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R/S 000339

SECOND ENDORSEMENT ON OIC, NAVSECGRUDET 467. NOVEMBER LTR SER 0003 OF 23 AUGUST 1964

FROM: OFFICER IN CHARGE, U.S. NAVAL SECURITY GROUP ACTIVITY
TO: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (OP-348)
VIA: COMMANDER TASK FORCE 72
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET
COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC FLEET

1. FORWARDED, CONCURRING IN BASIC LETTER.
2. THE VALUE OF A NAVAL SECURITY GROUP DETACHED IN A DIRECT SUPPORT ROLE IS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN PROVEN BEYOND QUESTION DURING THE VOYAGE OF THE MADDOX. BASED UPON THE SUCCESS OF THE TEAM IN THIS ROLE FEEL THAT ALL FUTURE DESOTO PATROL SECURITY GROUP TRACKING SHOULD EMPHASIZE THE DIRECT SUPPORT INTERCEPT AND ANALYSIS MISSION WITH UNIQUE SIGINT COLLECTION A SECONDARY TASK. DURING INSTANCES OF DUPLICATIVE INTERCEPT AND CRYPTANALYSIS BY BOTH FIELD SITES AND USN 457N, THE PERTINENT DECODED MESSAGES WERE IN THE HANDS OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER THIRTY MINUTES TO ONE HOUR PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF THE SAME INFORMATION ON THE ORI BROADCAST. THIS FACT STRONGLY ARGUES IN FAVOR OF THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE RECOMMENDATION IN PARAGRAPH 6.D OF THE BASIC LETTER.
3. CONCUR IN RECOMMENDATIONS PARAGRAPH 6.E.
4. PARAGRAPH 6.E. IN ORDER TO UTILIZE PRESENT SIZE COMMUNICATIONS TYPE SHELL TO FULLER INTERCEPT/COLLECTION CAPABILITY (I.E. MORE POSITIONS) IF A LARGER VAN IS CONSIDERED UNFEASIBLE, SUGGEST THAT THE ORI BROADCAST POSITION BE TAKEN OUT OF VAN AND INSTALLED IN PERHAPS RADIO 3-KAINED BY NAVSECGRUDET PERSONNEL AT ALL TIMES. ABOVE SUGGESTION WOULD ALLOW ACCOMMODATION OF THE NUMBER OF POSITIONS DESIRED IN BASIC LETTER AND PERMIT UTILIZATION OF PRESENT-SIZED VAN.
5. PARAGRAPH 6.D. CONCUR THAT TECH DETAILS SHOULD BE PROVIDED EMBARKED NAVSECGRUDET AS A MATTER OF COURSE AT END OF SPOT REPORTS. FORMAT COULD READ:

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ENCLOSURE (4)

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23 August 1964

FIRST ENDORSEMENT ON OIC, ~~NAVSECGRUDET 457 NOVEMBER~~ TOPSEC LTR SER 0003
OF 23 AUGUST 1964

FROM: COMMANDING OFFICER, USS MADDOX (DD 731)
TO: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (OP-94)
VIA: OFFICER IN CHARGE, U.S. NAVAL SECURITY GROUP ACTIVITY,
COMMANDER, TASK FORCE 72
COMMANDER, SEVENTH FLEET
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

1. FORWARDED, CONCURRING WITH THE COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE BASIC LETTER.
2. THE RESULTS OF THIS PATROL PROVED BEYOND ANY DOUBT THE VALUE OF THE NAVAL SECURITY GROUP DETACHMENT TO THE DESOTO PATROL. IN ADDITION TO ITS USUAL MISSIONS, THE SECURITY GROUP DETACHMENT PROVIDED OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WHICH MAY HAVE SAVED THE MADDOX FROM SERIOUS DAMAGE. BECAUSE OF THE TIME BETWEEN SCHEDULED FUEL REPLENISHMENTS AND THE LENGTH OF THE PATROL, IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE MADDOX TO PLAN THE "ORBITS" AT FIVE KNOTS IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THE PATROL WITHOUT ADDITIONAL FUELING. THE FIVE KNOT ORBITS WHICH WERE BEING CONDUCTED ON THE NIGHT OF 1 AUGUST WITH A PLANNED CPA TO LAM HATE AND SON ME OF ABOUT FOUR MILES, THROUGH CONCENTRATIONS OF FLYING JUNKS, MADE THE MADDOX PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO THE DIRECT TYPE OF ATTACK INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 2.F. OF THE BASIC LETTER. INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE SECURITY GROUP DETACHMENT PERMITTED THE MADDOX TO TAKE PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES AGAINST THIS TYPE OF ATTACK. ALSO THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE SECURITY GROUP GAVE THE MADDOX THE FIRST INDICATION THAT THE DRV REACTION TO THE PATROL WAS HOSTILE.
3. THE SECURITY GROUP DETACHMENT PROVIDED INFORMATION WHICH INDICATED THAT A TORPEDO ATTACK WAS IMMINENT ON 2 AUGUST. THIS WARNING PERMITTED THE MADDOX TO POSITION ITSELF ADVANTAGEOUSLY PRIOR TO THE ATTACK. IN ADDITION, THE SECURITY GROUP DETACHMENT PROVIDED INFORMATION WHICH INDICATED THAT THE DRV PLANNED TO ATTACK THE MADDOX AND TURNER JOY ON THE NIGHT OF 4 AUGUST.
4. THE EFFICIENCY, RELIABILITY, DEDICATION, AND COOPERATION OF THE U. S. NAVAL SECURITY GROUP DETACHMENT, UNDER LT GERRELL MOORE, WERE OUTSTANDING AT ALL TIMES AND IN KEEPING WITH THE HIGHEST TRADITIONS OF THE NAVAL SERVICE.

ROBERT L. GIGER, JR.

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U.S. NAVAL SECURITY GROUP ACTIVITY
APO 63, BOX 24
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

GDH:DS
SER 0003
23 Aug 1964

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FROM: OFFICER IN CHARGE, USN 467 HOVEMBER
TO: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (OP-046)
VIA: COMMANDING OFFICER, USS MADDOX (DD 731)
OFFICER IN CHARGE, U.S. NAVAL SECURITY GROUP ACTIVITY
COMMANDER, TASK FORCE 72
COMMANDER, SEVENTH FLEET
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

SUBJ: JULY-AUGUST 1964 DESOYO PATROL [SIGINT] OPERATIONS REPORT; SUBMISSION OF

REF: (A) USN 726 200900Z OF JULY 1964 (INFO) (S) (C) 2-64 TO DIR, SECDEF (57W)

ENCL: (1) GAZETTEER
(2) CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF [REDACTED]

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1. BACKGROUND.

A. USN 467 HOVEMBER WAS A [SIGINT] TASK FORCE ELEMENT OF USS MADDOX (DD 731) DURING THE PERIOD 20 JULY TO 23 AUGUST 1964. THE MISSION OF THE ELEMENT WAS: (1) TO RECONSTRUCT [SIGINT] OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY COMMANDING OFFICERS DURING A DESOYO PATROL ALONG THE COAST OF NORTH VIETNAM (HEREAFTER ABBREVIATED AS DRV); AND (2) CONDUCT [SIGINT] COLLECTION OPERATIONS AGAINST SELECTED DRV [REDACTED] OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED IN A COMMUNICATIONS VAN PLACED ON THE DECK LEVEL BETWEEN THE STACKS. POSITIONS INSTALLED WERE: ONE NAVAL HORN, ONE NAVAL HORN/RADIO-TELEPHONE, ONE RADIO-TELEPHONE [REDACTED] AND ONE RND-37 COMMUNICATIONS POSITION.

B. THE SHIP DEPARTED KUALA LUMPUR ON 20 JULY AND BEGAN THE PATROL IN THE GULF OF TONKIN ON 21 JULY AT A POSITION OF 16-47N 107-10E. THE SHIP PROCEEDED ALONG THE PROPOSED TRACK TO 19-47N 105-31E WHERE IT WAS ATTACKED BY THREE DRV MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS AT 0500H ON 2 AUGUST. THE PATROL RESUMED ALONG A REVISED TRACK (BETWEEN 19-47N 105-01E AND 17-15N 107-20E) ON 3 AUGUST WITH USS C. TURNER JOY (DD 951) IN COMPANY. THE TWO SHIPS WERE AGAIN ATTACKED BY AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF DRV MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS ON THE NIGHT OF 4 AUGUST IN THE VICINITY OF 16-17N 107-32E. THE PATROL WAS OFFICIALLY CONCLUDED ON 8 AUGUST, AND THE SHIP ARRIVED IN SUBIC BAY ON 23 AUGUST, FOLLOWING THIRTEEN DAYS OF OPERATIONS AS AN ELEMENT OF TASK FORCE 72.


C. THE YEAR-WISE SUMMARY OF THE FOLLOWING [REDACTED] IS:

LT GERRELL D. MOORE
ATCHINSON, RONALD S.
BAHN, JACK C.

62046/1618, USNR
59 49 04, CT3, USN
209 93 80, CT3, USN

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BURDETTE, HARVEY H.
 ZIMMELMAN, LYLE (DNR)
 MITCHELL, DENNIS E.*
 DE COURLEV, CHARLES H.*
 LIXON, THOMAS L.*
 O'ROURKE, RICHARD J.
 DELANEY, SAMUEL H.*
 PROUTY, DAVID A.
 COLYON, VICTOR J.
 ALLAIR, MATTHEW B.*
 GAUGHER, THOMAS A.*
 MCRAHAN, ARTHUR B., III*
 STANTON, JAMES H.



033, USN COMMUNICATIONS
 072, USN COMMUNICATIONS
 072, USN VIETNAMESE C/A
 072, USN VIETNAMESE T/A
 072, USN SIGNAL HORSE
 072, USN SIGNAL HORSE
 072, USN SIGNAL HORSE
 072, USN SIGNAL HORSE
 072, USN MAINTENANCE
 072, USN VIETNAMESE R/T
 072, USN VIETNAMESE R/T
 072, USN
 072, USN

* TRANSFERRED TO USS TIGONDEROGA (OVA 14) ON 1 AUGUST FOR FURTHER TRANSFER BY COD TO CUBI POINT TO RELIEVE PERSONNEL SHORTAGES AT PARENT COMMANDS.

D. THIS REPORT IS A SUMMARY OF [SIGHT] OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT BY USN 467 NOVEMBER, AND IS SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE (A).

2. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE REPORT:

A. DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 31 JULY THE USS MADDOX, WHILE ENROUTE TO THE GULF OF TONKIN FROM HO CHI MINH, PASSED WITHIN 42 MILES OF HAIKON ISLAND. THIS WAS THE CLOSEST POINT OF APPROACH TO CHICOM TERRITORY DURING THE PATROL. [COMMUNICATIONS NETS SERVING THE COMMUNICATIONS AND OBSERVATION POSTS IN THE AREA WERE MONITORED TO DETECT ANY REFLECTION OF THE MADDOX. NONE WAS NOTED, AND IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE MADDOX WAS UNDETECTED UNTIL SHE REACHED THE 30N COAST.]

B. ON 31 JULY THE MADDOX OPERATED IN THE AREA OF 17-05N 107-18E. ALTHOUGH, WHAT APPEARED TO BE, A RADAR TRACKING STATION WAS VISUALLY SIGHTED ON ISLE DU TIGRE [NO TRACKING THAT COULD BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE SHIP'S MOVEMENTS WAS NOTED ON THE 01N COASTAL TRACKING NETS. HOWEVER, BEGINNING AT 0136Z ON 1 AUGUST, A TRACKING STATION LOCATED AT VINH SON BEGAN PASSING SIGHTINGS REFLECTING THE PRESENCE OF THE MADDOX. TRACKING BY VARIOUS STATIONS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE TIME THE MADDOX WAS IN THE GULF OF TONKIN, AND WAS ESPECIALLY HEAVY BETWEEN 1 AND 4 AUGUST. SATURATION PLOTTING OF REVERSE AZIMUTH AND RANGE ENABLED THE DETACHMENT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE LOCATIONS:]

LOCATION	COORDINATE	AI GROUP
VINH SON	17-56N 108-25E	0424
VINH	18-40N 105-40E	4624
Hoi Hoi	18-48N 105-47E	0403, 0424
THANH HOA-AREA	19-49N 105-57E	9224
Hoi HE	19-23N 105-53E	9224
Hoi EN	18-18N 105-09E	4624

[A DEFINITE PATTERN APPEARED IN THE AI GROUP OF THE MESSAGES, PROBABLY

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REPRESENTING THE STATION NUMBER OF THE STATION SENDING THE SIGHTING. THE ONLY ABNORMALITY APPEARED IN THE TRAFFIC FROM HON HGU, WHICH WAS NOTED USING TWO DIFFERENT AI GROUPS. ON 1 AUGUST VINH WAS NOTED RELAYING SIGHTINGS FROM HON HGU (USING AI GROUP 0424) IN ADDITION TO SENDING SIGHTINGS FROM THE VINH SITE. LATER, HON HGU WAS NOTED SENDING SIGHTINGS DIRECTLY TO HAIPHONG (USING AI GROUP 0424). THE EXACT STATUS OF THE STATION AT HON HGU THEREFORE COULD NOT BE RESOLVED. IT WAS ALSO SUSPECTED THAT HON HGU WAS POSSIBLY USING RADIO-TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS TO PASS SIGHTINGS TO VINH. [A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF VIETNAMESE VOICE TRAFFIC WAS INTERCEPTED ON 129.05 MCS DURING THE PERIOD VINH WAS NOTED RELAYING SIGHTINGS FROM HON HGU.]

C. RANGES OF UP TO 73 MILES WERE NOTED IN THE TRACKING MESSAGES, BUT THE NORMAL RANGE WAS CONSIDERABLY SHORTER. IN GENERAL, THE TRACKING APPEARED TO BE RELATIVELY ACCURATE AND APPARENTLY WAS BASED ON BOTH VISUAL AND RADAR SIGHTINGS. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE THE TYPE OF RADAR BEING USED BY THE TRACKING STATIONS AS THE SHIP WAS UNABLE TO DF ELINT SIGNALS UNDER 550 MCS.]

D. [AVAILABLE SIGINT] EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT THE MADDOX (AND LATER THE C. TURNER JOY) WERE SHADOWED BY DRV NAVAL VESSELS ALMOST CONTINUOUSLY WHILE OPERATING IN THE GULF OF TONKIN. [SWATOW CLASS PGM'S WERE USED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY IN THIS ACTIVITY.] THERE IS POSITIVE EVIDENCE THAT THIS ACTIVITY MAY HAVE BEGUN AS EARLY AS THE NIGHT OF 31 JULY. [AT 1553Z A MESSAGE PASSED BETWEEN TWO UNIDENTIFIED STATIONS REVEALED THAT VESSEL T23 (UNIDENTIFIED AS TO TYPE) WAS GOING OUT TO OPERATE. THE STATION RECEIVING THE MESSAGE WAS TOLD TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE VESSEL. THERE IS NO ELINT OR FURTHER COMINT EVIDENCE TO CONFIRM THAT T23 ACTUALLY SHADOWED THE MADDOX. ON 2 AUGUST VESSELS, T377 (SWATOW CLASS PGM), T146 (SWATOW CLASS PGM), AND T142 (SWATOW CLASS PGM) WERE ENGAGED IN SHADOW ACTIVITY (SEE SUBPARAGRAPH F. BELOW). ON 3 AUGUST "SKINHEAD" RADAR CONTACTS WERE NOTED AT 0520Z AND 1320Z. AT THE LATTER TIME THE MADDOX HELD A RADAR CONTACT THAT WAS APPARENTLY PARALLELING THE COURSE OF THE DESOTO SHIPS. MESSAGES INTERCEPTED BY USN 27 INDICATE THAT T142 WAS THE VESSEL INVOLVED DURING AT LEAST PART OF THE DAY. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT BEGINNING AT 1200Z 2 HOURS AND 9 MINUTES OF PROBABLE DRV VOICE TRAFFIC WAS INTERCEPTED ON 131.0E MCS (SEE PARAGRAPH 3.5 BELOW). AT 1439Z BEN THUY ORDERED VESSEL T379 (SWATOW CLASS PGM) TO GO TO HON HGU, BUT TO STAY CLOSE TO THE COASTLINE ENROUTE. AT 1550Z THE VESSEL REPORTED ITS ARRIVAL AT HON HGU AND ADDED THAT THE SITUATION AT SEA WAS PEACEFUL. ON BOTH 4 AND 5 AUGUST THE SHIP AGAIN HELD "SKINHEAD" RADAR CONTACTS, INDICATING FURTHER SHADOWING BY SWATOW CLASS PGM'S. COMINT INDICATES THAT T142 WAS INVOLVED ON BOTH DATES. ON 6 AUGUST THE DESOTO PATROL WAS TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED AND THE SHIPS REMAINED OUTSIDE THE GULF OF TONKIN. ON 7 AUGUST THE MADDOX AND C. TURNER JOY HELD A "SKINHEAD" RADAR CONTACT. AT 0309Z AN UNIDENTIFIED DRV NAVAL VESSEL BEGAN PASSING SIGHTINGS ON TWO ENEMY SHIPS (IDENTIFIED ONCE AS LIGHT CRUISERS). AT 0403Z THE VESSEL REPORTED THREE SHIPS AND TWO ENEMY PLANES AND SAID, "I AM FOLLOWING". (AT THIS TIME THE USC SAMUEL E. MOORE HAD TEMPORARILY JOINED THE DESOTO SHIPS FOR TRANSFER OF MATERIALS RELATING TO THE 2 AND 4 AUGUST ATTACKS BY DRV NAVAL VESSELS.) SHADOW ACTIVITY WAS]

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AGAIN NOTED ON 8 AUGUST WHEN THE S. TURNER JOY HELD A "SKINHEAD" RADAR CONTACT BETWEEN 0316Z AND 0105Z. THERE IS NO COINTEL AVAILABLE TO IDENTIFY THE UNIT INVOLVED, BUT IT WAS PROBABLY A SWATCH CLASS PGM. AT 0314Z THE FINAL ACTIVITY THAT COULD BE RELATED TO THE SHADOWING OF THE DESOTO PATROL WAS NOTED WHEN A MESSAGE WAS INTERCEPTED THAT STATED AN UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL WOULD MAKE A PATROL FROM PORT GIANN TO VIKI THAT NIGHT AND RETURN THE FOLLOWING DAY. AT THE TIME OF INTERCEPT THE DESOTO SHIPS WERE IN THE VICINITY OF 17-05N 107-16E, AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER CONCLUDED THE PATROL AND LEFT THE GULF OF TONKIN.

E. AT 1626Z ON 1 AUGUST A PORTION OF A MESSAGE WAS INTERCEPTED WHICH MENTIONED THE "CHANGE OF THE ENEMY", ALERTING THE DETACHMENT FOR POSSIBLE HOSTILE ACTION. THE FULL TEXT OF THE MESSAGE, AS RECEIVED SHORTLY THEREAFTER FROM USN 27, INCLUDED THE STATEMENT, "IT HAS BEEN DECIDED TO FIGHT THE ENEMY TONIGHT". A MESSAGE PASSED TO T145 AT 1652Z GAVE THE POSITION OF THE "ENEMY ATTACK VESSEL" AS ELEVEN NAUTICAL MILES SOUTHEAST OF HON HE ON A BEARING OF 168 DEGREES. THIS WAS CLOSE TO THE ACTUAL POSITION OF THE MADDOX AT THAT TIME. A MESSAGE INTERCEPTED AT 1838Z FROM BEN THUY TO T377 STATED, "DRIFT NEAR HON HE AND AWAIT ORDERS. WITH THE 520 BLOCKED ENEMY'S (ONE GROUP UNREADABLE). HUNGER ONE; DESTROY AND REDUCE ALL 40 KILO PARCELS TO MAKE ONE PARCEL; LASH THEM INTO THE BOW OF THE 377. PREPARE THE 23 SO THAT WHEN IT IS PUT IN USE IT KNOWS THE NATURE OF THE DECISION." AT 2011Z T377 NOTIFIED BEN THUY, "AT 020230 (G) AUGUST UNIT DRIFTING FIVE DEGREES NORTHWEST OF POSITION." A LATER MESSAGE INTERCEPTED BY USN 27 REVEALED THAT THREE VESSELS OF 135 (MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT FLOYLLA 135, WERE BEING MOVED FROM PORT HALLUT TO HON HE. (IT IS BELIEVED THAT THESE WERE THE THREE PROBABLE P-4'S SIGHTED BY THE MADDOX ON 2 AUGUST.) WITH EVIDENCE OF POSSIBLE HOSTILE ACTION AT BOTH HON HE AND HON MAU THE MADDOX MOVED AWAY FROM THE COAST FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE NIGHT AND NO ENGAGEMENT TOOK PLACE.

F. ON 2 AUGUST A HEAVY FLOW OF TRAFFIC WAS NOTED ON DRV NAVAL NETS. VESSEL T377 CONTINUED ACTIVE AND AT 0305Z PASSED A SIGHTING THAT STATED, "AT 0800 TARGET THREE NAUTICAL MILES EAST OF HON HE." AT 0400Z THE MADDOX VISUALLY SIGHTED THREE PROBABLE P-4 CLASS MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS AND TWO POSSIBLE SWATCH CLASS PGM'S. A MESSAGE FROM T146 INTERCEPTED

AT 0634Z CONTAINED A SIGHTING OF THE "ENEMY SHIP". IT ALSO INDICATED THAT 135 WAS IN THE VICINITY OF HON HE. TWO OTHER MESSAGES FROM T146 TO HAIPHONG DURING THE NEXT HALF HOUR CONTAINED FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING THE COURSE, SPEED, AND MANEUVERS OF THE MADDOX. THEY ALSO STATED THAT THE "DIRECTORATE" WOULD COMMAND THE 135 AND CONTAINED INFORMATION CONCERNING THE TACTICS BEING EMPLOYED BY THE DRV VESSELS, INCLUDING THE MENTION OF LAUNCHING TORPEDOES. A MESSAGE FROM T142 TO PORT HALLUT INTERCEPTED BY USN 4141 STATED, "RECEIVED ORDERS. T146, T142 DID (ONE GROUP UNREADABLE) USE HIGH SPEED TO GO TOGETHER WITH (ENEMY) FOLLOWING TO LAUNCH TORPEDOES." THE MADDOX WAS ATTACKED BY THREE DRV MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS AT 0808Z. COINTEL LATER INDICATED THAT THESE WERE T333, T336, AND T339; T339 WAS SUNK AND THE OTHER TWO VESSELS DAMAGED, T336 VERY HEAVILY.

G. IN A MESSAGE INTERCEPTED AT 022341Z HAIPHONG INSTRUCTED T146 TO

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REPORT THE POSITION OF T135, T142, AND T146, TO SEND ONE VESSEL TO ASSIST "COMRADE GIANG'S SHIP", HAVE ONE VESSEL REMAIN TO ASSIST BOATS OF 135 AS TO THE NECESSITIES OF LIFE, AND TO ORGANIZE DEFENSES AT THE ANCHORAGE. T146 WAS FURTHER ORDERED TO MAINTAIN CONSTANT COMMUNICATIONS WITH HEADQUARTERS AND NOT TO GO ANY PLACE WITHOUT ORDERS FROM HEADQUARTERS.

H. ON 4 AUGUST INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM USN 414T AND USN 626J INDICATED A POSSIBLE ATTACK ON THE DESOTO SHIPS BY DRV NAVAL VESSELS THAT NIGHT.

I. FOLLOWING THE ATTACK BY CARRIER-BASED PLANES ON DRV NAVAL VESSELS AND INSTALLATIONS ON 5 AUGUST, DRV OFFICIALS APPEARED TO BE QUITE CONCERNED OVER THE SAFETY OF BOTH NAVAL AND MERCHANT VESSELS, AND TOOK ACTION TO LESSEN THE DANGER FROM ATTACKS OF ANY NATURE. AT 051614Z A MESSAGE FROM HAIPHONG TO ALL SHIPS ON A FISHING FLEET COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK STATED, "SITUATION INTRICATE TONIGHT; TEMPORARILY STAY AT (UNREADABLE PROBABLE PLACE NAME). ABSOLUTELY CANNOT NEGLECT THESE ORDERS (WHICH ARE) EFFECTIVE UNTIL NEW ORDERS ARRIVE." A BADLY GARBLED MESSAGE INTERCEPTED LATER THAT

DAY TO AN UNIDENTIFIED NAVAL VESSEL ORDERED IT TO HIRE FISHERMEN AND TO GO INTO SHORE AND MOBILIZE THE PEOPLE'S ARMY. IT ALSO DEALT WITH THE ASSIGNING OF VESSELS FOR ASSURANCE. VESSELS 405 AND 497 (UNIDENTIFIED AS TO TYPE) WERE MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY. AT 1928Z HAIPHONG INSTRUCTED VESSEL T142 TO "RETURN TO THE COAST IMMEDIATELY. ENROUTE SEARCH FOR A PLACE TO HIDE FROM PLANES BEFORE MORNING. REPORT YOUR POSITION AND ATTEND TO COMMUNICATIONS WITH HEADQUARTERS. THE MINE AREAS THAT THE ENEMY CANNOT ENTER ARE: A. 20-51-29N 107-04E, B. 20-53-20N 107-04E, C. 20-51-25N 105-09E, D. 20-53-25N 107-09E." AT 072032Z A MESSAGE FROM HAIPHONG REVEALED THAT, "THE FISHERMEN REQUEST OUR SHIPS TO MEET THEM AND GUARD THEM." A PROBABLE DISPERSAL PLAN WAS REVEALED WHEN IT CONTINUED, "ON 8 AUGUST THREE VESSELS ENTER (ONE GROUP UNREADABLE), TWO VESSELS GO INTO HAIPHONG, THREE SHIPS LEAVE THE RIVER MOUTH BETWEEN THEM."

J. AT 061548Z PORT WALLUT INFORMED AN UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL THAT, "FROM NOW ON WE WILL PRODUCE OUR INSIGNIA AS FOLLOWS: A YELLOW STAR; A RED BACKGROUND WITH A CIRCLE WITH A YELLOW EDGE. THERE WILL BE TWO RED LINES PASSING THROUGH THE YELLOW EDGE. THIS INSIGNIA WILL BE ON THE FUSELAGE, THE BELLY, THE WING, AND BEHIND THE TAIL OF THE PLANE. WHEN YOU OBSERVE AIRPLANES WITH THIS INSIGNIA ON IT, IT IS OUR PLANE. YOU MUST WAIT UNTIL YOU CAN DISTINGUISH IT."

K. AT 052312Z HAIPHONG INSTRUCTED VESSEL T120 (SWATOW CLASS PGM) TO TOW TWO OF 135'S BOATS BACK IMMEDIATELY. (THESE WERE LATER IDENTIFIED AS T333 AND T336, THE VESSELS DAMAGED IN THE 2 AUGUST ATTACK ON THE MADDOX.) IT ALSO REVEALED THAT THE SALVAGE TUG BACH DANG WAS TOWING T132 (SWATOW CLASS PGM) AND THAT FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE HELD CONCERNING THE TWO VESSELS THAT WERE SUNK (PROBABLY DURING THE AIR STRIKES OF 5 AUGUST.)

L. BETWEEN 6 AND 8 AUGUST SEVERAL PROPAGANDA TYPE MESSAGES WERE INTERCEPTED ON DRV NAVAL NETS. A MESSAGE FROM PORT WALLUT INTERCEPTED AT 061615Z CLAIMED THAT ON 2 AUGUST, "HE CHASED OFF THE AMERICAN WARSHIP",

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AND THAT ON 5 AUGUST FIVE ENEMY PLANES WERE SHOT DOWN AND THREE DAMAGED, AND ONE AMERICAN PILOT CAPTURED ALIVE. A MESSAGE INTERCEPTED AT 071720Z STATED, "WISH YOU VICTORY; IT IS THE BEGINNING OF THE FEELING OF HOSTILITY; PUSH STRONGLY THE DECISION (ONE GROUP UNREADABLE) ENEMY AND CARRY OUT EACH MISSION." OTHER MESSAGES DEALT WITH ALERT CONDITIONS AT BASES AND THE AWARDING OF MEDALS ON 8 AUGUST.

N. A MESSAGE INTERCEPTED AT 090320Z FROM TONY HALLUT TO AN UNIDENTIFIED STATION REVEALED THAT THE BODY OF ONE AMERICAN PILOT HAD BEEN PULLED OUT OF THE WATER ALONG THE COAST.

3. QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF INTERCEPT:

A. A TOTAL OF 135 HOURS AND 14 MINUTES OF MANUAL MORSE TRAFFIC WAS INTERCEPTED. THIS INCLUDED 96 HOURS AND 41 MINUTES OF DRV NAVAL TRAFFIC AND 17 HOURS AND 27 MINUTES OF [] NAVAL TRAFFIC. SIGNALS WERE GOOD TO EXCELLENT DURING THE PATROL, EXCEPT WHEN THE TRANSMITTERS OF THE MADDOX BLOCKED ALL FREQUENCIES.

B. A TOTAL OF 7 HOURS AND 49 MINUTES OF PROBABLE DRV RADIO-TELEPHONE TRAFFIC WAS INTERCEPTED. INCLUDED IN THIS WAS 7 HOURS AND 25 MINUTES OF POSSIBLE NAVAL TRAFFIC INTERCEPTED ON 125.0E AND 131.0E MCS. THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THIS TRAFFIC WAS INTERCEPTED WHILE IN THE VICINITY OF 19-00N 103-53E. HOWEVER, ON 5 AUGUST STRONG SIGNALS WERE INTERCEPTED ON 131.0E MCS WHILE OPERATING APPROXIMATELY SEVENTY-FIVE MILES FROM THE DRV COAST. WHETHER THIS WAS THE RESULT OF DRV NAVAL VESSELS KNOWN TO BE SHADOWING THE MADDOX, OR DUE TO ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS IS NOT KNOWN. DURING THE SAME PERIOD, THE SHIP'S SURFACE SEARCH RADAR WAS TRACKING CONTACTS AT UNUSUALLY LONG DISTANCES BECAUSE OF DUCTING. SPECIAL EFFORTS WERE MADE DURING BOTH ATTACKS BY DRV NAVAL VESSELS TO ISOLATE THE ATTACKING VESSELS IN VOICE COMMUNICATIONS. HOWEVER, ON BOTH OCCASIONS ALL FREQUENCIES BETWEEN 100 AND 200 MCS WERE BLOCKED BY THE SHIP AND SUPPORTING AIRCRAFT.

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C. ON 5 AUGUST, 38 MINUTES OF UNIDENTIFIED [] RADIO-TELEPHONE TRAFFIC WAS INTERCEPTED ON [] SIGNALS WERE FAIR TO GOOD DURING THE PERIOD OF THE INTERCEPT, BUT BECAUSE OF THE DISTANCE OF THE SHIP FROM THE [] COAST IT IS BELIEVED THE INTERCEPT WAS DUE TO ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS.

D. A SUMMARY OF ELINT INTERCEPT WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE DESOTO REPORT SUBMITTED BY USS MADDOX.

4. DIRECT SUPPORT (SIGHT) PROVIDED USS MADDOX:

A. WHILE ENROUTE TO THE GULF OF TONKIN ON 30 JULY, AND AT OTHER TIMES DURING THE PATROL WHEN THE MADDOX WAS OPERATING NEAR [] TERRITORY,

[] AIR DEFENSE NETS (EITHER MANUAL MORSE OR VOICE AS CAPABILITIES PERMITTED) WERE MONITORED TO PROVIDE EARLY WARNING SUPPORT TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER. ON 30 JULY NINE RAIDS, CONSISTING OF AT LEAST TWELVE PROBABLE []

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HOWEVER, NO REACTION TO THE DESOTO SHIP WAS NOTED AT ANY TIME ON THESE NETS.

B. THE INFORMATION CONCERNING SHADOW ACTIVITY AND THE IMPENDING ATTACKS BY DRV NAVAL VESSELS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE WAS PASSED TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER, USS MADDOX AND COMMANDER, DESTROYER DIVISION 192 IMMEDIATELY AFTER DECODING OR RECEIPT OVER THE GRI BROADCAST. IN ADDITION, A DAILY MEETING OF ALL COMINT CLEARED OFFICERS WAS HELD TO DISCUSS SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF THE PREVIOUS DAY.

C. THE DETACHMENT'S TWO ELINT PERSONNEL WERE ASSIGNED DIRECTLY TO THE OPERATIONS OFFICER OF THE MADDOX TO ASSIST IN THE COMBAT INFORMATION CENTER. THEY PROVIDED ADVICE AND INSTRUCTION TO AID THE SHIP'S COMPANY ECH OPERATORS IN THE COLLECTION AND EVALUATION OF ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE, AND ALSO STOOD NORMAL ECH WATCHES.

5. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT:

A. THE PERFORMANCE OF ALL INTERCEPT EQUIPMENT WAS EXCELLENT THROUGHOUT THE PATROL. THE SHIP'S LONG WIRE ANTENNA WAS USED FOR HIGH FREQUENCY INTERCEPT AND THE GRI BROADCAST. IT GAVE EXCELLENT RESULTS, AS DID THE VHF ANTENNAS INSTALLED ON THE VAN.

B. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE KWR-37 AND ALL ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT WAS OUTSTANDING. THE ONLY PROBLEM ENCOUNTERED WITH THIS SYSTEM OCCURRED FOLLOWING THE SECOND ATTACK BY DRV MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS WHEN JARRING CAUSED BY THE FIRING OF THE SHIP'S GUNS NECESSITATED MINOR ADJUSTMENTS TO THE KWR-37 AND THE BOEHME FREQUENCY SHIFT CONVERTER.

C. ON 7 AUGUST ONE OF THE VAN'S AIR CONDITIONERS BROKE AND COULD NOT BE REPAIRED ABOARD SHIP DUE TO THE LACK OF SPARE PARTS. A "RED DEVIL" BLOWER WAS OBTAINED FROM THE SHIP, AND ALTHOUGH THE TEMPERATURE IN THE VAN ROSE SLIGHTLY, THE DETACHMENT WAS ABLE TO CONTINUE FULL OPERATIONS WITHOUT ILL EFFECTS TO EITHER EQUIPMENT OR PERSONNEL.

D. IN ADDITION TO NEEDED AIR CONDITIONING REPAIRS, THE VAN, AFTER ALMOST SIX WEEKS OF SOLID PATROL TIME, IS IN NEED OF A GENERAL OVERHAUL.

6. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. EXCELLENT COOPERATION WAS RECEIVED FROM PERSONNEL OF THE USS MADDOX IN ALL RESPECTS. THE SHIP MADE EVERY EFFORT TO INSURE THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE DETACHMENT'S MISSION AND TO PROVIDE COMFORTABLE LIVING AND WORKING SPACES FOR THE DETACHMENT. THE ONLY DIFFICULTY ENCOUNTERED WAS THE BLOCKING OF INTERCEPT AT TIMES BY THE SHIP'S TRANSMITTERS (SEE PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE), AND THIS WAS HELD TO A MINIMUM BY SENDING ROUTINE TRAFFIC WHEN IT WOULD LEAST INTERFERE WITH PRODUCTIVE INTERCEPT BY THE DETACHMENT.

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B. THE SUPPORT PROVIDED TO THE DETACHMENT BY THE COMINT STATIONS TASKED WITH DESOTO SUPPORT WAS EXCELLENT THROUGHOUT THE PATROL. ESPECIALLY OUTSTANDING WAS THE SUPPORT PROVIDED BY USN 27 AND USN 414T/USN 626J WHEN THE PATROL WAS BEING SUBJECTED TO ENEMY ATTACK BETWEEN 2 AND 4 AUGUST. THE ONLY RECOMMENDATION FOR IMPROVEMENT WOULD BE TO INCLUDE BRIEF TECHNICAL DETAILS WITH THE INFORMATION PROVIDED SO THAT THE DETACHMENT COULD CONCENTRATE ITS EFFORTS ON THOSE CASES WHICH APPEAR TO BE MOST PRODUCTIVE AT ANY PARTICULAR TIME.

C. ONE OF THE OUTSTANDING FEATURES OF THIS PATROL WAS THE PROOF (IF ANY WAS REQUIRED) OF THE VALUE AND RELIABILITY OF THE GRI BROADCAST. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PATROL THERE WAS SOME APPREHENSION THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO COPY THE GRI BROADCAST WHILE IN THE GULF OF TONKIN. HOWEVER, THESE FEARS PROVED TO BE GROUNDLESS. AFTER SOME DIFFICULTY IN FINDING A SATISFACTORY NIGHT FREQUENCY THE FIRST TWO NIGHTS AFTER LEAVING KEELUNG, THE BROADCAST WAS COPIED WITH A CIRCUIT AVAILABILITY OF ALMOST 90 PER CENT FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE PATROL. (CIRCUIT AVAILABILITY FOR THE ENTIRE PATROL WAS 82.5 PER CENT.) USE OF THE ADONIS BACK-UP SYSTEM WAS NOT REQUIRED. THE VALUE OF ON-LINE COMMUNICATIONS TO THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THIS DESOTO PATROL CANNOT BE OVEREMPHASIZED.

D. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THIS WAS ONE OF THE FIRST DESOTO PATROLS TO HAVE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED WHOSE PRIMARY FUNCTION WAS ANALYSIS OF INTERCEPTED TRAFFIC. THIS PROVED TO BE EXTREMELY VALUABLE. EVEN THOUGH MUCH OF THE INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED FROM OTHER SOURCES LATER, IN SEVERAL INSTANCES HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER MUCH EARLIER THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE WITHOUT TRAINED ANALYSTS ABOARD. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT FUTURE DESOTO PATROL TEAMS INCLUDE TWO ANALYSTS WHO ARE THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH THE PRIMARY COMINT TARGET OF THE PATROL.

E. THE COMMUNICATIONS VAN PROVIDED AN EXCELLENT WORKING SPACE FOR THE DETACHMENT'S OPERATIONS, AND PLACING THE VAN BETWEEN THE STACKS DID NOT APPEAR TO HINDER OPERATIONS IN ANY RESPECT. HOWEVER, THE PRESENT VAN IS HARDLY ADEQUATE IN SIZE FOR EVEN AN ORDINARY PATROL, AND WHEN EMERGENCY CONDITIONS PREVAIL (AS THEY DID ON MUCH OF THE PRESENT PATROL), IT BECOMES INADEQUATE. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT A LARGER VAN BE PROCURED FOR FUTURE PATROLS, AND THAT THE INSTALLATION PROVIDE FOR A MINIMUM OF FOUR (PREFERABLY FIVE) INTERCEPT POSITIONS, ONE COMMUNICATIONS POSITION, AND ADEQUATE SPACE FOR PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS. THE NUMBER OF POSITIONS USED FOR MANUAL MONITOR AND RADIO-TELEPHONE COLLECTION COULD BE VARIED FROM PATROL TO PATROL, DEPENDING ON THE TARGET COUNTRY'S COMMUNICATIONS.

Gerrell D. Moore
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USN 414



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~~SECRET KIMBO~~

GAZETTEER:

BEN THUY	18-39N	105-42E
HAIPHONG	20-52N	106-41E
HON EN	18-18N	106-09E
HON ME	19-23N	105-56E
HON NE	19-54N	106-01E
HON NGU	18-46N	105-47E
ISLE DU TIGRE	17-10N	107-20E
PORT GIANH	17-42N	106-29E
PORT WALLUT	21-13N	107-34E
THANH HOA	20-00N	105-30E
VINH	18-40N	105-40E
VINH SON	17-56N	106-25E

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

ENCLOSURE (1)