Today is 22 January 1985. Our interviewee, Professor Telford Taylor. Professor Taylor, following duty as the General Counsel of the FCC, was commissioned as a Major in the U.S. Army and assigned to Special Bureau, G-2, War Department, in October 1942. He then was selected as Chief, Military Intelligence Section, War Department, London. After a move to Bletchley Park he commanded the unit in Hut 3 that selected Comint items for relay to G-2, the War Department, and the Special Branch in Arlington Hall. Lieutenant Colonel Taylor initiated the proposal for the Special Security Officer system and with the implementation the Americans were able to provide direct intelligence
support to the military commands. After VE day, Supreme Court Justice Jackson, charged with conducting the War Crimes in Nuremberg, asked Colonel Taylor to become Chief Prosecutor and Taylor accepted. He served in this capacity until 1947 and returned to civilian life and the teaching of law. He is currently teaching at Columbia University Law School, Yeshiva University and a third school in New York City. Interview is taking place in Professor Taylor's office at the Columbia University Law School in New York City. Interviewer, Bob Farley. Professor Taylor desires that these two cassettes be classified Secret, Handle Via Comint Channels Only.

TAYLOR: Shall we use the list of questions?
FARLEY: We can pretty much follow them along, whatever you think.
TAYLOR: Now I don't have to shout, I gather, I've got a microphone here...
FARLEY: No, you're in good shape. All right sir.
TAYLOR: Well, question one. ((Question: "Your early life, post-teen period"))
FARLEY: The early life -- this concerns the early life of Professor Telford Taylor. We can pretty much skip
that, we do have a lot of it on our own record. But whatever you think should be on the record. If you want to pick it up in Harvard and talk about ROTC or training duty.

TAYLOR: Well I was, you know I honestly don't know whether there was any ROTC program in Harvard. I know I didn't participate if there was. There was none at Williams. Of course this was in the period, in the '20s when military matters didn't command a very wide attention. The Army was tiny and I don't believe that I saw an officer in uniform other than on the Fourth of July parades for many, many years. You have the, in question four, you have the various position in which I served after graduation.((Question: "Various positions held from 1933-1942"))

FARLEY: All right sir.

TAYLOR: I graduated from Harvard in 1932 and in 1932-33 I was secretary to Judge Augustus N. Hand in New York. His picture's up there on the wall.

FARLEY: Right, I see him.

TAYLOR: And then I went to the Interior Department and then to these other positions, ending up at the Federal Communications Commission before I joined the Army.
FARLEY: All right sir, let's talk about the FCC. I had a couple of questions about that.

TAYLOR: Yes.

FARLEY: What were your prime responsibilities, prosecuting offenders in the COM field, for illegal transmissions?

TAYLOR: Oh no. We had no prosecutorial functions at all. Those would have been handled by the U.S. Attorney and any places where there were criminal violations of the monitoring rules or anything like that. Well, that's how the FCC was very much more simply organized and smaller than today. There were three principal staff members, the Chief Accountant, the Chief Engineer, and the General Counsel. So I was one of the three Chiefs of Staff. The Chief of Accounting was an accountant named Norwood, civil service man; the Chief Engineer was a former Naval Lieutenant, Euwel K. Jett; and under him was the Field Division which did the field work to try to detect unlicensed radio communications. So that as the war came, it was that field division, I can't remember who headed that, but whoever it was was under Jett, that first got into the business of intercept and of monitoring of foreign broadcasts. My main functions, until the war situation was changed,
was commission civil policy. I handled litigation in the Supreme Court and lower Federal courts by and against the Commission on matters of licensing and regulations of broadcast and that kind of thing and none of that was particularly military until quite close before the outbreak of war. Before Pearl Harbor came, however, there had been set up... it was an interdepartmental group... the Defense Communications Board, was what it was called. The Chairman of it was a General, the chairman of the FCC, James Lawrence Frye, and the other members included a Commodore, I can't remember his name. Redman I think, who was in communications at the Navy.

FARLEY: Yes sir.
TAYLOR: And a Major General Mauborgne?
FARLEY: Mauborgne.
TAYLOR: Who must have been Chief Signal Officer, I suppose.
FARLEY: Yes sir, he was.
TAYLOR: And an official from the Treasury Department who was one of the assistant secretaries, I can't remember his name, I think he just retired as Ambassador to Italy, and a man from the Treasury Department, because of the Coast Guard's interest in the matter. That was the
five, with Frye presiding. And I was the General Counsel to that Board as well as to the FCC, ex-officio. And before, before Pearl Harbor it had a good deal to do with rearmament and checking the flow of scarce materials to civilian ends and gearing it toward the military uses. The military men who came to those meetings until Pearl Harbor all came in civilian dress and I very well remember when Pearl Harbor happened, the next time we met, they all came in in uniform. And I was General Counsel then, and in that capacity I also presided over the Legal Subcommittee of the Defense Communications Board on which we had a representative, a Lieutenant Commander Willenbacher from the Navy, a Captain or Major, can't remember his name from the Army, Raymond Yingling from the State Department and a chap, again whose name I can't remember, from Treasury, same branches. And I guess it was before the war, though I'm not positive, that Frye got the idea of setting of the Federal Broadcast Monitoring Service, FBMS. I did play a part in that because they were looking for a man to head it. The first head of it was a man named Lloyd B, Lloyd Free, the same name as this famous basketball
player. But when he left they were looking for a successor and I recommended the man who was appointed. The man who was appointed was Robert D. Leigh, who had been a professor at Williams when I was a student there and had then become President of Bennington College when it was first set up. He had resigned as President at Bennington College having been in there for ten or twelve years and I recommended him strongly to the head of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service. He'd done a lot of work in the field of public opinion and, therefore, I thought he would understand well the interpretation of broadcast about political opinion and so forth, and he was indeed made head of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service. But I think that happened after the War had begun and I believe he was still in that position when I resigned my position with the FCC and was commissioned in the Special Branch. I had made other efforts to get in the military beginning in the spring of 1943. I was strongly requested by the Chairman, since I had important litigation pending, not to try to go into the military right away, but by the spring of '43 that litigation was in a stage where others could carry it
on and I first tried to get into the Navy as a Naval intelligence officer but I failed the eye test.

FARLEY: Sir do you remember? Let me bounce back just to two items on the FCC. Do you remember the controversy between the FBI and the FCC, where...?

TAYLOR: Well, I remember a number of particular controversies, yes.

FARLEY: The one about the German intercept, the FBI wanted to intercept German...

TAYLOR: Now, that I don't remember. When did that take place?

FARLEY: In the '40s, in the late '40s.

TAYLOR: Late '40s I'd have been gone.

FARLEY: All right sir.

TAYLOR: What I do remember was a very interesting one which in the McCarthy period was thrown up against me and (fired?) repeatedly. What had happened was that...I guess this happened right after the outbreak of war. We thought it desirable to get fingerprints from all the people who held radio transmission licenses, which we issued of course. We thought as an identification matter in the event of any monkey business with that it would be desirable to have fingerprints of all the radio license operators. And we had power to do that.
But we also thought it would be desirable to have fingerprints from the wire services, operators of telegraph, Western Union and so forth, but we did not have power to demand those because we didn't license them.

FARLEY: Yes.

TAYLOR: And Frye managed to bring about a voluntary submission of fingerprints from all the Western Union and the other company, Postal Telegraph, on the stipulation that we would only keep those and use them in the event of some national security breach occurring.

Well, so we had them on that agreement. There came a point when the FBI found out we had those and they didn't, and they demanded that we turn over to them the originals, or copies, of both the radio licenses which we had under our own power and the Western Union, and Postal Telegraph ones. And we turned over the radio ones, because we demanded them on our own steam. We gave them copies freely enough, but we did not feel that in good conscience we could turn over the others because we'd gotten them, not by force of law, but by the agreement. And that raised a hell of a rumpus. And the assistant, the first assistant
Attorney General, James Rowe, who had been an assistant to Roosevelt before he went over to the Department of Justice, as First Assistant to the Attorney General, was a contemporary of mine and a friend. I well remember some very heated telephone calls between me and him in which he said that I'd better get our ducks in a row and give those things up or there was going to be a lot of trouble. Well, I, of course, reported this to Frye. I had no authority on my own to change it and Frye didn't want to go back on the agreement either. But pressure accumulated and after all there were seven members of the commission and the time came in which the commission decided to yield and violate the agreement with Western Union. To explain to them that we couldn't stand up against the demand from Justice, and turned over those too. But in later years when I had some doings with Senator McCarthy, he looked up all the records and accused me of having opposed giving fingerprints to the FBI.

Oh boy. The situation I had in mind, sir, was the FBI requesting the FCC to do intercept of German agent communications. Now this was probably in the early '40s rather than the late. Do you recall anything on
that?

TAYLOR: No I don't.

FARLEY: All right, sir.

TAYLOR: I do recall that after I went into the Army... of course at that point I ceased to have any position with the Commission at all, with the Defense Communications Board, but I did have some relations with George, can't remember his last name, his first name was George. He ran that field division that was doing the intercepting and monitoring. I had some meetings with him and I remember... I believe both the FCC and the Coast Guard had been picking up some German signals from the Abwehr. What I don't remember is getting into any tangle with the FBI about that because, of course, the tangle would have been between the FCC and the FBI and I was no longer at the FCC.

FARLEY: All right, sir.

TAYLOR: What attitude I took at our meetings, which were entirely unofficial, I don't remember. There was another participant in those meetings, a Captain Kenneth Maidment. I don't know whether that name is familiar to you or not.

FARLEY: No sir.
TAYLOR: What?

FARLEY: No.

TAYLOR: Well he was the Washington representative of the famous "Little Bill" Stevenson in New York. And as a matter of fact this was all quite interesting because the Special Branch, in addition to what Arlington Hall itself was doing from the Japanese stuff, was getting these driblets of Abwehr traffic. It came in from the Coast Guard and I guess some from the FBI, or the FCC, though I don't remember that I knew that. But anyhow, they were very incomprehensible and I remember McCormack thinking they might be "spoof traffic" of some kind, because they didn't make any sense. They talked about "Say this to Africa Man", and I remember that as a particular word that we used. Well, Maidment, of course, knew all about them because he had been at BP. He knew all about the Abwehr through his being part of Stevenson's empire here, and he informed me once—he knew I was in Special Branch—and that the reason they were incomprehensible was because they were full of cover words. That's what made them sound so crazy and be impossible to make use of. And I duly reported that to McCormack and that was one of
the many things that raised the pressure for our getting in touch with BP and an interchange with BP, was that thing about the Abwehr. I became very close friends with Kenneth Maidment and indeed when I went overseas in '43, he was then in the process of bringing his wife and children to the States. He had been living in New York alone, but when he brought his wife and children he wanted to live in Washington where the bulk of his work was. I had a fairly big house out in Chevy Chase and he and his wife and children shacked up with my wife and our children at my home in Chevy Chase.

FARLEY: Oh, great.

TAYLOR: So that's what you jogged my memory on.

FARLEY: Very fine. Sir you mentioned Wilenbucher, do you remember the name...

TAYLOR: Wilenbucher.

FARLEY: Bucher, is that the way you pronounce it?


FARLEY: Okay good, I have it, Bucher. Do you remember whether you ever were involved in his "Plan Blue" or "Plan Gray" which was intended to get the FCC out of the intercept business? ((OP-20-WP developed two plans)).
TAYLOR: No, I never heard those words. Wilenbucher, during the period that I was on the Defense Communications Board and on that committee -- I was Chairman of the Legal Committee -- was not altogether friendly. I think that what you've described is his plan to get the FCC out of it would be a reflection of that same thing.

FARLEY: Right.

TAYLOR: Indeed the first time that I had wholly friendly words with Wilenbucher was at the meeting when I announced that I was leaving to go into the Army. He came up and said that I must've wanted to do it very badly and shook my hand and so forth. But we had disagreed on a good many things in the course of the approximately six months that I was in meetings with him generally. But I never heard of the Plan Blue or Plan Gray. He was appointed a commander shortly after the war broke out.

FARLEY: Okay. Was there any friction between the FCC and the military, or the service intelligence units at that period in the early '40s? Did the FCC try to direct the military service intelligence or intercept units to do things the FCC's way?
TAYLOR: I don't know that. I don't believe the Federal Broadcast Monitoring Service, the Foreign Broadcast would have done that because we were the only people doing it and we distributed the results of our copying to the Army as well as other agencies. But the monitoring of German signals that you described, that George, whatever his name was, that his office was doing, his field staff, might well. Frye would know more about that than I would, but of course he's dead, these many years.

FARLEY: Oh too bad.

TAYLOR: So I really don't know.

FARLEY: Okay. All right, let's see. I was just going to tell you that the FBIS was great. We, in the building, were able to anticipate that something was going on in China, like the Cultural Revolution by the first news items out of China, like the arresting of professors and the burning of books and all of this and it went to the watch committee and the USSID, based on the FBIS, so it paid off in the long run. You were out of there, so you can't probably answer the next question.

TAYLOR: I went out of there in October 1942.

FARLEY: Okay. So I was going to ask whether the mission
changed drastically after the beginning of World War II, but it doesn't matter sir.

TAYLOR: Well the mission of the FCC?

FARLEY: Yes sir.

TAYLOR: Well it certainly intensified. The monitoring service was certainly intensified. The work that George was doing. It also intensified the steps that were taken to completely shut off the flow of materials for civilian use in broadcasting. Indeed we shut down entirely on licensing new stations soon after Pearl Harbor so that there were no new radio stations. Of course television had just come in. Before the war came, there had been I think exactly seven television, commercial television licenses issued. And soon after the war we shutdown and there wasn't another television station built until after peace.

FARLEY: Right.

TAYLOR: So in those respects there were big changes of course, But I only lasted six or seven months after the war.

FARLEY: That's fine. I have a lot of questions about the FBIS but I want to move right into the other, more important things. How come you didn't try to get in the JAG, the Judge Advocate General, either in the

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Navy or in the military, Army?

TAYLOR: I suppose it was a desire for change. I wanted to get into something that was operational.

FARLEY: Good.

TAYLOR: And that's why I went to the Naval Intelligence thing first, which didn't work. Well I'll come later to when you want and I'll have to go to the Special Branch.

FARLEY: All right sir. Shall we move on to your association with Alfred McCormack?

TAYLOR: Just let me just look at any of these questions here first. See any of them that titilate my memory in any way? Yeah it's Wilenbucker, B-u-c-h-e-r.

FARLEY: All right I made that change sir.

TAYLOR: I have somewhere over there some old files that I haven't looked at since I put them in an envelope that I suppose I ought to at some point to take a look at.

FARLEY: These are World War II type files?

TAYLOR: Well, those are all FCC.

FARLEY: Oh I see, Oh boy. If you ever want to will those to anybody, we'd be delighted.

TAYLOR: Well, right.

FARLEY: All right sir. We have an individual now doing a
history of the FCC and its intelligence relationship.

TAYLOR: Oh really!

FARLEY: Yes sir. So that should be published within three or four months; I'll make sure you get a copy.

TAYLOR: Right, that would be good. Well, we come up to question 17 and I think I've answered that.

FARLEY: Right. That's when you were General Counsel ((Were you General Counsel when Pearl Harbor was bombed?)) and the JAG. And your first assignment...

TAYLOR: I suppose it might have come in the end to my going to JAG because I couldn't get into anything else. I mean I don't know if I would have passed the Army eye test either. But I found out about the McCormack unit. The way I found out about it, although I only got the most vague idea of what was going on there, was from a former colleague of mine at Williams, a slightly older man, Paul Birdsahl, who had been head of the History Department at Williams. I taught there one year before I went to law school, so I got to know him very well. He and I played a lot of tennis and I got to know him well and I saw him while I was at law school. I would go to visit Williams again, so I was very close friends with him. He resigned from Williams' faculty
and came down with the OSS at the time when Donovan's shop had what became the Office of War Information later, before that split took place. He was there doing some kind of intelligence work with Donovan, I don't know what. And he, sometime in the spring or early summer of 1942, made the shift to the Special Branch, because that part of OSS was moved over to the War Department and at that point he was commissioned a major in the Army. I was still with the FCC, but he continued, he had brought his family down to Washington and they had two girls, two little girls about the age of my first wife and my two daughters. We had the big place in Chevy Chase, big yard and they would come out for weekends. And in the course of these, Paul, sometime in the summer of 1942, told me that he was doing very interesting work at the War Department. I'm inclined to think that he hadn't been given the best of all security briefings, because I guess he told me a little more about it than he should have. And you would be amused to know I knew nothing about cryptography or cryptanalysis or anything like that, but I guess I'd read enough in the newspapers, so I was under the impression that there were
unbreakable codes. Now I couldn't imagine that they had anything like that over there, that real codes were unbreakable. Well then I found out that Al McCormack was the head of the section. I didn't know him personally, but I knew his law firm, the Cravass law firm, and while I was at the FCC I'd known McCloy, Secretary of War. He had had business with FCC; he was then representing Westinghouse, General Electric Company; they had a legal problem and he came to see me at the FCC in connection with that. McCormack I knew of only as being one of the partners in Cravass which was a big high-powered law firm, and I thought it was the best law firm in New York. I had been offered a job there, but I had gone with Judge Hand instead thinking that I would go with Cravass or somewhere like that later and then the "New Deal" came and I flocked to Washington with everybody else. But anyhow the, Birdsahl put me in touch with McCormack and very likely McCormack checked with McCoy. I don't know. But anyhow he was agreeable to seeing me, and discussing things with me and he decided that he wanted me to come. He was worried that Carter Clarke would not like me, or like having me there because

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Clarke was very, very Republican and right-winged and when he heard that I'd come down with the "New Deal" - "I suppose he likes Mrs. Roosevelt!" And so he was worried about that, but the funny thing was that when I finally saw Clarke, we hit it off well, and we hit it off better and better as time went on. So Clarke swallowed his worries about Mrs. Roosevelt and they put through my commission as a major and I didn't pass the eye test, but they got a waiver on it. And so there I was in the Special Branch.

While I think of it -- I had a letter from Carter Clarke, I told him I was going to talk to you, he said "Be sure and give him my best."

Oh good. When did you have it?

I talked to him about a year ago and I had a letter from him about a month ago.

About a month ago.

He had two serious operations and he is in not very good shape, but he's still writing letters to the editor, at least two a week, to the Clearwater Gazette and the St. Petersburg Times on every subject known to man.

Are they published?
FARLEY: Oh yes, they publish all of them. But he wanted to be remembered to you.

TAYLOR: Well thank you. I must write him. I wish I had his right address.

FARLEY: Yeah, all right, I'll send it.

TAYLOR: What were you going to say?

FARLEY: Do you want to check his address and I'll see if I can remember? If not I'll send it to you. It's a retirement settlement area in Clearwater.

TAYLOR: Retirement settlement.

FARLEY: Something Point, or something...

TAYLOR: General Ed Clarke. I don't believe that I do.

FARLEY: All right sir, I'll send it to you.

TAYLOR: What were you going to say?

FARLEY: Let's pick it up -- you're at Arlington Hall now, doing some basic training? Did you do any basic training...

TAYLOR: No I'm not in Arlington Hall, I'm in the Pentagon Building for the first three months.

FARLEY: Good. And that was just sort of an orientation type assignment?

TAYLOR: Well, it wasn't supposed to be because at that stage there had been no... I'll tell you how the other thing

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started. That didn't start 'til Christmas Day. McCormack was by then putting out the Magic Summary, of course, and had been for some time. His two chief assistants on that were Lou Stone and Hank Rigby. They were the chief editors of the thing and they would bring the stuff as they approved it into McCormack and he would put the final seal of approval on the Magic Summary. McCormack told me that he wanted me to have a thorough immersion in the material before giving me anything particular to do. So I read the stuff that came in from Arlington, but I didn't go to Arlington, I just at that stage was reading it and I don't know what they were going to do with me. And as a matter of fact McCormack never did give me a particular assignment, it was Clarke who did. Clarke took a shine to me for some reason despite the politics and I went in there one day and he said "Taylor, you know the Navy doesn't tell us anything, and I believe that there was some kind of bad defeat that they suffered out there near Guadalcanal somewhere, very recently, but they haven't said anything about any such thing, I want you to see if you can find out what happened." So my first task was
to spy on the Navy. Well, I didn't really know how to

go about it, but what I did was start collecting all
the Daily Battle communiques that come out in Tokyo
and in Washington, and anything else that I could lay
my hand on. But those communiques daily listed the
sinkings and damagings that each side was claiming and
so forth, and I hadn't been studying them very long
before I realized that if all those communiques were
true, we had each sunk the other's Navy twice over.
That, of course, didn't make sense. So I got out my
report on it, saying that I couldn't identify any
particular defeat from these communiques, but that the
communiques are obviously not to be trusted -- ours
any more than the Japanese -- and pointed out the
absurd results which those brought about. And he very
much liked what I had written, and became increasingly
friendly to me. Incidentally, very soon after I had
submitted the memorandum, our Navy finally released a
communique which revealed the Battle of Cebu Island,
in which we lost three cruisers and the Australians
lost one. That was what he had been upset about and
what I couldn't really put my finger on. So that
gives you some idea of the exact timeframe. It was

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just about the time of the Battle of Cebu Island was announced.

FARLEY: Did you go out to Arlington Hall for any orientation at all?

TAYLOR: Oh I did indeed. What happened next was that they had to have a watch officer over the premises in the Pentagon Building every evening to make sure no interlopers came in, even though everything was triple locked. I being the most recent major commissioned was given the job of being the watch officer Christmas Eve. So I was there Christmas Eve, and I took advantage of it to read all the old files on Pearl Harbor and the messages that came in at the time of Pearl Harbor. So I thought I'd spent the night in a profitable way, but Clarke came in early the next morning before anybody else was there. I encountered him in the washroom, actually, where I'd gone in to shave. And he said, "Taylor are you one of these guys that joined up only on the belief that he'd stay in the Pentagon Building, or could you go somewhere?" Well, I said, "I'd have to talk to my wife about it, but as far as I was concerned I would certainly consider going somewhere." What was it? And then he
told me that, "You know these bloody English -- we
don't get anything they're getting out of the German
traffic and that Naval guy they have over here,
Captain Eddie Hastings is -- ". His profanity was
extreme. But he said, "They've got all this stuff and
we ought to have it. So we're thinking of, in fact
we've decided to try to bring it about -- to send a
liaison team over there, and you're 'it', if you want
to do it." So I talked to my wife and decided that I
would do it. That was the week between Christmas and
New Year's of '42. And to the conclusion of that,
instead of going back to the Pentagon Building, Clarke
and McCormack arranged with Colonel Bullock who was at
that time head of it, that he would allow me to come
there and go through the whole works from bottom to
top so that I would get an amateur's acquaintance with
the terminology and the different systems, with
cryptography, what was being read and what wasn't
being read, the intercept business, traffic
analysis, the general view of all those things. So
from January, February and March, I was over at
Arlington Hall doing that.

FARLEY: Good. Were you given a security briefing and required
to sign an oath when you came into G-2? Did you go through the whole routine, the "blessing" and "you are now one of us" and "everything is very sensitive"?

TAYLOR: Of course, I had to take the oath of allegiance over. You don't mean that.

FARLEY: No, I mean the security.

TAYLOR: I was certainly given a very severe briefing on it, but I can't remember whether I signed any oath or not. I don't think so.

FARLEY: Probably not, but a security briefing is fine. But you had been told early that you were going to become MIS, WD London?

TAYLOR: Well, I was told, I mean that name had been arrived at, but I was told that I would go over to carry on the relation that they hoped to establish. The thought wasn't that I would go over alone in the first instance. I was only a major; I'd only been in the service for three months. And in fact when we went over, it was McCormack and Friedman and I who went together. But the idea from the beginning was that they would then leave me there assuming this was arranged properly and that they would gradually send me more staff as the need arose. So yes, I was 27
ticketed for that job when I accepted it, the end of December '42. That was what I would do and my going to Arlington Hall was for the purpose of equipping me to do that.

FARLEY: Good. Was three months adequate orientation at Arlington Hall for what you were going to be subjected to in England?

TAYLOR: I guess so.

FARLEY: Was it.

TAYLOR: Of course I didn't know that at the time one way or the other cause I didn't know what I was going to be subjected to in England. But actually we would have gone sooner than that, but for the fact that bringing about the arrangement proved quite sticky. There was one period... I was not party to those negotiations. Those were being handled by, I guess Clarke primarily, and with the backing of McCormack and McCloy with Eddie Hastings. I did get to meet Eddie Hastings when the thing was about to jell and he gave me my first briefing on "C" and Menzies. He said "You know he's only a Brigadier, but he's actually a very much more important man than that". And he told me about how "C" was the head of MI-6 and that BP and Berkley...
Streets were part of that empire. I don't believe I saw Eddie Hastings until late February or early March. And there was one stage that I remember very well at which Clarke was looking pretty woe-begone, that maybe they weren't going to be able to hitch the thing up. I don't know what the problem was. I remember going home to my wife, who is a very sensible woman, and telling her. She didn't know what was going on, but she did know I was going over there on this thing. "I don't know what they're going to do." She said, "Well, that's absolutely crazy with a war going on if they can't agree on something."

FARLEY: She's right. Sir, you mentioned that you had a love-hate relationship with Captain Hastings. Do you want to comment at all on that or is it worth our time?

TAYLOR: I've forgotten that I used that phrase.

FARLEY: I read some place where you used that love-hate relationship.

TAYLOR: I guess I wouldn't apply that word to it now. The relationship was never a close one. Once I got over there, of course, I ceased to see him except when he visited England and was only that introduction that I went through with him that was important. He did come
back to England eventually and was replaced in his liaison capacity. I saw rather more of him then for a while; I rather liked him and I guess he rather liked me. But I never had any real tempest of any kind with him, I don't know why I would have said that about him.

FARLEY: That's all right. Sir, when the three of you went to England -- before you went, did you have a meeting of the minds about what you were going to talk about, what you intended to accomplish, what you hoped to happen with the British?

TAYLOR: Pretty much. You see actually my talks with Maidment when he told me what that police traffic was, he told me a good deal more about what they were getting over there and I reported that to McCormack. That was one of the sparks that got McCormack and Clarke thinking, "Well, my God we ought to have that here!" So the main purpose of the trip was to make arrangements so that things of value to G-2 that came out of the traffic that Britain was reading and we weren't reading, would be sent back to Pentagon Building to be put in the grist of material that McCormack's Special Branch used.

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FARLEY: You people were not getting that material prior to that time then?
TAYLOR: No.
FARLEY: Good.
TAYLOR: No, bad.
FARLEY: Yeah! It's terrible, it's terrible.
TAYLOR: Well, though actually in the long run of course, as things worked out in the Special Branch the operational side of it became very much more a Pacific-oriented side than a Europe-oriented side, because, of course, we were the main blokes on the Jap stuff. The British lived off us on that, primarily, and we lived off them on the other. But the Order of Battle Section under Colonel Lovell, once American troops got engaged, set up this big apparatus in London to deal with captured documents and for the proper interpretation and understanding of captured documents. Of course there ought to be somebody on that staff that knew about ULTRA. That's all there was to it. That was Lovell. So the thing broadened out a great deal after we got started. But the main thing was to feed back to the Pentagon the things that the British were reading and we weren't.
FARLEY: Good. Sir, did the British welcome you three with open arms? Did they say "We're glad to see you"? Had it been pretty well "greased" before you three arrived?

TAYLOR: I think so. Of course the British are very courteous anyhow. But decisions must've been made at high-level, and I'm sure it was brought up with Churchill. Churchill, as you know, his policy was that we can't win the war without the Americans, and I think if the matter was laid before him he would have said, "Well by God you've got to give it to them. We're depending upon them for the main mass of manpower and material and everything else. You can't play that kind of a game with them." That's inference -- I don't know that, but I think it's probably true.

FARLEY: Good. Sir we've heard for many, many years that the British were a little concerned about the security of the American forces and the politicians and they were reluctant to give us ULTRA. Did that come through when you arrived there? Were you cautioned that, "Now look, this is very sensitive material and we don't want anybody else to know about it? Was it more so than at Arlington Hall -- the security consciousness?
The security consciousness was of a very different kind -- and you really asked two different questions...About general security as compared to the attitude toward the Americans.

All right sir.

I don't believe -- of course there were bound to be some security risks in passing a volume of stuff across the ocean. We had had some breaches of our codes in Egypt which Clarke and Bonner Fellers were involved with. There had been also breaches of some of the British Naval codes at odd moments, which I think they found out about during the war by reading ULTRA. But in any event we weren't the first people to be given access to the stuff. The Air Force had a colonel who was later a partner in a big brokerage firm.

A French name?

No, no, no it was not a French name.

Quesada?

No, no, he was a commander guy. This was a Wall Street broker who had gone into the Air Force and was there with Akers headquarters and later with Spaatz's headquarters. I'm sorry, he wasn't actually in their
headquarters, he was their man stationed at the Air Ministry, and he had been given access to ULTRA in that capacity before we got there. Furthermore the Navy had had a man in the Naval section at BP several months before we got there, early '43. We went in May '43 or April, I can't remember which, sometime around then.

FARLEY: Sir let me switch.

End Tape 1, Side A, begin Tape 1, Side B

FARLEY: All right sir, I'm on over about number 36, unless you have some before that. ((#36. Did you know that you would be staying in England and assume command of the MIS WD London?))

TAYLOR: Thirty-six, I guess I have covered most of those.

FARLEY: Yes sir.

TAYLOR: Well, you want to know then about our first reception there because that will bear on the British attitude.

FARLEY: Yes sir.

TAYLOR: We were introduced immediately to "C" and "C's" quarters down on Broadway, near St. James' Park, and very courteously received. McCormack, of course, was much the senior member of the party. Well, Friedman, in a sense that he was a senior technician, and
McCormack was very much senior to me. He did all the talking at meetings like that. I was there because I needed to know what had happened and was going to be staying on after they left. I had been promoted to lieutenant colonel for purposes of going over there. A speedy promotion. And all I can say is that, from what I remember of that meeting with Mengzies, that whether he liked it or not, he was thoroughly reconciled to the necessity of it and wished to be cooperative. Being in London, the next people we saw were not the Bletchley people, but the people of Berkley Street where the diplomatic traffic was handled. It was headed by Allister Denniston, who had been in Room G or Room H, or whatever it was with the Admiralty during World War I, had been decorated and had been put in charge of ULTRA under "C's" predecessor, Admiral Cummings, I believe he was. Admiral somebody or other. Then Denniston had been the head man when they moved to BP for a couple years. But he was already in his 60s and although he was a very fine linguist and a very excellent cryptanalyst, he, I think, had been brought up on a starvation diet like Friedman so long that he could not accommodate
himself to all of the sudden riches, money, the need for rapid expansion, Bombes and all this sort of thing. He just couldn't get around the speed and magnitude of the thing, so they put in a younger man, Travis, who had those assets of being younger and more aggressive. Denniston was sent back to London to head up the Berkley Street branch, so he remained in charge of all the diplomatic traffic. Since that was about all that I'd been exposed to by then at Arlington Hall, or the Special Branch, because that was all we had, when McCormack and Friedman left I was in a position to, with some information and background, deal with that right away. I was left there alone. But to go on with the trip -- after we'd gotten a view of Denniston's little empire at Berkley Street, where incidentally I was very much impressed by the fact that the Japanese, J-20, or whatever it was, the secondary code, not the Purple had had a section of about twenty people at Arlington Hall doing it. The British were doing the same thing with two elderly civil servants who were going around practically palsied, but would turn out the stuff just as well as the twenty young men doing it at Arlington.
They're real professionals, aren't they?

Real professionals. Then we went out to BP and met Travis and met his second man, Nigel. Can't remember his last name, Nigel somebody or other, and made the tour of Hut 3 and Hut 6. We didn't spend much time on the Naval side though we met the Naval men.

Was that DeGray?

Yes, Nigel DeGray, yeah. And since I was coming over in intelligence and not in a Signal Corps capacity, of course, Hut 3 was the main place I was going to be so we spent a long time with Jones, who was then the head of it, and with Rose, who was the head of the Air section of it and Terry Leithun was the head of the Army section. We spent two or three days out there being generally educated about the Bombes and what Hut 3 did, though not how they did it. And the watch and the specialists and the others things in Hut 3.

Sir, was the MIS WD in existence when you arrived?

Oh no, I was it.

You were it, all right, I want to put that on the record, you were it.

I was it, yeah. There was another military person there in the person of a naval lieutenant, who was in
the Naval section.

FARLEY: I see.

TAYLOR: But then very soon after I got there, McCormack and Friedman had left by then, but I guess by July the men that Colonel Bieber had arranged to send down to work in Hut 6, came on the scene and I did not have command over them. They were not part of MIS WD, London, they were Signal Corps personnel. Though in fact two of them, who were linguists rather than cryptanalysts, worked as consultants in Hut 3, helping on the translations. But apart from those two... Bundy, the commander of that group was lieutenant, later Captain Bill Bundy, later Assistant Secretary of State and...

FARLEY: Foreign Affairs.

TAYLOR: ...all that, yeah. He's retired.

FARLEY: Oh is he?

TAYLOR: Yeah, living in Princeton.

FARLEY: I saw him about three years ago. He was down at Ft. Meade and lectured to an International Affairs Institute group. Very fine man.

TAYLOR: Yeah. Now...

FARLEY: Let me ask, did you have any responsibility or association with the American Embassy or Military
TAYLOR: Maybe I better break off before we come to that.

FARLEY: All right sir.

TAYLOR: Well, No! I guess we should do that now. Yes, I was administratively under the military attache and indeed McCormack and Friedman and I came under his administrative umbrella. But although I think he generally knew about the fact that there was cryptanalysis going on here and there, he was not in on the know and it was understood that he would not interfere in any way with what we were doing, but the billeting office, the messing facilities, the uniform requirements, the communications facilities. We sent our messages back through his code office at Grosvenor Square. My office was in Grosvenor Square insofar as I was operating independently of the British. I shared it with a very nice major who was in the intelligence section there, I don't know what he did. I can't remember his name. Well McCormack and Friedman stayed, I guess, for about three weeks all told during this whole thing. We also paid a visit to Bicher's intercept operations down at Hastings and went on a maneuver where his field intercept
organization was going to be operating and watched that, somewhere down near Salisbury. But then they went back and I was left there alone. This was by now late May or early June and since I had nobody else, and since I knew exactly what to do at Denniston's place on Berkley Street, because I knew what we were reading back home, and I by then knew what Denniston's group was reading, I therefore was able -- I think quite competently -- to select the things which I knew we wouldn't have, and to tell Denniston I want those to go back.

FARLEY: Now did you have EEIs or any requirements or any guidance from Arlington Hall or from G-2, or SRB, as to what you should select to send back?

TAYLOR: What's SRB?

FARLEY: Well, it's special branch I guess. I'm sorry, it later became Special Research Branch, Special Branch.

TAYLOR: Yes, yeah. I had nothing from Arlington Hall, I had only the education I'd gained there about transpositions and codebooks and one-time pads and that sort of thing. And, of course, what they were doing down there didn't involve the Bombes. It was the same thing that had been going on at Arlington Hall that very much, except that they had specialized a lot on
other codes. They were reading the Spanish codes by virtue of, not of breaking the one-time pads, by lifting them out of the diplomatic pouch.

FARLEY: So you were reporting back both technical material and intelligence product material?

TAYLOR: Well, if I came across material that I knew would be technically interesting I would, but there was not much of that. And after all you could hardly call getting into the diplomatic pouch of the Spanish a technical matter.

FARLEY: That's right.

TAYLOR: But anyhow I was able to do that and I thought I ought to do it and keep doing it until somebody else came to take my place to do it. So I stayed there maybe six weeks until they sent me my first colleague, who was a young lawyer named Roger Randolph, civilian, who'd been working with Rigby and Stone on the Magic Summary at the Pentagon Building. A very bright guy. He came over, I would think late July and took over the work I was doing at Berkley Street. I introduced him to Denniston, to the other people there. I told him what I'd been doing, how I'd been doing it. It was not
difficult. He was as well-versed as I was in what was going on, coming into G-2. He hadn't been to Arlington Hall. He didn't know that very much, may have been over there a few days, but not very much. And he stayed a full year. And as soon as he was well settled there, I picked up stakes and moved to Bletchley and was given a permanent billet there at the Swan Hotel in Leighton Buzzard. I planted myself down in the air section and then in the military section, working consecutively and closely in the head's office. Because everybody came in and out of there I could see what was going on better than at anywhere else. I was given a higher education in what the watch did and what the duty officer did and what the Index did and all that. And that I kept on doing for a good long time, but as soon as I could I got myself set up in a way so that I could start doing the same there that I had been doing at Berkley Street. The real difficulty was that what I was doing at Bletchley they didn't have any of it back home, whereas for the diplomatic stuff they had a good deal of it. I didn't have to worry about Purple and the
Jap stuff. So that it was initial selection. By then I think I had gotten a pretty good eye for things that would be the kind of things that McCormack would want to put in his Magic Summary. But I hadn't been in the Order of Battle section. I hadn't had any order of battle training at that stage. I didn't know about Lovell. I didn't know until I was told from Washington that Lovell's staff in Washington -- at the Pentagon -- was growing too, and that they were hungry for bulk. Well, at about this time we had a brief fracas caused by the arrival of the senior General Strong, who was elderly. I gather he was a very good man in his day and I know Clarke thought well of him. But Strong certainly did not impress me very much at his performance when he came over at that time. This would have been probably late September, October, some time in there. He came up to BP and was given a luncheon and moved around a little bit, met most of the heads of sections. I had sensed before this that Nigel DeGray did not like what was going on with us at all. That he wanted to cut it down to a minimum. And Strong was persuaded by Nigel DeGray, apparently with
the toleration of Travis, that they really didn't need much back there. The order of battle was being handled by the American Headquarters and was being set up in England by then, and that, therefore, I should stop sending stuff back. And Strong agreed to that. Well, I wired this, of course, posthaste on my little private channel back to Clarke. Of course he saw red when he saw this happening and maybe a week later I got a message from Clarke saying that Strong had changed his mind about this and let the British know that we did need the stuff back there. I heard from Travis, though not from DeGray, that that was just a bad mistake on our part. We should have known you needed it and so go ahead again. In the meantime of course my relations with Eric Jones in Hut 3 had been not troubled, because we got along very well from the start, but disturbed. I mean he was also disturbed by what was going on. He had no use for DeGray.

FARLEY: Sir, this was subsequent to the 17 May '43 agreement with the Brits regarding the cooperation of effort and the ultimate dissimulation of Ultra material back to
the States? This obviously was after that?

TAYLOR: Oh yes.

FARLEY: Okay.

TAYLOR: The 17 May '43 agreement was what took the three of us over there in the first place.

FARLEY: Right.

TAYLOR: And this fracas occurred, oh a good four months later when Strong came. Now there must be a record of when Strong came.

FARLEY: I thought I might have it here someplace.

TAYLOR: I haven't read these things.

FARLEY: September of '43 I think. No, wait a minute. You said that you could send Ultra to G-2. You were told to be conservative in the selection and inform the ministries...

TAYLOR: What number are you on?

FARLEY: On 64, I'm skipping way ahead sir. (§64. Discuss the meeting attended by Menzies, Travis, DeGray, Jones and yourself in September 1943 which concerned the passing of ULTRA material to Washington.)

TAYLOR: Oh. I've answered most of those questions that I see here on the way.
FARLEY: Yeah. Strong reneged and said no Ultra would be send and then had backed off.

TAYLOR: Where are you? #60?

FARLEY: '67. (Was this not an embarrassing position to put you in?) I'm going to ask, wasn't this an embarrassing position to put you in?

TAYLOR: Yeah, yeah, this is, that's what I'm talking about now. Well, now let me read some of these 'cause these are getting into areas that...

FARLEY: Yeah I was just reading back too, and I think you have answered most of these. Let me ask a quick one.

TAYLOR: Well, 58 for example. (#58. Was the intelligence material passed to Washington via U.S. communications channels or through British channels?)

FARLEY: All right.

TAYLOR: The intelligence with very few exceptions was passed back by British channels, that was insisted upon by the British.

FARLEY: I see.

TAYLOR: Most of it went by radio or cable, but when we went to the bulk stuff, including stuff that was not urgent in any way, they started sending it by air.

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Farley: Courier?

Taylor: With weighted bags that would sink. Now I should tell you however, that in order to check on the British, while I was still at Berkley Street doing the Dip stuff, there came a Spanish message of special interest. There had been an explosion in the harbor of the Port of Spain and there was great interest in whether it had been sabotaged or what had done it, or whether it had been enemy action. Well, I came across a message that the British had gotten out of the Spanish code that said exactly what had happened in the harbor. Now I knew that would be something McCormack would want right away. So violating the agreement I'd made with the British, I sent that item back by my channel at the Embassy with a note on it, saying "I am doing this in violation of the agreement because I want to make sure that they are sending back what I pick."

Farley: Ah good.

Taylor: So they could have something to check on, both as to speed and as to substance. That was the last time I ever did that on a Dip message. But I did it once
again when the message came that Rommel had a stomach ache and was going to be pulled out of Africa and rested and then sent to France. I knew that was hot stuff and I sent that one back on my special channel too. But otherwise it all went back through British channels.

FARLEY: Okay good.

TAYLOR: The British Air Ministry passed them. The colonel's name was King Douglas. He was a full colonel and he was the American liaison at the Air Ministry, really. Whether he reported to the military attache or not, I don't know, administratively. He then also indoctrinated a few people at Aker's headquarters and later at Spaatz's headquarters. They probably passed some stuff back to the Air Corps. May not have been kosher to do that but they very likely did.

FARLEY: Yeah I would hope so.

TAYLOR: Guidance as to what to select really never came from Washington. Neither did any criticism or chastisement or kudos. They were very glad to get it -- needless to say. When Seaman came he was entirely on technical stuff. He lived also at the Hunt so I saw him every
night and we talked a lot and same was true of Walter Freed. He also stayed at the Hunt. So did Small when he came. He was a gigantic man.

FARLEY: He was. Poor fellow dropped dead at NSA. I saw him in the latrine one afternoon and I just followed him out and he just dropped dead, poor fellow.

TAYLOR: My goodness.

FARLEY: BEECHNUT project. Is there any reason to talk about that?

TAYLOR: I don't know what it was.

FARLEY: That was the intercept unit for German air and military communications, and they were set up at Bexley, Kent. I think we probably have enough on that. Why don't we go to...

TAYLOR: Well, of course, the British. I don't know anything about Bexley, Kent, but McCormack and Friedman and I had visited, and I later also visited alone, the big British Army intercept unit and the Air Force unit and the lower grade Air Force unit up at Cheadle. I've been to all those. I knew all about those and have been there and knew the heads of them.
FARLEY: Sir in number 63. (#63. Three U.S. no longer had to select items to be forwarded to Washington because a decision had been made to send everything. Did you make this decision?) It says something about after the 3rd of September in '43, Three U.S. no longer had to select items to be forwarded to Washington.

TAYLOR: Yes, I made that arrangement with Travis and Jones. I remember my making the arrangement. I didn't remember the date needless to say, and that was done with the understanding that the bulk stuff that didn't have any urgent value would go back by pouch, by air. And we would select the stuff which we thought was urgent enough so it ought to go by wire. But they'd get everything.

FARLEY: Good. And one question there. did it not in effect close down the Three U.S. operations or were you still monitoring?

TAYLOR: No because the stuff to select to go zip, zip was still done by us.

FARLEY: Good.

TAYLOR: And there was quite a lot of that.
FARLEY: I'll bet, I'll bet. I guess we've covered that pretty much. (#64. Discuss the meeting attended by Menzies, Travis, Degray, Jones and yourself in Sept. 1943 which concerned the passing of ULTRA material to Washington.)

TAYLOR: Yeah I believe that meeting took place out at Travis', out at BP.

FARLEY: You talked about General Strong, too.

TAYLOR: Yeah this is, has Strong...to be conservative and selection...Strong reneged and said "no ULTRA can be sent." Yeah, that's what I was talking about to you before. (More of #64. "Taylor could send ULTRA to G2, but was told to be conservative in selection. Strong reneged and said no ULTRA could be sent.")

FARLEY: Yes, right.

TAYLOR: What influenced Strong to change his mind about Ultra being sent to G-2? Of course I don't know. He didn't tell me that he was going to do that. DeGray told me he'd done it.

FARLEY: I see. He was obviously persuaded by the British to react that way.
By at least some of the British, and I'm sure that DeGray was one of them. (#66. Why was this decision made when Strong after meeting with Clarke later instructed me to... He didn't instruct me later, Clarke did.

Clarke did, all right fine, very good. So Clark was the...

"Was not this an embarrassing position to put you in?" You're Goddamned right. I couldn't resolve it. As far as I knew Strong had done this, and I wired that back to Clarke right away. DeGray told me that Strong had done it and I had no reason to disbelieve him. I simply had to suspend operations as far as sending stuff back from BP was concerned. It continued to go from Berkley Street.

Okay, good.

(He is repeating a question to himself.) "How did I communicate with other U.S. intelligence or ULTRA offices?"

That's Weymouth, Ryder and Bushy Street, some of those.
TAYLOR: Well those aren't ULTRA offices are they?

FARLEY: No, no, they were just intelligence offices or intercept units.

TAYLOR: Well, Bushey Park I think is what that must mean there. Bushey Park was where Eisenhower's headquarters was established.

FARLEY: Yes, SHAEF. (Supreme Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces)

TAYLOR: Yeah. Well, during this period, from September to the end of February of '44, my staff was expanding quite comfortably. Sam McKee, you asked about him, was sent over. (What time is it by the way?)

FARLEY: Five-fifteen.

TAYLOR: Yeah, I'm all right.

FARLEY: Good.

TAYLOR: He had been a professor of history right here at Columbia, and he had come into the Special Branch shortly before I left to go to England, with a rank of major. He was an older man than me. He was in his 50s then, or late 40s. He was turning 50. I was in 1942 --- I would have been 34, 34, 35. And he was sent over, and I brought him out to BP with me and that's when we established MID WS, which covered at

---SECRET---

---HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY---
the outset just Roger Randolph at Berkley Street and Sam McKee at BP, and me sort of over them.

FARLEY: Did Major Hyles come later?

TAYLOR: Hillis.

FARLEY: Hillis, is that the way it's pronounced?

TAYLOR: H-i-l-l-e-s, Hilles, yeah. He came later. And we got Bob Slusser from the documentary search unit in London. He was transferred up to BP. He didn't like it at first because we weren't order of battle specialists, and he was that and just worshipped that science. But as soon as he realized that he was getting next to order of battle information that they didn't have down there, he was a little better pleased. Bob, I guess, was the next one. Then things took a different turn in that the British conveyed to me, and this came right out of Hut 3, not out of Travis and DeGray, that they were hurting for more people to do the watch. I mean to process the stuff as it came from Hut 6 and distribute it to the headquarters. That had to be done by German-speaking intelligence officers and intelligence officers who were fairly well trained in order-of-battle. Bob Slusser's German, for example, was good, but not good
enough for that. So I was instructed to start trying to pick up people in London and they would start trying to pick up people in Washington to send over to me who would not be operating in MID WS. That is they wouldn't be in the room that was selecting the stuff to go to Washington. They would be mixed right in with the British and making the decisions on what should go to A.F.HQS, and what should go to Desert Air Force and what should go to SHAEF when SHAEF was set up. That is direct to the field commands, the American field commands being set up in Europe and in England. So they became in every sense part of the British set up. They were not just feeding Washington, they were part of the British operation distributing the ULTRA to the field. And I guess between October and the following March I must've gotten half a dozen at least, maybe more. I guess I had about a dozen officers of both Air, Air Corps it was then, and Army who joined the watch either, on Air traffic or Army traffic.

FARLEY: Did you ever have any Navy troopers, any Navy lieutenants?

TAYLOR: Well, no, they weren't under me. I certainly did not.
And they never numbered more than three. Joe Eachus and two others.

FARLEY: Howey Campaign, was he there? I guess he was an analyst.

TAYLOR: No he wasn't there.

FARLEY: Pres Currier?

TAYLOR: Well, I could pick him up off that list that you gave me.

FARLEY: That's all right.

TAYLOR: The last one of those to come in February was Lewis Powell, and we had a fight over him because he had been sent over from G-2 to be part of WD out of Bletchley Park. But he had already been in Africa and was well-known to King Douglas and to Weicker -- what was Weiker's first name -- was the father of the present Senator Weicker.

FARLEY: Oh yes.

TAYLOR: Lowell, Lowell Weicker.

FARLEY: Both the same first name I believe. Lowell, Junior.

TAYLOR: They were already with... I guess Spaatz had been set up by then.

FARLEY: Yes.

TAYLOR: They were already with Spaatz, and the guy who was
national squash champion. Well, his name will come to me. He became the A-2 for the..?

FARLEY: The Third TAC?

TAYLOR: For, no, the Air Force, Vandenberg. Vandenberg, and they knew Powell from before and they wanted him. I might add that Powell was also a person of consequence, quite apart from his military status. He was a partner in a very prominent Richmond law firm that had very important clients and Weicker was, of course, part of the, not the Colgate, but one of the big...

FARLEY: Soap manufacturers?

TAYLOR: ...soap manufacturers, yes. So just before I came back to Washington, Powell hadn't yet arrived, but there was an anticipatory dispute as to where he was going to go. I was finally telegraphed by Clarke, "Well, I guess we got to let him go." But he didn't go out from under my aegis. He remained administratively under me, but instead of having him work at BP he was going to work at Spaatz's headquarters and that's where he went. Now I came down with the flu at about that time and was hospitalized when Powell arrived. He came bringing the message to me from G-2 that they wanted me to come back for reorientation and

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updating as soon as I got well. So very soon after this thing about Powell was resolved and he went to Spaatz's headquarters. What was it called? U.S. Strategic Air Forces?

FARLEY: Yes.

TAYLOR: I went back and I stayed back in Washington maybe four weeks, I guess. It would have been February/March, around there of '44, and that was the point at which I put up to Clarke and McCormack the idea that I had been formulating for the Special Security Office at each headquarters. It had dawned on me all of a sudden this was possible when that was what happened to Powell which I hadn't planned. But I started ruminating on it and I got some idea of how many more headquarters were going to be set up and I concluded that this whole enterprise, that the source being British and these American headquarters with G-2s and assistant G-2s that had knew nothing about Bletchley or what this stuff was, would be both very bad security and very bad intelligence, and simply briefing the G-2 on this wasn't going to do the trick at all. I had by this time gotten involved in one or two of Winterbotham's briefings of new English
headquarters. I knew roughly how he did it and I don't mean by that that he did it badly. But I could see that it was a much easier matter with them. I mean they'd been in intelligence; they knew about "C" and the whole set up and were prepared to take at face value what they were told. But I could see a colonel G-2 come in there who had been brought up in Kansas and never been in Europe and knew nothing about the British and their ways. And all of a sudden he's told there's going to be a radio thing in his backyard, he's going to be getting traffic and sending traffic and he's not going to know what it is. And then this stuff is going to come out in which there's great security and he can only have one or two people on it. He might say "Nuts!"

FARLEY: Right.

TAYLOR: And that it badly needed a trained officer of field grade rank. Enough rank so he could at least confront the G-2 and tell him what the real situation was. And that this ought to be done at all headquarters from the level that the British had established, Army level to get it direct from BP. And I told all this to Clarke and McCormack. McCormack said "If you will get
up an order to Eisenhower on this basis, get up a draft of it, I'm sure Marshall will sign it." So I prepared a draft. Of course I was not a professional soldier and I hadn't had the usual training on drafting orders and things. So it was worked over by Clarke and McCormack and others and put in the proper lingo. But that's what it amounted to and it was an order to Eisenhower from the War Department saying that this is going to be going on and you should give whatever instructions are necessary that Colonel Taylor's appointments are honored and they're taken into the thing. Sam McKee was my deputy in my absence so while I was in Washington he was in charge there. So this was sent to Sam. I hadn't gone back yet and Sam was the one who took it to Eisenhower and laid it before him. Beadle Smith was in the room and Sam described the occasion to me later. When McKee handed this to Eisenhower and he started to tell Beadle Smith what was in it, Smith said "What the hell is the War Department doing over here?" But, of course, it was signed by George C. (Marshall) and Eisenhower apparently was quicker to see the point in the value of it and he approved it. So that was back in our hands if we needed to show it to any recalcitrant Army
or Army Group commander.

FARLEY: Good. Sir, let me, I've got three questions to catch up and we're in good shape.

TAYLOR: Yes, okay.

FARLEY: Talking about communications equipment, you had the Sigaba, the American Sigaba with ten rotors.

TAYLOR: Well, the Embassy did.

FARLEY: All right good.

TAYLOR: That was handled by the major and whose office I officed when I was at the Embassy.

FARLEY: Good. Did you ever hear of the Sigsaly?

TAYLOR: No.

FARLEY: This was the voice communications equipment between Roosevelt and Churchill? Not at all, good, that's fine.

TAYLOR: No. Indeed the training that I had gotten at Arlington Hall and that I suppose was valid was that the coding of voice communications was very unsatisfactory and secure.

FARLEY: Mickey Mouse they called it, or Donald Duck, I guess, rather.

TAYLOR: Yeah. Oh I used it because the British were using it, I guess the British just figured they had to because
they had to get the stuff around fast and discuss it. But that was the British thing that I used, the British scrambler. "Can you scramble?" and you have to say it with a British accent cause otherwise they wouldn't know what you were talking about. "Can you scramble?" And, "Yes, and then, "I'm scrambling."

FARLEY: Sir, were you considered the Senior Intelligence Officer in the Theatre?

TAYLOR: Oh no, oh no, certainly not. I was the Senior Intelligence Officer in War Department establishment.

FARLEY: Good, all right.

TAYLOR: But I was junior to the Military Attache. I was a lieutenant colonel until October of '44 when I was given full colonel.

FARLEY: Good.

TAYLOR: But no, I was subordinate to the Military Attache administratively. He was a BG, Peabody, and I, of course, wouldn't rank with the G-2s of the Armies and Armies groups. Well, I later did, I mean the G-2s of Armies were usually full colonels, but I was a lieutenant colonel until October and the G-2, General Siebert ranked me. Brigadier General Siebert who was the G-2 at ETOUSA and then moved over to be the G-2

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for Bradley. The G-2 for SHAEF, of course, was an
Englishman, General Strong. General Strong was a
major general and the number two was Tom Betts,
Brigadier General Tom Betts.

FARLEY: We're coming...

TAYLOR: Turn it off one second, I want to get a drink a water.

Took a break.

TAYLOR: I've taught two hours of class this afternoon.

FARLEY: I think we're in pretty good shape; we're up to about
Normandy now. I want to find out your involvement
in...? Did you look at number 77? (#77 To what degree
were you personally involved in the preparation for
OVERLORD?)

TAYLOR: Can I just refresh my recollection on those things, to
see what happened?

FARLEY: Of course.

TAYLOR: "Did you have free access to all areas in Bletchley
Park?" (question) Yes. I had opportunity to visit
the Bombe sites but I couldn't understand what they
were doing. "Personnel problems involving the
British?" (question)

FARLEY: Any friction at all?

TAYLOR: Not really. The only areas that I had a little

ULTRA

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ULTRA Secret things for diplomatic reasons that at first I didn't find out about. There was, for example, the decodes of Vatican communications. I've forgotten what it was called, but I was told about them and the other comparable thing was a thing called "ISPAL" - Illicit Series Palestine, the Stern Gang and other things like that. Now those didn't come out of Hut 3, they came mostly out of (?) Arc machines?). Those were not in the material that Denniston showed me. What I found out about them, I don't know whether I went to see "C" or somebody else in the Foreign Office. I can't remember who it was that I dealt with on this. But I perfected with him an understanding that when I visited London from BP, I would be allowed to look at it and if I thought there was anything in it that Washington needed to know I could raise that. I couldn't send anything back, I couldn't distribute it to anybody else, but I could see it and then discuss it. So I did, but I never found anything in it that I thought that would be of any value back home, so there was never any issue about it.

FARLEY: All right sir. Sir do you know whether there was any effort against the Soviets, the French, any of our
Allies at BP?

TAYLOR: At BP, they from time to time, not often, because intercept was bad that far away, but from time to time they read a German code called BROWN, which consisted of German decodes of Russian communications.

FARLEY: Oh, that's interesting.

TAYLOR: And those we read and they tried to break from time to time. But of course those were German codes, whether they tried to break any Russian codes, this did not involve our breaking any Russian codes. It was mostly low-level air traffic the Germans broke and then would telegraph the contents back in their code to Berlin. I simply don't know. I don't think I ever posed the question. I mean you hate to put a friendly foreign officer in a position to either having to lie to you or tell you, "I won't tell you." I figured if I got to know them as well as possible and they thought that it would be of any interest they would then make a decision whether to tell me or not, so I never thought it was worthwhile to ask.

FARLEY: All right sir, let me switch.

TAYLOR: I never heard of it.

FARLEY: All right sir, that's fine, good.
End Tape I, Side B, Start Tape 2, Side A

FARLEY: All right, do you want to talk about OVERLORD or are we up that far now?

TAYLOR: Let me see. (Answers question: "Were there any outstanding contributions to the military high commands of ULTRA material?") Well, there were occasional contributions to military commands by Ultra material. Indeed yes!. It's hard to say that there was one particular place that would come to. What do you mean by the Oshima message? That would come out of the Purple ordinarily.

FARLEY: This was the Japanese Dip. Oshima was stationed in Berlin and he was reporting back to Tokyo on a tour that he took to examine the Normandy fortresses before the landing.

TAYLOR: Oh.

FARLEY: He spelled out exactly who, what unit was where and what fortification they had. Do you remember that one at all?

TAYLOR: No. When was it do you remember? Because I was back again in the States in the summer.

FARLEY: Maybe that's when it was, that's when it was.
probably. So that doesn't matter then.

TAYLOR: But there were some. Now, for example, out of one of the diplomatic message they got very valuable data about the rockets.

FARLEY: Oh yes, Peenemunde.

TAYLOR: Peenemunde, yes. It was a very dramatic occurrence. As a matter of fact, I practically saw it happen. The diplomatic decodes were sent up to BP and were distributed to section chiefs so that the higher-ups knew what was going on down there, as well as what they were turning up themselves. There was a gentlemen there, Dr. Norman, who was the scientific analyst of messages having to do with scientific developments. He was sort of liaison between Dr. R.V. Jones, who was the big guy.

FARLEY: Wrote the "Wizard War." Right.

TAYLOR: Wizard War, yes. I was sitting in Wing Commander Rose's office. He was head of the Air section there and Norman came into the office with a Japanese diplomatic message, saying there's something funny here. This was in Kana, the Japanese Kana, and there was a word in there, Ah-Feea, Ah-Fea. The Japanese, says Norman, tell me, the Japanese translator there
said there's no word like that in Japanese. Then it's got all this other stuff there and they all puzzled about it. All of a sudden Norman said, "I've got it, it's not Japanese, that's German -- "A vier" "A Four" --which was of course the coverword for the rockets. So that made it tumble all out. What they were talking about was a very useful message, militarily, too, of course. So things like that happened, but they couldn't tell when they were going to happen. Whether there was any effort to break the Russian stuff or anything like that, I don't know.

FARLEY: All right good. (Question concerned Taylor's return to Washington with proposal for SSO program. Marshall OK'd program and Beadle Smith objected.)

TAYLOR: Spring of 1944, yes.

FARLEY: That's when you came back to D.C., right?

TAYLOR: Yeah, Beadle Smith objected...(to proposal to establish SSO system)

FARLEY: But he had to live with it I guess.

TAYLOR: Yes, he had to live with it.

FARLEY: Just like MacArthur in the Pacific.

TAYLOR: Did he object too?

FARLEY: Oh he did! He didn't want any of them around. In fact
we were told not to talk to the SSO troops. To be polite, but not to tell them anything.

TAYLOR: Did you know Tom Erkin who was out there doing...

FARLEY: I know the name. I didn't know him personally, no sir.

TAYLOR: He's here in New York you know.

FARLEY: Oh is that right?

TAYLOR: Yeah.

FARLEY: He'd be a good one to talk with.

TAYLOR: He would.

FARLEY: Right. Shall we talk about the Invasion now?

(Question: Were there growing pains within the SSO system?)

TAYLOR: Well, there were a few, (growing pains). For the most part things went very smoothly. I got another hat on my head with all that. When the American headquarters were set up, apart from the BP end of it. I was then given responsibility after this order was signed for briefing the commanders and G-2s of the American headquarters. I'd gone around with Winterbotham and I became Winterbotham's opposite number to handle this at the American headquarters. And I went down on my one trip to the Mediterranean. I was with the Eighth

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Army, Patch's Eighth Army, and there was an Army group.

TAYLOR: What was it? Sixth Army, Sixth Army Group. Patch's Army was being set up in Naples Headquarters and Devers was on Corsica at Bastia. Their brand new headquarters. A Colonel Quinn was going to be the G-2 at Eighth Army and General Frank somebody or other, was going to be the G-2 at Dever's headquarters. I got orders cut. I was very much my own boss in a thing like this, and just went to the Embassy to tell them to cut orders. I got them to cut orders to send me down to the Mediterranean to Caserta, where the British had a big unit at AFHQ which they had manned of course long, long before. That headquarters had been in existence long before I got into all this. So I went down to AFHQ with Don Bussey who was going to be planted with Patch and he was.

FARLEY: You probably saw him at the reunion in Connecticut.

TAYLOR: Yes I did. Then I went to Bastia and briefed. I had to brief Quinn. He knew nothing about ULTRA. I discussed with him who else on his staff would be briefed and did that. Then I left Bussey with him and went on to Dever's headquarters. The British had a

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unit there also to service this Army group, but they
hadn't briefed anybody yet except Devers himself, who
had already been briefed when he was command in London
before he went to Sixth Army Group. But I briefed his
G-2, Colonel Frank whatever his name was, Frank Allen,
and I arranged for a SSO Warner Gardner to come down
and be stationed there. Well, that all went fine.
They were both just superb SSO officers and they were
both at headquarters where their stuff was taken
seriously and they couldn't have been two more
smoothly operating headquarters. But the difficulty
arose after they had gotten up to Vittel. They were
pretty well north in France, at which point the
French, of course, had been part of that invasion
force coming in with -- what was it called? The
invasion of southern France? Well, it'll come to me.

Yeah, it escapes me too, the underbelly ---

They came up and they'd gone to Vittel where Dever's
headquarters was set up and they then decided that the
French had amassed enough in the way of manpower so
that there would be a French Air Force, the French
Provisional First Air Force. Well, that was at the
same level as the tactical Air Forces like Quesada's,
where we had an ULTRA. When I had visited SHAEF in the fall. This, I guess, was in the fall of '44. I had just been promoted colonel. And that raised a problem, because we had not been servicing any French with the stuff. But here was a command coming in at the same level and the guy was at SHAEF where we had Ed Thompson with SHAEF. We had Kellogg at Paris, at the Rear Headquarters. Anyhow, I got from Gardner, who was already with Devers, that they were planning that there would be ULTRA furnished to the First Provisional Headquarters Limited. Well, I checked that out with "C" and he was very strongly opposed to having any ULTRA go the French. And I went to see a major general on the SHAEF staff about this. I can't remember his name. He had just been briefed about ULTRA but that's all he knew about it. He shouldn't really have been. He was very hostile. I tell him that there were these obstacles in servicing the French. "Well, then we've gotta get these obstacles out of the way;-- What's the problem?" Well, he wouldn't say that he'd give it up. So I communicated that to "C" so that I could command higher artillery from SHAEF, if necessary. But I figured out what
proved to be a satisfactory solution. We sent another SSO down to the Sixth Army Group Headquarters. That was Leslie Rood, who was an Air officer, with the arrangement that he would office and keep the stuff entirely at Sixth Army Group Headquarters. But if he saw items in it, which were of value to the French, would not take the item over, but would convey it to them in covered form. That is to say they wouldn't be told it was a decode, but they would be told it was highly reliable intelligence. That was the way that was accomplished. And this censorious major general at SHAPE finally agreed to that, so I drove down there with an American colonel, I forget his name, who was in the Signal Corps and was acquainted with the general problem and we accomplished all these things down there at Vittel. That was about the only rough spot. Some of the headquarters didn't make much use of them (ULTRA items). The guy who went with Brereton for the Airborne Army, I don't think got a very good reception. Of course, there was sort of a transitory thing, in an operational way, anyhow. And, of course, when Fifteenth Army came into the picture, they were way up there and had a very limited combat
role, but we sent officers to all those places.

FARLEY: Did the senior military commanders accept COMINT pretty much, or were they sort of cautious about using it? Did they prefer collateral, agent reports, other type material?

TAYLOR: Well, you know, you would get much better answers to that from those things that your office sent me. Those are the few reports that were turned in by those guys at the end of the war, and deals with all of that in detail. I could tell you what I remember from those reports, but you'd get much more out of those.

FARLEY: No, we'll save time by moving on now. Was there trouble with the SLUs versus the SSOs?

TAYLOR: No.

FARLEY: Were they in competition at all or were they hand-in-hand?

TAYLOR: No, no. Some of the SLUs were entirely British, some were entirely American, some were mixed, and there was never any trouble.

FARLEY: Was there any morale problem? American GIs working for a British sergeant, for instance?

TAYLOR: I never heard of any.

FARLEY: Good.

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TAYLOR: Never had any reported to me. If so, they were handled by the SSO on the spot and he didn't need to bother me.

FARLEY: Okay, good.

TAYLOR: But, there again, I think those would surface in their reports, if there was anything worth talking about.

FARLEY: Sure. ((Question: "To what degree were you personally involved in the preparation for OVERLORD?")

TAYLOR: I was not personally involved in the preparation for OVERLORD. Indeed, as you see, I was back in Washington that spring and I didn't know until Sam McKee told me after I got back there sometime around—?

Well I must've gotten there. When was D-Day?

FARLEY: June 5th I believe it was, right.

TAYLOR: June 5th. I got back there about three weeks before that.

FARLEY: Okay. Let's see we can skip down to about...

TAYLOR: ((Question: "How many on Eisenhowers staff were cleared for ULTRA?") Well, there again, I think that Ed Thompson's report will state that, but of course both Strong and Betts and the A-2, who was a Commodore, Air Commodore Greerson. He was briefed. There must've been others, but Ed Thompson would
remember, I don't.

FARLEY: Okay.

TAYLOR: I can't answer 78. ((Question: How much low-level intercept was available before and during the invasion?))

FARLEY: Which concerns a low-level intercept...none available, probably.

TAYLOR: Yeah. Well, the SLUs would have gone along, whenever the headquarters went in.

FARLEY: Good. So there were probably some in those first boats that hit shore at Normandy.

TAYLOR: I guess so. I don't know whether any Army commander went ashore the first day. You see it wouldn't be down below that.

FARLEY: Probably not.

TAYLOR: And how many Army commanders went in there? Patton wasn't in yet. Bradley didn't go in immediately. First Army was Hodges and Monk Dixon would have been his G-2. He was in the picture. Whether he took some kind of a one-time pad in to do it on a temporary basis, or whether he took the SLU in with him, I don't know.

FARLEY: Right. Sir, how was the material, the intelligence
product provided to a military commander from the SSO?
Were there daily briefings? Was it single pieces of paper that were handed to the man for review?

TAYLOR: Well that again is all in those reports.

FARLEY: Good.

TAYLOR: But I can tell you in brief what was the usual, I was there a number of times, of course. There would be what would be called an "open briefing", not open to everybody but open to everybody in the intelligence picture. It would be based on open sources, prisoner of war interrogations, recce, that kind of thing.

Then after that there would be a special briefing for which only those who were in the ULTRA picture would stay. And the SSO would get up and go into things which could only be established on the basis of ULTRA. He could make emendations in the order-of-battle which ULTRA had revealed which the open source people didn't know. He could give material of that kind which would provoke a new discussion of the commanders "in-the-know" and participate in that. So he had to be good. Some of them were better than others.

FARLEY: That's fine.

TAYLOR: And the G-2s, I would have to say, the general run of
G-2s, with the possible exception of Siebert, were not what I would call "A plus" men. Frank Allen, had been a deputy Army commander in Italy, and for some reason been lifted out and he became first G-2 to Devers. He then became head of public information for Eisenhower. He was a very nice guy and I think he had a lot of savvy about dealing with people, but an analyst he was not. And Warner Gardner who was our ULTRA man there was about as sharp as a tack and I'm sure he made a big contribution to the intelligence there. Same with Bussey at Patch's Headquarters. Quinn however was good, Quinn was good.

FARLEY: Sir, the channel was from the SSO to the G-2 or from the SSO to the commander?

TAYLOR: Well, the G-2 would be present at this briefing and of course when the briefing wasn't going on the SSO would have access to the G-2 and would discuss things with him that need to be discussed. He would often times, I guess, take things to the G-2 that needed to go fast, and not wait for the briefing the following morning. I mean he had to be on 24-hour duty and the SLU did too.
FARLEY: Good. All right sir. Let's see, 90, I'm over to about 93. ((Question: "Was security for the SLUs in the field a problem?") You mentioned going to the field frequently. Was it just to check on the SSO groups or just to...?

TAYLOR: Well, I myself went to the field. Sam McKee went once before I did. He took a jaunt over, too, with Calvocoressi right at the time of the breakout from Normandy onto the mainland. He went just to those headquarters, I guess Bradley's and Hodges' and Patton's. The Invasion of Southern France hadn't yet happened. I was still having a good many problems, administrative recruitment and so forth, and briefing new headquarters in England, so I didn't go that soon. The first time I went was in late July to the Med to handle the briefing for the Invasion of Southern France.

FARLEY: I see.

TAYLOR: Then in November I went on this second trip in which I handled the fracas about the French Air Force that I told you about. That would have been in November and early December. It was late November and early December that I went on that one. Outside of 79

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the particular purpose that I had at the Sixth Army Group, the purpose was to see how things were going. I mean, was the SSO fitting in well with the command? Were there other officers that needed to be briefed that he'd been too sticky about? Were his relations with the G-2 good? With the commander good? Did anything need to be done? Did some guy need to be moved out? Did they need more manpower? All these things.

FARLEY: I see.

TAYLOR: And on that trip I started out at SHAEF and... What was the home headquarters? ETOUSA it was called -- the European Theatre of Operations, U.S.A., which was in Paris, SHAEF being in Versailles. Then I went to Sixth Army Group. Then to Patch's Seventh Army, Patch's Seventh Army. Then I went to Patton and to the Air Force attached to it. I'd been to the Air Force attached to Patch and then to Patton. Then I went up to Vittel to the Army Group Headquarters. And then I went north to Bradley's headquarters and to the Army and Air Force lesser headquarters there in that whole area. I made the complete circuit.

FARLEY: Sir, was...
On the way I got pneumonia and was laid up in Rheims for about a week, but I covered the whole thing.

Oh boy. Good. Was there ever any occasion for Winterbotham to visit the SSO units?

He never did after I got going.

Okay good.

Before I had gotten the order from Eisenhower and gotten the thing rolling there had been some American headquarters set up, which he had handled the briefings for. The last few I had gone with him to help him out, but after that, no he didn't.

All right sir.

I should further comment on the G-2 situation at Simpson's Ninth Army Headquarters, since there is no reason to mention his name any longer I won't bring it up now. But the G-2 there was a total wash-out. It was a real case of Simpson having problems.

Was it Becker?

Who?

Colonel Becker?

It wasn't either. Since you seem to be on to the thing. Bixell.

Bixell.
Yeah Bixell, Colonel Bixell.

Where did I get the name Becker?

Well, he was an old friend of Simpson's and he was just shoved into this job before Colonel (?Fox?), but he was terrible. He was a well-meaning guy but he had no... And the fact was that Becker, who was my man at the Ninth Army serving Bixell, he and I together persuaded Siebert to lift Bixell out of there and then he sent in a very good man who subsequently attained lieutenant general. Can't remember his name any longer.

Okay so Becker was an SSO.

Colonel Bixell.

He was kicked upstairs, too, wasn't he?

He was kicked downstairs. He was Corps G-2.

Oh I see, good.

He wasn't too pleased with that. He was ousted from our circle.

Sir what was the relationship with the Army RI Units, the Radio Intercept Units? Did you receive directly any of their product?

No. That would have been Colonel Bicher, of course.
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FARLEY: Okay, good.

TAYLOR: I suppose he must have received material. He had his team out to, at BP, the independent team in Hut 6 doing cryptographic work. I suppose that he fed his material directly to the American commands. I don't think any of that came back to BP. Maybe it did.

FARLEY: I don't know either.

TAYLOR: I tell you who would know. Landis Gores would know and I suppose that...

FARLEY: Van Norden?

TAYLOR: Van Norden might well know.

FARLEY: I talked to him some time ago, right. Sir I'm moving pretty fast. ((Question: "What details do you recall about the 9th Army episode wherein the G-2 was declared incompetent by the SSO and he was removed and assigned as G-2 of Corps?")

TAYLOR: Well I provided the details about the Ninth Army G-2 here, except you got the name wrong. The G-2 was Bixell, Bixell.

FARLEY: All right. I'll change that right now.

TAYLOR: And Becker was the SSO. ((Question 100 concerned intelligence flow from 3US to field recipients.)

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Taylor answered earlier.)

FARLEY: Good. Are we over on 100 and, before the Battle of the Bulge?

TAYLOR: Yes. Now look, that's a funny thing you know. I was in Luxembourg on December 7th, 1944, and while I was there a message came via the SSO saying that a request had come from Washington, from (Edenville?) back to Washington to testify at a Congressional Committee hearing on some matters pertaining to the FCC.

FARLEY: Oh yes.

TAYLOR: And it happened while I was General Counsel. I was very amused by the whole thing. The rule apparently was that no officer could be excused for this purpose, unless it was certified that he was not necessary to the war effort.

FARLEY: Makes you feel good!

TAYLOR: Well, it came to me to make certification since I had no superior, no operational superior in the zone. It was up to me to say whether or not I was essential. Well, I didn't know the Battle of the Bulge was coming and I couldn't have stopped the Germans anyhow, but I took advantage of this to certify that I could be spared December 7th. And I came back to Washington to
-testify at the hearing and stopped by G-2, and Clarke wanted me to stay a few weeks. While I was there the Battle of the Bulge took place. Curiously enough my namesake, General Maxwell Taylor, was also here when the Battle of the Bulge started and that's why Tony McAuliffe, acting commander of the 101st Airborne Division said "Nuts!" (to the Germans demanding surrender). General Maxwell Taylor, unlike me, had to fly back to Europe and parachute into Bastogne. I got back, I guess, on the 10th or so, by which time it was over. I've heard a good deal about it. The SSO, (Adolph G) Rosengarten, has written articles about it. There's a lot about it in Landis Gore's typed script on all this.

((Tape begins to slip and garbles speech))

FARLEY: It's not published yet?
TAYLOR: No, it's big as a house.
FARLEY: Too big?
TAYLOR: I've been in communication with him about what to do with it. One thing I said is I think the whole thing ought to be photocopied and deposited at Fort Meade.
FARLEY: Oh that'd be great if we could get it.
TAYLOR: Oh I'm sure...
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FARLEY: Should we? Do you think we could write him and ask him?

TAYLOR: Well, I think you would want a full copy.

FARLEY: Of course and 340 we can return the original script.

TAYLOR: I think he's got two or three copies.

FARLEY: Oh good, I'll...

TAYLOR: But he is still in the process of trying to get it accepted and published.

FARLEY: I see.

TAYLOR: And he might be a little chintzy about letting you have it for fear that someone else would publish part of it.

FARLEY: We wouldn't steal it. Do you suppose there was anything in there that may be classified that he might want us to review? Probably not then. We could under that pretext...

TAYLOR: He's very security conscious.

FARLEY: Under that pretext, sir, we could ask him if he would like us to review it and then if he would give us a copy for the record.

TAYLOR: Hold off until I have a chance to talk to him.

FARLEY: All right, sir.

TAYLOR: He's very security conscious. I've read the whole think thing and I don't think there is classified

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information. There are plenty of things in there that would have been. You know, it's the sort of things that hang on this that are technical data like that. So much of the ULTRA traffic has been released to the public now and I'm reasonably certain that there's nothing in there that would have a security problem. And I'm also sure that he does want to give a hard copy of it to Ft. Meade.

FARLEY: Very good.

TAYLOR: But I think he may want to hang on to it. He's at the moment trying to expedite a deal with a publisher. Publishing details that I'm helping him on.

FARLEY: All right sir. How about any input from GC&CS on the Japanese problem? I think I mentioned that earlier. How about the Italian and the Spanish and the South America traffic that might have passed across your desk in 3US.

TAYLOR: Well, not in 3US. The Spanish would have been down in Berkley Street.

FARLEY: I see.

TAYLOR: It was, that's why I (??words unintelligible??). The Italian was pretty well dried up by the time I got there. When was it that Badoglio surrendered?

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FARLEY: Well, that was almost a year before the German's surrendered, wasn't it?

TAYLOR: In '43.

FARLEY: Right, late '43, I think.

TAYLOR: Well any kind of military traffic would have dried up then you see. I know they had read some of it. I also remember hearing them say the Italian was much harder than the German. It was not going on. It played no part while I was there.

FARLEY: Did you have any responsibility for sending Japanese material, additive tables, technical material to Central Bureau in Australia or the people in India, the SIS people?

TAYLOR: No, no.

FARLEY: Okay good. I guess that probably would have been handled by Arlington Hall. Is there anything else about the war days that we should discuss or talk about? We've run through this in a hurry, but I think generally by your speaking, you've covered just about every question I had asked.

TAYLOR: No, I can't really think of anything else. The whole operation ballooned enormously. We had Berkley Street, we had the office 3US, it was called, in Hut 388
that was sending stuff. We had the Americans helping on the watch on the military. We had SSOs at virtually every headquarters, except we didn't have one at AFHQ because it was all up and going and thoroughly operational before we got into business. Or at (?place name?). Eighth Air Force would it have been in Italy?

FARLEY: Could have been. Nat Twining?

TAYLOR: Twining's Command. I went and visited it when I was in the area and there were some Americans on the staff that had access to the stuff. But it had been all done through AFHQ.

FARLEY: Okay shall we continue? Following the German surrender on 7 May '45, what happened in the 3US unit? Did you destroy all the papers?

TAYLOR: The papers that we'd sent back were to go to the Pentagon Building. ((missing words?) The other papers we didn't keep, we would designate which should go back but they would all go in to (?Bletchley?). Now memos and things like that, they're either in the Public Record Office or were destroyed. Almost right away, not right away because BP at the time of (Hitler's suicide) which would have been what, it was 89

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April 29th of '45, the 29th. 

TAYLOR: ...of '45, the 29th.

FARLEY: '45 right.

TAYLOR: The surrender came around May 7th didn't it?

FARLEY: May 7th.

TAYLOR: May 7th, something like that. Well, I guess I stayed on about another two weeks after that because... Well I got there the 24th and I'm telling you really what ((words inaudible)) had come home in '44 and Hilles had taken his place. (?words inaudible?).

FARLEY: And Hilles wrote the history of 3US. I think we have copies of that.

TAYLOR: Yes. It's spelled Hilles, and is pronounced "Hillis". He was a very, very distinguished scholar and professor at Yale.

FARLEY: Is he still alive sir?

TAYLOR: No.

FARLEY: ((Question: "Did you appoint any of your people to join the TICOM Teams?"))

TAYLOR: Target intelligence communications?

FARLEY: These were the Target intelligence committee teams that checked out captured enemy COMMS equipment and material. Art Levenson was one of them and his team...
captured a German communications train. There were some others who picked up code books and crypt material.

TAYLOR: No, I didn't appoint any of my people to join those teams. (? words inaudible?) There were still some of the guys in the field. My last trip was in late March and April of 1945. That was the demobilization trip. (?personal name?---ER?) and I wanted to talk to all the G-2s, and discuss at what point they could spare the SSOs so we could demobilize them.

FARLEY: Your personal evaluation of ULTRA/COMINT across the board in the military? What was it's value?

TAYLOR: You've got a play-by-play account if you read the reports of the SSOs. I can't speak for the value but I know by common report that the British rate it as the most important of all. They came within a whisker of being blockaded and they would have been but for the ULTRA. It aided the convoy system to bust them wide open, to sink the subs much faster, it greatly diminished the sinkings; it was "save the lifeline." So I think if Churchill or the other commanders were to make a list of successes in order that they would put that probably at the top. It's value for cover
purposes...I forgot to mention another guy on staff in B.P. that was liaison with X-2, OSS. Clarke sent him, Clarke was interested in him, Kelfie, Kelfie (?word inaudible?). I did not know what he did because I didn't need to know. He was obviously getting along perfectly well over there, and Clarke was happy with what he was doing. He had access to ULTRA in his capacity, and he, from time to time, did things for B.P. or Berkley Street, and X-2.

FARLEY: You made one statement some time ago that no major strategic decisions were made based on COMINT. Do you think it was useful only in tactical operations rather than strategic? How about the broad use of ULTRA or COMINT?

TAYLOR: There were certainly countless examples of use at the tactical level. A movement of an Air Force to a new location would come to me, sent with five X's for (?transmission?) to the commands and they would use that foreknowledge. (?words inaudible?) major strategic moves were so likely to be governed by ULTRA. ULTRA was, I think, of greater value on the defensive side of the war than the offensive.

FARLEY: Do you think it helped to shorten the war as it did in 92

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the Pacific? Nimitz and those troopers believed that COMINT obviously shortened the war in the Pacific. Do you think that was true in Europe?

TAYLOR: Well, I guess so. It could have come out in another way if they hadn't got that.

FARLEY: Yes.

TAYLOR: Also (?much of the?) stuff didn't start to break until (the war?) was pretty near a year old. There was some contribution to the (?) battle. It was mostly the lower-level, lower scientific stuff that did. Message traffic. But in terms of the order-of-battle of the German Air Forces, I mean to have a (flag plot?) which was pretty well kept up to date. The Air Forces were even less secure and the O.B. listings were maintained even more completely than the Army's was. Some of the rapid breaks occurred by the use of guesses.

FARLEY: Yes.

TAYLOR: A guess, a guess which proved to be right and then unwound the whole key. There was a weather operator up on ("Jan ----?") who always opened his message with "Morgan, Melden--here's information" All you had to do was (? word inaudible?) and out dropped that whole (?)missed word).
FARLEY: Right. Are there any other recollections about number two that you would like to put on tape?

TAYLOR: Number two?

FARLEY: Number two, I'm sorry, World War II, I'm sorry.

TAYLOR: It was Number One to me. Yes it certainly helped and especially in the Naval sense where the body of the knowledge was updated continually. The Naval defenses were able to be taken sooner and forward moves made sooner and more accurately and by a policy of accretion that was bound to keep us ahead of the game. (("Question: How soon after the war ended in Europe were you informed that you would be assigned to work on the War Crimes trials?") Right at the end. That's why I came back on the 7th.

FARLEY: Oh I see.

TAYLOR: (Entire paragraph garbled). Really I did not come back from Europe. (words inaudible). A message from the War Department, said that, Jackson had accepted my services and would I accept it. Well I didn't know. The war in Japan wasn't over and I hadn't been in the (Far East?). I thought I might like to go. I knew I had nothing to do in Europe. (??) came over and his staff...and came back very soon after I did.
(?inaudible?) our party there at B.P. (But when I (inaudible?) October 1st, before I? office). "We really need you in the Pacific; if you want to go out, there's a job for you. If what you want to do is rubberneck, we don't really need you." Also, I don't think that war's gonna last. The thought of going out there was interesting and what I did was fascinating as a result of the war in Europe. So I said "yes" and joined Jackson's staff as it was, in May.

**FARLEY:**

Good. Now the possible use of COMINT during the War Crimes trials. Since you had been exposed throughout your career to COMINT, did you use COMINT during or before the Trials? Did it serve any purpose in searching out references to documents or information on individuals? Was there anything in COMINT that would call attention to any evidence that you could have used for the prosecution.

**TAYLOR:**

Very, very little if any. The only things that I remember and I read in ULTRA had to do with the Germans in Italy. There were references to SS troops in traffic coming back from there which indicated the Germans were doing an awful lot of atrocities. So I
had that knowledge when we tried Kesselring. (?words garbled?). I remember that stuff never really came out in connection with the others very much. So the short answer would be "no." DeGrey came around to see me and asked to interrogate some of our prisoners and I told Jackson that it was damned important. I couldn't tell him why, but he trusted me that they should be allowed to do it. So their way was opened to interrogate our prisoners but that wasn't used.

FARLEY: Was there ever any consideration given to using that type of communications intelligence as evidence in a case against some of these criminals?

TAYLOR: No, the only people who were aware of that stuff were myself and Becker, and the British (?)technical?) specialists on German military (word unintelligible) and about a half a dozen others came and helped us. It was their knowledge of the German military set up rather than information from ULTRA.

FARLEY: I see. Would that have created a problem? Of information against these people and their wrong doings was so strong, could COMINT have been used as admissible evidence?

TAYLOR: If I'd come across any such thing it was my problem
FARLEY: Oh I see.

TAYLOR: But it didn't, it didn't come up. (part of following answer garbled). I suppose that's picked up most (X/M) had to do with ULTRA. I don't remember anything. There could have been a commando order to all the command units, even if (X/M) executed. Existed only the form of (?). I would (?) to it, because that would have been aimed as evidence. (words inaudible) war coming down from the highest authority, (?) dispatch saying, "Complied with" from that OSS bunch down in Italy. (?) the division commander, (?) following the command order and he's the one that was hanged by the U.S. authority. (Inaudible) also hanged but that was an international (inaudible). A high German general that we hanged, Doerffler. (garbled) command of order (inaudible) so there's no need... I don't even know if it ever came up. ((Above answer badly garbled)).

FARLEY: I don't know. All right sir.

TAYLOR: There were a lot of generals and colonels who were hanged but there was little publicity about it. Only Yamashita. There's no question but what the Army court martials' attitude toward high ranking Japanese
officers ...(word inaudible) much more "String 'em up!" The Germans---they just said... (inaudible)
Well, they were just ---?

FARLEY: So that

End of Tape 2, Side 1 (Thank goodness) ((Tape changed because of slippage problems.))

Begin Tape 3, Side 1 (Continued from problems in Cassette 2)

FARLEY: Do you have any thoughts on the rash of books or exposes on intelligence production during WWII? What do you think caused Winterbotham to write the first book and thus stimulate the flood of subsequent volumes?

TAYLOR: Well I must say as to your last question that I wish I knew. You could have knocked me over with a feather when I saw the Winterbotham book and it's especially ironic that he was the Chief Security Officer, and he was the one who did it. I have always suspected that maybe he was told he could go ahead and do it, but I don't know.

FARLEY: Right. He certainly started a rash of exposes.

TAYLOR: Oh yeah, the very next day, Al Friendly who had been part of our group at BP and was, of course, very high
in the *Washington Post* was there with a full-page spread. "Lewis Powell was in on this and Telford Taylor was in on this and I was in on this and so and so was in on this". It was all over the thing. Old friends call to say, "So now I know what you were doing during the war."

**FARLEY:** Sir, we're in pretty good shape.

**TAYLOR:** I think that's about all I've got to say.

**FARLEY:** All right, I have a couple of questions but we can ask these off the tape.

**TAYLOR:** Right.

**FARLEY:** Nuremburg Patch, do you have any Nuremburg patches left? We have a curator who wanted me to ask you that.

**TAYLOR:** I've got a couple of uniforms hanging up at home. I'll look and see. I can't remember, but I think that they probably have the Nuremburg patch on it, yeah.

**FARLEY:** All right good.

**TAYLOR:** You know it was the same as the SHAEF patch, except it was black instead of blue.

**FARLEY:** All right, that's good. Sir, before I knock it off I want to thank you much for giving me this time and I really do appreciate it. It's been a job, as I say to
run you down. What classification should we put on this tape? Is it Secret?

TAYLOR: Well, there are a few things in there that, I think, should be classified. I think the stuff about ISPAL, about the ISPAL and the Vatican for example, or the
SECRET

fact that I broke that agreement with the British and sent the thing back. I once did that on that one occasion. A few things like that should be classified yeah.

FARLEY: Okay, good. So we'll make it SECRET, COMINT CHANNELS.

TAYLOR: All right.

FARLEY: All right, leave it that way.

TAYLOR: If there are parts of it, and there are large parts of it, which can certainly be declassified.

FARLEY: All right.

TAYLOR: And if you want to consult on that any time, just let me know.

FARLEY: All right, sir.

TAYLOR: There are the things that immediately occur to me—where personalities came into it like the caliber of the G-2s or Colonel Bixel's shortcomings or these Catholic and Jewish matters in the ISPAL and the Vatican SPAL—they should be kept quiet, I guess.

FARLEY: All right, very fine.

TAYLOR: You could use your own judgement about a thing like General Strong's throwing the ball in the other court
for a while. It's of no lasting importance, but it is an interesting episode.

FARLEY: All right, sir. When I get back I'll send you a form which is an accessibility statement...

TAYLOR: Right.

FARLEY: ...saying you can decide where you want it kept, tightly controlled, lightly controlled. You can say who you would like to hear the tape or read the transcript—from nobody to everybody—and then in between. But I'll send it to you.

TAYLOR: All right, fine.

FARLEY: All right sir, let's cut off the tape and we're on pretty good schedule.

TAYLOR: Yeah.

FARLEY: And a few questions. So thanks again, we do appreciate it sir.