APPENDIX P

COMINT RELATIONS WITH THIRD PARTIES

AFFECTING BRUSA RELATIONSHIPS

I

BASIC PRINCIPLES GOVERNING ANY COMINT ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MAY BE MADE WITH THIRD PARTIES OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF ALLIED COMMANDS

1. For purposes of this Appendix, arrangements with Third Parties are defined as only those which are negotiated with Third Party Governments or COMINT authorities negotiating on an official basis. The products of these arrangements should be completely exchangeable.

2. Either party may negotiate independently with Third Parties, subject to the provisions of this Appendix. The negotiating Party should, as far as possible, keep the other party currently informed of the progress of the negotiations.

3. Wherever and whenever security considerations permit, the U.S. and U.K. national authorities may enter into relationships with Third Party Governments or COMINT authorities with the object of obtaining:

   (a) raw traffic (including material of type or quality not readily available through BRUSA intercept facilities);
   (b) end-product and technical material which cannot readily be obtained through BRUSA facilities;
   (c) interception sites.

4. Normally, either party may, without prior consent of the other and subject only to prompt notification, arrange with any

for the purposes stated in paragraph 3 above. In this connection

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the possible security compromises involved in merely presenting requirements should be considered.+

5. Either party may conclude an agreement which involves the supply to a Third Party of:

(a) raw traffic selected in accordance with identification criteria established by the Third Party, (such selection not being retrospective), or taken on circuits using fixed call signs and/or fixed frequencies, i.e. circuits from which the provision of traffic does not disclose the solution of complex call sign and frequency system;

(b) D/F results on the transmissions involved in (a) above;

(c) D/i data (i.e. call signs, frequencies, schedules and procedures) in respect to the transmissions involved in (a) above;

(d) interception storage or guidance upon transmissions of the type involved in (a) above;

(e) general advice not revealing knowledge of specific techniques or current problems;

provided only that before implementing such an agreement, the other party is consulted on the technical problems involved, such as the stabilization of raw traffic.

/6. ...

+ 'Relocatable' equipment is defined as that equipment which is relocatable under the national policies of the country making the delivery. In general, relocatable equipment is considered to be that which either can be purchased commercially or is available through governmental sources and classified not higher than CONFIDENTIAL.
6. Before entering into exchange arrangements involving the furnishing of end-product, or of raw traffic, D/F results, technical material, or guidance beyond those specified in paragraph 5 above, each party must obtain the consent of the other. The decision to release such data will be based on a consideration of the risk factors involved and the benefit likely to accrue in the technical or intelligence fields. Due weight must be given to the technical competence of, and knowledge already available to, the Third Party.

8. In negotiations with Third Parties all possible assurances should be obtained that the Third Party will safeguard all materials received, will not make them available to any other Power, and will conceal the existence of its agreement with the U.S. or U.K. The precise terms of those assurances must be left within the discretion of the U.S. or U.K. negotiating authority according to the circumstances of each case.

9. Both parties to the BRUSL agreement will pool their knowledge of foreign COMINT organizations up to the agreed limits of exchange of collateral.

10. In negotiations with Third Parties every effort should be made to avoid disclosure of U.S./U.K. collaboration in the COMINT field. If and when the question is raised by a Third Party, admission of the extent and nature of such collaboration must be kept to a minimum and
in no case reveal collaboration exceeding the scope of the arrangement existing or under negotiation with the Third Party concerned.

II

BASIC PRINCIPLES GOVERNING ANY COMINT ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MAY BE MADE WITH THIRD PARTIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF ALLIED COMMANDS

11. The following principles will govern any arrangement which may be made with Third Parties within the framework of allied commands.

12. Prior to entering into any COMINT co-operation with Third Parties within an allied command, which may necessitate disclosure of information regarding or resulting from U.S. and U.K. COMINT activities and collaboration, specific arrangements for such co-operation will be agreed by the U.S./U.K. COMINT authorities in advance. Specific arrangements for any allied command which have a bearing on U.S./U.K. collaboration arrangements under the BRUSI agreement will be made Annexures to this Appendix.

13. Participation in an allied COMINT structure should be limited to nations

(a) contributing substantial forces to that allied command and adequate COMINT support to those forces or,

(b) capable of making a significant contribution to the U.S. and U.K. COMINT effort within the command.

14. Co-operation with Third Parties within the allied command structure should be confined within the limits necessary to meet the essential needs of the command. The release of U.S. and U.K. COMINT end-product to Third Party nationals in allied commands should be avoided if possible and in any event should only be made after agreement between U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities. If such material must be released to Third Parties, the need-to-know principle must be applied strictly and the material limited as follows:
(a) Peace Time
   (i) Traffic Intelligence needed for planning purposes provided it is effectively disguised.
   (ii) Special Intelligence only when embodied in general intelligence summaries from which no information can be traced back to COMINT.

(b) War Time
   (i) Traffic Intelligence in categories mutually agreed as releasable in undisguised form by the U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities, and other Traffic Intelligence when effectively disguised.
   (ii) Special Intelligence effectively disguised, in categories mutually agreed as releasable by the U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities.

15. As a condition of participation, there should be prior acceptance of agreed security principles based on Appendix B and similar to those given at Exhibit 2 to Annexure P1 to this Appendix and agreed by the U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities.

16. In any allied COMINT arrangements there must be no revelation that U.S./U.K. COMINT collaboration exists outside the particular command concerned, or that within the command U.S./U.K. COMINT collaboration is more extensive than that to which Third Party nations are admitted.

17. COMINT units of participating nations would be at liberty to pass COMINT available to them to their national COMINT organizations and to units of other participating nations but not to units or nationals of non-participating nations.
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TO BE HANDLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH lllSIG

19 March 1953

APPENDIX P
ANNEXURE P1
COMINT ARRANGEMENTS FOR SACHER

II. GENERAL

1. The following principles affecting the COMINT arrangements for SACHER apply to planning for wartime except insofar as provision is made in paragraphs 26 - 29 below for additional peacetime co-operation. They will be the basis on which the U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities will negotiate with SACHER and on which subsequent negotiations with Third Party nations should be conducted. Any alterations of principle which may become necessary as the result of those negotiations will be agreed between the U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities and appropriate amendment made herein.

2. In order that the arrangements contained herein may be effective on the outbreak of war, it will be necessary to initiate planning in peacetime with the Third Party nations concerned. This planning activity should begin as soon as possible.

3. In order to promote the greatest possible readiness for war, it may be necessary to extend this peacetime co-operation beyond the stage of planning. The decision when to enter upon this second stage will be taken by the U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities at some later date in the light of the then prevailing international situation and of the experience gained in the course of co-operation with Third Party nations on COMINT planning.

NOTE: Pertinent definitions for the purposes of this paper are given at Exhibit 1 hereto.
II. DETAILED PROPOSALS

SACEUR Y STRUCTURE

4. The SACEUR Y Structure should have the following elements:
   
   (a) a senior Y officer at SHAPE (SACEUR Y officer) assisted by a Y staff;
   
   (b) Y staffs, where required at headquarters of major subordinate force commanders under SACEUR;
   
   (c) National armed forces Y units provided specifically for direct support of their own national forces operating under SACEUR.

5. The responsibility for formulating and implementing SACEUR's Y policy should lie with C. of S. (II), SHAPE.

PARTICIPATION IN SACEUR Y STRUCTURE

6. Participation in the SACEUR Y Structure, including Y staffs, should be open to all nations contributing to SACEUR command, as a normal minimal combat forces equivalent to a U.S. or British Corps, together with Y units adequate for their direct support, provided that these nations undertake to enforce appropriate security measures as set forth in Exhibit 2 hereto, and also undertake to apply the principles set forth therein, as a minimum, to all other COMINT activities under their control.

7. Each participating nation should provide and maintain the Y units needed for the direct support of its forces under SACEUR and should ensure their operational efficiency.
FUNDIONS OF THE SHAPE Y STAFF

8. The functions of the SHAPE Y Staff under A.0. of S.1 (I) should include:

(a) effecting any necessary general co-ordination of the SHAPE Y effort;

(b) establishing as far as national differences permit uniform operational procedures between Y units of different nations;

(c) giving technical advice as required to the SHAPE Intelligence Staff on the interpretation of Y information received by SHAPE, and arranging for the SHAPE Intelligence Staff to receive all the Y information available in the SACHER Command which may be of value to it;

(d) formulating and supervising compliance with security regulations and policies governing the production, handling and dissemination of Y material within the SACHER Command in accordance with the agreed security principles in Exhibit 2 hereto;

(e) arranging for Y units to receive such technical material and end-product, whether produced in the SACHER Command or received from national sources, as may be necessary for efficient conduct of their operations;

(f) co-ordinating arrangements for the exchange of traffic between Y units within the SACHER Y Structure and for the flow of traffic from Y units in that structure to national COMINT authorities as required.
(g) arranging for material of technical COMINT interest, including prisoner of war interrogations, prisoner of war reports, and captured documents and equipment to be made immediately available as appropriate to the elements of the SICHER Y Structure and to national COMINT authorities;

(h) establishing and stating to the appropriate authorities requirements for such special communications and crypto-channels as may be necessary to meet the operational and security requirements of the Y effort within the SICHER command.

FUNCTIONS OF Y STAFFS AT SUBORDINATE COMMANDS

9. Y staffs at subordinate commands should perform functions corresponding to those of the Y staff at SHAPE.

FUNCTIONS OF Y UNITS

10. The main task of a Y unit should be to serve its own command or formation with information of immediate value about forces directly opposing that command or formation.

11. When necessary a Y unit may support a command or formation of a different participating nation. Any arrangements for such support or any combination of Y units of one nationality with those of another nationality will be subject to agreement of the military commanders of the forces for whose support the units were provided, or of the cognizant national COMINT authority if required.
COINT UNITS IN THE SACHER ARE NOT ENGAGED IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF FORCES UNDER SACHER

12. Each nation with forces serving under SACHER may individually arrange with the authorities concerned to operate in the theatre national COINT units not provided specifically or exclusively for direct support of the forces under SACHER. These units will not operate as part of the SACHER Y Structure and will not be subject to the arrangements for inter-allied co-operation.

13. The U.S. and the U.K. will maintain an operational separation and, insofar as practicable, a physical separation between the Y units and their national COINT units.

14. It is recognized that certain COINT units at the higher levels (e.g., Army Group) would be directly supporting both SACHER and their national COINT organizations. Each participating nation would have discretion about such matters as the right of access of other nations to these units.

CO-OPERATION WITH THIRD PARTIES WITHIN SACHER Y STRUCTURE

15. Co-operation with Third Parties within the SACHER Y Structure should be confined within the limits necessary to meet the essential Y needs of the armed Forces contributed by them to SACHER and must not reveal that there is COINT collaboration between the U.S. and U.K. outside the sphere of Y. Within the limits agreed for the release of COINT material produced by U.S. and U.K. organizations (see paragraphs 20 and 21 below), co-operation with Third Parties should be wholehearted.
16. The channels for the provision of technical assistance to Third Parties from U.S./U.K. national COMINT sources should be via the highest levels of U.S. and U.K. Theatre COMINT organizations or via the SHAPE Y staff whichever is more appropriate in individual cases.

17. In so far as consistent with the agreed limits for the release of U.S. and U.K. COMINT, and in order to secure the necessary degree of uniformity, Third Parties should be persuaded to adopt certain common operational procedures (e.g., those parts of the SHREX notation system used by the U.S. and U.K. Y units supporting forces under SACEUR).

**APPENDIX P**

**ANNEXURE P** (continued)

**16.** The channels for the provision of technical assistance to Third Parties from U.S./U.K. national COMINT sources should be via the highest levels of U.S. and U.K. Theatre COMINT organizations or via the SHAPE Y staff whichever is more appropriate in individual cases.

**17.** In so far as consistent with the agreed limits for the release of U.S. and U.K. COMINT, and in order to secure the necessary degree of uniformity, Third Parties should be persuaded to adopt certain common operational procedures (e.g., those parts of the SHREX notation system used by the U.S. and U.K. Y units supporting forces under SACEUR).

**18.** The Y units and Y staffs of the participating nations would be at liberty to pass to their own national COMINT organizations and to other participating nations, but to those nations only, the technical material and traffic produced or received by themselves. The national COMINT organizations of the participating nations should in turn provide such technical support both to their own Y units and through the SHAPE Y staff to the Y units of other participating nations as they may consider would be appropriate and of assistance to the Y effort under SACEUR. Such material shall be handled in accordance with the regulations in Exhibit 2 hereto.

**EXCHANGE OF INTERNALLY PRODUCED COMINT END-PRODUCT BETWEEN SACEUR AND OTHER SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDERS**

**19.** Exchange with other major Commanders of NATO of internally produced COMINT end-product and appreciations should be as agreed be-
the Supreme Allied Commanders concerned and should be confined to
the highest levels practicable. Such exchange should take place in
a secure cryptographic channel provided exclusively for that purpose.
As a condition of such exchange, the security principles set forth in
Exhibit 2 hereto shall be applied as a minimum for the handling of the
material in the Commands concerned.

RELEASE OF TRAFFIC INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED BY U.S. AND U.K. ORGANIZATIONS

20. The release to Third Parties in the SACEUR Command of Traffic
Intelligence produced by U.S. and U.K. organizations will, within the
limitations of the need-to-know and the provisions of Exhibits 2 and 3
hereto, be subject to the following conditions:

(a) First (releasable) Category

Class I

This consists of Y material, both end-product and technical
material, produced by U.S. and U.K. Y units, and material
of the same kind and supplementary to it produced by U.S.
and U.K. COMINT organizations. This class will normally
be released automatically in wartime but the decision to
commence automatic release of this class will be subject
to mutual agreement between the cognizant U.S. and U.K.
COMINT authorities. All or any part of this material
will be withheld at any time by both parties if either
party declares that release would be hazardous to its
national interests.
Class II
This consists of COMINT material, both end-product and technical material which, although produced by a U.S. or U.K. COMINT organization other than a Y unit, would be capable of production by Y units, and which, if passed to a Y unit, would enable that unit to achieve a significantly higher degree of exploitation of its normal tasks. Both U.S. and U.K. national COMINT authorities must be in agreement before material in this class may be released. They will continuously review the class and maintain agreed lists of the material included in it.

(b) Second (Non-releasable) Category
This consists of the remainder of Traffic Intelligence not included above. It may not be released to Third Parties except as indicated in Exhibit 3 hereto.

RELEASE OF SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
21. Special Intelligence will only be released to Third Parties in the SICHER Corress in accordance with the provisions of Exhibit 3 hereto.

PRINCIPLES FOR HANDLING WITH COMINT END-PRODUCT INTRODUCED INTO ALLIED CHANNELS BY THIRD PARTIES
22. COMINT end-product introduced by Third Parties into Allied Intelligence channels will be handled in accordance with paragraphs 20 and 21 of Exhibit 2 hereto.
CO-OPERATION IN PLANNING OF VERTICAL Y STRUCTURE

23. It is agreed that co-operation with Third Parties in planning the wartime structure should begin in peacetime and as soon as possible, and that there should be step-by-step implementation of the SACEUR Y programme in consonance with satisfactory testing of each successive step. It is considered advantageous to establish relations with one Third Party nation at a time until all those considered eligible are included. Before making any proposals to individual Third Party nations which may necessitate the disclosure of information regarding U.S. or U.K. plans for Y, SACEUR should seek the concurrence of the U.S. or U.K. COMINT authorities.

24. In any approach to Third Parties within the SACEUR Command with regard to the planning of a wartime Y structure the following principles should apply:

(a) There must be no disclosure to Third Parties of any U.S./U.K. COMINT collaboration outside the SACEUR Command, and co-operation in planning should be conducted without revealing present U.S. and U.K. COMINT successes or the scale and nature of their present and planned COMINT effort.

(b) As a condition of co-operation in planning the SACEUR Y Structure Third Party nations must accept and adhere to minimum security regulations governing the production and handling of Y material.
ANNEXURE P (continued)

(c) Knowledge of the details of the planning of the SACEUR Y Structure must be restricted to nationals of those nations taking part in that planning.

25. The planning and negotiations in any approach should be done by the SACEUR Y officer, assisted by such officers of the U.S. and U.K. services concerned as it may prove necessary to appoint. He and his staff should establish, within the framework of the agreed wartime arrangements, a skeleton organization and communications network designed to ensure the orderly expansion and effective operation of the Y structure on the outbreak of war. They should also develop such common or similar procedures as may be desirable and practicable.

26. In order to carry out his planning task, and in order to advise Third Party nations, the SACEUR Y officer should be provided with pertinent information on the subjects listed below. The nations concerned should each designate the authority with whom he may communicate on those and other Y matters.

Types of Y units
Number of units planned
Administration
Basic operational organization
Manpower complements (by function)
Number of intercept positions
(in broad categories, e.g. HF Voice, D/F)
Frequency ranges of intercept equipment
Communications equipment of Y units
LIMITS OF PEACE-TIME CO-OPERATION BEYOND PLANNING THE WARTIME STRUCTURE

27. As planning of the wartime structure proceeds, it may become necessary to undertake further peacetime co-operation with Third Party nations contributing forces to SICHER in order to ensure the greatest possible readiness for war.

28. The first phase of this further co-operation will consist of a limited exchange with Third Party nations of traffic and technical material. The material provided by U.S. and British COMINT authorities will consist of selected traffic and technical data designed to assist Third Party nations to train Y and Intelligence personnel for eventual service with forces under SICHER. The commencement of this phase will be subject to the agreement of the U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities and the provision of the material may be progressively expanded, within the following limitations, as specifically agreed by U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities in each case and in the following order:

(a) Raw traffic selected in accordance with identification criteria known to be available to the Third Party.

(b) Raw traffic selected in accordance with identification criteria not known to be available to the Third Party, and not involving revelation of more than low grade technical success.

(c) Results of traffic analysis and plain text not involving solution of complex callsign or procedure systems.

29. As a second phase and depending upon developments in the international situation, co-operation may later be extended by agreement of the U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities within the limits agreed for war.
co-operation. This second phase will be designed to cover actual needs which will by then have become apparent. It will be conditioned by the greater knowledge of Third Party activities and of the security risks involved which will have been acquired during the earlier stages of peacetime co-operation.

30. COMINT dissemination to Third Parties in peacetime, beyond that provided for above, will be governed by the principles and regulations contained in Exhibit 3 hereto, and will commence on a date to be agreed by the U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities and SACEUR.
DEFINITIONS

1. COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE (COMINT): Intelligence information and technical material resulting from the interception and study of telecommunications. (COMINT includes Y, q.v.)

2. END-PRODUCT: Intelligence information produced by COMINT activities.

3. PARTICIPATING NATIONS: Nations contributing Y activities to the SICHER Y structure and entitled to receive the results of the COMINT arrangements for SICHER in accordance with agreed conditions.

4. PROCESSING: The action required to produce COMINT from traffic.

5. RAW TRAFFIC: Traffic showing no evidence of processing for COMINT purposes.

6. SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE: That COMINT which results from:
   (a) The decryption of texts in whole or in part except as provided in paragraph 11(b) below;
   
   (c) The decryption of call signs or message headings encrypted in codes or ciphers of high security gradings as may be specified by USCIB and LSIB; or
   
   (d) The interception of certain types of transmission as may be specified by USCIB and LSIB;
(a) Certain categories of plain texts, as agreed by USCB and LSIB.

7. TECHNICAL MATERIAL: Data concerning cryptographic systems, communications procedures and methods of target countries and related information.

8. THIRD PARTIES: All individuals or authorities other than those of the United States, the British Empire, and the British Dominions.

9. TRAFFIC: Interception telecommunications activity (including messages, chatter, procedure, etc.).

10. TRAFFIC ANALYSIS: Study of communications networks, procedure signals, callsigns, D/F bearings and other technical aids to produce information by all means short of actual decoding or decrypting of the text of intercepted communications.

11. TRAFFIC INTELLIGENCE: That COMINT which results from:

(a) The study of procedure signals, call-signs, message headings, D/F bearings and other externals of communications, except the decryption of callsigns or message headings encrypted in codes or ciphers of high security grading as may be specified by USCB and LSIB;

(b) The decryption of the whole or parts of communications in codes or ciphers of such low security grading that they are specifically classed as Traffic Intelligence by USCB and LSIB.
12. **WAR**TIME

A period of actual hostilities involving SACEUR's command.

13. **COM**INT

which mobile field units can derive from the timely processing of traffic procured by them by listening to enemy communications for the purpose of providing intelligence for the commanders of the forces which they are directly supporting.

14. **Y UNITS**

Mobile military field units exclusively engaged in Y activity.

*Definitions marked with an asterisk will require modification or omission before being used by the Y Staff Officer in discussing arrangements with non-U.S./U.K. parties.*
PRINCIPLES FOR THE HANDLING OF Y

INTRODUCTION

1. These principles shall be the basis in peace and war of all security regulations and policies governing the production, handling and dissemination of Y.

DEFINITION

2. Y is Communication Intelligence which mobile field units can derive from the timely processing of traffic procured by them by listening to enemy communications for the purpose of providing intelligence for the commanders of the forces which they are directly supporting. It includes raw traffic, end-product, technical material, working documents and captured material used in its production. It also includes intelligence reports, appreciations and summaries based on Y unless the information is so generalized that it cannot be traced back to a particular item of Y or to Y in general.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION

3. Nations participating in the SACEUR Y effort must, as a condition of participation, agree to accept and adhere to these regulations.

4. Each country participating in the SACEUR Y effort will designate a national authority to deal with all questions of Y security and enforce these regulations.

5. Each national authority will designate a Y Security Officer to whom Y materials and communications relating thereto shall be addressed.

6. SACEUR will formulate and supervise compliance with security regulations and policies for Y within the SACEUR command.
7. Before an individual in any capacity has access to the knowledge or results of the SACHER Y effort, he must be screened and cleared as being of unquestioned loyalty by his national authority. The screening must be as thorough as possible and at least as thorough as that given to individuals having access to COSMIC information. In addition to such clearance, each individual serving under SACHER command must be specifically nominated to receive Y either by SACHER or by the concerned national authority. In the latter case the nomination must be approved by SACHER. In exceptional circumstances under operational conditions the above requirements for screening, clearance and nomination may be waived for those individuals appointed to certain key posts, a list of which should be drawn up by SACHER. Such personnel may be given access to Y upon the authority of the appropriate commander.

8. Prior to being given access to Y, each individual will be Y indoctrinated by a special warning on the sensitivity of Y sources to compromise and be required to sign a document drawing attention to his special responsibility for safeguarding Y and to the consequences which the law or administrative or executive order of his country, or order of SACHER, provides, if either by intent or negligence he allows Y to come to the notice of unauthorized persons. It must be stressed that there is no time limit in that the information must be safeguarded indefinitely.

9. Distribution of Y must be on the need-to-know principle, i.e., each item of Y shall be made known only to those Y indoctrinated individuals who require it in the performance of their duties. SACHER will maintain control lists of indoctrinated Y recipients in forces under his command other than those engaged in the production of Communication Intelligence.
He will ensure that the number is kept to the minimum consistent with essential intelligence and operational needs. National authorities will maintain similar lists of their own nationals and apply similar restrictions.

10. Y indoctrinees must not be allowed to run a greater risk of capture or interrogation by enemies or potential enemies than is absolutely necessary for the efficient performance of their duties. This must also apply to a period of six months after they have ceased to receive Y material except during active operations in cases of impelling necessity.

11. The greatest care must be taken not to betray Y success by actions based on it. Efforts should be made, if at all possible, to devise suitable cover, such as reconnaissance. The source should on no account be needlessly risked.

12. SISER will determine the level to which Y will be disseminated. Normally, in ground forces this will not be below a Corps.* In exceptional instances, where it is essential for immediate operational purposes, information based on Y may, as specifically authorized by a Y indoctrinated commander, be disseminated below the normal level to unindoctrinated individuals provided the source is not disclosed. Where possible, names, time, positions and other data identical with that from the original text must be omitted, or, if the retention of such an item or items is essential, must be carefully paraphrased. Such information.

*Note: Throughout this paper where level of command is expressed in army terms, it shall be understood to include commands in other services with equivalent requirements.

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must be passed by a secure despatch service, by a secure line or in a cipher system approved by SACHER. It must not be passed in clear by radio (including radio telephone).

13. Knowledge of the methods and scope of, and the technical material resulting from, the SACHER Y effort will be restricted to the nations of the nations which participate in the SACHER Y effort. Access to the Y end-product should, as far as possible, be similarly restricted.

CLASSIFICATION AND PROCEDURES:

14. All Y resulting from the SACHER Y effort will be classified SECRET and designated by a codeword (except as provided in paragraph 19 below). The classification and the codeword shall appear on every sheet of paper which contains or discloses the existence of Y, except that, at the discretion of the unit commander, this provision need not be applied to purely working documents within a Y unit. The codeword indicates that the material must be handled in accordance with these principles, and used in its meaning, the codeword for Y will also bear the classification SECRET. The codeword and its implication shall not be made known to persons not indoctrinated in Y nor shall it be used in its codeword sense in the presence of such persons.

15. In peacetime, if Y documents are to be transmitted by bag within SACHER's Command, the route and procedure must be specially authorized by SACHER having regard to the adequacy of the security of the route and procedure. Documents should be double-wrapped and addressed to a Y indoctrinated officer (by name, not function); the
inner envelope should bear the appropriate security classification but not the codeword. In wartime, discretion will be left to the local commander to make the most secure arrangements possible. As a minimum, documents must be sent by hand of officer or by a secure despatch service.

16. If Y is transmitted within SACER's command by electrical means or by any physical means not completely secure, a secure cryptographic channel reserved exclusively for this requirement must be used. Participating nations must additionally ensure that when Y is similarly transmitted into, out of, or externally to the SACER command the cryptographic system or systems specially provided are used exclusively.

17. The highest standard of physical security must be applied to the custody of Y by national authorities and within SACER's command. Normally, except when in transit under conditions prescribed herein, Y materials and communications relating thereto must at all times be:

(a) under the direct surveillance of a Y indoctrinated person responsible for their safe-keeping, or

(b) looked in a three-combination safe accessible only to Y indoctrinated personnel, or

(c) stored in a locked compartment which is under constant surveillance by an armed sentry and which is accessible only to Y indoctrinated personnel.

18. Y documents must be destroyed as soon as they have ceased to be of use. This is particularly important in field conditions where destruction must be by fire.
19. In order that necessary operational use can be made of certain types of low-level tactical Y (such as D/F bearings and plain text messages) on which immediate action must obviously be taken in combat operations, SICHEUR may prescribe less stringent security regulations which will permit the dissemination of such Y, without a codeword and at a classification not below Confidential, to uninstructed recipients who need to know.

20. COMINT end-product or intelligence based on COMINT introduced into Allied intelligence channels by Third Parties participating in the Y-structure of the command should be handled in Y-channels and subjected to the security measures prescribed for handling Y. Where such Third Party COMINT is furnished by a participating National COMINT authority or organization and is of a higher grade than Y material produced within the Y-structure or than the COMINT supplied to the Y-organization by U.S./U.K. COMINT authorities, it will be passed through Y-channels and its distribution will be kept to a minimum.

21. COMINT end-product or intelligence based on COMINT introduced into Allied intelligence channels by Third Parties not participating in the Y-structure of the command should, whenever possible, be transferred to Y-channels at the first point at which such end-product or intelligence come to the attention of Y personnel, and from that point transmitted directly to the Supreme Allied Commander's Y Officer. Care should be taken not to compromise the existence of Y-channels as such. The Supreme Allied Commander's Y Officer should bring any such material to the attention of the D of S (I) for decision as to further action or dissemination.
In deciding on such further action or dissemination the IC of S (I) will give full consideration to the need to protect COMINT.

22. National authorities and SACEUR must expand these principles into a set of regulations adapted to local conditions. Copies of the Y security regulations of each national authority will be forwarded to SACEUR through Y channels.
APPENDIX P

Annexure P1

EXHIBIT 3

RELEASE OF U.S. AND U.K. COMINT END-PRODUCT TO THIRD
PARTY NATIONALS IN SECURED COMMANDS IN PEACE

AND WAR

I. PEACE TIME

TRAFFIC INTELLIGENCE

1. (a) Traffic Intelligence (as currently defined by USCEI
and LSIB) may be passed in peacetime to Third Party
nationals in SHAEF on a need-to-know basis for
planning purposes under the conditions set forth
below.

(b) When passed to Third Party nationals, Traffic
Intelligence must be disguised effectively, in such
a way as not to be attributable in whole or in part
to COMINT, and must be ascribed in precise and
positive terms to another source chosen for its
plausibility. The disguise will include as a
minimum:

(i) removing inessentials;

(ii) paraphrasing any remaining text, numbers and
times being rounded off and, whenever possible,
approximations being substituted for precise

(c) Indoctrinated U.S. or British recipients or undisguised
Traffic Intelligence in each Staff Division in SHAEF
will recommend to A.C. of S. (I) SHAEF which Traffic--
Intelligence should be disseminated for planning
purposes to Third Party nationals. A.C. of S. (I)
will refer each case to the cognizant U.S. or U.K. national authority which originated the Traffic Intelligence (or whose COMINT units did so), asking for clearance to pass this particular Traffic Intelligence to Third Party nationals and forwarding a copy of the disguised form in which it is proposed to disseminate the information together with the proposed distribution, or requesting that it be furnished to him in disguised form.

(d) Disguised Traffic Intelligence will not carry the Traffic Intelligence codeword. When it has been disguised, and when the source to which it is to be attributed has been chosen, it will carry the security grading appropriate to that source and will normally be disseminated and handled in the manner customary for that source. Where it is considered that disguise may not be fully effective and that the intelligence should not be withheld, it shall be given special handling through S.S.O./G.C.U. channels in accordance with the following provisions:

the disguised Traffic Intelligence must be shown to designated Third Party nationals by the G2 or Chief Intelligence Officer or by an indoctrinated U.S. or British officer on the Staff, in order not to draw attention to the function of the S.S.O./G.C.U.; copies should not be passed to Third Party nationals for retention by them.

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE

2. Special Intelligence items as such will not be disseminated to Third Party nationals in peacetime in any form; however information derived from such Intelligence may be disseminated to Third Parties
SHAPE if it can be embodied in general intelligence summaries in such a manner as to ensure that the information cannot be traced back to COMINT in general or any specific item of COMINT. A.C. of S. (I) should inform the cognizant U.S. and U.K. national authorities of any Special Intelligence he considers should be made available, and they will make every effort to make it available in this form.

CO-ORDINATION

3. The U.S. and U.K. national authorities will ensure that each is informed of any action taken by the other under the above provisions, and material may be excluded from these arrangements at the request of either authority. The U.S. and U.K. national authorities will keep these arrangements under review.

II. PARTIES

TRAFFIC INTELLIGENCE

4. (a) Traffic Intelligence, as such, whether produced within SACHER's Command or received from U.S. or U.K. national authorities, will only be disseminated to Third Parties if it falls into the first (releasable) category as defined in paragraph 20 of "COMINT ARRANGEMENTS FOR SACHER".

(b) Dissemination of such Traffic Intelligence to Third Parties shall be by whichever of the following channels is appropriate:

(i) via S.S.C./G.C.U. channels;
(ii) in the case of commands which contain no integrated U.S./British personnel, from the appropriate inter-allied SACHER command;
(iii) from a U.S. or U.K. Y unit or COMINT unit direct to the integrated SACHER command or formation which it supports.
(a) Second Category Traffic Intelligence (see paragraph 20 of COMINT ARRANGEMENTS FOR SACEUR) shall not be disseminated as Traffic Intelligence to Third Party nationals in inter-allied SACEUR commands but may be disseminated, when necessary, in accordance with the regulations set forth below for the dissemination of Special Intelligence.

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE

5. (a) For purposes of wartime dissemination to Third Party nationals in inter-allied SACEUR Commands, Special Intelligence will be divided into two categories:
   (i) conditionally releasable (disguised),
   (ii) unreleasable.

(b) The U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities will currently maintain an agreed list of the material in both categories.

CONDITIONALLY releasable (disguised) SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE

6. (a) Disguised Special Intelligence will be passed initially only to commands which contain an integrated U.S. or British element, but the U.S. and U.K. national COMINT authorities will review the situation in the light of later circumstances. Under the conditions set forth below disguised Special Intelligence will be passed in wartime to inter-allied SACEUR Commands which include U.S. and British elements down to Army level for ground forces* on a strict need-to-know basis through the S.S.O./G.O.U. system.

*Note: Throughout this paper where level of command is expressed in army terms, it shall be understood to include commands in other services with equivalent requirements.
(b) Except as provided for in paragraph 8(a) below, disguised Special Intelligence may only be disseminated to Third Party nationals in such a way as not to be attributable in whole or in part to COMINT. Disguising shall include as a minimum:

(i) removing inessentials;

(ii) paraphrasing the remaining text, numbers and times being rounded off and, whenever possible, approximations being substituted for precise statements;

(iii) ascribing the item in precise and positive terms to another source which is chosen for its plausibility and which, by the special security handling arrangements normally prescribed for it, will permit retention only by U.S. or British nationals.

(a) Disguising of conditionally releasable Special Intelligence will be the responsibility of the cognizant U.S. and U.K. national authorities who will make suitable arrangements to prevent the circulation of more than one disguised version of the same item.

(d) Disguised Special Intelligence will be disseminated with a security grading appropriate to its ascribed source and handled in a manner consistent with that source. Copies of disguised Special Intelligence will not be passed to Third Parties for their retention.

(e) Disguised Special Intelligence will not carry the Special Intelligence codeword and will be the only version used for inter-allied purposes in all inter-allied AIFOR commands. The disguised version will also be made available to U.S. and U.K. national Intelligence agencies.
The undisguised versions of these items will also be passed to the S.S.O./G.C.U. They will carry the Special Intelligence codeword and [redacted].

Access to the disguised form must be restricted on a need-to-know basis to:

(i) officers of Third Parties holding the posts of Commander, Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff, G2, G3, G5 and Signals Officer (or their equivalents);

(ii) additional Third Party officers, nominated by JACKR on the recommendation of an appropriate high-ranking British or U.S. Officer. Such Third Party officers must be approved by name by USID and LSID, or in exceptional circumstances by one of those only.

A list of Third Party officers entitled to see disguised Special Intelligence will be maintained by the S.S.O./G.C.U. and reported back periodically to USID and LSID.

Except as provided for in the above paragraphs relevant to Third Party nationalists, disguised Special Intelligence must be given the same treatment as any other form of Special Intelligence.

EMERGENCY PROCEDURE

In exceptional instances indoctrinated U.S. or British commanders at the level of Army or higher may pass releasable Special Intelligence in operational orders or other communications to Third Party nationals.

See note on page 4.
who urgently require it for purposes of vital operational importance. Such orders or communications will be so worded that if they be captured the source could not be identified as Special Intelligence. Only essential specific items will be transmitted, and names, times positions and other data from the original texts will be paraphrased as far as possible.

6. Information from Special Intelligence essential to the SÜCHER Y effort may be disseminated by U.S./U.K. national authorities in either of two ways:

(a) if it can plausibly be represented as the result of further processing of Y material at national centres, or if it can be represented as arising from captured documents, and if there is no reason why it should not come to the knowledge of Third Parties, it will be made available, on a need-to-know basis, to Third Party as well as U.S. and British participants in the SÜCHER Y effort;

(b) if the above is not applicable, it will be passed by TOP SECRET COMINT channels to an authorized Special Intelligence Recipient addressed by name at U.S. and British Y units with a need to know; the recipient will exercise the utmost discretion when applying - if he considers it necessary to apply - the Special Intelligence information to the Y effort of his unit. Under no circumstances will material in this second category be made available to Third Party nationals.
10. It is realized that the arrangements for the routine dissemination of Special Intelligence as defined above may need revision in the light of experience and future conditions, even to the extent of indoctrinating fully a limited number of specified foreign nationals in highly responsible positions within the SICER Command.
APPENDIX P

ANNEXURE P2

COMINT ARRANGEMENTS FOR SACLANT

I. GENERAL

1. The following principles affecting the COMINT arrangements for SACLANT apply to planning for wartime except insofar as provision is made in paragraphs 26 - 28 below for additional peacetime cooperation. They will be the basis on which Canadian/U.K./U.S. COMINT authorities will negotiate with SACLANT and on which subsequent negotiations with Third Party nations should be conducted. Any alterations in principle which may become necessary as the result of these negotiations will be agreed among Canadian/U.K./U.S. COMINT authorities and appropriate amendment made herein.

2. In order that the arrangements contained herein may be effective on the outbreak of war, it will be necessary to initiate planning in peacetime with the Third Party nations concerned. This planning activity should begin as soon as possible.

3. In order to promote the greatest possible readiness for war, it may be necessary to extend this peacetime cooperation beyond the stage of planning. The decision when to enter upon this second stage will be taken by Canadian/U.K./U.S. COMINT authorities at some later date in the light of the then prevailing international situation and of the experience gained in the course of cooperation with Third Party nations on COMINT planning.

NOTE: Pertinent definitions for the purpose of this paper are given in Exhibit 1 hereto.
II. DETAILED PROPOSALS

SA/CY Y STRUCTURE

4. The SA/CY Y Structure should have the following elements:
   a. A senior Y officer at SA/CY Headquarters (SA/CY Y Officer) assisted by a Y staff,
   b. Y Officers and Y Staffs, where required, at headquarters of major subordinate Commanders under SA/CY,
   c. National Y units provided for support of SA/CY forces.

5. It is recommended that the responsibility for formulating and implementing SA/CY Y policy lie with a, c. of S. (I), SA/CY.

PARTICIPATION IN SA/CY Y STRUCTURE

6. Participation in the SA/CY Y Structure, including Y staffs, should be open to all nations contributing combat forces to SA/CY command, together with Y units adequate for their direct support, or contributing Y units for general support of the SA/CY command. It shall be a condition of participation that those nations undertake to enforce appropriate security measures as set forth in Exhibit 2 hereto, and also undertake to apply the principles set forth therein, as a minimum, to all other COMINT activities under their control. Participation in the activities of the SA/CY Y Structure should be limited to those nations whose geographical location and Y units can, in SA/CY's opinion, contribute to the overall effectiveness of the structure. Participation only in the shore-based direction finder operations will not necessarily entitle a nation or its nationals to receive other types of Y information.

7. Each participating nation should provide and maintain its own Y units contributed for the support of SA/CY, or of forces under his command, and should ensure their operational efficiency.
FUNCTIONS OF THE SAICLANT HEADQUARTERS Y STAFF

8. Within the limits of agreed cooperation, the functions of the SAICLANT Headquarters Y Officer and Staff should include:

a. Effecting any necessary general coordination of the SAICLANT Y effort;

b. Establishing as far as national differences permit uniform operational procedures between Y units of different nations;

c. Giving technical advice as required to the SAICLANT Headquarters Intelligence Staff on the interpretation of Y information received by SAICLANT Headquarters, and arranging for the SAICLANT Headquarters Intelligence Staff to receive all the Y information available in the SAICLANT Command which may be of value to it;

d. Formulating and supervising compliance with security regulations and policies governing the production, handling, and dissemination of Y material within the SAICLANT Command in accordance with the agreed security principles in Exhibit 2 hereto.

e. Arranging for Y units to receive such technical material and end-products, whether produced in the SAICLANT Command or received from national sources, as may be necessary for efficient conduct of their operations.

f. Establishing and stating to the appropriate authorities requirements for special communications and crypto-channels as necessary to meet operational and security requirements of the Y effort within SAICLANT's Command.

g. Subject to security regulations, maintaining effective liaison with other activities, such as radio warfare, which may relate to or affect the discharge of his COMINT responsibilities. (Arrangements in this paper do not include radio warfare.)
b. Arranging, within the procedures stipulated by NATO, for material of technical COMINT interest, including prisoner of war interrogations, prisoner of war reports, and captured documents and equipment to be made immediately available as appropriate to the elements of the SAOCOMINT Y Structure and to national COMINT authorities.

FUNCTIONS OF Y STAFFS AT SUBORDINATE COMMANDS

9. Y Officers and Y Staffs at subordinate commands should perform functions corresponding to those of the Y staff at SAOCOMINT Headquarters.

FUNCTIONS OF Y UNITS

10. Y units should intercept and process material and provide D/F information to meet the requirements prescribed by SAOCOMINT. Any combination of Y units of one nationality with those of another will be subject to agreement of cognizant national COMINT authorities if required.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

11. International cooperation in Y within SAOCOMINT's Command is expected to consist of:

a. Coordinated shore-based direction finder operations by national nets and stations organized and controlled as mutually agreed among the participating nations.

b. Direction finder and intercept operations in allied vessels.

c. Interception and processing by national Y units of enemy communications of tactical interest to SAOCOMINT.

d. Certain exchange and coordination with SACHER's Y structure.
COMINT UNITS IN THE SACLANT ARE NOT ENGAGED IN SUPPORT OF FORCES UNDER SACLANT

12. Each nation with forces serving under SACLANT may individually arrange to operate in SACLANT's area national COMINT units not provided specifically or exclusively for support of the forces under SACLANT. These units will not operate as part of the SACLANT Y structure, and will not be subject to the arrangements for inter-allied cooperation unless agreed by the nations providing them.

13. Canada, U.K., and U.S. will maintain an operational separation and, insofar as practicable, a physical separation between the Y units and their national COMINT units.

14. It is recognized that certain COMINT units at the higher levels would be directly supporting both SACLANT and their national COMINT organizations. Each participating nation would have discretion about such matters as the right of access of other nationals to those units.

COOPERATION WITH THIRD PARTIES WITHIN SACLANT Y STRUCTURE

15. Cooperation with Third Parties within the SACLANT Y structure should be confined within the limits necessary to meet the essential Y needs of SACLANT and the forces under his command and must not reveal that there is COMINT collaboration among Canada, U.K., and U.S. outside the sphere of Y. Within the limits agreed for the release of COMINT material produced by Canadian/U.K./U.S. organizations (see paragraphs 20 and 21 below), cooperation with Third Parties should be wholehearted.

16. The channels for the provision of technical material to Third Parties from Canadian/U.K./U.S. national COMINT sources should be via the SACLANT Y staff.
17. Insofar as consistent with the agreed limits for the release of Canadian/U.K./U.S. COMINT, and in order to secure the necessary degree of uniformity, Third Parties should be persuaded to adopt certain common operational procedures.

MOVEMENT OF Y MATERIAL BETWEEN UNITS UNDER SAIC INT AND THIRD PARTY NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

18. The Y units and Y staffs of the participating nations would be at liberty to pass to their own national COMINT organizations and to other participating nations, but to those nations only, the technical material and traffic produced or received by themselves. The national COMINT organizations of the participating nations should in turn provide such technical support both to their own Y units and through the SAIC INT Y staff to the Y units of other participating nations as they may consider would be appropriate and of assistance to the Y effort under SAIC INT.

Such material shall be handled in accordance with the regulations in Exhibit 2 hereto.

EXCHANGE OF INTERNALLY PRODUCED COMINT END-PRODUCTS BETWEEN SAIC INT AND OTHER SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDERS

19. Exchange with other major Commanders of NATO of internally produced COMINT end-products and intelligence summaries based thereon should be as agreed between the Supreme Allied Commanders concerned and should be confined to the highest levels practicable. Such exchange should take place in a secure cryptographic channel provided exclusively for such material. As a condition of such exchange, the security principles set forth in Exhibit 2 hereto shall be applied as a minimum for the handling of the material in the Commands concerned.
RELEASE OF TRAFFIC INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED BY CANADIAN/U.K./U.S. ORGANIZATIONS

20. The release to Third Parties in the SACINT Command of Traffic Intelligence produced by Canadian/U.K./U.S. organizations will, within the limitations of the need-to-know and the provisions of Exhibit 2 and 3 hereto, be subject to the following conditions:

a. First (releasable) Category

Class I

This consists of Y material, both end-products and technical material, produced by Canadian/U.K./U.S. Y units, and material of the same kind and supplementary to it produced by national Canadian/U.K./U.S. COMINT organizations. This class will normally be released automatically in wartime but the decision to commence automatic release of this class will be subject to mutual agreement among the cognizant Canadian/U.K./U.S. COMINT authorities. All or any part of this material will be withheld at any time by these parties if one party declares that release would be hazardous to its national interests.

Class II

This consists of COMINT material, both end-products and technical material which, although produced by a Canadian/U.K./U.S. COMINT organization other than a Y unit, would be capable of production by Y units, and which, if passed to a Y unit, would enable that unit to achieve a significantly higher degree of exploitation of its normal tasks.

Canadian/U.K./U.S. national COMINT authorities must be in agreement before material in this class may be released. They will continuously review the class and maintain agreed lists of the material included in it.

b. Second (Non-releasable) Category

This consists of the remainder of Traffic Intelligence not included above. It may not be released to Third Parties except as indicated in Exhibit 3 hereto.
RELEASE OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE

21. Special Intelligence will only be released to Third Parties in the SAOCENT Command in accordance with the provisions of Exhibit 3 hereto.

PRINCIPLES FOR DEALING WITH COMINT END-PRODUCT INTRODUCED INTO ALLIED CHANNELS BY THIRD PARTIES

22. COMINT end-product introduced by Third Parties into Allied Intelligence channels will be handled in accordance with paragraphs 20 and 21 of Exhibit 2 hereto.

COOPERATION IN PLANNING OF WARTIME Y STRUCTURE

23. It is agreed that cooperation with Third Parties in planning the wartime structure should begin in peacetime and as soon as possible, and that there should be step-by-step implementation of the SAOCENT Y program in consonance with satisfactory testing of each successive step. It is considered advantageous to establish relations with one Third Party nation at a time until all those considered eligible are included. Before making any proposals to individual Third Party nations which may necessitate the disclosure of information regarding Canadian/U.K. or U.S. plans for Y, SAOCENT should seek the concurrence of Canadian, U.K. or U.S. COMINT authorities.

24. In any approach to Third Parties within the SAOCENT Command with regard to the planning of a wartime Y structure the following principles should apply:

a. There must be no disclosure to Third Parties of any Canadian/U.K./U.S. COMINT collaboration outside the SAOCENT Command, and cooperation in planning should be conducted without
revealing present Canadian/U.K./U.S. COMINT successes or the scale and nature of their present and planned COMINT effort.

b. As a condition of cooperation in planning the SACLANT Y structure, Third Party nations must accept and adhere to minimum security regulations governing the production and handling of Y material.

c. Knowledge of the details of the planning of the SACLANT Y structure must be restricted to nationals of those nations taking part in that planning.

25. The planning and negotiations in any approach should be done by the SACLANT Y officer, assisted by such officers of the Canadian/U.K./U.S. Services concerned as it may prove necessary to appoint. He and his staff should establish, within the framework of the agreed wartime arrangements, a skeleton organization designed to ensure the orderly expansion and effective operation of the Y structure on the outbreak of war. They should also develop such common or similar procedures as may be desirable and practicable.

26. In order to carry out his planning task, and in order to advise Third Party nations, the SACLANT Y officer should be provided with pertinent information on the subjects listed below. The nations concerned should each designate the authority with whom he may communicate on these and other Y matters:

- Types of Y units
- Number of units planned
- Administration
- Basic operational organization
- Manpower complements (by function)
Number of intercept positions
(in broad categories, e.g., H/F Voice, D/F)
Frequency ranges of intercept equipment
Communications equipment of Y units

PEACE TIME COMINT ARRANGEMENTS FOR SACLANT

27. It is recognized that in addition to the necessity to plan for wartime COMINT cooperation within SACLANT, peace time COMINT arrangements for SACLANT should be developed in order to promote readiness for wartime operations. The progressive or phased implementation of such arrangements should be accomplished, within the limits of agreed wartime cooperation, in accordance with the procedures described below.

28. The Y activities included in the SACLANT Y structure, should be organized and conducted in peace time as follows:

a. Phase I -

A SACLANT Y Officer should be appointed to begin laying the groundwork for agreed wartime arrangements, for SACLANT to obtain the results of national shore-based direction finder operations. SACLANT should keep COMINT authorities of participating nations advised of the progress of any planning or arrangements with other NATO members that affects them. Nations concerned should each designate an authority with whom the SACLANT Y Officer can communicate on direction finder matters.

b. Phase II -

When the above arrangements for shorebased direction finder operations are made, the SACLANT Y Officer should arrange for
operational drills during NATO exercises or maneuvers.+

The use of information based on D/F and shipborne intercept operations will be in accordance with the following provisions:

1. **Shorebased D/F Operations.** Fixes and the fully evaluated results of shorebased D/F operations, during NATO exercises or maneuvers, may be passed to nationals of those nations participating in the D/F operations. During the exercises, information resulting from D/F fixes may be passed to nationals of nations participating in the exercises, even though these nations do not participate in the D/F operations, when the following conditions are fulfilled:

   (1) When specifically authorized by SACLANT,
   (ii) When a real advantage to the exercise then in progress would accrue, and
   (iii) When the intelligence can be attributed to another source, or, if this is not possible, the true source is not stated.

   During post-exercise conference, shorebased D/F information or results may be disclosed to nationals of nations not participating in the D/F operations only as already disclosed in the course of the exercise. (This is not to prohibit the use, during post-exercise conferences, of intelligence or situation summaries issued to all participating units in the exercise).

2. **Shipborne D/F and Interception.** During exercises, results of shipborne D/F operations and the shipborne interception of plain text or self-evident code messages may be passed to nationals of those nations participating in the exercise. The analyzed results of shipborne D/F and interception operations may be made available in post-exercise conference without restriction.
Depending on developments in the international situation, cooperation may later be extended within the agreed limits of wartime cooperation by Canadian/U.K./U.S. agreement as actual needs develop and as increased knowledge of Third Party activities, acquired during organization and planning, provides a better basis for assessing the security risks involved.

Coordination between SACEUR and SCOLINT to ensure consonance of practices will be required.

29. The dissemination of COMINT to Third Parties in SCOLINT's Command in peacetime will be as indicated in Exhibit 3.
Annexure F2

EXHIBIT 1

DEFINITIONS

1. COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE (COMINT): Information and technical material resulting from the interception and study of telecommunications for intelligence purposes. (COMINT includes Y, q.v.)

2. COMINT END-PRODUCTS: Intelligence information produced by COMINT activities.

3. PARTICIPATING NATIONS: Nations contributing Y activities to the SACLANT Y structure and entitled to receive the results of the COMINT arrangements for SACLANT in accordance with agreed conditions.

4. PROCESSING: The action required to produce COMINT from traffic.

5. RAW TRAFFIC: Traffic showing no evidence of processing for COMINT purposes.

6. SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE: That COMINT which results from:

(a) The decryption of texts in whole or in part except as provided in paragraph 11(b) below;

(b) [Redacted]

(c) [Redacted]
(c) The decryption of callsigns or message headings encrypted in codes or ciphers of high security gradings as may be specified by CRC, LSIB, and USCIB; or

(d) The interception of certain types of transmission as may be specified by CRC, LSIB, and USCIB;

(e) Certain categories of plain texts, as agreed by CRC, LSIB, and USCIB.

7. TECHNICAL MATERIAL: Data concerning cryptographic systems, communications procedures and methods of target countries, and related information.

8. THIRD PARTIES: All individuals or authorities other than those of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

9. TRAFFIC: Intercepted telecommunications activity (including messages, chatter, procedure, etc.).

10. TRAFFIC ANALYSIS: Study of communications networks, procedure signals, callsigns, D/F bearings, and other technical aids to produce information by all means short of actual decoding or decrypting of the text of intercepted communications.

11. TRAFFIC INTELLIGENCE: That COMINT which results from:

(a) The study of procedure signals, callsigns, message headings, D/F bearings, and other
externals of communications, except the
decryption of callsigns or message headings
encrypted in codes or ciphers of high
security grading as may be specified by CRC,
LSIB, and USCIB;

(b) The decryption of the whole or parts of
communications in codes or ciphers of such low
security grading that they are specifically
classed as Traffic Intelligence by CRC, LSIB,
and USCIB;

(c) [Redacted] that they
are specifically classed as Traffic Intelligence
by CRC, LSIB, and USCIB;

(d) Certain categories of plain texts, as agreed
by CRC, LSIB, and USCIB.

12. wartime:
A period of actual hostilities involving
SIGINT's command.

13. X:
COMINT derived from the timely processing of
traffic procured by listening to enemy
communications for the purpose of providing
tactical intelligence for the commanders of
the combat forces.

14. y units:
COMINT units engaged in the production of
Y.

* Definitions marked with an asterisk will require modification or
omission before being used by the Y Staff Officer in discussing
INTRODUCTION

1. These principles shall be the basis in peace and war of all security regulations and policies governing the production, handling, and dissemination of Y.

DEFINITION

2. Y is Communication Intelligence derived from the timely processing of traffic procured by listening to enemy communications for the purpose of providing tactical intelligence for the commanders of combat forces. It includes raw traffic, end-products, technical material, working documents, and captured material used in its production. It also includes intelligence reports and summaries based on Y unless the information is so generalized that it cannot be traced back to a particular item of Y or to Y in general.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION

3. Nations participating in the SIGINT Y effort must, as a condition of participation agree to accept and adhere to these principles.

4. Each country participating in the SIGINT Y effort will designate a national authority to deal with all questions of Y security and enforce these principles.

5. Each national authority will designate a Y Security Officer to whom Y materials and communications relating thereto shall be addressed.
6. SACLANT will formulate and supervise compliance with security regulations and policies for Y within the SACLANT command.

7. Before an individual in any capacity has access to the knowledge or results of the SACLANT Y effort, he must be screened and cleared as being of unquestioned loyalty by his national authority. The screening must be as thorough as possible and at least as thorough as that given to individuals having access to COSMID information. In addition to such clearance, those individuals serving under SACLANT's command must be specifically nominated to receive Y either by SACLANT or by the concerned national authority. In the latter case the nomination must be approved by SACLANT. In exceptional circumstances under operational conditions the above requirements for screening, clearance and nomination may be waived for those individuals appointed to certain key posts, a list of which should be drawn up by SACLANT. Such personnel may be given access to Y upon the authority of the appropriate commander.

8. Prior to being given access to Y, each individual will be indoctrinated by a special warning on the sensitivity of Y sources to compromise and be required to sign a document drawing attention to his special responsibility for safeguarding Y and to the consequences which the law or administrative or executive order of his country, or order of SACLANT, provides, if either by intent or negligence he allows Y to come to the notice of unauthorized persons. It must be stressed that there is no time limit in that the information must be safeguarded indefinitely.

9. Distribution of Y must be on the need-to-know principle, i.e., each item of Y shall be made known only to those Y indoctrinated individuals who require it in the performance of their duties. SACLANT will maintain control lists of indoctrinated Y recipients in forces under

- 2 -
his command other than those engaged in the production of Communication Intelligence. He will ensure that the number is kept to the minimum consistent with essential intelligence and operational needs. National authorities will maintain similar lists of their own nationals and apply similar restrictions.

10. Y indoctrinees must not be allowed to run a greater risk of capture or interrogation by enemies or potential enemies than is absolutely necessary for the efficient performance of their duties. This must also apply to a period of six months after they have ceased to receive Y material except during active operations in cases of impelling necessity.

11. The greatest care must be taken not to betray Y success by actions based on it. Efforts should be made, if at all possible, to devise suitable cover, such as reconnaissance. The source should on no account be needlessly risked.

12. SIGINT will determine the level to which Y will be disseminated. In exceptional instances, where it is essential for immediate operational purposes, information based on Y may, as specifically authorized by a Y indoctrinated commander, be disseminated below the normal level to unindoctrinated individuals provided the source is not disclosed. Where possible, names, times, positions, and other data identical with that from the original text must be omitted, or, if the retention of such an item or items is essential, must be carefully paraphrased. Such information must be passed by a secure courier service, by a secure line, or in a cipher system approved by SIGINT. It must not be passed in clear by radio (including radio telephone).
13. Knowledge of the methods and scope of, and the technical material resulting from the SACLNT Y effort will be restricted to the nationals of the nations which participate in the SACLNT Y effort. Access to the Y end-products should, as far as possible, be similarly restricted.

14. All Y resulting from the SACLNT Y effort will be classified SECRET and designated by a codeword (except as provided in paragraph 19 below). The classification and the codeword shall appear on every sheet of paper which contains or discloses the existence of Y, except that, at the discretion of the unit commander, this provision need not be applied to purely working documents within a Y unit. The codeword indicates that the material must be handled in accordance with regulations based on these principles and when used in its codeword sense will also bear the classification SECRET. The codeword and its implication shall not be made known to persons not indoctrinated in Y nor shall it be used in its codeword sense in the presence of such persons.

15. In particular, if Y documents are to be transmitted by bag within SACLNT's Command, the route and procedure must be specially authorized by SACLNT, having regard to the adequacy of the security of the route and procedure. Documents should be double-wrapped and addressed to a Y indoctrinated officer (by name, not function); the inner envelope should bear the appropriate security classification but not the codeword. In wartime, discretion will be left to the local commander to make the most secure arrangements possible. As a minimum, documents must be sent by hand of officer or by a secure courier service.
16. Except in the exceptional instances described in Paragraph 12, if Y is transmitted within SACILANT's command by electrical means or by any physical means not completely secure, it must be encrypted in a secure cryptographic channel reserved exclusively for this requirement. Participating nations must additionally ensure that when Y is transmitted into, out of, or externally to the SACILANT command it is encrypted in a cryptographic channel specially approved by SACILANT for this purpose.

17. The highest standard of physical security must be applied to the custody of Y by national authorities and within SACILANT's command. Normally, except when in transit under conditions prescribed herein, Y materials and communications relating thereto must at all times be:

(a) under the direct surveillance of a Y indoctrinated person responsible for their safe-keeping, or
(b) locked in a three-combination safe accessible only to Y indoctrinated personnel, or
(c) stored in a locked compartment which is under constant surveillance by an armed sentry and which is accessible only to Y indoctrinated personnel.

18. Y documents must be destroyed as soon as they have ceased to be of use. This is particularly important under hazardous conditions.

19. In order that necessary operational use can be made of certain types of low-level tactical Y (such as Direction finder results and plain text messages) on which immediate action must obviously be taken in combat operations, SACILANT may permit the
dissemination of such Y, without a codeword and at a classification not below Confidential, to unindoctrinated recipients who need to know.

20. COMINT end-product or intelligence based on COMINT introduced into Allied intelligence channels by Third Parties participating in the Y-structure of the command should be handled in Y-channels and subjected to the security measures prescribed for handling Y. Where such Third Party COMINT is furnished by a participating National COMINT authority or organization and is of a higher grade than Y material produced within the Y-structure or than the COMINT supplied to the Y-organization by US/UK/Canadian COMINT authorities, it will be passed through Y-channels and its distribution will be kept to a minimum.

21. COMINT end-product or intelligence based on COMINT introduced into Allied intelligence channels by Third Parties not participating in the Y-structure of the command should, whenever possible, be transferred to Y-channels at the first point at which such end-product or intelligence come to the attention of Y personnel, and from that point transmitted directly to the Supreme Allied Commander's Y Officer. Care should be taken not to compromise the existence of Y channels as such. The Supreme Allied Commander's Y Officer should bring any such material to the attention of the AO of S(I) for decision as to further action or dissemination. In deciding on such further action or dissemination, the AO of S(I) will give full consideration to the need to protect COMINT.

22. National authorities and SLQINT must expand these principles into a set of regulations adapted to local conditions. Copies of the Y security regulations of each national authority will be forwarded to SLQINT through Y-channels.
Annexure P2
EXHIBIT 3
RELEASE OF CANADIAN/L.K./U.S. COMINT END-
PRODUCTS TO THIRD PARTY NATIONALS IN SAACLNT COMMANDS
IN PEACE AND WAR
I. PEACE TIME

TRAFFIC INTELLIGENCE

1a. Traffic Intelligence (as currently defined by CRO, LSIB, and USCIB) may be passed in peacetime to Third Party nationals in SAACLNT's Headquarters on a need-to-know basis for planning purposes under the conditions set forth below.

b. When passed to Third Party nationals, Traffic Intelligence must be disguised effectively, in such a way as not to be attributable in whole or in part to COMINT, and must be ascribed in precise and positive terms to another source chosen for its plausibility. The disguise will include as a minimum:

   (1) removing inessentials;
   (2) paraphrasing any remaining text; rounding off numbers and times; and, whenever possible, substituting approximations for precise statements.

c. Indoctrinated Canadian/L.K./U.S. recipients of undisguised Traffic Intelligence in each Staff Division in SAACLNT Headquarters will recommend to A.O. of S(I), which Traffic Intelligence should be disseminated for planning purposes to Third Party nationals. A.O. of S(I) will refer each case to the cognizant Canadian/L.K./U.S. national
authority which originated the Traffic Intelligence (or whose COMINT units did so), asking for clearance to pass this particular Traffic Intelligence to Third Party nationals and either forwarding a copy of the disguised form in which it is proposed to disseminate the information, together with the proposed distribution, or requesting that it be furnished to him in disguised form.

d. Disguised Traffic Intelligence will not carry the Traffic Intelligence codeword. When it has been disguised, and when the source to which it is to be attributed has been chosen, it will carry the security grading appropriate to that source and will normally be disseminated and handled in the manner customary for that source. Where it is considered that disguise may not be fully effective but that the intelligence should not be withheld, it may be shown to designated Third Party nationals by the A.C. of S.(I) or Chief Intelligence Officer, or by an indoctrinated Canadian/U.K./U.S. officer on the Staff, provided that the national COMINT authority concerned has approved; copies may not be passed to Third Party nationals for retention by them.

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE

2. Special Intelligence items as such will not be disseminated to Third Party nationals in peacetime in any form; however, information derived from such intelligence may be disseminated to nationals of Third Parties in SMOLINT's Headquarters on a need-to-know basis for planning purposes if it can be embodied in general intelligence summaries in such a manner as to ensure that the information cannot be traced back to COMINT in general or any specific item of COMINT. A.C. of S.(I) should inform the cognizant
Canadian/U.K./U.S. national authorities of any Special Intelligence he considers should be made available, and they will make every effort to make it available in this form.

COORDINATION

3. Cognizant Canadian/U.K./U.S. national authorities will ensure that each is informed of any action taken by the others under the above provisions, and material may be excluded from these arrangements at the request of one of the authorities. Canadian/U.K./U.S. national authorities will keep these arrangements under review.

II. WARTIME

TRAFFIC INTELLIGENCE

4a. Direction finder results may be transmitted without a COMINT codeword, but suitably classified, to allied commanders and units who need to know. Intelligence based on or incorporating D/F results but containing no material requiring the COMINT codeword, suitably classified may also be so transmitted.

b. Traffic Intelligence, as such, received from Canadian/U.K./U.S. national authorities, will only be disseminated to nationals of Third Parties if it falls into the first (releasable) category as defined in paragraph 20 of "COMINT ARRANGEMENTS FOR SACLANT."

c. Dissemination of such Traffic Intelligence to Third Parties shall be by whichever of the following channels is appropriate:

(1) via special COMINT channels (i.e. U.S.-SSO System, U.K.-GCU System, etc)
(2) In the case of commands which contain no integrated Canadian/U.K./U.S. personnel, from the appropriate inter-allied SACLANT command;

(3) from a Canadian/U.K./U.S. Y unit or COMINT unit direct to the integrated SACLANT command or formation which it supports.

c. Second Category Traffic Intelligence (see paragraph 20 of COMINT ARRANGEMENTS FOR SACLANT) shall not be disseminated as Traffic Intelligence to Third Party nationals in inter-allied SACLANT Commands; however information derived from such traffic intelligence may be disseminated on a strict need-to-know basis to nationals of Third Parties in SACLANT's Command if it can be embodied in general intelligence summaries or operation plans and orders in such a manner as to ensure that the information cannot be traced back to COMINT in general or to any specific item of COMINT.

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE

5. Special intelligence as such may not be disseminated to any national of Third Parties in SACLANT's Command in any form except as provided in paragraph 8 below; however, information derived from special intelligence may be disseminated to nationals of Third Parties in SACLANT's Command on a strict need-to-know basis if it can be embodied in general intelligence summaries or operation plans and orders in such a manner as to ensure that the information cannot be traced back or attributed to COMINT in general or to any specific item of COMINT.
EMERGENCY PROCEDURE

6. In exceptional instances indoctrinated Canadian/U.K./U.S. commanders may pass releasable Special Intelligence in operational orders or other communications to Third Party nationals who urgently require it for purposes of vital operational importance. Such orders or communications will be so worded that if they be compromised the source could not be identified as Special Intelligence. Only essential specific items will be transmitted, and names, times, positions, and other data from the original texts will be paraphrased as far as possible.

DISSEMINATION BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THIRD PARTY ARRANGEMENTS

7. Special Intelligence will be passed to SACLANT Commands in accordance with separate arrangements for exchange and dissemination within SACLANT's Command of COMINT beyond the scope of Third Party collaboration.

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE ESSENTIAL TO THE SACLANT Y EFFORT

8. Information from Special Intelligence essential to the SACLANT Y effort may be disseminated by Canadian/U.K./U.S. national authorities in either of two ways:

a. if it can plausibly be represented as the result of further processing of Y material at national centres, or if it can be represented as arising from captured documents, and if there is no reason why it should not come to the knowledge of nationals of Third Parties, it will be made available on a need-to-know basis and appropriately classified to Third Party as well as Canadian, U.K., and U.S. participants in the SACLANT Y effort;

b. if it cannot be represented as in a, above, it will be passed by TOP SECRET COMINT channels to an authorised Special Intelligence Recipient addressed by name at Canadian, U.K., and U.S. Y units with a
need-to-know; the recipient will exercise the utmost discretion when applying—if he considers it necessary to apply—the Special Intelligence information to the Y effort of his unit. Under no circumstances will material in this second category be made available to Third party nationals.