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JOINT MEETING OF  
ARMY-NAVY COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE BOARD  
AND  
ARMY-NAVY COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING COMMITTEE  
15 October 1945

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SUMMARY

Action To Be Taken By Committee Members.

None.

Action To Be Taken By Secretariat:

None.

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DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE  
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS  
PANEL, E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP NO. 2004-005

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Members present

## ANCIB

Army. Maj General Clayton Bissell  
Brig. General W. Preston Corderman\*  
Captain Robert F. Packard\*

Navy: Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman  
Commodore Thomas B. Inglis  
Lieutenant John V. Connorton\*

## ANCICC

Army. Brig. General W. Preston Corderman\*  
Captain Robert F. Packard\*

Navy: Captain J. N. Wenger  
Captain P. R. Kinney  
Captain W. R. Smedberg, III  
Lieutenant J. V. Connorton\*

\*Joint membership

Also present:

GCCS: Sir Edward Travis  
Group Captain Eric M. Jones  
Mr. F. H. Hinsley

A joint meeting of ANCIB-ANCICC and representatives from GCCS was held at 1500 on 15 October 1945 in the office of Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman, Chairman, ANCIB. The meeting was called for a discussion of Anglo-American collaboration in communication intelligence.

Purpose of this Meeting.

Rear Admiral Redman introduced Sir Edward Travis, Group Captain Jones, and Mr. Hinsley, stating that the meeting had been

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called to discuss with British representatives the nature and implementation of any steps which might be taken toward future Anglo-American collaboration in communication intelligence.

Proposals Regarding Complete Anglo-American Collaboration in Communication Intelligence.

Sir Edward Travis reviewed in brief the history and development of Anglo-American collaboration in communication intelligence as initiated in 1940, and most recently extended to include collaboration on [REDACTED]. He stated that, prior to the end of the war, the British had established a unit to undertake work on [REDACTED] and that the British Chiefs of Staff had subsequently approved collaboration with the United States on this project. He felt that progress on [REDACTED] will be slow at best, but that it can be facilitated considerably by continued emphasis upon full collaboration. Feeling that such Anglo-American collaboration as has existed in the various branches of communication intelligence has been beneficial to both parties, he urged that complete collaboration in all branches of communication intelligence be carefully considered for the future. He felt that this would be particularly desirable from the technical point of view. Prior to this visit to the United States, approval had been secured from the British Chiefs of Staff to discuss and implement complete Anglo-American collaboration in communication intelligence. Defining the most desirable type of collaboration to be achieved as a "partnership," he stressed the fact that the field of communication intelligence is not readily adaptable to the separation of its several branches and that any cooperative effort will be severely weakened by any limitations to full collaboration. He recommended that complete partnership with mutual access to work in all branches of communication intelligence and on all tasks be accepted as a basic principle for cooperation. He indicated that there might be specific tasks regarded by either party as purely "domestic" problems and that such tasks might wisely be reserved as exceptions to the partnership. However, such exceptions must be mutually agreed upon. In answer to a query by General Bissell as to whether his directive enabled him to discuss complete Anglo-American collaboration in communication intelligence without reservation, Sir Edward Travis stated that, if there were to be any reservations, they would be "open reservations" subject to the knowledge and agreement of both parties.

E.O. 12958, as amended  
Section 3.3(b)1, (b)(3), and (b)(6)

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General Bissell requested the views of Sir Edward Travis as to what conditions, if any, might control the termination of an Agreement such as he had proposed. Sir Edward Travis stated that such an Agreement could not be so concluded as to be permanently binding. He was in agreement with the idea of General Bissell that such an Agreement should be continued only so long as it is advantageous to both parties.

Making reference to Sir Edward Travis' mention of "domestic" problems which might constitute exceptions to an over-all Agreement, General Bissell asked that such problems be more clearly defined. Sir Edward Travis cited as possible examples of such exceptions problems which might develop relative to [REDACTED] and would therefore be purely British matters or problems relative to the Philippines which would be the unique concern of the United States. It was his feeling that no such exceptions should be considered to be in effect at the present time and that, if considered advisable, they should be raised independently by either party when necessary. Problems involving third parties or matters not uniquely British or American could not be considered "domestic" issues and would not constitute exceptions to the over-all Agreement. General Bissell emphasized his feeling that if an agreement on over-all collaboration is reached, reservations should be held at a minimum in order not to establish such a precedent for future action. He felt that they would only weaken the principle of complete partnership and might be a source of suspicion between the parties to the Agreement. As a matter of over-all world strategy, both the British and Americans must consider all nations [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] as potential enemies subject to C.I. activity [REDACTED] In line with this policy complete cooperation and exchange must be maintained regarding all sources of C. I. information other than those directly controlled [REDACTED] Sir Edward Travis indicated complete agreement with the position taken by General Bissell.

#### U S -British Participation in the Economic Field.

Commodore Inglis raised the question as to the extent to which British and American participation in the economic field would be allowed under the proposed Agreement. Pointing out that ANCIB, representing the United States War and Navy Departments, is directly responsible only for C. I. activity in the military and naval field and is therefore limited in the extent

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to which it can project its control into the economic field, he indicated his understanding that British communication intelligence activity might extend more deeply into the economic field. The question of a balance between United States limitations and the extent of British participation in C. I. activity in the economic field must be resolved in the preparation of the over-all Agreement. As concerns this problem, Sir Edward Travis indicated that such British C. I. effort as is directed toward the [redacted] field will be part of broader efforts directed against future military and political enemies. Within the proposed Agreement active work on [redacted] ciphers should be by mutual consent only. Commodore Inglis indicated that he was primarily concerned with the dissemination of economic information from ULTRA sources. The situation of ANCIB and the relationship of United States government agencies to American [redacted] organizations is such that ANCIB could not agree to any procedure for dissemination which would make ULTRA information available to British [redacted] concerns through governmental or semigovernmental channels. Sir Edward Travis stated that American protection in this matter will be guaranteed by the fact that the proposed Agreement can be terminated by either party at any time. It is not in the nature of the partnership, as he conceives it, that one member will disseminate the result of joint efforts without the consent of the other party.

Participation of British Dominions in Proposed Agreement.

Commodore Inglis raised the question of British Dominion participation in the proposed Agreement, indicating that this problem must be thoroughly discussed and a joint policy defined prior to the conclusion of any Anglo-American collaboration Agreement. He suggested that this problem divides itself into three phases: (1) the collection and exchange of traffic; (2) control over the dissemination of the decrypted product, and (3) the extent to which the Dominions should participate in joint cryptanalytic activity. He cited Canadian activity as a case in point. Sir Edward Travis indicated that it would be necessary to consider each Dominion separately, feeling that Canada [redacted] must of necessity be included to some extent within the scope of the Agreement and that Australia should probably be included. He is not at present advised as to the likely extent of Australia participation. The Dominions must receive ULTRA information which is relative and vital to their security. Referring to Canada, he indicated that the exclusion of Canada from the proposed Agreement would be embarrassing to

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all concerned. All members present were agreed that, with proper control, Dominions should be included within the scope of the Agreement. Stating that the United States must be apprised of ULTRA dissemination to the Dominions, General Bissell asked Sir Edward Travis whether the British would expect to provide ULTRA information to those Dominions and/or colonies and mandates which might be used as bases for intercept activity. In reply, Sir Edward Travis indicated that colonies and mandates within the British Empire would not be provided ULTRA information in return for the use of their areas as intercept bases. The only ULTRA information to be disseminated within these areas will be that which is of immediate tactical importance. Such dissemination will be made only to local military commanders under complete British control. General Bissell was in agreement with this policy as expressed.

Dissemination of ULTRA Information.

Admiral Redman raised the question of the extent to which ULTRA information will be distributed throughout the British Empire, placing particular emphasis upon procedures established for the administrative handling of this distribution. It was his feeling that it will be difficult to place any specific limitation on the extent of technical work within or between the military, naval, [REDACTED] fields. Control over security and the extent of C. I. activity will of necessity be effected through control of dissemination. Inasmuch as both British and United States ULTRA dissemination will be largely interrelated, he felt that this question must be thoroughly discussed and included within the scope of the proposed Agreement. Sir Edward Travis stated that the British representatives have brought with them suggested changes for security regulations based on the proposition that ULTRA dissemination must be more limited and controlled in the future than has been the wartime practice.

The question of straightening out and defining liaison channels to be effected under the proposed Agreement was brought up by Captain Wenger. He was in agreement with the statement of Captain Smedberg that such tacit Agreements as had existed during the war concerning the dissemination of ULTRA information should be replaced by formal written Agreements in the future. There ensued a discussion about the various wartime situations in which ULTRA information had been provided to unauthorized recipients without the official knowledge of or exercise of satisfactory control by United States and British communication

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intelligence organizations. Mentioning various cases where the Office of Strategic Services and the Office of War Information had obtained ULTRA information in London through British channels, General Bissell indicated his feeling that this was largely due to the unstable U.S. administrative setup in Washington and abroad. To this extent he felt that the American Government should be considered responsible for these leaks and must be held responsible to exercise greater administrative control in the future. He indicated further that these situations had developed due to the pressing need for unusually broad ULTRA dissemination during the war years, a situation which would not likely exist in the future. Agreeing with Captain Wenger that future liaison channels must be limited and clearly defined, he wished to reemphasize the good faith of both parties as regards these matters in the future. Stating that ANCIB is in a position to control all dissemination of ULTRA information through United States channels, Admiral Redman asked Sir Edward Travis whether the London Sigint Board is in a position to effect such control over British dissemination. Sir Edward Travis stated that the London Sigint Board, through its complete control over the initial dissemination of ULTRA, exercises control over all ULTRA dissemination in any form.

Exchange of Collateral Information.

Captain Wenger requested the views of the British representatives and committee members as to the advisability of agreement concerning the exchange of collateral information. He defined collateral information as [REDACTED] and all other related material not derived from ULTRA itself which is useful as technical information for analysts and as allied intelligence for those engaged in the use, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence. In answer to General Bissell's query as to the extent to which the British would propose to share their ULTRA intelligence product, Sir Edward Travis indicated his feeling that the British would propose to provide the United States with the purely (factual) ULTRA product itself. Evaluation of this material is conducted by various ministries in the British Government and their product will not be completely available. He stated that he was not authorized to speak for the policy of these ministries as regards dissemination of their intelligence product nor for British naval intelligence as regards their exchange of collateral information with United States naval authorities. Such agreements must be made separately. It is his understanding that discussion between British and American

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naval authorities concerning such exchange has already been initiated. He further pointed out that a good deal of the most useful collateral information cannot be shared, citing as an example of such the collateral information picked up through United States and British [REDACTED] channels. It was his feeling that the proposed Agreement should not include provisions for the complete exchange of collateral information. All members present were in agreement with his views.

Exchange of [REDACTED] Traffic.

General Corderman asked Sir Edward Travis about the extent to which the British would propose to exchange [REDACTED] traffic. Sir Edward Travis stated that he had contemplated a complete exchange, indicating that he was aware of the United States' position as regards its ability to guarantee the continued procurement of such traffic.

The Security of Sources of Communication Intelligence as Affected by the Congressional Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Incident.

Stating that he was anxious for the British to be fully apprised of procedures being followed by the Navy to protect the sources of communication intelligence involved in the Pearl Harbor investigation, Captain Smedberg outlined the present naval policy on this matter. The Navy is making all necessary ULTRA materials available to the legal Counsel of the Congressional Investigating Committee. The Counsel has been briefed as to the nature of this material and the importance of preserving its security. He has indicated that he will take all possible steps to prevent the disclosure of the sources of this material. Captain Smedberg stated that every possible effort is being made by the Navy Department to protect our C. I. activities.

Procedures to Implement Discussion of the Proposed Agreement.

Admiral Redman closed the discussion by proposing that ANCICC be directed to prepare a draft Agreement for study and approval by ANCIB. He stated that the draft should be in sufficient detail and affirmed the statement of General Bissell directing that any problems of a policy nature should be promptly referred to ANCIB. In answer to General Corderman's question as to whether ANCICC should prepare its draft proposal on the premise of complete Anglo-American collaboration in communication intelligence

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activities, he stated that complete coordination is the general policy of ANCIB. Sir Edward Travis requested that the British representatives be allowed to participate in the drafting of the proposed Agreement, and it was arranged that Mr. Hinsley would prepare a draft to be presented for discussion at a joint meeting of ANCICC and British representatives to be held the following day.

Adjournment.

There being no further business to discuss, the meeting was adjourned.

John V. Connorton  
Robert F. Packard  
Secretariat, ANCIB-ANCICC

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