MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

14 JANUARY 1965

SUBJECT: Chronology of Events of 18-20 September 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin

1. The report forwarded herewith contains the events, in chronological order, surrounding the incident on 18 September involving the U. S. destroyers Edwards and Morton in the Gulf of Tonkin.

2. In-so-far as the SIGINT aspects of the actions are concerned, the report is as complete as the need for documentation of SIGINT involvement appeared to necessitate. Documentation presented by the non-SIGINT portions of this report is only as complete as DIRNSA's receipt of relevant messages allowed.

FOR THE CHIEF, B2:

DELMAR C. LANG
LT. COL., USAF
CHIEF, B205

Copy to: DIR
D/DIR
ADN
ADP
B
B2
B26
HQ NSAPAC
NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (C)
NSAPAC REP JAPAN
SUSLO (M)
This report presents a resume of intelligence developments and operational actions which were related to the Desoto Patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin, 16-20 September 1964. A chronology of significant events is attached as an Appendix.

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I. PLANNING

A. CINCPAC-JCS Actions

On 9 September, CINCPAC queried CINCPACFLT views regarding the resumption of the Desoto Patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin. CINCPACFLT responded with a proposed orbit for a five day, two destroyer patrol. CINCPAC forwarded this proposal to JCS recommending a three day patrol with an orbit no closer than 20 miles from the North Vietnamese coastline or 12 miles from the offshore islands. The JCS concurrence, to CINCPAC also established that in case of attack, both ships and aircraft were to fire upon the target(s) with intent to destroy; ships were authorized to pursue attacker(s) to within three miles of shore; aircraft were authorized hot pursuit of any target(s) they could firmly identify as having attacked the Desoto. Aircraft pursuits were authorized to overfly North Vietnam, Hainan Island and the Chinese Communist mainland, if necessary. The patrol was originally scheduled to commence on 14 September but was twice postponed due to adverse weather and the political crisis in South Vietnam and did not proceed from its first point (17-10N 107-43E) until 162336Z. The patrol was conducted by the USS Morton and the USS Edwards.

B. NSA Actions

On 11 September DIRNAVSECGRUPAC informed DIRNSA of plans for an intercept team, USN-467P, to be aboard the USS Morton. DIRNSA was also advised of those naval command which were to be included as addressees for SIGINT reports containing reactions to or reflections of the patrol.

Upon receipt of DIRNAVSECGRUPAC's 11 September message, the Chief, B205 called a meeting of appropriate B2 and P2 personnel to discuss those actions which were necessary to ensure maximum SIGINT support to the Desoto patrol as well as to determine the desired SIGINT tasking. It was agreed that the problem would be approached in two phases: first, to provide SIGINT support to a routine patrol and second, to make preparations to permit prompt SIGINT reaction in the event of hostile actions against the patrol.

In the first phase, messages were released on 11 September alerting the appropriate field stations to the forthcoming patrol. The messages outlined priority intercept targets and provided additional routine technical support to such tasking. In addition, B2 drafted a message for P2 release to the JCS requesting action to provide Queen Bee Delta collection from an orbit in the Gulf of Tonkin during the
Desoto patrol. JCS concurred in this proposal. and programs were reviewed and it was concluded that all planning information concerning these programs was already being made available to DIRNSA.

DIRNSA requested that CINCPAC provide appropriate field stations with periodic position reports of the Desoto patrol in an effort to enhance SIGINT analytic efforts. However, CINCPAC was unable to comply in that the patrol was to be under EMCOM, a mode of radio silence.

In the second phase of DIRNSA support plans, in which the patrol was to be regarded as a potential target of hostile DRV or reactions, a 12 September message was sent to field stations reviewing the intercept/forwarding/reporting problems encountered during the 2/4 August Gulf incident. In this, B205 advised of operational and reporting procedures to be followed and also informed field stations of the latest available information on the track the Desoto patrol was to follow.

C. In-House Actions

In anticipation of a possible incident in the Gulf of Tonkin, B205 took numerous in-house actions in an effort to attain a posture of optimum preparedness. All technical, reporting and administrative data was assembled in a central location and the B2 Conference Room was readied for immediate conversion into an operational watch area. A stand-by crew, including analytic personnel, was placed on 24 hour alert and all appropriate personnel were briefed as to their duties should the necessity arise. Messages were prepared to cover any SIGINT Readiness condition that might be called—leaving only the date to be filled in, a signature, and the concurrence of ADP before release. B205 instituted a skeleton watch during the critical hours of the first evening of the patrol (16/17 September, local).

II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REACTIONS

A. Summary/Background

The patrol vessels arrived at point Alfa (17-10N 107-43E) at 162336Z (morning of 17 September, Gulf of Tonkin time) and then proceeded on a northerly track along the DRV coast. The vessels continued on course without incident but under sporadic tracking surveillance by shorebased DRV radar elements and/or visual observation by DRV naval/shipping/fishing entities. On the morning of
18 September, the patrol returned on track in the vicinity of point Delta (18-42N 107 E) and continued along their northerly track until the evening when the vessels retired some 50 mile seaward to their night steaming area. Later that evening (181220Z), in the vicinity of 18-35N 107-50E and again at 181337Z near 18-30N 106-52N, the patrol vessels took unidentified radar targets under fire. Following the shelling and early on the morning of 19 September the patrol vessels and fighter aircraft searched the area unsuccessfully for debris or other evidence of the previous night's action prior to continuing their patrol from approximately point Echo (19-23N 106-10E) southward to point Alfa.

In response to urgent JCS/CINCPAC queries the vessels reported their fire had been prompted by five radar targets which were closing despite warning shots. No visual observation of the "targets" was made, nor was there any evidence that any rounds or torpedoes were expended against the U.S. vessels. Again based on radar surveillance the U.S. vessels claimed hits on three of the targets.

B. Surveillance

The Desoto vessels arrived at point Alfa (17-10N 107-43E) at 162336Z and then proceeded on a northerly track along the DRV coast. The initial reflection of DRV awareness of the presence of U.S. ships in the Gulf of Tonkin was at 17004SZ when Northern Fleet Headquarters, Port Wallut, reported that the U.S. Seventh Fleet's intentions were to move into the area close to the shore for the purpose of provoking the DRV.

The Desoto vessels came under radar surveillance at least as early as 170300Z. DRV Naval Radar tracking entities were noted at a moderately increased state of readiness during the period 17-19 September with some 327 messages noted, approximately 98 of which reflected the Desoto mission. Although two messages from Haiphong gave orders to "report continuously" on the enemy destroyers, tracking was both sporadic and erratic when compared to activity noted during the August patrol. Comparison of the patrol's known position with available tracking indicates that although discrepancies up to ten nautical miles were observed in some reports, overall, the September trackings appear to be somewhat more accurate than the August patrol.

Available messages indicate that throughout the patrol DRV naval entities were keenly aware and fairly accurately informed of the presence of the Desoto vessels. Fearing a South
TOP SECRET DINAR

Vietnamese incursion and expecting a U.S. provocation, the DRV Navy was geared to repulse the "intruders". To this end, DRV Naval authorities continually admonished subordinate units to effect a high level of defensive preparedness, to institute alert condition one, and to camouflage their locations. There were no firm SIGINT reflections of hostile intent such as were observed during the August patrol.

III. SIGINT SUPPORT

A. Readiness Actions Implemented

Approximately one hour and fifteen minutes after the USS Morton opened fire on closing targets, and approximately thirty minutes subsequent to B205's receipt of the CRITIC from COMNAVFORJAPAN, DIRNSA declared SIGINT READINESS BRAVO "OUTBOARD" at NSA and appropriate field stations covering the North Vietnamese problem. Within this same thirty minute span, the B2 operations center was fully operational.

During the early morning hours of 19 September (local), SIGINT reflected the movement of at least six jet fighters and a transport aircraft from [blank]...

In consideration of this and other unusual communications activity, DIRNSA extended SIGINT READINESS BRAVO "OUTBOARD" to additional field stations

Upon the termination of the patrol and when it became apparent that there were no firm indications of DRV/CHICOM actions, DIRNSA cancelled SIGINT READINESS BRAVO at 1805Z on 20 September.

B. Washington Area Consumer Support

Early in the morning on 18 September, prior to the USS Morton's shelling, DIA levied a telephonic requirement on B2 for a summary of DRV reactions to the Desoto patrol on 16-17 September. This information had been requested by General Wheeler. DIA requested response by 1500 local time. Despite the insuing activity, B2 met this requirement by both cable and SIGINT product prior to 1700 hours. The information was updated, per DIA request, the following morning.

At approximately 1045 on 18 September, a request was received from the Secretary of Defense for elaboration of certain SIGINT information relating to the incident. The Chief, B205 was
immediately dispatched to the Pentagon where he briefed the Director, DIA and his staff and later assisted in drafting a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense. From there he went to CIA where he briefed General Carter on his activities at the Pentagon.

Throughout the period of 18-20 September the B2 Operations Center was in almost constant telephone contact with both DIA, JCS, JRC and the SECDEF Watch officer, responding to queries and apprising them of all SIGINT developments as they occurred. All requirements which necessitated written responses were prepared in the most expeditious manner possible and disseminated to the requestor by message or by courier. Where practicable, these responses were immediately followed-up with serialized product to the community.

In addition, throughout 18-20 September B2 maintained senior analysts and linguists on board at all times to monitor field translations, technical data, etc. with an eye toward accuracy and presentation and to ensure further dissemination to appropriate consumers if required.

The prompt NSA reaction that this effort permitted is well evidenced in the following example. On 20 September, USN-27 issued a CRITIC to the effect that an attack by DRV naval elements upon the Desoto patrol was possible that evening. Within two hours of the time of intercept, the B2 Operations Center had received the relevant technical data, retranslated and interpreted it and issued an amplifying product to the intelligence community which clarified the original CRITIC pointing out that the DRV concern pointed equally as well to the possibility of an attack on South Vietnamese "raiders" as it did to an attack on the Desoto patrol.

IV. OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS ENCOUNTERED

A. Communications Outages

SIGINT Readiness Bravo Outboard was implemented during a period when CRITICOM circuits were overloaded and a backlog existed at several stations. The additional load of high precedence traffic, equipment failure, and poor atmospheric conditions resulted in unusually difficult communications problems.

Throughout the period of the Readiness, B2 was plagued with non-receipt of or excessive delays in the arrival of badly needed product and technical material. Washington Consumers were also
concerned about the lack of timely SIGINT input. In some instances IMMEDIATE items took as long as 27 hours to reach Washington and FLASH items took 6-7 hours.

In exploring the problem, B2 contacted the T1 Duty Officer and was informed of the general deterioration of communications. With the details then available, B2 was in a position to advise local consumers on the matter on a continuing basis. In addition, B2 brought the situation to the attention of the Director and ADP. Subsequent action resulted in the declaration of a "minimize" condition in an attempt to alleviate the situation.

B. Distribution of USN-467P Input

The manner in which USN-467P reported significant intelligence gleaned from their intercept has caused considerable concern. The problem lies in the fact that while the platform had no SIGINT reporting responsibilities per se it did forward certain intelligence items to selected consumers, i.e., DIA, JCS and Naval commands. While the items reported were relevant to the platform's role of direct support of the patrol vessel, and were therefore of direct interest to the addressees selected, it prompted CIA and the White House to form the opinion that DIA was getting information they weren't.

Fortunately the case in point was explainable because of the communications difficulties, however, future platforms must have more definitive reporting instructions and the necessary mechanics clearly established to avoid any further instances of this nature.
INTRODUCTION

The following report presents a chronological summary of the events surrounding the 18-20 September Desoto Patrol incident involving two U. S. destroyers, the U. S. S. Edwards and the U. S. S. Morton, on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Desoto Patrols, accomplished to assert the right of U. S. vessels to patrol in international waters and for the purpose of collecting intelligence, were established in April 1962 and have operated since in waters off the China and North Vietnam coastlines.

In this instance, the U. S. S. Morton had a SIGINT collection team aboard designated USN-467P. The team included one manual Morse position, one radio-telephone position, and one combined manual Morse/radio-telephone position. The personnel complement included both Chinese and Vietnamese linguists. The team's primary mission was to provide immediate support to the patrol itself, and secondarily to intercept DRV communications in accordance with tasking provided by DIRNSA.

DIRNSA plans for support of the Desoto Patrol were in two phases. One phase dealt with the patrol under routine circumstances, provided relevant SIGINT tasking instructions and necessary procedures for continued technical support for the period when the patrol would be in progress. The other phase regarded the patrol as a potential target for hostile North Vietnamese or actions. To cover that contingency, instructions were issued which specified the intercept, forwarding and reporting procedures to be implemented in the event of an incident.

In reading the following report it may be helpful to bear in mind that messages originated by CTF 77 were from the task force commander of the Seventh Fleet; those messages from the patrol were designated CTG 77.6.6. USN-414T, indicated as the originator on some messages, was a Marine contingent at USM-626J (Phu Bai, South Vietnam) charged, in conjunction with USM-626J, with the collection, processing and reporting of North Vietnamese naval communications. It should also be borne in mind that, aside from the SIGINT information which is as complete as the purpose of this report appeared to require, this report is based solely on that information available to NSA and does not purport to contain all relevant non-SIGINT information.
CHRONOLOGY - SEPTEMBER 1964 DESOTO PATROL IN THE GULF OF TONKIN

090429Z CINCPACFLT submitted a proposal to CINCPAC for a two-destroyer Desoto Patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin. (Tab 1)

092209Z CINCPAC concurred with JCS proposal to resume Desoto Patrol. (Tab 2)

102339Z JCS authorized a three day patrol, giving rules of engagement. (Tab 3)

110354Z DIRNAVSECGRUPAC informed DIRNSA that a SIGINT support element, designated as USN-467P, would embark aboard the USS Morton and gave navigational reference points for the patrol. (Tab 4)

112117Z DIRNSA informed appropriate field stations of the forthcoming patrol. (Tab 5)

121733Z DIRNSA sent a message to JCS (JRC) requesting QUEEN BEE DELTA collection from Gulf of Tonkin orbit stressing the importance of VHF communications from airfields in and the DRV. (Tab 6)

121945Z DIRNSA passed collection guidance for USN-467P. (Tab 7)

121951Z DIRNSA issued reporting guidance to the appropriate field stations to be implemented in the event of hostile reactions to the Desoto Patrol. (Tab 8)

122020Z DIRNSA requested CINCPAC to provide periodic position reports of the Desoto vessels to enhance SIGINT support to the patrol itself as well as to the intelligence community. (Tab 9)

131203Z DIRNSA informed appropriate field stations, of revised track, for the patrol. (Tab 10)

131836Z Chairman, JCS implemented positive control over the patrol to ensure immediate withdrawal if required due to political unrest in South Vietnam. (Tab 11)

140623Z CINCPAC informed DIRNSA that hourly position reports for the vessels was not feasible since the patrol would be under EMCOM (a mode of radio silence). (Tab 12)

141952Z JCS advised of decision to proceed with Desoto Patrol with a 24 hour delay in execution. (Tab 13)

151155Z USS Morton advised that the Desoto Patrol was virtually ready and that she intended to cross Latitude 17 at 163000H. (Tab 14)
191121Z DIRNSA summarizes current movement of fighter aircraft. (Tab 67)

191131Z DIRNSA published a recap of SIGINT observations relating to 2/4 August and 18 September, Gulf of Tonkin Naval engagement. (Tab 68)

191412Z Morton issued a further recap of events. (Tab 69)

191522Z USN-27J reported that an element of DRV Navy to change from Grade-One to Grade-Three alert. (Tab 70)

191528Z USN-27 issued a CRITIC, "the Desoto will be attacked tonight". (Tab 71)

191600Z DIRNSA issued a message to DIA updating the info passed the day before in response to the Chairman JCS requirement, -- see Tab 53. (Tab 72)

191608Z DIRNSA issued a further report clarifying information of a reported increase in volume of messages. (Tab 73)

191704Z DIRNSA issued a follow-up to USN-27 CRITIC concluding that DRV concern apt to be over South Vietnamese vessels as well as U. S. destroyers. -- see Tab 71. (Tab 74)

191821Z JCS deferred Desoto Patrol. (Tab 75)

192000Z DIRNSA advised appropriate field stations of suspension of the Desoto Patrol. (Tab 76)

200225Z Desoto Patrol and strike posture cancelled. (Tab 77)

201200Z USN-27J reported a message that all DRV stations were to beware of the Seventh Fleet south of the Demarcation Line. (Tab 78)

201255Z DIRNSA terminated SIGINT READINESS BRAVO OUTBOARD. (Tab 79)

201315Z DIRNSA issued report to all relevant field stations terminating SIGINT READINESS BRAVO OUTBOARD. (Tab 80)

230436Z USN-27 relayed a message originated by USN-467P in reply to a DIRNSA query providing a list of the SIGINT products received by the USS Morton prior to 18 September. (Tab 81)

250326Z USN-27 advised that USN-467P was deactivated as of 232359Z. (Tab 82)
DIRNSA provided additional guidance to USN-467P and appropriate field stations. (Tab 15)

DIRNSA provided second day Patrol schedule to appropriate field stations. (Tab 16)

DIRNSA passed additional evaluation instructions to appropriate field stations. (Tab 17)

DIRNSA furnished technical aid to USN-467P and appropriate field stations. (Tab 18)

DIRNSA provided further technical support. (Tab 19)

USN-27J reported possible alert of DRV Naval Forces. (Tab 20)

USN-27 reported that the Desoto Patrol had commenced at 170736H. (Tab 21)

USN-27J reported DRV establishment of "alert rank 1". (Tab 22)

A DRV Naval message reported the movement of the Desoto Patrol. (Tab 23)

USN-27J reported on further details of DRV alert. (Tab 24)

USN-467P reported that DRV Naval Sub-Unit Six received orders "to postpone the Battle". (Tab 25)

USN-27 reported that DRV radar placed the patrol at 1732N-105E (near point Bravo). (Tab 26)

Upon receipt of the message from USN-467P (Tab 25), DIRNSA asked USN-27 and USN-27J to confirm or deny the report from their own sources. (Tab 27)

USN-27 and USN-27J responded to DIRNSA's query (Tab 27). Intercept indicated DRV maintaining defensive vice offensive posture. (Tab 28)

DIRNSA advised appropriate field stations to assure technical back-up on all serialized products. (Tab 29)

USN-27 reported a DRV Naval Unit in vicinity of point Delta. (Tab 30)

USN-467P reported that a DRV Naval vessel was preparing for "Battle". (Tab 31)

USN-27 reported that DRV radar detected the presence of two (enemy) destroyers. (Tab 32)
USN-27 reported that DRV Naval vessels and shore stations were ordered to effect alert condition One. (Tab 33)

USN-27 published a further resume of DRV message activity. (Tab 34)

USN-27J reported that the DRV Navy was to take precautions against South Vietnamese vessels attacking the shore. (Tab 35)

The Morton reported the situation well in hand, no need for additional aircraft overhead. (Tab 36)

COMNAVFORJAPAN released a CRITIC stating that "at 181233Z, USS Morton commenced firing on closing targets, request cover". (Tab 37)

USN-27 reported that DRV shore stations were to increase the strength of their areas, and be able to distinguish between American ships. (Tab 38)

DIRNSA declared SIGINT READINESS BRAVO, and provided reporting guidance for appropriate field stations. (Tab 39)

DIRNSA gave further translation on "Battle Postponement" --see Tab 25. (Tab 40)

The Morton reported possibility of 3 hostile surface targets sunk. (Tab 41)

USN-27J reported that radio stations are to promote dispersion, camouflage, and prepare the surface preparations. (Tab 42)

USS Morton recaps events of attack. (Tab 43)

JCS queries CINCPAC for specific details of the attack. (Tab 44)

USN-27 reported that DRV shipping communications reflected the presence of the Desoto Patrol. (Tab 45)

DIRNSA asked NSAPAC REP VIETNAM 3 and USN-27 for specific details of the attack. (Tab 46)

DIRNSA set forth procedures for field stations to follow in event of weather reporting suggested a deployment of Vietnamese forces. (Tab 47)

USN-27J reported the presence of Desoto Patrol in vicinity of Hon Matt. (Tab 48)

DIRNSA reported the possibility that DRV Naval authorities fear actions by South Vietnamese vessels. (Tab 49)
181950Z DIRNSA issued a Gulf of Tonkin report, gisting significant messages that preceded the attack on the U. S. Destroyers. (Tab 50)

182034Z DIRNSA requested AFSSO SAC to forward daily forecasts of weather conditions for the Gulf of Tonkin. (Tab 51)

182038Z DIRNSA instituted a partial "minimize" on CRITICOM circuits in the European and Mediterranean Areas. (Tab 52)

182133Z DIRNSA responded to a DIA request for SIGINT reflection of DRV surveillance of Desoto Patrol. (Tab 53)

182343Z USS Morton fired warning shots. (Tab 54)

190134Z DIRNSA requested AFSSO SAC to forward daily forecasts of weather conditions for the Gulf of Tonkin. (Tab 51)

190152Z CINCPAC, in a message to CINCPACFLT, requested more concrete evidence that the Desoto destroyers were actually under attack. (Tab 56)

190154Z CINCPAC advised the Patrol to be prepared to initiate or repeat patrol in accordance with original three day itinerary. (Tab 57)

190227Z USN-27J reported that a message intercepted from a shore station stated that the enemy fired on the ship. (Tab 58)

190238Z DIRNSA requested NSAPAC REP VIETNAM to establish communications with Phu Bai by CRITICOM or whatever means available. (Tab 59)

190306Z DIRNSA released a report on communications anomalies noted on 18 and 19 September. (Tab 60)

190410Z NSAPAC REP VIETNAM advised of continuing circuit outage between Saigon and Phu Bai. (Tab 61)

190438Z The Morton advised she could find no evidence of debris to support the attack. (Tab 62)

190525Z USN-27J reported that a DRV message stated that they (DRV) must execute correctly alert grade ONE. (Tab 63)

190542Z DIRNSA published a report that the 18 September engagement in the Gulf of Tonkin revealed no preparation for initiation of an attack on U. S. destroyers. (Tab 64)

190823Z DIRNSA published a report of the DRV Navy on Alert Condition ONE. (Tab 65)

191005Z DIRNSA extends SIGINT READINESS BRAVO OUTBOARD. (Tab 66)
GULF OF TONKIN DESOTO PATROL (S)

A. DISCUSSIONS YOUR CAPT O'CONNELL MY CAPT GIBSON FM 8 SEP.

B. CINCPAC 062317Z FEB 63

C. CINCPAC 152334Z AUG 64

1. AS DISCUSSED IN REF A, A PROPOSAL IS HEREBY SUBMITTED TO CONDUCT A TWO DESTROYER DESOTO PATROL INTO THE GULF OF TONKIN IN THE LATTER PART OF SEP OR EARLY OCT FOR ABOUT A FIVE DAY PERIOD. INFO HERE CONFORMS TO THE FORMAT PRESCRIBED BY REF B.

PAGE 2 RUEPCR 185 TOP SECRET

A. COMDESDIV 52 IN MORTON (DD 948) WITH ADDITIONAL DD TO BE DESIGNATED. MORTON WILL BE CONFIGURED WITH COMM BAN SIMILAR TO THAT PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED IN MADDOX.

B. SHIPS ASSIGNED WILL DEPART EITHER SOUTH CHINA SEA OPERATION AREA, SUBIC OR KAOSIUNG DEPENDENT ON THEIR LOCATION
TOP SECRET

WHEN PATROL IS ORDERED TO COMMENCE. PATROL CAN COMMENCE ANYTIME DURING THE PERIOD 17 OCT--? OCT. 72 HOURS NOTIFICATION REQUIRED.

C. PROPOSED ITINERARY IS AS FOLLOWS:

D DAY MINUS MAXIMUM THREE DAYS - DEPART FOR POINT ALFA.

D MINUS ONE - UNREP VICINITY 16N 110E.

D DAY - COMMENCE PATROL. PATROL BETWEEN POINTS ALFA BRAVO, CHARLIE AND DELTA.

D DAY PLUS ONE - PATROL BETWEEN POINTS DELTA, ECHO, FOXTROT AND GOLF.

D DAY PLUS TWO - PATROL BETWEEN POINTS FOXTROT, GOLF AND HOTEL.

D DAY PLUS THREE - PATROL BETWEEN POINTS GOLF, FOXTROT, ECHO AND DELTA.

D DAY PLUS FOUR - PATROL BETWEEN POINTS DELTA, CHARLIE BRAVO AND ALFA. WITHDRAW FROM GULF OF TONKIN AND TERMINATE PATROL ON COMPLETION.

D. TO BE DETERMINED.

2. NAVIGATION REFERENCE POINTS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Point</th>
<th>Coordinates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALFA</td>
<td>17-10N 107-43E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAVO</td>
<td>17-54N 106-54E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARLIE</td>
<td>18-10N 106-43E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELTA</td>
<td>18-42N 106-11E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>19-23N 106-10E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOXTROT</td>
<td>19-50N 106-30E</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOP SECRET
3. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY FOR CARRYING OUT THE MARITIME AND INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE OF THE PATROL, THE DESOTO COMMANDER WILL BE AUTHORIZED TO CONDUCT RANDOM PATROL AT MODERATE SPEEDS ALONG THE DESIGNATED SEGMENT OF THE TRACK EACH DAY. THE PATROL GROUP WILL COMMENCE THE COASTAL PATROL DAILY ONE HOUR AFTER SUNRISE, RETIRING TO SEAWARD ONE HOUR BEFORE SUNSET AND DURING PERIODS OF REDUCED VISIBILITY.

4. THE PATROL GROUP WILL REMAIN AT LEAST TWENTY MILES OFF THE NVN MAINLAND AND TWELVE MILES OFF NVN ISLANDS THROUGHOUT THE PATROL EXCEPT AS DISCUSSED IN PARA SEVEN FOLLOWING.

5. AIR COVER WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE YANKEE TEAM CVA. A SUBMARINE CAN BE STATIONED IN THE GULF OF TONKIN FOR SAR IF NECESSARY.

6. THE DESOTO COMMANDER WILL BE UNDER THE OPCON OF CTG 77.X IN THE CVA FOR THIS PATROL.

7. IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILE ATTACK, PATROL SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT WILL COMPLY WITH RULES OF ENGAGEMENT CONTAINED IN REF (C).
TANGO THREK FOR ADMNO CINCPAC

DESOTO PATROL - GULF OF TONKIN

A. CINCPAC FLT 09429Z PASEP

1. IN VIEW OF TIME FACTOR REF (A) IS PASSED DIRECT, CINCPAC CONCURS WITH PROPOSAL AS OUTLINED SUBJECT TO FOL COMMENTS:

   A. RECOMMEND FOLLOWING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT:

   IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILE ATTACK, THE PATROL SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT ARE DIRECTED TO FIRE UPON THE HOSTILE ATTACKER WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF INSURING DESTRUCTION.
SHIPS ARE AUTHORIZED TO PURSUE THE ENEMY TO THE RECOGNIZED THREE MILE TERRITORIAL LIMIT. AIRCRAFT ARE AUTHORIZED HOT PURSUIT INSIDE TERRITORIAL WATERS (THREE MILES) AGAINST SURFACE VESSELS AND INTO HOSTILE AIRSPACE (INCLUDES DRV, HAINAN ISLAND AND MAINLAND CHINA) AGAINST ATTACKING AIRCRAFT WHEN NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE DESTRUCTION OF IDENTIFIED ATTACK FORCES. SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT WILL CONFINE THEIR ACTIONS TO THE ATTACKING SHIPS AND/OR AIRCRAFT.

OF REF A, SAR WOULD BE PROVIDED BY OTC OF CVA TG HAVING OPCON OVER DESOTO UNITS. IAW SOP FOR SAR OTC OF NAVAL FORCE MAY CALL ON OTHER SAR FACILITIES IN AREA FOR ASSISTANCE, E.G. 2ND AIR DIV WHICH HAS AMPHIBIAN RESCUE ACFT IN DANANG AREA. ADDITIONALLY CVA TG OPERATING IN VICINITY OF PT YANKEE WOULD HAVE OTHER DE'S AVAILABLE PLUS ONE DD PROBABLY OR WATCH DO STATION APPROX VIC OF 17-20N USE DURING DESOTO OPERATION.

2. SUBJ TO FOREGOING RECOMMEND DESOTO PATROL PROPOSAL IN REF (A) BE APPROVED FOR EXECUTION ON D-DAY 17 SEP.

3. FOR CINCPACFLT, WHEN PATROL APPROVED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY AND IN EVENT 34A MAROPS ARE AUTHORIZED FOR RESUMPTION, DIRLAUTH COMUSMACV TO AVOID MUTUAL INTERFERENCE AND COORDINATE INFORMATION. GP-3
FROM JCS TO CINC PAC
INFO CNO
CINCPACFLT
COMUS MACV
CONSEVENTH FLT
WHITE HOUSE
SEC DEF
STATE DEPT

SUBJ: DESOTO PATROL (U)

REF: A. CINCPACFLT MSG DTG 09429Z (NOTAL) PASEP

H. CINCPAC MSG DTG 092249Z (NOTAL)

1. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO EXECUTE MISSION PROPOSED BY REFERENCE A FOR A PERIOD OF 3 DAYS. D-DAY IS 15 SEPT SAIGON TIME.

2. THE FOLLOWING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ARE APPROVED FOR THIS PATROL:
IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILE ATTACK, THE PATROL SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT ARE DIRECTED TO FIRE UPON THE HOSTILE ATTACKER WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF INSURING DESTRUCTION. SHIPS ARE AUTHORIZED TO PURSUE THE ENEMY TO THE RECOGNIZED THREE MILE TERRITORIAL LIMIT. AIRCRAFT ARE AUTHORIZED HOT PURSUIT INSIDE TERRITORIAL WATERS (THREE MILES) AGAINST SURFACE VESSELS AND INTO HOSTILE AIRSPACE (INCLUDES DRV, HAINAN ISLAND AND MAINLAND CHINA) AGAINST ATTACKING AIRCRAFT WHEN NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE DESTRUCTION OF IDENTIFIED ATTACK FORCES. SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT WILL CONFINE THEIR ACTIONS TO THE ATTACKING SHIPS AND/OR AIRCRAFT. GP-5
**SECRET COMINT CHANNELS**

**DESO TO PATROL (C)**

1. **A. CINCPACFLT 102103Z NOTAL GENSERV**

2. **B. CINCPACFLT 090429Z NOTAL GENSERV**

**1. REF B, AS AMPLIFIED BY REF A, PROPOSES A TWO DESTROYER DESOTO PATROL IN GULF OF TONKIN, COMMENCING FROM POINT ALFA (LISTED BELOW) 15 SEP AND CONTINUING FOR ABOUT THREE DAYS. PATROL SHIPS NOT DEFINITELY DESIG TO DATE. NAVSECGRUDET (DESIG USN 467P) WILL BE DRAFTED IN ONE PATROL SHIP TO PROVIDE SIGINT DIRECT SUPPORT TO PATROL UNITS AND CONDUCT SIGINT COLLECTION OPERATIONS.**

2. **REF A PROVIDES FOL NAVIGATION REFERENCE POINTS FOR PATROL:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REFERENCE POINT</th>
<th>Coords</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALFA</td>
<td>17-10N 107-43E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAVO</td>
<td>17-54N 106-54E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARLIE</td>
<td>18-20N 106-42E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELTA</td>
<td>18-42N 106-11E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>19-23N 106-10E</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DRAFTED**

**HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY**

**SECRET**
TO:
FOX TROT 19-50N 136-30E
GOLF 20-48N 137-00E
HOTEL 20-26N 137-30E

3. SLC 467P WILL HAVE ONE EA MM, RT, AND MM/RT/_________ POSIT AND 467P BCST RECEIVE TERMINAL. PATROL SHIPS' ELINT COLLECTION CAPABILITY WILL BE AUGMENTED BY USN 467P ELINT OPER. WILL COORDINATE SIGINT COLLECTION TASKS FOR USN 467P AND, UNLESS OTHERWISE ADVISED, WILL BE GUIDED BY AUG DESOTO COLLECTION ASSIGNMENTS.

4. REQUEST APPROPRIATE SIGINT STAS BE TASKED TO SUPPORT DESOTO PATROL. ALL MSGS IN SUPPORT OF DESOTO PATROL SHOULD BE ADDRESSED DIRECTLY TO USN 467P USING __________ AS CRITICOM ROUTING INDICATOR AND FLALED "DESGTO SUPPORT" IN ADDITION TO USN 467P, ENSURE ALL SIGINT PRODUCT CONTAINING REFLECTIONS/REACTIONS TO DESOTO PATROL INCLUDE CINCPACFLT, COMSEVENTHFLT, CTF 77, COMNAVFORJAPAN AND COMNAVPHIL AS ADEES.
TOP SECRET

SURFACE SURVEILLANCE (DESOLO PATROL)

1. THIS MSG TO ADVISE PLANS FOR SURFACE SURVEILLANCE OPERATION IN GULF OF TONKIN AREA. PATROL WILL BE CONDUCTED BY USS MORTON (DD-948) AND ONE OTHER DESTROYER WITH CMEDR DESTROYER DIV 52 EMBARKED. PATROL
TO: TO BE HELD 15 TO 18 SEPTEMBER (SAIGON TIME). COMINT COLLECTION TEAM USN-467P WILL BE EMBARKED. 2. AREA OF OPERATION. MORTON WILL CONDUCT RANDOM PATROL ALONG FOLLOWING TRACK:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POINT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALFA</td>
<td>17.10N 107.43E</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELTA</td>
<td>18.42N 106.11E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>19.23N 106.1E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOXTROT</td>
<td>19.50N 106.30E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOLF</td>
<td>20.08N 107.00E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTEL</td>
<td>20.26N 107.30E</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PATROL WILL MOVE INTO COASTAL TRACK ONE HOUR AFTER SUNRISE AND RETURN TO SEA ONE HOUR BEFORE SUNSET AND DURING PERIODS OF REDUCED VISIBILITY.

PATROL WILL REMAIN 2% NM OFF NORTH VIETNAMESE MAINLAND AND 12 NM FROM OFFSHORE ISLANDS. AIR COVERAGE WILL BE PROVIDED BY U.S. CARRIERS.

3. ANTICIPATE THIS PATROL MAY GENERATE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST REACTIONS. IN THIS REGARD, U.S. ACTION ADDRESSES FORWARD: SIGINT REPORTS CONTAINING:

A. ALL SIGNIFICANT REFLECTIONS/REACTIONS TO
FROM: [REDACTED]

TO: [REDACTED]

THIS OPERATION IN ESTABLISHED VEHICLES AT APPROPRIATE PRECEDENCE ENSURING THAT ONI, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, COMSEVENTHFLT, USN-467P, CTF 77, COMNAVPHIL, [REDACTED] AND COMNAVFOR JAPAN ARE AMONG ADDRESSES (WILL ADD CTF 77 TO TECHINS 4003 LATER). USE ROUTING INDICATOR FOR USN-467P. B. ANY ROUTINE TECH SUPPORT DATA FOR EMBARKED TEAM (AFTER PATROL HAS COMMENCED), BY APPROPRIATE PRECEDENCE TO USN-467P USING [REDACTED] AS CRITICAL ROUTING INDICATOR. KEEP MSG VOLUME TO ESSENTIAL MINIMUM AND FLAG ALL MSGS QTE DESOTO SUPPORT UNQTE, AND INFOR DIRNSA, [REDACTED] AND OTHER ADDRESSES AS APPROPRIATE.

4. FOR REQUEST FORWARD REFLECTIONS AS ABOVE

CONCUR: [REDACTED] SHOWN TO: ADNSG

M/R: This message forwards information concerning USS MORTON (DD-948) DESOTO patrol from 15 to 18 September.
ACTION PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY
INFO PRECEDENCE
SPECIAL HANDLING
COMINT CHANNELS

FROM: DIRNSA
TO: JCS, JRC

TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS—
P21/0354
ACRP/DESOTO PATROL

REF MY 0920402, P214/0332

IN VIEW DESOTO PATROL SCHEDULED IN GULF OF TONKIN 15 TO 18 SEPTEMBER, SUGGEST JCS/JRC ACTION TO PROVIDE QUEEN BEE DELTA COLLECTION FROM JVLF ORBIT (18TH TO 20TH PARALLELS) DURING DESOTO OPERATIONS. JUSTIFICATION CONTAINED IN REFERENCE PARTICULARLY PERTINENT DURING SCHEDULED NAVAL PATROL. VHF COMMUNICATIONS FROM AIR ACTIVITIES IN HANOI AREAS, AS WELL AS FROM ACTIVITIES, POTENTIALLY VITAL DURING THAT PERIOD.

M/R: Reference contains airborne collection requirements in the Gulf of Tonkin and stresses the importance of VHF communications from airfields in and in North Viet Nam. Such communications could have great significance during the time of the DeSoto Patrol. This action concurred in by Chief, B2.
HEREWITH IS COLLECTION GUIDANCE FOR USN-467 PAPA DESOTO PATROL.

PART ONE: PRIMARY TARGETS

A. NORTH VIETNAMESE VOICE
   1. SEARCH 100-150 MC VHF WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON FIGHTER
      ACTIVITY AND GROUND CONTROLLERS FROM THE FOLLOWING AIRFIELDS/
      AREAS IN NORTH VIETNAM. AS MANY AS FOUR

DIFFERENT FREQUENCIES IN THE ABOVE BAND CAN BE EMPLOYED AT ONE TIME:
SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON AIRCRAFT OPERATING ON 5.3, 101.25, 118.1, 125, 125.25, 129, 129.5, 143.25 AND 143 MC. PROBABLY ACTIVE BETWEEN 2300-1500Z (VHTS 5@1@6 APPLIES IN PART).

2. SEARCH FOR VHN NAVAL R/T (SHIP TO SHIP, SHIP TO SHORE). VHN PATROL BOATS EMPLOY 607 (1.5 - 12 MC AM) AND 609 (100-156 MC AM) TYPE RADIOS. SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON DRV NAVAL FAST PATROL BOATS NOTED JULY-AUG 64 OPERATING ON 131.20 AND 131.5 MC. BOATS WERE USING TACTICAL CALLS COMPRISING TWO-PART PLACE NAMES (E.G., NAM DINH CALLING SONG CA). REFERENCES TO USE OF 5.828 AND 125 MC HAVE ALSO BEEN NOTED. FISHING FLEET TRAWLERS EMPLOY HF VOICE IN 3 MC RANGE.
4. SEARCH 50 - 1,000 MC FOR GCI, AIR WARNING AND AAA COMMUNICATIONS PROBABLY ON SINGLE CHANNEL VOICE. POSSIBLE THAT SOME MULTICHANNEL ACTIVITY WILL BE HEARD. CALLSIGNS CAN BE CODE WORD OR TWO DIGIT.

B. NORTH VIETNAMESE

1. VH NAVY

VHNB 50109 (NAVAL TRACKING NET), FREQ RANGE 2,600-7,700 KC.

OBJECTIVE IS TO LOCATE OUTSTATIONS COPS AND TRACKING STATIONS.

2. AIR WARNING/DEFENSE

AAA - ASSOC (VHZB 50113). SUB-FILTER CENTERS TO MAIN FILTER ENTER (VHZB 50112). MIL REGION FOUR (SOUTHERN DRV) RADAR TRACKING FACILITIES (VHZB 50602), DELTA AREA COUNTERPART (VHZB 50119, 50120).
PART TWO: SECONDARY TARGETS. SEARCH FOR AFTER PRIMARY TARGETS ON A TIME AVAILABLE BASIS.

B. NORTH VIETNAMESE VOICE/MULTICHANNEL

1. VH GROUND FORCES UNITS EMPLOY BOTH HV/VHF R/T.
TO: RIVER DELTA (APPROX 19:30N TO 20:30N). MAY USE R109 (21 - 28.5 MC FM) WITH MORSE STANDBY COMMUNICATIONS.

2. SEARCH FOR LOW LEVEL DRV AND VC VOICE 20 - 88 MC (FM).

3. VH

THESE TRANSMISSIONS ARE BELIEVED TO BE EMANATING FROM AT LEAST THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF NORTH VIETNAM AND POSSIBLY VINH LINH.

PART THREE: ELINT NORTH VIETNAMESE

1. CONDUCT GENERAL SEARCH THROUGHOUT FREQUENCY RANGE 50 - 10, 750 MC: RECORD ANY NEW OR UNUSUAL SIGNALS AT HIGHEST SPEED AVAILABLE.

2. SEARCH FOR TRANSMISSIONS 595 - 625 MC. BQ99 TRANSMISSIONS FROM PROBABLY WERE INTERCEPTED BY AN AIRBORNE COMMUNICATION RECONNAISSANCE PLATFORM ON 8/11 SEPTEMBER.

3. REQUEST COMINT ALERT ELINT WHEN COP'S NOTED PASSING SIGHTING REPORTS TO DETERMINE TYPES OF RADARS UTILIZED TO TRACK TARGETS OR WHEN VESSELS OBSERVED IN VICINITY OF DESOTO.

PART FOUR: TECH SUPPORT TO BE SENT DIRECTLY TO USN-467P (USE
SECRET KIMBO

TO:
ROUTINE INDICATOR □ □ AS FOLLOWS:

1. FOR □ PROVIDE TECH SUPPORT □
2. FOR □ PROVIDE TECH SUPPORT ON VHN TARGETS TO INCLUDE VHN TEXTA AND □ CRYPTO SYSTEM DATA. ALSO PASS LOCATIONS OF SURFACE SEARCH RADAR TRACKING COP'S FOR EMPHASIS ON ELINT COLLECTION.
3. FOR □ REQUEST PROVIDE NECESSARY TECH SUPPORT SPECIFICALLY INCLUDING VHTS/VHZB/VHAB TEXTA.

PART FIVE:
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORWARDING/EVALUATING OF ABOVE INTERCEPT TO FOLLOW.

SECRETKIMBO
SECRET KIMBO

B205/354-64

SUBJECT: REPORTING OF COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO FORTHCOMING GULF OF TONKIN DESOTO PATROL.

REF P214/0353/112117Z

1. CANNOT, OF COURSE, PREDICT DRV REACTION TO FORTHCOMING DESOTO PATROL IN GULF OF TONKIN, BUT, ASSUMING SITUATION SIMILAR TO 2-4 AUGUST PATROL COULD ARISE, WISH TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF EXPERIENCE GAINED DURING THAT CRISIS.
TO:

2. FOR USN-27J: REQUEST YOU ACCOMPLISH COMINT PRODUCT REPORTING IAW ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES. DURING CRISIS USN-414 AT ISSUED MULTITUDE OF MESSAGE EXTRACTS WHICH WOULD HAVE SERVED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITIES NEEDS BETTER HAD THEY BEEN REDUCED/CONVERTED TO NORMAL PRODUCT. SIGINT PRODUCERS NEEDS BEST MET THEN BY ELECTRICAL FORWARDING OF ACTUAL MESSAGES AS TECHNICAL FOLLOW-UPS TO SERIALIZE PRODUCT REPORTS. NOT CERTAIN BUT BELIEVE USN-414 AT ACTION MAY HAVE BEEN DUE TO THEIR BELIEF SUCH FORWARDING NECESSARY IN SUPPORT OF SSG/SOG KITKAT RESPONSIBILITIES. DO NOT BELIEVE REFLECTIONS/REACTIONS TO DESOTO PATROL REQUIRE REPORTING IN KITKAT CHANNELS. NEEDS # REP VIETNAM AND COMUSMACV FOR THESE REFLECTIONS/REACTIONS CAN BE SATISFIED BY REGULAR SERIALIZE PRODUCT REPORTING. REQUEST NSAPAC REP VIETNAM CONFIRM THIS BY RETURN MESSAGE.

3. FOR REQUEST EVERY EFFORT BE MADE TO PROVIDE FASTEST ELECTRICAL FORWARDING POSSIBLE OF FULL TECH DETAILS OF RELEVANT INTERCEPT ACCOMPLISHED BY QUEEN BEE DELTA. FOR EXAMPLE: DURING GENERAL PERIOD OF LAST GULF OF TONKIN CRISIS
TO:

QUEEN BEE DELTA HEARD [ ] BASED FIGHTERS ACTIVE ON VHF AT SAME TIME RADAR TRACKING REPORTS SUGGESTED [ ] FIGHTERS WERE MOVING INTO NORTH VIETNAM. RECEIPT BY SIGINT PRODUCERS OF FULL TEXT TRANSCRIPT THIS FIGHTER VOICE ACTIVITY WITH MINIMUM DELAY WOULD HAVE MATERIALLY ENHANCED OUR CAPABILITY TO ACCURATELY REPORT RAPIDLY DEVELOPING EVENTS. REQUEST ALL TRANSCRIPTS WHEN ELECTRICALLY FORWARD: INCLUDE DIRNSA (DDI ICH AND ZAD), [ ] USA-32 AND [ ] ADDRESSES. PRECEDENCE OF FORWARDING AT YOUR DISCRETION BASED ON CRITICALITY OF SITUATION/DEVELOPMENTS. IF SIGINT PRODUCT ISSUED BY YOU FORWARD TRANSCRIPTS BY AT LEAST SAME PRECEDENCE AS USED FOR PRODUCT REPORT.

3. FOR USN-27: REQUEST YOU RESUME ISSUANCE OF DAILY CHICOM/DIV DIGEST - DESOTO PATROL (F05/1018/1316062 AUG APPLIES).

5. FOR [ ] IN THE EVENT OF ADDITIONAL FIGHTER MOVEMENTS FROM CHINA INTO NORTH VIETNAM
TO:

HOPEFUL MORE RAPID RESOLUTION OF MOVEMENTS/"FALSE" MOVEMENTS POSSIBLE THAN WAS SOMETIMES THE CASE DURING LAST CRISIS.

RAPID MOVEMENTS OF RELEVANT TECHNICAL DATA TO FOR ALL INDICATIONS APPARENT IN VH AIR MATERIAL AND TO FOR ALL INDICATIONS APPARENT IN AIR MATERIAL IS, OF COURSE, ESSENTIAL (REQUEST DIRNSA DDI IOH, AOH BE ADDEE ALL FORWARDING). DFCAR FOR VH AIR PROBLEM AS ESTABLISHED MY B205/303-64 SHOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IN THIS REGARD BUT IN EXTREMELY TENSE AND FAST MOVING SITUATION VERY TIMELY TECH FOLLOW-UP REPORTING TO SERIALIZE PRODUCT REPORTING ESSENTIAL WITH DFCAR, IN THIS SITUATION, PROVIDING ROUTINE DAILY WRAP-UP OF TECH DATA AND ACTIVITY IN ESTABLISHED, FORMATTED REPORT.

SUGGEST WHERE RESOLUTION OF ACTIVITY REQUIRES TECHNICAL JUDGMENT BASED ON BOTH VH AND AIR ACTIVITY MAXIMUM USE BE MADE BY OF TELECOM EXCHANGES. NSA WILL DO ALL POSSIBLE TO ASSIST IN THIS REGARD.

6. FOR ALL ADDRESSES IN DISTRIBUTION OF SIGINT PRODUCT CONTAINING REFLECTIONS/REACTIONS TO DESOTO PATROL ESSENTIAL TO ASSURE THAT FOLLOWING ARE INCLUDED AS ADDRESSES (WRITING

SECRET KIMBO
DATE:

FROM: [omitted]

TO: [omitted]

IN WHERE NECESSARY):

USN-467 PAPA (USE ROUTING INDICATOR)

CINCPACFLT

COMSEVENTHFLT

CTF 77

COMNAVFORJAPAN

COMNAVPHIL

ALL CVA NSG-DETS WESTPAC

REQUEST [omitted] ADVISE ALL FIELD STATIONS NOT ADDRESSES TO
THIS MSG TO ASSURE INCLUSION THESE ADDRESSES IN ANY SIGINT
PRODUCT THEY MAY ISSUE RELATING TO DESOTO PATROL. ALL
MESSAGES SENT IN SUPPORT OF DESOTO PATROL MUST BE SENT TO
USN-467 PAPA (ROUTING INDICATOR [omitted] FLAGGED "DESOTO
SUPPORT". INCLUDE, AS INFO ADDRESSES ALL SUCH SUPPORT
MESSAGES: USN-27,

[omitted]

M/R: This message provides general reporting guidance to
field units for forthcoming DeSoto Patrol in Gulf of Tonkin.
SUBJECT. POSITION REPORTS FROM DESOTO PATROL

1. Our SIGINT support to the Desoto Patrol itself, and to the intelligence community at large, could be substantially enhanced by receipt of periodic position reports of Desoto Patrol vessels. Ideal would be hourly position reports for both destroyers. If selected field stations could be in receipt such reports on timely basis correlation of this information with sighting reports passed on various north Vietnamese communications could then readily be made. It would then be possible to know with virtual certainty that communist sightings, and indicated intention to counter the sighted vessel, was a reference to the Desoto Patrol.
TO: VESSELS AS OPPOSED TO ANY/ALL OTHER VESSELS ON WHICH SIGHTING REPORTS ARE ROUTINELY PASSED AND INTERCEPTED.

2. STATIONS/PROCESSING CENTERS WITH TIMELY NEED FOR THE INFORMATION ARE: ____________ DIRNSA, USN-27, USN-27J, ____________ USA-32, ____________ALTHO AT LEAST HOURLY POSITION REPORTS PREFERRED, REGULAR POSITION REPORTS AT LONGER TIME INTERVALS WOULD BE HELPFUL IF HOURLY REPORTS TOO BURDENSOME OR OTHERWISE NOT POSSIBLE.

3. IF YOU CONCUR, REQUEST NECESSARY ACTION TO PROVIDE COMMENCING WITH ARRIVAL AT BEGINNING OF TRACK ON 15 SEP.

M/R: This message requests CINCPAC to arrange for hourly position reports on DeSoto Patrol vessels in order that maximum SIGINT support can be provided.
SUBJ: 15-18 SEPTEMBER DESOTO PATROL IN GULF OF TONKIN

FOLLOWING ALTERS TRACK INDICATED IN MY P214/0353/112117Z:

PATROL WILL BE CONDUCTED IAW FOLLOWING ITINERARY (TRACK AS
STATED IN P214/0353 EXCEPT FOR POINTS GOLF AND HOTEL WHICH WILL
NOT BE USED):

(1) D DAY – 15 SEPTEMBER: COMMENCE PATROL. PATROL BETWEEN points ALFA,
BRAVO, CHARLIE AND DELTA.

(2) E DAY PLUS ONE: PATROL BETWEEN POINTS DELTA, ECHO AND FOXTROT

(3) D DAY PLUS TWO: PATROL BETWEEN POINTS DELTA, CHARLIE, BRAVO
TO:

AND ALFA. WITHDRAW FROM GULF OF TONKIN AND TERMINATE PATROL.

PATROL IS TO BE ADJUSTED AT THE DISCRETION OF THE

PATROL COMMANDER IN ORDER TO EFFECT PATROL AS DESCRIBED ABOVE AND

YET ALLOW FOR MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY TIMEWISE TOWARDS MAXIMUM ALL

SOURCE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION.

M/R: Provides information needed by field stations and processing
centers regarding track to be used by Gulf of Tonkin Desoto Patrol
which is to commence on 15 September Saigon Time.
TOP SECRET
ZSL DESPS139U253Ø
RUEPCR
DE RUEPCR Ø65 13/184ØZ
Z 131836Ø ZFF3
FM JCS
TO RUHPA/CINCPAC
INFO ZEM/CNO
RUHPB/CINCPACFLT
RUATUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUEHCR/AMEMB SAIGON
RUEMCR/CTF 77
CUMCCR/CTG 77.6
RUEMCR/COMDESDIV P2
RUECCR/ USS MORTON
RUECCR/ USS RICHARD S EDWARDS
BT

TOP SECRET JCS 86Ø9 CHAIRMAN SENDS

SUBJECT: DESOTO PATROL

REFERENCE: 8518-64 DTG 1Ø/23392 SEP (NOTAL)

1. AS RESULT OF HIGH LEVEL WASHINGTON CONFERENCE ON
SITUATION SVN, IT IS DESIRED THAT CAPABILITY TO POST-
PONE SCHEDULED DESOTO PATROL BE ESTABLISHED. DECISION
TO PROCEED OR POSTPONE WILL BE TAKEN IN WASHINGTON BY
18ØØ HOURS EASTERN DAYLIGHT TIME 14 SEPTEMBER.

2. REQUEST YOU ESTABLISH POSITIVE CONTROL AND ADVISE
LATEST TIME YOU MUST HAVE DECISION IN ORDER FOR
PATROL TO WITHDRAW PRIOR TO REACHING POINT ALPHA.

BT

TOP SECRET
SECRET KIMBO

DE THLANA 14/0625Z SEP

ZKZK PP SOA DE
P 14/0623Z
FM CINCPAC
TO DIRNSA
CINCPACFLT
INFO DIRNAVSECGRUPAC

NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (g)

USN-27
USN-27J
SUSLO (M)
HQ NSAPAC

NSAPAC REP PHIL

USA-32

ZRM

SECRET KIMBO. DESOTO PATROL - GULF OF TONKIN

A. DIRNSA B205/06-64 DTG 122020Z

1. REP A SUGGESTED DESOTO PATROL MAKE HOURLY POSIT REPORTS
   IF POSSIBLE IN ORDER RELATE THEM WITH COMMUNIST SIGHTING REPORTS
   AND INDICATED INTENTIONS TO COUNTER SIGHTED VESSEL.

2. DESOTO PATROL WILL OPERATE UNDER EMCON CONDITIONS DURING
   SOME PHASES OF PATROL NEGATING TRANSMISSION POSIT REPORTS DURING
   THESE PERIODS.

SECRET KIMBO
3. DESOTO PATROL UNITS EMBARKED COMINT CAPABILITY PERMITS RECEIPT OR VARIOUS SIGHTING REPORTS AND NVN \_\_\_\_\_ INTENTIONS. BASED ON THIS WOULD APPEAR THAT INFO DESIRED BY REF A COULD BE FULFILLED AS FOLLOWS:

A. DESOTO PATROL UNIT RECEIVES NVN \_\_\_\_ SIGHTING REPORTS AND EQUATES THEM WITH HER POSIT.

B. IF SIGHTING REPORT AND RELATED ENEMY INTENTION TO COUNTER MSG JIBES WITH DESOTO PATROL POSIT, DESOTO UNIT WILL BREAK EMCON AND GIVE POSIT, COURSE, AND SPEED WITH TIME TO ALCON PATRICULARLY ADDEES PROVIDING SIGINT SUPPORT.

C. IF SIGHTING REPORTS AND/OR NVN \_\_\_\_\_ INTENTION TO COUNTER MSGS DO NOT JIBE WITH DESOTO PATROL SHIP POSIT DESOTO UNIT WILL REMAIN SILENT. FROM THIS SILENCE INTERESTED ADDEES CAN DEDUCE THAT SIGHTING REPORT AND/OR NVN \_\_\_\_\_ INTENTION TO COUNTER DO NOT EQUATE WITH DESOTO.

D. WHENEVER DESOTO UNIT IS REQUIRED TO TRANSMIT SHE WILL INCLUDE HER POSIT, COURSE, SPEED, AND TIME.

4. BELIEVE PROCEDURE OUTLINED IN PARA WILL MEET REQUIREMENT IN REF A.

5. FOR CINCPACFLT. REQUEST DESOTO UNIT CARRY OUT INTENT OF PARA ABOVE.
TOP SECRET

DE RUEPCR Ø6 14/1955Z
Z 141952Z ZFF6
FM JCS
TO RUHPA/CINCPAC
INFO ZEN/CNO
RUHPB/CINCPACFLT
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUATZL/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUEPCR/DIRNSA
RUEPIA/CIA
RUEHCR/AMEMB SAIGON
RUMFUI/CTG 77
RUMGCR/CTG 77.6
RUMGCR/COMDESDIV 52
RUMGCR/ USS MORTON
RUMGCR/ USS RICHARD S. EDWARDS
RUEPWW/ WHITE HOUSE
ZEN/SECDEF
RUEHCR/STATE DEPT

BT

TOP SECRET JCS 8625 JCS SENDS.

SUBJECT: DESOTO PATROL
REF: JCS 8609 DTG 131836Z

DECISION IS TO PROCEED WITH EXECUTION OF DESOTO PATROL,

HOWEVER, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED DELAY EXECUTION OF PATROL UP
TO 24 HOURS. REQUEST YOU ADVISE JCS IF LONGER DELAY IS
REQUIRED AND WHEN PATROL COMMENCES. GFS.

BT
DE RUEPWW 130 15/1855Z
O 151854Z
FM JCS
INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPCR/NSA
RUEHCR/STATE
RUEPIA/CIA
O 151155Z
FM CTU 77.6.6
TO AIG 181
ZEN/CTF 77
ZEN/CTG 77.6
INFO ZEN/TU 77.6.6
ZEN/CTF 76
RUWDAF/MOPHOTO PAC
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
ZEN/NAVCOMMSTA PHIL
RUMJIR/AMEMB SAIGON
BT

SECRET

DESGOTO PATROL OPSUM (S)
A. JCS 141952Z
B. CINCPACFLT 132311Z
C. COMSEVENTHFLT 120633Z
1. 152000H POSIT 16-55N 108-23E. BOTH SHIPS FUELED BY CTG 77.6
AND NOW HAVE 94 PER CENT ON BOARD. WEATHER AND SEA CONDITIONS
MUCH IMPROVED.
2. INTEND SET EMCON AT 152400H EXCEPT FOR ___ AND SURFACE RADAR NAVIGATIONAL SWEPS.

3. UNDIR INTEND CROSS LAT 17-00N AT 160600H AND COMMENCE ASSIGNED PATROL AT 160740H IN CONSONANCE WITH REFS ALFA, BRAVO, CHARLIE.

   OP=5

BT
SECRET KIMBO

B261/537/64

SUBJECT: DESOTO SUPPORT

1. IF INDICATIONS IN THE VHNAH-3 TRACKING CODE DURING THE UPCOMING DESOTO PATROL ARE COMPARABLE TO THE 31 JULY - 2 AUGUST PERIOD THE FIRST SURFACE RADAR TRACKING OF THE PATROL WILL BE REPORTED FROM VINH SON WHO IS PRESENTLY USING TX CALLSIGN C5VP. AS THE PATROL MOVES NORTH A RADAR STATION IN THE VICINITY OF CAP ST ANNE WITH TX CALLSIGN PSPJ AND AN OBSERVATION POST ON HON MATT WITH TX CALLSIGNS JB3K WILL PROBABLY REPORT ITS POSITION. (JB3K IS PROBABLY A VISUAL SIGHTING STATION.) AS THE PATROL MOVES NORTH A RADAR STATION AT MY DUC WITH TX CALL 9WPU WILL PROBABLY TRACK AND REPORT ITS POSITION, ETC.
2. WHEN THE INSTALLATION OF SURFACE RADAR WAS BEING PLANNED IT SEEMS THAT THE MILEAGE OF THE COASTLINE THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE BORDER WAS DIVIDED BY THE RELIABLE EFFECTIVE RANGE OF THE SURFACE RADAR TO BE ERECTED. THIS IS APPARENTLY CONFIRMED FROM THE DISTANCES BETWEEN KNOWN LOCATIONS OF THE SURFACE RADAR, VIZ., THE DISTANCE BETWEEN VINH SON AND A SITE IN THE VICINITY OF CAPE ST ANNE IS 70 MILES, AND FROM THIS SITE TO MY DUC IS 70 MILES, FROM MY DUC TO DO SON PENINSULA IS 70 MILES WITH EACH STATION OVERLAPPING THE ONE ON EITHER SIDE OF IT. THE RELIABLE EFFECTIVE RANGE FOR THIS TYPE OF RADAR IS APPROXIMATELY 35 MILES. THE DISTANCE FROM VINH SON TO THE 17TH PARALLEL IS 70 MILES BUT A SURFACE RADAR IS NOT IN THIS AREA EVEN THOUGH THE PATTERN OF KNOWN SURFACE RADAR STATION SITES SUGGESTS THAT ONE SHOULD BE LOCATED HERE. THE INSTALLATION OF SURFACE RADAR HERE MAY HAVE BEEN LEFT FOR A FUTURE DATE BECAUSE OF ITS PRESENT VULNERABILITY TO ATTACK FROM SOUTH VIETNAMESE JUST ACROSS THE BORDER. NOTHING IS KNOWN ABOUT NORTH VIETNAMESE SURFACE RADAR MOST INTERESTED IN COLLECTION OF ANY EMISSIONS FROM ISLE DU KERSAINT 21-22N 107-57E AND PERHAPS THE ISLAND OF KAOTO 21-01N 107-50E AND
3. There are additional radar sites other than those listed which are 70 miles apart, and because of land masses blocking the line of sight, a suspected site on Long Chau (Isle Norway) is logical because the radar line of sight from Do Son Peninsula is blocked by land for some ships entering Ha Long Bay.

4. In addition to radar, there are a few visual sighting cops but there do not seem to be more than 12 cops in operation by the North Vietnamese. Following are two previously unreported surface radar locations along with their transmitting calls:

   SOGI possibly on Do Son Peninsula 20°41'N 106°47'E
   ZSLH possibly on Isle Norway 20°37'N 107°10'E

5. The cops track their own patrol and torpedo boats as well as enemy ships. It can be determined from the messages how many boats...
TO:

ARE IN A GIVEN TARGET SIGHTING AND IF THE QUANTITY OF PATROL BOATS EXCEEDS THAT WHICH MIGHT BE CONSIDERED AS A ROUTINE SHADOWING OPERATION IT MAY INDICATE AN IMMINENT ATTACK. PRIOR TO THE ATTACK ON 2 AUGUST TRACKING MESSAGES GIVING THE MADDOX'S POSITION WERE IDENTIFIED WITH A DINOME OF 62 IN THE A2AB POSITION, THE DRV PT BOATS WERE IDENTIFIED WITH 58 AS A2AB, A GENERAL CATEGORIZATION OF NON WARSHIPS WAS IDENTIFIED WITH 00 AS A2AB

M/R: Support to forthcoming DeSoto Patrol. Priority precedence employed due to need for timeliness in receipt of this information.
TO: DIRNSA

INFO: DIRNAVSECRU
DIRNAVSECRUPAC
ASSTDIRNAVSECRU
CGUSASA

PACSCYTHN
APSS FM
HQ NSAPAC

USAFFF

USN-27J
USN-27
USM-626

DATE: 15 SEP 64

NSAPAC REP PHIL
PACOM ELINT CENTER
SUSLO (M)
NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (C)

CH ASAPAC
CINCPAC
ONI
CINCPACFLT
CONSEVENTHFLT
CTG-77
CORNAPHL

TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS

P214/0366

A. JCS 1516572 CITE 8663
B. MY 142942Z P055/292-64

1. REP ALFA REPORTS DESOTO PATROL NOW SCHEDULED TO COMMENCE OPERATION ONE HOUR AFTER SUNRISE 17 SEP LOCAL TIME.
TO:

2. PATROL WILL BE CONDUCTED ACCORDING TO THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POINT A</th>
<th>162348Z</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POINT D</td>
<td>170957Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POINT D</td>
<td>172344Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POINT F</td>
<td>180955Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POINT D</td>
<td>182344Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POINT A</td>
<td>190949Z</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M/R: Provides additional data on DESOTO Patrol.

TOP SECRET

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

TOP SECRET
SECRET KIMBO

P214/9371

SEPTEMBER DESOTO PATROL

FORWARDING/EVALUATION INSTRUCTIONS. FLAG ALL INTERCEPT DESOTO.

A. MM DISTRIBUTION:

(1) UNCODED COPIES 1 AND 2 TO NSA, ATTN: B22.

COPY 3 TO UNCODED

COPY 4 TO UNCODED

COPY 5 TO USN-27.

RETAIN REMAINDER.
TO:

(2) VH: COPIES 1 AND 2 TO NSA, ATTN: B26.
COPY 3 TO USM-626J
COPY 4 TO USM-9
COPY 5 (VRS/N) TO USN-27
COPY 6 TO USN-414

B. R/T MULTICHANNEL DISTRIBUTION:

(1) [Blank] ALL TAPES TO [Blank] ATTN: [Blank]
(2) VH: ALL [Blank] TO USM-626J, ALL [Blank] TO USA-32.

C. ALL ELINT MATERIAL TO PACOM ELINT CENTER.

D. FOR ALL: FOR PURPOSES OF THIS PATROL, REQUEST ANY ELECTRICAL CORRESPONDENCE WITH NSA INCLUDE DDI'S ZULU LIMA ALFA, ALFA OSCAR HOTEL AND HOTEL INDIA INDIA.

E. EVALUATION INSTRUCTIONS:

(2) FOR USM-626J/USA-32. UPON COMPLETION TRANSCRIBING, FORWARD
GIST ELECTRICALLY AND HARD COPIES OF TRANSCRIPTS TO DIRNSA, ATTN:
B26; ONE COPY TO ONE COPY TO USM-9; ONE COPY VHN/S TO
USN-27; ONE COPY VHA/T/V/Z TO USA-57. HOLD TAPES MINIMUM 90 DAYS
BEFORE ERASURE.
(3) FOR USM-626J: REQUEST YOU PROVIDE EVALUATION VHN INTERCEPT AS
EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE AFTER RECEIPT AND FORWARD ELECTRICALLY TO
DIRNSA, ATTN: P21, B26 AND NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (C).
(4) FOR REQUEST YOU PROVIDE EVALUATION VHA/T/V/Z INTERCEPT
AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE AFTER RECEIPT AND FORWARD ELECTRICALLY
TO DIRNSA, ATTN: P21, B26 AND NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (C).
(5) FOR USN-27: REQUEST YOU PROVIDE EVALUATION VHN/S INTERCEPT AS
EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE AFTER RECEIPT AND FORWARD ELECTRICALLY TO
DIRNSA, ATTN: P21, B26 AND NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (C).
(6) FOR PACOM ELINT CENTER: REQUEST EVALUATION DESOTO PATROL TAKE
UPON COMPLETION ANALYSIS. FORWARD TO DIRNSA, ATTN: C15, B22, B26,
NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (C) AND

SECRET—KIMBO

SECRET—KIMBO
TO: (7) FOR DIRNAVSECGRUPAC: REQUEST DIRNSA (P21, B22 AND B26) BE PROVIDED A COPY OF NAVSECGRUDET SIGINT OPERATIONS REPORT UPON COMPLETION OF PATROL

CONCUR: B2/4 TII (DDI's only) P215

SHOWN TO: ADNSG

M/H. This message provides forwarding and evaluation instruction for September DESOTO Patrol to units concerned.
SEF3E T KIMBO
B26/545/64
SUBJ: DESOTO SUPPORT
SECRET KIMBO

SECRET KIMBO
REQ YOU INCLUDE DATE-TIMES IN YOUR ELINT REPORT WHEN RADAR SIGNALS WERE FIRST INTERCEPTED AND TIME OF SHUTDOWN. THIS INFORMATION WILL FACILITATE THE PLACEMENT OF PRESENTLY UNLOCATED NAVAL SURFACE RADAR SITES

M/R: Furnishes timely support to current DeSoto patrol. Priority precedence employed due to imminent commencement of patrol.
SECRET KIMBO

TO: USA-32
USN-467P
USA-37

INFO: PAGSCYRGN
DIRNAVSEGGRUPAC

SECRET KIMBO

DESO PO SUPPORT

F214/4676 (USA-37 PASS TO _____ FOR ACTION)

RECENT VHF INTERCEPT INDICATES _____ TORPEDO BOATS

REQUEST YOU MONITOR THESE FREQUENCIES DURING FORTHCOMING DESOTO PATROL FOR POSSIBLE _____ NAVAL ACTIVITY

SHOWN TO: AFSS FM, ADNSG,

M/R. This message provides appropriate field stations with further technical support for the DESOTO Patrol beginning on 17 September in the Gulf of Tonkin. No concurrence necessary. Submitted by B2051.
DE 17 17/0315Z SEP
R 17/0315Z
FM USN-27J
TO QUEBEC ONE/CHARLIE
AFSSO SAC
AFSSO CONAD
AFSSO TAC
COMNAVFORJAPAN
USN 467P
COMNAVPHIL
COMTAIWANDEFUS/US
CTG 77
ZEM

SECRET KIMBO

DESOLO SUPPORT
2/Q1/VHN/R07-64 RPT 2/Q1/VHN/R07-64. ST 220 SPOT REPORT
POSS ALERT OF DRV NAVAL FORCES
MESSAGES PASSED BY NORTHERN FLEET ACTY POSS BAI CHAY TO ALL
STATIONS AND SHIPS FROM U/I ENTITY/PERSOAILITY INTERCEPTED
17/0212Z, ALERTED AGAINST SHORELINE PROVOCATION AND CAUTIONED
AGAINST ENEMY ATTACK BY AIR OR SEA.
SOGT PATROL OPSUM (S)

A. COMSEVENTHFLT 120633Z

1. COMMENCED PATROL IN ACCORD REF A. PASSED THROUGH POINT ALFA 170736H.

L23 NOTE: DTG 120633Z IS NOT LOCATED L23 OR T1

SECRET

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.
SECRET KIMBO

DE 29 17/0514Z SEP
ZKZK 22 HHA NRL DE
Z 170515Z ZYH
FM USN 27J
TO QUEBEC NE/CHARLIE

AFSSO SAC
AFSSO CONAD
AFSSO TAC

COMNAVFOR JAPAN
USN 467P
COMN PHIL
CONTAIWANDEFCOM/US
CTF 77
ZEN

SECRET KIMBO

DESEO SUPPORT
2/Q1/VHN/R10-64 RPT 2/Q1/VHN/R10-64 ST220
FOLLOWUP NR Ø2 TO 2/Q1/VHN/R07-64, SPOT REPORT DTG 170315Z
POSS ALERT OF DRV NAVAL FORCES
1. BADLY GARBLED MSG PASSED BY PORT GIANH AT 170402Z TO

SWATOW PGM-259 AND DET 2 (SOUTHERN FLEET ENTITIES) MAKES
REFERENCES TO:

QTE DIRECTION 99 ((DEGREES)) UNQTE, QTE SPEED 18 UNQTE, QTE
ALERT RANK 1 UNQTE, QTE THAN LE (U/I, UNLOCATED) TO MOBILIZE AND
WAIT IN THE AREA UNQTE.

SECRET KIMBO
SECRET KIMBO

A MSG INTERCEPTED 170420Z TO NORTHERN FLEET SWATOW PGM, POSS T-142, FROM NORTHERN FLEET ACTY, PBNSHR CHAZ MYMZTVTFD QTE AQIT IN AREA, CAMOUFLAGE AND MUCFLNRE.I,153. ADDTL GARbled EXTRACTS AS FOLLOWS: THE ENEMY HAS ((1GRU)) PROVOKED LF ATTACK US BY SEA AND AIR. ((1GRU)) DURING 17 AND 18 SEP.
SECRET KIMBO

Φ722Z 17 SEP 64
NR 29  CK 62  17 SEP 1355G

TO SUB-UNIT 2, 253, (2grG), 259. AT PRESENT THERE ARE TWO DESTROYERS AT A DISTANCE OF 25 NAUTICAL MILES GOING VERY SLOW XGM HAVE 1 AIRCRAFT CARRIER.

9AXZ/S2CI DE JI2U 3684M Φ722Z 17SEP
S2CI DE JI2U 3685M Φ724Z 17 SEP
SECRET–KIMBO

DE 48 17/0832Z SEP

ZKZX 00 HHA DE
O 170802 ZTH 170830Z

FM USN-27J

TO QUEBEC ONE/CHARLIE

APSSO SAC
APSSO CONAD
APSSO TAC

COMNAVFORJAPAN

USN 467P

COMTAIWANDEFCOM/US

CTF 77

ZEM

SECRET–KIMBO

DESOOTO SUPPORT

2/Q1/VNH/R12-64 RPT 2/Q1VHN/R12-64, ST22Z

FOLLOWUP NR ONE TO 2/Q1/VHN/R07-64. ST PT RPT DTG-170315Z

POSS ALERT OF DRV NAVAL FORCES

1. MSG PASSED BY SOUTHERN FLEET NAVAL ACTY PORT GIANH TO
DET 2, YP T-25 AND SWATOW PGM 259 AT 0714Z, DIRECTED ALL
STATIONS TO QTE SET GRADE 1 ALERT UNQTE.

2. DRV SOUTHERN FLEET DET 6 AND 7 WERE ADVISED BY SOUTHERN
FLEET ACTY, POSS BEN THUY, THAT 2 ENEMY DESTROYERS QTE
APPEARED UNQTE 22NM OFF SON ZWONG ISLAND (18.06N 106.27E)
AT 0452Z. ADDRESSEES WERE DIRECTED TO QTE REENFORCE ((1CR U)) –BE
ALERT–FIERCELY STABLE. COMMUNICATE WITH K (U/I COMMAND AUTHORITY,
PORT WALLUT) UNQTE. GARbled PORTION SAME MSG CONTAINED QTE NORTH
THERE ARE MANY SUPPORT AIRCRAFT UNQTE.

SECRET–KIMBO–
SECRET KIMBO

COMMENT: THE IDENTITY OF THE AIRCRAFT WAS NOT GIVEN.

25Ø
SECRET KIMBO

ZZ

DE 6-17/1214Z SEP

ZKZK ZZ NRL SOA DE
Z 170845Z
FM USN-467P
TO DIA
CNO
CINCPAC
CINCPACFLT
COMUSTDC
COMSEVENTHFLT
COMNAVFORJAPAN
CTF 72
DIRNAVSECGRU
DIRNAVSECGRUPAC
DIRNSA
JCS
USN-27
USN-27J
ZEM

SECRET KIMBO

SPOT INTELLIGENCE ITEM

1. FOL PARTIALLY GARBLED MSG PASSED AT 0810Z FROM VINH SON TO BEN THUY:
   QUOTE TO SUB UNIT SIX (ONE GRU GARBLED) RECEIVED ORDERS TO POSTPONE THE
   BATTLE UNQUOTE.

SECRET KIMBO
SECRET KIMBO

DE 125B 17/1109Z SEP
ZKZK 00 HHA NNN NRL DE
O 171110Z ZTH
FM USN 27
TO DIST QUEBEC/MIKE
PLUS
USN 27
USN 467P
ZEM

SECRET KIMBO

2/Q/VHN/R100-64 ST220 RPT 2/Q/VHN/R100-64 ST220
FOLLOW-UP NR 01 TO USN 27 2/Q/VHN/R07-64 SPOT REPORT
POSSIBLE ALERT OF DRV NAVAL FORCES
SUBSEQUENT RELAY (TOI 179232) OF PREVIOUSLY REPORTED MSG IDENT
THE OBJECTS UNDER DRV SURVEILLANCE AS QTE TWO
DESTROYERS UNQTE AND INDICATES THE TIME OF SIGHTING AS
1020G (0320Z). ALTHOUGH UNIDENTIFIED, THE OBSERVATION WAS
PROBABLY TAKEN BY VINH SON THUS LOCATING THE PATROL AT
APPROXIMATELY 17-52N 105-5 (NEAR POINT BRAVO) AT
THE TIME OF SIGHTING.

COMMENTS: CURRENTLY AVAILABLE DRV NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPT
HAS REFLECTED KNOWLEDGE OF THE PATROL'S PRESENCE OFF THE
VIETNAMESE COAST. HOWEVER, EXCEPT FOR THE MESSAGE REPORTED
ABOVE WHICH WAS RELAYED ON NAVAL TRACKING FACILITIES, THE
TRACKING NET CONTINUES TO BE PRACTICALLY NIL HEARD. COMINT
TENDS TO INDICATE THAT THE DRV HAS ADOPTED A DEFENSIVE
RATHER THAN OFFENSIVE POSTURE BUT ARE "PREPARED FOR COMBAT" (B).
SECRET KIMBO

B205/318-64

REF USN-467P SPOT INTELLIGENCE ITEM DTG 170845Z. REQUEST IMMEDIATE ACTION TO CONFIRM/DENY 0810Z INTERCEPT REPORTED CITED ITEM, FROM INTERCEPT ACCOMPLISHED YOUR STATION. ALSO REQUEST THOROUGH SEARCH ALL INTERCEPT FOR ANY RELATED/RELEVANT ITEMS. REPLY BY FLASH PRECEDENCE TO ADDEES USN-467P SPOT INTELL ITEM US COMUSMACV AND NSA REP VIETNAM. NEGATIVE REPLY REQUIRED.
SECRET KIMBO

ZKZK ZZ HHS DEZPC451

ZZ

DE 87 17/1630Z SEP

ZKZK ZZ NRL SOA DE

Z 171630Z ZTH

FM USN 27J

TO USN 467P

DIA

CNO

CINCPAC

CINCPACFLT

COMUSTDC

COMSEVENTHFLT

COMNAVFORJAPAN

CTF 72

DIRNAVSECGRU

DIRNAVSECGRUPAC

DIRNSA

JCS

USN 27

COMUSMACV

NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (O)

ZEM

SECRET KIMBO

A. USN-467P SPOT INTEL ITEM 170845Z

SECRET KIMBO
SECRET KIMBO

B. USN 27J FOLLOW-UP NR 85 TO 2/QL/VHN/R DTG 170853Z NOTAL

C. DIRNSA B205/318-64 DTG 171521Z

1. MSG REPORTED INTERCEPTED REF ALFA WAS VERSION REF BRAVO
   INTERCEPTED THIS STA AT 170832Z.

2. REF BRAVO USES QTE INH UNQTE AS SIGNATURE. SEARCH CONFIRMED
   THIS PERSONALITY TO BE LINKED WITH SOUTHERN FLEET ACTIVITY IN
   THE PAST. BELIEVE USE OF QTE DINH UNQTE TO MEAN POSTPONE AS
   REPORTED REF ALFA INCORRECT IN THIS INSTANCE, DUE TO LOCATION
   IN SENTENCE STRUCTURE.

3. FOL IS USN 27J VERSION REPORTED REF BRAVO QTE:
   TO DETACHMENT 6 ((1GR U)) RECEIVE ORDER ((POSS TO FIGHT))
   DINH ((U/I PERSONALITY))

   COMMENT: UNRECOVERED GRP BELIEVED TO MEAN QTE HAVE NOT YET UNQTE.
   UNQTE.

4. NO RELATED ITEMS NOTED THIS MSG.

220
SECRET

DE 178B 17/1646Z
ZE 171648Z ZTH
FM USN 27
TO DIRNSA
USN 27J
INFO DIA
CNO
CINCPAC
CINCPACFLT
COMUSTDC
COMSEVENTHFLT
COMNAVFORJAPAN
CTF 72
DIRNAVSECECU
DIRNAVSECEGRUPAC
JCS

USM 9
NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (C)
COMUSMACV
ZEM
SECRET COMINT CHANNELS

A. DIRNSA B205/318-64; DTG 171521Z
1. RAW TFC INTERCEPT JUST RECEIVED USN-27J TOI 170832Z

SECRET
SECRET

REAFFIRMS USN-467P SPOT INTELL ITEM WHEN AN UNIDENT
SOUTHERN FLEET ENTITY STATED QTE SUB-UNIT 6 ACKNOWLEDGED
THE ORDER TO POSTPONE THE BATTLE UNQTE.

2. ONLY OTHER RELATED ITEM MAKING MENTION OF BATTLE WAS
INTERCEPTED ON SHIPPING COMMS REPORTED MY 2/Q/VHS/R44-64
DTG 17/0938Z RE-QUOTED FYI: AIR DEFENSE HQS SENDS ((2GR G))
ESPECIALLY REINFORCE THE BORDER IN ORDER TO DEFEND
AGAINST ENEMY ACTIVITIES IN THE AIR AND ON THE OCEAN. BE
PREPARED FOR COMBAT.

3. REMAINING INTERCEPT INDICATES DRV MAINTAINING
DEFENSIVE VICE OFFENSIVE POSTURE.

210
DATE: 17 SEPT 64

TO: USN-27J
USA-32
USA-57
USM-626J

INFO: HQ NSAPAC
NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (C)
DIRNAVSECRU
USAFSS

SUBJ: TECH BACK-UP TO REPORTING ON DESOTO PATROL

FURTHER MY B205/319-64 AND REF USN-467P SPOT INTELL ITEM

DTG 170845Z NOTAL.

1. MUST AGAIN EMPHASIZE NEED FOR REPORTING, VIA TECH SUPPLEMENT TO SERIALIZED PRODUCT, THE BASIS ON WHICH PRODUCT WAS FORMED.

2. FOR EXAMPLE: ALTHO CANNOT ASK U.S.S. MORTON TO TRANSMIT TECH BACK-UP MATERIAL THE DESIRABILITY OF USN-27J/USN-27/NSA POSSESSION, ON MOST TIMELY BASIS, OF ACTUAL RAW TRAFFIC FORMING BASIS FOR USN-467P SPOT INTELL ITEM IS OBVIOUS. BY SAME TOKEN USN-27/NSA POSSESSION OF RAW TRAFFIC (ACTUAL MSGS ETC) FORMING BASIS FOR THE TWO USN-27J SPOT REPORTS AND SPOT SUPPLEMENTS ALREADY ISSUED ON CURRENT DESOTO PATROL.

D. C. LANG, LTCOL, USAF, CH B205/517AD
C. LANG, LTCOL, USAF, CH B205/517AD

SECRET

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
IS ALSO OBVIOUS.

3. AGAIN URGENTLY RESTATE REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL PRODUCERS OF SIGINT PRODUCT RELATING TO CURRENT DESOTO PATROL TO FORWARD VIA SAME PRECEDENCE AS PRODUCT REPORT ITSELF THE REQUIRED TECHNICAL INFORMATION IN FORM OF TECH SUPPLEMENTS IAW SECTION IV, PARA 5 BRAVO OF TECHINS 414.

4. FOR USN-27J: REQUEST YOU IMMEDIATELY FORWARD TECH SUPPLEMENTS FOR YOUR TWO SPOT REPORTS (AND SUPPLEMENTS) VIA IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE IAW TECHINS 414

M/R: Field stations have not been, and are not now, adhering to the requirements of TECHINS 414 in the forwarding of technical back-up reports to their serialized product.
USN 467P
ZEM

SECRET KIMBO

2/Q/VHN/R101-64 ST220 RPT 2/Q/VHN/R101-64 ST220
FOLLOW UP NR 02 TO USN-27J 2/Q/VHN/R07-64 SPOT REPORT
POSS ALERT OF DRV NAVAL FORCES.

THERE ARE INDICATIONS OF A DRV NAVAL UNIT IN THE
VICINITY OF 18-53N 105-34E. AT 17055Z AN UNIDENT
STATION INFORMED A COMRADE THU AND SUB-UNIT SEVEN TO
ALLOW THE UNIT TO GO UP TO YUAN ZUONG (18-53N 105-34E).
THIS POSITION WAS POINTED OUT TO BE ALONG THE SOUTHERN
BANK AND 2.7 NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE UNIT'S PRESENT
POSITION.

COMMENT: THIS POSITION IS APPROX 30 MILES WNW OF
ENTRY POINT DELTA (18-42N 106-11E) OF DESOTO VESSEL AT
172344Z.

200
SECRET KIMBO

DE 77B 18/0533Z SEP
ZK2K Z2 SOA NRL DE
Z 180534Z ZTH
FM USN 27
TO DIA
CNO
CINCPAC
CINCPACFLT
COMUSKDC
COMSEVENTHFLT
COMNAVFORJAPAN
CTF 72
DIRNAVSECGRU
DIRNAVSECGRUPAC
DIRNSA
JCS

USN 27
USN 27J

COMUSKDC
CTG 77.6
CTG 77.7
CTF 77
ZEM
Z 180247Z ZTH

SECRET KIMBO
PM USN 467P
TO USN 27
ZEM

SECRET KIMBO

TITLE SPOT INTELLIGENCE

ITEM 1. FUP FOL PARTIALLY GARBLED MSG PASSED AT 0247Z FROM UNIDENT VESSEL TO UNIDENT SHORE BASED SHIPPING NET CONTROL STATION ("CAN SEE CLEARLY NR 946) AND (950. PREPARING FOR BATTLE. MET ANOTHER (X GRPS MISSED)1 /975 190 METERS) AWAY (CAN SEE CLEARLY 946) AND (590 PRESENTLY PREPARING TO (GARBLED) PLEASE INFORM THE DISTRICT OSCAR OSCAR PLEASE INFORM THE DISTRICT AND OSCAR OSCAR. DISTRICT 22800.

PARA 2. USS EDWARDS DELTA DELTA 905 AND USS MORTON DELTA DELTA 948 AT TIME OF INTERCEPT PASSED TWO FISHING VESSELS DISTANCE TWO THOUSAND YARDS. NO CRS CHANGES OR OVERT ACTIONS MADE.

SECRET KIMBO
SECRET KIMBO

00 YDRKDA YDRKDO YDRLDN YEKAXA YEKHDH
DE YMZDAH 55B 18/0348Z SFP
ZKZX 00 HHA NNN NRL DE
O 180350Z ZTH
FM USN 27
TO DIST QUEBEC/MIKE

PLUS USN 467P
ZEM
SECRET KIMBO
2/Q/VHN/R102-64 ST 220 RPT 2/Q/VHN/R102-64
FOLLOWUP NR @3 TO USN-27J 2/Q/VHN/R07-64 SPOT REPORT
POSS ALERT OF DRV NAVAL FORCES
AT 180254Z, HAIPHONG INFORMED THE RADAR SITE AT MY DUC
AND/94 THE SITE IN THE VICINITY OF HON NGU
OF THE PRESENCE OF TWO (ENEMY) DESTROYERS AT 0830G AND
ORDERED THE STATION(S) TO REPORT CONTINUOUSLY BACK TO ((K)).
(HAIPHONG). THE VESSELS WERE REPORTED AT A RANGE OF 18 NM
FROM AN UNDETERMINED POINT.
THIS IS THE INITIAL REFLECTION OF THE DESOTO PATROL THUS
FAR NOTED ON DRV NAVAL NETS ON 18 SEPT.
SECRET KIMBO

ZKZK PP HHS HII NRL DE
P 18@356Z
FM USN-27
TO QUEBEC/TANGO

USN 467P
CINCPAC
ZEM
SECRET KIMBO
ST 161, 229 RPT ST 161, 229
DRV ICU RCM FOR PERIOD 16170@Z - 171659Z SEPT 64

I. HIGHLIGHT:
A. AT 17020@Z PORT WALLUT INFORMED ALL STATIONS AND SHIPS THAT THE 7TH FLEET WAS ACTIVE FROM ZOI ((2 GR G)) TO KHANG NGAI (UNLOCATED). ALL STATIONS AND SHIPS WERE FURTHER INFORMED THAT HQS REALIZED THAT THE ENEMY COULD ENTER THE GULF AND STEAM CLOSE TO THE SHORELINE THEREBY PROVOKING THE DRV. ALL WERE ORDERED TO GUARD AGAINST A POSSIBLE ENEMY ATTACK FROM THE AIR OR THE SEA AND OTHER POSSIBLE PROVOCATIONS.

B. AT 17071@Z BEN THUY INFORMED THE T-259, T-253 AND SUB-UNIT THAT AT 1600@G 17 SEPTEMBER, THERE WERE TWO DESTROYERS BEARING 99 DEGREES, RANGE 28,
NAUTICAL MILE, COURSE 309 DEGREES,
SPEED 18 KNOTS. ALTHOUGH NO POINT OF REFERENCE WAS MENTIONED OBSERVING SITE WAS PROBABLY VINH SON. ALL SHIPS WERE ORDERED TO EFFECT ALERT CONDITION 1 AND COMMENCE PATROLS, GUARDING AGAINST A POSSIBLE ATTACK.

II. DRV NAVY, FLEET OPERATIONS:

SECRET KIMBO
A. LEVEL OF ACTIVITY:


B. MAINLINE NETS:

1. COMMAND NET UNOBSERVED. ON THE ADMIN NETS, DRV NAVAL HQS HAIPHONG WAS ACTIVE WITH NORTHERN FLEET HQS PORT WALLUT, SOUTHERN FLEET HQS BEN THUY, AND SUBORDINATE ACTIVITY QUANG KHE. REMAINING COMMAND/ADMIN NETS CONSIDERED NORMAL.

2. ROUTINE PREFLIGHT MESSAGE WAS PASSED TO NORTHERN FLEET ELEMENTS.

C. NORTHERN FLEET AREA, PORT WALLUT:

1. NORTHERN FLEET MOBILE ACTIVITY INCLUDED: SO-1 SUBCHASERS T-227, T-231, SWATOWS T-120, T-134, T-142, T-146, SUB-UNITS 1, 2, AND 3.

2. AT 170014Z THE T-142 WAS ORDERED QTE NOT TO FIRE UNQTE. ALTHOUGH NOT SPECIFIED, THIS ORDER PROBABLY REFERS TO GUNNERY EXERCISES (SEE FOLLOWING).

3. AT 170046Z THE T-227 WAS INFORMED THAT ON THE MORNING OF 17 SEPTEMBER SHE WOULD TEST FIRE HER 20MM GUNS AT HANG DUAB (UNLOCATED).

4. AT 170231Z THE T-120 WAS INFORMED THAT SHE WOULD RETURN TO PORT AT 1 ((5G 18 SEPTEMBER TO TAKE ON WATER.

5. AT 170305Z THE T-231 ANCHORED UNSPECIFIED AREA, AFTERNOON AND EVENING OF 17 SEPTEMBER.
SECRET KIMBO

6. AT 170420Z THE T-146 WAS INFORMED THAT THE "ENEMY HAS THE INTENTIONS OF PROVOKING AND POSSIBLY ATTACKING BY MEANS OF THE SEA AND AIR ROUTES" SHE WAS ORDERED TO CAMOUFLAGE, PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE ATTACK AND AWAIT FURTHER ORDERS.

D. SOUTHERN FLEET AREA, BEN THUY:

1. SOUTHERN FLEET MOBILE ACTIVITY INCLUDED: SWATOW T-10N YARD PATROL VESSEL T-253, UNIDENTIFIED T-326, UNIDENTIFIED T-26, SUB-UNITS 2, 6 AND 7.

2. AT 170830Z, UNIDENTIFIED SOUTHERN FLEET ACTIVITY REPORTED THAT SUB-UNIT 6 ACKNOWLEDGED THE ORDERS WHICH POSTPONED THE BATTLE. SIGNIFICANCE THIS ORDER UNDETERMINED, NO OTHER OFFENSIVE ACTIONS INDICATED DRY NAVY COMMS.

3. AT 170955Z AN UNIDENTIFIED ACTIVITY INFORMED COMRADE THU AND SUB-UNIT 7 THAT THE SUB-UNIT WAS TO GO AND REMAIN AT YUAN ZOUNG (18-53N 105-34E) (See 2/Q/VHN/R101-64).

4. 3-5 171213Z SUB-UNIT 2 WAS INFORMED THAT THE T-326 HAD A SMALL ENGINE FITTING OUT OF ORDER.

E. TRACKING:

1. HAIPHONE, PORT WALLUT, BEN THUY TRACKING CONTROLS WERE ACTIVE WITH BACH LONG VI, DO SON, HON MATT, HONG NGU LN MY DUCH, VINH SON, AND FIVE UNIDENTIFIED OUTSTATIONS. FORTY THREE MESSAGES WERE OBSERVED. DESOTO PATROL PROBABLY REFLECTED IN ONLY FIVE OF TRACKING MESSAGES.

III. ACTIVITY:

A. NO REFLECTIONS DESOTO PATROL NOTED IN AVAILABLE INTERCEPT.
2/Q/VHN/R103-64 ST 220 RPT 2/Q/VHN/R103-64 ST 220
FOLLOW UP NR Ø1 AND FINAL TO 2/Q/VHN/R99-64 SPOT REPORT.
I. PROBABLE DRV REACTIONS TO PRESENCE OF DESOTO PATROL.

1. THROUGHOUT THE DAY OF 17 SEPTEMBER DRV NAVAL ENTITIES WERE AWARE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE DESOTO VESSELS. ALL INTERCEPT TENDS TO IMPLY THAT THE DRV NAVY ASSUMED A DEFENSIVE POSTURE AND WAS NOT PREPARING TO REACT OVERTLY AS EXPERIENCED ON 2 AND 4 AUGUST. THERE IS BUT ONE MSG OF UNDETERMINED SIGNIFICANCE WHICH STATED THAT SUB-UNIT 6 (A SOUTHERN FLEET ENTITY) ACKNOWLEDGED ORDERS WHICH POSSIBLY STATED THE BATTLE HAD BEEN POSTPONED.

2. AT 170054Z PORT WALLUT REPORTED THE PRESENCE OF THE QTE SEVENTH FLEET UNQTE TO ALL SHIPS AND STATIONS ((A)). THEY WERE DIRECTED TO DEFEND FORCIBLY IN THE GENERAL SOUTHERN AREA AND GUARD AGAINST ENEMY ATTACK BY SEA OR AIR. AT 170429Z PORT WALLUT INFORMED THE SWATOW T-146 THAT THE ENEMY HAD INTENTIONS
SECRET KIMBO

OF PROVOKING AND ATTACKING THE DRV ON 17 AND 18 SEPTEMBER. ((B))
PORT WALLUT AGAIN AT 17°51'4Z ADMONISHED AN UNIDENT STATION TO
CAMOUFLAGE AND PREPARE FOR POSSIBLE ATTACKS. AT 17°71'4Z BEN THUY
INFORMED THE SWATOW T-259, YP T-253, AND SUB-UNIT 2 THAT THE
1000G OBSERVATION FROM AN UNSPECIFIED LOCATION CONSISTED OF TWO
DESTROYERS BEARING 99 DEGREES, RANGE 28 NAUTICAL MILES, COURSE
309 DEGREES, SPEED 18 KNOTS. ((C)) ALL STATIONS WERE DIRECTED TO
ASSUME ALERT CONDITION ONE. THIS OBSERVATION WAS PROBABLY TAKEN
BY VINH SON RADAR SITE thus LOCATING PATROL IN VICINITY 17-52N
E (NEAR POINT BRAVO) AT TIME OF SIGHTING. AGAIN AT 17°92'0Z
UNSPECIFIED (PROB VINH SON) STATION REPORTED THE SAME INFORMATION
WITH A TIME OF SIGHTING OF 1020G. AT 17°95'5Z COMRADE THU OF
SUB-UNIT 7 WAS PERFITTED TO TAKE HIS UNIT TO XUAN ZUONG (18-53N
105-3'E). THIS POSITION IS APPROX 30 MILES WWN OF DESOTO VESSELS
ENTRY TO POINT DELTA (18-42N 106-11'E). ((D)) PORT WALLUT REPORTED
THE DESTROYERS POSITION AS 46 DEGREES APPROX RANGE 26 MILES.
COURSE 328 DEGREES, SPEED 15 KNOTS FROM AN UNSPECIFIED POSITION.
TIME OF OBSERVATION REPORTED AT 1430G AND ONCE AGAIN PROBABLY
REPORTED FROM VINH SON.

3. DRV TRACKING FACILITIES OPERATED AT A NORMAL LEVEL ON 17
SEPTEMBER, PASSING APPROXIMATELY 75 MESSAGES, ONLY FIVE OF WHICH
REFLECTED THE MOVEMENTS OF THE DESOTO PATROL. ALTHOUGH NOT
OBSERVED ON THE TRACKING NET, THE RADAR SITE AT VINH SON (17-57N
106-3'E) PROBABLY TRACKED THE VESSELS IN THE VICINITY OF POINT
BRAVO AT APPROXIMATELY 17°32'0Z. AT 17°6'4Z, VINH SON REPORTED
THE VESSELS TO BE AT 18-06N 106-53'E. THE PATROL WAS SUBSEQUENTLY
TRACKED BY HON MATT (18-47N 105-58'E) FROM 17°94'5Z AT 19-39N
106-22'E ON A NORTHWesterLY COURSE TO 18-43N 106-20'E AT 1710'0Z.

SECRET KIMBO
THENCE NORTHEASTERLY TO 18-53N 106-32E AT 171135Z WHERE TRACKING CEASED.

4. THIS WILL BE A FINAL REPORT IN THIS SPOT REPORT SERIES. SUBSEQUENT REFLECTIONS OF DRV REACTION WILL BE PUBLISHED IN A NEW SPOT SERIES OR OTHER APPROPRIATE VEHICLE.

((A)) 2/Q/VHN/R99-64
((B)) 2/Q1/VHN/R10-64
((C)) 2/Q1/VHN/R11-64
((D)) 2/Q1/VHN/R101-64

603

NNNNN
SECRET KIMBO

00

DE 51 18/Ø935Z
ZK2K 00 HHA NRL DR
O 18Ø92ØZ ZYH
FM USN 27J

TO QUEBEC ONE/CHARLIE

AFSSO SAC
AFSSO CONAD
AFSSO TAC

COMNAVFORJAPAN
USN 467P
COMNAVPHIL
COMTAIWANDEFCOM/US

USN 39

ZEM

SECRET KIMBO
DESOOTO SUPPORT
2/Q1/VHN/R18-64 RPT 2/Q1/VHN/R18-64, ST 22Ø
FOLLOWUP NR 1Ø TO 2/Q1/VHN/RØ7-64, SPOT REPORT DTG 17Ø315Z
POSS ALERT OF DRV NAVAL FORCES

1. MSG INTERCEPTED DIRECTING TO TAKE PRECAUTIONS AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAMESE VESSELS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF AMERICAN SHIPS AS PRESENCE TO ATTACK THE SHORE. Rely on HEADQUARTERS TO CONTROL THE SITUATION. PRECAUTIONS AGAINST AIR ATTACK ON PORT GAINH WAS NOTED IN GARbled MSG WHICH ALSO MADE SECRET KIMBO
SECRET KIMBO

REFERENCE TO QTE AVOID PROVOCATION UNQTE AND QTE PROMOTE DISPERSION AND CAMOUFLAGE UNQTE.

2. FOL VESSEL MOVEMENTS DIRECTED:

SWATOW PGM T-255 AND T-259 RETURN PORT AT 181200Z AND REPORT SITUATION OF BACH (1GR G) TO GIANH RIVER AREA.

SWATOW PGM T-253 REMAIN QUANG LOC (U/L).

T-326 (UXI) RETURN PORT TONIGHT (18 SEP), POSSE PORT GIANH.

200

SECRET KIMBO
TOP SECRET

ZKZK 00 ZAD
ZKZK 00 ZSL ZLA ACH HII DE
00 RUEPCR 378
DE RUMGUN 289 18/1256Z
Z 0 181256Z
FM CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX
TO RUATUL/BVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUHHL/CINCPACFLT
INFO RUEKDA/JCS
RUECW/CNO
RUHHLQ/CINCPACN
RUMFUI/ULKT/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
RUEPCR/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPCR/STATE DEPARTMENT
RUEKDA/SEC DEF
RUEPIA/CIA
RUEPCR/DIRNSA
RUMJIR/AMBMT SAIGON
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMFS/COMNAVPHIL
RUMFCR/CTU SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX PT SIX
RUMFKB/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE
RUEAHQ/DIA
BT

TOP SECRET
TONKIN GULF DESOTO PATROL (S)
SITREP TWO

TOP SECRET
A. COMSEVENTHFLT 120033Z

B. MY 180001Z

1. 181230Z NAVY PEON POSIT IARRN OPERATE,
REQUESTING AIR IMVER REPORTS FIRING ON CLOSING TGTS.
BHR LAUNCHED 2 F8 181240Z. CONSTEL 2 F4B CTLD I.

BOTH CVA HAVE 4A4/2 AIH COND I LOADED FOR
PT BOATS. FLARES INCLUDED

2. 181145Z WAVY PEON REPORTS QUOTE BELIEVE
SITUATION IN HAND AT PRESENT. DO NOT
REPEAT NOT REQUIRE ADDITIONAL ACFT. OVERHEAD UNQUOTE.

GP-1

BT
CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM CTG 77.6.6 OVER LIMA NET.

AT 181233Z AM FIRING ON CLOSING TARGET. REQUEST COVER

MSG WAS SENT TO USTDC FOR RELAY.

C FM 18/1301Z SEP DTG 181301Z
SECRET–KIMBO

ZKZZ ZZ SOA NNN NRL DE
Z 181338Z ZTH
FM USN 27
TO DIST QUEBEC/MIKE
ZEN USN 467P
ZEM

SECRET–KIMBO

2/Q/VHN/R105-64 ST 220 RPT 2/Q/VHN/R105-64 ST 220

FOLLOWING MESSAGE PASSED FROM PORT WALLUT TO UNIDENTIFIED
ENTITY AT 181338Z: //2 PART MESSAGE COMPLETE//
NR 32. TO ALL STATIONS. THE ENEMY IS CARRYING OUT PROVO-
ICATIONS: ALL STATIONS WILL INCREASE THE STRENGTH OF ((THEIR))
AREAS; ((BE ABLE TO)) DISTINGUISH AMERICAN SHIPS; SOUTHERN
AREA. TRY YOUR BEST TO AVOID PROVOCATIONS; HOLD AGAIN THE
PROPOSAL OF NEW OPERATIONS OF KH 100 ((A)); WARD OFF ENEMY
AIRCRAFT ATTACKS. ALL STATIONS PROMOTE DISPERGING ((1GRU))
PREPARE ALL TO BE READY. SUGGEST SHIPS IN THE SOUTHERN
AREA ((BEWARE)) U.S. ATTACK RAIDER SHIPS ENTERING INTO
SHORE. THANK

((A)) AS IN TEXT, MEANING UNKNOWN

SECRET–KIMBO
B2Φ5/316-64

SUBJECT: SIGINT READINESS

1. IN VIEW OF RECENT ACTIONS AGAINST THE DESOTO PATROL IN THE GULF TONKIN, SIGINT READINESS BRAVO IS DECLARED AT ACTION ADDRESSEES THIS MESSAGE. 2. REPORTING TO BE ACCOMPLISHED IAW FOLLOWING: A. ALL FIELD STATIONS REPORT DRV UNCODED REFLECTIONS/REACTIONS TO DESOTO PATROL AS OBSERVED IAW TECHINS 4Φ14 AND 4Φ19 AT PRECEDENCE APPROPRIATE TO SIGNIFICANCE OF ACTY. ASSURE THAT USN-4675 (ROUTING DESIGNATOR PΔ5), CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, COMSEVENTHFLT, COMNAVFILIP, COMNAVFORJAPAN, NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (Φ), USN-27, USN-39, AND ALL CVA DETS WESTPAC ARE INCLUDED AS RECIPIENTS ALL

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**TOP SECRET DINAR**

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**TOP SECRET DINAR**
REPORTS, WRITING IN TO ESTABLISHED DISTRIBUTIONS AS REQUIRED. SIX
HOUR REPORTING NOT RPT NOT REQUIRED. IMPORTANT THAT TECH DATA
FORMING BASIS ALL REPORTS BE FORWARDO SOONEST POSSIBLE TO
DIRNSA AND [ ] FLAG ALL REPORTS SIGINT READINESS BRAVO OUTBOARD.
B. [ ] WILL PROVIDE TIMELY WRAP-UP REPORTING AS REQUIRED OF ALL
[ ] REFLECTIONS/REACTIONS. 3. FOR [ ] APPREC YOU ARRANGE SUCH
[ ] PARTICIPATION AS YOU DEEM APPROPRIATE

COMCUR: [ ] PO5, Dr. Shinn
ADP, [ ]
PROPOSED BY: B Group, [ ]

R: Instructions to field units for reporting developments under
SIGINT READINESS BRAVO OUTBOARD. This action approved by Chief, B2
and Chief, PO5.
SECRET KIMBO

DE
DE
DE 556 18/1412Z SEP
ZKZK RR RNI DE
O 181408Z ZTH
FM DIRNSA
TO OSCAR/VICTOR XRAY
USN 467P
ALL CVA NSG DETS WESTPAC
ZEM
SECRET KIMBO CHANGE 2 2/Q/VHN/R12-64
CHANGE 2
DRV NAVAL MESSAGE POSSIBLY REFERs TO "BATTLE POSTPONMENT"
1. CONTINUED ANALYSIS OF A DRV NAVAL MESSAGE PASSED AT 170834Z
BY UNIDENTIFIED CORRESPONDENTS INDICATES THE MESSAGE SHOULD
READ:
"SUB-UNIT 6((1)), (C VAL LET US KNOW) IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED
ORDERS TO FIGHT. ((SIGNED)) DINH((2))
2. CHANGE TITLE TO READ: "DRV NAVAL MESSAGE POSSIBLY REFERs
TO "BATTLE ORDERS."

((1)) AN ELEMENT OF SOUTHERN FLEET AND PROBABLY COMPRISED OF
THREE VESSELS.
((2)) PROBABLY THE INDIVIDUAL PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED AS DEPUTY
COMMANDER OF SUB-UNIT AND SKIPPER OF SWATOW 495.
TOP SECRET

ZKZK 00 ZAD ZHA DECA837
ZKZK 00 ONN ZSL DEZB130
CDA 435VV KCG489VV PHAHØ52B327VHØ68ØTFC681UN16Ø
00 RUEPCR RUEPIA
DE RUMGUN 315 18/1426Z
O 181426Z
FM CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX
TO RUATUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
INFO RUEKA/JCS
RUECW/CNO
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUMFUKDZU5KT/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
RUEPCR/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPCR/STATE DEPT
RUEKDA/SEC DEF
RUEPIA/CIA
RUEPCR/DIRNSA
RUMJIR/AMEMB SAIGON
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMFS/COMNAVPHIL
RUMFCR/-ØEV/CTU SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX PT SIX
RUAGFL/M3TC/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE
RUEAHQ/JCS

TONKIN GULF DESOTO PATROL (S)
SITREP FOUR
A. COMSEVENTHFLT 12Ø633Z

TOP SECRET
B.  MY 181337Z

1. 181355Z WAVY PEON REPORTS HE HAS HELD TOTAL OF FIVE HOSTILE SURF TGTS AND HAS XARED ON ALL GR REPORTS BELIEVE THREE TGTS SUNK.

2. NEGATIVE DAMAGE TO DESOTO SHIPS 181408Z.

3. 181408Z. WAVY PEON REPORTS PROCEEDING TO POINT NORTHEAST OF POINT ALPHA GUND WILL AMPLIFY INFO SENT PREVIOUSLY. ALL QUIET AT PRESENT. GP-1
SECRET KIMBO

ZZ
DE 77 1844Z SEP
ZKZK ZZ HHA DE
Z 18144Z ZTH
FM USN 27J
TO USN 27
INFO DIRNSA
ZEM

SECRET KIMBO

DESOLO SUPPORT
A. USN-27 181338Z
1. MESSAGE REPORTED REF A INTERCEPTED THIS STA AND REPORTED AS FOL:
RADIO STATIONS PROMOTE DISPERSION AND CAMOUFLAGE AND PREPARE THE SURFACE PREPARATIONS. TAKE PRECAUTIONS AGAINST THE SVN SHIPS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE AMERICAN SHIPS TO ATTACK AND RAID THE COAST. THANH SVN

2. CACS DAIR SUCQ TIDEN SIFHAAF HANS NGUYJ TRANG CHUAANR BIJ CACS MAWTJ SAWNR SANGF. DEEF PHOOGF TAUP MIEENF NAM LOWIJ ZUNGJ TAUP MYX TAANS COONG BIETJ KICHs WWOF BOWF. THANH

3. MSG INTERCEPTED AT 1001Z. TEXT ESSENTIALLY SAME AS MSG INTERCEPTED AT 1004Z WITH ADD AS FOL: TAKE PRECAUTIONS AGAINST ENEMY AIR ATTACK. DEEF PHONGF MAYS BUY DICJH TAANS COONG
SECRE

DE RUEPCR 194 18/2053Z
Z 182052Z
INFO RUEPPW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEHCR/STATE DEPT
RUEPIA/CIA
RUEPCR/NSA
Z 181542Z
FM CTU 77.6.6
TO AIG 181
RUMSSA/COMUSMACV
ZEN/CTF 77
RUMFUAO/CTOIC/CTF 76
ZEN/CTG 77.7
ZEN/CTG 77.6
RUWDAF/MOPHOTOUPAC
ZEN/NAVCOMSSA PHIL
BT

SECRET

AMPLIFYING REPORT ON DESOTO 181327Z SITREP

1. SITREP FOLLOWS IN TWO PARTS FACTS AND OPINIONS.

A. AT 181992H MORTON AND EDWARDS STEAMING IN COLUMN DISTANCE 2000 YDS COURSE 130 SPEED 20 KTS CONDITION OF READINESS THREE, AT LAT 15-46N LONG 106-48.6E.

B. MADE SURFACE RADAR CONTACT AT 181943H BRG 118 RANGE 20,500 YDS TRACKED ON COURSE 213 AT 17 KTS NO LIGHTS SHOWING. WATCHED CONTACT CLOSING UNTIL A 11,500 YDS WITH A 150-3400 YD CPA.
C. At 181950H with target at approx 9500 yds turned right 30 degrees and increased speed to 25 KTS to clear contact more. At 2014 turned right 60 more degrees when range continued to close contact sit to 2 contacts came right and increased sp to 23 knots. Heard hydrophone effects on same bearing. (Note: Training of snarmen conducted yesterday.)

D. 182000H SSS cond of readiness one both ship turned 60 degrees further right to evade torpedoes in case fired.

E. 182006H made surface contact brg 292 range 11,200.

F. 182008H changed course to 160. and speed to 15 knots to pass between contacts in case friendly.

G. No contacts showed any lights.

H. 1820154H decided to move between and away from targets rapidly.

I. 182018H contacts on both bows closing tracked at speeds from 22-35 knots.

J. 182019H at bearing 7 range miles directed morton fired one warning shot ahead of contacts on port bow.

K. 182020H when targets continued to close rapidly ordered morton to open fire.

L. At 182022H directed edwards to fire warning shot ahead of closing target on his side.

M. 182023H morton ceased fire, hits observed, one target disappeared other opened rapidly to southwest.

N. At 1820252 directed edwards to open fire on target closing on his side. Four hits observed by edward target appeared and ceased fire at 182032H.
SECRET

O. 182028H MORTON FIRED WARNING SHOT AT TARGET BEARING 145-4500 WITH HYDROPHONE EFFECTS OPENED FIRE AT 2026H. THREE HITS OBSERVED TARGET FADED.

P. BOTH SHIPS FIRED ON TARGET AT 079-8500 At 2136 ONE DIRECT HIT BY MORTON AND FIVE HITS OBSERVED BY EDWARD. TARGET DISAPPEARED.

Q. 182137H CEASED ALL FIRING.

R. NO TARGETS VISUALLY SIGHTED. NO DESCRIPTION POSSIBLE.

TOTAL ROUNDS FIRED BY MORTON 56-5 INCH 128-3 INCH. BY EDWARDS 205 INCH 605 INCH NO KNOWN ROUNDS FIRED AT EITHER MORTON OR EDWARDS.

S. NO KNOWN TORPEDOES FIRED AT EITHER SHIP.

T. ALL CONTACTS RADAR

3. OPINIONS TYPE SHIP NOT KNOWN COULD BE SWATOWS OUTSIDE OF GUN RANGE. IF SWATOWS ONLY EXPLANATION FOR NOT USING ALL OF SPEED IS UNSURE OF DESTROYER POSITIONS.

GP-3

---SECRET---
Z 181550Z
FM JCS
TO UHPA/CINCPAC
INFO RUFB/CINCPACFLT
BT

TOP SECRET JCS 8790

1. ANSWERS TO FOLLOWING QUESTIONS REQUIRED ASAP AT HIGHEST LEVELS:
   A. WAS IT INTENTIONAL ATTACK?
   B. WAS TARGET FIRING?
   C. WHAT WAS THE TARGET?
   D. WHAT MANEUVERS DID THEY MAKE?

2. REQUEST REPLY IN PARTS IF NECESSARY.  CP-3
SECRET KIMBO

ZKZK 00 DZI ZHA DELAA545LDA824ZDA327AIL695
00
DE 199B

ZKZK 00 NOL NNN NSD NRL DE
0 181614Z ZTH
FM USN 27
TO DIST QUEBEC/INDIA
PLUS ALL CVA NSG DETS WESTPAC
USN 467P
USN 27J
ZEM

SECRET KIMBO

2/Q/VHS/R46-64 ST22Ø FOR EVALUATION SIGINT READINESS BRAVO,
OUTBOARD, REPORT NUMBER 2.
DRV SHIPPING COMMS REFLECT PRESENCE OF DESOTO PATROL.
AT 181419Z THE CARGO VESSEL THONG NHAT INFORMED HAIPHONG IN
A MULTI-SUBJECT MESSAGE THAT QTE THE ENEMY SHIP WAS SOUTHEAST
OF HON MATT AND AT 21Ø55 ((SIC)) ADDITIONAL ENEMY ((1GR U)).
UNITS PREPARE FOR BATTLE UNQTE.
TO: NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (C) USN-27
INFO: USN-27J

TOP SECRET DINAR

B26/485/64 WS 530

HAVE URGENT REQUIREMENT HIGH LEVEL SOURCE FOR ANY SIGINT

ANSWERS TO FOLLOWING QUESTIONS RELATING TO CURRENT DESOTO INCIDENT:

A. WAS IT INTENTIONAL ATTACK?
B. WAS TARGET FIRING?
C. WHAT WAS THE TARGET?
D. WHAT MANEUVERS DID THEY MAKE?

R: This action directed by Gen. Blake.

REFERENCES:

B26/4718

CH/B26/3240

P.L. 86-36

TOP SECRET DINAR

ROUTE

5

AGI 0

DTG N

SUSPENSE E
SECRET KIMBO
A2/3283

1. DURING PERIOD OF SIGINT READINESS BRAVO OUTBOARD REQUIRE FOLLOWING ACTIONS: REPORT (PRIORITY PRECEDENCE) TO DDI LIZ AND DIRNSA ANY WEATHER REPORTING THAT WOULD SUGGEST MOVEMENT DEPLOYMENT OF VIETNAMESE/CHICOM FORCES. GENERAL GUIDANCE PROVIDED TECHINS 7002.

2. SPECIFICALLY REQUEST THE FOLLOWING FROM NORTH VIETNAMESE COMMUNICATION ENTITIES:
   A. ALL WEATHER APPEARING ON DRV AIR DEFENSE (VHZ) AND VHA/VHV COMMUNICATIONS.
   B. ALL HALF-HOURLY WEATHER APPEARING ON ANY VHT ENTITIES AND ON CGSTG 50201.
TO:

C. OTHER THAN NORMALLY TRANSMITTED TERMINAL AIR FORECASTS ON VHF ENTRIES AND CSTB 50201.

D. OUT OF AREA/COUNTRY WEATHER DATA REQUEST.

E. NORTH VIETNAMESE WEATHER APPEARING ON ANY ENTITY.

F. INTRODUCTION OF ANY ENCRYPTION SYSTEMS

CONCUR

E23, [signature]

USAF

M/R: Providing guidance to field stations in reporting under present alert conditions.

CAPT, USAF/A2321/42078

DATE: 18 SEP 64

SECRET

KIMBO
SECRET KIMBO

DE

ZKZK ZZ HHA NRL DE
H/W CORRECTED COPY DESTROY ALL OTHERS

DE □ 101 18/1946Z SEP
ZKZK ZZ HHA NRL DE
Z 181945Z ZTH
PN USN-27J
TO QUEBEC ONE/CHARLIE

/AFSSO SAC
AFSSO CONAD
AFSSO TAC
COMNAVFORJAPAN
USN 467P
COMNAVPHIL
COMTAIWANDEFCOM/US

SECRET KIMBO
SECRET KIMBO

ZEM

SECRET KIMBO

DESO TO SUPPORT

2/Q1/VHN/R20-64 RPT 2/Q1/VHN/R20-64 ST220 SPOT REPORT

DRV PREPARATIONS AGAINST ATTACK.

1. IN A MESSAGE INTERCEPTED IN FOUR PARTS FROM 181719Z TO

181826Z FROM POSS BAI CHAY ADDRESSED TO ALL STATIONS AND THE

S M A T O W PGM-S T-12®, T-134 AND THE SO-1 SUBCHASER T-227, TWO

AMERICAN DESTROYERS WERE REPORTED 40 NAUT MILES EAST OF HON M A T

(18-43N 155-57E). AN AREA DIRECTIVE WITHIN THE MESSAGE INDICATED

IT WAS PRIMARILY FOR NAVY AND AIR DEFENSE AND ALL STATIONS SHOULD

QUOTE COMPLETELY DISPERSE ((1GR U)) - REINFORCE AREAS - PREPARE -

MAINTAIN EXACTLY INTENTIONS ((1GR U)) (((INHS-SIC)) ((1GR U))) HAS

JUST BEEN PUBLISHED ((2GR U)) EXTERMINATE ENEMY UNQUOTE. THE

MESSAGE CONTINUED WITH A TONE THAT INDICATED FEAR ON AN ATTACK

AND INSTRUCTED THAT COMMUNICATIONS BE MAINTAINED IN THE AREA.

IT ENDED WITH QUOTE THE WARSHIP IS DOING EXACTLY WHAT ((1GR U))

SAID THAT IT WOULD UNQUOTE.

SECRET KIMBO
SECRET KIMBO

ZKZK 00 RNI DE
O 1819482 ZTH
FM DIRNSA
TO OSCAR/VICTOR XRAY
USN-467P
ALL CVA NSG DETS WESTPAC
ZEM

SECRET KIMBO

2/0/VHN/R14-64 ST 22º

DRV ANTICIPATES ATTACK BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE VESSELS

FURTHER STUDY OF THE DRV NAVAL MESSAGE REPORTED IN 2/0/VHN/R195-64 INDICATES THAT DRV NAVAL AUTHORITIES FEAR SOUTH VIETNAMESE SHIPS MIGHT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION IN THE GULF OF TONKIN:

"NUMBER 32. TO ALL STATIONS: THE ENEMY IS ADVANCING TO PROVOKE ((US)). ALL STATIONS STRENGTHEN YOUR AREAS AND DISTINGUISH BETWEEN AMERICAN AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE SHIPS. AVOID PROVOKING ((THEM)). ADOPT THE NEW OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES OF K-1 ((UNIDENTIFIED COMMAND AUTHORITY, NORTHERN FLEET AREA)). ALL STATIONS DISPERSE ((1 GR U)).

SECRET KIMBO
SECRET KIMBO

MAKE PREPARATIONS FOR EVERY POSSIBILITY AND BE READY TO DEFEND AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAMESE SHIPS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE ((PRESENCE OF)) U.S. SHIPS TO ATTACK THE SHORE.

((SIGNED)) THANH

COMMENT:

Throughout the day of 17 September 1964, DRV Navy messages indicated that they were aware of the presence of U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. Though one message on that day asked a naval element if it had received orders to fight, there were no first indications of hostile intent. Most messages alerted fleet elements to the presence of hostile ships and advised them to guard against possible attack.

The U.S. destroyers began the patrol at 2336Z, 16 September. They first came under radar surveillance at 0642Z, 17 September when an unidentified station passed a tracking originated by the radar facility at Vinh Son (17-57N 106-30E). No further trackings were observed until 0945Z, 17 September when Hon Matt (18-48N 105-58E) began to continuously track the destroyers through 1133Z; a single tracking was later observed at 2330Z. Vinh Son, which originated the first tracking at 0642Z, 17 September did not commence continuous tracking until 2116Z, that day; its last tracking was noted at 2227Z.

The USS Morton reported that it was firing on a closing target at 1233Z, 18 September.

Following are gists of the more significant messages which preceded the attack on the U.S. destroyers:

172032Z: Port Wallut informed all stations and ships that the Seventh Fleet was active. All stations and ships were further informed that Headquarters realized that the enemy could enter the Gulf and steam close to the shoreline thereby provoking the DRV. All ships and stations were ordered to guard against a possible enemy attack from the air or the sea and other
SECRET KIMBO

POSSIBLE PROVOCATIONS.

170418-171025Z: MESSAGE INTERCEPTED REPORTED TWO ENEMY DESTROYERS UNDER OBSERVATION. DESTROYERS WERE THEN SHADOWED BY T-520 UNTIL 171550Z.

170420Z: THE T-146 WAS INFORMED THAT THE "ENEMY HAS THE INTENTIONS OF PROVOKING AND POSSIBLY ATTACKING BY MEANS OF THE SEA AND AIR ROUTE." SHE WAS ORDERED TO CAMOUFLAGE, PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE ATTACK AND AVOID FURTHER ORDERS.

170526Z: MESSAGE TO ALL STATIONS AND ALL VESSELS STATED THAT RADAR CONTACT HAD BEEN MADE WITH THE TWO (DESTROYERS).

170714Z: BEN THUY INFORMED THE T-259, T-253 AND SUB-UNIT 2 THAT, AT 1000G ON 17 SEPTEMBER THERE WERE TWO DESTROYERS BEARING 99 DEGREES, RANGE 28 NAUTICAL MILES, COURSE 390 DEGREES, SPEED 18 KNOTS. THE OBSERVING SITE WAS POSSIBLY VINH SON. ALL SHIPS WERE ORDERED TO EFFECT ALERT CONDITION 1 AND COMMENCE PATROLS, GUARDING AGAINST A POSSIBLE ATTACK.

170722Z: MESSAGE TO DET 2, 253 AND 259: "AT PRESENT HAVE TWO DESTROYERS TO THE NORTHWEST 25 NAUTICAL MILES GOING SLOWLY TO THE SOUTH. 90 MILES FROM DONG HOI ((THERE IS)) ONE AIRCRAFT CARRIER.

170830Z: AN UNIDENTIFIED FLEET ACTIVITY ASKED SUB-UNIT 6 IF IT HAS RECEIVED ORDERS TO FIGHT. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS ORDER IS UNDETERMINED.

172115Z: TRACKING REPORTS FROM VINH SON PLACED TARGET(S) AT APPROXIMATE POSITION OF 18-33N 106-46E, COURSE 299.

172338Z: MESSAGE STATED THAT "TWO ENEMY DESTROYERS OBSERVED AT
SECRET KIMBO

1118 AT 1725. LOST THE TARGET - TURNED OVER SHADOWING RESPONSIBILITY TO THE 520."

180247Z: A MESSAGE PASSED FROM AN UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL TO AN UNIDENTIFIED SHORE BASED SHIPPING NET CONTROL STATION STATED: "CAN SEE CLEARLY NUMBER 946 AND 950. PREPARING FOR BATTLE." THE NUMBER OF THE USS EDWARDS DD IS 950 AND THE USS MORTON DD IS 948. AT THE TIME OF INTERCEPT THE TWO U.S. DESTROYERS PASSED TWO FISHING VESSELS AT A DISTANCE OF 2,000 YDS.

180255Z: MESSAGE STATED POSITION OF TWO DESTROYERS.

180418Z: THE CARGO VESSEL THONG-NNAT INFORMED HAIPHONG THAT THE ENEMY SHIP WAS HEADING FROM THE SOUTH ON A NORTHERLY COURSE.

181038Z: MESSAGE TO ALL STATIONS WARNING THEM OF THE ENEMY ADVANCING TO PROVOKE THEM. STATIONS ARE ORDERED TO STRENGTHEN THEIR AREAS, DISTINGUISH BETWEEN U.S. AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE SHIPS, AND AVOID PROVOKING THEM. MESSAGE ALSO WARNED AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAMESE SHIPS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENCE OF U.S. SHIPS TO ATTACK THE SHORE.

SECRET KIMBO
SECRET KIMBO

ACTION PRECEDENCE INFO

FROM: DIRNSA
TO: AFSSO SAC
INFO: AFSSO AWS
       AFNICC (COURIER)
       NSA DEP SAC

SECRET KIMBO

A2/5:087

AFSSO SAC PASS TO S10 DET 1, 3MW
AFSSO AWS PASS TO S10 AWS
REQUEST DAILY FORECAST OF WEATHER CONDITIONS FOR GULF OF TONKIN

CONCUR:

B2/3  

To support B2 effort during SIGINT Alert Readiness BRAVO Outboard.

A2/34/4933s

SECRET KIMBO
TO: DIA/ISIC (CIIC) ATTN COL GASPARD  
JCS J3 (JRC CDE FITZWATER)  

SECRET KIMBO  
B295/323/64  

SUBJECT: DESOTO SURVEILLANCE  

1. PURSUANT TO TELEPHONIC REQUIREMENT THIS DATE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS SUPPLIED. INFORMATION ALSO RELEASED AS 2/0/WHN/R13-64 181958Z.  

2. THROUGHOUT THE DAY OF 17 SEPTEMBER 1964, DRV NAVY MESSAGES INDICATED THAT THEY WERE AWARE OF THE PRESENCE OF U.S. DESTROYERS IN THE GULF OF TONKIN. THOUGH ONE MESSAGE ON THAT DAY ASKED A NAVAL ELEMENT IF IT HAD RECEIVED ORDERS TO FIGHT, THERE WERE NO FIRM INDICATIONS OF HOSTILE INTENT. MOST MESSAGES ALERTED FLEET ELEMENTS TO THE PRESENCE OF HOSTILE SHIPS AND ADVISED THEM TO GUARD AGAINST POSSIBLE ATTACK.  

A single tracking was later observed at 2330Z. Vinh Son, which originated the first tracking at 0640Z, 17 September did not commence continuous tracking until 2116Z, that day; its last tracking was noted at 2227Z.

The USS Morton reported that it was firing on a closing target at 1233Z, 18 September.

Following are gists of the more significant messages which preceded the attack on the U.S. destroyers:

170203Z: Port Wallut informed all stations and ships that the Seventh Fleet was active. All stations and ships were further informed that headquarters realized that the enemy could enter the Gulf and steam close to the shoreline thereby provoking the DRV. All ships and stations were ordered to guard against a possible enemy attack from the air or the sea and other possible provocations.

170418-171025Z: Message intercepted reported two enemy destroyers under observation. Destroyers were then shadowed by T-520
UNTIL 171550Z.

170420Z: THE T-146 WAS INFORMED THAT THE QTE ENEMY HAS THE INTENTIONS OF PROVOKING AND POSSIBLY ATTACKING BY MEANS OF THE SEA AND AIR ROUTE. UNQTE SHE WAS ORDERED TO CAMOUFLAGE, PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE ATTACK AND AWAIT FURTHER ORDERS.

170526Z: MESSAGE TO ALL STATIONS AND ALL VESSELS STATED THAT RADAR CONTACT HAS BEEN MADE WITH THE TWO (DESTROYERS).

170714Z: BEN THUY INFORMED THE T-259, T-253 AND SUB-UNIT 2 THAT, AT 1600G ON 17 SEPTEMBER THERE WERE TWO DESTROYERS BEARING 99 DEGREES, RANGE 28 NAUTICAL MILES, COURSE 390 DEGREES, SPEED 18 KNOTS. THE OBSERVING SITE WAS POSSIBLY VINH SON. ALL SHIPS WERE ORDERED TO EFFECT ALERT CONDITION 1 AND COMMENCE PATROLS, GUARDING AGAINST A POSSIBLE ATTACK.

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170830Z: AN UNIDENTIFIED FLEET ACTIVITY ASKED SUB-UNIT 6 IF IT HAD
TO:

RECEIVED ORDERS TO FIGHT. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS ORDER IS UNDETERMINED.

172115Z: TRACKING REPORTS FROM VINVH SON PLACED TARGET(S) AT APPROXIMATE POSITION OF 18-33N 106-46E, COURSE 299.

172338Z: MESSAGE STATED THAT QTE TWO ENEMY DESTROYERS OBSERVED AT 1118 AT 1725. LOST THE TARGET-TURNED OVER SHADOWING RESPONSIBILITY TO THE 52ø UNQUOTE.

180247Z: A MESSAGE PASSED FROM AN UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL TO AN UNIDENTIFIED SHORE BASED SHIPPING NET CONTROL STATION STATED: QTE CAN SEE CLEARLY NUMBER 946 AND 95ø. PREPARING FOR BATTLE UNQTE. THE NUMBER OF THE USS EDWARDS DD IS 95ø AND THE USS MORTON DD IS 948. AT THE TIME OF INTERCEPT THE TWO U.S. DESTROYERS PASSED TWO FISHING VESSELS AT A DISTANCE OF 2,000 YDS.

180255Z: MESSAGE STATED POSITION OF TWO DESTROYERS.

180418Z: THE CARGO VESSEL THONG-NHAT INFORMED HAIPHONG THAT THE ENEMY SHIP WAS HEADING FROM THE SOUTH ON A NORTHERLY COURSE.
TO:

181038Z: MESSAGE TO ALL STATIONS WARNING THEM OF THE ENEMY ADVANCING TO PROVOKE THEM. STATIONS ARE ORDERED TO STRENGTHEN THEIR AREAS, DISTINGUISH BETWEEN U.S. AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE SHIPS, AND AVOID PROVOKING THEM. MESSAGE ALSO WARNED AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAMESE SHIPS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENCE OF U.S. SHIPS TO ATTACK THE SHORE.

M/R: Response to DIA request for SIGINT reflections of DRV surveillance of Desoto Patrol. This satisfied PROD Requirement 562-64.
TOP SECRET

RUHFK/CINCPAC ADV
RUMGO/CINCPAC ACC
BT

TOP SECRET
TONKIN GULF (U)

SITREP 1 THROUGH 181200Z

1. AT 181143Z GULF OF TONKIN DESOTO PATROL CONSISTING OF DD'S MORTON AND EDWARDS MADE RADAR CONTACT WITH SURFACE TARGETS CLOSING AT SPEEDS FROM 22-35 KNOTS. WARNING SHOTS FIRED, TARGETS CONTINUED CLOSING. TARGETS ENGAGED DURING PERIOD 181120Z TO 181337Z. ESTIMATED FOUR TO FIVE TARGETS TAKEN UNDER FIRE.

NO TARGETS VISUALLY SIGHTED. NO KNOWN ROUND OR

PAGE REPCR 80 TOP SECRET

TORPEDOES FIRED AT EITHER DD.

2. AREA TO BE SEARCHED AT DAYLIGHT FOR EVIDENCE. PREPARATIONS BEING MADE FOR POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTION BY PACFLT AND PACAP UNITS.

3. RESUMPTION OF DESOTO PATROL AWAITING JCS APPROVAL.

4. 20 F-105'S DIRECTED PROCEED CLARK AND DANANG.

5. NO OTHER ACTIONS ORDERED. GP 3

BT

TOP SECRET
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION PRECEDENCE</th>
<th>INFO PRECEDENCE</th>
<th>SPECIAL HANDLING</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMMEDIATE</td>
<td>IMMEDIATE</td>
<td>COMINT CHANNELS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECRET**

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

SECRET

Non-Responsive

AGI NR. 09002/19

DTG 190134Z
SECRET

ZIZI PP ZLA HII ACH ZAD DE
PP RUEPCR
DE RUEPCR 95 19/0537Z
P 19/0536Z
FM JCS
INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEHCR/STATE DEPT
RUEPIA/CIA
RUEPCR/NSA
19/0152Z
FM CINCPAC
TO TUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
INFO RUMFCR/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUMFCR/CTF 77
RUMFCR/CTG 77.6
RUMFCR/CTG 77.6
RUMFCR/CTU 77.6.6
RUEKDA/JCS
BT
SECRET

DESOLO INCIDENT (U)

1. I APPRECIATE THE EFFORTS OF ALL COMMANDS CONCERNED IN THEIR EFFORTS TO KEEP ME AND HIGHER AUTHORITY INFORMED AS EVENTS UNFOLDED IN THE LATEST TONKIN GULF INCIDENT OF 18 SEP. NEVERTHELESS, THE INFORMATION RECEIVED WAS NEITHER SUFFICIENTLY COMPLETE NOR SUFFICIENTLY TIMELY TO MAKE A RAPID AND FACTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE OCCURRENCE IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE PROPER COURSE OF ACTION. IN THIS INSTANT, THROUGH POSSIBLY NO FAULT OF YOUR OWN, THERE IS STILL NO CONCRETE EVIDENCE THAT SECRET
THE DESOTO PATROL DESTROYERS WERE ACTUALLY UNDER ATTACK. THIS IS A VITAL PIECE OF INFORMATION DIRECTLY BEARING ON FUTURE ACTIONS. THE POSITIVE TO NEGATIVE VERIFICATION OF THIS INFORMATION IS STILL LACKING SOME 13 HOURS AFTER THE INCIDENT.

2. I WANT TO FULLY IMPRESS UPON ALL CONCERNED THE VERY GREAT NEED FOR MINUTELY DETAILED INFORMATION TO BE TRANSMITTED TO ME AND HIGHER AUTHORITY BY THE FASTEST MEANS POSSIBLE. EACH AND EVERY OFFICER IN COMMAND AUTHORITY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THAT THE FLOW OF INFO FROM ON-THE-SCENE IS PROMPT, CONTINUOUS AND DETAILED.

GP
SECRET

ZKZK PP ZAD DEAN
ZKZK PP ZSL ZLA AOH HII DE
PP RUEPCR
DE RUEPCR 104 19/0641Z
P 190640Z
FM JCS
INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEHCR/STATE
RUEPIA/CIA
RUEPCR/NSA
190154Z
FM CINCPAC
TO RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUEKDA/JCS
RUMFSS/COMSEVENTHFLT
BT
SECRET

DESO (U)
A. MY QOPPRUZ
B. JCS 8838 DTG 182358Z

1. REF A DIRECTED COMPLIANCE REF B FOR COMPLETION THIRD
   DAY DESOTO PATROL 19 SEPT HOTEL.
2. BE PREPARED ON 20 SEPT HOTEL TIME TO INITIATE OR REPEAT
   PATROL IN ACCORDANCE WITH ORIGINAL THREE DAY ITINERARY.
   DO NOT INITIATE UNTIL DIRECTED BY CINCPAC.

SECRET
3. OPLAN 34A MAROPS WILL NOT BE INITIATED UNTIL COMPLETION DESOTO PLUS 24 HOURS. CP 1
SECRET KIMBO

ZKZK 00 NRL HOL HHA DE

DE YADHNV 19/0230Z SEP
ZKZK 00 RNI NRT NOL HHA DE
O 190227Z ZTH
FM USN 27J
TO QUEBEC ONE ALFA

AFSSO CONAD
AFSSO SAC
AFSSO TAC
PLUS USN 467P

COMNAVPHIL
ALL CVA DETS WESTPAC
ZEM
SECRET KIMBO

2/Q1/VHN/R22-64 ST220 SIGINT READINESS BRAVO, OUTBOARD
REPORT NUMBER 1

INITIAL REFLECTION THIS STA NAVAL ACTION/ENGAGEMENT NOTED DRV COMMS FROM SOUTHERN FLEET ACTY, POSS BEN THUY, INTOPTD 19H50Z STATING QTE THE ENEMY FIRED AT THE SHIP AND ONLY THEN WAS ABLE TO FIRE AGAIN UNQTE.

COMMENT: THE STATEMENT PROB REFERENCES THE FIRING OF WARNING SHOTS BY THE US SHIPS AND WHEN NO ATTEMPT TO ALTER COURSE TAKEN THEN THE US SHIPS JUSTIFIED IN FIRING FOR EFFECT

SECRET KIMBO
FROM: DIRNSA
TO: NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (O)
INFO: HQ NSAPAC

CONFIDENTIAL COMINT CHANNELS
B205/324 537

ACUTELY AWARE HERE OF COMPLETE BREAKDOWN CRITICOM CIRCUIT BETWEEN
SAIGON AND PHU BAI AND ELSEWHERE IN YOUR GENERAL AREA. IN VIEW
PRESENT SIGINT READINESS BRAVO OUTBOARD THE DIRECTOR REQUESTS YOU
IMMEDIATELY TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS
WITH PHU BAI BY CRITICOM OR WHATEVER OTHER MEANS AVAILABLE.
CANNOT OVER EMPHASIZE URGency OF THIS MATTER. IF ALL EFFORTS TO
ESTABLISH ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS FAIL, SUGGEST COURIER BY
HOTROD AIRCRAFT. RESPONSE REQUESTED BY THE DIRECTOR

CONCUR: GEN DAVIS

M/R: In addition to steps being taken locally to correct communications
deficiencies, subject message intended to obtain all possible help from
Saigon.

AUTHOR: WATCH OFFICER B2

RELEASED AT (ZULU) 190233

PAGE 1 OF 1

REFERENCES TO MESSAGE N

AGI N

DTG N

SUSPENSE E

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET KIMBO

SPOT REPORT
19 SEPTEMBER 1964
DIST: O/VX PLUS
ALL CVA NSG DETS WESTPAC
ST 160

18 AND 19 SEPTEMBER

SECRET KIMBO
DE

ZKZK ZZ RNI DE
ZEL

EE 17 19/0411Z SEP
ZKZK ZZ RNI DE
Z 190410Z ZTH

FM NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (C)
TO DIRNSA (ATTN DIRECTOR AND T1)
INFO HQ NSAPAC
ZEM

CONFIDENTIAL COMINT CHANNELS

CITE: F46/2954 SW 603 SH 2026

PRESENT STATUS OF COMMUNICATIONS CRS SAIGON

1. PRESENTLY ONE CIRCUIT IS OPERATIONAL FROM CRS SAIGON. ALFA CIRCUIT BECAME OPERATIONAL AT 0800 LOCAL. CIRCUIT WAS IN AND OUT FROM 1330 LOCAL 18 SEP TO 0800 LOCAL 19 SEP. BRAVO CIRCUIT STILL OUT.

A. BACKLOG AT PHU BAI FOR CRS SAIGON:

IMMEDIATE - NONE
PRIORITY - 0 FOR 626 AND 40 FOR USM-9

B. BACKLOG CRS SAIGON TO PHU BAI:

IMMEDIATE - 20
PRIORITY - 20

C. ZVA BACKLOG - IMMED - 40 PRIORITY - 20

2. CIRCUIT OUTAGE DDNC 1962 AND 1H16.
AT 0530Z 18 SEPT 1964 CRITICOMM CIRCUITS DDNC 1962 AND 1H16 WERE LOGGED OUT THIS STATION BECAUSE OF EQUIPMENT TROUBLES BETWEEN HUE AND PHU BAI (BIRD DOG VHF) AT 0800Z 18 SEPT 1964 THIS STATION NOTIFIED THAT VOA WAS OVER RIDING THE FREQUENCY USED ON DDNC 1962 AND 1H16.

CONFIDENTIAL
THIS PROBLEM WAS ELIMINATED AT 1215Z 18 SEPTEMBER 1964. AT THIS IMX FREQUENCIES WERE AVAILABLE BUT THE TCC-20'S WERE STILL INOPERABLE. THE CONDITIONS EXISTING WERE PASSED ON TO ADVON OLL TEST FOR CORRECTION. 39TH SIGNAL BN. (ADVON OLL TEST) IS THE RESPONSIBLE AGENCY FOR THESE TWO UP COUNTRY CIRCUITS.


2358Z 18 SEPTEMBER 1964. DDNC 1962 WAS FULLY OPERATIONAL AND AVAILABLE FOR TRAFFIC.

THIS STATION NOTIFIED THAT REPAIRS WERE ON THEIR WAY TO HUE TO ATTEMPT REPAIRS ON TCCAWP'S. UNTIL SUCH REPAIRS ARE ACCOMPLISHED THIS STATION HAS ONLY ONE (1) CIRCUIT AVAILABLE. AN RVN CIRCUIT HAS BEEN PRE-EMPTED FOR DDN: 1962.

OUTAGES ON DDNC 1962 AND HH16

180530 - 180800Z - TCC-20
180800 - 181215Z - TCC-20 AND VOA
18125 - 182312Z - CCAWP
182312 - 182358Z - RESTATED SSNCH CIRCUIT ALIGNMENT.

3. MACV STAFF, J6, 39TH SIGNAL, 3RD RRU PROVIDING EVERY EFFORT AVAILABLE TO RESTORE COMM.

4. STANDING BY FOR APPROVAL OF AIRCRAFT PLAN TO MOVE FOLLOWING AS SUGGESTED IF SITUATION DOES NOT IMPROVE.
TOP SECRET

ZKZK 00 ZAD DE
ZKZK 00 ZSL ZLA AOH HII DE
OO RUEPCR
TO NSA
RUMGUN 116 19/0438Z
Z 190438Z
FM CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX
TO RUATUD/BVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUEHL/H/CINCPACFLT
INFO RUEKDA/JCS
RUECW/CNO
RUEHL/H/CINCPAC
RUMFUI/74KT/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
RUEPCR/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPCR/STATE DEPT
RUEKDA/SEC DEF
RUEPIA/CIA
RUEPCR/DIRNSA
RUMJIR/AMEMB SAIGON
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMFS/COMNAVPHIL
RUMFCR/CTU SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX PT SIX
RUMSJB/M3TC/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE
RUEAHQ/DIA
BT

TOP SECRET
TONKIN GULF DESOTO PATROL (S)
SITREP EIGHT

TOP SECRET
A. COMSEVENTHFLT 120633Z

B. MY 182110Z

QMV AIR SEARCH IN PROGRESS CONTINUOUSLY FOR ATTACK EVIDENCE SINCE LAST REPORT. A1H AND ELB SEARCH ACFT AUGMENTED BY A3B ACFT FIRST LIGHT SEARCH CONCENTRATED AREA BOUNDED BY FOL COORDINATES:

PAGE TWO RGUN 116 TOP SECRET

19-00N, 106-06E/19-00N, 106-15E

2. VISUAL SEARCH SOMEWHAT HAMPERED BY 5-600 FT CEILINGS 3NM (EST) VISIBILITY: HOWEVER OTS EST COMPLETE VISUAL AND RADAR COVERAGE, NO, RPT NO SURE CONTACTS AND NO DEBRIS OR OTHER ATTACK EVIDENCE LOCATED OR DETECTED.

3. GAST TWO SEARCH A1H DUE LAND CONSTEL 190630Z. NEGATIVE SEARCH RESULTS REPORTED WHILE AIRBORNE.

4. USS COLUMBUS PROCEEDING RDVU WITH AND REFUEL USS MORTON/EDWARDS POSIT 17N, 108E ABT 191100Z.

5. STRIKE PREPARATIONS IN PROGRESS.

GP-1
DE 22 19/0530Z
ZKZK 00 RNI NRL NOL HHA DE
O 190525Z ZTH
FM USN 27J
TO QUEBEC ONE/ALFA
ZMDOZKC/AFSSO CONAD
AFSSO SAC
AFSSO TAC
USN 467P
COMMNAVPHIL
ALL CVA DETS WESTPAC
ZEM

SECRET KIMBO

2/Q1/VHN/R3-64 ST220 SIGINT READINESS BRAVO, OUTBOARD, REPORT NUMBER 2

1. HEADQUARTERS ((ADVISORY)) FROM PORT GIANH TO DETACHMENT 2 AND TWO U/I VESSELS T-253 AND T-259 RELATED THAT AT 052G THE AMERICAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE MET AND MADE PUBLIC THAT AMERICAN SHIPS WERE ATTACKED ON NIGHT OF 18 SEPT. ALL STATIONS ARE TO QUOTE EXECUTE CORRECTLY ALERT GRADE ONE UNQUOTE. GARbled PORTION OF TEXT STATED QUOTE ((2GR U)) HAVE ORDERED AN ALERT OF ((2 GR U)) IN THE PHILIPPINES. HONOLULU IYWF PREPARING. UNQUOTE.

2. COMMENT: FROM APPEARANCE THEN THE STATEMENT OF ALERT IN THE PHILIPPINES POSSIBLY WAS USED TO REFER TO THE STATUS OF UCVS. MILITARY PERSONNEL STATIONED THERE.

SECRET KIMBO
ZKZK ZZ RNI DE
Z 190542Z ZTH
FM DIRNSA
TO OSCAR/VICTOR XRAY
ALL CVA NSG DETS WESTPAC
USN-467P
ZEM
SECRET KIMBO 2/0/VHN/R15-64

DRV NAVY APPEARS TO BE TAKING DEFENSIVE ACTIONS.

A PRELIMINARY FIELD STATION REPORT INDICATES THAT THE
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE NAVAL FORCES PASSED
SUBSEQUENT TO THE 18 SEPTEMBER ENGAGEMENT IN THE GULF OF
TONKIN REVEALS NO PREPARATIONS FOR INITIATION OF AN ATTACK
ON THE U.S. DESTROYERS MORTON AND EDWARDS.

AS OF 190145Z SIGINT GLEANED FROM A SPARSE AMOUNT OF
INTERCEPT SUGGESTS THAT DEFENSIVE PREPARATIONS ONLY ARE
BEING MADE.

SECRET KIMBO
DE 522 19/0808Z SEP
O 190803Z ZHY
FM DRSNA
TO OSCAR/VICTOR KILO
ZEM
SECRET KIMBO
VIETNAMESE (NORTH) WS 1359-64 2/0/VHN/T19-64 ST 220
DIST: HCF
DRV NAVAL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
FR ((U/I)): DUONG ((A)) (ZWONGR) 19 SEP 1964 151G
TO ((U/I)): --- -- NR 29
CAMOUFLAGE TO TAKE COVER FROM SHIPS OF THE OPPOSITION. IF THE
ENEMY FIRES UPON YOUR SHIP, ONLY THEN MAY YOU RETURN FIRE.
COMMUNICATE WITH K ((B)) TO RECEIVE ORDERS. Ø5ØG - ALERT
CONDITION ONE.
((A)) UNIDENTIFIED PERSONALITY PREVIOUSLY NOTED ISSUING ORDERS
FROM BEN THUY.
((B)) UNIDENTIFIED COMMAND AUTHORITY (OPERATIONS) HAI PHONG
(B VAL)
MS 27, 19 SEP 1964 ØØ5ØZ

SECRET KIMBO
TOP SECRET

ZKZK 00 RNI DE
O 1910052 ZTH
FM DIRNSA
TO USM-626

HQ NSAPAC
NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (C)
NSAPAC REP JAPAN
NSAPAC REP PHIL
USN-27
USN-27J

TOP SECRET DINAR
TOP SECRET DINAR

SUBJECT: READINESS OUTBOARD EXTENDED

A. IN VIEW OF \_

RE反ON/REFLECTIONS TO RECENT DESOTO INCIDENT IN GULF OF TONKIN ACTION (BRAVO) READINESS OUTBOARD IS EXTENDED TO INCLUDE ACTION ADDEES THIS MESSAGE. ALL FIELD STATIONS REPORT \_

REFLECTIONS/REACTIONS TO DESOTO PATROL AS OBSERVED LAW TECHINS 4014 AND 4019 AT PRECEDENCE APPROPRIATE TO SIGNIFICANCE.

USN-467P (ROUTINE DESIGNATOR \_

), CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, COMSEVENTHFLT, COMNAVPHIL, COMNAVFORJAPAN, NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (O), USN-27, \_

AND ALL CVN DETS WESTPAC TO BE INCLUDED AS RECIPIENTS OF ALL REPORTS. WRITE IN TO ESTABLISHED DISTRIBUTION AS REQUIRED. SIX HOUR REPORTING NOT RPT NOT REQUIRED. URGENT NEED
TOP SECRET DINAR

FOR ALL TECH DATA ON WHICH REPORT IS BASED ASAP TO DIRNSA,

AND FLAG ALL REPORTS SIGINT READINESS BRAVO OUTBOARD.

TOP SECRET DINAR
SECRET KIMBO

ZK2K 00 RNI DE
0 191121Z ZTH
FM DIRNSA
TO OSCAR/VICTOR XRAY
ALL CVA NSG DTS WESTPAC
USN-467P
SSO FT RICHIE
ADDEUR
ZE1

SECRET KIMBO ST 175, 225
EXTENSION OF SIGINT READINESS BRAVO "OUTBOARD":

IN VIEW OF ACTIVITIES BEING REFLECTED IN SIGINT, THE SIGINT READINESS BRAVO "OUTBOARD" DECLARED BY DIRNSA AT 181348Z SEPT IS EXTENDED TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING STATIONS:

THE CURRENT MOVEMENT OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT FROM TOWARDS THE SOUTH, COUPLED WITH FIFTEEN MINUTE WEATHER REPORTING BEING OBSERVED ON FIGHTER OPERATIONS COMMUNICATIONS, SUGGESTS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THESE FIGHTERS ARE BEING TRANSFERRED. ALTHOUGH

SECRET KIMBO
SECRET--KIMBO--

A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THIS ACTIVITY, AS WITH ACTIVITY PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, AND THE EVENTS IN THE GULF OF TONKIN IS NOT YET EVIDENT IN SIGINT. THE COINCIDENCE IN TIMING DOES NOT ALLOW THIS POSSIBILITY TO BE OVERLOOKED.

ADDITIONAL REPORTING ON THESE, AND ALL OTHER DEVELOPMENTS, WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED AS THE EVENTS ARE OBSERVED.
SECURE KIMBO

ZKZK 00 RNI DE
0 191131Z ZTH
FM DIRNSA
TO OSCAR/VICTOR XRAY
ALL NSG DETS WESTPAC
USN-467P
ZEM

RECAP OF SIGINT OBSERVATIONS RELATING TO 2/4 AUGUST AND 18 SEPTEMBER GULF OF TONKIN NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS

THIS REPORT REVIEWS DRV NAVAL CORRESPONDENCE SINCE SHORTLY BEFORE THE USS MORTON AND USS EDWARDS COMMENCED THEIR DESOTO PATROL AND THROUGH 181130Z EDT. FOR PURPOSES OF COMPARISON AND/

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OR CONTRAST, A BRIEF RESUME OF DRV NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS WHICH PRECEDED THE 2 AND 4 AUGUST ATTACK ON THE USS MADDOX IS INCLUDED (SEE PART II). ADDITIONALLY, THE DISPOSITION OF DRV NAVAL VESSELS ON 17 SEP, AS CAN BE DETERMINED IN SIGINT, IS COVERED (SEE PART III).

PART ONE: DRV NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS, 16-18 SEP

DRV NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS FROM 161244Z THROUGH 181844Z INDICATED NO EVIDENCE OF DRV PREPARATIONS TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK AGAINST THE TWO U.S. DESTROYERS ON PATROL IN THE GULF OF TONKIN.

THE PATROL BY MORTON AND EDWARDS COMMENCED AT 162336Z. AT 170054Z VAN HOA (PORT WALLUT) ALERTED ALL STATIONS TO "SEVENTH FLEET" ACTIVITY AND INSTRUCTED THEM TO TAKE PRECAUTIONS AGAINST ENEMY ATTACKS. AT 170418Z TWO ENEMY DESTROYERS WERE REPORTED UNDER SURVEILLANCE AND FROM AT LEAST THIS TIME FORWARD DRV AUTHORITIES APPARENTLY KEPT CLOSE TRACK OF THE PATROL. OVER THE NEXT FEW HOURS NAVAL ELEMENTS AND PATROL BOATS WERE ALERTED TO THE PRESENCE AND MOVEMENTS OF THE PATROL AND TOLD TO TAKE PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES. REFERENCES TO "BATTLE PREPARATION" OR "BATTLE ORDERS" AND "CLASS ONE ((ALERT))" WERE NOTED, BUT IT IS PROBABLE THAT THESE REFERENCES REFLECT SIMPLY "BATTLE STATION" PROCEDURES.

TRACKING CONTINUED THROUGH THE NIGHT AND ON THE MORNING OF 18 SEPTEMBER AN UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL REPORTED VISUAL SIGHTING OF DD 946 (SIC: USS MORTON IS DD 948 AND DD 956 USS EDWARDS)). AT 181038Z "ALL STATIONS" WERE TOLD THAT THE ENEMY WAS "ADVANCING TO PROVOKE" THE DRV AND ORDERED ACTIONS TO STRENGTHEN ALL AREAS AND "AVOID AGAINST PROVOKING THEM." THE STATIONS WERE ALSO WARNED...
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AGAINST "RAIDER" ATTACKS AGAINST THE DRV COASTLINE TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE US SHIPS.

AT 181233Z THE US SHIPS REPORTED OPENING FIRE ON THREE ENEMY TARGETS WHICH HAD BEEN CLOSING IN ON THEM. (WHILE NO COMINT EVIDENCE OF THE PRESENCE OF THESE THREE BOATS IS AS YET AVAILABLE, IT IS PROBABLE THAT COMMUNICATION AMONG THESE BOATS WOULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED BY RADIO-TELEPHONE.

THE FIRST DRV REACTION TO THIS INCIDENT AVAILABLE AT THIS WRITING WAS TRANSMITTED "TO ALL STATIONS" AT 181719Z. IT STATES THAT "AT 1930G (1230Z) 2 US DESTROYERS ((WERE LOCATED)) 40 NM EAST OF HON MATT. IN THE GIANH RIVER WE HEARD GUN FIRE." THIS MESSAGE SPECULATES POSSIBLE ENEMY ACTIONS, SUCH AS ATTACKS ON "OUR MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TARGETS, MAINLY NAVAL AND AIR DEFENSE," AND ORDERS PREPAREDNESS, ALERTNESS AND MAINTENANCE OF CLOSE COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTING.

THE FOLLOWING IS A SELECTED CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AS REFLECTED IN DRV NAVAL CORRESPONDENCE AVAILABLE THROUGH 181844Z.

161244Z VAN HOA (PORT WALLUT) TO SUB-UNITS 1, 2, 3 AND BOATS 122, 124, 130, 132, 134, 144 AND 146 ORDERING EACH TO SEND ONE MANY WHO HAD PERFORMED OUTSTANDINGLY IN COMBAT TO RECEIVE "A FLAG" ON 18 SEP.

162236Z DESOTO COMMENCES PATROL

170054Z VAN HOA (PORT WALLUT), DRV NAVY BASE, ALERTS ALL STATIONS AND SHIPS TO FACE "SEVENTH FLEET IS ACTIVE" AND COULD ENTER GULF AND PROVOKE THE DRV. ALL ELEMENTS TO GUARD AGAINST POSSIBLE ENEMY ATTACK FROM AIR OR SEA AND OTHER POSSIBLE PROVOCATIONS.

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170204Z MESSAGE FROM BOAT TO GIANH RIVER REGION. ROUTINE
"TODAY WE'RE TO STUDY ON BOARD SHIP."

170231Z T120 ORDERED TO RETURN TO PORT AT 181800G TO
TAKE ON WATER.

170418Z MESSAGE REPORTED TWO ENEMY DESTROYERS UNDER
OBSERVATION. SHADOWED ((TRACKED)) BY 520 UNTIL
171550Z.

170420Z T146 ALERTED, TOLD TO CAMOUFLAGE, PREPARE FOR
SECTI ON TWO OF THREE 2/0/VHN/T16-64
POSSIBLE ATTACK, AWAIT FURTHER ORDERS.

170430Z TO SUB-UNIT 7. ROUTINE MESSAGE. HAVE THREE
NAMED INDIVIDUALS PRESENT ON NIGHT OF 18 SEP.
ARE TO REPORT ON 19 SEP FOR A "RECAPITULATION."

170526Z MESSAGES TO ALL STATIONS AND BOATS STATED THAT
VINH SON RADAR CONTACT HAD BEEN MADE WITH THE
TWO ((DESTROYERS)).

170604Z COMINT REFLECTS RADAR SURVEILLANCE OF DESOTO
BY VINH SON (17-57 106-300) RADAR STATION.

170640Z SUB-UNITS 6 AND 7 ALERTED. INFORMED OF THE TWO
ENEMY DESTROYERS AND GIVEN LOCATION AS OR 1152G
((94522)). TOLD THAT "((1U)) NORTH HAS MANY SUPPORT-
ing AIRCRAFT" SPECULATES THAT ENEMY MAY COORDI-
nATE THIS OPERATION WITH ACTIVITIES IN LAOS,
SHELLING OF THE COAST, OR SUPPORT OF ((SOUTH
VIETNAMESE)) RAIDERS/BOATS TOLD TO BE ALERT,
MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS.
170714Z  BEN THUY NOTIFIED T259, T253 AND SUB-UNIT 2 THAT AT
171000G (170300Z) THERE WERE TWO DESTROYERS AT BEARING
OF 99 DEGREES, RANGE 28 NM, COURSE 390 DEGREES,
SPEED 18 KNOTS. ALL SHIPS PLACED ON A CLASS ONE
ALERT, TOLD TO COMMENCE PATROLS, GUARD AGAINST
POSSIBLE ATTACK.

170722Z  MESSAGE TO T259, T253 AND SUB-UNIT 2 GIVING LOCATION
DATA ON TWO DESTROYERS. ADDS THAT THERE IS ONE AIR-
CRAFT CARRIER 90 MILES OFF DONG HOI.

170830Z  SUB-UNIT SIX RECEIVED MESSAGE ASKING IF IT HAB
RECEIVED COMBAT ORDERS ((OR "ORDERS TO FIGHT").

170920Z  "TO ALL STATIONS," ADDRESSED TO T129, 134, 142,
170940

171004Z  227 GIVING LOCATIONS, ETC. ON THE TARGETS

171029

171038Z  ACCORDING TO VINH SON RADAR.

171126

170939Z  SIGNAL INSTRUCTIONS TO T134, 129, 142 CONCERNING

171039

171044Z  SUB-UNITS 1, 2 AND 3.

170945Z  HON MATT (18-48 105-58) TRACKED DESOTO CONTINUOUSLY
UNTIL 1135Z.

170955Z  SUB-UNIT 7 ORDERED TO STOP AT XUAN ZUONG (18-44
105-44) FOR THE NIGHT

171046Z  T227 INFORMED THAT CARGO SHIP DOAN KET WOULD TEST HER
20MM GUN(S) "THIS MORNING".

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171213Z SUB-ELEMENT 2 RECEIVED QUERY: WHICH ENGINE ON T326 BROKE DOWN?

172115Z VINH SON TRACKING LOCATED TARGET(S) AT 18 DEGREES 33' 106 DEGREES 46', COURSE 249.

172116Z- VINH SON CONTINUES TRACKING

172227Z

172330Z SINGLE TRACK OBSERVED (HON MATT?)

172338Z LOCATION REPORT ON TWO ENEMY DESTROYERS. TARGET LOST; SHADOWING (TRACKING) RESPONSIBILITY TURNED OVER TO 52°.

180247Z UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL REPORTS TO UNIDENTIFIED SHORE-BASED SHIPPING NET CONTROL THAT "CAN CLEARLY SEE NUMBER 946 AND 950. PREPARING FOR BATTLE."

((USS EDWARDS IS DD 950; MORTON IS DD 948. AT TIME OF INTERCEPT OF THIS MESSAGE DESOTO PASSED TWO FISHING VESSELS AT 2000 YARDS DISTANCE.

180255Z LOCATION OF THE TWO DESTROYERS REPORTED.

180418Z DRV CARGO SHIP "THONG NHAT" INFORMED HAIPHONG OF HEADING OF ENEMY SHIP STATED UNITS PREPARED FOR COMBAT. (CONTAINED IN MESSAGE OF ROUTINE REPORTING FORMAT CONCERNING CARGO OF THONG NHAT)

181038Z ALERT TO ALL STATIONS WARNING THEM OF ENEMY ADVANCING TO PROVOKE THEM. STATIONS ORDERED TO STRENGTHEN THEIR AREAS, DISTINGUISH BETWEEN US AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE SHIPS AND AVOID PROVOKING THEM. ALSO WARNED AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAMESE SHIPS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENCE OF US SHIPS TO ATTACK THE ((DRV)) SHORE.
SECRET KIMBO

181233Z MORTON OPENS FIRE
181402Z TO SUB-UNIT 7 AND ALL STATIONS. ROUTINE PRE-FLIGHT MERCHANT SHIPPING MOVEMENTS INFORMATION.
181719Z 4-PART MESSAGE TO ALL STATIONS ADDRESSED TO 12Φ,
181844Z (lU) 134,227. "AT 1930G (1239Z) 2 USS DESTROYERS 4Φ NM EAST OF HON MATT. IN THE GIANH RIVER WE HEARD GUNFIRE. SPECULATES AT POSSIBLE ENEMY ACTIONS SUCH AS ATTACKS ON "OUR MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TARGETS, MAINLY NAVAL AND AIR DEFENSE." ORDERS PREPAREDNESS, STRESSES NEED TO MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS, KEEP UP WITH EVENTS AND REPORT THEM.

FINAL SECTION OF THREE 2/0/VHN/T16-64 ST 22Φ

PART TWO: DRV NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS PRECEDING DRV ATTACKS OF 2 AND 4 AUGUST ON THE USS MADDOX

THE FOLLOWING IS A RESUME OF DRV NAVAL ACTIVITIES OBSERVED IN SIGINT WHICH PRECEDED THE ATTACKS ON THE USS MADDOX ON φ2 AND φ4 AUGUST. THIS REPORT IS DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS, A AND B, TO COVER THE FIRST AND SECOND ATTACKS RESPECTIVELY.

A. THE FIRST ATTACK, φ2 AUGUST


2. AT φ11φ27Z, A MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM BEN THUY NOTING THAT IT HAD BEEN "DECIDED" TO FIGHT THE ENEMY TONIGHT-WHEN YOU RECEIVE DIRECTING ORDER. "2/Q/VHF/R26-64, φ11924Z"

SECRET KIMBO


5. AT 020612Z, AN UNIDENTIFIED SHORE STATION ORDERED THE T-146 TO "TURN BACK TO THE PATH OF THE ENEMY TO ATTACK." (2/Q/VHN/R29-64, 021232Z).

6. AT APPROXIMATELY 020716Z, USN-27 ISSUED A CRITIC MESSAGE, BASED ON A DRV WHICH INDICATED THAT DRV CRAFT WERE ON CLOSE WITH THE "ENEMY" AND TO USE TORPEDOES.

7. BETWEEN 020309Z AND 020732Z, DRV NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS CONTINUED TO KEEP THE DESOTO UNDER CLOSE SURVEILLANCE. DURING THIS PERIOD, DRV NAVAL VESSELS WERE APPARENTLY GROUPING TO ATTACK. (2/Q/VHN/R29-64, 021232Z).

8. AT 020807Z, THE MADDOX REPORTED SHE WAS UNDER ATTACK BY THREE DRV PT BOATS.

FOLLOWING THE ACTION ON 02 AUGUST, COMINT REFLECTED THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ENGAGING PRIMARILY IN "MOP-UP" ACTIONS, PRINCIPALLY CONCERNED WITH LOCATING THEIR DAMAGED PT BOATS AND TOWING THEM BACK TO PORTS. MEANWHILE, THEY CONTINUED TO TRACK AND REPORT ON THE U.S. VESSELS IN THE GULF OF TONKIN.

B. THE SECOND ATTACK, 04 AUGUST

SECRET KIMBO

2. AT $411140^2$ USM-626J REPORTED EVIDENCE OF "IMMINENT PLANS OF DRV NAVAL ACTION POSSIBLY AGAINST DESOTO MISSION."
(2/G11/VHN/R11-64, $411140^2$ AUG).

3. AT $41140^2$, THE TICONDEROGA REPORTED THAT THE MADDOX OPENED FIRE AGAINST A PT BOAT.

PART THREE: DISPOSITION OF DRV NAVAL FORCES AS EVIDENCED IN SIGINT ON 17 SEPTEMBER

A STUDY OF ALL AVAILABLE MESSAGES INDICATES THE FOLLOWING DISPOSITION OF DRV NAVAL FORCES ON THE DAY (17 SEPTEMBER 1964) PRECEDING THE 18 SEPTEMBER ENGAGEMENT IN THE GULF OF TONKIN.

SOUTHERN FLEET:

AT 170955Z SUB-UNIT 7 WAS TO ANCHOR AT XUYAN DUONG (18-44/ 195-44). SUB-UNIT 7 IS TENTATIVELY HELD BY NSA AS CONSISTING OF UNIDENTIFIED TYPE VESSELS T253, T255, T257.

DURING 17 SEPTEMBER SUB-UNIT 6 WAS NOTED ON SOUTHERN FLEET COMMUNICATIONS AND HENCE PRESUMED TO BE IN SOUTHERN FLEET WATERS. SUB-UNIT 6 IS TENTATIVELY HELD TO CONSIST OF UNIDENTIFIED TYPE VESSELS T377 AND PROBABLY TWO OTHERS WHOSE VESSEL NUMBERS ARE UNKNOWN.

ALTHOUGH THE VESSELS COMPRISING SUB-UNITS 6 AND 7 ARE UNIDENTIFIED AS TO TYPE IT IS THOUGHT THAT THEY ARE PROBABLY SWATOWS.

NORTHERN FLEET:

THE FOLLOWING UNITS/VESSELS WERE OBSERVED ACTIVE ON DRV NORTHERN FLEET COMMUNICATIONS ON 17 SEPTEMBER AND HENCE THROUGHT TO BE IN NORTHERN FLEET WATERS:

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SECRET KIMBO

SUB-UNIT 1, SUB-UNIT 2 AND SUB-UNIT 3, ALL OF WHICH ARE UNIDENTIFIED AS TO NUMBER OR TYPE OF VESSEL.

VESSEL T12Φ - UNIDENTIFIED AS TO TYPE

VESSEL T134 - PROBABLE SWATOW

VESSEL T142 - PROBABLE SWATOW

T227 - UNIDENTIFIED AS TO TYPE
DESOTO (U)

(A) CINCPACFLT 190234Z

1. THIS IS SECTION ONE THREE, A STATEMENT MAIN BATTERY OFFICER, USS MORTON (DD 948) SUBJ: SURFACE ENGAGEMENT, NIGHT OF 18 SEPTEMBER AT CONDITION 3 WATCH, FIRST TARGET PICKED UP APPROXIMATELY 1940, LOCKED ON AND TRACKING 1945. RANGE 7000 YARDS. TARGET CLOSING AT HIGH SPEEDS 1150000 DEG AT 20 KNOTS. 1950 GENERAL QUARTERS SET, ONE ROUND FIRED ACROSS TARGET'S BOW. TARGET CONTINUED TO CLOSE
AT HIGH SPEED. 1921 COMMENCED RAPID CONTINUOUS FIRE. FIRST FEW ROUNDS NOTED TO BE SHORT OF TARGET. RECEIVED PLUS 500 YARDS SPOT FROM GUN CONTROL. SHOT THEN APPEARED TO BE DIRECTLY ON TARGET. AFTER SEVERAL ROUNDS APPEARED DIRECTLY ON TARGET, RANGED CEASED CLOSING AND TARGET DISAPPEARED FROM SCOPE. CEASED FIRING 2023.

2. TRACK SEVERAL TARGETS AT APPROXIMATELY 15,000 YARDS INTO 11,000 YARDS. AT THIS TIME TARGETS APPEARED TO SPLIT, ONE CLOSING, ONE STAYING AT APPROXIMATELY 11,000 YARDS. TRACK CLOSING TARGET INTO APPROXIMATELY 5,000 YARDS AT WHICH TIME TARGET OPENED IN RANGE, WHILE SECOND TARGET CLOSED AT HIGH RATE OF SPEED. THIS SEEMED TO BE THEIR DESIGNED METHOD OF ATTACK.

EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTY IN TRACKING CLOSING TARGETS BECAUSE OF SMALL RADAR RETURN AND JAMMING. JAMMING WAS IN THE FORM OF RADAR INTERFERENCE, TO WIT: SINE WAVE EFFECTS ON B AND SWEEPS, SPIKE EFFECTS AND BLOT OUT EFFECTS ON A AND R SWEEP. ALL INCOMING TARGETS WERE TRACKED AND EITHER LOCKED ON GAITED. THROUGHOUT ENGAGEMENT ENCOUNTERED BLOT OUT EFFECTS ON ALL SWEEPS SIMILAR TO WEATHER OR JAMMING. UPON MANY OCCASIONS TARGETS SEEMED TO HEAD FOR THESE AREAS OF COVER. CHANGING FREQUENCIES AND PULSE REPETITION RATE ELIMINATED MOST OF THE ELECTRONIC EFFECTS (JAMMING). TARGETS WERE TAKEN UNDER FIRE DURING THIS TIME TWICE. AT TIMES 2026 COMMENCED FIRING, 2027 CEASED FIRING; TIE 2032 COMMENCED FIRING, 2035 CEASED FIRING.

3. RECEIVED DESIGNATION OF TARGET AT 8,000 YARDS CLOSING AT HIGH SPEEDS, 22 KNOTS. 2039 TAKEN UNDER FIRE, SHOT APPEARED TO BE DIRECTLY
ON TARGET IN RADAR SCOPE. TARGET OBSCURED BY SPLASHES AND
DISAPPEARED FROM SCOPE. CEASED FIRING 2043 AT RANGE 4,000 YARDS.

4. RECEIVED DESIGNATION OF TARGET CLOSING HIGH SPEED. 2114 FIRED
ROUND ACROSS ITS BOW. TARGET OBSERVED TO TURN AWAY AND OPEN RANGE.

5. RECEIVED DESIGNATION OF TARGET AT 15,000 YARDS. LOCKED ON AND
OBSERVED TWO SMALL TARGETS. TARGET SPLIT, ONE MAINTAINING ITS RANGE,
THE OTHER CLOSING. LOCKED ON CLOSING TARGET AT 11,000 YARDS. 2126
FIRED WARNING SHOT ACROSS THE BOW. TARGET CONTINUED TO CLOSE IF
RANGE. TIME 2131 COMMENCED FIRING AT RANGE 9,000 YARDS. TARGET
COMPLETELY OBSCURED BY SHOT. ESTIMATED 20 ROUNDS. NO TARGET VISIBLE
ON SCOPE WHEN SHOT SPLASH CLEARED AWAY. CEASED FIRING 2132.

6. SEVERAL MORE TARGETS TRACKED BUT NOT TAKEN UNDER FIRE WHEN RANGE
OPENING.

7. NOTES:

1. HEAVY ELECTRONIC JAMMING OR INTERFERENCE NOTED DURING FIRST
PART OF ENGAGEMENT.

2. TARGETS THROUGHOUT APPEARED EXTREMELY SMALL, VERY DIFFICULT TO
LOCK ON AND TRACK.

3. ONE TARGET TRACKED AT PLUS 30 KNOTS, THE REST TRACKING
APPROXIMATELY 20 TO 23.
SECRET KIMBO

0 1915222 ZTM
FM USN 27J
TO QUEBEC ONE/ALFA

/AFSSO CONAD
/AFSSO SAC
/AFSSO TAC
PLUS USN 467P

COMNAVPHIL
YXDLXH/ALL CVA DETS WESTPAC
ZEM

SECRET KIMBO

2/Q1/VHN/R26-64 ST 220 SIGINT READINESS BRAVO, OUTBOARD, REPORT

NUMBER 5

HAVE INDICATION THAT ELEMENT DRV NAVAL FORCE SOUTHERN

FLEET AREA TO CHANGE FROM ALERT GRADE ONE TO GRADE THREE AT

192200Z.
SECRET KIMBO

CRITIC CRITIC CRITIC CRITIC CRITIC CRITIC CRITIC CRITIC CRITIC CRITIC

ZCZC

ZKZX

ZTH

FM USN 27

TO DIRNSA

ZEM

SECRET KIMBO QUEBEC/GOLD

CRITIC-2-64

INTERCEPT RECEIVED 191513Z INDICATES DESOTO WILL BE ATTACKED BY VHN ENTITIES TONIGHT. SPECIFIC TIME UNDETERMINED

CPT.  1199//115527Z SEPT DTG 191528Z
SECRET KIMBO

ZZ YEKAAH
DE YMZAHH 93B 19/1547Z SEP
ZKZK ZZ ZZZ DE
Z 191548Z ZTH
FM USN 27
TO DIRNSA
ZEM

SECRET KIMBO

SPECIAL TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT TO CRITIC MESSAGE 2-64
GWIR 253, 259, PHAAN DOOIJ ((1GRU)). ((1GRU)) BAOS DOONG
TINHF HUONGS. NGAY S BAOS CAOS TANS PHONG KHOONG.
DEEM DANHS BIEPTTJ KICHS. TRACKS
VHNB 5050/97INJ DE JI2U/3684M/1513 DDA:
191513Z/USN-27:
NR 47 CK 35 1909 2120 BT
TO 253, 259, SUB UNIT ((1GRU)). ((1GRU)) ALERT CONDITION SITUATION.
IMMEDIATELY ((2GRG)) AIR DEFENSE NIGHT STRIKE
RAIDERS. TRACK.
FROM: DIA/NSA  
TO: DIA/CIC ATTN: COL GASPARD  
       JCS 33 (JRC CDR FITZWATER)

SECRET KIMBO

B205/327

DESMETO SURVEILLANCE

REF: B205/323/64

1. THIS MESSAGE UPDATES INFO CONTAINED REFERENCE MESSAGE.  AT
181233Z THE USS MORTON REPORTED OPENING FIRE ON THREE (LATER
CORRECTED TO FIVE) ENEMY TARGETS WHICH WERE CLOSING IN ON HER.
181719Z - A MESSAGE TO ALL STATIONS STATED QUOTE AT 1930G (1230Z)
2 US DESTROYERS ((WERE LOCATED)) 40 NM EAST OF HON MAT.  IN THE GIANH
RIVER WE HEARD GUN FIRE UNQUOTE.  THE MSG CONSIDERS POSSIBLE ENEMY
ACTIONS SUCH AS ATTACKS ON MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TARGETS,
MAINLY NAVAL AND AIR DEFENSE. CALLS FOR ALERTNESS, PREPAREDNESS,
AND CLOSE COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTING.
190120Z - HAIPHONG INFORMED A CARGO VESSEL, DOAN KET, THAT QUOTE
THE ENEMY WAS AT PRESENT STRONGLY ACTIVE, TO PREPARE FOR BATTLE
AND NOT TO AWAIT ORDERS UNQUOTE.  COMMENT: USN-27 (THE INTERCEPT
SITE) STATED FELT THIS WAS A DEFENSIVE REACTION.
FROM:

TO:

1900Z - A BADLY GARbled MSG FM AN UNID MOBILE UNIT IN NORTHERN FLEET INFORMED HAI PHONG THAT THEY WERE PREPARING IMMEDIATELY. MSG MENTIONS INDIVIDUALS WHO, FROM INFO DERIVED FROM MSGS NOTED IN LATE AUGUST, MAY REFER TO DRV NAVAL VESSEL COMMANDERS ACTIVE IN THE NORTHERN FLEET AREA.

THE ABOVE MSGS ARE THE ONLY REFLECTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN RECEIVED HERE RELATIVE TO THE GULF OF TONKIN, INCIDENT. TO DATE, NONE OF THEM APPEAR TO BE OFFENSIVE IN NATURE. IN ADDITION, THERE HAVE BEEN CERTAIN REFLECTIONS OF ACTIVITY IN [BLANK] COMM FACILITIES WHICH MAY BE RELATED, REPORT AS FOLLOWS:

SECRET KIMBO
2. ADDITIONAL RELEVANT MESSAGES ARE INCLUDED IN 2/0/VHN/R16-64, 191138Z QUOTE RECAP OF SIGINT OBSERVATIONS RELATING TO 2/4 AND 18 SEPTEMBER GULF OF TONKIN NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS UNQUOTE.

M/R: Message updates info sent to JCS and DIA on 18 September in response to PROD Requirement NR 562-64.
SECRET KIMBO

DE YEKAH 53θ 19/1612Z SEP
2KZK O0 AZS DE
O 1916θ2Z ZTH
FM DIRNSA
TO OSCAR/VICTOR XRAY
ALL CVA NSG DTS WESTPAC
ZEM
SECRET KIMBO-2/0/CCN/R14-64 ST 16θ
FOLLOW-UP NR ONE TO DIRNSA 2/0, R13-64 SPOT REPORT, DTG 19θ3θ6Z

THE TRANSMISSION OF THREE MESSAGES DURING A TWO-HOUR PERIOD
VIS-A-VIS AN OCCASIONAL MAXIMUM OF TWO FOR AN ENTIRE DAY CONTINUES TO
BE INEXPLICABLE. HOWEVER, THIS ACTIVITY IS NOT CONSIDERED SIGNIFICANT
SINCE ALL AVAILABLE DATA DOES NOT REVEAL A RESUMPTION OF THIS ACTIVITY
THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF THE DAY, AND THE ROUTINE TRANSMISSION OF
PRACTICE MESSAGES CONTINUES.

FINALLY, IT IS PRESUMED THAT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN

WERE ESTABLISHED

SINCE NO FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS WERE OBSERVED BEING TRANSMITTED
BETWEEN . FURTHER, THERE HAS BEEN NO MANIFESTATION
OF UNUSUAL SHIP ACTIVITY IN THE AREA. SHIPS ARE
BELIEVED TO BE ENGAGED IN ROUTINE PATROL AND COASTAL SURVEY OPERATIONS
AND ARE SUFFICIENTLY DISPERSED WITH NO OSTEWSIBLE CONCENTRATIONS OR
EVIDENCE OF IMMINENT BUILDUPS.
CONSEQUENTLY, DATA CURRENTLY AVAILABLE FROM COMINT REVEALS NO APPARENT ASSOCIATIONS OF THE FOREGOING ACTIVITY WITH THE 18 SEPTEMBER INCIDENT INVOLVING THE USS MORTON AND USS EDWARDS. ACCORDINGLY, THIS WILL BE A FINAL REPORT OF THIS ACTIVITY UNLESS FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS ARE OBSERVED WHICH HAVE ANY POTENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE.
SECRET KIMBO

KZK ZZ RNI DE
Z 1917942 ZYN
FM DIRNSA
TO OSCAR/VICTOR XRAY
ALL CVA NSG DETS WESTPAC
USN-467P

SECRET KIMBO 2/0/VHN/R17-64

NSA FOLLOW-UP TO USN-27 CRITIC NR 2-64:

A TRANSLATION ACCOMPLISHED AT NSA OF THE MESSAGE ON WHICH
THE USN-27 CRITIC REPORT WAS BASED INDICATES THAT THE MESSAGE
READS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE FROM: (POSSIBLY) BEN THUY TO T253 AND
T259 AND SUB UNIT (ONE GROUP UNRECOVERED). (ONE GROUP UNRECOVERED)
ALERT CONDITION SITUATION ONE. BY DAY (POSSIBLY DISPERSE FOR)
AIR DEFENSE. BY NIGHT STRIKE THE RAIDERS. (SIGHED) TRACH UNQUOTE.
COMMENT: BEN THUY IS THE LOCATION OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE
SOUTHERN FLEET. THE VESSELS T253 AND T259 ARE TENTATIVELY THOUGHT
TO BE MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS. THE SIZE OF THE SUB-UNIT, IN TERMS OF
NUMBER OF VESSELS, IS UNKNOWN. IN LIGHT OF CONCERN PREVIOUSLY
EXPRESSED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE NAVAL AUTHORITIES OVER GUARDING
AGAINST THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE RAIDERS THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT
THEIR CONCERN AS EXPRESSED IN THIS MESSAGE IS AS APT TO BE FOR
SOUTH VIETNAMESE VESSELS AS IT IS FOR THE U.S. DESTROYERS.

SECRET KIMBO
TOP SECRET

191821Z
FM JCS
TO RUHPA/CINCPAC
INFO ZEN/CSA
ZEN/CNO
ZEN/CUSAF
RUECEM/XMX
RUHPB/CINCPACFLT
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUATUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUEPCR/NSA
RUMFUI/CTF 77
RUMGUN/CTG 77.6
RUMFCR/CTU 77.6.6
RUMGCR/USS MORTON
RUMGCR/USS RICHARD & EDWARDS
RUEHCR/AMEMB SAIGON
RUEPIA/CIA
RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEHCR/STATE DEPT
ZEN/SECDEF

TOP SECRET JCS 8869-64 JCS SENDS.
SUBJECT: DESOTO PATROL (U)
REFERENCE: A. JCS 8838 DTG 182358Z
1. DEFER DESOTO PATROL UNTIL FURTHER INSTRUCTED. CP-3
FROM: DIRNSA
TO: USM-626
     USA-37
     USN-9
     USN-86
     USN-27

INFO: USAFSS
      CGUSASA
      SUSLO (M)
      HQ NSAPAC
      ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
      NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (C)
      NSAPAC DIR NAVSECGRU
      CGUSASA PAC
      PACSECTYGRN
      DIRNAVSECGRUPAC
      DIRNAVSECGRU

TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS
B205/329
SIGINT READINESS BRAVO OUTBOARD

1. HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT DESOTO PATROL SUSPENDED FOR AT LEAST
   ONE WEEK. WILL KEEP ADDRESSES ADVISED

M/R: Notification of decision with regard to DESOTO Patrol. SNOO
     is aware of this action.

TOP SECRET

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

CH B2051/51748
CH B2051/51748

RELEASED AT (20LO) 191945
PAGE 1 OF 1
AGI NR. 86-36

REFERS TO MESSAGE:
AGI 0
DTG 19200000-Z
SUSPENSION N

 NSA250X3
 NSA250X6
TOP SECRET

OO RUEKDA RUECW RUEPCR RUEPIA RUEAHQ
DE RUMFUN 52 20/0225Z
Z 0 20/0225Z
FM CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX
TO RUATUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUXFIAL/CINCPACFLT
INFOR ELDA/JCS
RUECW/CNO
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUMGUI/U4L5/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
RUEPCR/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPCR/STATE DEPT
RUEKDA/SEC DEF
RUEPIA/CIA
KEPCR/DIRNSA
RUMJIR/AMEMB SAIGON
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMFS/COMNAVPHIL
RUWPCCR/AP3V/CTU SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX PT SIX
RUMSBJ/M3TC/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE
RUEAHQ/DIA
BT

TOP SECRET
TONKIN GULF DESOTO PATROL (S)
SITREP ELEVEN AND FINAL
A. COMSEVENTHFLT 120633Z
B. MY 192135Z

TOP SECRET
1. IAW DIRECTIVES FROM HIGHER AUTHORITIES,
DESOOTO PATROL TERMINATED AND STRIKE
POSTURE CANCELLED.

2. USS MORTON WITH COMDESCIV 52 EMBARKED/
USSR EDWARDS ENROUTE JOIN TG 77.6. USS SABALO
ORDERED WITHDRAW GULF OF TONKIN LIFEGUARD STA
AND HONORED JOIN CTG 77.7.

PAGE TWO RUMXMMFUN 52 T O P S E C R E T

3. CTG 77.6 INS CONSTEL WITH MORTON/EDWARDS
WILL PROCEED SUBIC FOLL TRANS YANKEE TEAM DUTY TO
CTG 77.7 20 SEP IAW CONSEVENTHFLT 200026Z.

NOTAL.

4. THIS IS FINAL SITREP.

GP-1
SECRET KIMBO

201200Z

AFSSO CONAD
AFSSO SAC
AFSSO TAG
COMNAVPHIL
ALL CVA DETS WESTPAC
ZPM

SECRET KIMBO

2/21/VHN/R28-64 ST220 SIGINT READINESS BRAVO, OUTBOARD, REPORT NUMBER 7
MSG INTERCEPTED AT 200945Z STATES THAT SEVENTH FLEET STILL SOUTH OF DEMARCATION LINE AND THAT GOIN XON ISSUED ORDERS TO CARRY OUT GULF PATROL.

COMMENT: IDENTITY GION XON NOT KNOWN THIS STA. MSG ADDRESSED TO ALL STATIONS AND POSS REFERS TO ENTIRE GULF TONKIN.
TO OSCAR/VICTOR XRAY
USN-467P
ALL CVA NSG DET WESTPAC
SSO FORT RITCHIE
ADDEUR
ZEM

SECRET KIMBO 2/0/R11-64 ST 175,220
SIGINT READINESS BRAVO OUTBOARD TERMINATED

IN VIEW OF THE POSTPONEMENT OF FURTHER PATROLLING BY US SHIPS IN THE GULF OF TONKIN AND THE LACK OF EXTENSIVE OR DRV REACTION, SIGINT READINESS BRAVO OUTBOARD IS HEREBY TERMINATED. NORMAL REPORTING PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN RESUMED.
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B2051/331/64

SRB OUTBOARD TERMINATION

REF: A. DIRNSA B205/319-64, 171655Z SACLIN B. DIRNSA B205/326/64,
191052Z. IN VIEW OF SUSPENSION OF DESOTO PATROL AND LACK OF EXTENSIVE
DRY REACTIONS, SIGINT READINESS BRAVO OUTBOARD DECLARED REF
ALFA AND EXTENDED REF BRAVO HEREBY TERMINATED. ACTION ADDEES WILL
RESUME NORMAL REPORTING POSTURE

M/R; Termination of SIGINT Readiness condition. This action was
discussed with Chief, B2, ADP, and DIR. SNOO aware of this action.
ZK2K PF ZLA AOH HII NRL DE
P 230436Z
FM USN 27
TO DIRNSA
INFO CNO
HQ NSAPAC
CINCPAC
DIRNAVSECGRU
DIRNAVSECGRUPAC
ZFM

TOP SECRET DINAR SECTION ONE OF TWO
OIC USN 467P ORIGINATES
SIGINT SUPPORT TO DESOTO PATROL
A. DIRNSA B205/328-64 DTG 191440Z
B. DIRNSA B205/334-64 DTG 221629Z (PASEP)
1. REF ALPHA NOT HELD USN 27 OR USN 467P FILES.
2. AS REQ REF BRAVO HEREWITH BY TOI/TOR DESOTO REFLECTIONS
RE ACTIONS AND POSS RELATED SIGINT INFO RECD ABOARD USS MORTON
TOP SECRET DINAR

PRIOR 181233Z:

TOI 170815Z MSG FM PORT WALLUT TO UNIDENTIFIED "//IN HERE// DO NOT FIRE PROBABLY RELATED TO FIRING TRAINING.

TOI 170238Z MSG FM PORT WALLUT TO T120 "NR 15. TO ALL STATIONS AND ALL SHIPS. ((GRM)) ARRIVE KHANG ((QRM)). RECOGNITION OF THE ENEMY BY HEADQUARTERS ((1GRG)) POSIBILITIES: ((2GRG)) ENTER ((2GRU)) PROVIDE ((XGM)) WITH FORCE THE SOUTHERN AREA ((4GRG)). ALL STATIONS WAIT ((2GRU)) TAKE PRECAUTIONS (AGAINST) THE ENEMY ATTACK (WHETHER) BY SEA OR AIR ((2GRG)) PROVOKE."

TOR 170258Z USN 27 PASSED FOL MSG: "1. FOLLOWING GIST
FURNISHED FYI: A. 170554Z/27: THE SEVENTH FLEET'S INTENTIONS ARE POSSIBLY TO MOVE IN AND TO PROVOKE. ALL STATIONS ARE NOTIFIED THE ENEMY COURSE IS CLOSE TO SHORE PLANNING TO PROVOKE US. B. BASED ON CORRUPT TEXT -

DE NGL2 ((PORT WALLUT))";

TOI 170410Z USN 27J 2/Q/VHN/R07-64. DTG 170315Z

TOI 170411Z USN 27 J/Q/VHN/R99-64 DTG 170258Z

TOI 170420Z FM PORT WALLUT TO UNIDENTIFIED "NR 18. (YOU) MUST WAIT ((2GRU)); PREPARE TO CAMOUFLAGE; THE ENEMY (WILL) POSSIBLY PROVOKE AND ATTACK US BY SEA (AND/OR) BY AIR: ((2GRU)) INSIDE THE 17TH AND 18TH OF SEP."

TOR 170552Z USN 27J 2/Q/VHN/R06-64, DTG 170120Z

TOI 170528Z FM PORT WALLUT TO UNIDENTIFIED "NR ((SHIP BLKS)) ALL SHIPS RELAY STATION R2D ((2GRG)) ((2GRG)) OBSERVED AT 1020 HRS 2 DESTROYERS AT BEARING OF 99//SHIP BLK//SPEED 18 KNOTS."

TOR 170618Z USN 27J 2/Q/VHN/R10-64 DTG 170515Z

TOI 170725Z FM BEN THUY TO UNIDENTIFIED "//IN HERE// COAST; ALSO POSSIBLE ((2GRU)) TO RAID ((2GRU)). "K" ((1GRM)) GUARD ((3GRU)) REMAINING

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COMMUNICATION WITH "K".
TOI 170745Z FM BEN THUY TO UNIDENTIFIED "ENEMY POSSIBLE ((2GRU)
WITH ACTIVITY AT LAOS; POSSIBLE SHELL THE COAST LINE; ALSO COULD
POSSIBLE ((2GRU)) RAID ((2GRU)). "A'S" DIRECTIVES ((2GRU))
MUST STRENGTHEN ((2GRU)); GUARD; MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS WITH "K".
TOI 170810Z FM VINHSON TO BEN THUY "TO SUBUNIT 6 ((1GRU)) RECEIVED
ORDERS TO POSTPONE THE BATTLE.
TOI 170919Z FM PORT WALLUT TO T231 "NR 22. TO ALL STATIONS, T120,
134, 142, T227. ((2GRU)) REPORTS 143°G AT A BEARING OF 46 DEGREES,
RANGE 260KM, COURSE 328 DEGREES, SPEED 15 KNOTS; 2 DESTROYERS
THREATENING."
TOR 170938Z USN 27J 2/Q1/VHN/R13-64 DTG 170853Z
TOR 171000Z WUN 27J 2/Q1/VHN/R08-64 DTG 170335Z
TOI 171045Z FM PORT WALLUT TO UNIDENTIFIED SHORE STATION NORTH FLEET
"NR 2. TO T134, 120, 142. WITHIN THE RADIO NET, THE ORDER IN WHICH
TO COME UP (IS AS FOLLOWS): SUB-UNIT ONE, THEN SUB-UNIT TWO, THEN
SUB-UNIT 3 ((4GRU)) REPEATEDLY DISORDERLY BY NITE ((REMAINDER OF
HINT GRBLED)).
TOR 171253Z USN 27J 2/Q1/VHN/R12-64 DTG 170830Z
TOR 171845Z USN 27J PASSED FOL MSG
"1. MSG REPORTED INTERCEPTED REF
ALFA (170810Z ENTRY) VERSION REF BRAVO INTERCEPTED THIS STA AT 170823Z.
2. REF BRAVO (171000Z ENTRY) USES QTE DINH UNQTE AS SIGNATURE.
SEARCH CONFIRMED IN VERSION REPORTED REF BRAVO QTE: TO
DETACHMENT 6 "(GRBLED)"
TOR 171910Z USN 27 2/Q/VHN/R101-64 DTG 171750Z
TOR 172012Z DIRNSA 2/0/VHN/R12-64 DTG 171652Z

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TOR 180037Z USN 27J PASSED FOL MSG: "A. USN 467P SPOT INTEL ITEM 170845Z
B. USN 27J FOLLOW-UP NR 65 TO 2/Q1/VHN/207-64 DTG 170853Z NOTAL
C. DIRNSA B205-318-64 DTG
1. MSG REPORTED INTERCEPTED REF ALFA WAS VERSION REF BRAVO INTERCEPTED THIS STA AT 170832Z. 2. REF BRAVO USES QTE DINH UNQTE AS SIGNATURE. SEARCH CONFIRMED THIS PERSONALITY TO BE LINKED WITH SOUTHERN FLEET ACTIVITY IN THE PAST. BELIEVE USE OF QTE DINH UNQTE TO MEAN POSTPONE AS REPORTED REF ALFA INCORRECT IN THIS INSTANCE, DUE TO LOCATION IN SENTENCE STRUCTURE. 3. FOL IS USN 27J VERSION REPORTED REF BRAVO QTE: TO DETACHMENT RECEIVED ORDERS ((POSS TO FIGHT)) DIN. ((U/I PERSONALITY)) COMMENT: UNRECOVERED GRP BELIEVED TO MEAN QTE HAVE NOT YET UNQTE. NO RELATED ITEMS NOTED THIS STA."

TOR 180217Z USN 27J 2/Q1/VHN/R11-64 DTG 170700Z
TOR 180219Z USN 27 2/Q/VHN/R106-64 DTG 171110Z
TOI 180247Z FM: U/I (ON SHIPPING/FISHING FREQ) TO. VOU2 (SHORE STA CONTROL):
"CAN SEE CLEARLY 946, 950. PREPARING FOR BATTLE. MET ANOTHER //QRM// ABOUT 100 METERS AWAY CAN SEE CLEARLY NR 946, NR 950 PRESENTLY PREPARING((GRBL)) PLEASE INFORM DISTRICT AND OO DISTRICT 22800."
NOTE: ANTENNA RIGGED FISHING CRAFT PASSED BY DESOTO (DISTANCE 200 YARDS)).

TOP SECRET DINAR FINAL SECTION OF TWO

TOI 180305Z FM PORT WALLUT TO: U/I
NR YM GO 142, 134, 120, AT 1930L 18 SEP THE T142 RETURN TO PORT ((2GRU)). T 1830G 19 SEP THE T132 (SWATOW) RETURN TO PORT ((2GRU)) TO ADMINISTER ((2GRU)) FIRING AND ((2GRU)) AFTERWARDS

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RETURN TO BAI CHAY TO TAKE ON ((2GRU)) Ø330G 2Ø SEP ((2GRU))
ANCHORAGE AREA ((2GRU)) CONTINUED
TOI 18Ø324Z FM: PORT WALLUT TO: T146, T12Ø
TO ((2GRG)) Ø955G; NR 28. TO T12Ø TRANSMIT (TO) COMRADE KIM.
((2GRG)) 17 SEP 2 DESTROYERS WERE OUT A SEE. AT Ø63ØG 18 SEP
(THE TWO DESTROYERS) WERE ((1GRG)) NAUTICAL MILES NORTHEAST OF
HON MATT. T Ø83ØG (THE DESTROYERS) WERE 18 NAUTICAL MILES FROM
HON MATT.
TOI 18Ø329Z FM: PORT WALLUT TO: U/I
19ØØG 18 SEP THE T142 (SWATOW) RETURN TO PORT ((2GRU)). A
183ØG 19 SEP T132 RETURN TO PORT ((2GRU)) TO ADMINISTER ((2GRU))
FIRING AND ((1GRU)) AFTERWARDS RETURN TO BAI CHAY TO TAKE ON
((2GRU)) ..3ØG 2Ø SEP RETURN TO ANCHORAGE AREA ((2GRU))
TOI 18Ø435Z FM: U/I VES TO: CONTROL
PULLING IN NETS NOW THE ENEMY SHIPS ARE DOING ((GBLD)). AGAIN
ALMOST ((1GRU)) HERE TO RELEASE //SHIP BLKS// FLY DOWN. IN ORDER
TO PREPARE FOR BATTLE ((1GM)) RUN AND BE SEPARATED FROM THE NET
((GARBLED)) VIEWPOINT IN ORDER TO PULL IN THE NET URGENTLY//SHIP
BLK// FLY DOWN. (I M) RETURNING TO THUONG RIVER, PRESENTLY
AWAITING NEWS.
TIO 18Ø435Z FM: CONTROL TO: U/I VES
(YOU) CONTINUE TILL 163Ø. THE NET WILL HAVE PLANS (OR STRITGEY)
AFTER ((1GRG)).
TOI 18Ø445Z FM: U/I TO: U/I
NR 2. TO 49. COMRADE NHAN (IS) RETURNING (FOR) THE NETTING:
COMRADE CAN GO OVER TO THE BOAT (TO MEET) COMRADE NHAN. IN
TOI 18Ø62ØZ MSG FM PORT WALLUT TO IDENTIFIED: NR 3Ø. TO T12Ø, T227
TRANSMIT TO COMRADE KIM. AT Ø13ØG 2 DESTROYERS ARRIVED 3Ø NM NORTHEAST

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TOP SECRET DINAR

OF LACH CHAO, HEADQUARTERS REMINDS ALL STATIONS TO REINFORCE (OR STRENGTHEN) THEIR DOMMINS AND EXECUTE EXACTLY THE DIRECTIVE NR 603 OF AUG 22, 1964.

TOR 180640Z USN 27 17112 DTG 18066Z
TOR 180720Z USN 27 2/Q/VHN/R104-64 DTG 180656Z

TOI 180813Z FM T120 TO PORT WALLUT: //IN HERE// SPEED TO ATTACK (OR AMBUS) IN THE BORDER ((2GRU)) HIGHEST DEGREE //QRM// ALREADY ((2GRU)) FIRM SITUATION.

TOI 180817Z FM T120 TO PORT WALLUT: THE ENEMY IS CONTINUING TO PROVOKE ((2GRU)) HAVE ORDERS FOR ALL STATIONS. STRENGTHEN (YOUR) AREAS; DISTINGUISH AMERICAN SHIPS; SOUTHERN REGION. DO YOUR BEST TO AVOID PROVOCATIONS: TO GRSP (ND) TO ADVOCATE K QJS NEW WAR. TAKE PRECAUTIONS (AGAINST) AN AIRCRAFT ATTACK, ALL STATIONS ((2GRU)) NANCE, DISPERSE (AND) CAMOUFLAGE; ALL PRESENT ((2GRU)) BATTLE (KIM IS NOW BOARD THE T120, WHICH EXPLAINS WHY A SWATOW CLASS PGM IS ISSUING ORDERS SUCH AS THESE)

TOI 181002Z FM PORT WALLUT TO UNIDENTIFIED: //IN HERE// STRENGTHEN THE AREAS; DISTINGUISH AMERICAN SHIPS; SOUTHERN AREA; DO YOUR BEST TO AVOID PROVOCATIONS; GRSP (AND) ADVOCATE K-1'S NEW WAR; TAKE PRECAUTIONS (AGAINST) AN ENEMY AIRCRAFT ATTACK ((2GRU)) CONTINUED ALL STATIONS RISE FORWARD PREPARE EVERYONE TO BE READY. TAKE PRECAUTIONS (AGAINST) AN ATTACK WITHIN (OUR) LIMITS BY THE AMERICAN SHIPS IN THE SOUTHERN AREA.

TOI 181145Z USN 27J 2/Q1/VHN/R15-64 DTG 18
FROM: USN-27
TO: DIRNAVSECGRU
INFO: DIRNAVSECGRUFAC

SECRET COMINT CHANNELS
SEPT DESOTO (C)

A. CINCPACFLT 230406Z NOTAL
1. USN 467P DEACTIVATED 232359Z IAW REF ALFA.

SECRET

L23 NOTE: DTG 230406Z UNABLE TO LOCATE L23.

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SECRET

SECRET