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15 Jan 63

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

**SUBJECT: Meeting With Consumers On Cuban Air Defense Requirements**

1. A meeting was held in the Director's Conference Room on 11 January 1963 at 1400 hours for the purpose of reviewing and up-dating consumer requirements on reporting of the Cuban Air Defense problem. The meeting was attended by representatives from DIA, Army, Navy, Air Force, State and CIA; NSA participants were

2. The following items were discussed:

a. The SAC proposal to decrease the precedence of reports accepted when an overflight sortie is in progress, or to report hostile intent and/or action.

b. The priority order in which new reports developments/events in the Air Defense operations.

(1) Air reactions to US reconnaissance flights, with real time reporting on overflights and 3 hour reports on peripheral recon flights.

(2) Cuban aircraft exiting Cuba.

(3) Location and operational status of all tactical aircraft in Cuba.

(4) Civil/military transport, identified as Soviet or Cuban, arriving or departing Cuba.

(5) AOB, proficiency of the air defense/early warning systems, degree of Soviet influence.

(6) Six-hour reports on total air mission of , with emphasis on Soviet participation and influence.

c. The proposal from COMAD to move its portion of the Joint Reconnaissance Control Center (JRCC) at Boca Chica to Montgomery Air Defense Sector (MDADS), including the AFSSO Key West and the KI-26 circuit.

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12958  
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

*RAW* date 30 Apr 98

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3. The following agreements were reached:

a. The SAC recommendation was bought by all consumers, subject to the stipulation that possible hostile intent/action toward peripheral flights be accorded the same high priority of overflights.

b. In reference to priorities, the present arrangement was agreed to, except for the following changes:

- (1) The requirement for reporting on peripheral reconnaissance flights is put on the same plane as reporting on overflights.
- (2) The requirements agreed to be in lower priority for reporting were agreed to solely on the basis of the rapidity with which they would be reported. This in no way negated or downgraded the necessity for reporting such items as USSR participation/influence, indications of Russian departure, proficiency of Cuban/Russian Air Defense systems, transport activity in or out of Cuba, and the location and status of tactical aircraft in Cuba.

c. In reference to COMAD's proposal to move to NDAS, the Navy dissented, pointing out the need to keep the KJ-26 circuit into Base Chica for COMCLANT aircraft. The Air Force explained that, by moving to NDAS, greater intercept capability could be brought to bear on any "mad dog" Cuban pilot who decides to attack the US, or to facilitate any potential defector aircraft's safe arrival in the U.S. It was pointed out that providing the type of reporting desired by COMAD would have an adverse effect on its capability to perform its mission for other consumers. DIA will advise NSA of the decision reached on the COMAD request. No further action is required by NSA at this time.

Chief,

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