

(a) BPC53/Q Final: "The Establishment of a US Screening Group at GCHQ in Peacetime."

(c) SAC/E/R/5(revised): "Arrangements for Exchange and Dissemination within SACLANT's command of Intelligence beyond the Scope of Third Party Collaboration."

(d) LSIB 333/52(revised) "Arrangements for COMINT Dissemination to and within SHAPE and its Sub-Commands."

8. Item 7(c) above will be the subject of further informal discussions between US, UK and Canada.

Signed

for U.S. Delegation

for British Delegation

25 March 1953
APPENDIX B

PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION

INTRODUCTION

1. These principles shall be the basis of all regulations for the security and dissemination of Communications Intelligence issued by or under the authority of USCIB or LSIB and other appropriate authorities of the Governments of the two parties. The scope and phrasing of such regulations may vary in accordance with requirements of the parties, agencies, departments, and ministries to whom they are designed to apply, but all shall be in accord with these basic principles in every respect and shall observe the standards herein as a minimum. As an aid to uniform interpretation, each party shall forward all pertinent Board regulations and directives to the other for information.

2. It is recognised that, while the following principles are in general of universal application, changing conditions or emergencies and, in particular, the outbreak of general hostilities may require modification to ensure that the maximum operational benefit consistent with security is derived from communications intelligence.

DEFINITIONS AND CATEGORIES

3. Communication Intelligence (COMINT) is the name given to all processes involved in, and intelligence information and technical material resulting from, the interception and study (a) of foreign communications passed by wire, radio, and other electromagnetic means (except press, propaganda, and public broadcasts) and (b) of selected foreign communications sent by non-electromagnetic means. /See NOTE 1.7/
4. There are two types of COMINT: Crypt Intelligence and Traffic Intelligence [See NOTE 27]. They are defined as follows:

b. **Traffic Intelligence** is that COMINT which results from traffic analysis (e.g. the study of call-signs, message headings, procedure signals, volume of traffic, precedences, D/F bearings, and from plain texts, i.e., information produced by all means short of the actual cryptanalysis of intercepted communications.

5. For purposes of security handling and control COMINT is divided into Categories and Sub-Categories.

a. COMINT is divided at the present time to three Categories:
   - Category III COMINT
   - Category II COMINT
   - Category I COMINT

b. COMINT is placed in appropriate Categories as mutually agreed by USCIB and LSIB from time to time.

c. As mutually agreed by USCIB and LSIB, separate Sub-Categories of COMINT may be established within Categories III and II in order to permit differentiation in the processing, dissemination, exchange or use of material.

6. **Category III COMINT** is that COMINT for which the protection of source or content is the overriding consideration and which must, therefore, be given the highest degree of security protection. In general, it will include:

a. Crypt Intelligence except that specifically included in other Categories.

b. Special Weather Intelligence.

c. Traffic Intelligence involving call-signs or message headings encrypted in codes or ciphers of high security gradings as specified and mutually agreed by USCIB and LSIB.
d. Other Traffic Intelligence as specified and mutually agreed by USCIB and LSIB.

7. Category II COMINT is that COMINT for which the protection of source or content is not always the overriding consideration and for which a less rigid standard of security is considered an acceptable risk. In general, it will include:
   a. Traffic Intelligence not specifically included in other Categories.
   b. Crypt Intelligence involving solution of codes, ciphers and special systems of lower security as specified and mutually agreed by USCIB and LSIB.

8. Category I COMINT is that COMINT which may be subject to the least stringent security restrictions and which may require more extensive dissemination in order to provide for effective utilization. In general, it will include certain types of low level COMINT as specified and mutually agreed by USCIB and LSIB.

ASSIGNMENT OF COMINT TO CATEGORIES

9. In assigning COMINT to a Category, the following general criteria will be considered:
   a. The intelligence value of its content.
   b. The difficulty of solution or intercept to include:
      (1) Sensitivity of techniques employed in solution and exploitation.
      (2) Sensitivity of source of intercept.
      (3) Inter-relationships between cryptographic systems.
   c. Cryptographic sophistication of the country originating the traffic involved.
   d. Security grading given to contents by the country originating the traffic involved.
   e. The advantage to be gained versus the risk of loss by utilization under a given Category, including:
(1) The value of extending the dissemination of certain COMINT to permit essential use of the operational intelligence contained therein.

(2) The capability of certain Third Party COMINT groups to exploit the COMINT in question with the attendant security risks beyond the direct control of U.S. and U.K. authorities.

(3) The value of providing technical guidance or COMINT information to Third Party COMINT activities to insure receipt from them of unique intercept and critical COMINT information not otherwise available.

10. In assigning COMINT to the lower Categories the following additional factors will be considered:
   a. A system or class of COMINT, once downgraded, may not effectively be upgraded.
   b. The distinction between Category I on the one-hand and the higher Categories on the other is that the former does not require codeword protection, whereas the latter do.

11. USCIB and LSIB shall have prepared and maintained in current status mutually agreed lists to indicate COMINT placed in the several Categories and in such Sub-categories as may be established.

CLASSIFICATION AND CODEWORDS

12. Category III COMINT shall be classified TOP SECRET and shall be designated by a distinctive codeword agreed between USCIB and LSIB and replaced every two years. In the event that USCIB and LSIB agree that positive security advantages will be obtained by earlier change then such change shall be made and a new period of two years shall be in effect from that date.
13. Category II COMINT shall be classified SECRET and shall be designated by a distinctive codeword agreed between USCIB and LSIB and replaced every two years. In the event that USCIB and LSIB agree that positive security advantage will be obtained by earlier change, then such change shall be made and a new period of two years shall be in effect from that date.

14. Category I COMINT shall be classified not lower than CONFIDENTIAL and shall not be designated by a codeword.

15. Sub-categories. Whenever a Sub-category is established within Categories III or II COMINT, it shall be designated by a separate or auxiliary codeword agreed from time to time between USCIB and LSIB.

16. Technical material pertaining to COMINT shall bear the classification and codeword appropriate to the most highly classified and sensitive Category or Sub-category of COMINT to which it relates and shall be handled accordingly.

17. Documents which reveal actual success, progress, or processes in the production of COMINT shall bear the classification and codeword appropriate to the most highly classified and sensitive Category or Sub-Category of COMINT to which they relate and shall be handled accordingly, even though such documents may not reveal COMINT as such.

18. Raw traffic (i.e., intercepted traffic showing no evidence of processing for COMINT purposes beyond sorting by clear address elements, elimination of unwanted messages and the inclusion of a case number and/or an arbitrary traffic designator) shall be classified not lower than CONFIDENTIAL and need not be designated by a codeword.

19. Codewords. When used as such, the codewords which designate Categories III and II COMINT, and the Sub-Categories which may be established within these Categories shall bear the TOP SECRET classification according to the Category. These codewords and their implications shall not be made known to non-indoctrinated persons, nor shall these codewords be used in their codeword sense in the presence of non-indoctrinated persons.
20. Conservation of COMINT sources is of supreme importance. It is essential, therefore, that the production, exploitation, and dissemination of COMINT, and of all related or resultant information, be strictly controlled and the dissemination appropriately limited. The physical security of related documents is not alone sufficient; it is essential that all reference to the existence of COMINT, either direct or indirect, be avoided except among those to whom the knowledge is necessary for the proper performance of their duties. These provisions shall apply to any intelligence which, in whole or in part, includes information which can be traced solely to COMINT sources.

21. There is no time limit for the safeguarding of COMINT as defined herein. It is of the utmost importance that complete and absolute silence on all COMINT matters be maintained by those who have ever been indoctrinated for COMINT. If, at any time, matter referring to COMINT is broadcast or published, even though by prominent people or those in authority, this does not in any way free those other persons who are, or ever have been indoctrinated for COMINT from their continuous obligation to maintain silence.

22. Except as agreed by USCIB or LSIB, all persons to be assigned to duties involving COMINT shall be the subject of security investigation and clearance. As an aid to the uniformity of investigations and clearances, and to promote adequate minimum standards, each party shall inform the other of the standards prescribed by it for this purpose.

23. All persons to be assigned to duties involving Categories of COMINT other than Category I shall be indoctrinated (i.e., instructed as to the nature of COMINT and the security regulations and practices which govern the handling of COMINT material and COMINT activities). Recipients of Category I COMINT only will not be indoctrinated. Producers of Category I COMINT only need not necessarily be indoctrinated.
a. Knowledge of specific Categories or Sub-Categories of COMINT shall be made available to indoctrinated persons solely on the basis of their "need to know".

b. Every effort shall be made to restrict the number of persons indoctrinated for COMINT to the essential minimum.

c. It shall be permissible for persons who have access only to a less sensitive Category or Sub-Category of COMINT to work within Agencies or Centers in which there are located other persons engaged in the production or exploitation of a more sensitive Category or Sub-Category of COMINT, only so long as due precaution shall be taken (by providing segregated, secure areas or otherwise) to ensure that the activities and knowledge of such persons are confined to the COMINT material and activities to which they have access.

24. Under extraordinary conditions, as determined by USCIB or LSIB, it may be essential for an individual to take up duties involving COMINT before the requisite investigation can be completed. In such cases, the person concerned may be suitably indoctrinated on the authority only of senior officers or officials as designated by the respective parties. In all such cases, steps shall be taken to ensure that security investigations and clearances are completed as soon as possible after indoctrination.

25. Each Party shall ensure that complete lists of indoctrinated persons are maintained.

26. USCIB and LSIB shall keep each other fully informed of the approximate number of indoctrinated persons in each of the Departments, Ministries, Agencies, and Offices receiving COMINT, by Category of Sub-Category where applicable.

27. No national of one party shall be permitted access to the COMINT agencies or to the Categories III and II COMINT of the other Party,
unless he has been approved by his parent agency or Board and has been properly indoctrinated. Such access shall be limited to the Categories or Sub-Categories of COMINT agreed by his parent agency or Board.

28. Every effort shall be made to ensure that no person who has a knowledge of current value about COMINT, such that his capture or interrogation could be a substantial risk to the security of COMINT, shall be assigned to or engage in activities of a hazardous nature.

30. In applying these principles persons who are or have been indoctrinated will be divided into four groups:

a. Producers of Category I COMINT who have no knowledge of other Categories are classed as Group A. They may be assigned to hazardous activities only on the authority of senior officers. (No restrictions are applied to the recipients or non-indoctrinated producers of Category I COMINT only).
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b. Individuals who have knowledge of current value about Category II COMINT are classed as Group B. They may be assigned to hazardous activities only after six months separation from such material.

c. Individuals, other than those specified in sub-paragraph d below, who have knowledge of current value about Category III COMINT are classed as Group C. They may be assigned to hazardous activities only after a separation of one year or longer from this type of information.

d. Individuals with precise knowledge of COMINT processing techniques, competence, or potential, regarding the more sensitive Category III COMINT material are classed as Group D. They shall not be assigned to hazardous activities at any time.

31. The provisions in paragraphs 28, 29 and 30 shall be applied only by senior officers and officials at a level to be established by USCIB or LSIB. Exceptions shall be authorized only after careful consideration in each instance of the advantages to be gained, as opposed to the risk involved. In considering exceptions to sub-paragraph 29d, the protection offered by diplomatic status should not automatically be considered sufficient, but should be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances involved. Any exception in the case of Group D personnel must receive prior approval by the Board concerned. The considerations relevant to COMINT personnel serving with COMINT units in exposed areas are dealt with in Annexure B2. All possible action shall be taken to discourage or prevent any individual with a knowledge of current value about COMINT from engaging in hazardous activities (as defined in paragraph 29 above) in any unofficial capacity at any time.
32. Except as implicitly involved in the operation of paragraphs 35, 36 and 37 below, Categories III and II COMINT shall remain exclusively in the custody of indoctrinated persons, secure from examination by non-indoctrinated persons.

**DISSEMINATION**

33. The basic principle governing the dissemination and use of COMINT is the "need to know". Each item of COMINT shall, therefore, be made known only to those individuals who require it in the performance of their duties and, except as specifically provided in paragraphs 35, 36 and 37 below, are indoctrinated and authorized to have access to the particular Category or Sub-Category of COMINT to which such item appertains.
36. Category I COMINT may be disseminated in accordance with the normal practice of each Party as regards intelligence materials of similar classifications. However, it may not be passed to Third Party recipients except as provided in paragraph 37 below, and must be handled accordingly. It is recognized that this dissemination will involve loss of control by COMINT authorities, and every effort shall be made to ensure that the following provisions are enforced to the maximum extent possible. Whenever Category I COMINT is to be transmitted by a means exposed to interception, it shall normally be transmitted in an appropriate cryptographic system. It may be transmitted in plain language only when there is no suitable means of secure communication available and when there is an urgent operational need to do so. Whenever possible such plain language transmissions shall be in the form of operational orders so worded that the subject matter cannot be traced specifically to its COMINT origin.
37. Category I COMINT may be disseminated to Third Party recipients under the following conditions:
   a. In COMINT arrangements with Third Parties, Category I COMINT may be released to these Third Parties in accordance with the provisions of Appendix P.
   b. During active hostilities or in the case of an emergency involving a matter of importance to the national security of either Party, Category I COMINT may be disseminated to nationals of Third Parties who are engaged directly with the U.S. or U.K. in these hostilities or are allied directly with the U.S. or U.K. in dealing with the emergency concerned. The determination of a requirement to make this exception and the authority to grant this exception shall lie only with senior officers or officials at a level to be established by USIC or ISIC.

38. In the event that either Party produces individual items of COMINT which, by reason of the extreme sensitivity of their source or content shall be given a more limited dissemination than would normally be given to the Category or Sub-Category of COMINT within which they fall, it will be for the originating party to indicate the nature of the special handling desired and to request that the other Party afford similarly limited dissemination.

39. Category III and II COMINT shall never under any circumstances or in any form be disseminated to any Ministry, Department, Agency, Organization, Office, or individual from which or from whom it might reasonably be expected to find its way, officially or extra-officially, into the possession of any person or group who could use it for commercial competition or commercial gain or advantage.
40. The appropriate classification and codeword shall:

a. Appear on every sheet of paper which contains or discloses
Category III or II COMINT or a Sub-Category thereof, technical
material pertaining to these Categories and Sub-Categories and
documents which reveal actual success, progress or processes
in their production. Except as provided in paragraph 35 above,
this rule applies to maps and charts on which are plotted
data and information derived from these categories of COMINT.
41. Category III COMINT and related technical material shall not be transmitted in plain language except as follows:

   a. Sealed, by safehand channels, over routes specifically approved by USGIB or LSIB. Each Board shall inform the other of all approved routes involving transport across territory of a third party, the approval of such routes to be held to the necessary minimum.

   b. Over landlines specifically approved in each instance by USGIB or LSIB.

   c. Over completely protected local communication systems exclusively internal to agencies or offices producing or utilizing COMINT.

42. Category II COMINT and related technical material shall not be transmitted in plain language except as provided in paragraph 41 above, or by protected postal channels internal to, or under exclusive control of the US, the UK, or other collaborating British Commonwealth countries.

43. Category I COMINT and related technical material should be transmitted by COMINT channels wherever possible, but may be transmitted by conventional channels used for intelligence materials of similar classification. It shall not be transmitted in plain language by a means exposed to interception, except as provided in sub-paragraph 36a above.

44. Raw traffic may be transmitted in plain language as provided in paragraphs 41 and 42 above. Raw traffic classified CONFIDENTIAL may also be transmitted in accordance with the normal procedure for this classification, except that when transported across the territory of the country originating the traffic, it shall be with the express sanction of USGIB or LSIB. This sanction will be granted only in cases of compelling need.
45. Except as provided in paragraph 35 above:
   a. Category III COMINT and related technical material transmitted in encrypted form shall be encrypted in special cryptographic channels expressly provided for these subjects.
   b. Category II COMINT and related technical material transmitted in encrypted form shall be encrypted in special cryptographic channels expressly provided for these subjects, those listed in paragraph a above, or in the most secure cryptographic channel available.
   c. However, in the case of cryptographic systems mutually approved for the purpose, the transmission of COMINT related technical matters and raw traffic over the same channel is authorized, provided that such channels are reserved for these subjects exclusively.

46. In order to facilitate a concerted effort directed toward the determination and assessment of the causes and effects of known or presumed COMINT compromises or losses, it is agreed that:
   a. Whenever any breach of its COMINT security regulations or any other circumstance which in fact has, or can be presumed to have, compromised COMINT or COMINT codewords, or to have revealed COMINT successes to unauthorized persons, becomes known to either Party, it shall inform the other by means of a report embodying the pertinent facts and conclusions in each case, except that when the Party concerned concludes that there is a good reason to believe that such compromise or revelation has not reached and will not, in fact, reach foreign nationals, no report need be made to the other Party.
b. Whenever a significant change occurs in foreign cryptographic or communications security, the Party discovering such change shall notify the other. Each Party shall then analyze and assess the known and suspected circumstances having a bearing upon the change; these analyses and assessments shall be exchanged by the Parties; and each Party shall thereafter keep the other fully informed of any additional information bearing upon the case.
Notes to Appendix B

Note 1 Throughout this Appendix:

a. "Foreign communications" are understood to mean those of the Government, or of any military, Air or Naval force, faction, party, department, agency or bureau of a foreign country, or any person or persons acting or purporting to act therefor, and shall include and private communications originated by nationals of a foreign country which may contain information of military, economic, political, or counter intelligence value. "Foreign country" is understood to include all countries, whether or not their governments are recognized by the US or the UK, excluding only the US and the British Commonwealth of Nations.

b. "Technical material" is understood to mean data concerning:

   (1) cryptographic systems,

   (2) communications procedures and methods,

   (3) methods and equipment, as used in or designed for COMINT processes,

and information related to any of the above.

c. "Communications intelligence" does not include the interception and study of non-communications transmissions. The term Signal Intelligence (Sigint) (as used by the UK) includes both COMINT and the interception and study of non-communications transmissions. These transmissions are outside the scope of this Appendix.
Note 3  Paragraph 34 shall be so interpreted as to allow:

a. The use of COMINT by indoctrinated persons in the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates, JIC appreciations and similar documents issued without COMINT codewords, as specified by either party, provided the statements contained in them are so generalised that they cannot be traced to a particular item of COMINT or to their COMINT origin. Specific COMINT detail must be restricted to supporting papers carrying the COMINT codeword.
1. This Annexure delineates the basis for (a) the establishment of Sub-Categories, (b) the assignment of COMINT to Categories and Sub-Categories, (c) the classification of COMINT assigned to Category I and (d) the application of codewords to designate Sub-Categories, as provided in paragraphs 5c, 5-8, 14 and 15 of Appendix B respectively. This Annexure is not intended to specify or accomplish the detailed categorization of all COMINT. However, along with the criteria described in paragraphs 9 and 10 of Appendix B, it governs the preparation and maintenance of current, mutually agreed lists, which are required under paragraph 11 of Appendix B, to indicate the precise assignment of all COMINT to Categories and Sub-Categories.

Category I shall contain:

a. Traffic intelligence relating to D/F mission assignments, bearing reports and fix reports (i.e.: target frequencies, call-signs, "piped signals", other signal information, bearings and fixes), provided that no interpretations of complex changing call-sign systems are included. This material shall normally be classified CONFIDENTIAL.

b. Plain-text tactical or operational traffic provided that no interpretations of complex changing call-sign systems, enciphered map references, or results of advanced traffic analysis are included. This material shall include local procedural and local grid and zone systems used for artillery direction, tactical control and movement of front line units, early warning and exercise of tactical combat control of aircraft. This material shall normally be classified CONFIDENTIAL.
c. Traffic Intelligence or Crypt Intelligence from analysis of radar tracking reports and visual observation reports as found in tactical or operational traffic, provided that enciphered aircraft type designations or interpretations of complex changing call sign systems are not included. Inclusion of local grid or zone references, local procedural codes used for brevity and plain-text interspersed with cover words is permissible. This material shall normally be classified CONFIDENTIAL.

d. Crypt Intelligence from naval tactical maneuvering codes, when used as such, and from jargon codes. This material shall normally be classified CONFIDENTIAL.

3. Category II shall contain

a. Traffic Intelligence (including freely available privacy and brevity systems) except where specifically assigned to other Categories. Category II plain-text which qualifies for exceptional handling under paragraph 35g of Appendix B shall include only such of the following as is not assigned to Category III under subparagraphs 4d and 4e below:

b. Crypt Intelligence specifically assigned on the basis of crypto-systems. USID and LSID shall have supplementary lists of all cryptosystems mutually adjudged suitable for inclusion in this Category kept jointly in current status by their respective technical groups. These lists shall be based upon the criteria in subparagraphs 9a, b, c, and d, and
paragraph 10 of Appendix B. Either Party may, after
consideration of advantages and risks as provided in sub-
paragraph 9e of Appendix B, assign any crypto-system
currently so listed to Category II. The other Party shall
then be notified immediately through the technical channel
used in maintaining the joint lists, and shall similarly
assign the crypto-system involved.

4. Category III shall contain:

a. Crypt Intelligence except where specifically assigned to
other Categories.

b. Traffic Intelligence involving call-signs or message
headings encrypted in codes or ciphers of high security
grading.

c. Traffic Intelligence involving such combination ("fusion")
of separate Traffic Intelligence or other Category II
sources as produces information whose value is so great that
security of content becomes the overriding consideration.

e. Material involving sensitive collection procedures or the
revelation of success against unusual, sensitive or complex
transmission procedures and devices.
SECURITY PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF COMINT ACTIVITIES IN EXPOSED AREAS

1. INTRODUCTION

It is recognized that effective interception of foreign communications and effective support of field commanders may require the establishment of COMINT activities in locations which may suddenly fall under unfriendly control with consequent loss of COMINT personnel and/or associated classified materials. It is agreed that in addition to the pertinent, general provisions of Appendix B, the specific provisions which follow shall govern the conduct of COMINT activities in such locations.

2. DEFINITIONS

Exposed areas are those which are susceptible of being quickly overrun by enemy forces or those wherein the local political or military situation is such as to pose a distinct threat to the security of COMINT activities conducted therein. At present they comprise primarily countries

and areas adjacent to these countries which are beyond defense lines expected to be tenable. In proportion to the risk of loss of COMINT personnel and/or classified material located therein, such areas involve three situations:

a. Protected situations, i.e.: those in which there is no reasonable expectation of such a loss.

b. Risky situations, i.e.: those in which it is likely that complete evacuation of COMINT personnel and removal or effective destruction of classified material will be accomplished.

c. Dangerous situations, i.e.: those in which it is unlikely that complete evacuation of COMINT personnel and removal or effective destruction of classified material will be accomplished.
3. EVALUATION OF SITUATIONS IN EXPOSED AREAS

The decision whether a given situation is protected, risky or dangerous shall be made by USCIB or ISIB, or by such other authorities as are responsible for the security of the COMINT activities concerned, and shall be made in the light of the political, military, and other factors affecting the safety of the COMINT personnel and materials involved.

4. FACTORS AFFECTING DECISIONS TO CONDUCT COMINT ACTIVITIES IN RISKY OR DANGEROUS SITUATIONS

COMINT activities shall be conducted in risky or dangerous situations only after due consideration of the COMINT losses which may result if the area concerned is suddenly attacked, and of the probable effect of such losses upon the conduct of COMINT activities elsewhere.

5. SAFEGUARDS FOR RISKY SITUATIONS

In the case of COMINT activities established in risky situations, the following safeguards shall be applied save as exceptions to them are specifically approved by USCIB or ISIB:

a. Only intercept, analytic and reporting tasks which cannot be performed satisfactorily in safe or protected situations shall be assigned.

b. No Category III COMINT or related documents and technical material shall be held except those essential to the assigned task and of current application thereto, and the latter shall be maintained in such condition as to insure immediate destruction, if necessary, upon sudden threat of seizure.

c. No person in Group D, as defined in sub-paragraph 30d of Appendix B, shall be assigned, unless required by technical considerations.

d. Facilities shall be provided with which of the complement can be expected to destroy effectively, if necessary, all classified
e. Appropriate steps shall be taken to ensure that adequate arrangements are made for safe evacuation of all personnel whose loss would be damaging and that the unit in question is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis.

6. SAFEGUARDS FOR DANGEROUS SITUATIONS

In the case of COMINT units established in dangerous situations the following safeguards shall be applied save as exceptions to them are specifically approved by USCIB or LSIB:

a. Only unique intercept tasks which cannot be accomplished elsewhere shall be assigned, and only such analysis as is locally required to support these tasks and permit essential technical reporting shall be performed.

b. Only COMINT documents or technical aids essential and of current application to these tasks shall be held.

c. No Category III COMINT or related documents and technical material shall be held.

d. Personnel technically informed in COMINT of a higher level or broader scope than is required for the limited mission of the unit should not be assigned if avoidable.

e. No person in Group C as defined in sub-paragraph 30c of Appendix B shall be assigned unless his presence is vital for the effective functioning of the unit.

f. No person in Group D as defined in sub-paragraph 30d of Appendix B shall be assigned in any circumstances.
g. Facilities shall be provided with which the minimum number of persons on duty at any one time can be expected to destroy effectively, if necessary, all classified COMINT materials within a time limit commensurate with existing dangers, and unit personnel shall be skilled in the use of these facilities.

h. Appropriate steps shall be taken to insure that the unit in question is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis.
APPENDIX D

CO-ORDINATION OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS AND EXCHANGE
OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS MATERIAL

(For details see Annexure D1)

1. It will be the joint objective of the parties to ensure that the required field of traffic analysis problems is covered as thoroughly as possible but only general rules can be laid down for the division of T/A responsibility between the two parties.

2. With this objective in view, unproductive duplication of detailed work will be eliminated and it is recognised that the best method of furthering this process of elimination is to exchange information where ever possible in the form of partly or fully processed material.

3. Published reports on Traffic Analysis will always be made available to the other party.

4. Where the exchange of published reports is inadequate the requirements for a more detailed exchange will be stated. These requirements will be satisfied as far as possible from the material being currently produced - e.g., work sheets, log digests, daily diagrams and other pre-digested material - but both parties will endeavour to meet any additional requirements by modifying the form or content of these partly-processed reports.

5. Where in any specific case the exchange of material provided for in paras. 3 and 4 above is inadequate either party may request copies of the unprocessed logs or chatter sheets. Such requests will be satisfied within the limits of the resources available.

6. The method of exchange in all cases will be by radio or by bag according to the nature and urgency of the material.

7. In order to facilitate the exchange of material a degree of standardisation will be aimed at in the use of names or abbreviations to describe T/A features, e.g., transmission-systems, call-sign systems, procedure codes, traffic types etc.

8. Continuing efforts will be made to apply common validity standards and terminology in T/A reports of both Agencies, to facilitate understanding and possible re-use of reports by the other Agency. The following adjectival meanings are accepted as standard for the validity designators "A" to "D".

OGA
EO 1.4.(c)
EO 1.4.(d)
10. The basis for the continuous co-ordination involved will be an exchange of reports consisting of:

(i) reports on intercept results as requested by either party.
(ii) lists of tasks allotted to stations (on a monthly or weekly basis as is required).
(iii) information on major changes in the cover situation (exchanged by signal).

**COORDINATION OF EFFORT ON D/F: [ ] AND [ ] TASKS**

11. In general the division of work must fall naturally according to the locations of D/F and intercept stations, and the intercept tasks and search programmes undertaken by each party.

12. Collaboration between the parties in the field of D/F shall be in the form of:

(i) requests from any agency direct to any other for bearings and fixes on specified targets and
(ii) the exchange of results.

13. Collaboration in the field of work will automatically occur in the normal exchange of Traffic Analysis.
APPENDIX D
Annexure D1
OUTLINE OF REVISIONS EFFECTED IN APPENDIX D
UKUSA AGREEMENT

A. CO-ORDINATION OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS AND EXCHANGE OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS MATERIAL

Para. 1. Wording revised.

2-7. No revision required.

8. Revised in order to incorporate provision for use of validity indicators contained in US/UK Conference Agreement, July 1951.

9. No revision required. (Reviewed by NSA-61)

10. No revision required.

11. No revision required.

12. No revision required.

13. No revision required.

B. APPENDIX D, Annexure D1. (Old sheet #1)

The wording of the present heading changed to reflect arrangements currently in effect.

Para. (i). Exhibit 6 deleted.

(ii). No revision required.

C. (i) CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING ALLOCATION OF MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERCEPTION

Para. 1. No revision required.

2. Last sentence revised in keeping with current practice.

3. Deleted.

Renumbered old sub-paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7 to read 3, 4, 5 and 6; no other revisions required. Old paragraph 8 deleted, no longer applicable.

D. (ii) EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON STANDARD FIELD INTERCEPT OPERATIONS

Para. 7. Wording revised in order to provide for continuing, as opposed to initial, exchange of the type of documents listed in 9(a) and 9(b).

7a (1). DSR Format changed to: "Station Coverage Format".

(6). D/F Manual changed to read "D/F Manual (when available)".

(8). Log Digest Format changed to read "TECSIM Format".

(10). "DARE Format" added.
E. APPENDIX D, Annexure D1, Exhibit 1
Exhibit 1 has been almost completely revised inasmuch as only a very few of the present paragraphs can be retained.

G. APPENDIX D, Annexure D1, Exhibit 3
Exhibit 3 has been completely revised.

H. APPENDIX D, Annexure D1, Exhibit 4
INTERCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TARGETS
Para 1. No revision required. (Reviewed by NSA-61)
Para 2. No revision required. (Reviewed by NSA-61)
Para 3. No revision required. (Reviewed by NSA-61)
Para 4. No revision required. (Reviewed by NSA-61)
I. **APPENDIX D, Annexure D1, Exhibit 5**

**ASSOCIATION OF U.S. AND U.K. D/F FACILITIES**

Para 1. No revision required. (Reviewed by NSA-61)

Para 2a. 8th line change AFSA to NSA. (Reviewed by NSA-61)

Para 2b. No revision required. (Reviewed by NSA-61)

Para 3. 3rd line, delete the word "projected". (Reviewed by NSA-61)

J. **APPENDIX D, Annexure D1, Exhibit 6**

Delete this exhibit.
APPENDIX H

COMMUNICATIONS

(For details See Annexure H1)

1. TELECOMMUNICATIONS REQUIRED

Exclusive and readily extensible telecommunications between Agencies, and between Agencies and their outlying stations, will be maintained in order to make possible the rapid flow of all types of raw traffic from the points of interception to the several Agencies; the rapid exchange of all types of raw traffic, technical matter and Communication Intelligence between the Agencies; and the efficient control of interception coverage. In addition lateral communications between stations of one party and Agencies or stations of the other may be provided for the same purposes as necessary and mutually agreed.

2. INSTALLATION, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF TERMINALS

The terminals of circuits or channels intended exclusively to carry Comint traffic between the British Commonwealth and the United States will be installed, maintained and operated as arranged by the appropriate Comint Authorities of the countries concerned and, although normally such terminals will be installed, maintained and operated by the appropriate U.S. or British Commonwealth authority on whose territory the terminals are situated, this will not be obligatory.

3. PROVISION OF EQUIPMENT

The provision of equipment of all types will be by mutual assistance where necessary and practicable and as agreed in each specific case.

4. CRYPTOGRAPHIC AIDS

a. Common cryptographic aids will be used for combined Comint communications. The matter of cryptographic aids will be kept continuously
under review with the object of maintaining and increasing security and of facilitating communications.

b. In order to reduce the number of personnel required for communication and cryptographic operations and thereby to augment the forces available for direct intercept operations, and also to improve speed and accuracy, the ultimate goal should be the transmission of all Comint material in on-line cryptosystems. Every effort should be made towards this end, consistent with the policies of the Services of both countries.

5. BAG ROUTES

Bag routes will be kept under review with the object of taking full advantage of sea and air services.

6. MICROFILM

All agencies will be equipped to handle microfilm so that it may be available for use when it is not practicable to send the original material.

7. COMMUNICATIONS LIAISON

A representative of the Director, GCSB, and a representative of the Director, National Security Agency, will be given the specific duty of keeping under review Comint communications problems and advising on such problems as they occur.

8. COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY OTHER APPENDICES

It is agreed that when all appendices which impose a communication requirement are approved by Comint authorities concerned, such communication requirements will be included in Annexure H.1.
OGA
EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)
(b) Implementation will be phased to meet the communication requirements of the U.S. intercept stations and units currently located and planned for location in the U.K., and should be completed not later than the date of establishment of the U.S. CCCC.

(e) The requirement for this facility includes synchronous on-line cryptographic operation and a minimum capability of handling 20 per cent of its normal hourly capacity during any hour of the day.

5. **TRANS-PACIFIC FACILITIES**

a. Requirements

(1) When the 367th Signals unit as a whole moves from Hongkong to Okinawa there will be a requirement to pass an estimated 100,000 groups of traffic daily from Okinawa to Melbourne. As a matter of expediency and economy, the possibility of expanding the existing USAF RAAF single channel circuit between these points to multichannel operation should be explored.

(2) Subject to later discussion between NSA-DSB-GCEQ, it is considered that there may be requirements for direct communication between DSB and NSA (and possibly Tokyo and Hawaii). In the meanwhile essential communications will be passed by GCEQ.

6. **OTHER COMBINED COMMUNICATION NETS AND LINKS (EXISTING AND PLANNED)**

a. **GCEQ - 6910 SG - 365 SU Net**

(1) **GCEQ - 6910 SG Link**
This is a simplex circuit operated on-line.

(2) **6910 SG 365 SU Link**
This is a simplex circuit operated on-line.

(3) **6910 SG Cheadle Link**
This circuit is being held in abeyance.
EGA
EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)
EO 1.4.(c)
EO 1.4.(d)
ADDITION OF FOOTNOTE TO APPENDIX P

The Conference agreed upon the following definition of "releasable" equipment for insertion as a footnote to paragraph 4 of Appendix P:

"Releasable" equipment is defined as that equipment which is releasable under the national policies of the country making the delivery. In general, releasable equipment is considered to be that which either can be purchased commercially or is available through governmental sources and classified not higher than CONFIDENTIAL."
APPENDIX P
ANNEXURE P1

COMINT ARRANGEMENTS FOR SACEUR

1. GENERAL

1. The following principles affecting the COMINT arrangements for SACEUR apply to planning for wartime except insofar as provision is made in paragraphs 26 - 29 below for additional peacetime co-operation. They will be the basis on which the U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities will negotiate with SACEUR and on which subsequent negotiations with Third Party nations should be conducted. Any alterations of principle which may become necessary as the result of these negotiations will be agreed between the U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities and appropriate amendment made herein.

2. In order that the arrangements contained herein may be effective on the outbreak of war, it will be necessary to initiate planning in peacetime with the Third Party nations concerned. This planning activity should begin as soon as possible.

3. In order to promote the greatest possible readiness for war, it may be necessary to extend this peacetime co-operation beyond the stage of planning. The decision when to enter upon this second stage will be taken by the U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities at some later date in the light of the then-prevailing international situation and of the experience gained in the course of co-operation with Third Party nations on COMINT planning.

NOTE: Pertinent definitions for the purposes of this paper are given at Exhibit 1 hereto.

II. DETAILED PROPOSALS

SACEUR Y STRUCTURE

4. The SACEUR Y Structure should have the following elements:

(a) A senior Y officer at SHAPE (SACEUR Y officer) assisted by a Y staff.

(b) Y staffs, where required, at headquarters of major subordinate Force Commanders under SACEUR.

(c) National armed forces Y units provided specifically for direct support of their own national forces operating under SACEUR.

5. The responsibility for formulating and implementing SACEUR's Y policy should lie with A.C. of S. (1), SHAPE.
PARTICIPATION IN SACEUR Y STRUCTURE

6. Participation in the SACEUR Y Structure, including Y staffs, should be open to all nations contributing to SACEUR command, as a normal minimum, combat forces equivalent to a U.S. or British Corps, together with Y units adequate for their direct support, provided that these nations undertake to enforce appropriate security measures as set forth in Exhibit 2 hereto, and also undertake to apply the principles set forth therein, as a minimum, to all other COMINT activities under their control.

7. Each participating nation should provide and maintain the Y units needed for the direct support of its forces under SACEUR and should ensure their operational efficiency.

FUNCTIONS OF THE SHAPE Y STAFF

8. The functions of the SHAPE Y Staff under A.C. of S. (I) should include:

(a) effecting any necessary general co-ordination of the SACEUR Y effort;

(b) establishing as far as national differences permit uniform operational procedures between Y units of different nations;

(c) giving technical advice as required to the SHAPE Intelligence Staff on the interpretation of Y information received by SHAPE, and arranging for the SHAPE Intelligence Staff to receive all the Y information available in the SACEUR Command which may be of value to it;

(d) formulating and supervising compliance with security regulations and policies governing the production, handling and dissemination of Y material within the SACEUR Command in accordance with the agreed security principles in Exhibit 2 hereto;

(e) arranging for Y units to receive such technical material and end-product, whether produced in the SACEUR Command or received from national sources, as may be necessary for efficient conduct of their operations;

(f) co-ordinating arrangements for the exchange of traffic between Y units within the SACEUR Y Structure and for the flow of traffic from Y units in that structure to national COMINT authorities as required;

(g) arranging for material of technical COMINT interest, including prisoner of war interrogations, prisoner of war reports, and captured documents and equipment to be made immediately available as appropriate to the elements of the SACEUR Y Structure and to national COMINT authorities;
(b) establishing and stating to the appropriate authorities requirements for such special communications and crypto-channels as may be necessary to meet the operational and security requirements of the Y effort within the SACEUR command.

FUNCTIONS OF Y STAFFS AT SUBORDINATE COMMANDS

9. Y staffs at subordinate commands should perform functions corresponding to those of the Y staff at SHAPE.

FUNCTIONS OF Y UNITS

10. The main task of a Y unit should be to serve its own command or formation with information of immediate value about forces directly opposing that command or formation.

11. When necessary a Y unit may support a command or formation of a different participating nation. Any arrangements for such support or any combination of Y units of one nationality with those of another nationality will be subject to agreement of the military commanders of the forces for whose support the units were provided, or of the cognizant national COMINT authority if required.

COMINT UNITS IN THE SACEUR AREA NOT ENGAGED IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF FORCES UNDER SACEUR

12. Each nation with forces serving under SACEUR may individually arrange with the authorities concerned to operate in the theatre national COMINT units not provided specifically or exclusively for direct support of the forces under SACEUR. These units will not operate as part of the SACEUR Y Structure and will not be subject to the arrangements for inter-allied co-operation.

13. The U.S. and the U.K. will maintain an operational separation and, insofar as practicable, a physical separation between the Y units and their national COMINT units.

14. It is recognized that certain COMINT units at the higher levels (e.g. Army Group) would be directly supporting both SACEUR and their national COMINT organizations. Each participating nation would have discretion about such matters as the right of access of other nationals to these units.

CO-OPERATION WITH THIRD PARTIES WITHIN SACEUR Y STRUCTURE

15. Co-operation with Third Parties within the SACEUR Y Structure should be confined within the limits necessary to meet the essential Y needs of the Armed Forces contributed by them to SACEUR and must not reveal that there is COMINT collaboration between the U.S. and U.K. outside the sphere of Y. Within the limits agreed for the release of COMINT material produced by U.S. and U.K. organizations (see paragraphs 20 and 21 below), co-operation with Third Parties should be wholehearted.
16. The channels for the provision of technical assistance to Third Parties from U.S./U.K. national CONINT sources should be via the highest levels of U.S. and U.K. Thebre CONINT organizations or via the SHAPE Y staff whichever is more appropriate in individual cases.

17. To so far as consistent with the agreed limits for the release of U.S. and U.K. CONINT, and in order to secure the necessary degree of uniformity, Third Parties should be persuaded to adopt certain common operational procedures (e.g. those parts of the BROWN notation system used by the U.S. and U.K. Y units supporting forces under SACEUR).

MOVEMENT OF Y MATERIAL BETWEEN UNITS UNDER SACEUR AND THIRD PARTY NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

18. The Y units and Y staffs of the participating nations would be at liberty to pass to their own national CONINT organizations and to other participating nations, but to those nations only, the technical material and traffic produced or received by themselves. The national CONINT organizations of the participating nations should in turn provide such technical support both to their own Y units and through the SHAPE Y staff to the Y units of other participating nation as they may consider would be appropriate and of assistance to the Y effort under SACEUR. Such material shall be handled in accordance with the regulations in Exhibit 2 hereto.

EXCHANGE OF INTERNALLY PRODUCED CONINT END-PRODUCT BETWEEN SACEUR AND OTHER SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDERS

19. Exchange with other major Commanders of NATO of internally produced CONINT end-product and appreciations should be as agreed between the Supreme Allied Commanders concerned and should be confined to the highest levels practicable. Such exchange should take place in a secure cryptographic channel provided exclusively for that purpose. As a condition of such exchange, the security principles set forth in Exhibit 2 hereto shall be applied as a minimum for the handling of the material in the Commands concerned.

RELEASE OF TRAFFIC INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED BY U.S. AND U.K. ORGANIZATIONS

20. The release to Third Parties in the SACEUR Command of Traffic intelligence produced by U.S. and U.K. organizations will, within the limitations of the need-to-know and the provisions of Exhibits 2 and 3 hereto, be subject to the following conditions:

(a) First ( releasable) Category

Class 1

This consists of Y material, both end-product and technical material, produced by U.S. and U.K. Y units, and material of the same kind and supplementary to it produced by U.S. and U.K. CONINT organizations. This class will normally be released automatically in wartime but the decision to commence automatic release of this class will be subject
to mutual agreement between the cognizant U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities. All or any part of this material will be withheld at any time by both parties if either party declares that release would be hazardous to its national interests.

**Class II**

This consists of COMINT material, both end-product and technical material which, although produced by a U.S. or U.K. COMINT organization other than a Y unit, would be capable of production by Y units, and which, if passed to a Y unit, would enable that unit to achieve a significantly higher degree of exploitation of its normal tasks. Both U.S. and U.K. national COMINT authorities must be in agreement before material in this class may be released. They will continuously review the class and maintain agreed lists of the material included in it.

**(b) Second (Non-releasable) Category**

This consists of the remainder of Traffic Intelligence not included above. It may not be released to Third Parties except as indicated in Exhibit 3 hereto.

**RELEASE OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE**

**21.** Special Intelligence will only be released to Third Parties in the SACEUR Command in accordance with the provisions of Exhibit 3 hereto.

**PRINCIPLES FOR DEALING WITH COMINT END-PRODUCT INTRODUCED INTO ALLIED CHANNELS BY THIRD PARTIES**

**22.** COMINT end-product introduced by Third Parties into Allied Intelligence channels will be handled in accordance with paragraphs 20 and 21 of Exhibit 2 hereto.

**CO-OPERATION IN PLANNING OF WAR-TIME Y STRUCTURE**

**23.** It is agreed that co-operation with Third Parties in planning the wartime structure should begin in peacetime and as soon as possible, and that there should be step-by-step implementation of the SACEUR Y programme in consonance with satisfactory testing of each successive step. It is considered advantageous to establish relations with one Third Party nation at a time until all those considered eligible are included. Before making any proposals to individual Third Party nations which may necessitate the disclosure of information regarding U.S. or U.K. plans for Y, SACEUR should seek the concurrence of the U.S. or U.K. COMINT authorities.

**24.** In any approach to Third Parties within the SACEUR Command with regard to the planning of a wartime Y structure the following principles should apply:

(a) There must be no disclosure to Third Parties of any U.S./U.K. COMINT collaboration outside the SACEUR Command, and co-operation in planning should be conducted without revealing present U.S. and U.K. COMINT successes or the scale and nature of their present and planned COMINT effort.
(b) As a condition of co-operation in planning the SACEUR Y Structure Third Party nations must accept and adhere to minimum security regulations governing the production and handling of Y material.

c) Knowledge of the details of the planning of the SACEUR Y structure must be restricted to nationals of those nations taking part in that planning.

25. The planning and negotiations in any approach should be done by the SACEUR Y officer, assisted by such officers of the U.S. and U.K. services concerned as it may prove necessary to appoint. He and his staff should establish, within the framework of the agreed wartime arrangements, a skeleton organization and communications network designed to ensure the orderly expansion and effective operation of the Y structure on the outbreak of war. They should also develop such common or similar procedures as may be desirable and practicable.

26. In order to carry out his planning task, and in order to advise Third Party nations, the SACEUR Y officer should be provided with pertinent information on the subjects listed below. The nations concerned should each designate the authority with whom he may communicate on these and other Y matters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Y units</th>
<th>Number of units planned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>Basic operational organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manpower complements (by function)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of intercept positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(in broad categories, e.g. H/F Voice, D/F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency ranges of intercept equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications equipment of Y units</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LIMITS OF PEACETIME CO-OPERATION BEYOND PLANNING THE WAR TIME STRUCTURE

27. As planning of the wartime structure proceeds, it may become necessary to undertake further peacetime co-operation with Third Party nations contributing forces to SACEUR in order to ensure the greatest possible readiness for war.

28. The first phase of this further co-operation will consist of a limited exchange with Third Party nations of traffic and technical material. The material provided by U.S. and British COMINT authorities will consist of selected traffic and technical data designed to assist Third Party nations to train Y and Intelligence personnel for eventual service with forces under SACEUR. The commencement of this phase will be subject to the agreement of the U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities and the provision of the material may be progressively expanded, within the following limitations, as specifically agreed by U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities in each case and in the following order:

(a) Raw traffic selected in accordance with identification criteria known to be available to the Third Party.
(b) Raw traffic selected in accordance with identification criteria not known to be available to the Third Party, and not involving revelation of more than low grade technical success.

d) Results of traffic analysis and plain text not involving solution of complex call sign or procedure systems.

29. As a second phase and depending upon developments in the international situation, co-operation may later be extended by agreement of the U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities within the limits agreed for wartime co-operation. This second phase will be designed to cover actual needs which will by then have become apparent. It will be conditioned by the greater knowledge of Third Party activities and of the security risks involved which will have been acquired during the earlier stages of peacetime co-operation.

30. COMINT dissemination to Third Parties in peacetime, beyond that provided for above, will be governed by the principles and regulations contained in Exhibit 3 hereto, and will commence on a date to be agreed by the U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities and SACEUR.
INTRODUCTION

1. These principles shall be the basis in peace and war of all security regulations and policies governing the production, handling and dissemination of Y.

DEFINITION

2. Y is Communication Intelligence which mobile field units can derive from the timely processing of traffic procured by them by listening to enemy communications for the purpose of providing intelligence for the commanders of the forces which they are directly supporting. It includes raw traffic, end-product, technical material, working documents and captured material used in its production. It also includes intelligence reports, appreciations and summaries based on Y unless the information is so generalized that it cannot be traced back to a particular item of Y or to Y in general.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION

3. Nations participating in the SACEUR Y effort must, as a condition of participation, agree to accept and adhere to these regulations.

4. Each country participating in the SACEUR Y effort will designate a national authority to deal with all questions of Y security and enforce these regulations.

5. Each national authority will designate a Y Security Officer to whom Y materials and communications relating thereto shall be addressed.

6. SACEUR will formulate and supervise compliance with security regulations and policies for Y within the SACEUR command.

7. Before an individual in any capacity has access to the knowledge or results of the SACEUR Y effort, he must be screened and cleared as being of unquestioned loyalty by his national authority. The screening must be as thorough as possible and at least as thorough as that given to individuals having access to COSMIC information. In addition to such clearance, each individual serving under SACEUR command must be specifically nominated to receive Y either by SACEUR or by the concerned national authority. In the latter case the nomination must be approved by SACEUR. In exceptional screening, clearance and nomination may be waived for those individuals appointed to certain key posts, a list of which should be drawn up by SACEUR. Such personnel may be given access to Y upon the authority of the appropriate commander.
8. Prior to being given access to Y, each individual will be Y indoctrinated by a special warning on the sensitivity of Y sources to compromise and be required to sign a document drawing attention to his special responsibility for safeguarding Y and to the consequences which the law or administrative or executive order of his country, or order of SACEUR, provides, if either by intent or negligence he allows Y to come to the notice of unauthorized persons. It must be stressed that there is no time limit in that the information must be safeguarded indefinitely.

9. Distribution of Y must be on the need-to-know principle; i.e. each item of Y shall be made known only to those Y indoctrinated individuals who require it in the performance of their duties. SACEUR will maintain control lists of indoctrinated Y recipients in forces under his command other than those engaged in the production of Communication Intelligence. He will ensure that the number is kept to the minimum consistent with essential intelligence and operational needs. National authorities will maintain similar lists of their own nationals and apply similar restrictions.

10. Y indoctrinees must not be allowed to run a greater risk of capture or interrogation by enemies or potential enemies than is absolutely necessary for the efficient performance of their duties. This must also apply to a period of six months after they have ceased to receive Y material except during active operations in cases of impelling necessity.

11. The greatest care must be taken not to betray Y success by actions based on it. Efforts should be made, if at all possible, to devise suitable cover, such as reconnaissance. The source should on no account be needlessly risked.

12. SACEUR will determine the level to which Y will be disseminated. Normally, in ground forces this will not be below a Corps. In exceptional instances, where it is essential for immediate operational purposes, information based on Y may, as specifically authorized by a Y indoctrinated commander, be disseminated below the normal level to unindoctrinated individuals provided the source is not disclosed. Where possible, names, time, positions and other data identical with that from the original text must be omitted, or, if the retention of such an item or items is essential, must be carefully paraphrased. Such information must be passed by a secure despatch service, by a secure line or in a cipher system approved by SACEUR. It must not be passed in clear by radio (including radio telephone).

13. Knowledge of the methods and scope of, and the technical material resulting from, the SACEUR Y effort will be restricted to the nationals of the nations which participate in the SACEUR Y effort. Access to the Y end-product should, as far as possible, be similarly restricted.

*Note: Throughout this paper where level of command is expressed in army terms, it shall be understood to include commands in other services with equivalent requirements.
CLASSIFICATION AND PROCEDURES:

14. All Y resulting from the SACEUR Y effort will be classified SECRET and designated by a codeword (except as provided in paragraph 10 below). The classification and the codeword shall appear on every sheet of paper which contains or discloses the existence of Y, except that, at the discretion of the unit commander, this provision need not be applied to purely working documents within a Y unit. The codeword indicates that the material must be handled in accordance with these regulations, and used in its meaning, the codeword for Y will also bear the classification SECRET. The codeword and its implication shall not be made known to persons not indoctrinated in Y nor shall it be used in its codeword sense in the presence of such persons.

15. In peacetime, if Y documents are to be transmitted by bag within SACEUR’s Command, the route and procedure must be specially authorized by SACEUR having regard to the adequacy of the security of the route and procedure. Documents should be double-wrapped and addressed to a Y indoctrinated officer (by name, not function); the inner envelope should bear the appropriate security classification but not the codeword. In wartime, discretion will be left to the local commander to make the most secure arrangements possible. As a minimum, documents must be sent by hand of officer or by a secure despatch service.

16. If Y is transmitted within SACEUR’s command by electrical means or by any physical means not completely secure, a secure cryptographic channel reserved exclusively for this requirement must be used. Participating nations must additionally ensure that when Y is similarly transmitted in or out of, or externally to the SACEUR command the cryptographic system or systems specially provided are used exclusively.

17. The highest standard of physical security must be applied to the custody of Y by national authorities and within SACEUR’s command. Normally, except when in transit under conditions prescribed herein, Y materials and communications relating thereto must at all times be:

   (a) under the direct surveillance of a Y indoctrinated person responsible for their safe-keeping or

   (b) locked in a three-combination safe accessible only to Y indoctrinated personnel, or

   (c) stored in a locked compartment which is under constant surveillance by an armed sentry and which is accessible only to Y indoctrinated personnel.

18. Y documents must be destroyed as soon as they have ceased to be of use. This is particularly important in field conditions where destruction must be by fire.
19. In order that necessary operational use can be made of certain types of low-level tactical Y (such as D/F bearings and plain text messages) on which immediate action must obviously be taken in combat operations, SACUR may prescribe less stringent security regulations which will permit the dissemination of such Y, without a codeword and at a classification not below Confidential, to unindoctrinated recipients who need to know.

20. COMINT end-product or intelligence based on COMINT introduced into Allied intelligence channels by Third Parties participating in the Y-structure of the command should be handled in Y-channels and subjected to the security measures prescribed for handling Y. Where such Third Party COMINT is furnished by a participating National COMINT authority or organization and is of a higher grade than Y material produced within the Y-structure or than the COMINT supplied to the Y-organization by U.S./U.K. COMINT authorities, it will be passed through Y-channels and its distribution will be kept to a minimum.

21. COMINT end-product or intelligence based on COMINT introduced into Allied intelligence channels by Third Parties not participating in the Y-structure of the command should, whenever possible, be transferred to Y-channels at the first point at which such end-product or intelligence come to the attention of Y personnel, and from that point transmitted directly to the Supreme Allied Commander's Y Officer. Care should be taken not to compromise the existence of Y-channels as such. The Supreme Allied Commander's Y Officer should bring any such material to the attention of the AC of S (J) for decision as to further action or dissemination. In deciding on such further action or dissemination the AC of S (J) will give full consideration to the need to protect COMINT.

22. National authorities and SACUR must expand these principles into a set of regulations adapted to local conditions. Copies of the Y security regulations of each national authority will be forwarded to SACUR through Y channels.
APPENDIX P

ANNEXURE P2

COMINT ARRANGEMENTS FOR SAACLANT

I. GENERAL

1. The following principles affecting the COMINT arrangements for SAACLANT apply to planning for wartime except insofar as provision is made in paragraphs 26-28 below for additional peacetime cooperation. They will be the basis on which Canadian/U.K./U.S. COMINT authorities will negotiate with SAACLANT and on which subsequent negotiations with Third Party nations should be conducted. Any alterations in principle which may become necessary as the result of these negotiations will be agreed among Canadian/U.K./U.S. COMINT authorities and appropriate amendment made herein.

2. In order that the arrangements contained herein may be effective on the outbreak of war, it will be necessary to initiate planning in peacetime with the Third Party nations concerned. This planning activity should begin as soon as possible.

3. In order to promote the greatest possible readiness for war, it may be necessary to extend this peacetime cooperation beyond the stage of planning. The decision when to enter upon this second stage will be taken by Canadian/U.K./U.S. COMINT authorities at some later date in the light of the then prevailing international situation and of the experience gained in the course of cooperation with Third Party nations on COMINT planning.

NOTE: Pertinent definitions for the purpose of this paper are given in Exhibit 1 hereto.
II. DETAILED PROPOSALS

SAKLANT Y STRUCTURE

4. The SAKLANT Y Structure should have the following elements:
   a. A senior Y officer at SAKLANT Headquarters (SAKLANT Y Officer)
      assisted by a Y staff.
   b. Y Officers and Y Staffs, where required, at headquarters
      of major subordinate Commanders under SAKLANT.
   c. National Y units provided for support of SAKLANT Forces.

5. It is recommended that the responsibility for formulating and
   implementing SAKLANT Y policy lie with A. C. of S. (I), SAKLANT.

PARTICIPATION IN SAKLANT Y STRUCTURE

6. Participation in the SAKLANT Y Structure, including Y staffs,
   should be open to all nations contributing combat forces to SAKLANT
   command, together with Y units adequate for their direct support, or
   contributing Y units for general support of the SAKLANT command. It
   shall be a condition of participation that these nations undertake to
   enforce appropriate security measures as set forth in Exhibit 2 hereto,
   and also undertake to apply the principles set forth therein, as a mini-
   mum, to all other COMINT activities under their control. Participation
   in the activities of the SAKLANT Y Structure should be limited to those
   nations whose geographical location and Y units can, in SAKLANT's
   opinion, contribute to the overall effectiveness of the structure.
   Participation only in the shore-based direction finder operations will not
   necessarily entitle a nation or its nationals to receive other types of Y
   information.
7. Each participating nation should provide and maintain its own Y units contributed for the support of SACLANT, or of forces under his command, and should ensure their operational efficiency.

FUNCTIONS OF THE SACLANT HEADQUARTERS Y STAFF

8. Within the limits of agreed cooperation, the functions of the SACLANT Headquarters Y Officer and Staff should include:

a. Effecting any necessary general coordination of the SACLANT Y effort;

b. Establishing as far as national differences permit uniform operational procedures between Y units of different nations;

c. Giving technical advice as required to the SACLANT Headquarters Intelligence Staff on the interpretation of Y information received by SACLANT Headquarters, and arranging for the SACLANT Headquarters Intelligence Staff to receive all the Y information available in the SACLANT Command which may be of value to it;

d. Formulating and supervising compliance with security regulations and policies governing the production, handling, and dissemination of Y material within the SACLANT Command in accordance with the agreed security principles in Exhibit 2 hereto.

e. Arranging for Y units to receive such technical material and end-products, whether produced in the SACLANT Command or received from national sources, as may be necessary for efficient conduct of their operations.

f. Establishing and stating to the appropriate authorities requirements for special communications and crypto-channels as necessary to meet operational and security requirements of the Y effort within SACLANT's Command.

g. Subject to security regulations, maintaining effective liaison with other activities, such as radio warfare, which may relate to or affect
the discharge of his COMINT responsibilities. (Arrangements in this paper do not include radio warfare.)

b. Arranging, within the procedures stipulated by NATO, for material of technical COMINT interest, including prisoner of war interrogations, prisoner of war reports, and captured documents and equipment to be made immediately available as appropriate to the elements of the SACLANT Y Structure and to national COMINT authorities.

FUNCTIONS OF Y STAFFS AT SUBORDINATE COMMANDS

9. Y Officers and Y Staffs at subordinate commands should perform functions corresponding to those of the Y staff at SACLANT Headquarters.

FUNCTIONS OF Y UNITS

10. Y units should intercept and process material and provide D/F information to meet the requirements prescribed by SACLANT. Any combination of Y units of one nationality with those of another will be subject to agreement of cognizant national COMINT authorities if required.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

11. International cooperation in Y within SACLANT's Command is expected to consist of:

a. Coordinated shore-based direction finder operations by national nets and stations organized and controlled as mutually agreed among the participating nations.

b. Direction finder and intercept operations in allied vessels.

c. Interception and processing by national Y units of enemy communications of tactical interest to SACLANT.

d. Certain exchange and coordination with SACEUR's Y structure.
COMINT UNITS IN THE SACLANT AREA NOT ENGAGED IN SUPPORT OF FORCES UNDER SACLANT

12. Each nation with forces serving under SACLANT may individually arrange to operate in SACLANT's area national COMINT units not provided specifically or exclusively for support of the forces under SACLANT. These units will not operate as part of the SACLANT Y structure, and will not be subject to the arrangements for inter-allied cooperation unless agreed by the nations providing them.

13. Canada, U.K., and U.S. will maintain an operational separation and, insofar as practicable, a physical separation between the Y units and their national COMINT units.

14. It is recognized that certain COMINT units at the higher levels would be directly supporting both SACLANT and their national COMINT organizations. Each participating nation would have discretion about such matters as the right of access of other nationals to these units.

COOPERATION WITH THIRD PARTIES WITHIN SACLANT Y STRUCTURE

15. Cooperation with Third Parties within the SACLANT Y structure should be confined within the limits necessary to meet the essential Y needs of SACLANT and the forces under his command and must not reveal that there is COMINT collaboration among Canada, U.K., and U.S. outside the sphere of Y. Within the limits agreed for the release of COMINT material produced by Canadian/U.K./U.S. organizations (see paragraphs 20 and 21 below), cooperation with Third Parties should be wholehearted.

16. The channels for the provision of technical material to Third Parties from Canadian/U.K./U.S. national COMINT sources should be via the SACLANT Y staff.

17. Insofar as consistent with the agreed limits for the release of Canadian/U.K./U.S. COMINT, and in order to secure the necessary degree of uniformity, Third Parties should be persuaded to adopt certain common operational procedures.
MOVEMENT OF Y MATERIAL BETWEEN UNITS UNDER SACLANT AND THIRD PARTY NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

18. The Y units and Y staffs of the participating nations would be at liberty to pass to their own national COMINT organizations and to other participating nations, but to those nations only, the technical material and traffic produced or received by themselves. The national COMINT organizations of the participating nations should in turn provide such technical support both to their own Y units and through the SACLANT Y staff to the Y units of other participating nations as they may consider would be appropriate and of assistance to the Y effort under SACLANT.

Such material shall be handled in accordance with the regulations in Exhibit 2 hereto.

EXCHANGE OF INTERNALLY PRODUCED COMINT END-PRODUCTS BETWEEN SACLANT AND OTHER SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDERS

19. Exchange with other major Commanders of NATO of internally produced COMINT end-products and intelligence summaries based thereon should be as agreed between the Supreme Allied Commanders concerned and should be confined to the highest levels practicable. Such exchange should take place in a secure cryptographic channel provided exclusively for such material. As a condition of such exchange, the security principles set forth in Exhibit 2 hereto shall be applied as a minimum for the handling of the material in the Commands concerned.

RELEASE OF TRAFFIC INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED BY CANADIAN/U.K./U.S. ORGANIZATIONS

20. The release to Third Parties in the SACLANT Command of Traffic Intelligence produced by Canadian/U.K./U.S. organizations will, within the limitations of the need-to-know and the provisions of Exhibit 2 and 3 hereto, be subject to the following conditions:
a. First (releasable) Category

Class I

This consists of Y material, both end-products and technical material, produced by Canadian/U.K./U.S. Y units, and material of the same kind and supplementary to it produced by national Canadian/U.K./U.S. COMINT organizations. This class will normally be released automatically in wartime but the decision to commence automatic release of this class will be subject to mutual agreement among the cognizant Canadian/U.K./U.S. COMINT authorities. All or any part of this material will be withheld at any time by these parties if one party declares that release would be hazardous to its national interests.

Class II

This consists of COMINT material, both end-products and technical material which, although produced by a Canadian/U.K./U.S. COMINT organization other than a Y unit, would be capable of production by Y units, and which, if passed to a Y unit, would enable that unit to achieve a significantly higher degree of exploitation of its normal tasks. Canadian/U.K./U.S. national COMINT authorities must be in agreement before material in this class may be released. They will continuously review the class and maintain agreed lists of the material included in it.

b. Second (Non-releasable) Category

This consists of the remainder of Traffic Intelligence not included above. It may not be released to Third Parties except as indicated in Exhibit 3 hereto.

RELEASE OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE

21. Special Intelligence will only be released to Third Parties in the SACLANT Command in accordance with the provisions of Exhibit 3 hereto.
PRINCIPLES FOR DEALING WITH COMINT END-PRODUCT INTRODUCED INTO ALLIED CHANNELS BY THIRD PARTIES

22. COMINT end-product introduced by Third Parties into Allied Intelligence channels will be handled in accordance with paragraphs 20 and 21 of Exhibit 2 hereto.

COOPERATION IN PLANNING OF WARTIME Y STRUCTURE

23. It is agreed that cooperation with Third Parties in planning the wartime structure should begin in peacetime and as soon as possible, and that there should be step-by-step implementation of the SACLANT Y program in consonance with satisfactory testing of each successive step. It is considered advantageous to establish relations with one Third Party nation at a time until all those considered eligible are included. Before making any proposals to individual Third Party nations which may necessitate the disclosure of information regarding Canadian/U.K. or U.S. plans for Y, SACLANT should seek the concurrence of Canadian, U.K. or U.S. COMINT authorities.

24. In any approach to Third Parties within the SACLANT Command with regard to the planning of a wartime Y structure the following principles should apply:

a. There must be no disclosure to Third Parties of any Canadian/U.K./U.S. COMINT collaboration outside the SACLANT Command, and cooperation in planning should be conducted without revealing present Canadian/U.K./U.S. COMINT successes or the scale and nature of their present and planned COMINT effort.

b. As a condition of cooperation in planning the SACLANT Y structure Third Party nations must accept and adhere to minimum security regulations governing the production and handling of Y material.

c. Knowledge of the details of the planning of the SACLANT Y structure must be restricted to nationals of those nations taking part in that planning.

25. The planning and negotiations in any approach should be done by the SACLANT Y officer, assisted by such officers of the Canadian/U.K./U.S.
Services concerned as it may prove necessary to appoint. He and his staff should establish, within the framework of the agreed wartime arrangements, a skeleton organization designed to ensure the orderly expansion and effective operation of the Y structure on the outbreak of war. They should also develop such common or similar procedures as may be desirable and practicable.

26. In order to carry out his planning task, and in order to advise Third Party nations, the SACLANT Y officer should be provided with pertinent information on the subjects listed below. The nations concerned should each designate the authority with whom he may communicate on these and other Y matters.

Types of Y units
Number of units planned
Administration
Basic operational organization
Manpower complements (by function)
Number of intercept positions (in broad categories, e.g., H/F Voice, D/F
Frequency ranges of intercept equipment
Communications equipment of Y units

PEACETIME COMINT ARRANGEMENTS FOR SACLANT

27. It is recognized that in addition to the necessity to plan for wartime COMINT cooperation within SACLANT, peacetime COMINT arrangements for SACLANT should be developed in order to promote readiness for wartime operations. The progressive or phased implementation of such arrangements should be accomplished, within the limits of agreed wartime cooperation, in accordance with the procedures described below.

28. The Y activities included in the SACLANT Y structure, should be organized and conducted in peacetime as follows:

a. Phase I -

A SACLANT Y Officer should be appointed to begin laying the groundwork for agreed wartime arrangements, for SACLANT to obtain the results of national shore-based direction finder operations. SACLANT should keep COMINT authorities of participating nations advised of the
progress of any planning or arrangements with other NATO members that
affects them. Nations concerned should each designate an authority to
whom the SACLANT Y Officer can communicate on direction finder matters.

b. Phase II -

When the above arrangements for shorebased direction finder operations
are made, the SACLANT Y Officer should arrange for operational drills during
NATO exercises or maneuvers.*

* The use of information based on D/F and shipborne intercept operations
will be in accordance with the following provisions:

1. Shorebased D/F Operations. Fixes and the fully evaluated results
of shorebased D/F operations, during NATO exercises or maneuvers, may be
passed to nationals of those nations participating in the D/F operations.
During the exercises, information resulting from D/F fixes may be passed
to nationals of nations participating in the exercises, even though those
nations do not participate in the D/F operations, when the following con-
ditions are fulfilled:

   (i) When specifically authorized by SACLANT,
   (ii) When a real advantage to the exercise then in progress
        would accrue, and
   (iii) When the intelligence can be attributed to another source,
        or, if this is not possible, the true source is not stated.

During post-exercise conferences, shorebased D/F information or results
may be disclosed to nationals of nations not participating in the D/F
operations only as already disclosed in the course of the exercise.
(This is not to prohibit the use, during post-exercise conferences, of in-
telligence or situation summaries issued to all participating units in the
exercise).

2. Shipborne D/F and Interception. During exercises, results of
shipborne D/F operations and the shipborne interception of plain text or self-
evident code messages may be passed to nationals of those nations partici-
pating in the exercise. The analyzed results of shipborne D/F and inter-
ception operations may be made available in post-exercise conference with-
out restriction.
c. Phase III -

Depending on developments in the international situation, cooperation may later be extended within the agreed limits of wartime cooperation by Canadian/U.K./U.S. agreement as actual needs develop and as increased knowledge of Third Party activities, acquired during organization and planning, provides a better basis for assessing the security risks involved. Coordination between SACEUR and SACLANT to ensure consonance of practices will be required.

29. The dissemination of COMINT to Third Parties in SACLANT's Command in peacetime will be as indicated in Exhibit 3.
APPENDIX P
Annexure P2
EXHIBIT 2

SECURITY PRINCIPLES FOR THE HANDLING OF Y

INTRODUCTION

1. These principles shall be the basis in peace and war of all security regulations and policies governing the production, handling, and dissemination of Y.

DEFINITION

2. Y is Communication Intelligence derived from the timely processing of traffic procured by listening to enemy communications for the purpose of providing tactical intelligence for the commanders of combat forces. It includes raw traffic, end-products, technical material, working documents, and captured material used in its production. It also includes intelligence reports and summaries based on Y unless the information is so generalized that it cannot be traced back to a particular item of Y or to Y in general.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION

3. Nations participating in the SACLANT Y effort must, as a condition of participation agree to accept and adhere to these principles.

4. Each country participating in the SACLANT Y effort will designate a national authority to deal with all questions of Y security and enforce these principles.
5. Each national authority will designate a Y Security Officer to whom Y materials and communications relating thereto shall be addressed.

6. SACLANT will formulate and supervise compliance with security regulations and policies for Y within the SACLANT command.

7. Before an individual in any capacity has access to the knowledge or results of the SACLANT Y effort, he must be screened and cleared as being of unquestioned loyalty by his national authority. The screening must be as thorough as possible and at least as thorough as that given to individuals having access to COSMIC information. In addition to such clearance, these individuals serving under SACLANT’s Command must be specifically nominated to receive Y either by SACLANT or by the concerned national authority. In the latter case the nomination must be approved by SACLANT. In exceptional circumstances under operational conditions the above requirements for screening, clearance and nomination may be waived for those individuals appointed to certain key posts, a list of which should be drawn up by SACLANT. Such personnel may be given access to Y upon the authority of the appropriate commander.

8. Prior to being given access to Y, each individual will be Y indoctrinated by a special warning on the sensitivity of Y sources to compromise and be required to sign a document drawing attention to his special responsibility for safeguarding Y and to the consequences which the law or administrative or executive order of his country, or order of SACLANT, provides, if either by intent or negligence he allows Y to come to the notice of unauthorized persons. It must be stressed that there is no time limit in that the information must be safeguarded indefinitely.
9. Distribution of Y must be on the need-to-know principle, i.e., each item of Y shall be made known only to those Y indoctrinated individuals who require it in the performance of their duties. SACLANT will maintain control lists of indoctrinated Y recipients in forces under his command other than those engaged in the production of Communication Intelligence. He will ensure that the number is kept to the minimum consistent with essential intelligence and operational needs. National authorities will maintain similar lists of their own nationals and apply similar restrictions.

10. Y indoctrinates must not be allowed to run a greater risk of capture or interrogation by enemies or potential enemies than is absolutely necessary for the efficient performance of their duties. This must also apply to a period of six months after they have ceased to receive Y material except during active operations in cases of impelling necessity.

11. The greatest care must be taken not to betray Y success by actions based on it. Efforts should be made, if at all possible, to devise suitable cover, such as reconnaissance. The source should on no account be needlessly risked.

12. SACLANT will determine the level to which Y will be disseminated. In exceptional instances, where it is essential for immediate operational purposes, information based on Y may, as specifically authorized by a Y indoctrinated commander, be disseminated below the normal level to unindoctrinated individuals provided the source is not disclosed. Where possible, names, times, positions, and other data identical with that from the original text must be omitted, or, if the retention of such an item or items is essential, must be carefully paraphrased. Such information must be passed by a secure courier service, by a secure line, or in a cipher system.
approved by SA CLAI MT. It must not be passed in clear by radio (including radio telephone).

13. Knowledge of the methods and scope of, and the technical material resulting from the SA CLAI MT effort will be restricted to the nationals of the nations which participate in the SA CLAI MT effort. Access to the Y end-products should, as far as possible, be similarly restricted.

14. All Y resulting from the SA CLAI MT effort will be classified SECRET and designated by a codeword (except as provided in paragraph 19 below). The classification and the codeword shall appear on every sheet of paper which contains or discloses the existence of Y, except that, at the discretion of the unit commander, this provision need not be applied to purely working documents within a Y unit. The codeword indicates that the material must be handled in accordance with regulations based on these principles and when used in its codeword sense will also bear the classification SECRET. The codeword and its implication shall not be made known to persons not indoctrinated in Y nor shall it be used in its codeword sense in the presence of such persons.

15. In peacetime, if Y documents are to be transmitted by bag within SA CLAI MT's Command, the route and procedure must be specially authorized by SA CLAI MT, having regard to the adequacy of the security of the route and procedure. Documents should be double-wrapped and addressed to a Y indoctrinated officer (by name, not function); the inner envelope should bear the appropriate security classification but not the codeword. In wartime, discretion will be left to the local commander to make the most secure arrangements possible. As a minimum, documents must be sent by hand of officer or by a secure courier service.
16. Except in the exceptional instances described in Paragraph 12, if Y is transmitted within SACLANT's command by electrical means or by any physical means not completely secure, it must be encrypted in a secure cryptographic channel reserved exclusively for this requirement. Participating nations must additionally ensure that when Y is transmitted into, out of, or externally to the SACLANT command it is encrypted in a cryptographic channel specially approved by SACLANT for this purpose.

17. The highest standard of physical security must be applied to the custody of Y by national authorities and within SACLANT's command. Normally, except when in transit under conditions prescribed herein, Y materials and communications relating thereto must at all times be:
   (a) under the direct surveillance of a Y indoctrinated person responsible for their safe-keeping, or
   (b) locked in a three-combination safe accessible only to Y indoctrinated personnel, or
   (c) stored in a locked compartment which is under constant surveillance by an armed sentry and which is accessible only to Y indoctrinated personnel.

18. Y documents must be destroyed as soon as they have ceased to be of use. This is particularly important under hazardous conditions.

19. In order that necessary operational use can be made of certain types of low-level tactical Y (such as Direction finder results and plain text messages) on which immediate action must obviously be taken in combat operations, SACLANT may permit the dissemination of such Y, without a codeword and at a classification not below Confidential, to unindoctrinated recipients who need to know.
20. COMINT end-product or intelligence based on COMINT introduced into Allied intelligence channels by Third Parties participating in the Y-structure of the command should be handled in Y-channels and subjected to the security measures prescribed for handling Y. Where such Third Party COMINT is furnished by a participating National COMINT authority or organization and is of a higher grade than Y material produced within the Y-structure or than the COMINT supplied to the Y-organization by US/UK/Canadian COMINT authorities, it will be passed through Y channels and its distribution will be kept to a minimum.

21. COMINT end-product or intelligence based on COMINT introduced into Allied intelligence channels by Third Parties not participating in the Y-structure of the command should, whenever possible, be transferred to Y-channels at the first point at which such end-product or intelligence comes to the attention of Y personnel, and from that point transmitted directly to the Supreme Allied Commander's Y Officer. Care should be taken not to compromise the existence of Y channels as such. The Supreme Allied Commander's Y Officer should bring any such material to the attention of the AC of S (I) for decision as to further action or dissemination. In deciding on such further action or dissemination, the AC of S (I) will give full consideration to the need to protect COMINT.

22. National authorities and SACLANT must expand these principles into a set of regulations adapted to local conditions. Copies of the Y security regulations of each national authority will be forwarded to SACLANT through Y channels.
CHANGES IN PHRASEOLOGY IN APPENDIX Q

1. The Conference recommends the following changes in phraseology to clarify references to British Commonwealth Countries in paragraphs 11 - 16 of Appendix Q. The changes, which are in fact insertions in all cases, are underlined below:

a. The title of para. 11 to read:

b. The first sentence of para. 11 to begin:
"Other British Commonwealth etc."

c. The second sentence of para. 11 to read in part:
"traffic and technical material with other Commonwealth centres etc."

d. The subheading within para. 11 to read:
"PRINCIPLES OF COLLABORATION AMONG THE U.S., AND THE U.K. AND OTHER BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OVERSEAS NATIONAL COMINT CENTRES."

e. The title of para. 13 to read in part:

f. The first sentence of para. 13 to read in part:
"involving both U.S. and British Commonwealth forces etc."

g. The first sentence of para. 14 to read in part:
"co-operation among the U.S., and the U.K. and other Commonwealth etc."
APPENDIX Q
ANNEXURE Q1

COLLABORATION BETWEEN U.S. AND U.K. NATIONAL COMINT CENTERS

INTRODUCTION

1. This Annexure sets forth agreed arrangements for the implementation of the principles of collaboration contained in paragraphs 7 - 10 of Appendix Q to the BRUSA Agreement. Although these principles apply in particular to a wartime situation, at least two stages are involved in the effective implementation of the provisions of this Appendix. These are:
   a. Peacetime Augmentation Program - to be effective up to the day of full mobilization.
   b. Wartime combined effort at full scale.

PEACETIME AUGMENTATION PROGRAM

2. During peacetime, combined NSA-GCHQ efforts will be established on specific problems, as agreed between USCI and LSIB. Arrangements for combined efforts will be made for those problems which under existing conditions can be most effectively processed at one center. These arrangements will be kept under continuing review and are subject to change by either party. Any additional increases in the peacetime augmentation program will be as agreed upon between USCI and LSIB.

WARTIME COMBINED EFFORT AT GCHQ

3. That part of GCHQ producing COMINT relevant to a war in Europe and contiguous areas will be augmented with U.S. COMINT resources, and will form a combined operation to be named the Combined Center, Europe (CCE).

ORGANIZATION

4. The organization of the CCE will be as follows:
b. Director, GCHQ, will be assisted by two Deputy Directors, one appointed by the Director, NSA, and the other by the U.K. The U.S. Deputy will be primarily concerned with the Groups assigned to the CCE, the U.K. Deputy primarily with those GCHQ elements which will remain outside the CCE.

c. Director, GCHQ, will be further assisted by a number of Assistant Directors, of whom one, appointed by the Director, NSA, will have major responsibilities for Production within the CCE.

d. Below Directorate level, the CCE will be organized into a series of groups, each responsible for a specific sphere of operations.

CONTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES TO THE CCE
b. Small portions of CCEQ may be retained outside the CCE for such purposes as special exploitation or dissemination tasks required by U.K. intelligence consumers, particularly with reference to subjects outside Europe and contiguous areas.

c. The U.S. will contribute substantial COMINT resources to the CCE, details of which are given in Exhibit 1 to this Annexure.

TASKS OF THE CCE

6. The main tasks of the CCE will be:

a. Technical COMINT support of U.S., U.K., and other British Commonwealth field resources in Europe and contiguous areas.

b. Technical COMINT support of the Y units of Third Party Nations participating in the Y structure of Allied Commands in Europe and contiguous areas, in accordance with the provisions of Appendix P.

c. Operational control of U.S., U.K., and other British Commonwealth field resources essential to the coverage of Europe and contiguous areas, except those required and reserved for close support of the field forces of the contributing nation or otherwise reserved by the contributing nation.

d. Processing and exploitation of COMINT material relevant to Europe and contiguous areas.

e. Research in support of such processing and exploitation.

f. Production of COMINT information and the distribution of such information directly to appropriate national or combined COMINT centers.
PRESERVATION OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS TO DIRECTOR, GCHQ

8. a. Paragraph 8 of Appendix Q provides that the complete and product of the CCE will be made immediately available to the intelligence organizations of both nations. To this end, the US intelligence liaison officers at the CCE will receive the end-product of the CCE.
b. The CCE will endeavor to produce end products in the form or forms acceptable to the US and the UK for dissemination to all authorized intelligence recipients and this will be the form in which the information will normally be disseminated.

c. The US intelligence liaison officers will be responsible for dissemination to US Commands and other US recipients abroad and for the dissemination of selected items to their parent US intelligence organizations; GCHQ will continue to be responsible for dissemination to UK Commands and UK Intelligence Organizations.

d. The US service intelligence liaison officers and GCHQ will collaborate in dissemination to Allied Commands, and combined cryptographic channels will normally be used. In exceptional cases where there is disagreement between GCHQ and US service intelligence liaison officers on addressees or on the substance of the information to be disseminated to Allied Commands, either may disseminate provided that it is made clear that the other is not committed and that the relationship to any other disseminated version is stated. Every effort will be made to avoid or to resolve such disagreements. Copies of CCE end products disseminated by electrical means to Allied Commands will be immediately disseminated to the appropriate intelligence organizations of both nations, as required.

e. The US intelligence liaison officers will have access to those points in the CCE activities where the CCE end product becomes available for dissemination.

f. The U.S. Intelligence Organizations do not intend to establish intelligence production groups at the CCE. No exact estimate of the number of intelligence liaison personnel necessary can be made at this time; however, it is expected that they will be in such numbers as to operate a watch in connection with each point of dissemination.
10. Personnel exchanged between NSA and GCHQ will be integrated organizationally within each center, will remain assigned to their home agency, and will be otherwise responsible to a resident head from this home agency. In the case of a problem which is to be worked as a primary commitment at one center by a combined NSA-GCHQ
group, the exchanged personnel will be integrated in both technical
and operational management positions within the group. In the case of
a problem worked jointly at both centers, exchanged personnel will be
integrated technically into the groups at each center. An equal
voice in technical and operational management will be exercised only
on these problems being worked as a primary commitment at one center
by a combined group.

ESTIMATE OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR WARTIME AUGMENTATION

PROGRAMME

11. Exhibit 1 to this Annexure contains the estimate of
personnel and equipment required for the wartime augmentation
program. Its details will be reviewed from time to time by both
parties and revised as necessary.

STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONTINUATION OF COMBINED OPERATIONS IN THE
EVENT OF DISRUPTION THROUGH ENEMY ACTION
OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE WARTIME AUGMENTATION OF GCQ

1. It is estimated that a total operational strength of 9000 will be needed for the CCE in war to deal with the problems assigned to it. The UK intends to contribute about 6000 of this total. In view of the importance of the CCE to the US intelligence effort it is felt that the US should endeavor to supply the additional 3000 persons who would be required.

2. Existing UK mobilization manpower plans allow for an increase of 5500 to GCQ's peacetime establishment of 4000 in the first twelve months of war. Of this 5500, 3200 will be provided during the first three months of war.

3. The bulk of the increase is intended for the reinforcement of the CCE and supporting groups, which may be expected to give these groups a total strength of about 4000 by M / 3 months, and of the final 6000 by M / 12 months.

4. A small proportion (at present estimated at 300) of the GCQ staff may be sent overseas and would thus not be available to the CCE.

5. During the period M / 12 months, the U.S. target should be to reinforce the CCE by 2000 persons. It is recommended that this increase be phased as follows: --

   (a) By M / 6. The provision of at least 500 persons, of whom the majority should have had training and experience in COMINT production and reporting activities.

   (b) By M / 12. The provision of a further 1500 persons. It is realised that for practical reasons the majority of these will not have had extensive training or experience in COMINT activities. Nevertheless, every effort should be made to ensure that as many as possible have at
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least had basic COMINT training and that a cadre of trained COMINT personnel
be included in this group to ensure the effective integration of the group
with the CCE.

6. It is recognized that the U.S. contribution to the CCE may be
reduced in accordance with any allocation of personnel to other national
or combined centers in working on COMINT
problems pertaining to Europe and contiguous areas.

7. Equipment requirements for the Centre should be considered in detail
so far as possible in advance of war by N.S.A. and G.C.H.Q. In this
connection it is intended that G.C.H.Q. should make the maximum possible
contribution in the development and use of analytical machinery for
research and exploitation. The U.S. contribution of standard IBM
equipment should be commensurate with the U.S. contribution of personnel
to the CCE, based upon existing proportions of such equipment to
processing personnel within NSA.

OSA
EO 1.4.(c)
EO 1.4.(d)
APPENDIX Q
ANNEXURE Q2

PRINCIPLES OF WAR-TIME COLLABORATION AMONG COMINT CENTERS OF THE
U.S., U.K., AND OTHER BRITISH COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES.

1. In the event of hostilities involving the U.S., U.K., Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand, hereinafter referred to as collaborating nations
the COMINT collaboration among these nations will be such as to ensure the
greatest possible contribution to the prosecution of the war consistent with
security.

2. Normally, collaboration will be effected through direct co-
ordination between the appropriate COMINT organizations. Where necessary
and feasible, however, COMINT organizations may be integrated as mutually
agreed.

3. Field COMINT resources of one or more of the collaborating
nations operating in a theatre supported by a national or combined center
will be provided by that center with such technical assistance as
may be required and mutually agreed. In order to facilitate such
arrangements the national authorities may assign liaison and working
groups to these centers as necessary.

4. Arrangements in theaters in which the forces of only one of
the nations are engaged are not subject to the special principles
stated in this annexure.

5. The COMINT authorities of the collaborating nations will remain
free to require their National COMINT Centers both at home and overseas
to undertake any task relevant to their national worldwide interests,
and to set up such additional Centers as may be necessary. Subject to
this over-riding principle, there will be a broad division of tasks
between the National COMINT Centers in order to insure the maximum
timely interception and production of COMINT information.
6. In accordance with the above the following arrangements are projected:

   a. In view of the geographic proximity of the Canadian and the U.S. National COMINT Centers, and of the close relationships which will exist between the military forces of the two nations in time of war, an integrated effort on specific problems may be required. Such collaboration may involve an exchange of technical personnel between the two Centers and the provision by NSA of technical support to the integrated effort to the extent desirable and feasible.

   b. In the Pacific Area collaboration is required to minimize the need of duplicate interception and processing facilities. The U.S. rather than establishing a National COMINT Center in the Southwest Pacific, will coordinate its COMINT operations in this theater with the center in Australia as required.

   c. The U.S. National COMINT Center(s) concerned with the Pacific area will have direct communication with the COMINT authorities of the collaborating nations in order to effect rapid exchange of COMINT material as required and as mutually agreed.

   d. The U.S. envisages the assignment of a U.S. working party to the center in Australia immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities involving both parties. This working party will take part in the operations of the Center in Australia and will serve as the cadre for any further augmentation of the center in Australia which may become desirable as the war progresses.
ESTABLISHMENT OF OVERSEAS NATIONAL COMINT CENTERS

7. Current plans consider the possible establishment of COMINT Centers as set forth in Exhibit 1 to this Annexure. Its details will be reviewed from time to time by the parties concerned and revised as necessary.

ESTABLISHMENT OF OVERSEAS COMBINED CENTERS

8. With reference to U.S. and U.K. plans to establish National COMINT Centers circumstances may require the establishment of a combined UK-US center in this area.
TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

MINUTES OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE PLINARY COMMITTEE HELD AT 11:30 HOURS, 2 MARCH 1953, IN THE LOUNGE, NAVAL SECURITY STATION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Those present were:

UK DELEGATES
Mr. C. Loehnis
Brigadier J. H. Tiltman
Colonel R. C. Yolland, Army
Mr. W. Millward
Mr. A. W. Bonsall
Captain M. Hodges, RN
Commander H. H. Ridler, RN
Wing Commander P. W. Hudson, R.A.F.
Mr. H. J. Dryden

US DELEGATES
Rear Admiral J. N. Wenger, USN
Mr. V. P. Keay
Mr. R. F. Packard
Dr. L. W. Tordella
Mr. H. D. Sheldon
Captain B. F. Roeder, USN
Lt. Col. C. M. Townsend, USAF

DISTINGUISHED GUESTS
Major General R. C. Partridge, USA
Rear Admiral Carl F. Espe, USN
Major General J. A. Stanford, USAF
Brigadier General H. Reichelderfer, USA
Mr. R. Forwood
Colonel A. R. Marcy, USA

Lt. K. B. Monypeny, Jr. acted as Secretary.

1. In welcoming the members of the U. K. delegation, Major General Canine expressed the regrets of Mr. Allen Dulles, Chairman, USCIB, who was unable to attend the opening meeting. He stated that Mr. Dulles had designated a personal representative to deliver the opening address, but that only very shortly before the meeting, it was learned that the representative so designated was also unable to attend. He further stated that it therefore became his pleasure to welcome the British delegation on behalf of the Chairman, USCIB, and himself.

He noted that since the London Conference of 1952 many events had transpired. He commented that he considered the only sin possible in the COMINT business to be a static condition, and added that neither the UK or US had been guilty of sponsoring such a condition.

In concluding Major General Canine said how delighted he was to welcome Commander Loehnis as the head of the British delegation. He expressed the hope that all the delegates enjoyed their stay to the fullest and would also fully complete the heavy schedule set out before them.

OGA
50 1.4. (d)
2. Commander Loehnis, expressing thanks on behalf of the UK delegation for the warm welcome made, said how much he, personally, and those of the delegation who had been here before had been looking forward to the visit. He added that the one or two delegates who had not made the trip previously would quickly learn to look forward to the next visit.

On the subject of the Agenda he stated that he feared that the rather heavy Agenda facing the delegates to the conference was rather the fault of the UK because of their desire to complete the conference within three and a half weeks. He explained that the shortage of personnel at GCHQ combined with the extra burdens of the move to Cheltenham necessitated such a schedule for the UK delegates.

He noted that in the past, at similar conferences it had always been possible to work out solutions to problems which were satisfactory to both the US and the UK.

He continued by saying that, although there were apparently one or two items on the Agenda for the present Conference with which it would be difficult to deal, he was confident that the future would prove similar to the past so far as satisfactory solutions were concerned.

3. General Canine invited Commander Loehnis to take the chair of the Executive Committee. Commander Loehnis expressed his thanks but proposed Rear Admiral Wenger in his stead. This was accepted and the appointment of Mr. E. J. Dryden as British Secretary, and Lt. K. B. Monypeny, Jr. as U.S. Secretary was approved.

4. It was agreed that the Executive Committee would be composed as follows:

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<th>U.K.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. G. Loehnis</td>
<td>Rear Admiral J. N. Wenger, USN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brigadier J. H. Tillman, Army</td>
<td>Mr. R. F. Packard</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel R. G. Yolland, Army</td>
<td>Mr. V. P. Keay</td>
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<td>Mr. W. Millward</td>
<td>Mr. H. D. Shaldon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. A. W. Bonsall</td>
<td>Dr. L. W. Terdella</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commander H. H. Ridler, RN</td>
<td>Captain B. P. Roeder, U.S.N.</td>
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5. It was further agreed that the first meeting of the Executive Committee would be at 1430, 2 March 1953, in the Lounge at the Naval Security Station, and the Chairman of the various working groups would be instructed to attend.

6. There was no other business.

/s/ H. J. C. DRYDEN
UK Secretary

/s/ K. B. MONYPENY, JR.
US Secretary
U.K./U.S. BRUSA Planning Conference, 1953

Minutes of the first meeting of the Executive Committee held at 1430 hours, 2 March, 1953

Present

Chairman: RADM. J. N. Wenger

U.K. Representatives

Cdr. C. Loehnis
Brig. J. H. Tiltman, S.B.L.O.
Col. R. G. Yolland, Army
Mr. W. Millward
Mr. A. W. Bonsall
Capt. M. Hodges
Cdr. H. H. Ridler, R.N.
W/C F. W. Hudson, R.A.F.
Mr. H. J. C. Dryden (Secretary)

U.S. Representatives

RADM. J. N. Wenger USN.
Mr. R. F. Packard
Mr. E. D. Sheldon
Mr. V. P. Keya
Capt. B. F. Roeder, USN.
Dr. L. W. Tordella
Lt. Col. G. C. Long, USA
Lt. Col. C. M. Townsend, USAF

Lt. K. B. Monsey, Jr. (Secretary)

1. Review of Conference Agenda and organization of the conference

RADM. Wenger proposed that Cdr. Loehnis assume Chairmanship of the Executive Committee. The latter declined and requested that RADM. Wenger serve as Chairman. This was agreed.

The Committee agreed to the proposed Conference Agenda as in Annexure 1.

The Committee further agreed that the delegates form subcommittees to consider each item of the agenda.

2. Committee structure and conference program

It was agreed that the subcommittees to be appointed would be designated by the particular Appendix they were to consider.

The Chairman proposed that the US furnish Secretaries for the various subcommittees and that the Chairman of subcommittees be selected upon the basis of the party which initiated discussion of the items.

The Committee accepted both these proposals.

After discussion the Committee agreed that subcommittees would normally meet initially at 0900 each morning.

The Chairman proposed that the subcommittee to be appointed later give first priority to discussion of Appendix B and Appendix Q.

3. Appointment of subcommittee members, and designation of subcommittee chairmen.

The Committee agreed on the composition of subcommittees as shown in Annexure 2, and

Further agreed that subcommittees B and O meet at 0900, 3 March, in Rooms A and C of the Conference Headquarters; Subcommittee H to meet at 1000 in Room B; and subcommittee P(A) to meet at 0900, Thursday 5 March.
4. Committee procedures, schedules, and reports

The Committee agreed to the proposals for conduct of committee work as contained in Annexure 3.

5. Schedule of Executive Committee meetings.

It was agreed that the Chairman and the head of the UK delegation would discuss the Schedule of Executive Committee meetings further in order to arrive at an arrangement which would least interfere with the work of the subcommittees.

6. Additional items for informal discussions

The Committee agreed to assign the various items for informal discussions to subcommittees as follows:

(a) Arrangements of Exchange and Dissemination within SACLANT's Command of COMINT beyond the Scope of Third Party Collaboration - To Subcommittee PB.

(b) COMINT (beyond Third Party arrangements) between SACEUR/SACLANT and subordinate commands - To Subcommittee PB.

(c) Definition of "releasable equipment" - To Subcommittee PA.

(d) USGRO - To Subcommittee Q(b)

(e) Preliminary UK/US discussions on counter clandestine arrangements.

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<tr>
<td>Mr. A. W. Bonsall</td>
<td>Mr. V. P. Keay (Chairman)</td>
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<td>Mr. C. F. Collins</td>
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<td>Mr. R. L. Conley</td>
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<td>Maj. J. B. Pratt</td>
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<td>Mr. W. B. Ryan (Secretary)</td>
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(f) D.S.B. - For discussion between the heads of the UK and US delegation.

7. Announcements

Dr. L. W. Tordella delivered an explanation of the recent reorganization of NSA.

/s/ H. J. C. DRYDEN
UK Secretary

/s/ W. H. COMPANY, JR.
US Secretary
CGA
EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)
COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

UK

Cdr. C. Loehnia
Brig. J. H. Tiltman
Col. R. G. Yolland, Army
Mr. A. W. Bonsall
Cdr. H. H. Rider, R.N.
W/C F. W. Hudson, R.A.F.

USA

Rear Admiral J. N. Wenger, Chairman
Mr. V. F. Keay
Mr. H. D. Sheldon
Dr. L. W. Tordella
Mr. R. F. Packard
Army - Lt. Col. G. C. Long, USA
Navy - Captain B. F. Roeder, USN
Air Force - Lt. Col. C. M. Townsend, USA
Lt. K. B. Monypenny, USN (Secretary)

SUB-COMMITTEES

1. Appendix B.

Mr. R. F. Packard (Chairman)
Dr. L. Shinn
Mr. S. F. Ellis
Mr. C. F. Collins
Colonel K. G. Clow, USA
Major J. B. Pratt, USA
Captain B. F. Roeder, USN
Lt. Colonel C. M. Townsend, USAF
Mr. Gordon Sommers (Secretary)

2. Appendix D.

Mr. A. W. Bonsall (Chairman)
Col. R. G. Yolland, Army
W/C F. W. Hudson, R.A.F.
Mrs. H. E. Baber

3. Appendix H.

Capt. M. Hodges
Colonel A. R. Marcy, USA (Chairman)
Captain G. J. Kirkby, PACEUR
Colonel Wilkes, USAF
Lt. Col. R. G. Holton, Jr. PACEUR
CDR. J. M. Watacon, USN
LCDR. R. T. Conley, USN (Alternate)
Captain Russell Jones, USA
Col. G. E. Sampson
Captain P. K. Looney, USAF (Secretary)

4. Appendix N.

Col. R. G. Yolland, Army
Mr. A. W. Bonsall
Cdr. H. H. Rider, R.N.
W/C F. W. Hudson, R.A.F.

Lt. Col. L. Booth, USA (Chairman)
CDR. M. B. Gillespie, USN
Major McGreer, USAF
Mr. R. Battey
Major O. Jones, USAF (Secretary)
5. Appendix P(a).

Mr. A. W. Bonsall

6. Appendix P(b).

Mr. W. Millward (Chairman)
Col. R. G. Yolland, Army
Capt. M. Hodges
Capt. R. G. Yolland, Army
W/C F. W. Hudson, R.A.F.

Mr. W. Millward (B)
Mr. C. R. Forwood (B)

(Chairmanship of Q3 remains undecided)

7. Appendix Q (A & B).

Mr. A. W. Bonsall
Col. R. G. Yolland, Army
Capt. M. Hodges
W/C F. W. Hudson, R.A.F.
Mr. D. L. G. Crewe
Mr. W. Millward (B)
Mr. C. R. Forwood (B)

8. Appendix O.

Mr. W. Millward
W/C F. W. Hudson, R.A.F.

Mr. F. A. Sims (Chairman)
Captain R. O. Manter, USN
Lt. Col. R. A. Dickson, USAF
Lt. Col. L. H. Hutchinson, USAF

Annexure 2
To BPC 53/EX/M (1) Final
001
SUGGESTED INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONDUCT OF COMMITTEE WORK

1. The Executive Committee will designate the Chairman and composition of each Committee and allocate its tasks.

2. Committee Chairmen are responsible for arranging with the Conference Secretary for the reservation of Committee rooms.

3. The Secretariat is prepared to render all typing and duplicating service. A limited amount of stenographic service is available.

4. Working committees will not be required to submit minutes of their meetings. However, a progress report will be required from all working committees on Thursday 5 March 1953. This report will include:
   a. Statement of items considered.
   b. Statement of any items completed.
   c. Questions requiring resolution by the Executive Committee.
   d. Instructions required of Executive Committee.
   e. Additional progress reports will be submitted as directed by the Executive Committee.

5. All papers of whatever nature will be dated. All committee working papers will carry a date only. All other papers, except working papers, will carry a reference number constituted as follows:
   i. BPC53/ - BRUSA Planning Conference 1953.
   ii. Followed by Committee designation as follows:
       EX - Executive Committee
       B - Appendix B Subcommittee
       D - Appendix D Subcommittee
       etc.
   iii. Followed by one of the following:
       A - Agenda (serial number of meeting in ()).
       M - Minutes (serial number of meeting in ()).
       (Minutes will be kept only of Executive and Plenary Committee Meeting.)
       R - Report
       (All drafts to be numbered serially and final drafts so marked.)
   iv. Directly under the line continuing the above data will be a serial number indicating the conference serial number of the paper.
Examples:

BPC 53/EX/4 (2) 1st Draft - 1st draft of the minutes of the 2nd meeting of the Executive Committee.


Working Committee reports after approval by the Executive Committee will, in addition to other reference, bear the words "Final Conference Paper."

6. Agreed papers which are appropriate for inclusion as appendices, annexures, or exhibits to the BRUS Agreement will be prepared accordingly. All drafts are to be numbered and dated. Final drafts will be so marked.

7. Committee reports and other papers which are to be considered by the Executive Committee will be submitted promptly to the Conference Secretary.

8. The Conference Secretary will deliver immediately to the members of the Executive Committee and Working Committee papers designated by the Working Committee Chairman as for consideration of the Executive Committee and will notify the Committee Chairman concerned when the papers are ready for consideration by the Executive Committee.

9. When these papers are being considered by the Executive Committee, the Working Chairman and senior member of the Committee from the other delegation will be present. The Conference Secretary will be responsible for notifying the Chairman and others concerned of the time at which they are to appear before the Executive Committee.

10. The minutes of the Executive Committee meetings will be taken and distributed promptly to members and Working Committee Chairman.

11. The Conference Secretary will be responsible for notifying promptly Working Committee Chairman of any Executive Committee decision or instruction affecting their committees.
U.K./U.S. BRUSA Planning Conference, 1953

Minutes of the second meeting of the Executive Committee held at 1430 hours, 6 March 1953

Present

Chairman: RADM. J. N. Wenger

U.K. Representatives

Cdr. C. Loehnis
Brig. J. H. Tiltman, S.B.L.O.
Col. R. G. Yolland, Army
Mr. W. Millward
Mr. A. W. Bonsall
Capt. M. Hodges
Cdr. H. H. Ridler, R.N.
W/C F. W. Hudson, R.A.F.
Mr. H. J. C. Dryden
(Secretary)

U.S. Representatives

Mr. R. F. Packard
Mr. C. F. Collins (alternate)
Mr. V. P. Kesey
Capt. B. F. Roeder, USN
Dr. L. W. Tordella
Lt. Col. G. C. Long, USA
Lt. Col. C. M. Townsend, USAF

Lt. K. B. Monypeny, Jr.
(Secretary)

Observers

Mr. C. R. Kirby
Col. U. W. Wildes, USAF
Lt. Cdr. R. A. Conley
Mr. A. W. Small

1. Consideration of Minutes of Opening Plenary Session

The third paragraph of the minutes of the opening Plenary Session was corrected to read, "General Canine invited Commander Loehnis to assume chairmanship of the Conference." The minutes were then approved as corrected.

2. Consideration of Minutes of the First Executive Committee Meeting

The second draft of the minutes of the first Executive Committee meeting was approved as written.

3. Consideration of Report by Appendix B Subcommittee

The Committee took note of the first progress report of Appendix B subcommittee, and after detailed discussion of the Inclosure, referred back to the subcommittee for reconsideration for the proposed revision of Appendix B.
4. Consideration of Report by Appendix Q Subcommittee

The Committee took note of the first progress report of Appendix Q subcommittee. Minor revisions were made and the report approved as corrected.

The Committee further approved the Inclosure to the report, "Exhibit 1, Operational and Logistical Requirements for Wartime Augmentation of GCHQ", with one minor correction.

5. Consideration of Report by Appendix H Subcommittee

The Committee took note of the report by the Appendix H subcommittee.

6. Schedule of Subcommittee Meetings

Mr. Packard reported that the Appendix B subcommittee would complete consideration of Appendix B, not including Annexures, by 9 March 1953. He added that the subcommittee proposed next to consider Annexure B2, which might possibly be completed by March 10, and at that date turn toward consideration of Annexure B3. He also proposed that the subcommittee first consider the general principles of Annexure B1 so that when agreement was reached, members of his subcommittee not required for drafting of the Annexure might be released for consideration of other items of the Conference Agenda.

Both these proposals were accepted.

Mr. Kirby reported that Appendix Q subcommittee had completed work on Items 6(a) and 6(b) (excluding Dissemination) of the Conference Agenda. He proposed that the subcommittee continue consideration of Items 6c, d, e, on March 9, and added that consideration of these items should be completed on March 10.

The Committee accepted this proposal. It was further agreed that March 11 would be set as a target date for initiating discussion on Dissemination.

7. Date of Third Meeting of the Executive Committee

The Chairman proposed that the third meeting of the Executive Committee be held on Tuesday, 10 March 1953, at 1500 hours.

It was agreed.

/s/ H. J. C. Dryden
H. J. C. Dryden
UK Secretary

/s/ K. B. Monypeny, Jr.
K. B. Monypeny, Jr.
US Secretary
U.K./U.S. BRUSA Planning Conference, 1953

Minutes of the third meeting of the Executive Committee held at 1500 hours, 10 March 1953

Present

Chairman: RADM. J. N. Wenger

U.K. Representatives

Cdr. C. Loehnis
Brig. J. B. Tiltman, S. B. L.O.
Col. R. C. Yolland, Army
Mr. W. Millward
Mr. A. W. Bonsall
Cdr. H. H. Ridler, R.N.
W/C F. W. Hudson, R.A.F.
Mr. H. J. C. Dryden (Secretary)

U.S. Representatives

Mr. V. P. Keay
Mr. C. F. Collins (alternate)
Dr. L. W. Tordella
Mr. R. F. Packard
Lt. Col. G. C. Long, USA
Capt. B. F. Roeder, USN
Lt. Col. C. M. Townsend, USAF
Lt. K. B. Mongeby, USN (Secretary)

Observers

Capt. M. Rodgers
Mr. G. R. Kirby
Mr. A. W. Small
Mr. F. B. Rowlett
Major D. M. Grosjean, WAC
Lt. Cdr. R. T. Conley

1. Consideration of Minutes of Second Meeting of Executive Committee

The minutes of the second meeting of the Executive Committee were approved as written.

2. Rearrangement of Agenda

The Chairman suggested that since certain items on the agenda might entail more discussion than others, the agenda be rearranged so as to dispose of less controversial items first.

It was so agreed.

3. Oral Report of Chairman Subcommittee P_A

Mr. Rowlett, Chairman of subcommittee P_A delivered an oral report to the Committee. He added that a final report would be made at the next meeting of the Executive Committee.

The Committee took note of Mr. Rowlett's report.

4. Consideration of Progress Report of Appendix H Subcommittee

The Chairman suggested that the Committee briefly review the inclusion to the second progress report of Appendix H subcommittee, hearing in mind that modification might be necessary due to conflicts with Appendix Q Annexures still to be considered.

This proposal was accepted.
The Committee then reviewed Appendix H and referred paragraph 4a(3) of Appendix H, Annexure H1 back to the subcommittee for clarification.

Minor editorial changes were made in paragraph 6c.

The Committee then approved Appendix H subject to modifications which might be necessary to bring Appendix H and Appendix Q into consonance.

6. Consideration of Second Report of Appendix Q Subcommittee

The Committee then took note of the second report of Appendix Q subcommittee and after detailed discussion it was agreed to refer paragraph 6a of draft Annexure Q1 back to the subcommittee for the addition of a footnote. It was further agreed to hold in abeyance approval of draft Annexures Q1 and Q2 and Exhibits thereto until minor editorial changes were agreed upon.


The Committee took note of the second report of Appendix B subcommittee. Mr. Packard reviewed the inclosure to the report to indicate changes made by the subcommittee to the previous draft. Minor revisions were directed by the Committee and the following paragraphs were discussed at some length and referred back to the subcommittee for reconsideration in the light of this discussion:

3 (and footnote)
3b
33b,g,h

The Committee approved Appendix B subject to minor editorial revisions and above paragraphs resubmitted to the subcommittee.

The Chairman pointed out that a problem existed in that Appendix B would be discussed with the Canadians and that obtaining agreement among the three boards would prove cumbersome.

It was agreed to appoint an ad hoc committee consisting of Mr. Dryden and Mr. Packard to present a solution to the Committee of the above problem.
8. Future Scheduling of Subcommittees

It was agreed that Appendix B Subcommittee would consider Annexure B2 and B1 in that order on 11 March, and that consideration of Qb would commence immediately on completion of above, if possible on 12 March. It was further agreed that Pb subcommittee could not meet until completion of work of subcommittee Qb.

9. Date of Next Meeting of Executive Committee

The next meeting of the Executive Committee was scheduled for 1500 hours, 12 March 1953.

/s/ H. J. C. DRYDEN
H. J. C. DRYDEN
UK SECRETARY

/s/ K. B. MONTFENY, JR.
K. B. MONTFENY, JR.
US SECRETARY
U.K./U.S. BRUSA Planning Conference, 1953

Minutes of the fourth meeting of the Executive Committee held at 1600 hours, 12 March 1953

Present

Chairman: RADM, J. N. Wenger

U.K. Representatives

Cdr. C. Loehnis
Col. R. C. Yolland, Army
Mr. W. Millward
Mr. A. W. Bonsall
Cdr. H. H. Ridler, R.N.
W/C F. W. Hudson, R.A.F.

U.S. Representatives

Mr. V. P. Keay
Mr. C. P. Collins (alternate)
Dr. L. W. Tordella
Mr. R. F. Packard
Capt. B. F. Roeder, USN
Lt. Col. G. C. Long, USA
Lt. Col. C. M. Townsend, USAF

Mr. H. J. C. Dryden (Secretary)

Observers

Capt. M. Hodges, R.N.
Mr. F. B. Rowlett
Mr. A. W. Small
Maj. D. M. Grosjean, WAC

1. Consideration of Minutes of Third Meeting of Executive Committee

The third sentence of paragraph 7 was corrected to read as follows:

"Minor revisions were directed by the Committee and the following paragraphs were discussed at some length and referred back to the subcommittee for reconsideration in the light of this discussion."

The minutes were then approved as corrected.

2. Consideration of First Progress Report of Appendix P(a) Subcommittee

Mr. Rowlett stated that there would be an addition of two sub-paragraphs, c and d, to paragraph three. He proceeded to read the two paragraphs and after discussion by the Committee it was agreed to defer decision on them until the next meeting of the Executive Committee in order to enable all members to have sufficient time to study the proposed paragraphs.

The Committee then discussed the report in detail. Minor editorial revisions were made and,

It was agreed to approve this report and Tab A thereto, subject to an acceptable rewording of the last sentence of the proposed paragraph 3d.

Cdr. Loehnis stated that he wished to make a reservation that as the U.K. team had gone rather beyond the brief given to it by LSEB there might be some difficulty in obtaining approval by the latter.

TOP SECRET
3. Consideration of Third Progress Report of Appendix B Subcommittee

In presenting the report of Appendix B Subcommittee, Mr. Packard stated that paragraph 3, which had been referred back to the subcommittee for reconsideration, said that COMINT includes foreign communications passed by wire. He continued by saying that in fact there are certain circumstances and arrangements under which some foreign communications passed by wire are not, and will not be handled as COMINT. He stated that the subcommittee felt that notwithstanding this inconsistency in the definition any effort to expand the definition or to elaborate on this point in an Annexure would be far too detailed and involved to merit doing so. Furthermore, he said, these cases are variable and subject to change and are not similar on the U.S. and U.K. sides.

Mr. Loewes suggested that the definition be accepted with each side being aware of variables on each side of the Atlantic in the way of complete implementation.

It was agreed.

After detailed discussion of paragraph 3b the principles set forth were agreed upon and the exact wording to specify "Top Secret and Secret COMINT only" was left to the discretion of the subcommittee.

Paragraph 33b was accepted as written and minor editorial revisions made in paragraph 40.

Paragraph 44 was referred back to the subcommittee for redrafting of 44a and to verify that it follows principles set forth in recent correspondence between U.S. and U.K. on the subject.

The Committee then approved Appendix B with the exceptions of paragraphs 33 and 44, subject to minor editorial revisions previously directed. It was further agreed that, subject to reaching a common understanding of the use of OS/CIB, NSIB, and NCO throughout the document, the U.S. would forward Appendix B, minus paragraphs 33 and 44 to the Canadians. It was agreed that Mr. Packard and Mr. Dryden would be responsible for editorial changes in the final draft.

4. Report on Progress of Appendix N Subcommittee

The Chairman stated that the Chairman of Appendix N Subcommittee had informed him that the subcommittee was making satisfactory progress and should complete its work within the next two or three days.

5. Consideration of Progress Report of Appendix O(a) Subcommittee

The Committee discussed in detail the inclusion to the report.

It was agreed that a new sub-paragraph be inserted in paragraph 6 of Annexure O to read in effect as follows: "b. Technical COMINT support of other COMINT resources as provided under Appendix P."

The present sub-paragraph b to become c and the others renumbered accordingly. It was agreed to refer the sub-paragraph back to the Committee for consideration of the exact wording.

It was further agreed that in Exhibit I to Annexure O paragraph 2 would be renumbered 6 and the others renumbered accordingly.
6. Future Scheduling of Subcommittee Meetings

It was agreed that Appendix D Subcommittee commence work before Appendix P0 Subcommittee, if possible on Monday, March 16 at 0900 provided work on P0 was completed. Appendix D Subcommittee would begin at 1100. Appendix P0 Subcommittee would commence work at 1115 on Tuesday, March 17, dealing with the SACCHUR aspects first.

It was further agreed that the next meeting of the Executive Committee be held at 0900, Tuesday, March 17, and the following meeting on Thursday afternoon.

There was no further business.

The meeting adjourned at 1745.

/s/ H. J. C. DRYDEN
H. J. C. DRYDEN
U.K. SECRETARY

/s/ K. B. MONYPENY, JR.
K. B. MONYPENY, JR.
U.S. SECRETARY
U.K./U.S. BRUSA Planning Conference, 1953

Minutes of the fifth meeting of the Executive Committee held at 0900 hours, 17 March 1953

Present

Chairman: RADM. J. N. Wenger

U.K. Representatives

Cdr. C. Loehnis
Brig. J. H. Tiltsman
Col. R. C. Yolland, Army
Mr. W. Millward
Mr. A. W. Bonsall
Cdr. H. H. Ridler, R.N.
W/C F. W. Hudson, R.A.F.
Mr. H. J. C. Dryden (Secretary)

U.S. Representatives

Mr. S. P. Ellis (alternate)
Mr. C. P. Collins (alternate)
Dr. L. W. Tordella
Mr. R. F. Packard
Capt. B. F. Roeder, USN
Lt. Col. G. C. Long, USA
Lt. Col. C. M. Townsend, USAF
Maj. D. M. Grosjean, WAC (Secretary)

Observers

Capt. M. Hodges
Lt. Col. L. Booth, USA
Maj. O. Jones, USAF
Mr. A. W. Small

1. Consideration of Minutes of Fourth Meeting of Executive Committee

The minutes of the fourth meeting of the Executive Committee were approved as written.

2. Consideration of Report of Subcommittee Pa

The Chairman, in discussion with Cdr. Loehnis, agreed that consideration of the report of Subcommittee Pa, as directed in the minutes of the fourth meeting, would be postponed until the next Executive Committee meeting.


Mr. Packard reviewed the fourth report (third redraft) of proposed revision to Appendix B (basic paper).

The Committee then discussed the report in detail. Minor revisions were made and it was agreed to approve this report, with the exception of paragraph 33h, which would be considered at the next meeting.

The first report (first redraft) of Appendix B, Annexure B2 was presented by the Subcommittee to the Executive Committee. This report was discussed in detail and referred back to the subcommittee for reconsideration, as Cdr. Loehnis stated his delegates were not entirely happy with the provisions of the proposed draft.


The Committee took note of the fourth report of Appendix H Subcommittee.

It was agreed that this report, Appendix H, and Annexure R1 would be
accepted as written.

5. Consideration of First Progress Report of Appendix N Subcommittee

The Committee took note of the first report of Appendix N Subcommittee, reviewing in detail the proposed draft of Appendix N, Annexure N1, Annexure N2, and Exhibit 1 to Annexure N1. After detailed discussion this report was referred back to the Subcommittee for reconsideration, the new draft to be presented at the next meeting of the Executive Committee.

6. Consideration of Progress Report of Subcommittees Q

The Committee took note of the fourth report of Subcommittee Qa for Appendix Q. It was agreed to accept the new paragraph 6b to Annexure Q1, and the renumbering of paragraphs in Exhibit 1 to Annexure Q1, as submitted.

The report of Committee Qb on arrangements for disseminating the CCE end-product was noted. It was agreed to accept the report, with minor revisions, for inclusion in the final draft of Annexure Q1, as prepared by Subcommittee Qa.

It was noted that with the acceptance and approval of the above reports of Subcommittees Qa and Qb, the following papers were accepted as approved:

- Annexure Q1
- Exhibit 1 to Annexure Q1
- Annexure Q2
- Exhibit 1 to Annexure Q2

7. Consideration of Progress Report of Subcommittee Qb (USGRO)

The Committee took note of Report of Committee Qb on informal discussions of the Establishment of a U.S. Screening Group at GCHQ in Peacetime. After recommended minor revisions had been directed, it was agreed to accept this report.

8. The Chairman stated that the Plenary Session of the 1953 CAN/UK/US Tripartite Conference would be held in the Lounge Room, Naval Security Station at 1000 hours, 20 March 1953. Immediately following the Plenary Session, the first Executive Committee Meeting of the Tripartite Conference would be held.

9. The Chairman reviewed the progress of work of the various subcommittees, and stated that reports from the following would be considered at the next meeting:

- Appendix B Subcommittee
- Appendix D Subcommittee
- Appendix N Subcommittee
- Appendix O Subcommittee
- Appendix P0 Subcommittee
- Appendix Qa Subcommittee
- Appendix Qb Subcommittee
10. The next meeting of the Executive Committee was scheduled for 1500 hours, 19 March 1953.

11. The meeting adjourned at 1230 hours.

/s/ H. J. C. DRYDEN
H. J. C. DRYDEN
U.K. SECRETARY

/5/ D. M. GROSJEAN
D. M. GROSJEAN
U.S. SECRETARY
U.K./U.S. BRUSA Planning Conference, 1953

Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the Executive Committee held at 1500 hours, 19 March 1953

Present
Chairman: RADM. J. N. Wenger

U.K. Representatives
Cdr. C. Loehnis
Col. R. C. Yolland, AM
Mr. W. Millward
Mr. A. W. Bonsall
Cdr. H. H. Ridler RN
W/Cdr. F. W. Hudson RAF
Mr. H. J. C. Dryden (Secretary)

U.S. Representatives
Mr. V. P. Keay
Mr. C. P. Collins
Dr. L. W. Tordella
Mr. W. F. Packard
Capt. B. F. Roeder, USN
Lt. Col. G. C. Long, USA
Lt. Col. C. M. Townsend, USAF
Maj. D. M. Grousjean, WAC (Secretary)

Observers
Capt. M. Hodges
Capt. N. E. Blaisdell, USN
Lt. Col. L. Booth, USA
Mr. A. W. Small
Mr. F. B. Rowlett
Mr. F. A. Sims

1. Consideration of Minutes of Fifth Meeting of Executive Committee

The minutes of the fifth meeting of the Executive Committee were approved as written.

2. Consideration of Fifth (Final) Progress Report of Appendix B Subcommittee

The Committee approved the deletion of paragraph 35h from the redrafted Appendix B and accepted the proposed revision of paragraph 18. The Subcommittee Chairman indicated the alterations which had been made by his editorial team since the previous meeting of the Executive Committee and these were agreed with the exception of paragraph 40b which was referred back for clarification. It was agreed that the substance of paragraph 2 of Appendix D (029) concerning Security Grading of information relating to D/AF, would be included in Category I of Annexure Bl. The mentioned above, and subject to final editorial review, the Committee approved the draft Appendix B.

In discussion of the draft Annexures Bl and B2 (035) various alterations were agreed in principle by the Committee and some detailed amendments were accepted. Mr. Packard and Mr. Dryden were instructed to redraft and edit both Annexures as necessary, to obtain the concurrence of other members of Subcommittee B as required and to submit the revised versions to the Chairman as soon as possible. The head of the U.K. delegation expressed doubts whether Annexure B2 in its present form was suitable for inclusion in the BRUSA Appendices and although no decision was taken this view found support on both sides.

-1-
3. Consideration of First Progress Report of Appendix D Subcommittee

After discussion, during which was substituted for throughout the report and other editorial changes were made, it was agreed that the report (029) should be accepted as a Conference Paper and included in suitably edited form in the final report of the Executive Committee. It was further agreed that the substance of paragraph 2 of the report (029) concerning Security Grading of information relating to D/F should be embodied in Annexure B1.

5. Consideration of Second Progress Report of Appendix N Subcommittee

After discussion, during which "the cognizant British authority" was substituted for "his British counterpart" in paragraph 13(b) of the draft Appendix N, the draft Appendix, together with Annexures N1 and N2 and Exhibit 1 to the first Annexure (032), were approved.

7. Consideration of First and Second Progress Reports of Appendix Fb Subcommittee

After discussion, during which it was noted that it was left to SAC/EUR and SACLANT to organize the exchange of COMMENT between themselves and their respective Subordinate Commands, it was agreed that:

(a) all the inclusions to the report required further discussion.

(b) SAC/E/R/7 should be embodied in the BRUSA Appendices as Annexure P2 and SAC/E/R/5 should remain as an informal agreement similar to LSIB 333/52.
8. Consideration of Fifth Progress Report of Appendix Qa and Qb Subcommittee

After discussion, during which a proposed revision of page 4 of the draft Annexure Q1 was accepted (subject to the insertion of "Among other duties" at the beginning of the second sentence of paragraph 7b, the deletion of "and the liaison officers referred to in paragraph 8a below," and the amendment of part of the second sentence of paragraph 8a to read "the U.S. intelligence liaison officers at the CCE will receive"), the draft Annexures Q1 and Q2 and Exhibit 1 to each (023) were approved.

9. Consideration of Additional Work for Final Report of Executive Committee

It was agreed that the draft Appendices, Annexures and Exhibits and the reports accepted as Conference Papers should be edited in final form and that the Chairman and the head of the U.K. Delegation would prepare a covering report.

10. Concluding Remarks

The Chairman thanked the U.K. Delegation and the U.S. members of the Committee for the work they had put into achieving such very satisfactory results, and Commander Loehnis expressed his delegation's thanks for the help and cooperation they had received from their U.S. colleagues in all fields.

11. The meeting adjourned at 1825 hours.

/s/ H.J.C. DRYDEN
H.J.C. DRYDEN
U.K. SECRETARY

/s/ D. M. GROSJEAN
D. M. GROSJEAN
U.S. SECRETARY

-3-
EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)
QGA
EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)
EO 1.4 (c)
EO 1.4 (d)
OGA
EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)
OGA
EO 2.4. (c)
EO 2.4. (d)
Report of Committee C₀ on informal discussions of the Establishment of a U.S. Screening Group at GCHQ in Peacetime

1. On 13 March 1953 Committee C₀ discussed informally the proposal for establishment of a US Screening Group at GCHQ contained in coordinator USCIB Memorandum UC #000378 to Director GCHQ dated 29 September 1952.

2. It was noted by the U.S. members that the proposal to set up a U.S. Screening Group at GCHQ had been accepted in principles, by the LSIB. It was noted:
   a) that the need for the Group was only likely to arise after the move of GCHQ to Cheltenham;
   b) that the personnel figure of 15 quoted in UC #000378 was a maximum; it would probably not be necessary to build up to this figure initially and personnel would be allocated to the Group only as need arose;
   c) that the problem of space and communications facilities would be considered when a concrete proposal was made to activate or extend the Group; although GCHQ would do all possible to provide the necessary space and facilities, this might prove a limiting factor at least until the construction of buildings to house GCHQ at Cheltenham was complete.

3. It was further agreed that although the main task of the Group was dissemination of GCHQ end product to U.S. recipients, it might be desirable in selected cases for the appropriate member of the U.S. Screening Group to participate in an informal and advisory capacity in the dissemination of GCHQ end product to allied recipients (i.e., NATO Commands). This would normally apply to cases where GCHQ had been augmented under the provisions of Appendix Q, Annexure Q1, but could also apply where no augmentation had taken place. The bringing into force of this arrangement would be subject to specific mutual agreement in each case.
4. In the event that one or more of the U.S. intelligence agencies desire to disseminate from GCHQ direct to U.S. recipients by electrical means, it was agreed that such an arrangement would be generally satisfactory to GCHQ and every effort would be made to provide the necessary facilities and communications.

5. A draft Charter for the U.S. Screening Group is appended as Tab A.

/s/ D. F. ROEDER
D. F. ROEDER
Captain, USN
1. A USCIB Screening Group (USGRO) is hereby established as part of the SUSLO Unit at GCHQ.

2. The purpose of USGRO is to provide means for the selection of GCHQ-produced COMINT items of the high priority interest to member organizations of USCIB for rapid transmission to appropriate SSO’s and to NSA.

3. Each member organization of USCIB is invited to propose to the USCIB Coordinator names of individuals to sit on USGRO. Each of these individuals should have a thorough knowledge of the intelligence requirements of his parent organization and of its U.S. Recipients in the European area. The number of representatives appointed by each organization should be limited to the minimum number needed to fulfill requirements.

4. (a) USGRO is an integral part of the SUSLO Staff, and all members of USGRO are under the control and direction of SUSLO. USGRO will be under the immediate supervision of the Z Department Liaison Officer on SUSLO’s Staff, who, for this purpose, is designated Officer-in-Charge, USGRO.

(b) The individual members of USGRO will assist the SUSLO in his selection for their respective parent organizations of appropriate GCHQ-produced COMINT items for rapid transmission to appropriate SSO’s in the London area and to NSA. NSA will insure prompt dissemination of all such items it receives to all USCIB Member Organizations in the United States.

(c) The USGRO will be responsive to requests for "spot" intelligence requests from the SSO’s and from NSA. Requests for information from their parent organizations in the United States will be channelled through NSA.

(d) Access to GCHQ working spaces will be as defined by the Director, GCHQ.

5. (a) Communications facilities will be provided at GCHQ to the service SSO’s in the London area, namely:

- Army SSO
- Navy SSO
- Air Force SSO

(b) Communications facilities already in existence between GCHQ and NSA will be used for the transmission of items selected for NSA and for consumers in the U.S.
(c) Unless other arrangements are made, items selected for U.S. Army, State Department, CIA, and FBI Recipients in the European area will be transmitted to the Army SSO. Items selected for U.S. Navy Recipients in the European area will be transmitted to the Navy SSO. Items selected for U.S. Air Force Recipients in the European area will be transmitted to the Air Force SSO.

(d) It will be the responsibility of the Officer-in-Charge, USGRO to insure the prompt dispatch of all items selected for electrical transmission.
ARRANGEMENTS FOR EXCHANGE AND DISSEMINATION WITHIN SACLANT'S COMMAND
OF COMINT BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THIRD PARTY COLLABORATION

1. This paper considers the Communications Intelligence produced by combined UK/US/Canadian collaboration. This does not include Y produced in SACLANT's Command, instructions for the production and handling of which are contained elsewhere.

2. It will be necessary to make arrangements for the following:
   (a) To supply COMINT to SACLANT and to certain of his subordinate commands;
   (b) To arrange interchange of appropriate COMINT between designated SACLANT Commands and between those commands and appropriate authorities outside SACLANT's Command.
   (c) To make intelligence reflecting COMINT available for general operational use within SACLANT's Command.

3. In developing these arrangements the following factors either govern or affect the procedures which can be adopted:
   (a) Security aspects: COMINT is controlled by arrangements between US, UK and Canada. Under the terms of these arrangements SACLANT cannot be authorized to make ad hoc arrangements for COMINT within his Command nor to provide COMINT to nationals other than those of US, UK or Canada.
   
   The number of Headquarters dealing with COMINT must be limited by tri-partite agreement and the number of individuals within each Headquarters, authorized by national authorities to handle COMINT, must also be strictly limited.

   Within SACLANT Headquarters the Intelligence Division is relatively small and is integrated; that is, Intelligence Officers of other NATO nations are full working members of the Division. On no account can they be permitted to handle COMINT material.
   
   Existing arrangements require that COMINT be passed only by Special Secure Cryptographic Channels exclusively for this use.
(b) Timeliness of Information: COMINT may contain information on enemy air and surface movements or enemy plans and intentions. It must be delivered without delay to one or more operational commanders to allow appropriate action to be initiated in time.

(c) Geography: COMINT relevant to SA C/LANT's Command is produced in three locations, widely separated, - that is, in London, Ottawa, and Washington.

The major operational commanders under SA C/LANT are separated by large distances, though their areas of operational responsibility are contiguous.

Operational Intelligence Centers (OICs) will be operated in USA, Canada, and UK, each primarily fed by its own national COMINT source but indirectly receiving the products of all three.

On the other hand, SA C/LANT and CIN C/EST/EST/LANT's Headquarters are adjacent in Norfolk, Va. CIN C/EST/LANT and CIN C/AIR/C/EST/LANT will be co-located in UK when buildings are completed and CIN C/LANT and CIN C/AIR/C/EST/LANT are co-located in Halifax, Nova Scotia.

4. In order to discharge their operational responsibilities CIN C/EST/LANT, CIN C/LANT/CIN C/AIR/C/EST/LANT, and CIN C/EST/LANT/CIN C/AIR/C/EST/LANT will each have to maintain an OIC in which all available COMINT products are fully processed. Since such an OIC must function on a 24-hour basis the number of indoctrinated officers must be considerable. Should SA C/LANT desire to process fully COMINT material at his own headquarters, it would be necessary to increase his intelligence staff substantially by U.S., U.K., or Canadian officers. The presence of such a group within SA C/LANT's Intelligence Staff, a group from which other MAIO officers must be excluded, would be embarrassing and constitute a security hazard. Moreover, in Norfolk such a group would at the present time duplicate work being necessarily performed by CIN C/EST/LANT.

It is therefore considered that for reasons of security and conservation of highly specialized officers, SA C/LANT should delegate to CIN C/EST/LANT the responsibility for supplying him with processed COMINT to meet his requirements at Norfolk. He could similarly designate the responsibility either to CIN C/AIR/C/EST/LANT or CIN C/LANT if he moves his Headquarters.
5. The movement of COMINT to and among the OICs will then follow the below pattern:

(a) **Into the OICs**: The main flow of COMINT end products will be into CINCWESTLANT OIC, in Norfolk, primarily from Washington; into COMGANDLANT/COMAIRCMANLANT OIC, in Halifax, primarily from Ottawa; into CINCEASTLANT/CINCAIREASTLANT OIC, in the UK, primarily from London.

Between the three producing agencies there is interchange of raw material, technical data and end products which augment the production of the national agency supporting each OIC.

Into these same OICs will be fed "Y".

(b) **Between the OICs** there will be exchange of specially important individual COMINT items, and of all appreciations and discussions of plots' based thereon. This channel will permit a constant comparison of plots to resolve differences in interpretation of position of units at sea particularly in the vicinity of chop lines. Such exchange between OICs will normally be repeated to appropriate National Service Intelligence Staffs (e.g., Admiralty, NSHQ, Navy Dept.) for general information or interpretation and investigation by technicians if required. A secure cryptographic channel for combined use will be needed for this as well as an agreed operating procedure.

(c) **Out of OIC's**: Two categories of intelligence will be disseminated by OIC's:

(i) The first will be at COMINT level and will be sent only to subordinate commanders cleared to receive COMINT, who must be U.K., U.S. or Canadian nationals. Such consumers will be served by the appropriate OIC through COMINT channels.

(ii) The second category will be at non-COMINT level and will be sent to all commanders concerned through non-COMINT channels, normally in the form of intelligence summaries.
COMINT may be used as background in the selection and formulation of these summaries, but items of information derived solely from COMINT must be rigorously excluded from them and in addition care must be taken to ensure that nothing in the summaries as issued could be traced back to COMINT in general.

(iii) These arrangements will apply in peacetime. Any modification to meet emergency or wartime conditions will be in accordance with the policy of U.S.C.I.B., L.S.I.B. and Canadian COMINT Authorities.

6. Responsibility for maintaining COMINT security.

(a) Should it be necessary to take action in the light of COMINT made available under para 5 (c) (i) above, the utmost care must be taken by commanders responsible for issuing operational orders to ensure that neither the enemy, nor Allied Third Party nationals and unindoctrinated U.K., U.S. or Canadian nationals involved, become aware of the existence of the COMINT information.

(b) In the case of the intelligence summaries disseminated as in para 5 (c) (ii) above, it is the responsibility of OIC's to ensure that the principles stated are followed in their preparation. Commanders will then be at liberty to use them in any way that their classification (SECRET or TOP SECRET) allow.

7. Responsibility for maintaining COMINT security.

(a) Should it be necessary to take action in the light of COMINT made available under paragraph 5 (c) (i) above, the utmost care must be taken by commanders responsible for issuing operational orders to ensure that neither the enemy, nor Allied Third Party nationals and unindoctrinated U.K., U.S. or Canadian nationals involved, become aware of the existence of the COMINT information.
(b) In the case of the intelligence summaries disseminated as in paragraph 5 (c) (2) above, it is the responsibility of OICs to ensure that the principles stated are followed in their preparations. Commanders will then be at liberty to use them in any way that their classifications (SECRET or TOP SECRET) allows.

8. Designation of COMINT Recipients. SACLANT should recommend to the appropriate National Authority those US, UK, and Canadian Commanders to whom he considers COMINT should be available. In accordance with paragraph 3 (a), he should not recommend any Third Party National as the recipient of COMINT.

The National COMINT authorities alone have the jurisdiction to authorize individual officers as COMINT recipients. It is recommended that in each command authorized to receive COMINT, the Staff Officers nominated to handle COMINT should occupy the same named positions, viz, Chief of Staff and the Senior Staff Officers responsible for Operations, Intelligence, Plans and Communications.

There is a requirement for each OIC to know all holders of their special COMINT cryptographic channel.

9. Communications Requirements. From consideration of the above the following communications are required in war:

(a) Rapid, secure direct communication between each OIC and its primary source of COMINT.

(b) A secure means of mutual exchange between each OIC, its primary source of COMINT, and its National Service Intelligence Staff.

(c) Very rapid communications between the OICs.

(d) A secure means of exchange of pertinent material between producing agencies in UK, US and Canada. These facilities are assumed to exist.

(e) A special COMINT cryptographic channel between OICs and from OICs to indoctrinated commanders.

(f) Secure non-COMINT cryptographic channel from OICs for conveying operational intelligence reports and orders to units in their areas. These facilities are assumed to exist.

(g) Secure means of mutual exchange between SACLANT (and subordinate commands) and SACEUR (and subordinate commands).
10. Immediate Requirements

(a) The necessary communication circuits and cryptographic channels should be provided as soon as possible on a scale commensurate with peacetime requirements in order to ensure the requisite degree of readiness for emergency.

(b) To provide, however, machinery for necessary dissemination in the SACLANT command now, the ECM will be adopted mutually as the combined cryptographic machine.

(c) So as to allow exchange between SACLANT (and subordinate commands) and SACEUR (and subordinate commands) at appropriate levels, common ECM crypto-channels will be employed by SACLANT and SACEUR and designated subordinate commands.

(d) The most expeditious communications channels will be employed in each case, but exclusive channels will be used wherever such can be made available.

(e) ECM crypto-channels will accordingly be made available as follows:--

- NHQ Ottawa
- COMCANTLANT
- CINCRC
- Admiralty
- CINCEASTLANT
- ONI
- CINCWESTLANT
- COMSTIK/FLT (Com, U.S. SECOND FLT)

(f) ECM is already used by GCNQ.

(g) SACLANT will later nominate additional holders in his command.
ARRANGEMENTS FOR COMINT DISSEMINATION TO AND WITHIN SHAPE AND ITS SUB-COMMANDS

I RESponsIBILITY FOR DISSEMINATION


2. In order to provide for close co-ordination in the dissemination of U.S. and U.K. Comint to S.H.A.P.E. and its Sub-Commands, G-2, D/A will establish liaison at G.C.H.Q.

II PRINCIPLES OF DISSEMINATION

3. a) Rear to Front

(i) Security arrangements satisfactory to U.S.C.I.B or L.S.I.B must be made for handling COMINT material in all relevant headquarters under S.H.A.P.E., particularly in those where the intelligence staffs include other than U.S. - U.K. nationals. Subject to this understanding, the principle of direct simultaneous dissemination of Comint to S.H.A.P.E. and its Sub-Commands in war-time is agreed.

It is also agreed that it is essential to achieve in peace-time the methods which will be required in war. Initially in peace, however, not all of S.H.A.P.E.'s Sub-Commands are in a state of readiness to receive a direct service. Therefore, initially, only critical items will be disseminated directly to Sub-Commands, the remainder being disseminated to them by S.H.A.P.E., which will inform G-2 and G.C.H.Q. what material is so disseminated. When and as determined by S.H.A.P.E. for each Sub-Command, routine direct dissemination from executive agents to S.H.A.P.E. Sub-Commands will be initiated. S.H.A.P.E. will in all cases receive copies of all Comint disseminated directly to its Sub-Commands.

(ii) When direct dissemination to Sub-Commands begins, S.H.A.P.E. will establish the requirements of its Sub-Commands.

(iii) Within the foregoing limits, U.S. and U.K. produced Comint will be disseminated directly by the respective executive agents to S.H.A.P.E. and its Sub-Commands by the most expeditious means available to either party. The executive agents will exchange all Comint disseminated by them to S.H.A.P.E. and its Sub-Commands by the most expeditious means available.

b) Front to Rear
b) Front to Rear

(i) As a principle, front to rear dissemination normally should parallel Command channels, with exception being made for items of a critical nature. S.H.A.P.E. will determine which of existing Comint communication channels shall be employed until facilities for dissemination in parallel with Command channels are provided.

(ii) S.H.A.P.E. will determine the requirements and responsibilities of the Sub-Commands.

(iii) With the cognizance to the executive agents, S.H.A.P.E. will arrange with the appropriate U.S. and U.K. national authorities to obtain for itself and its Sub-Commands material produced by U.S. and U.K. field Comint organisations outside the S.H.A.P.E. Command structure.

(iv) It is agreed that any rear to front Comint material incorporated in front to rear reports should, so far as practicable, be clearly indicated as such.

III DISSEMINATION STRUCTURE

4. In order to provide adequate Comint channels, the ECM (SIGABA), subject to approval by the London Cypher Policy Board, will be adopted initially as the combined cypher machine for combined use in the dissemination of Comint to S.H.A.P.E. and its Sub-Commands. This does not exclude the use of other approved systems in addition to ECM. As soon as possible, G.C.H.Q. will provide a land-line "on-line" cypher system between G.C.H.Q. and S.H.A.P.E. subject to approval by U.S. communication security authorities. "On-line" radio facilities linking G.C.H.Q. and N.S.A. are available for use subject to availability of circuit time in excess of that required for NSA-G.C.H.Q. operations, and will be used insofar as they prove the most expeditious means of transmission. N.S.A. and G.C.H.Q. will give Comint for S.H.A.P.E. and its Sub-Commands priority in each category of precedence. The question of using for this purpose in peace-time one of the emergency cable channels between N.S.A. and G.C.H.Q., to obviate delays due to bad transatlantic radio conditions, should be considered by the appropriate authorities.

5. It is agreed that the ECM will be made available for installation at the following organisations and Commands:

G-2, U.S. Army
G.C.H.Q.
S.H.A.P.E.
A.F.N.E.
A.A.F.C.E.
A.F.S.E.
S.S.C., Frankfurt (for A.S.A.(E) produced Comint)
6910 Security Group
B.A.O.R.

/2 T.A.F.
6. Top priority in supply of the E.C.M. is to be accorded G.C.H.Q. and A.F.N.E. The priority of installation at the remaining Commands and any additional requirements will be determined by S.H.A.P.E.

IV COMMUNICATIONS

7. Communications details are attached as Appendix A.

V IMPLEMENTATION

8. The foregoing arrangements will be effective upon approval by U.S.C.I.B. and L.S.I.B.

9. The S.I.O. (Special Integration Office) will be deactivated as soon as administratively practicable following Board approval of the new dissemination arrangements and the establishment of liaison as provided in paragraph 2.
COMMUNICATIONS

I. BEAR TO FRONT

1. (a) U.K. Comint
   (i) U.K. Comint will go direct from G.C.H.Q. to S.H.A.P.E.
   (ii) Initially S.H.A.P.E. will pass on to Sub-Commands as required except that critical items may be sent direct from G.C.H.Q.
   (iii) Later, when S.H.A.P.E. is ready, G.C.H.Q. will send direct to Sub-Commands as required.

(b) U.S. Comint
   (i) U.S. Comint will go from Washington to S.H.A.P.E. either via G.C.H.Q. or by any other route which may be more expeditious at the time.
   (ii) Initially S.H.A.P.E. will pass on to Sub-Commands as required except that critical items may be sent direct from Washington to Sub-Commands either via G.C.H.Q. or by any other route which may be more expeditious at the time.
   (iii) Later, when S.H.A.P.E. is ready, Washington will send direct to Sub-Commands as required either via G.C.H.Q. or by any other route which may be more expeditious at the time.

2. Requirements
   (a) Immediate
      (i) Land-line between G.C.H.Q. and S.H.A.P.E. S.S.O.
      (ii) ECM for G.C.H.Q.
      (iii) On-line system between G.C.H.Q. and S.H.A.P.E.
      (iv) ECM for A.F.N.E.
      (v) One Time Pads for A.F.N.E. (if required before ECM provided).
   (b) As may be decided later.
      (i) Cable channel between N.S.A. and G.C.H.Q.
      (ii) On-line crypto system for cable channel between N.S.A. and G.C.H.Q.

/(iii) Additional
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(iii) Additional land-line from G.C.H.Q to S.H.A.P.E. Signals Centre.

(iv) Exclusive communications between G-2/G.C.H.Q. and A.A.F.C.E.

(v) Exclusive communications between G-2/G.C.H.Q. and A.F.N.E.

(vi) Exclusive communications between G-2/G.C.H.Q. and A.F.S.E.

3. Details of 2(a)

(a) Sub-para (i) and (v) to be arranged by G.C.H.Q.

(b) Sub-para (ii) and (iv) to be arranged by N.S.A. in consultation with G.C.H.Q.

(c) Sub-para (iii) to be further discussed between G.C.H.Q., N.S.A. and S.H.A.P.E. with a view to making best arrangements for earliest implementation.

4. Details of 2(b)

(a) Necessity for sub-para (i) in peace-time, to obviate any radio delays, to be discussed later between G.C.H.Q. and N.S.A.

(b) If sub-para (i) implemented, sub-para (ii) to be discussed later between G.C.H.Q. and N.S.A. with a view to earliest provision.

(c) Sub-para (iii) to be discussed later between G.C.H.Q. and S.H.A.P.E.

(d) Sub-para (iv), (v) and (vi) to be considered after experience gained and in any case considered essential.

II FRONT TO REAR

5. Provision of ECM at 2 T.A.F. and B.A.O.R. to be discussed later when desired by S.H.A.P.E. In the meantime product of 365 S.U. to be made available to S.H.A.P.E. and A.A.F.C.E. and that of No. 1 Wireless Regiment to S.H.A.P.E. by most expeditious existing routes.