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SENSITIVE

PAGE 28 SITUATION/SUBJECT MESSAGE(S) LISTING DATE 11/24/72/13

SITUATION: SERIES  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: CHECK

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ANNOTATIONS:  
MESSAGE SENT TOHAK KENNEDY AND HOWE

MESSAGE:  
PRIORITY  
P 211836Z NOV 72  
FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHECK)

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA DELTA CONTROLLED ITEM~~

EXCLUSIVE FOR DELTA CONTROL OFFICER  
WARNING: THE COMINT CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE,  
IF A USIB MEMBER (OR HIS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED DEPUTY), APPROVES  
THE USE OF THIS COMPARTMENTED ITEM IN A TOP SECRET CODEWORD  
PUBLICATION, THE PRECISE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET (WHICHEVER  
IS SENSITIVE) SHOULD BE CONCEALED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE  
AND NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE NSA DELTA REFERENCE SERIAL,  
IN ALL OTHER CASES, THIS MATERIAL MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA  
SECURITY CONTROLS.

TRANSMITTED HERewith IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE,  
NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES  
DQLL-VND. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE  
EXISTING DELTA RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS  
TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH)  
XXMMENPOLFOO72326  
3/00/DQLL-VND/T -72  
LFR,AVS,KUS,AVN/FORP/B.  
SOUTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR REPORTS ON MEETING WITH FRENCH  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
XXCC

ER PARIS, ((AMBASSADDR)) PHAM DANG LAM 17 NOV 72 1900  
TO SAIGON; FOREIGN MINISTRY;  
PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT HOANG DUC  
NHA -- 20/PDVN/TM  
~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 01-18-2017 pursuant to E.O. 13526

SENSITIVE

PAGE 29 SITUATION/SUBJECT MESSAGE(S) LISTING DATE 11/24/72//

SITUATION: SERIES  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: CHECK

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

I HAVE THE HONOR TO RENDER AN ACCOUNT OF A 1-HOUR MEETING WITH ((FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER MAURICE)) SCHUMANN THIS AFTERNOON. I EXPLAINED TO HIM THE POSITION OF OUR GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE KISSINGER-LE DUC THO DRAFT AGREEMENT. SCHUMANN TOLD ME THAT HE UNDERSTANDS PERFECTLY OUR POSITION. HE REVEALED HAVING HIMSELF BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF KISSINGER THAT THE NUMBER ONE PROBLEM IS INDEED THAT OF THE PRESENCE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. KISSINGER REPLIED TO HIM THAT TO DEMAND TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS WOULD BE EQUIVALENT TO DEMANDING THE SURRENDER OF HANOI WHICH THE COMMUNIST SIDE WOULD NEVER ACCEPT. NEVERTHELESS, KISSINGER INSINUATED TO HIM THAT THERE WOULD BE A GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT ACCORDING TO WHICH ONE PART OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS, MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE NUMBER OF 38,000, WOULD RETIRE TO THE NORTH, THE REMAINDER BEING AUTHORIZED TO REMAIN IN THE SOUTH. SCHUMANN TOLD ME THAT HE WAS MORTIFIED TO LEARN THAT THINGS DID NOT HAPPEN AS KISSINGER HAD FORESEEN. HE DID NOT HIDE HIS ANXIETY CONCERNING THE DIFFICULT, INDEED UNTENABLE SITUATION, IN WHICH OUR GOVERNMENT MIGHT FIND ITSELF PLCED BECAUSE HE IS ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN THAT THE U.S. WILL SIGN BEFORE JANUARY 20 WITH OR WITHOUT US. SCHUMANN KNEW THAT MOSCOW WAS AT PRESENT PUTTING PRESSURE ON HANOI IN ORDER TO BRING NORTH VIETNAM TO COMPROMISE. HE DID NOT THINK THOUGH THAT ANY SUBSTANTIAL MODIFICATIONS WOULD PRODUCE A DRAFT AGREEMENT. ((PRESIDENT)) NIXON, WHOM SCHUMANN HAD SEEN A SHORT TIME BEFORE THE ELECTIONS, TOLD HIM THAT HE INTENDS TO BEGIN HIS SECOND TERM WITH A CLEAN SLATE.

TI 17 NOV 72 2244Z

XXHH

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BT